Author: staceymeeker

  • Holding up Our End of History

    I have often referred in these Chronicles to Francis Fukuyama’s idea, first articulated in 1989, that the fall of communism represents the “end of history,” having always found that strong, Hegelian models of this kind help us to understand historical turning points better than more prudently qualified ones. But whatever interest this thesis may have had before September 11, its very complacency, which now seems of another era, tells us much about historical reality in our post-millennial world. As I noted in Chronicle 244, these events make the Cold War look like a family quarrel. The historical dialectic within the Western tradition may now be concluded, but that still leaves the rest of the world unaccounted for.

    I share Dr. Fukuyama’s admiration for liberal democracy, the social form that he considers definitive, whose inherent dynamic obliges it to generate ever more degrees of freedom in order to recycle the resentments of an ever-more-demanding population. Liberal democracy has been by far the most successful and productive mode of social organization in history. Yet its seemingly unchallengeable ability to co-opt its opposition through what Herbert Marcuse called in Orwellian language “repressive tolerance”–selling gangsta records to would-be gangsters–has been shown to have a huge window of vulnerability.

    Despite my admiration for Fukuyama’s daring thesis, it contains a central contradiction that the present events only make more apparent. To declare the historical dialectic at an end, one must make a decision as to the insignificance of the ongoing conversation. This is the equivalent, let us say, of distinguishing between the discussion in a legislature while a bill is being debated and the chatter that takes place after the vote; or, to choose an example more suited to Fukuyama’s Hegelian objectivity, between the dialogue among scientists before a problem is solved, and the continuing bavardage of pseudo-science (e.g., Thomas Hobbes’ persistent attempts to square the circle). But in the matter of history, how is this decision to be arrived at?

    The final stage of the historical dialectic may be said to have been achieved by liberal democracy because in this system, the decision-making process in both economic and political exchange is minimally constrained by power-relations. The result in each given case is, in principle, unpredictable by any individual, the product of a generalized form of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” that integrates the wisdom of all. Which is to say that the ultimate superiority of liberal democracy does not lie simply in its empirically-found capacity to produce more wealth and to give its citizens more options, but derives from the minimality of the constraint the system places on its decision-making process. Another way to put this is that the historical macrodialectic may be declared at an end only insofar as it is transformed into a microdialectic within the global market-system dominated by, and ultimately to be made up entirely of, liberal-democratic states.

    But in such a system, the decision whether to characterize the dialectic as historical or post-historical can be made only by a consensus of the participants. If one party or another refuses to participate in the global exchange-system, then it is contrary to the very rules of this system to declare that party’s dialectical position nugatory. After all, critics of Soviet communism such as Frederick Hayek denounced socialism as a sham in 1944, following a more technical argument articulated by Ludwig von Mises as early as 1922. What would then have prevented these writers from declaring the “end of history” after WWII, claiming that the apparent challenge presented by communism to the market-system was in principle nonviable?

    But the definitive proof of my point is supplied by Dr. Fukuyama himself. His article in the October 5 Wall Street Journal  defending his position is entitled History Is Still Going Our Way. Is that an affirmation one can legitimately make after the end of history?


    Far more radically than the communist-capitalist competition, focused on the creation of material prosperity–the point of Khrushchev’s near-friendly “we will bury you”–the current conflict opposes two irreconcilable conceptions of social order. And if, geopolitical questions aside, there was really no way that Soviet-style economies could have out-produced the market, the situation is much less clear in a confrontation where opposition has no such common ground. The victory of market democracy, which would consist in the demonstration of its invulnerability to terrorism, leading to the marginalization if not the complete elimination of the latter, is by no means assured.

    Clear thinking at such a moment walks a fine line. One can hardly disagree with those who use terms like “evil” to describe terrorist attacks. Those others–and they are not so few–who climb on their high horses to tell us that these actions, however horrible, are expressions of legitimate grievances and/or punishment for “our” arrogance only display their own moral obtuseness. The idea that we should pull out of the Middle East and stop supporting Israel so as to bring acts of terrorism against us to an end is not only morally bankrupt but terminally naïve. It is not some rival fanaticism of our own, but the social dynamic at work in this conflict that makes any kind of quid pro quo, let alone any negotiation–with whom?–unthinkable. We can, and should, act to mitigate the resentment that found expression in these attacks. But we must do this by positive gestures, such as those we are currently making to the people of Afghanistan, not by shaping our foreign policy to the will of the resenters.

    Yet it would be foolish to deny that, far more than the tragic utopianisms of the past century, to say nothing of the ideology of our farcical protest movement that has now turned its sights from the WTO to our anticipated “racist war,” these attacks express a coherent world-view. Moral considerations aside, neither Nazism nor communism had any real possibility of creating a viable society by eliminating “bourgeois parliamentarianism” or the bourgeois economy. In contrast, Islamicism–the term both distinguishes the terrorist ideology from Islam and recalls their intimate relationship–is the most coherent opposition to market society conceived in recent times. It has spread over the “third world” as the apocalyptic hope of the resentful masses, and even as we do our best to change the object of this hope, we must understand its logic.

    Let us compare the ideology behind September 11 with that of the terrorist attack whose body-count record it shattered. Although both radical enemies of the market system (and of the Jews who are held to embody it), Tim McVeigh and Osama bin Laden have very different visions of the good society. McVeigh’s white-supremacist dream finds its most vigorous expression in The Turner Diaries, a novel published in 1978 under a pseudonym by William Pierce, the leader of the neo-Nazi National Alliance. (I hesitate to recommend this book to my readers, but it is available on line at http://www.angelfire.com/hi/themadmoose/tdforwar.html; Francophones may prefer the French translation at http://www.natall.com/french-turner/ .) I don’t know what al-Qaeda leaders read in their spare time, but, at the novel’s climactic moment, the eponymous protagonist achieves immortal glory by deliberately crashing his airplane, armed with a nuclear bomb, into the Pentagon. After thus defeating the Jews and their henchmen in the United States, the “Organization” proceeds to realize its dream of an all-white world by wiping out the entire population of Asia. Aside from the vileness and absurdity of this dream, its substance is naively utopian; once all the “non-whites” have been eliminated, those who are left will inevitably find new ways of differing, and fighting, among themselves. The Nazi dream of Aryan community is not only repulsive but incompatible with reality.

    These same flaws cannot be found in the ideology of those who actually hit the Pentagon. No doubt their motivation was rather to strike at American power and cause us suffering than to impose their ideals on us, but the two aims are quite compatible. The destruction of the world market system that the twin towers symbolized would return us to a pre-industrial world that the Islamicists would find far less threatening than ours and where they would stand a good chance of imposing their religious views. Provided we convert to Islam, we would all have a place in this world; unlike the Nazis, Islamicists are not racially exclusionary. Nor is their social ideal unrealizable: something like it exists in many places and it has many adherents around the world. For example, the Taliban-ruled poverty of Afghanistan. No doubt, in the world of today, such a society is not really self-sustaining: the rulers cynically extort food and other supplies from efficient producers to make up for their inability to foster a viable economy. If the whole world were reduced to their level and no such supplies were available, most would die, but those remaining might well find stability in something like a Taliban-ruled existence.

    When elaborate social orders fall apart, they do not simply disintegrate. Those who call themselves “anarchists” should reflect (assuming for the sake of argument that anarchism and reflection are not incompatible) that what results from the breakdown of order is not a blissful lack of constraint but the domination of those most able to take advantage of such conditions, that is, groups of young men with guns, optionally under the direction of older leaders. In the worst cases, such as recently in Sierra Leone, these gangs of young men are driven by nothing but greed and lust. But such groups are highly unstable; they lack a principle of cohesion by which to defer the internal resentments they generate. One such principle is a caricature of Marxist ideology, such as that which binds together “leftist” guerillas in places like Colombia and (formerly) Peru, not to speak of the Khmer Rouge. But the most fundamental and powerful principle of cohesion has always been the sacred. The Taliban may be a gang of thugs, but their thuggery is in the service of Islam as they conceive it.


    Let us consider a worst-case scenario. Suppose our society were continually disrupted by terrorist attacks on power-stations, transportation systems, dams, workplaces, leisure attractions, and computer networks, perhaps even struck by “weapons of mass destruction” wielded by rogue states in league with the terrorists. At some point, arguably, our economic system would give way under the strain, our political order would break down, and warlords and gangsters would take over. A society in such a state of decomposition could no longer make use of sophisticated production techniques, let alone provide services like road maintenance or health care. We would return to something like Hobbes’ state of nature where our lives would become, if not solitary, then certainly “poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” just as are today those of a good part of the Afghan population–and of many other populations–even with foreign aid. Whether or not we all converted to Islam–homegrown fanaticisms would be more likely–the apocalyptic goal symbolized with diabolical brilliance by the destruction of the World Trade Center would be accomplished. The modern configuration of liberal democracy, consumer society, individual choice, and global exchange will have been supplanted by an impoverished pre-modern world where the only alternative to lawless violence is inflexible tyranny.

    The establishment throughout the globe of Taliban-style social order, I should make clear, would by no means signify another kind of “end of history”: conflicts would arise, even between Islamic regimes, with who knows what long-term outcome. But the destruction of the global market system would set the world back a good few hundred years, and that, in historical terms, is about as much as anyone can hope for.


    The purpose of these remarks is not to make us more fearful, but more resolute. We cannot afford either complacency or fatalism; we must realize that we may be called upon to exert ourselves in altogether new ways both to defend democratic market society and to promote it in those parts of the world that now foster, or at least cheer on, those who abominate it. We may have to endure sacrifices less punctual than the loss of even a few thousand people and far more disruptive than waiting an extra hour at an airport. As we do so, I think we can best maintain our courage by keeping our eyes fixed on the alternative.


  • GA Twenty Years After

    My first book of Generative Anthropology, The Origin of Language (TOOL), was published in 1981. At that time, there was not a great deal of literature about language origin. Everyone quoted the ban on the subject imposed in 1866 by the Société Linguistique de Paris. There were a few seekers for the Ursprache, such as Alexander Marshack and Mary Le Cron Foster; Gordon Hewes suggested that human language began with gesture (as I recall, one of his pieces of evidence was that the palm of the hand–whose visibility at a distance is essential for a gesture-language–is never darkly pigmented even among those with the darkest skin). Derek Bickerton’s Roots of Language, which uses pidgins and creoles to make the case for a universal basic syntax, also appeared in 1981.

    The originary scene in TOOL was closer to Girard’s model than more recent versions: the moment of the “aborted gesture of appropriation” that becomes the first linguistic sign was situated after rather than before the sparagmos, making deferral a consequence of mimetic violence. I made no attempt in TOOL to associate the hypothetical moment of origin with palaeontological data, and made little reference to primatology. I thought, naively as it turned out, that once the model of origin was supplied–and I was convinced I had supplied it–the empirical details could be worked out by others more familiar with the terrain.


    How have my ideas changed since 1981? I still believe not only that my model of language origin is the most parsimonious but that it alone explains the connection between language and religion–a subject virtually ignored since the days of Max Müller. But I have become less utopian concerning GA’s potential for displacing the methods and perspectives of social science. Originary thinking is of value in explaining cultural forms and ideas and as a critique of the conclusions that may be drawn from empirical research; it is neither a program for such research nor a substitute for it.

    What of the originary scene itself? In TOOL and for some time afterward, I conceived the scene as an event for which we could of course not expect to find evidence but that we could attempt to reconstruct by fleshing out our hypothesis concerning human culture (“the deferral of violence through representation”) with whatever empirical knowledge we might acquire of the life of our ancestors. As we continue to revise our understanding of humanity’s prehistory, it seems increasingly appropriate to consider the scene as a heuristic construction–and yet not a simple fiction like the social contract or John Rawls’ “original position.”

    Given the basic presupposition that the signs of human language are derived not from appetite but from its deferral, the originary event, understood as a “little bang,” the first hesitation that converts a gesture of appropriation into a sign, must have occurred. But the originary hypothesis is stronger than the tautological assertion that, given that C lies on the path between A and B, if you go from A to B there is a moment at which you are at C. This weak notion of a moment of origin does not suffice to explain the scenic nature of human culture. If I emphasize religion in tandem with language, it is because all manifestations of religion take place explicitly on an external or internal scene. Indeed, one could define religion as the most general mode of representation that is explicitly scenic. The simplest understanding of God is as the Being that maintains the permanence of the scene of representation; the consolation of prayer is that, in whatever solitude or misery one finds oneself, its interlocutor is conceived as always on the scene.

    The minimal originary hypothesis need not postulate a watershed event that would radically transform relations among the members of the group. The equalitarian configuration of the scene of representation, with the sacred object at the center and the human participants on the periphery, need not replace all at once the pre-human configuration of “pecking-order” power relations. But we can say that, however fleetingly, the event-nature of the event must have imprinted itself on the consciousness of the participants, else there would be no cultural scene–and no history–at all. However minimal, the little bang must nonetheless be understood as an event.

    In the Spring 2000 GA seminar, Antoine Philippe of UCI made an insightful point about this event: it is an event in which nothing happens. Projected onto the worldly plane, the conversion of a gesture of appropriation into a “vertical” sign turns an action into a non-action. The first event is a non-event; the first memorable scene is constituted by the uneventfulness, however temporary, that takes place on it. This emptiness, Sartre’s néant, is the space-time of representation, which is the ground of the specifically human freedom that Sartre finds there.


    The most serious misconception about GA is that what I call the “minimal” requirement of an originary hypothesis is rather a violation of the rule of parsimony than an expression of it. Discussions of morality or religion tend to begin either in medias res, with the data–which may be obtained largely from thought-experiments–or with an a priori model, motivated only intuitively, that is subsequently applied to this data to see if it fits. In the place of an originary hypothesis, the author customarily refers to the état présent of the field and/or to classical texts. This procedure may be parsimonious in minimally disturbing the terrain of previous discussions, but surely not in minimizing its ontological presuppositions.

    Even when philosophers discover aspects of language that have clear anthropological roots and implications, such as Austin’s notion of the “performative,” these aspects are taken as given and never traced back to an originary model. Yet “doing things with words” is a cultural activity; any model of the phenomenon that ignores its origin and cultural function is incomplete. How did it become possible to use words to marry, to christen, to promise? What is the most parsimonious model of the human that explains these phenomena? It is in answer to questions such as these that the minimality of originary thinking is made evident.

    Just about every thinker since Marx has denounced metaphysics and offered a way to replace it, or, more prudently, to “deconstruct” it. In comparison with what has gone before, originary thinking offers the clearest definition of the metaphysical and of our limited but real capacity to “comprehend” it within an anthropology. Metaphysics is best understood as the mode of thought that recognizes no utterance-form more elementary than the declarative sentence or proposition. Metaphysical discourse is sufficient for analyzing the natural world, which is not dependent on our representation of it; this discourse cannot adequately describe the human world because it has effaced the trail that leads back to its own anthropological origin.

    I believe that in the uniformitarian spirit of science, the emergence within the natural world of the cultural world of representations–entailing the often implicit but always operative dualism of our reflections on human ontology–should be made the object of an explicit hypothesis. Within the Humanities, this is even more crucial in the domains of ethics, religion, and philosophy in the traditional sense than in those of literature and art, whose works are only effective if they contain so to speak a “portable anthropology” within themselves. The originary hypothesis obliges us to understand the human faculty of representation not as an inexplicable given but as generated within a world where it did not exist. This generative model provides an anthropological basis for ethical concepts such as the categorical imperative, which we are otherwise asked to accept on faith, by grounding these scenic phenomena in a hypothetical originary scene where the relationships among the participants are made explicit. Similarly, this heuristic makes intelligible both the “supernatural” entities of religion and the imaginary constructions of esthetic culture, where the scenic is abstracted from its relationship to the everyday world temporally as well as spatially. The originary hypothesis permits the transcendence or Aufhebung of the monism-dualism, body-mind debate that circles constantly around the same tired dilemmas.

    GA has been around for twenty years now. Its survival into the next generation will depend on whether you, dear reader, find that it helps you to better perform your task in our endless human enterprise of self-understanding.


  • Minimizing Difference

    I had already completed a draft of this Chronicle before the events of September 11, but its subject-matter is not altogether irrelevant to the questions posed by these events to our anthropological understanding. We have language and other modes of representation because we are threatened by violence, which, according to a hermeneutically circular definition, is mimetic conflict pushed to the point where it must be deferred through representation. No witness to Black Tuesday will question my minimal definition of the human as the species that has more to fear from itself than from the rest of the universe. Fear and the accompanying deferral of action are the beginnings of a particularly human wisdom that also goes by the name of original sin. There is more fundamental anthropology in Genesis than in all the “scientific” demonstrations that humans differ no differently from other animal species than they differ from each other.

    * * *

    A recent discussion on the GAlist began with the following conundrum posed by Chris Fleming of the University of Western Sydney:

    . . . recently I instructed quite a few members of my department to “check out” the GA website, read through the “Introduction to GA,” and then have a look at Anthropoetics. The quite bizarre result of this “experiment” was not that these academics–a few of whom told me that they [spent] hours on the site–didn’t “understand” GA. They (independently) told me that they’d read through the things I recommended, but just couldn’t quite work out what was being argued through; surprisingly, two of them could tell me that GA […] concerned “the deferral of violence through representation,” but admitted that they couldn’t explain what that MEANT.

    This unsettling reaction may be understood on many levels. But before we explore the personal equation or the difficulty inherent in any attempt to close or even to theorize the gap between the humanities and the sciences, I think it most useful to consider it a reaction less to the ideas of GA (no one failed to “understand”) than to its problematic status as a research program in the academic context within which most of us operate.

    It is my strong impression, given the vast increase over the past few decades in the personnel and activity of knowledge-related fields, that conditions pertinent to the “sociology of knowledge” increasingly determine what kind of knowledge will be assimilated and disseminated. As a scientific colleague recently noted, the traditional concept of “academic freedom” is irrelevant to those filling out grant applications. I am not speaking here of any kind of conspiracy; quite the contrary. If I have anything to complain of in the contemporary academic scene, it is rather an excess of democracy than an excess of elitism. Generative anthropology is less attuned than either victimary or positivist (“materialist”) thinking to the communal style of today’s academy.

    To think anthropologically is to renounce the metaphysical point of departure based on the declarative sentence, or, to put it another way, on the idea that “mind” can be abstracted from its implantation in human beings. This ideal of objective representation is that of science itself. Because GA is anthropology not as a positive science but as an ontology of the human, it is not organized around a particular research program. But this characteristic, which makes GA disconcerting to Chris Fleming’s colleagues, makes it a potential meeting ground not only between the humanities and the social sciences but between these sciences themselves. Of all the scientific studies I have read concerning the origin of human language, I cannot think of one in which confronting the hypothesis that defines human culture as “the deferral of violence through representation” would not have aided the author to reframe and sharpen the conclusions derived from his or her research.


    Here is an example from the extremely active field of primatology. In a long, passionate, and deliberately “unscientific” article (“Ape Language: Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” in The Origins of Language: What Nonhuman Primates Can Tell Us, School of American Research Press, 1999, 115-88), the distinguished primatologist Sue Savage-Rumbaugh (SSR) conceives an imaginary debate between herself and “Wally,” a composite of those social scientists who maintain that there is an unbridgeable chasm between ape and human communication. Without claiming that apes have languages directly comparable to ours, SSR gives examples of intentionality and communication of intent, symbolic reference to absent objects, deception, premeditated revenge, and so on, insisting throughout that the strict separation in kind between human and ape language is more a self-serving myth than a scientific hypothesis, and, in conclusion, affirming that the point of research into both human and ape communication is not to establish where these functions are “located” in the brain, but to improve the quality of this communication: “Behavioral science will be judged . . . by its creations rather than by its explanations of cognitive structure . . . Localizing skills in the brain does not build a better mind” (187).

    It is impossible not to respect the passion of someone who has dedicated a lifetime to understanding our primate cousins and who clearly shares a good deal of the humanist’s impatience with the bloodlessness and spurious rigor of much social science. Yet I think that a little originary thinking would have considerably sharpened and focused this author’s quarrel with the skeptics.

    I have no ideological or theoretical difficulty in accepting SSR’s judgment that there is real communication between apes, or even that the bonobo Kanzi is really using language when he tells his conspecific Tamuli to return to the author the keys Tamuli has stolen from her. Such revelations, by throwing discredit on the neat absolutism of human-animal difference, only help us better to understand the theoretical importance of the originary scene. What is the difference between ape and human? Even if we deny with SSR the existence of a “human-ape linguistic gulf (118),” we cannot deny that human language and culture differ considerably from those of apes. What is most characteristically human is not merely to be different from other species but to define ourselves by this “absolute” difference. In another article in the same volume–”The Game of the Name: Continuity and Discontinuity in Language Origins,” 229-68–Iain Davidson comes close to this idea by suggesting that these binary distinctions are not found in nature but are a product of the human ability to “name.” But his hypothesis of how “naming” might have come about on the basis of exchanges of signals relies on a contingent “trick”:

    [we hypothesize] two hominids communicating with each other using a bodily gesture(-call) that indicates the observable presence of prey or predator through iconic movements of hand and arm . . . If that gesture were accidentally or incidentally traced into a more permanent medium (such as the side of a stream channel), then the trace itself might become an object of attention in the absence of the prey or predator. . . . Some such trick is needed to achieve the distinctive discontinuity between nonhuman primate and human communication represented by the uniquely human, and languagelike, ability to pay attention to the communicative act itself, rather than to the object of communication. (261)

    I will let my readers judge whether they find this scenario more convincing than those I have suggested for the originary hypothesis.

    Let us grant that bonobos can communicate their intentions in language, that chimps can use tools and even use tools to make tools, even (why not?) that these apes have some kind of proto-religion. This only increases the burden of explaining why human evolution was driven by the capacity for representation by signs whereas that of bonobos and chimps was not. Some have been tempted to lay down the burden by blaming it all on a chance genetic mutation. (That this absurd notion has been taken seriously by authorities in the field such as Derek Bickerton consoles me for their neglect of the originary hypothesis.) On the contrary, the closer our cousins come to displaying a linguistic competence less developed than but similar to our own, the more crucial it becomes to explain why this competence never came to drive their evolution and consequently failed to generate a historical culture.


    To reiterate the originary hypothesis, the crucial, generative function of human language, over and above communication about the natural world, is the deferral of potential conflict, reflecting René Girard’s still-ignored observation that the mimetic nature of intelligence makes the most intelligent animals increasingly susceptible to such conflict. At the point where the need to contain mimetic conflict surpasses the capacity of animal communication, the only alternative to annihilation is the emergence of formal and institutional representation, ritual sacrifice and language.

    However dependent our everyday use of language may be on context, linguistic signs, in contrast with signals, typically have a context-free meaning or signified. To speak of an event of language origin is to propose a specific moment of emergence for a sign whose meaning “always already” emancipates itself from this original context of utterance. Yet the linguistic sign, liberated from its context, continually recalls it. Because words are products not of biological evolution but of cultural creation, they bear the mark, some more explicitly than others, of their event of origin. Whenever we use a word, we revive and renew its entire etymology as the history of the binding between this particular signifier and its signified. Not only Biblical exegetes but modern thinkers from Locke to Heidegger have mined words for ontological–I would call them anthropological–truths.

    Signals may be manipulated by their users, and there is no need to affirm dogmatically that the higher primates use them with no sense of intention. (There is in any case a distinction between the number of levels of intention or “theory of mind” accessible to humans and non-humans.) Let us then accept SSR’s reproach that the dogmatic distinction between “call” and “utterance” only provides an alibi for the refusal of skeptics like “Wally” to recognize the real similarities between ape and human language. The important point is not intentionality as such but the fact that that animal signals derive from sounds or gestures that express the drives or “instincts” of their producers. In contrast, I hypothesize the first sign of human language to have been an aborted gesture of appropriation, a checking or deferral of our appetitive drive toward its object. It is the anti-instinctual, interdictive nature of its origin that distinguishes human “symbolic” communication from animal language. Of course the fear of one’s fellows that overrides appetitive-mimetic desire for the central object is itself “instinctual,” but the inhibition of appetitive desire that it effects is not the drowning out of one drive by another, but its deferral and displacement from the untouchable object onto the shareable sign.

    Granted that apes can learn some language, engage in ritual-like practices, have elements of a “theory of mind,” none of these demonstrations of primate cousinship reduce the plausibility that the differentiation of human from ape was triggered by the inadequacy of ape communication. The object of originary thinking is to provide a plausible function for human difference so as to be able to explain the emergence of the human as that of “absolute” difference itself.

    Davidson is correct: binary distinctions are facts, not of nature, but of language. But not even this binary distinction should be hypostatized into a fact of nature. The natural, prehuman world has plenty of de facto binary distinctions. Biology, in particular, has a neat way of creating such distinctions: speciation–two creatures that can produce fertile offspring are of the same species; otherwise, they are not. The difference between these and absolute (de jure) distinctions is created by their formalization in language by a creature whose survival depends on explicit binary distinctions. Durkheim saw that the most fundamental binary distinction of all is the social/ethical opposition between sacred and profane. To separate the potential combatants requires an interdiction of ontological force that is the creation of ontology itself. This does not mean that language “creates reality.” Language does not even create our perception of reality. What it creates is a différance or deferral of violence by means of a representation of its object as different. The primary difference is that between the significant and the insignificant, the sacred and the profane, this meaningful thing and everything else. Where Derrida goes wrong is in presuming the symmetry of this difference on the Saussurean model of a grammatical paradigm.

    Apes have no notion of difference; humans do. This is no denial of ape intelligence, and surely no invitation to treat bonobos as Cartesian robots. It is simply a fact of evolution that at some point difference, the basis of all signification, became necessary and was created/invented. Saying that this creation makes us “absolutely” different from animals is really only another way of saying that our difference may be thought of as vanishingly small in concrete, relative terms. Both SSR and “Wally” ought to be able to agree on this.

    Perhaps the simplest explanation for the “incomprehensibility” of originary thinking is that it focuses on the never completely graspable moment of emergence of the “vertical” sign from its “horizontal” context. Language is born in paradox; the sign both expresses and denies appetite and, in so doing, transforms it into desire. Human culture plays out this paradox in narrative time, forever re-presenting the genesis of representation. Generative anthropology is founded on a minimal model of this paradox.

    Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the chief result of this focus on the moment of origin is an increased sensitivity to historical specificity. The very fact that mimetic desire and the need to defer the conflict it arouses are always the same implies that the means to effect this deferral cannot remain fixed; the new human community created by the deferring sign will have the free time (French loisir, “leisure”) in which to generate new desires and new conflicts. The absolute nature of sacred significance both permits and obliges us, in contrast to our closest non-human relatives, to generate the continuous series of relative changes in the objects of significance that we call history.


  • The New World Order

    I had finished a draft of my next Chronicle when the catastrophe occurred. I was born three months before Pearl Harbor and now have lived to see even greater devastation inflicted on the city of my birth. When I spoke of a new post-millennial era I couldn’t anticipate how clear and horrible the defining moment would be.

    In La violence et le sacré, published nearly thirty years ago, René Girard put forth the basic tenets of a new “fundamental” or generative anthropology founded on the primacy of the human need to defer mimetic violence. Those who professionally go by the name of anthropologists have ignored Girard’s generative model, as they have ignored my own attempts to extend it to human language. Perhaps events of this magnitude are necessary to convince those who escaped but have not yet absorbed the horrors of the last World War that deferral of violence is the crucial function of human culture–and that this deferral is not and can never be synonymous with the utopia of perpetual peace. In the preceding Chronicle, I suggested that the conflict between capitalism and communism was the last moment in the dialectic of world history that would be dominated by the internal conversation of the West. In the light of the events of today, the Cold War assumes its true dimension as a family quarrel. As the name of their prime target indicates, the perpetrators of this series of acts have declared war not just on Western but on world civilization, and on the market that supports it. This is a time when those who have heretofore focused their energies on denouncing the evils of the market system had better start to come to grips with the implications of their position.

    I send my condolences to the victims as well as my pledge to pursue for as long as I am able these efforts to improve our understanding of our common humanity, whose mimetic abilities give us such awesome capacities for peace and for violence, for love and for resentment.

  • The Chinese Dao of Language

    At a meeting of the UCLA Center for the Study of Religion, it was pointed out that the Chinese term dao (formerly tao), usually translated “way,” also has the meaning of “discourse.” I found this usage tantalizingly close to that of the Greek word logos, diversely translated as “word,” “discourse,” “speech.” In the New Testament book of John that famously opens with En arche en ho logos [In the beginning was the Word], Jesus also identifies himself as “the way and the truth and the life” (John 14.6). The parallelism between logos and dao offers a privileged opening to the difference and similarity between the two cultures.

    As a follow-up to our discussion, my colleague William Bodiford of East Asian Languages and Cultures recommended to me Chad Hansen’s A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (Oxford, 1992), which I read with great interest. I discovered, somewhat to my surprise, that ancient Chinese thought, focused on the social, “performative” use of language, is closer to GA’s understanding than Western metaphysics, which sees language from the perspective of the individual mind. I also felt a considerable affinity with the paradoxical thinking about language in Laozi and others, despite the fact that there is no room for an originary scene in this mode of thought (see Cecily Hurst’s “The Origin of Language in Chinese Thought”), which never conceives of the human social order as other than a kingdom.

    For these thinkers, language is important above all not as a medium for enunciating true propositions but as a means of guiding action. As Hansen points out:

    Classical Chinese does not have explicit descriptive and prescriptive forms. Students of comparative translation, therefore, will find huge chunks of text that one translator renders in declarative English and another in imperative English. Behind this apparent ambiguity, I suggest, lies this assumption about the function of language. All language functions to guide behavior. Given that assumption, a community would not require an explicit prescriptive marker.

    That does not mean that all sentences are prescriptive sentences. It means only that, like a computer program, the input as a whole guides our action in the world. We use all the distinctions made in language in guiding action. The communication of information is a subtask of language. Information is always information in relation to a program that guides action. (51)

    In other words, the Chinese declarative has not become metaphysical; it has not lost its connection with what I have called the “elementary linguistic forms”: the ostensive and imperative that designate objects of significance, for worship or practical action.

    The central tension in Chinese thought reflects the ambivalence of the deferral of violence through representation as the bringer of both freedom and order. On the one hand, Confucianism is concerned with maintaining traditional ritual usage through “rectifying names,” making sure that the signs of language name a socially appropriate object. (A Western parallel might be the debate as to when a fetus becomes a “human being.”) Confucianism, unlike traditional Western thought, has not lost sight of the primary link between language, music, and ritual. The modern rediscovery of this connection in the West could be made only through the detour of ethnology; in contrast to Confucianism, Christianity, the religion that abolished sacrifice, has no internal conception of ritual. On the other hand, the Daoist current reflects the fact that no use of language can put an end to dialectical reciprocity. Daoism is inhabited by a sensitivity to the fundamentally paradoxical relationship of language to what it asserts that is almost wholly lacking in the West. “The way [dao] that can be spoken is not the constant way.” That is, once you’ve spoken of a “way,” it’s no longer the same way; it has become an object toward which you must take a stand rather than the series of steps you are taking. Ethical language, by the very fact of suggesting a “way” of action, modifies that way of action. Because the focus of Chinese thought about language is ethical rather than metaphysical, it sees paradox neither as a nuisance a la Bertrand Russell or as a psychological operation a la Gregory Bateson, but as a fundamental property of language.


    Hansen, whose lucidly and passionately argued views are, as I understand it, somewhat controversial, groups Buddhism and Indian thought in general with Western individualist logic and language philosophy, leaving China (he says nothing of Japan) as the sole source of truly non-Western thinking. Chinese civilization understood over two thousand years ago that (1) ostensive words are more fundamental than declarative sentences; (2) language is closely allied to ritual as a means of creating order, yet (3) the assertion of this order in language is paradoxical. In contrast, the mature intellectual life of the West begins with Plato’s construction of the concept or Idea as an object of reflection accessible only through the declarative sentence. This separation of declarative objectivity from ostensive-imperative pragmatic activity has its parallel in the founding scene of Judeo-Christian religion, God’s appearance to Moses in Exodus 6 (the burning bush), where he names himself with the declarative sentence Ehyeh asher ehyeh: I am/will be who/what/that I am/will be. (See Science and Faith.) Western culture has been built on the forgetting of the originary function of language.

    I am tempted to use a paraphrase of Laozi’s gnomic words to explain why GA’s recalling of these “Chinese” insights has met with little enthusiasm. What makes a culture function, its dao, is incompatible with the revelation of its operation. The ethical paradoxality of language is the suppressed truth of Western individualism, built upon what we might call the Lockean fiction that language is the subjective possession of individuals who subsequently come together to communicate objective truths about the world. The individual mind and external nature (“what is the case”) are perceived as the polar elements of linguistic communication, so that Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus with its “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen” [what we cannot speak of, we must leave in silence] becomes the ultimate, tragic work of Western philosophy. As Hansen shows, Chinese thought’s refusal to lose sight of the interpersonal nature of language has been associated with the domination of language and society by a centralized despotism rather than the seemingly utopian proliferation of “ways” encouraged by Daoist thought. Insight for insight, Western emphasis on the individual’s possession of language has been more socially productive than Chinese emphasis on its communal origin.


    The twenty-first century, however, may change all that. A new era is dawning, one marked by the global interplay of cultural modes. The very success of market society means that it no longer belongs exclusively to the West. Even the triumph of Western liberal democracy over (European) communism may perhaps best be understood as the end of the era in which the historical dialectic was played out on Western terrain.

    One way to formulate the historical dilemma implicit in this development is as a choice between two models of globalization. If we take as unquestioned the unity of the global market, then the crux of twenty-first-century history (have you noticed that–unlike the French who entered le dix-septième siècle in 1600–English speakers live for the first time in a century with a compound name?) will be the progressive integration of the “third world” into this market. In this case, the main axis of world tension will be between the (more or less Christian) West and Islam, the world’s chief source of resistance to market society. In contrast, if Chinese culture, as expressed in the Confucian-Daoist dialectic, is indeed the true Other of Western-based world civilization, then the potentially richest, as well as most dangerous, interaction is likely to be that between the US, the leader of the global market, and China. As every consumer in the West is aware, China, unlike the lands of Islamic fundamentalism, is a real and growing presence in the marketplace, yet it shows little sign of evolving toward the Western model of liberal democracy.

    The next few decades should tell us whether there is indeed a distinct Chinese road to market dominance. As a good Westerner, my sympathies lie with Francis Fukuyama’s position that liberal democracy is the freest and therefore the most creative social form and, consequently, the inevitable outcome of the evolution of market society. But the Western world should not make light of the challenge of a society whose understanding of human interaction was shaped over two thousand years ago by a non-theistic anthropology of language that brings together ritual order and self-referential paradox.


  • We Are All Buddhists Now

    Early this month, I flew to Long Island, NY for the funeral of my last uncle, Martin Gans, my father’s younger brother, who died at the age of 86. My parents, through a not altogether fortuitous combination of protectiveness and religious indifference, kept me away from funerals when I was young and refused their own when they were old; this was actually the first time I attended the funeral of a close relative.

    Marty was Jewish and his wife Catholic, a not atypical combination in mid-century New York City (remember Abie’s Irish Rose?). Although hardly true believers, neither ever dreamt of denying their respective heritage. Yet the plastic memorial card given out at the funeral home contains, on one side, a prose rendering (unidentified) of Max Ehrmann’s poem “Desiderata” (written in 1927, popular in the sixties, and all over the Internet), whose first sentence reads, “Go placidly amid the noise and haste, and remember what peace there may be in silence,” and, on the other, a lotus-like image of the Buddhist eightfold path above the word “Peace.”

    Thus a couple of educated but not hypereducated, aware but not trendy, and surely not New-Age New Yorkers, raised in two great Western religions that share a common holy book, chose to express themselves through a Buddhist image and what Westerners (if not real Buddhists) would think of as Buddhist-like spirituality. No doubt this is a Buddhism reduced to the merest symbolic gesture, but that does not explain why the materials for this gesture were not drawn from within the Judeo-Christian tradition.

    What has made the Buddhist perspective attractive to Westerners since the days of Schopenhauer is its rejection of desiring individuality. Few in consumer society practice the systematic denial of desire, but many  include in their consumption practices signs of this denial to display to themselves and others. Yet this recuperation of “Eastern” values by “Western” consumerism is not altogether complete. As the popularity of Ehrmann’s poem illustrates, there is a peace to be gained from renouncing the Judeo-Christian drama of salvation. Although not overtly competitive, the quest for individual salvation unavoidably smacks of the desire for centrality. In the Buddhist equivalent, one renounces all desire and with it, the desiring traits that make up one’s “self.”

    I am not unmindful of René Girard’s point that the Judeo-Christian tradition conveys the sharpest vision of the anthropological function of the mimetic violence that all religions seek to expel into the realm of the sacred. The prophetic denunciations of sacrificial violence that culminate in the Gospels display more awareness of its anthropological function than the turning away from all violence characteristic of Buddhism or Jainism. It is easy to make the argument that the West’s greater awareness of culture’s function in deferring violence has oriented it toward developing secular alternatives to the sacrificial mode rather than merely turning sacrificial violence inward against one’s own desire. When the Western tradition renounces worldly desire, it is in the service of the individual soul’s spiritual desire–a desire that can still arguably enter into an inter-human dialogue–rather than the search for Nirvana.

    Perhaps the most striking contrast between Buddhism and Christianity is in the career of their respective founders. Where the former rejects sacrificial violence, the latter both rejects it and falls victim to it. This dramatic element in Christianity (prefigured many times in the Old Testament) has no place in Buddhism. Like Jesus, Buddha lives and dies, but he is neither a divine being nor a sacrificial victim–characteristics that we know to be two moments of the same history. The contrast is all the more telling in a cultural context where everyone knows the story of Jesus but few know much about Buddha; ignorance only enhances the attraction of the undramatic.

    The contrast between Buddha and Christ is reflected in the religions’ respective models of sanctity. The Christian makes a sacrifice of his desire; the more heroic his suffering, the greater his celestial reward–witness Saint Anthony (Flaubert’s patron) with his nightly temptations in the desert. The Buddhist approach, as I understand it, is that the sage doesn’t struggle to extirpate his desires, he merely learns to avoid suffering by not acting on them. Without the Satanic personalization of the figure of temptation, learning to resist desire, however arduous, is no more dramatic than learning to play the piano.


    Christian dramatization of the soul’s struggle for salvation, along with its secular derivatives, is arguably the driving force in the West’s historical success. The more advanced the exchange system, the more individual participants are obliged to invest in their own “story.” Does the preference for undramatic “Buddhist” moral exemplarity over Western personal-historical drama suggest, then, a turning-away from this investment? I think not.

    Let us read “Desiderata” as an expression of American “Buddhism.” The work, more a homily than a poem, consists almost entirely of a series of imperatives. We are told to go placidly, to speak quietly (and to listen), to avoid comparing ourselves to others, to remain interested in our careers, to accept aging, to be cheerful, to strive to be happy. Yet the strongest statement of the poem is in the indicative mode: “You are a child of the universe, no less than the trees and the stars; you have a right to be here.” Only one penetrated by Western romantic alienation and Geworfenheit (“thrown-ness”) could conceive, or require, such reassurance. I’d be willing to bet that the average Buddhist would find this poem inappropriately focused on protection of self rather than loss of self.

    The most striking feature of Ehrmann’s text is the constant backing and filling in an effort to reconcile asceticism and hedonism, to defer the violence of worldly desire in such a way as to forestall a resentful reaction. This attitude is perhaps best illustrated by the line, “Beyond a wholesome discipline, be gentle with yourself.” The ancient ne quid nimis (nothing in excess) is here applied, not to desire, but to the self-discipline that controls desire. Or: “Whatever your labors and aspirations in the noisy confusion of life, keep peace in your soul.” We have come a long way from the moral striving of an earlier phase of market society, illustrated by Henley’s “Invictus,” Kipling’s “If”–best of all, by Longfellow’s “Psalm of Life”:

    Life is real! Life is earnest!
    And the grave is not its goal;
    Dust thou art, to dust returnest,
    Was not spoken of the soul.

    Not enjoyment, and not sorrow,
    Is our destined end or way;
    But to act, that each tomorrow
    Find us farther than today.

    A more mature market society balances consumption with production, “discipline” with “gentleness.” It cultivates the drama of each life, but, in order to maintain the energy required for this cultivation, it gives us a fall-back position, a way of looking at our lives in which nothing need be won or lost. What we think of as “Buddhist” is really a perspective that, by reassuring us of the availability of this position, permits us to invest yet more energy in worldly ambition.

    Perhaps the twenty-first century will discover that this kind of spirituality is more helpful than the Christian variety in the mature global marketplace. But it is more likely that the market system, and the globalizing culture that accompanies it, is evolving toward a pluralistic synthesis of (at least) Western historicism and Eastern transcendentalism. We were already Christians, and now we are Buddhists too.


    Born in 1915, my uncle Marty, a Jew who sang in church choirs and wanted to be remembered with a Buddhist image, was already a citizen of the twenty-first century.


  • On Consumption and Immortality

    Many of these Chronicles have been devoted in one way or another to defending consumer society against those who affect to despise it. Resentment of the wealthy aside, the intellectual loathes consumerism because it has proved an effective substitute for socialism. The potential revolutionary is diverted from the struggle by the constant pressure to update his life-style. The Marcusian idea of “repressive tolerance” secularizes Pascal‘s critique of the worldly divertissement that distracts us from the care of our immortal soul.

    But secular spirituality need not be assimilated to political negativity. The mode of the soul’s perseverance with which we are most likely to concern ourselves is historical. Celebrities fascinate us not simply because they are famous now; their aura reflects our expectation that they will be inscribed in the future’s reconstruction of the present as past that goes by the name of history. Our passion for top-100 lists of films, actors, sports figures, and what have you reflects this equation of historical immortality with salvation.

    No doubt the modern exchange system complicates the simple dichotomy of sacred production and profane consumption: because consumption produces social meaning, its expense is also an investment. As opposed to the Calvinist for whom worldly success is a sign of salvation, the modern producer/consumer manipulates signs in order to succeed, choosing the wine or travel anecdote that will clinch the sale. Even what is at first sight pure animal self-indulgence is recuperated by the system of signs. The attention to body-image that has shrunk portions in upscale restaurants gives rise in reaction to stores selling frozen yogurt and even chocolate chip cookies, high-calorie words in the yuppie message inflected with the ethnic accent of Mrs. Fields or Famous Amos–compare Winchell’s Donuts.

    Yet the opposition between consumption and production, self-indulgence and self-abnegation, continually reasserts itself. The “p” in yuppie stands for “professional.” Buying the right suit is part of being a lawyer, but it doesn’t substitute for law school, the bar exam, and fourteen-hour workdays. Nodding respectfully to conspicuous consumption and potlatch, the Pascalian dichotomy reemerges in everyday reality. We constantly encounter the temptation to abandon the sacred for the profane, even if the sacred corresponds to cleaning out the garage and the profane to redecorating the living room. The dichotomy is unforgivingly clear for writers. Business deals may be sealed on the golf course, but books are not written there. The chief source of Marcel Proust’s iconic status as The Writer is the falsely reassuring myth his career inspires that our lives wasted in self-indulgence will some day be “regained” by twenty years’ activity in a cork-lined room.

    No, the critique of consumption as distraction has not lost its relevance. The clothes, entertainment, or travel I consume may enhance my self-image and serve my career, but unless I am a professional model, film critic, or travel writer, they will not win me a place in the history books; better work at downing the most hot dogs in ten minutes and get my name in the Guinness Book of World Records. Consumption steals money, time, and mental energy from the productive activity that is our best shot at becoming immortal. It tempts us with the short-term satisfactions of acquiring and using a new object, of experiencing the envy of others. For our chances of historical immortality are vanishingly small, and the pleasures of consumption, fleeting but reliable.


    One candidate for the “motor” of Western history is the structural difference between Christian spiritual immortality and secular historical immortality. It is not simply that the latter is more difficult than the former; in Pascal’s Jansenist universe, nothing is less certain than the salvation against which we are asked to wager our finite lives. The difference lies rather in the competitive nature of historical as opposed to spiritual salvation. That not all souls are saved is no reflection on God’s ability to save them, whereas historical immortality rewards a few successful competitors for the world’s finite attention. This scarcity inevitably arouses resentment. However clearly an individual has earned his place in history, our sense of human moral equality is violated by a selection process that saves a mere handful and casts the others, good and evil alike, into eternal darkness.

    This resentment in turn provides energy for faith, which we can understand most simply as reliance on the omnipotent sacred center to preserve us from violence. The cultural scene’s success in deferring mimetic violence makes it a transcendental causal agent to which can be attributed the power to defer all violence–the violence of death, and of forgetting.

    If originary, “ostensive” faith is indistinguishable from this reliance itself, faith in the strong, “declarative” sense conceives the sacred Being as the subject of a predication rather than as the object of an ostensive sign. This removal of the sacred to the sphere of narrative gives birth to divinities who incarnate the permanence that inheres in sacred Being as the object of the originary sign. At this point, the sacred becomes a bulwark not merely against Hobbesian violence but against resentment of human difference: whatever my neighbor’s superiority over me, it is as nothing compared to God’s over both of us. Before preserving historical memory, language and culture commemorate God’s omnipotence. It is no coincidence that the minimal credo of Islam, the religion most successful at channeling resentment, begins with “God is great”; that of Judaism, the religion most successful at attracting resentment, reads “our God is one” (yours, presumably, isn’t).

    Salvation, translated into anthropological terms, is participation in the immortality of representation. For the Christian, as opposed to the Buddhist, this means individual salvation, the promise of resurrection in the flesh. A democratic and vastly more comprehensive version of the library, the Internet offers no doubt the first practical secular model of immortality. Just as all our life’s actions are presumably preserved on the celestial WWW of which God is webmaster, we expect all files on the Internet to remain available forever. The belief that the Internet or its successor will preserve–if it hasn’t already–not merely selected documents but every trace of our existence in every medium is not implausible. A mere two decades ago, a twenty-page (40K) essay posed a storage problem to personal computers. Today’s 20G hard disk contains a few bytes for every person on earth. Who can imagine network capacity even fifty years hence? Survival on the Internet is not equivalent to survival in the history books, but survival in any form is sufficient to give one a shot at the history books of the future.

    Where does this leave the Pascalian opposition between production and consumption? A web page is at least nominally a “production,” but what of those webcams that give us the opportunity to create our own reality TV? (Pretty girls finance their education by getting men to pay-per-view them all day long.) Perhaps the web of the future will contain recordings of complete lives; I can see upscale parents subscribing their unborn children, beginning with conception. Historical memory at last freed from the contentious condition of scarcity, we will all remain “out there” forever. . .


    And why am I writing these fantasies, dear reader? As a diversion from the book that I should be writing about the origin of language. For a writer, even writing can be a form of divertissement. Or could it be that these Internet Chronicles are what will one day remain of my writings on Generative Anthropology?


  • Apologia

    By forty, you learn to live with yourself; at sixty, you have to bet on yourself, on your own unique set of limitations. You may be able to push them back a little, but you’re surely not going to “transcend” them. Thus I have no choice but to wager that someone like myself–someone too impatient with data to concentrate his energies on any particular subject-matter, notably the details of others’ lives (my last “biographical” book dates from 1974)–can contribute significantly to human thought.

    Over twenty years ago I proposed that the origin of language must be conceived as an event because it is the origin of the event-ness that defines human culture. Nowhere in the ever-increasingly volume of language origins research has this idea been refuted: it is simply not taken into account. I am betting that the very unanimity of this neglect shows that it is I, rather than everybody else, who am right.

    If the human is indeed defined by a system of exchange that serves to defer violence, there is no difficulty explaining why, in the current context, this definition is not generally adopted. Academic life is elaborately organized to eliminate direct competition: rivals in one’s field are elsewhere, local colleagues are in other fields. Above all, there is no hierarchy: all are specialists, and no one’s work encompasses anyone else’s. Such a system cannot, almost by definition, tolerate an anthropology that insists on the transcendence of nature by the scene of culture focused on the sacred center. The center is a vulnerable place, all the more so when its occupant is no longer crucified but scorned as uncool.

    The originary hypothesis defines humanity by what most critically concerns it. Whether in the Kansas City Star or the New York Times, the biggest headlines are atop stories of violence. Persons with whom we have only humanity in common interest us to the point of obsession when they become characters in a tale of human violence. Recently the Star commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the death of a notorious petty criminal who had for years single-handedly terrorized several North Missouri counties, stealing hogs, burning down houses, threatening witnesses, and, finally, shooting a man in the neck at close range–for which he was convicted of second-degree assault and allowed free on bond during appeal. The community had had enough; in a rural area where firearms abound, a few individuals dealt with the problem. The identity of the murderers, if the term is appropriate, has never been revealed. This story illustrates the immense danger posed to the social order by even a single person who refuses to participate in the common deferral of violence. Denial that this deferral is fundamental to being human is only another form of deferral.

    Scientific discourse takes human mortality into account only as subject-matter; medical science is no more humanistic than geology. Conversely, cultural discourse defers through representation our return to physical nature. Human beings whose awareness of death is revealed to them by the culture they share cannot afford to wait forever to understand their origin. They need an impatient anthropology that provides a minimal core of self-knowledge invulnerable to the storms of empirical data.


    Let me give a brief counter-example. Recently I read Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy’s The Origins of Complex Language (Oxford, 1999), which develops with great skill and tenacity an intricate argument requiring mastery of linguistic philosophy and linguistics as well as a good working knowledge of neuroscience and primatology. The author presents the specificity of human language as a consequence of the descent of the larynx, itself initiated not by the need to enunciate phonemes but as an anatomical consequence of erect posture. Our adoption of a form of language that features sentences possessing a truth value rather than simple noun phrases (NPs) is described as a consequence of the dual rhythm imposed on language by vowel-consonant articulation, which, in turn, results from the articulatory mode favored by our descended larynx. But even if the suggested correlation between the rhythms of phonetic and syntactic articulation is valid, it cannot explain the origin of language because it cannot explain the crucial correlation between the emergence of language and that of the human social order, inevitably established on a sacred foundation. It is sad to see so much intelligence expended in the service of the naïve and hackneyed antihumanist polemic with which the author concludes:

    The idea that something so immense in its effects as human language could have its beginnings in physiological adjustments consequent on bipedalism strikes deeply at the assumptions that human uniqueness must be based on something rather grand and profound, such as access to unique kinds of knowledge and self-awareness. But, once we get used to the idea, I think we will come to realize that it is only our pride that is hurt. Certain historical accidents have indeed supplied us with a uniquely sophisticated mechanism for communication and for the mental representation of the world; but, apart from that, we are just one species among many. (231)

    What does it really mean to describe humanity as “just one species among many”? If this is a critique of religious anthropology, the author should explain how our “uniquely sophisticated mechanism for communication” is related to religion. If not, he should tell us what would count as falsifying his description. We are treated to a moralizing sermon in guise of a dismissal of “our” moral prejudices, which are really those of the great unwashed, since the intelligentsia has been obsessed with chastising our “speciesist” pride throughout the postwar era.

    This is a case where empirical research might have benefited from the framework supplied by this impatient old amateur. Ostensives are not “NPs,” but complete utterances in their own right. The passage from ostensive to declarative is not simply cognitive but ethical; it is the passage from interdicting the sacred object through the sign to formulating this interdiction explicitly in signs. In other words, what makes humans a different kind of species is not language but ethics, which language uniquely articulates. However well or poorly our own ethical value compares with that of other species, ours is the only species that assigns such values; it is this fact, rather than the values assigned, that is relevant to Carstairs-McCarthy’s inquiry.


    Dear reader, if you’ve heard all this from me before, don’t be impatient: who knows how much longer I’ll be around? But if you find value in this kind of anthropological humanism, you owe it not to me but to yourself to defend it. Social science insists with quasi-religious fervor that language is either a simple extension of animal communication or an “instinct” analogous to those of animals. The idea of human uniqueness is dismissed as a contemporary equivalent of the belief that the sun revolves around the Earth. But denial cannot save us from the ethical question this uniqueness poses. The unique attributes of humanity are what make us dangerous to each other and, accessorily, to the other inhabitants of the planet. If we would protect the Other, we must first ensure that we are protected from Each Other; this Hobbesian need is what defines us as human in the first place.

    I am betting that, however long people deny these truths, sooner or later, they will come to acknowledge and live with them, as the basis of what Kant called “perpetual peace.” I may not see that day, nor, no doubt, will you, dear reader; but you would do well to bestir yourself if you would like your children or your grandchildren to do so.


     

     

  • On Time and the Novel

    Teaching an undergraduate course on the novel reminds us of how little effect a century of “literary theory” has had on how we read. Lacking our dubious skill in dealing with novels as “texts,” undergraduates remind us of an essential epistemological point: one can’t follow a story without constructing its actors in our mind in the same way that we construct real people. We speak of these textual entities as though they are real because that is indeed the only way to talk about a novel’s content. But this very fact reflects the historic specificity of novelistic form.

    A novel, however short, must be long enough to allow us to experience the passage of time in the lives of the characters. The novel, whether classical, “realist,” or avant-garde, alternates between interactive scenes and extra-scenic passages characteristically narrated at too fast a pace to provide material for the reader’s vicarious experience: “telling,” not “showing.” The characters leave the scene (I say “the scene” because scenic confrontations all derive from the same model), return to it, and leave it once more. Although these acts of leaving and returning are often literal, their narrative implementation permits of alternatives: interior monologues, flashbacks, repetitions. We make the passages of summarizing narration part of our reading experience only by integrating them within our scenic knowledge of the character: the fact that X has studied here, worked there, traveled somewhere else is relevant only to the X whom we know now, in this scenic moment of his life. Novelistic scenes are islands of meaning in a non-scenic sea.

    What the apparently merely quantitative fact of length makes distinctive about the novel is the tension between the scene and its narrative environment. What holds it together is an overarching sense of the unity of life, usually of a single character, but extensible to the family and even the community in the collective sagas or romans-fleuves of the plethoric first decades of the twentieth century. The novel models the texture of life in its systolic-diastolic opposition between scenic and non-scenic moments. This texture, by making us aware of the fragility of the scene, creates a phenomenon that I shall call novelistic felicity: the narration of a revelatory experience analogous to that of the sacred because, at that one precious moment, wholly enclosed within the scene. Love is the source of most such experiences, but there are felicitous scenes of battle, of murder, even of whaling. What we take for granted in classical theater (and, in an ironic mode, in modern theater as well) has in the novel the status of a rare epiphany–a status that self-conscious modern novelists (think of Proust’s petite madeleine) increasingly thematize, but whose privilege is already clear in France’s first great novel, La princesse de Clèves.


    Let us consider in this light the association of mediated desire with the novelistic context in which René Girard discovered it in Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque (1961). Although Girard has since found mimetic desire equally present in the theater, notably in Shakespeare, his original insight should not be lost. The ahistorical tenor of Girard’s writing that make some see the triangle of desire as a “structure” should not blind us to the historical specificity of his analyses. All desire is mimetic and all culture a means of deferring it, but the novel defers mimetic desire in a new and radical way.

    The mimetic theory of desire is a theory of the “double bind”: the mediator both incites our desire and discourages it, incites it because he discourages it. (Georges Bataille’s model of (erotic) desire as transgression respects the indissociability of desire’s double bond.) Thus it is not always so easy to distinguish between the positive and negative moments of triangular desire. “Mimetic theory,” sad to say, has never gone beyond Girard’s basic scenario: (1) the mediator, knowingly or not, designates the object to the subject-disciple (imitate me!); (2) the disciple displays desire for the object; (3) the mediator forbids the object to the disciple (don’t imitate me!). If the mediator is external to the world of the disciple, he is unaware of the latter and therefore presumably cannot carry out the negative moment of interdiction. This appears to imply that only internally mediated desire can produce the triangular double-bind effect. But it is clear from Girard’s own association of external mediation with the sacred that attraction and interdiction both inhere in any mediation process and therefore in any desire.

    Considered in this light, moments (1) and (3) of Girard’s triangular scenario are merely two descriptions of the same operation. To “designate” an object is both to display its availability as a focus of desire (which is why harems are not open to the public) and to display its unavailability to everyone but its designator (which is why rich people drive expensive cars). The positive (imitate me!) and negative (don’t imitate me!) moments of mimetic desire both inhere in the same act.

    This analysis permits us to add a degree of freedom to the triangular model in order to account for the different ways in which mimetic desire may be made the basis of a literary (or, more generally, “cultural”) plot. Instead of limiting the model’s variability to the distance– internal or external–of the mediator from the disciple, we consider as well the degree to which the positive and negative moments of mediation predominate at the origin of desire. On this point, I propose the following hypothesis: whereas the classical, typically theatrical, plot turns on negatively mediated desire, the modern, typically novelistic, plot turns on positively mediated desire.

    This explains, for starters, why Girard first discovered mimetic desire in the novel and only later thought to apply his schema to tragedy. Oedipus is no Julien Sorel seeking in Napoleon’s memoirs the course to follow. Always already the object of Laius’ aggression, he chooses a path always away from his paternal mediator. What drives the plot of Sophocles’ play is Oedipus’ quest not for Jocasta but for his father’s rival, that is, for himself as disciple of the negative moment of mediation. What Oedipus learns from mimetic desire is above all the impossibility of the subject’s coexistence with his mediator. Sandor Goodhart points out in “Oedipus and Laius’ Many Murderers” (Diacritics , 1978: 55-71) that we never really learn whether Oedipus killed Laius, because once the shepherd brought in to testify about the murder recognizes Oedipus as the child Jocasta gave into his care, Oedipus accepts his guilt as his mother’s husband and forgets about finding his father’s murderer. This switch, which Goodhart attributes to Sophocles’ awareness of the arbitrary necessity of Oedipus’ guilt, also demonstrates the priority of the negative moment of mimetic desire over the positive. The positive moment (incest with the mother) provides Oedipus and the audience with an imaginary object of desire, and guilt, that dissimulates for a moment the more banal negative moment (murder of the father), but it is the latter that drives the story, as it does in all tragedy. The tragic agon re-presents mimetic crisis not as a common desire for a central object but, on the contrary, as the chaotic aggression occasioned by a central object’s loss of desirability. The well-known fact that tragedy typically deals with plots known in advance is but another way of stating this fact; the “already-known” is the negative moment of desire. The name, and the history, of the novel make the contrast clear.


    Girard’s title sets up as a foil to the novel (romanesque) the “romantic” (romantique) that dissimulates mediation behind the apparent spontaneity of desire. Without accepting the invidious nature of Girard’s distinction, we may understand romance in its courtly origins as the first stage of modernity’s shift from interdiction of the sacred world to valorization of the profane world. The donna m’apparve that inaugurates courtly love marks the descent of the sacred to the earth. Whether or not Dante loved Beatrice because some nameless rival designated her to him, the crucial mediation that marks his love is the consecration of the profane world by the spirit of Christianity.

    The novel is no longer concerned with the descent of the sacred but with the disenchanted world of profane desire–the world of the marketplace. Even if “falling in love” still follows the Dante-Beatrice model these many centuries later, sacred mediation is not otherwise an effective way to chart a course through such a world. To construe the novel as a condemnation of mediated desire requires that we take its sacrificial structure as a moral, as in a fable. (Tobin Siebers’ Morals and Stories  [Columbia UP, 1992] insightfully examines the paradoxical relationship between narrative and the lesson we are expected/asked/dared to draw from it.) In its contribution to the practical world of its readers, the novel is much rather an encouragement to mediated desire; its cautionary moral is no less necessary in form and artificial in content in the novels that Girard accepts into his Pantheon than in Les liaisons dangereuses (see Chronicle 235). If the novel reveals the “demonic” nature of mediation, it also reveals that the lives of those who read novels are constructed on a demonic basis.

    Girard concludes his history of the novel with Alyosha Karamazov’s renewal of the Gospel message of love transcending worldly desire, a Christian equivalent of apocalyptic socialism. Once the critique of mediated desire truly becomes the moral of the novel, as it might arguably be said to do with Dostoevsky, from whose world the evolving consumer society so visible from Balzac through Flaubert and Zola is virtually absent, the novel becomes a prelude to spiritual-political change–such as the Bolshevik Revolution was supposed to bring about. But however much Girard wants his story to end with Dostoevsky, it ends in reality with Proust, whose esthetic transcendence of desire is at the same time the recycling of desire in a bourgeois world. To understand Proust’s artistic praxis as a tribute to the punctual revelation of the vanity of mimetic desire is, in his case above all, to succumb to the myth of the novel rather than to elucidate it.

    It is not surprising that the heroic age of the novel coincided with the birth, evolution, and implementation of the illusion that future society would do away with the mediations of human exchange. The novel concretely recounts a life of mediation while pointing abstractly to a set of meanings beyond mediation. Its survival through postmodernity depends on our willingness to identify with lives that can no longer be felt to incarnate any such meanings. Impatient with the exemplarity of these unexemplary biographies, I, like many others, have come to prefer the more concrete–and temporally limited–scenicity of cinema. The novel requires that we follow a protagonist from scene to scene in the faith that the time we have invested in reading will be capitalized in a thrill of narrative felicity. For me, like Marcel’s mother’s kiss, this moment, so eagerly awaited, cannot compensate by anticipation the loss of meaning that is its inevitable aftermath.


     

  • Telling One’s Story

    I should say at the outset that I am not good at telling stories. Finding the story-teller’s position too perilously hierarchical, I prefer to improvise an answer, interject a witticism, make up class lectures as I go along. Wary of generating narrative, I turn to theory to explain its dangers. This Chronicle is one of several stabs at an originary analysis of narrative, (see “Originary Narrative” in Anthropoetics 3, 2). I can only hope that the story of these attempts is leading to a happy ending.

    The semiotic theories that sought to derive stories from sentences are now largely forgotten. It is no problem to reduce narrative n to sentence s, but since what makes n a narrative is not (yet) in s, without a procedure for generating n from s, we have no real theory of narrative. The fundamental weakness of the semiotics of narrative lies not in its concept of derivation but in the insufficient theorizing of its point of departure. As I first tried to show twenty years ago in The Origin of Language, the declarative sentence cannot be taken for the originary basis of human language–nor, I might add, of narration–without falling into the familiar trap of metaphysics.

    The analysis of narrative requires a vocabulary that describes what narrative does without itself doing it. The sign is, minimally, a deferred gesture of appropriation. Emission of the sign “tells the story” of the conversion of the horizontal world of appetite into the vertical one of interdiction and desire. Any story can thus be described as a movement from (horizontal) crisis to the establishment of a new (vertical) significance. In this description, the key operator is the word “crisis.” A story creates a crisis in its audience; the word “crisis” by which we describe it does not.

    (A generation of literature professors would respond that the critic–excuse me, critical theorist–too creates a crisis. Yes, the critic creates mini-crisis. And what distinguishes a mini-crisis from a crisis is precisely that the first can be resolved by means of declarative sentences alone. When I read texts of critical theory, I never imagine real people living and dying–other than the writer and myself, respectively.)

    This distinction allows us to pinpoint the semiotician’s error. If we model our generative process on the substitution trees by which linguists generate an unlimited number of sentences from a root pattern such as NP + VP, the key substitution is not that of a linguistic entity, whether intermediary or terminal, for another, but that of an effective crisis on the audience’s scene of representation for the word “crisis” in our description. This procedure is analogous to semiotic analysis only in appearance. This generative substitution moves from language toward the world; it operates ostensively, not declaratively.

    An effective story puts us in an imaginary state of mimetic crisis–the “imagination” being only another name for our internalized scene of representation. Stories provide explanations for human institutions by making them appear as means of resolving crises. All stories are “just so” stories; what gives a bad reputation to those that explicitly go by that name is the same error that makes theology good anthropology but bad cosmology: the abuse of a cultural technique to explain a natural phenomenon. One of Kipling’s tales derives the rhinoceros‘ wrinkled skin from scratching at crumbs. Scratching an itch is a simple crisis-resolution pattern, a good metaphor for many acts, but it tells us little about rhinoceroses and their skin. (In contrast, the giraffe stretching its neck to reach high branches is a textbook illustration of Baldwinian evolution.)


    Today, although we tell each other fewer stories than in the past, we thus describe our interactions far more frequently. From boardrooms to classrooms, we constantly refer to every activity from marketing a product to interpreting a sonnet in terms of telling a story. The dominance of the story model is commonly said to reflect postmodern suspicion of the geometrical Cartesian ideal that presided over the Enlightenment and that remained dominant in Western culture, despite well-publicized romantic reactions, until the postwar era. There are no a priori rules for making a good story (whereas there are almost enough to allow you to construct a good proof). Even when its content is entirely verifiable, a story is fictional, its moral, “socially constructed.” These explanations all present the postmodern as a demystifying subtraction from the metaphysical logos. On the contrary, I think our fascination with stories bespeaks the intuition that this logos is itself an abstraction from an originary ostensive mode of signification that narrative continues to embody.

    The postmodern obsession with stories reflects its ethical obsessions. Story is about sacrifice; it ratifies the postmodern dominance of victimary epistemology. This explains an interesting anomaly, otherwise understood in political–which is to say, merely volitional–terms: Even the most dubious victimary claim (that of Mumia Abu-Jamal is a good recent example) suffices to turn postmodern skepticism about “master narratives” into its opposite, inciting the same thinkers who deconstruct with relish the most innocuous universalist discourse to compose and promote heavy-handed harangues in the style of Noam Chomsky, not to say the old Comintern. The reduction of causal explanation to narrative “construction” is a condemnation of the hegemonic logos presumed to preside over this construction. By in effect reducing the crisis internal to the story to the simple root term “crisis,” postmodern story-analysis claims to uncover the sacrificial arbitrariness of the resolution of this crisis through the designation of a scapegoat/victim.

    The reader may have noted the uncanny resemblance of this depiction of postmodern story-analysis with Girard’s reading of myth. This resemblance points to a reality that merits fuller discussion: the uneasy kinship of Girard, and thence of GA, with victimary thinking or “PC.” Just as neoconservatism reacts against victimary thinking in the domain of politics, mimetic theory and generative anthropology may be understood  in historical terms as reactions against–but also “with”–the victimary temper of postmodernity.


    A critique (by René Harrison) of the preceding Chronicle requires a response. It is claimed that by reducing all questions of justice to negotiations of resentment, I have denied the validity of the objective criteria of justice through which these negotiations might be settled. To phrase this argument in the historical context within which victimary thinking became dominant, it is as if the Jews should be asked to sit down with the Nazis to try to settle their differences.

    The problem, of course, is that once one has determined who are the Nazis and who the Jews (the Israelis–who have overwhelming military power? the Palestinians–who reprint the Protocols of the Elders of Zion?) the discussion is over. My point in declaring the end of the victimary era is not to delegitimize victims’ resentment against their persecutors, but to recognize that, generally speaking, this resentment has played out its value as a world-historical source of insight. In disagreeing with me, what must be refuted is not my political perspective but my sense of history.

    How is this matter relevant to the present Chronicle? Persecution and victimage are the heart of story-telling; to tell someone’s story is to tell the story of a victim. The immense charge that still derives from Foucauldian discourse analysis is that it claims to detect beneath the supposedly neutral language of rational exposition a narrative of sacralization. But it should not be forgotten that this narrative is essentially sacrificial. The “patriarchal” narrative, for example, legitimizes male hegemony by extolling men’s sacrifice (notably in war); their domination is presented as a result of this sacrifice.

    The end of the victimary era does not imply the end of storytelling as a means of determining justice. What it does imply is rather negotiation between the parties themselves, whether or not in the presence of a mediator. Each side tells its story; no single story imposes itself as the true one. In a successful post-victimary adjudication, the story that prevails is the story of the negotiation itself.

    Meanwhile, the stories we continue to tell are derealized. This is, I think, the sense of Raoul Eshelman’s notion of performatism (see “Performatism, or the End of Postmodernism“). In a film like Run, Lola, Run, the heroine gets three chances to succeed in rescuing her boyfriend. Such a story is less the representation of an action than of the mental rehearsal of an action. In effect, it is a crisis narrated from the perspective of one who is aware of the term “crisis.” The performatist narrative can pull off its external view of the narrative mechanism because it understands the cultural presuppositions of this mechanism, which knowingly operates in the domain of the unreal. That the performatist story openly but formally (“outside” “the story itself”) tells us that it is unreal does not make it fundamentally different from any other story. But it makes story as such a performance of self as narrator and spectator rather than the generation of culturally valid meanings through the depiction of a commonly-experienced crisis and its resolution. Performatism is the sign of a world where individuals, like factions in a dispute, each retain their myths but are unable to dissimulate their mythic identity. In such a world, the only real story is that of endless, unpredictable, and unrepeatable confrontation and hoped-for conciliation.