Author: staceymeeker

  • Firstness, Resentment, and the West

    As I noted in The End of Culture (1985), menin, the first word of the Iliad and thereby of high Western culture, refers to Achilles’ “rage” at his humiliation by Agamnenon, who took Achilles’ captive Briseis in exchange for his own, the daughter of a priest of Apollo whom he was forced to return. Because Agamemnon is the leader of the Greek forces, Achilles cannot confront him to requite this humiliation; his “rage” is an example of what Nietzsche analyzed as le ressentiment: a sense of injustice that cannot be openly avenged.

    The reader who is aware of this might then wonder why “the epistemology of resentment,” the reliance on this same sense of injustice as an objective source of moral justification, only appears nearly three millennia later with the French Revolution. The difference is that, as opposed to both Achilles and the participants in medieval peasant revolts, those who massacred the soldiers defending the Bastille on that famous day in 1789 were not called upon to repent.

    What explains this difference between the great Achilles and the sans-culottes, whose progeny have been among the most murderous of mortals? And how did these sans-culottes, who at least had good reasons to be resentful, morph into the crybullying antiracists of our own day, who would have their instructor suspended, if not fired, for making them feel unsafe by quoting the n-word from a 19th century novel? The difference is that woke resentment is not for one’s own victimization; even when the victim’s resentment is “triggered” on his own behalf, he is in essence acting as a symbolic representative of a whole class of victims.

    But we must not let the manipulative nature and apparent hypocrisy of Wokism lead us to dismiss it as unworthy of serious analysis. We should recall that the core principle of GA is that, with resentment as with language, necessity is the mother of invention. If there is a change in the operation of resentment from Achilles to our crybullies, or from the sans-culottes to the girl who brought a complaint about my Spanish teacher friend’s complimentary remarks about Columbus, this reflects some social necessity. The more apparently absurd a social phenomenon, the more urgently we must seek to uncover what made it necessary in order to diminish the level of tension in some area—even if it increase it in others, for society is complicated. Our political institutions, imperfect as they are, were designed to deal with this complexity; when they seem to break down, as at present, we are all the more obliged to seek an explanation.


    For the past few decades I have sought to understand the ever-increasing power of the victimary in our society. I believe that still today, most promoters of victimary ideas truly believe, to the extent that their sincerity is worth taking into consideration, that they are on the side of virtue and not vicariously exploiting others’ resentments to benefit themselves. More precisely, their actions are apotropaic, not merely on an immediate level, for fear of pressure either from other members of the elite or from victimary activists, but more broadly, from a sense that “social justice” requires society’s especial concern.

    Conservatives have been saying since 1789, and certainly since 1917, and even more certainly since 1989, you’ve been there, done that, and look how it turned out, and yet the Left is continually reborn as the party of the victimized. The amount of voluntary self-humiliation undergone by the elite and passed on to the population as a whole is painful to behold: deliberately embarrassing reformulations of vocabulary (enslaved person, even pregnant person, “what are your pronouns?”…); all presumably meant to compensate for inequities so scandalous that they justify these humiliations in the minds of those who practice them. That black people are Black and white people only white has become standard even in a conservative paper like the WSJ. Is this supposed to make up for slavery and segregation?


    The UCLA (student) Bruin Film Society opens its weekly announcements with the following paragraph—followed by a set of more everyday “antiracist” statements:

    The Bruin Film Society at UCLA acknowledges our presence on the traditional, ancestral, and unceded territory of the Gabrielino/Tongva peoples. The struggle for Indigenous Rights affects us all, especially as students that actively utilize the resource that is their land. Bruin Film Society fully backs the Lands Back movement, which advocates for the decolonization and rematriation [sic] of all land back to their traditional caretakers. We would also like to extend this statement to the colonized and militarized island territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific as well as the forcefully taken state of Hawai’i and their Native People.

    Now really, if we gave all land back to their [its?] traditional caretakers, wouldn’t we have to go back to “where we came from”? The point is always that we are the ones who must compensate for our success; it doesn’t matter which peoples had been driven out by the last people to take over the land, even if it was the Aztecs, who ate their captives. The Christian attitude is to focus on our (the West’s) sins, not those of others.

    Yet the very point of this manifesto is its purely symbolic nature. The authors haven’t the least intention of doing anything about rematriating California. This is not a promise of action but a hyperbolic statement of abstract-unreal intention that is presumably all the more virtuous for its unreality. Only deplorables demand the straightforward realism of “Put your money where your mouth is.”

    The comparison is sometimes made between the Woke and our Puritan witch-burning ancestors, who certainly “signaled their virtue.” But a Puritan would find the same things outrageous in the above paragraph as I do. A Puritan who professed all the right values but caroused and frequented “loose women” would be denounced (or worse!) for hypocrisy; what is notable here is that the question of hypocrisy has clearly never crossed the author’s mind. The author is ipso facto without agency; if anything is to be done about this, it’s Mommy and Daddy who’ll have to take care of it. This is a new take on the idea that faith can move mountains.

    The real point of these deliberate self-humiliations—for linguistic coercion, which violates our linguistic conscience, which is to say, a part of our internalized sacred, is deeply humiliating—is to distance us from the patriotic attachment to the national community of the USA that was taken for granted until a short time ago, but is now considered deplorable, like Obama’s clinging a few years earlier. What we cling to is denial of the victimary truth that our “white” society was built not just regrettably and in part, but essentially and irretrievably, on the backs, on the land, on the lives, of George-Floyd-like Others, whose forgotten misery, enslavement, and untimely deaths are what allow us to enjoy our privileged life.

    And perhaps the most horrible aspect of this is that there is truly nothing we can do now to change it—other than acknowledge it at every moment, in every meeting announcement—so that our very inaction becomes the gravest of all accusations leveled at the evil of Western civilization: we are powerless to right the wrongs from which we profit.


    In the Christian world-view, the point of Jesus’ mission on Earth was to absolve us of the profound and indelible sinfulness implicit in our human ancestry. How does the notion of “original sin,” which Girard identifies with the practice, if not any specific incident, of “emissary murder,” enter into the originary hypothesis, in which the human can emerge only from a successful event of communal sharing? If indeed the human begins by solving the problem of intraspecific violence, whence comes this hubristic challenge to the sacred itself?

    In a word, what is the anthropological significance of Eve and Adam’s eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil? What element of human experience does this disobedience refer to?

    The internalized sacred is not a reflex; we experience it as a transcendental will, but one that we must obey, that requires our active assent. The idea that we are made in God’s image reflects the fact that the sacred will is conveyed to us not as a reflex but as a conscious judgment that we share, however much we are tempted to contradict it. But in the Genesis scene, God’s single interdiction to Adam does not follow this pattern: it is imposed from without, with no explanation. Obviously the interdiction itself, understood not as the voice of the sacred within the conscience, but as a command from without, defines God as communicating with Adam from a higher plane. The interdiction, in other words, does not, like the deferral of appropriation in the originary scene, correspond to the “inner voice” of the sacred; it affirms God’s firstness. And as I pointed out in Chronicle 419, that Eve listens to the serpent—two potentially resentful creatures—in disobeying God’s order allows us to trace resentment’s place in human culture to its very origin.

    In GA’s hypothesis, the reality of “evil” must have preceded the “good” solution to the distribution of the meat: the sacred path of deferral in the interest of common satisfaction must have been preceded by many unhappy counter-examples. That is, to be human can only mean being already aware of the difference between “good and evil” as precisely what in the originary event prevents taking anything for oneself until all can communally do so.

    In Genesis 3:22, God expresses the fear that, now that Adam, knowing good and evil, “is become as one of us,” he might “put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever”—whence the necessity of “sending him forth.” God’s reason for the expulsion of the couple receives less attention than the fact of their shame at their nakedness, and of the expulsion itself.

    The ambiguously plural designation of God ([Adonai] Elohim) makes understandable the “one of us”; I believe this is the only place in the Bible that alludes directly to a community of gods. The “tree of life” that confers immortality may be understood as embodying the sacred itself, which exists only as a transcendent force. Outside Eden, Adam can know good and evil, but he is condemned to mortality. What is it then that within Eden would give the possessor of this knowledge access to immortality?

    The explanation that I would offer for this phenomenon explains as well Girard’s derivation of cultural reciprocity from the violence of emissary murder, rather than understanding such murders, and the Crucifixion itself, as posterior revelations of the mimetic rivalry that had been suppressed by the successful deferral of violence implicit in the emergence of the sign.

    Such causal inversions are characteristic of Biblical revelations. The most obvious is the “binding of Isaac” in Genesis 22, where God orders Abraham to sacrifice his son, but at the last moment supplies a ram as his replacement. Everything in the story suggests that sacrificing a ram was a mode of worship and feasting that had been the norm since the beginning, but the fact remains that in this scene, the ram was a substitute for Isaac, so that henceforth in making an animal sacrifice, Abraham and his successors will be reminded that the spiritual reality of the sacrifice is of our own blood, a gesture repeated on a transcendent level by Christians ingesting the communion wafer.

    From an anthropological standpoint, the success of the originary scene could not have abolished all memory of the failed scenes that must have preceded it during the transition from serial (ape) to egalitarian (human) distribution. What this suggests is that the anthropological significance of the Fall reflects the discovery, following the scenic discovery of true reciprocity, that human seriality, firstness, has not for all that been abolished, but merely deferred: that the sacred cannot, like an animal inhibition, provide us with a reflexive protection from the resentments that the originary scene avoided. It is in this sense that the originary sense of communal harmony would have been followed by the understanding that the sacred space of the scene could not become a place of permanent habitation.

    Treating this as our “original sin” is a way of explaining that the sacred does not protect us from ourselves, that to know its imperatives does not abolish our selfish impulses. Once we can say “good” we can say “evil”—and do it. To understand this as our originary “fault,” in both the superficial and profound senses of the word, may be understood as the beginning of theology, of seeking to understand the sacred, not simply as a mechanism of deferral, but as possessing a set of intentions for us that we are commanded to impose on ourselves in the absence of the assembled community whose mimetic force makes them impossible to reject.


    Unlike Islam, the Christian world understands our destiny not as submission, but as liberation. By accepting Jesus, humanity can start over, undo the violence without which it would not have come into existence. But alas, such faith, however far extended beyond its Hebrew origins, remains ultimately tribal, not global; it expresses solidarity with “the human community,” not abstractly, but as those who share a common heritage, be it only what Benedict Anderson in an immortal phrase called an imagined community. Thus while Islam retains its dream of the all-inclusive caliphate, as does Eastern Orthodoxy in a more ambivalent form, Western Christianity, however much it seeks world unity, has resolved itself into a system of “Westphalian” nation-states.

    But today these “imagined communities” are victims of a plague far more spiritually deadly than Covid-19. That they have survived and prospered is turned into a proof of the evil they have visited on those who have not. The genius of the Woke version of the epistemology of resentment is to find in firstness, the privilege of the founders, the source of all evil. Not so much acts of inequity as the very being of inequity must somehow be suppressed—after which, its embodiment in material advantages is of no great importance.

    Why is this happening now? Why is the first generation after the death of the Communist International discovering these noble moral projects to rectify the immoral conquests of past, unWoke generations?

    Lost with traditional religious training and its secular equivalent in historical revelation (“The International Soviet shall be the human race!”) is the sense of human firstness as a positive phenomenon—that providing a space for the “pursuit of happiness” and success is, despite inevitable excesses, the only means of progress, and indeed, the only way to permit the failures to ultimately turn their destinies around. That the woke tacitly recognize this is reflected in their at most lukewarm hostility to those whose “pursuit of happiness” has indeed succeeded. Bernie Sanders may rail against “millionaires and billionaires,” but the worst they are threatened with is increasing their tax rates, as if their accountants and lawyers were not earning their six and seven-figure salaries. On the contrary, it is only the health of the market economy that permits the woke to flourish—even while underfunding the military it will need to defend itself.


    The 20th-century heirs of the post-Christian epistemology of resentment have destroyed much, but as Adam Smith once said, “there’s a lot of ruin in a nation,” and wokeness’ symbolic damages are the easiest ruins to repair.

    Without descending into micro-politics, I think that much would be resolved, in Europe and the US as well as the Middle East, by the continued pursuit of the last administration’s project of bringing together the three Abrahamic faiths. It is quite significant that most of those who violently rebel against Western civilization, including most violent American black nationalists, identify not with “Marxism” but with Jihad. But today’s jihadism expresses a politics of despair. With the expansion of cordial relations, this self-sacrificial energy could be turned to more positive ends, and serve as an example to those who surrender to the fecklessness of historical guilt.

    Generative anthropology offers us a reasonably clear understanding of the West’s victimary problem. But if I let my optimism be guided by the Abraham Accords, it is because I have no illusions that originary thinking itself can take the place of transcendental faith. The benefit we can obtain from anthropological understanding is to encourage the confluence of great historical forces that, no doubt fortunately, lie beyond the reach of our theories, but to which these theories can supply a possibly useful catalyst.

    Above all, while freely admitting our sins, we must resist “white guilt” in all its forms. Instead, we should bend our efforts to safeguarding “Abrahamic” Western civilization, which has indubitably been the human community’s greatest achievement, against the forces that, seeing the depths to which it has temporarily sunk—as reflected in our current political leadership—would humiliate and destroy it.

  • Paradox and the Future of Judeo-Christianity

    As explained in the previous Chronicle, ever since Alain Cohen pointed me toward Watzlawick et al’s study of “pragmatic paradox,” I have viewed paradox, at first vaguely, then more fundamentally, as the Ur-concept of what I have come to describe as “humanistic anthropology.” Not as a para-logical footnote to the logical, but because what is not paradoxical is simply logical and therefore predetermined, as are the theorems of mathematics once the axioms are spelled out, and cannot therefore explain the “existential” freedom of human action guaranteed by our species’ discovery/invention of the sign and the scene.

    It is the misapprehension that “reality” is logically ordered that leads, or led, metaphysicians to believe that studying concepts, really words, could reveal the “essence of reality,” whereas the real “studying” that goes on concerns not the words but their resonance in the mind, by which they call up intuitions of real-world behavior. Whence the potential of GA, a phenomenology based on an originary hypothesis, to relate anthropological concepts to the foundations established in the event/scene of origin.

    Metaphysics sees the key to wisdom in being able to understand words like “Being.” This is a vice that Girard cured me of. Instead of trying to get back to the Heideggerian Ur-concepts deconstructed—but not replaced—by Derrida, GA offers a pragmatic model to which philosophical abstractions may be referred. Along these lines, despite Sartre’s present unfashionability, I contend that L’être et le néant‘s “psychological” descriptions of the pour-soi and the en-soi, bad faith, etc., represent a real advance in contrast not only with classical philosophy but also with Heidegger’s “existential” mysticizing about das Sein.

    But providing an originary hypothesis is only the point of departure of GA, and the fear that haunts me is that connecting its phenomenology to historically attested cultural institutions continues to prove a very difficult task for those who today must perforce conceive their projects in terms acceptable to the institutions that fund research—in contrast with the diminishing numbers of those of us whose (tenured) professor’s salaries had sufficed to permit them to concoct ideas sitting at their computers.

    Although no one is giving out grants to study paradox, elucidating its intrinsic connection with human culture, a project central to the New Criticism, now deprecated in favor of endless iterations of Cultural Marxism, is particularly urgent today as the accelerating degeneration of our common culture daily makes clearer its bankruptcy as a mode of human self-understanding. The sanity of common sense that we have lost can be restored only through a renewal of this understanding; “turning back the clock” is not an option.


    As an object of intellectual puzzlement—for which I am happy to second Matthew Taylor’s recommendation of Nicholas Falletta’s The Paradoxicon (Wiley, 1983)—paradox is a catchall word for the real or apparent self-contradictions hidden within seemingly rational systems, where straightforward definitions lead to unexpected outcomes—as in the St. Petersburg paradox, a betting scheme in which each single turn has an “infinite” expectation of gain.

    But the human context of paradox goes far deeper than mathematical games. In a comparison between Zeno’s paradoxes of motion and the Mahayana Buddhist Nagarjuna’s argument purporting to demonstrate the impossibility of any sentence’s conveying a real-world truth (in Chronicles 515516), I proposed that we should view Zeno’s challenges to common-sense views of motion, quantity, etc., as pointing to the need for a more precise conceptualization/notation, such as would be supplied in the 17th century by calculus. In contrast, Nagarjuna’s point was rather to demonstrate the impossibility of precise worldly language, as prefatory to recognizing the illusory nature of the concern with worldly as opposed to transcendental experience. We need not share these Buddhist views to recognize that it is Nagarjuna rather than Zeno who anticipates the paradoxical de-constructions of Western post-metaphysical thought.


    The underlying fascination of paradox lies in its inevitability in any attempt to re-present reality. Nor does the problem go away now that philosophers have put the “R-word” on the no-no list; whatever one claims language or any other sign-system does, it cannot avoid the danger of unwanted self-reference, the confusion of layers of meaning.

    The simplest illustration of this is that a map of a given territory cannot include a representation of itself without falling into infinite regression. But in more culturally relevant terms, the same paradox is implicit in the fundamental unit of human culture, which is the scene. However much Renaissance drama, recognizing this danger, seeks to bring it into the open by offering the “play within a play,” it cannot avoid revealing/exploiting this “imperfection.”

    The bottom line is that paradox is a quality of representation, and since only humans represent, paradox is a fundamental quality unique to humans. DNA doesn’t “represent” proteins even if it contains codes for constructing them. Only humans re-present, and the German Darstellen, meaning “putting there,” no doubt the model for Heidegger’s Dasein, “being there,” reflects the scenic nature of language as a deferral of physical appropriation, placing its object on a scene that derives ultimately from the participatory scene of ritual distribution.

    Decades of “animal-friendly” analyses of intelligence should not obscure our absolute difference in this regard from, as far as we know, the rest of the universe. A propos of this, reading magazines like Science News makes one realize the depth of the scientific denial of the Earth’s uniqueness, including not just “intelligent life” but life itself. One cannot read an article on astronomy without finding constant mentions of life: planets that might support it, elements and compounds that suggest its presence, even in our own solar system. This is the cosmic version of the humble-resentful, crybullying denials of firstness that make up our post-Christian Wokeness.

    Of course I can be shown up as a Terracentric fool next week by an earthshaking discovery, but I’d be surprised if life is ever found anywhere else. This doesn’t prove the “existence of God,” but it lets us appreciate the rarity of our planet. After all, the minimal anthropic hypothesis is simply that the universe is so organized that (human) life is possible: la preuve! But we don’t know how many gazillions of universe-years and -spaces may have preceded its emergence.


    We recall that in the hypothetical originary event, the sign as aborted gesture of appropriation functions to demonstrate that, although only one person can appropriate a given object, any number can attend to it, or intend it, whence the potentially peace-bringing effect of joint shared attention. But the shareability of representations does not increase that of their referents. In the originary event, no one needed or expected to appropriate the whole object in question; previously the Alpha had taken possession of the whole, but only to bite off the first piece, in contrast with the central distribution function in despotisms, where the ruler or the State takes the whole thing and doles out pieces to those it favors.

    The originary function of the sacred as the source of the deferral that promises a “providential” solution to those who follow its precepts is to serve as a transcendental agent of the egalitarian “moral model,” imposing it on the members of the group without standing as itself a potential worldly rival to them: the Word “appropriates” its worldly object in such a way that it remains physically divisible among the community.

    The crucial step beyond the idolatrous “compactness” of the archaic empires is the recognition that any embodiment of the sacred is by nature paradoxical and can be understood only, as the deconstructionists would say, sous rature. Thus the Hebrew One God, the minimal embodiment of the West’s active divinity, in contrast with the Nirvana-oriented sacred of South Asia or the communal spirits of China and Japan, can call himself ehyeh asher ehyeh (I am what/that I am), but may only be referred to as Hashem (the name) by his worshipers. This minimal linguistic connection, consecrating the absolute difference between God and man, suffices for the Jews without their having to dwell on it. That the Jews traditionally retain a “familial” relationship to God, as in many Talmudic passages and even in everyday “conversations,” is a paradox accepted as a transcendental reality that need not be tested by reason.

    In any event, neither Judaism nor Islam—which by giving the divinity a name while interdicting physical representation, tacitly acknowledges the absence of this “familial” relation—insists on paradoxicality as an element of its worship. Nor, as far as I know, does Buddhism, which has no problem with multiple divine entities, including extra-Buddhist ones, and indeed sees divinity—defined not as being but self-extinction (Nirvana), achievement of “pure,” empty scenicity—as the aim of all spiritual beings.

    Christianity is different. At first, Christianity insists on paradox (“Scandal to the Jews, folly to the pagans”), and in so doing, as Girard realized, offers itself as an ultimate, liminal religion, on the frontier of demystifying the sacred as absurdity. It imposes on its faithful the most extreme actes de foi: belief in concrete worldly “miracles,” not in illo tempore but now, in historical time, witnessed by contemporaries.

    Yet, as I understand it, historical Christianity does not insist on its paradoxicality. I am no expert on Christian theology, but I do know that Tertullian’s credo quia absurdum est is not recognized as good Christian doctrine. We don’t believe because it is absurd. Because it seems absurd? Because the belief appears incompatible with common sense in a way that Judaism is not?

    I would say that this half-stifled recognition of the paradoxicality of “true religion” is an anthropological revelation, one that liberates Christianity from self-indulgent “religiosity” and sets it on a path, as those can say who have followed the path a bit farther, not to “atheism,” but to what I have called anthropology in the etymological sense, human self-knowledge.

    What Christianity recognizes as revealed in the Crucifixion is the inextricable connection (mediated by the Spirit) between the human and the sacred that transcends the human. The self-reflection made possible by the deferral of appetite makes us aware of (1) the peaceful reciprocity that defers mortality, yet also (2) the inevitability of our mortality nonetheless, now become an object of understanding and therefore of dread. It is this dread, Heidegger’s Sein zum Tode, that leaves us vulnerable to the temptation of the “original sin” that rejects the God-given understanding of the human condition as providential, given that we must perish in any event.

    Thus in order to accept the Christian synthesis, the believer is obliged not only to accept the miracles attendant on Jesus’ birth and death—most importantly, the Resurrection—but to have faith in his own resurrection “in the flesh” in a restored Eden or Gehenna according to the verdict of the Last Judgment. And this belief, so powerfully stated in John 11:25 (“I am the resurrection and the life…”), however little it forms an element of public discourse today, has indubitably provided until very recently the motive force of Christian faith, and in a different form, of Islam as well; even Judaism has not altogether escaped the hope of an afterlife, albeit one that preserves its deniability.

    Genesis tells us that it was Eve’s and Adam’s sin that made us mortal, but in anthropological, in the first place, biological terms, the contrary is obviously the case: it is awareness of our mortality that tempts us to disobey the will of the sacred to profit selfishly from our limited time on Earth.

    Christian Paradox and the Next Stage of Western Culture

    I have repeatedly referred to Michael Tomasello’s egregious lines about the origin of religion (quoted in Chronicle 519) because this off-the-cuff dismissal of a fundamental element of human culture on the part of a cognitive scientist who has analyzed in detail the first utterances of his child—one could hardly be farther from Roy Rappaport’s idea of the “coevality” of language and religion—is itself an anthropological revelation.

    I view it as marking the endpoint of the epistemology of resentment, at the moment when it loses its resentfulness and becomes simply the new common sense, the Geplapper of our “secular” world. It does not (yet) correspond to Wokism, the current elite post-religion, but the link is clear enough. If religion is, as Marx suggested, an “inverted world” meant to dupe the exploited into accepting their exploitation in hopes of an other-worldly reward, then to reject it need not imply, as Marx and his followers thought, the end of economic exploitation. For originary scenic equality may have led to more or less equal distribution of meat, but the necessary precondition of this distribution was the symmetrical, reciprocal exchange of the sign. The magical belief of Wokism is that, once this symbolic exchange has eliminated all “privilege,” all will be as if the meat too will be distributed without “privilege.”

    From the outside this looks like arrant hypocrisy; the significant element in the difference between me and a billionaire is surely not the color(s) of our skin. (And indeed, the more socialistic Wokists do want to tax billionaires more heavily.) But the Wokists are clearly onto something in effectively returning to the very origin of human society to establish what they might call originary equity. We cannot help remarking that this reliance on symbolic equality is an explicit element of Christian faith. Like the multiplied loaves and fishes, or the communion wafer, it is the infinitely shareable Word that signifies the equality and brotherhood of mankind.

    Is Christianity to blame for Woke epistemology? Aren’t the Woke just being extra-good Christians, defining the one real sin as the denial of full human reciprocity?


    Here is a benignly trivial example: With the lifting of COVID bans, the Santa Monica Public Library has declared that it is no longer charging fines, clearly less to alleviate the delinquents’ financial burden than to avoid any semblance of a “microaggression.”

    This little bit of wokeness is a relatively harmless corollary of Soros-sponsored DAs’ not prosecuting petty criminals and/or letting them go free without bail: victimocracy. It reinterprets imitatio Christi as (white) society’s Christ-like taking on the burden of other people’s sins, not in any active sense, and certainly not in order to correct them; merely by abstractly assuming society’s responsibility for them. Of course, this leaves the actual victims of the crime, library or shoplifted store or petty theft victim, as collateral damage, like the eggs broken for Lenin’s omelet—we’re saving the criminal’s soul, let us not worry about material trivia. Particularly if we live in “safe” neighborhoods.

    I don’t think Jesus would be at all happy with this version of Christianity. In fact, I imagine he would find it even more hypocritical than the “scribes and Pharisees.” Yet one cannot deny that its caricatural paradoxicality is indeed “in the spirit” of Christianity: the last shall be the first, publicans and sinners preferable to high priests, saving an adulteress from stoning… It is not to calumniate Christianity itself to observe that Wokism’s resentful flaunting of the originary moral model is rooted in Christianity’s highest aspirations—and only by a considerable extrapolation, those of Judaism, which has sagely kept God and man separated.

    Viewing this process within the historical dialectic of Western religion, generative anthropology provides a lucid understanding of it, rather than rejecting it as absurd and waiting for “common sense” to take over—as does happily seem to be occurring in some extreme cases, such as the omnipresent male/transwoman swimmer whose victories are beginning to be questioned by NCAA officials as well as some (female) swimmers.

    But to put Wokism behind us, we cannot simply go back to an earlier state. The return to common sense from “craziness” fails to explain the basis of the craziness, that is, fails to learn from its faulty extrapolations rather than simply condemning them. Even the most horrible moments of history must serve us as lessons. Even the Holocaust. Had the West made a greater effort to understand the Holocaust, instead of simply condemning it as an abomination (“Never again!”), it might not find it so easy today to see Israel compared with Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa.

    GA, as a synthesis of the two branches of French Theory, is in a real sense a reaction to Wokism and its victimary predecessors. One of the reasons for my enthusiasm toward the Abraham Accords, Trump’s greatest international achievement, is that I cannot help thinking that a real integration of Islam within the expanded culture of the West should restore what I consider its one great strength that the West increasingly lacks: a respect for ethical order. Cutting criminals’ heads off is going too far, but canceling library fines and refusing to convict shoplifters, or as in France (and elsewhere in Europe), allowing criminal gangs to control whole cities and attack police and firemen, is not right either. The Wokist caricature of Christianity can use some counterweight.

    Coda

    A very long time ago I wrote the phrase: le paradoxe est antérieur à la logique: paradox is prior to logic. At the time, it seemed like a simple boutade, an intuition en l’air.

    I can now give substance to this idea. If the human derives in the first place from the failure of reflexive animal mechanisms to prevent internal conflict, then this “paradoxical” breakdown is the necessary precondition of human language, which is alone capable of representing these mechanisms in logical terms. The fundamental error of metaphysics is in seeking to situate this rational capacity in the system from the beginning. For metaphysics cannot fathom the paradoxical différance that marks the transition from the “natural” to the human.

  • Esthetic Paradox

    Back in the days when I wrote in French, I published a little book called Le paradoxe de Phèdre (Nizet, 1975), which included a separate essay entitled “Le paradoxe constitutif du roman.” My purpose was to situate the novel within an overall conception of the esthetic that I called l’esthétique paradoxale. The original inspiration for this notion was my reading of Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson’s Pragmatics of Human Communication (Norton, 1967), which under the inspiration of Gregory Bateson’s work in Palo Alto drew attention to the phenomenon of pragmatic paradox, the all-time favorite example of which is the Jewish mother who tells her son, “Be spontaneous!”, asking him to become the source of his own inspiration while at the same time being inspired by her order.

    My idea was that any work of art is in the first place an objective artifact that I encounter outside myself, but that if I want to “use” it in an appropriate manner, I have to “take it into myself,” not merely look at it or listen to it, but experience it on my internal scene of representation. Yet we are never free to simply treat these experiences as our own, since we must constantly return to the work to confirm them. Our attention, which is to say, our intention, oscillates between what we have made our own and what we must take from the work.

    This is true even in the case of the plastic arts, where we can see the whole painting or sculpture in a single glance. For there too our attention oscillates between the physical appearance of the work and our mental reconstruction of it. This is clear in the case of a representational painting or sculpture, but it applies as well to abstract art, at least if it truly deserves the name of art, rather than merely creating a pleasing visual pattern that evokes no significant worldly experience.

    In a literary work of whatever category, the reader must constantly return from his subjective construction of the text to attend to what follows. This is obviously true in a real-time dramatic presentation, where the spectator is not in control of its temporal unfolding, but it applies all the more powerfully to reading, where, as a consequence of the advent of “silent reading,” as recounted in a celebrated passage of Augustine’s Confessions (6:3), the reader has the opportunity to pause and reflect at any moment of the text before proceeding—making him all the more aware of his dependence on what follows. But however obscure a (modern) text may appear at first reading, it is only of value to us if we can finally come to read it through, particularly if it is a poem, as a literary work is meant to be read.

    What is paradoxical about this process is very much the same as with the Jewish mother’s command. Just as the son cannot act “spontaneously” without recalling her prior order, so the consumer of an artwork and in particular, the reader of a narrative, is on the one hand provided material from which he constructs an imaginary world in his mind, yet on the other, is obliged to learn from the author the outcome of whatever anticipations he may have conceived. The oscillation between the work and its imaginary reconstruction involves a constant arousal and deferral of desire that, if the work is successful, provides the reader with a final “catharsis.”


    In my essay on the paradox of the novel, I conceived this relationship as a dialectic between the moment and the totality of the text, whose length (recalling the novel’s picaresque origins) obliges it to contain a multiplicity of concrete scenes. To illustrate my point, I cited two exemplary passages; one from the first modern French novel, Mme. de Lafayette’s 1678 La princesse de Clèves, and one from the end of the novel’s classical age, Proust’s 3000-page A la recherche du temps perdu.

    In the first, the narrator shows us the Duc de Nemours, who loves the Princess without daring to approach her, spying on her in a pavilion as she creates a memento by tying ribbons bearing Nemours’ colors around a cane that she had secretly taken from his sister, then contemplates the painting of a battle which includes Nemours’ portrait. “One cannot express what M. de Nemours felt in that moment.” This scene is crucial to the plot, because although the Princess avoids Nemours once she suspects his presence, her jealous husband, who had sent a gentleman to spy on Nemours, learning of this and other similar attempts, and not convinced of his wife’s innocence, is taken ill and dies.

    In the second passage, from near the end of Proust’s novel, the narrator tells us that, after many years during which he was altogether discouraged about his literary project of recovering “lost time,” he steps on a loose paving-stone that reminds him of a similar experience in his youth in the courtyard of St. Mark’s in Venice, making him feel as though the years separating the two experiences had suddenly been abolished. At this moment, as in his famous madeleine experience near the beginning of the novel, he has the sense of re-finding (retrouver) all the details of a past world he had thought lost, and this allows him to begin his great project of recuperating le temps perdu.


    Only humans have scenes, a seemingly obvious fact that is ignored by those who seek to understand human behavior in quantitative, pre-human terms. Scenes are what make up history, as only humans can conceive it, that is, conceiving rather than simply experiencing moments within a significant, potentially providential totality. The notions of history, destiny, project,… may be anticipated in the universe of animal reflexes, but only what Sartre called the human pour-soi can conceive such ideas, because, precisely, they are ideas, not percepts, accessible only to creatures with language. As Aristotle tells us, art “imitates” such totalities, and this imitation is an intentional act that makes the artist, as Gustave Flaubert put it in a famous letter written during the composition of Madame Bovary, “like God in his creation” (see Chronicle 725).

    Thus the audience of any artwork must rely on the creator’s “providential” will to leave the world of his creation in a state of harmony, accomplishing what Aristotle called catharsis, the purging of what are in effect potentials of mimetic aggression. This faith in the novelist’s “godlike” powers obliges us to recognize in these novels the mutual necessity of the individual moments and the text as a whole, whether implicit, as in the first novel, or explicit, as in the second (meta-) novel. And this is true even when the narrator (not the author) speaks in the first person, or as postmodern writers are wont to do, comments on his own narration, adding a supplementary paradox to what is already paradoxical, as if to make this fundamental paradoxicality appear perverse rather than necessary.

    The theory of esthetic paradox puts in scenic, human terms the tension between detail and whole, or to use the classical terminology, unity in variety. No variety = no esthetic unity; the scene must be prolonged, as it was already at the origin, yet still remain a/the scene. This extensibility gives proof of an enduring sacred will that preserves for its duration the human community from self-destruction. (The counter-example of the normally one-moment joke or mot d’esprit—which itself may be extended for ironic effect—depends on the anticipated effect of laughter that reflects the abortion of the scene as originally set. But this would require another Chronicle.)

    The originary event, as I have described it, must have had more than a momentary duration, prolonging the deferral of action that created the human scene in the first place. Thus we should conceive this scene as already structured by the same dialectic of moment and totality that we find in Proust’s 3000 pages. Even if the participants did nothing other than repeat the originary sign and point at the central object, we cannot imagine that their passions could have been calmed by a single gesture. Moore’s Law tells us that computers can double their information processing capacity every two years or so, but we cannot—thus we can appreciate Homer today as his audience did 3000 years ago.

    The story of Scheherazade is an allegory of art in general; the duration of the story, and in the broader sense, that of the scenes of human culture—religion, art, games, et al.—helps protect society from mimetic violence. The decision to single out a particular moment of a work draws attention to this feature of art, in all the poignancy of knowing that even the most perfect moment, like that of Nemours, is insufficient to constitute a whole. In contrast, we note that no such moment is involved in a “happy ending”: they lived happily ever after or ils vécurent heureux et ils eurent beaucoup d’enfants merely summarize what follows the resolution of a human crisis.


    Looking back on this understanding of the esthetic, it strikes me as lacking in one important dimension to bring it into harmony with generative anthropology. While the interplay of moment and totality indeed applies to the modern novel as well as to the originary event, what is missing from this theory of esthetic paradox is the anthropological basis common both to the originary and to all subsequent scenes: their necessity, born in the potential violence of a mimetic crisis. The birth of the sign was the necessary result of a critical situation which would otherwise have ended in chaos, one of sufficient importance such that, in the absence of the solution provided by deferral and preserved by the sign, it might well have condemned the nascent human species to extinction. The scene’s “playful” repetition in artworks depends on the arousal and appeasement of a fictional crisis into which we are persuaded to enter in order to enjoy a simulation of the originary catharsis, which reinforces our solidarity with our fellows and sets an example for crises of our own.

    La princesse tells the life story of a young woman who is warned from the start by her mother of the dangers of the court’s immorality, what Girard would describe as its exacerbation of mimetic desire, posing dangers to her virtue and well-being. The supremely seductive Nemours poses these dangers in concrete terms, and the novel until the very end describes the princess’s determined resistance to his attractiveness, including refusing to marry him even after her husband’s death, to which she well knows that his not altogether unjustified jealousy of Nemours had contributed, and finally ending her life in a convent, leaving as her legacy “inimitable examples of virtue.”

    Proust’s story is much more complex, but throughout, although it often focuses on characters other than “Marcel” (this name appears only once in the text of the novel, but it has become traditional to thus designate the narrator), it treats them within the context of his own worldly desires, along with, always in the background, his transcendental project to write the novel that would recover, in a meaningful autobiographic totality, the “lost time” of these ultimately frivolous desires. In contrast with La princesse, where the heroine faces a crisis whose structure is summed up in the scene we have described, bringing together her secret love for Nemours and the impossibility of its realization, the individual scenes of Marcel’s life are important both as distractions from and material for his overarching novelistic project.

    Worldly fulfillment is not Marcel’s aim. To reach a satisfactory outcome, he must learn through experience that the pursuit of worldly desire is not a possible source of his work’s ultimate resolution—that “lost time” can be “regained”/retrouvé only by understanding his experience  independently of desire, which only bears us into the future—and to disappointment. This understanding is revealed not by dramatic interactions with the objects of our passion, but by the irruption into our memory of seeming trivial moments that bring back to us whole realms of life that we had thought forgotten.

    What is significant in Marcel’s existence, in other words, are not the superficial crises of desire he undergoes throughout the novel, but solitary experiences of purely personal significance that assure him of his human uniqueness. Proust’s novel can be called a meta-novel because by redefining the crisis that it must resolve as the possibility of its own creation, it puts into question the relevance of “mere” worldly accomplishments and satisfactions as providing a satisfactory resolution to the crisis we see ourselves as coming into the world to solve.

    But if the only story one can tell is that of one’s transformation into the Godlike artist who alone can tell one’s story, then how can we continue to tell (other) stories? And yet we do, if only with an added nuance of irony. In the works of novelists who have absorbed Proust’s lesson, the protagonist implicitly understands the irony of his not quite worldly situation: his complicity with his creator’s godlike role in helping to prolong the survival of our species.


    Coda

    Those of us who can recall the excitement at the emergence of the nouveau roman in the 50s and 60s were told by critics such as Roland Barthes that the roman lisible was giving way to the roman scriptible, the “writable novel” that, rather than catering to the reader’s traditional passivity, forces him to “compose” the novel on his own from incomplete indications provided by the author. Finnegans Wake was a preview of this process.

    But when in 2012 I gave a seminar on the nouveau roman in what was still the UCLA French Department, the titles of the novels I chose were barely familiar to the graduate students who would have devoured them (or pretended to) 50 years earlier. Today, even the most original authors no longer pretend to transform the basic act of reading in this manner—no doubt simply because the results, however much jouissance they may have procured to Barthes (though I really wonder), are painful to read, and impossible to sell.

    And indeed, the best authors of nouveaux romans, pace Barthes, had no intention of writing romans scriptibles: they played with our expectations, but as readers we well understood that it was they, not we, who were doing the playing.

    The remaining fans of the postmodern may take issue with so banal a conclusion. But rather than attacking the messenger, objectors should address themselves to God, or more simply, to humanity’s providential ability to intuit a sacred that protects our community from itself.

  • The Epistemology of Resentment, Revisited

    Resentment is an attitude toward one’s fellows that stands on the border between animal and human. If we consider the serial organization typical of the higher apes, the ability of individuals to challenge higher-ranking animals for their position reflects a degree of mimetic tension that nonetheless remains within the reflexive limitations of serial ranking. The breakdown of this system among certain hominins, which I hypothesize led to hominization, would have reflected an increased tension leading to generalized resentment/aggression against the entire ranking system, eventuating in the originary event.

    At this point, the participants, in fear of their lives, first experienced the sacred as a transcendental force that obliged them to consciously abort their appropriative gestures, leading to the reciprocal exchange of these gestures as signs marking the deferral of appropriation and ultimately permitting the egalitarian division of the object of contention. This is the foundation of originary morality, the sense of reciprocal symmetry inherent in humans as members of a cultural community, sharing the beginnings of language and a common sense of the sacred.

    But even in egalitarian societies, the members cannot be exclusively guided in everyday life by the symmetry of the originary scene. This scene, and the equal distribution of food that is its founding institution, embody a general principle of reciprocity that is necessarily tempered by the needs of other activities. This importantly includes child-rearing, where parents initiate their offspring into the customs of the community, extending scenic self-consciousness to what were formerly unreflective actions.

    Thus there arises, in conjunction with the moral imperative of reciprocity grounded in the scene, a set of ethical rules that necessarily differentiate among members of the community. For example, various group actions require a degree of hierarchy: like parents with children, someone must be in charge of a team of hunters or participants in a construction project.


    In time, the practice of sedentary agriculture gives rise to true hierarchical societies with explicit differences in rank that directly contradict the intuition of moral equality inherited from the originary scene. Eric Voegelin described the archaic middle-Eastern empires as compact in the sense that sacred transcendentality was wholly subordinated to the social order, kings and emperors being assimilated to gods. In these societies, egalitarian morality, however practiced between those of equal rank, was rejected as a universal; no underlying equality was recognized between nobles and commoners, between an Athenian citizen and one whom Aristotle considered a “natural slave,” or a Roman and an instrumentum vocale.

    Very briefly, it was the transformations of what Jaspers called the “Axial Age,” beginning in the West with the Hebrews’ conception of the One God whose will commands all humans as “created in his image,” that renewed within these societies the originary intuition of moral reciprocity. Seth Sanders’ The Invention of Hebrew (U Illinois, 2009) demonstrates the importance among the Hebrews of a shared scripture (and a high degree of literacy) in contrast with the imperial religions revealed only to the rulers and their priests and courtiers, whose writing systems were complex and inaccessible to the multitude.

    Thus the fundamental moral model was once more made the foundation of communal ethics. As Hillel’s “golden rule” put it, “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow: this is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation.” Christianity emphasized the dialectical relationship implicit in Judaism between worldly ethics and transcendental morality, Caesar and God, whose final purpose is conceived not as the maintenance of a particular social order but the survival of an ethical universe ultimately grounded on reciprocal morality among souls of equal intrinsic worth.


    Chronicle 621 exemplified what I have called the epistemology of resentment by the perspective implicit in the actions of the representatives of the Tiers-Etat in 1789 to accept their resentment of status inferiority as the ultimate source of their moral intuition. This perspective subsequently came to be associated with the “Left,” in reference to the seating of those who refused to recognize the King’s supreme authority in the 1789 French National Assembly, as opposed to those on the “Right” who continued to respect what Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France let us call the “Burkean” values of the historically consecrated social order.

    The promotion of our visceral sense of injustice to the transcendental source of moral truth is in effect its sacralization, setting it above any culturally specific ethical laws. To thus divest the sacred of its connection via established religion to the social order implies iconoclasm in both vocabulary and action. Hence we should understand the French Revolution’s destruction of churches and religious objects less as a denial of the sacred as such than as its relocation in an individual moral intuition no longer corrected or guided by these institutions. Needless to say, within a traditional social organization, such rejection of authority is precisely what the sacred represses.

    Medieval peasant revolts and the like had been spontaneous outbursts, lacking in a clear ideology, let alone the means to overthrow the system of government. Even the turmoil in 17th century England never successfully challenged the fundamental principles of political order, and the monarchy has survived to this day. In contrast, the revolutionary consequences of the 1789 Etats-Généraux offered their example to future emulators.

    It is worth noting that the French Revolution might well not have occurred without its less radical American predecessor. Andrew Roberts (The Last King of America, Viking, 2021) has noted that George III, denunciation of whom occupies a large portion of the Declaration of Independence, was a liberal monarch not unsympathetic to the demands of the colonials, although opposed to granting them independence.

    The Americans’ grievances were stated in severe but not resentful terms, as violations of the rights of colonials as British citizens presumably deserving of an equal say in fiscal policy (“no taxation without representation”) despite not residing in the homeland. Thus Burke, whose condemnation of the French Revolution is canonical, had been generally sympathetic to the colonials’ demands and opposed to Britain’s military aggression, even if he was unhappy with the final outcome. Although the war inspired by these grievances led—ironically, aided by crucial French military assistance under Lafayette—to separation from the motherland rather than the overthrow of an established government, it clearly supplied a prototype for the latter.

    We describe as “liberal democracy” the pragmatic model of Western government, of which the US Constitution remains the most elaborate and so far most successful example, yet its near-coevality with the epistemology of resentment is no mere coincidence. It was the conscious danger of what Aristotle described as the tendency of democracy to degenerate into ochlocracy, the rule of the resentful mob, that had prompted the creators of the Constitution to introduce multiple “checks and balances” to prevent resentful conflict from taking over the political debate. Although the American example failed to moderate the French revolutionaries, we can be glad that we were not obliged to find out what the reverse order of events might have accomplished.


    Yet the sacralization of resentment in the heat of political conflict did not offer itself as a serious political doctrine; on the contrary, revolutionaries did their best to deny its motivating force. Marx’s system, elaborated following the failure of 1848’s last “bourgeois revolution,” sought to justify its communist ideology by means of an economic doctrine that in theory required no political action whatever. The Marxist militant denied resentful motivation: he was merely a historical midwife ushering in the birth of the new era. The “falling rate of profit,” a term today’s so-called Marxists show little sign of having heard of, was the engine that would bring about the apocalypse of capitalism. To quote a famous passage from Chapter 32 of Das Kapital:

    The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. (https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch32.htm )

    Whether or not a Communist party may be presumed to be guiding this “expropriation,” the evolution of the economy leads inevitably to it. This violence, presented as generated by the economy itself (bursting integument, death-knell of private property, expropriation expropriated), cannot be blamed on its mere facilitators. “Scientific socialism’s” belief in history is not transcendental but immanent faith. What justifies our resentment of the “fetters upon the mode of production” is described not in terms of our sense of injustice but of world-historical socio-economic necessity.

    The ambiguity inherent in calling such revolutionary doctrines as communism, fascism, wokeism,… religions reflects the fact that although the sacred/Superego is never really absent from human affairs, the replacement of the transcendental source of our originary sense of moral equality (“endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights”) by the confident assertion of its natural immanence grants it something like the status of a mathematical truth, one that trumps the ethical laws of the social order.

    Which conveniently permits dismissing any necessary inequalities of the revolutionary order itself as temporary expedients destined to “wither away”—a term no longer heard, although implicit in communist doctrine, presumably even with “Chinese characteristics”—and consequently to set these inequalities beyond judgment, in a word, to sacralize them—en attendant. Thus have history’s most egregious tyrannies been excused by the need to break eggs to make omelets—provided they affirm, with whatever degree of hypocrisy, the originary doctrine of moral equality.


    Orwell’s “freedom is slavery” sums up the ethic of the revolutionary “vanguard” that abolishes society’s Burkean wisdom and denies to its subjects the free use of the human consciousness it pretends to liberate. Whatever the generosity of its original motivation—admixed even in the most sincere cases with ruthless cruelty—it is no surprise that the history of social orders created by the ideologies derived from the epistemology of resentment has been uniformly disastrous. (Yet we cannot blame these ideologies alone for the horrors of the 20th century; would they have ever been unleashed had it not been for the civilizational quasi-suicide of the first World War, whose horror was principally the result, not of an excess of resentful passion, but of a tragic misunderstanding of the effects of modern weaponry that discredited the late-Westphalian concept of limited war?)

    Marx’s “scientific” conclusion that capitalism evolves of itself into socialism has been disproved in every single instance. The state’s monopoly on production can be established only by despotism, which may decay, as it did in the USSR, but certainly not “wither away.” The world continues to vote with its feet; those who leave war-torn or impoverished nations to seek a better life elsewhere are uniquely drawn to liberal democracies, not to Russia, North Korea, Iran, or even China. Nor need we assume that the growth of AI will make socialism any more viable. The market as a source of economic feedback remains indispensable to technological innovation, which has not shown itself to be accessible now or in the conceivable future to the replacement of free market activity by “machine learning.”

    In short, the empowerment of a ruthless party tasked with rooting out vestiges of the former order inevitably leads to tyranny, and as we see in China today, despite Deng’s seemingly promising integration of market methods into Mao’s centralized state, in the absence of institutional “checks and balances,” the innovation-killing centralization of all power in the Party poses a seemingly inevitable temptation for succeeding leaders such as Xi.

    The Victimary

    There emerged, so to speak as a dialectical response to the liberal-democratic West’s defeat of communism and apparent achievement of the “end of history” in 1989-91, although it had been in preparation since the 1960s, a significant new wrinkle in the epistemology of resentment. I have called it victimary thinking, the essential component of which is white guilt, the internalization by the “victimizers” of the victim’s resentment, in principle without consulting the latter.

    Today this has been absorbed into the all-embracing Woke paradigm that dominates the American and a good part of the European academic/intellectual and institutional elite. I have discussed at length the political implications of wokeism (see, e.g., Chronicle 715), but it merits a more fundamental, let us say, strategic rather than tactical, analysis.

    It is no small matter that the key object of stigmatization in the victimary perspective is not Marxian class-relations but racism—to be followed by sexism, homophobia, transphobia, ad nauseam. Whereas Marx had understood class distinctions in a materialist framework, reconceiving the class resentment of, e.g., the Tiers-Etat as a sign of the historically necessary dialectic of systems of production, the partisans of wokeness constantly emphasize the racial nature of social distinctions, dismissing any explanation of the greater or lesser success of given ethnic groups in modern society other than past and/or persistent racial/ethnic discrimination.

    Thus victimary thinking overtly describes itself as a reverse (“anti-“) racism that, analogously to antisemitism in the religious domain, attacks the bearers of socio-economic firstness. Since the founding of Israel in 1948, and particularly since the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, this assimilation is made increasingly openly, the Jewish State being described as a “European colony” in the Jews’ former homeland which, having once been a part of the Islamic Ummah, can no longer legitimately be separated from it. And, just as many Jews are themselves willing to accept this analogy, so many whites willingly accept the denunciation of their “white privilege” as a burden of historic guilt independently of their individual experience, whether in the US as an apotropaic gesture toward America’s black population, or in Europe, toward immigrants from former colonies.

    Despite the fact that racial discrimination has been outlawed in Western nations, rather than encouraging all races to accept this recognition of their intrinsic equality and put the past behind them, victimary thinking insists on explaining any difference of current qualification or status as the consequence of racial discrimination, promoting various forms of affirmative action as means not simply to overcome deficiencies of preparation but to compensate for them. The substitution of “equity” for equality is understood to imply that any group disparity in success is evidence of racism and must be counterbalanced regardless of aggregate qualifications—deliberately ignoring, and indeed, profiting from, the demeaning effect this “soft bigotry of low expectations” has on the members of the racial groups thus advantaged.

    The strength of victimary thinking within the liberal-democratic order lies in the appropriation of the formerly colonized/enslaved’s resentment by those whose own privileged status remains invulnerable to the reverse discrimination accorded the descendants of the latter. Those who virtue-signal their white guilt use this borrowed resentment as a weapon against their “deplorable” middle- and lower-class white counterparts, who have not only lost any former privileges but are faced with the compensatory privileges of their former “victims,” who are encouraged not only to accept the benefits of affirmative action but to condemn their white competitors as intrinsically privileged nonetheless.


    Both class resentment and victimary thinking put forth the absolute primacy of the moral model of reciprocal equality, but where the implementation of the former leads in principle to the overthrow of the social order that permits the possessors of “capital” to own the means of production and to subject workers to “wage-slavery,” the latter is indifferent to socio-economic structure, measuring inequity merely by the relative status of different races with respect to wealth, health, education level, etc.

    In other words, wokeness is the political equivalent of a neutron bomb in contrast with the real thing. Leaving “infrastructure” intact as irrelevant to its interactional model of morality, it attacks only in terms of interpersonal relations, as though we were still a group of hunters surrounding the body of a bullock, careful not to allow any individual—or any “racial” subgroup—to take a piece before anyone else. That some of us are billionaires and some minimum-wage workers is not something we need to condemn; what must be made equal is rather the percentage of whites and blacks in the former category, and in all other social categories considered prestigious.

    There are, of course, no “entry requirements” for billionaires; they have to make it on their own. But for administrative appointments or advertising model gigs or admissions to Harvard, an “equitable” number must be chosen from each victimary group. It is thus quite understandable why the billionaires and their associates are happy to support this doctrine.

    We might describe it as a cynical means of distracting us from the real “inequities” in a system which, in contrast to Marx’s “to each according to his needs,” allows some to earn and possess vastly more than others. But behind the cynicism is a fundamental anthropological truth: the most offensive, resentment-provoking behavior is one that harks back to the originary scene of humanity by denying equality face to face. The woke billionaire may not share his income with you, but he will be sure not to subject you to any micro-aggressions. On the contrary, like the Democrat lawmakers in this famous photograph, he will happily express his worshipful humility toward the memory of the unfortunate George Floyd.

    I needn’t tell you how old Marx would have reacted to this approach to expropriating the expropriators.

  • Sacred and Significant — Part II

    Although today language seems to us more natural and certainly more essential than religion, which all but a few of its practitioners confine to a limited set of practices while we use language constantly, if we take the originary hypothesis as our model of emergent human behavior, the sacred clearly dominates over the significant, to the point that we cannot answer the question as to what exactly is the “referent” of the originary sign. Is it the hypothesized food-source in the center of the circle? Or is it what I have called the “sacred will” that we experience as compelling us to refrain from completing our act of appropriation? Even if we are pointing at the central object, are we truly referring to it, or to its sacred, interdicted status?

    Clearly at this point there is no need for such a distinction; given the absence of a prior notion of referring, all we can affirm is that the sign draws attention both to the central object and to the presumed source of its own incompleteness as a worldly act. My sign shows my neighbors both that I am “interested in” the object and at the same time that I have renounced any attempt to possess it. If we assume that this gesture is repeated as a reciprocal communication among the group, as a result all the members will have convinced each other of the same.

    Given that the group considers the dead animal as a food-source and has either purposely killed it or come upon it as scavengers, it would find itself in this situation only if it had been forced to abandon the previous Alpha-Beta method of distribution, in which the members approach the food-source in serial order. By mutually communicating their renunciation of the attempt to “play the Alpha,” the members of the group constitute themselves as a self-conscious community, mediated by the sign that reciprocally reassures them of this deferral, which, unlike the reflexive inhibitions of the lower-ranked animals in the serial system, is a conscious interdiction—if not at first, then certainly once the sign has become associated with it.

    Once all are participating in this exchange of signs, it is plausible to assume that they will all gradually approach the animal and (on the example of Robertson Smith’s camel sacrifice) at some point decide that they can each tear off their portion, being careful not to come into conflict with their neighbors. As I have often noted, the final result is not so different from the way humans share food today, although in ceremonial functions there is usually an officiant who divides up the meat—in principle in “equal” portions.

    How should we conceive the communal understanding of the pointing gesture after this inaugural human distribution? Since the gesture was presumably successful in avoiding conflict, its sign-function will be retained, not merely as the residue of an aborted act but as an intentional gesture—which it will already have become in the course of its first, repeated, use. That the gesture designates something appetitively attractive but for the moment interdicted allows us to take it as the inaugural expression of desire, in contrast with mere animal appetite. This corresponds to Girard’s intuition that desire is always conceived in a mimetic context; although I do not need my neighbor to tell me that I am hungry, to speak of my desire for food implies that its eating is (communally) meaningful as well as physically satisfying.


    Given that the sign derives from an aborted gesture of appropriation, its originary imputation of significance to its referent would be indistinguishable from its imputation of sacrality. At this point, the significant—worthy of signing rather than simply acting on—and the sacred—worthy of common attention/concern but for that very reason interdicted to individual possession—would not require different signifiers, for the combination of appetitive cum mimetic interest and deferral of possession are the same in both cases. And to think of language historically, the attribution of a word to some new object may be understood as the recognition of a new nuance of sacrality; the object worthy of its own word is something that not just I personally but the human community to which I belong considers worthy of conceiving, mentally setting on a scene, as opposed to immediately taking.

    But at the same time, the attendant “lowering of the threshold of signification,” as I called it in TOOL, implies an emerging separation between an indefinitely multipliable set of signs and significant objects and the unitary sense of the sacred that has led Western civilization to define itself by the One God, while Eastern religion, as exemplified by Buddhism, focuses rather on the purification of our understanding of the empty—hence fully potential—scene of representation itself.

    On the example of what we call our “conscience,” the originary experience of the sacred is that of an alien will that compels us from within ourselves—much like what Freud called the Superego. No doubt, from an external perspective, one can explain my aborted gesture of appropriation by fear of the potential violence of my fellows. But the unanimous recognition of this interdiction, communicated within the group by the reciprocally exchanged sign, acknowledges within each of us the recognition not just of this fear, but of a will that by interdicting individual possession transcendently oversees the human community and protects it… from itself.

    This “Girardian” truth of the danger of mimetic violence as the source of humanity is never recognized by the social scientists who speculate on the origin of language. Yet the sacred will that protects the human community from itself is the constitutive agency of this community, the justification for Durkheim’s description of the sacred as embodying the “solidary” values of the community as a whole as opposed to those of its members.

    This agency can have no worldly embodiment. The idols that Abraham smashed, though they may have been objects of idolatry, were never—in contrast with the paradoxical figure of the incarnate Christ—understood as truly embodying the sacred. Their physical particularity, their perishability, made them only sacred representations. And at a certain point, knowledge of their variety across different cultural groups permitted the intuition that even the multiplicity of gods was a mere accident of history. Once the Hebrews understood God to be always the same under different names and figurations, they rejected idolatry and forbade “graven images.” Their conception of the One God expressed an intuition whose firstness the world has yet to forgive.

    Conceptually, God is no more “supernatural” than a Saussurian sign. Where in the real world is a signifiant? Both the signifier and idea of God (as the Orthodox Jewish reference to God as Hashem, “the name,” makes clear) are means humans have of sharing thoughts about sacred/significant elements of their common experience.

    Whether or not we “believe in God,” we cannot deny the omnipresence of the sacred in all human societies, defined as the will behind the tacit rules that regulate our interactions. Any affirmation of significance partakes of the sacred; to utter a word is to presume that its listener will attend to it in preference to his current activity, that is, that he will defer this activity to the advantage of our utterance. We take for granted such customs without thinking that they all derive from the communal configuration of the originary scene.

    Just as the cosmopolitan nature of today’s Western culture raises questions about the universality of specific cultural rules, on the highest level, the mixing of diverse peoples should convince us, as it did the nomadic Hebrews, of the universality of the sacred will as such as the providential basis for the cultural mediations that defer the reflexive expression of our appetites.

    Whether we claim this universality as a demonstration of the “existence” of God as opposed to the conceptual necessity of the sacred may best be understood in a pragmatic light: is it enough to merely conceive this conceptual necessity, or does our survival as a species depend on faith that this providential force is generated not by the interactions of the human community but outside it and prior to it, as a foundational component of the universe? And even if the possibility be admitted that humans created the idea of God, since there is no conceivable proof of the contrary, can this creation be successful unless we conceive malgré tout, by an act of faith, that God, through the mediation of the physical universe, created us? The very nature of faith is such as to make a logical response to this question impossible.


    It is difficult for us today to realize the degree to which even in the West everyday life remained saturated by the sacred well into the twentieth century. A religious believer has no difficulty understanding the control of divine providence over the totality of his activities, including sleeping and eating, understood as means to make oneself capable of doing one’s sacred duty to carry out actions of value to the community. The non-believer is likely to view this attitude as “superstitious” in the etymological sense of a holdover from more God-centered eras. But we must understand that this modern view is not more enlightened than the old one; it simply takes for granted, as the conveniences of modernity in advanced countries in peacetime have allowed us to do, the satisfactory functioning of the social order, forgetting that this order always remains dependent on our shared sense of the sacred in the form of our social conscience or Superego.

    Secularization in its most basic sense is best defined as a forgetting of the originary scenic configuration that religious rites commemorate—taking the harmonious functioning of the social order for granted so long as one is able to function within it. The similarity between this state and that of a child in a protective family—a condition that our current social order often tends to prolong well beyond the limits of adolescence—is no coincidence. The self-indulgent softness of modern Western life after 75+ years of general peace is no doubt an inevitable consequence of what amounts to a forgetting of “human nature.” Religions have traditionally functioned to remind us of what Christianity refers to as our “original sin”—our propensity to mimetic rivalry—which is the reason why, in order to protect ourselves from each other, we became human in the first place.

    The notion of original sin as posterior to the emergence of humanity is grounded on a solid anthropological intuition that we reject at our peril. Because animals, however intraspecifically violent, do not under normal circumstances endanger their species’ existence, they can remain “innocent”; humans, who required a new layer of protection, had to develop deferral, conscience… and our felix culpa, sin, a product of the non-reflexive, voluntary nature of deferral, the curse that accompanies the blessing of free will.


    The postwar spread of secularization has appeared to many as a liberation from the persistence of obsolete cultural modes. But the utter incomprehension of the place of the sacred in human society that one finds, for example, in Michael Tomasello’s throwaway explanation of religion in A Natural History of Human Morality (Harvard, 2016; discussed in Chronicle 519) fails to recognize the persistence of the sense of the sacred in the absence of traditional explicit references. We should realize that this sense pervades all communal human values, those that we evoke tacitly or explicitly to justify our actions in society.

    Whether these values are expressed in a legal charter such as the Bill of Rights or the Déclaration des droits de l’homme, all such attempts at codification have their roots in a moral intuition that takes for granted that all members of the community are subject to the same sacred imperatives. Even the current tendency toward anarchy that removes penalties for “minor” crimes is based on an alternative sense of the sacred, rooted in the epistemology of resentment, a transcendental faith that, although no more grounded in objective truth than traditional religious beliefs, pretends to provide humanity with “social justice” by denying the equivalent of original sin—despite the many times such efforts have led to disaster.

    Yet in this era of growing secularism, we cannot ignore that traditionally religious people—in Europe, mostly Muslims—are quite a bit more likely than the irreligious to reproduce themselves. It is hard to make a clearer argument for religion than this correlation. Western nations, now including the US, have all fallen below replacement level, and in Europe the birth rate among the nominally Christian population is far below this level. This correlation is not written in stone, but among Western-style nations, Israel alone, whose population remains consciously animated by a desire to replace the Jews murdered by the Nazis (and even there, the religious population has a far higher birth rate), has no demographic problem.

    The simplest demonstration a contrario of the functionality of the sacred in maintaining the welfare of the human species can indeed be found in the tendency of those who have become disconnected from the originary scene of humanity to privilege their own individual flourishing over ensuring the future of the human community. Let us hope that this reminder of the undiminished relevance of the sacred to human life may remind us as well of the undiminished relevance to our own lives of the West’s Abrahamic religious culture.

  • Sacred and Significant — Part I

    In 1999, Cambridge University Press posthumously published anthropologist Roy Rappaport’s magnum opus, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, whose major thesis is that religion and language are coeval: that whichever of the two we use to define the minimal state of the human, it did not come into existence without the other. Generative Anthropology can be understood as an attempt to vindicate this view in the most rigorous terms.


    Forty-four years ago I had what Jesuit theologian Bernard Lonergan calls an “insight” that I have pursued ever since. In 1978 I had been invited as a visiting professor to Johns Hopkins by René Girard, who had been my dissertation director, in hopes of securing a permanent position on the faculty. Instead, I secured this insight.

    My insight was an intuition of the originary scene of human language. It was based on Girard’s scene of emissary murder in La violence et le sacré, although it has evolved away from it over the years. In 1981 I published at the University of California Press The Origin of Language: A Formal Theory of Representation (TOOL), where formal referred to the aspect of language that could be separated from what I called the institutional element of the scene, which would evolve into sacrificial ritual and other religious practices.

    At the core of my intuition was the notion that what we call a “scene” is something uniquely human, that the center-periphery relationship typical of scenes such as a lecture—or a dramatic performance, or a film, or a circus act—before an ensemble of (hopefully) silent listeners, but by extension, an individual’s reading the transcript of the lecture, or a novel, or watching a video, in whatever format but, more and more typically of our screenic culture, on an electronic screen—that the scenic configuration, which we tend to unthinkingly imagine we share with animals, is in fact practiced by humans alone. Even Karl von Frisch’s famous bee-dance, in which a scout-bee instructs “followers” as to the location of a source of nectar, functions through individual physical contact and is nothing at all like a bee sitting in the center of a circle of her fellows informing them as to which way to fly.

    After 44 years I can claim, with ever greater confidence, that generative anthropology, the fruit of this original insight, is indeed a “new way of thinking” that has alone been able to conceive a plausible scenario of human origin.

    But if I began by evoking the work of a Catholic theologian, it is because his book about insight is ultimately a study of revelation. Revelation is supposedly sent by God; the originary hypothesis has no such pretension. Yet we cannot help noticing that sacred revelation in the traditional sense has been the formative element in our various civilizations, of far greater effect overall than that provided in recent times by the scientific method of hypotheses falsifiable through empirical observation—a development that without the cultural basis provided by Christianity would never have become possible. If I call generative anthropology a new way of thinking, it is as an assertion of the power of what might be called originary phenomenology, that is, the exploration of an intuition, reduced by Occam’s razor to what I hope is its minimal expression, of human origin, and tested by its ability to explain plausibly, in simple terms, the two fundamental realities of human culture: language and religion.

    Empirical science’s skepticism of a real-world originary hypothesis is in fact an inheritance from the domain of philosophy or metaphysics, which may be defined by its tacit or explicit rejection of the idea of the historical origin of mature language—the language of the (declarative) proposition. The paradoxes inherent in metaphysics, which in different forms have preoccupied both the analytic and “Continental”-existential varieties of post-Kantian philosophy, were brought most sharply to light by the late Jacques Derrida, who I believe merits the title of “the last” or “ultimate” metaphysician. Derrida, in his seminal 1968 essay “La différance,” quoting Heidegger’s Das Spruch des Anaximander, affected to dream with Heidegger of “le mot unique,” das einzige Wort that belongs to the uniqueness of Being. (I commented on this passage in the 2019 second edition of TOOL, first published in Chronicle 535.) Yet as Derrida most certainly ironically, if tacitly, realized, if the originary element that you seek is “Being,” you are guaranteed never to emerge from metaphysics’ Teutonic mist to find an explanation more fundamental than a word.

    For metaphysics is the discipline founded on the idea, whose first explicit presentation was that of Plato’s Socratic dialogues, that the ultimate truths (which are always truths of the human, but which are too easily extended “metaphorically” to the entire universe) can be found through the examination of language, more specifically, of words. One might think that in this scientific-technical age, the idea that words “contain” truths about reality would no longer be taken seriously. Yet throughout the twentieth century, and still today, both existential and analytic philosophers have in effect agreed on this point, differing only in the degree to which they focus on the words themselves or on their syntactical combination.

    My position is simply that metaphysics is incapable of grasping human origin because it is founded on the premise that the worldly existence of language, notably including its origins prior to the proposition, need not be examined. No doubt nearly all philosophers since Hegel have put metaphysics into question, or as Fred Jameson’s well-known title has it—a mistranslation of Nietzsche, the Wikipedia tells us—seek to escape the prison-house of language. Derrida grasped better than anyone—this was the secret of his rock-star celebrity, far beyond the imagination of anyone who did not witness it in his day—the paradox inherent in metaphysics: its incapability of founding itself.


    My study of the origin of language began from the premise that the declarative sentence, the logical proposition, could not have been language’s first manifestation. The first linguistic sign must have been an ostensive, a verbal pointing, an idea confirmed by the fact, brought out by cognitive scientists such as Michael Tomasello, that the arch-human act of pointing involves the phenomenon of joint shared attention, which is beyond the capacity of other animals. This is true even of our fellow primates, who indeed point at things, but not in the human manner of directing their fellows’ gaze, as the Zen koan puts it, to look at the moon and not at my finger.

    At the time of TOOL, Girard’s emissary murder scenario minimally provided the motivation for the attention of a group to a common center. In terms of Girard’s “mimetic triangle,” consisting of subject, object and the mediator who indicates the object to the subject, it sufficed to add to an original triangle an indefinite set of similar triangles, all of which had the same object in the center, with all of the subjects serving as mediators of each other’s desire—precisely the configuration of “scapegoating.”

    In an article entitled “Differences,” written just after TOOL, which appeared in MLN (formerly Modern Language Notes), also in 1981, I emphasized the connection between the scenic configuration and Derrida’s notion of différance. This neologism plays on the double meaning of the French word différer, which means to differ but also to defer—a relationship that can be understood as the root concept of the sacred, which defers appropriation or possession. To my mind, this rapprochement between the scenic and deferral was Derrida’s most significant step toward human self-understanding. Yet he never conceived its relationship either to religion/the sacred or even simply to the behavioral consequences of deferring action, his sole aim having been to deconstruct metaphysics’ implicit postulate, revealed most clearly in what he saw as philosophy’s prejudice in favor of the “presence” of speech to its audience in contrast with the necessary non-presence of writing, as the guarantee of the inherent atemporality of the proposition and its truth.

    Derrida used the inaudible distinction between différance and difference as a demonstration that there can be no immediate coincidence between signifier and signified, that the relationship is inhabited by a temporal… différance, a deferral. This is a profound intuition about originary language, which is indeed inhabited by deferral. Yet the (deliberate?) obscurity of the text that reveals this simple truth is in its way something tragic; a thought that I wonder if Derrida, at the pinnacle of his celebrity, ever entertained.

    For, as my article pointed out, the deconstruction of metaphysics was not the originary anthropological function of deferral. Before we encounter the deferral that inhabits the space between subject and predicate, even if there are no linguistic or phonetic paradigms but only a single sign reduced to a simple pointing gesture, the enunciation of the sign is already a deferral, not of the formal presence of its referent, but of an action. What was originarily deferred was not in the world of the sign, but precisely what was excluded by the world of the sign, that is, worldly action, the pre-human act of appropriating the object.

    Which suggests that the emissary murder scenario was not very well suited to the scenic configuration, given that by definition it involved no deferral—au contraire—of the murderous gestures of the group. Only once the victim was dispatched might his cadaver become an object of both desire and interdiction, which is to say, a sacred object… But then, why begin with an “emissary murder”?


    The sacred is not a standard philosophical concept. Although Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro concerns piety, the concept of the sacred has never interested philosophers, who yet often speak of God or Being. This is because, like its parallel category, the significant, the sacred is implicitly relative to its individual or collective subject. Whereas Being or God can be understood as designating something independent of the individual who uses the word, “the sacred” suggests dependence on an individual or collective belief or disposition before its object can be defined. Sacred to whom?

    This is not, as it might appear, a mere matter of the definition of the word sacred. Philosophy inhabits the world of shared or shareable truth-values. But to examine the criteria by which we call something sacred—or significant—is to risk revealing the pre-propositional roots of language, which by tacit agreement philosophy does not permit itself to examine.

    Hence it is no surprise that, unlike Friendship or Courage or the Good, serious exploration of the sacred appeared only with the discipline of anthropology, which in its beginnings was focused on the belief systems of the preliterate peoples studied by the first generations of ethno-anthropologists, such as Tylor, Frazer, or the Durkheim of Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. This is in itself a strong indication that the sacred is a concept that points beyond the limits of metaphysics. For the sacred can only be understood in conjunction with language from a standpoint that precedes that of metaphysics, precedes it not merely logically but historically, or we should say, pre-historically. The originary connection between religion and language, between the sacred and the significant, is very simply that the latter term describes what from the beginning language takes into consideration in the same way that the sacred describes what religion, or most broadly, what I would call the sense of the sacred takes into consideration.


    Let us now return to the hypothetical scene of human origin, the object of our originary hypothesis. To understand the action of pointing as the foundation of the ostensive, it suffices to conceive a group of proto-humans surrounding an object of interest, such as, for example, a cadaver, possibly of a recently dispatched human scapegoat, but far more likely, of a large edible animal. Each reaches toward the object, thereby “mediating” the attention of the others. But in order for this reaching gesture to become a sign, an act of pointing, this emergent gesture of appropriation must not reach the object; it must be aborted.

    The cause of this abortion is clear to anyone who has put out his hand at the same time as someone else to take a last canapé or cookie. We might call it politeness, but if we conceive how this would play out among hungry proto-humans all reaching for the same source of nourishment, we must consider the potential danger of conflict. What I consider to be Girard’s key contribution to anthropology is found at just this point.

    What is Girard’s great discovery? The supreme importance of mimetic desire as a feature of humanity. Animal intelligence, as Girard conceived it, is essentially mimetic. Like other animals, but more intensely insofar as we are more intelligent, we learn from others by imitating them. At the same time, as our intelligence increases, we are increasingly likely to come into conflict with those we imitate; this is illustrated in the later novels of Mensonge romantique, where we pass from external to internal mediation.

    These are not mere literary categories. Girard’s genius was to see mimetic rivalry as the distinguishing feature of humanity, the only species that poses a greater danger to itself than does the outside world. And given the emergence of this feature over the millennia of proto-human evolution, the kind of serial hierarchy practiced by the higher apes, where an Alpha male takes the first piece of food or the first female and leaves the rest to the Beta, and so on down the line, is no longer feasible. At a certain level of mimetic tension, the others will no longer be ruled by “conditioned reflex” to accept the Alpha’s right to go first.

    It is at this point that we can understand the crucial necessity to our species of the deferral of appropriation, and of the sign that this deferral creates, and mutually communicates, in the aborted gestures of appropriation of the members of the group. And by the same token, this explains why apes, who do not need signs, although they certainly are capable of mimetic intelligence and of instinctive signals, do not point as we do.

    Whence my original formulation of the sign: I reach toward the object, but defer possession of it, and in doing so, I convert my act from a practical worldly action into a sign, one universally recognized by humans throughout history, we might say, “in all languages.” This provides a solid empirical foundation for the hypothesis that this gesture, no doubt accompanied by a vocalization, since all human languages for the hearing have a vocal component, is indeed the originary sign of language. The exchange of such signs among the group would presumably function to avert conflict and eventually permit the peaceful division of the food source among the participants—as has occurred in every collective meal held ever since, including our Thanksgiving dinners and our Passover seders.

    In TOOL, I went on to propose hypotheses of how this first ostensive sign might have evolved into first an imperative, then an interrogative answered by a declarative, giving birth to the declarative sentence or proposition. Which makes understandable why metaphysics, as the study of propositions and their elements, cannot conceive the pre-declarative phase of language.

    Think of Hegel’s Logik, which begins with Being, das Sein—the term for which Heidegger in the above-quoted essay affected to seek “the first word.” An anthropologically conceivable first word could have been nothing so abstract as “Being,” which I very much doubt would have made sense in any language before the to on of the Greek philosophers. But we can say that by definition the object being pointed to was significant, worthy of a sign.

    And in the context of the originary scene as thus described, it becomes obvious that this first referent of a sign, which we consequently call “significant,” is also the first object we can call “sacred.” The centrality of the victim of sacrificial ritual, of which Christ is for our culture the ultimate representative, but which our primitive forbears represented on cave walls in the form of large calorie-rich bison or antelopes, is also that of the referent of the first sign. But, and this is an important but, whereas the significant status of the bison is unproblematic, and will eventually be extended to the thousands of other objects we have invented words for, its sacred status is not, for reasons we shall discuss.

    To be continued…

  • Dara Horn and Loving Dead Jews

    Dara Horn, born in New Jersey in 1977, has made a name for herself with five novels on Jewish themes, novels all very different from the “Jewish-American novel” of Bernard Malamud, Norman Mailer, Saul Bellow, or Philip Roth. A scholar of Hebrew and Yiddish literature brought up in an Orthodox home, Horn eschews straightforward narration focused on Jewish adaptation to American life to explore the connections between modern and ancient lives in the US and in the “old country,” moving back and forth in time, sometimes over centuries.

    Horn’s most conventional novel, All Other Nights, published in 2009, obeys the rules of the historical genre, centering around the American Civil War and the figure of Louisianan Judah Benjamin (1811-84), the first Jewish US Senator and, following the creation of the Confederacy, the number two figure in Jefferson Davis’ government; Benjamin left the US after the war for a distinguished career as a barrister in England. The novel’s main character is a New York Jew from a business family who enlists in the US Army and as a secret agent spies on (and kills) a Jewish southerner, but becomes attached to a second Confederate Jewish family, which he secretly defends while falling in love with one of its three daughters (the youngest one speaks in palindromes!). After being seriously injured in an explosion he is finally united with his beloved, both having presumably been purged of their sins through their sufferings.

    In Horn’s latest and most provocative novel, Eternal Life, published in 2018, she creates Rachel, a character born in the time of the Roman expulsion of the Jews from “Palestine,” who is, along with her priestly lover Elazar, condemned to eternal recommencement, in each of her multitude of lives marrying, having children, growing old with them, and then starting over again as a young woman.

    The book ends with a curious twist (SPOILER ALERT). Having reached the present day, Rachel’s granddaughter Hannah, a medical researcher, has discovered via DNA analysis the genetic miracle that has allowed Rachel to remain eternally 18 years old, her bodily deterioration with age being only for show, so that when the time comes to “die” she can let her body be destroyed and be reborn from undamaged DNA. At first Hannah wants to use this discovery as a means to make all humans immortal. But on contracting a serious disease of her own, she decides that not death but inability to change is humanity’s greatest problem, and she redirects her energies to developing a genetic treatment for “cognitive deterioration.” Meanwhile, Rachel goes on to still another family, accepting the curse of continual death and rebirth, which in the context of the novel can be likened to the role of a “mortal/immortal” novelist, who “dies” and “is reborn” with each new story, but who can never end her storytelling as she follows the Jewish people’s never-ending adaptation to a changing world.


    Horn’s 2021 nonfiction volume People Love Dead Jews (Norton) touches on the same dilemma as Adam Katz’s and my The First Shall Be the Last: Rethinking Antisemitism (Brill, 2015). Although she is not concerned to develop a theory of antisemitism, her frustration with the gentile world’s attempts at a moral reaction to it expresses from a very different angle the same paradox that we pointed out: the Jews’ firstness in the Abrahamic world can be neither accepted nor ignored. Truly taking into account Jean Paul II’s designation of the Jews as “elder brothers” would require a revolution in Western anthropology.

    The Romans opposed Jewish particularism, but it was Christians who inaugurated antisemitism as the resentment of firstness by claiming to be the New Israel. While consolidating their European territories, Christians had for many centuries little and always fragile tolerance for the Jews, persecuting and expelling them at different times, culminating in the Holocaust.

    Horn’s book is explicitly a reaction to the rebirth of antisemitism among generations increasingly distant from the Holocaust, which discredited antisemitism for a couple of generations in Europe and America. In particular, since Israel’s victory in the 1967 “Six-Day War,” the growing international hostility to Israel as the “new Nazis” whose “genocide” of Palestinians is comparable to Hitler’s and whose “apartheid” to old South Africa’s, has spawned an ever-proliferating left-wing antisemitism.

    This trend has really taken off in the past few years with the emergence of “wokeness,” a term absent from Horn’s book. That I was able to teach for fifty years in American universities, from 1965 to 2014, without ever facing campus antisemitism illustrates the abruptness of the sea-change that has taken place.

    Horn complains of being obliged to compose op-eds in reaction to the recent rash of small-scale but often deadly incidents in the US that have made her realize that antisemitism is again in business. She is offended by reporters’ eagerness to explain as many of these assaults as possible as resulting from “community tensions” by pointing out that Orthodox Jews moving into minority neighborhoods are seen as agents of “gentrification”—even if their assailants are not in fact residents of the affected neighborhood and seemingly attack them simply as visible Jews.

    A point that she does not make, although she mentions that many of the recent incidents were perpetrated by blacks, is that today’s antisemitism is not that of the Christian gentry of Gentlemen’s Agreement vintage. Even when its funding and ideological sources are traceable to the contemporary successors of the old Euro-American elite, its ideology is filtered through the new-fashioned woke, including many woke Jews, who, much as they look down on Trump-voting “deplorables,” view their Zionist brethren as “colonials” cruelly oppressing the Palestinians. Such behavior provides a cover of “intersectional” legitimacy to the thugs who commit antisemitic crimes in the West, as well as to the Palestinian “resistance” in Israel and its Western backers. But Horn’s understandable reluctance to get involved in the current culture wars precludes any effort to situate the new antisemitism in its political context.


    More worthy of discussion is Horn’s attitude toward cultural attempts to preserve in a respectful form the memory of the Holocaust itself, and above all, that of the Yiddish-based Jewish culture it so largely destroyed. Horn is very unhappy with the exploitation of the Holocaust and other instances of Jewish suffering in “uplifting” narratives and museum exhibits. The idea that the irrational hatred and murder of Jews should “serve a purpose” goes against her grain.

    One of her most poignant chapters describes the Soviet betrayal of the Jews whose Yiddish language and culture they had generously sponsored in the 1920s and 30s. Horn’s second novel, The World to Come (Norton, 2006), had dealt with some of the writers and artists, including Marc Chagall, who had participated in the Soviet revival of Yiddish culture, without of course realizing that it had been even from the start a mere propaganda operation that would end up after WWII with Stalin’s liquidation of its remaining participants.

    After publishing The World to Come, Horn had been contacted by Ala Zuskin, the surviving daughter of Yiddish theater actor/director Benjamin Zuskin (transformed in the novel to Ziskind), who confirmed for Horn the Soviets’ betrayal of these artists. Horn sympathizes, without altogether agreeing, with Ala’s expostulation that their treachery in disguising their murderous intentions while persuading Jews to reject their religion (and Zionism) for the sake of preserving their Yiddish culture made them worse than the Nazis. “And [unlike the latter] they never, ever paid for it.”

    Horn’s book ends on a personal anecdote that is more of a parable than a guide to action. As with her novels, the point is always to preserve and renew the memory of the Jewish people, and it is in that spirit that she concludes by explaining that, discouraged by the rebirth of antisemitism, she decided to participate, after her many years of study of Hebrew and Yiddish, in the Daf Yomi (a page a day) study of the Talmud, a procedure, inaugurated in 1923, meant to allow those who, unlike traditional ultra-Orthodox men, cannot devote their entire lives to this study, to get through the 2711 double pages of the Talmud in seven plus years… after which many simply go back to Volume I and begin again. For the endless disputations of the Talmud are not meant to reach a final conclusion, but to provide material for an eternal dialogue, the quintessence of Judaism supposedly consisting in the endless re-thinking and -debating of the Law. The Daf Yomi reading completed its most recent 13th cycle in 2020.


    Horn’s attempts to deal with the dilemma of the Jew in Western Christian society are worthy of great respect. What might appear as a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude is historically justified by the West’s endless backsliding into antisemitism, which, much like woke racialism, does its supposed beneficiaries, American blacks and Palestinian Arabs, more harm than good, but which, unlike racialism’s relatively minor effect on whites, is gradually making the so-called Christian West once again inhospitable and even dangerous for Jews.

    Horn mostly avoids the vocabulary and mindset of critical theory, presenting her negative reactions to commemorative texts or displays as visceral rejections of what she sees as excuses for perversely justifying the deaths of the dead Jews they honor. She bewails the fact that Anne Frank’s journal, ending as published with “I still believe, in spite of everything, that people are truly good at heart” is read as providing an ultimate catharsis, whitewashing the real horror of Nazism—and of her own tragically premature death in Auschwitz from cholera. Holocaust films like Schindler’s List are reproached with their “uplifting” messages, and even the currently circulating supremely tasteful Musealia Auschwitz Exposition, which while mentioning other victims of the Holocaust does not forget to insist that 90% of the victims were Jews, leaves her with a bitter taste and no desire ever to return. (Horn fails to mention, perhaps not having visited it, Warsaw’s Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews, completed in 2013, which sympathetically tells the story of the Jewish community in Poland from its beginning a millennium ago rather than focusing pointedly on the Holocaust.)

    In Horn’s sole reflection on literary theory, she reproaches the Western European novel with what Frank Kermode called its “sense of an ending,” drawing a contrast with works of Yiddish literature in which she finds any such “sense” deconstructed by an ironic refusal to bring the story to a satisfying closure. As a counter-example to “epiphany” as a genre of “uplifting” ending, she cites the final exclamation of Sholem Aleichem’s Tevye the dairyman (popularized in Fiddler on the Roof): “Tell all our Jews everywhere that they shouldn’t worry: our old God still lives!”

    Horn seemingly does not notice that this expression of confidence in God is itself an epiphany. But what she grasps intuitively is that it is an epiphany whose distinguishing Jewish characteristic is to be trans-individual, trumping the “sense of an ending” in the lives of the individual characters by affirming that whatever happens remains under the control of divine providence—which, in historical terms, implies that whatever horrors Jews must endure, the Jewish people will nonetheless survive.

    The Holocaust not surprisingly led many to say with Adorno that “To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.” Thus the most challenging view of Horn’s novels is that, unlike those who continue after Auschwitz to write novels formally no different from before, she wants to find a path for the novel that will not ignore or trivialize the Holocaust, but that will permit its experience to be fully taken into account. Such a perspective makes the very idea of the “well-made” novel with its godlike author working out all problems inappropriate. In this perspective, the end of art cannot be described simply as catharsis, but as a challenge to the reader to remain, like Rachel in Eternal Life, eternally absorbed in life’s problems. Like the cyclical peruser of the Talmud, Horn would have her reader not passively experience the power of God’s providence, but share his endless pain and joy in helping his people survive through the ages.


    People Love Dead Jews is a satiric title, expressing bitterness at even the most respectful memorialization of the victims of the Shoah, as though respectfully lamenting their death could prettify its sheer human ugliness and that of its roots in centuries of persecution.

    Yet this title, not unlike Nietzsche’s “God is dead,” has a far broader relevance in Western civilization, once we consider that Christianity is founded on the worship of God as a “dead Jew” whose Resurrection is intended as a promise to all: I am the Resurrection and the life:  . . . whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die. What is strange indeed is how rarely this obvious connection is drawn.

    Which is why I believe that Christians and others must accept the challenge that the Judeo-Christian history of the West must be explored from the Jewish side (and eventually from the Muslim side as well)—from which dead Jews remain dead, but God’s mortality, and that of his ironically “chosen people,” remains unthinkable. Dara Horn has grasped this challenge, and I very much look forward to her future insights.

  • Antisemitism, Scapegoating, Christianity, and Judaism

    As an indication that René Girard’s intellectual influence has in effect outlasted that of French Theory, an article by Andrew Doran entitled “Christians Need to Confront Anti-Semitism” in the February 2 Wall Street Journal under their Houses of Worship rubric cites Girard’s thought as the explanation for today’s renascent antisemitism:

    … Antisemitism is resurgent on the political right, which feels alienated from governing institutions. And the most refined anti-Semitism continues to be taught on university campuses.

    By rejecting the right of the Jewish people to exist in political community—that is, the modern state of Israel—campus anti-Semitism implicitly rejects the humanity of Jews everywhere. . . .

    Anti-Semitism at a more primitive level finds its roots in the scapegoating mechanism, the impulse in humans to seek a culprit for communal ills. As the French historian René Girard (1923-2015) explained, once the mob’s lust for violence is satisfied by the sacrificial victim, communal health is restored—an evolutionary adaptation that seems nothing short of diabolical. Girard believed that Christ’s sacrifice should deliver Christians from the scapegoat urge. Yet too many Christians have descended into scapegoating and anti-Semitism over the centuries, and sadly even today. . . .

    We cannot but be struck to see that, even in the WSJ, a writer can blithely attribute antisemitism to the Right, citing as his sole example its presence on university campuses. Claiming that today’s professors who “[reject] the humanity of Jews everywhere” are on the Right is about as accurate as affirming that Hitler was a member of the Communist Party. But as we shall see, Doran’s concern is not really political.

    This aside, what concerns me here is the, shall we say, vulgar-Girardian notion of scapegoating in relation to antisemitism. Girard’s explanation of the scapegoat mechanism emphasizes the arbitrary nature of the choice of the victim. In recognition of the source of the term in Leviticus 16, the essence of scapegoating for Girard is discharging the public’s anxieties in a “mimetic crisis” upon a marginal member of the group who will neither be able to defend him/herself nor is likely to be avenged by others. As Doran naively remarks, our supposed scapegoat urge is “an evolutionary adaptation that seems nothing short of diabolical.” Whence the Christian article of faith that God sent Jesus to earth so that this diabolical side of humanity might be purged.

    If explaining scapegoating by the “scapegoat mechanism” begs the question, explaining antisemitism by this mechanism does so even more egregiously. As the old joke goes:

    —It was the Jews who caused the war!

    —Yes, the Jews and the bicyclists!

    —Why the bicyclists?

    —Why the Jews?

    (adapted from Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism)

    The Jews are the one people in the entire world who serve as default scapegoats when one is needed. They have played this role for two thousand years, wherever Christianity and/or Islam have become known.

    We should appreciate the recent efforts of the Catholic Church to consider the Jews as Christianity’s “elder brothers,” but the Church’s undoubted sincerity in this has not prevented Israel from remaining the constant target of UN resolutions for which the majority of “Christian” countries have voted, as well as of innumerable hostile NGOs based in these countries, recently exemplified by Amnesty International’s report on “Israeli apartheid.”

    If I have hope for the Abraham Accords, it is because these agreements counteract the propaganda generated by such NGOs and set an example for the nations of Europe. Today, the original Muslim reaction to Israel as an inadmissible Jewish invasion of Dar-es-Islam, like that to the Spain of the Reconquista, has subsided. The Palestinian irredentists who remain the pretext for the survival of European antisemitism are no longer representative of Sunni Muslim sentiments—nor perhaps those of Shiites either, given the unpopularity of the Iranian regime with its own population. The success and extension of these Accords cannot but increase the pressure on the still nominally Christian nations of Europe to end their resistance to Israel’s existence as a Jewish state.


    As I pointed out in Chronicle 721, unlike Judaism or even Islam, Christianity obliges its faithful to accept the worldly presence of supernatural phenomena in the historical present. No doubt supernatural elements are present in the other Abrahamic religions, and in most others as well, but the salience of miracles in the Old Testament or the Koran is marginal. Dictating the latter to Mohammed or the Torah to Moses is hardly more than a metaphor; even delaying the sunset, causing a great flood, saving Daniel from the lions, or keeping the lamps lit for the Maccabees—or for that matter creating the universe—are ways of describing or tweaking natural processes. Whereas taking Jesus from his tomb—and Mary before death—up into heaven is not, and the “scandal to the Jews” is that these events are presented as taking place not in illo tempore but now. Unlike either Judaism or Islam, the compatibility of Christianity with what we call anthropology is thus made intentionally paradoxical, or as Paul put it, “folly to the pagans.”

    The genius of Girard, to which GA owes its point of departure, is to have had the chutzpah to face up to this anomaly and dare to naturalize Christian redemption in what he called “fundamental anthropology.” Which is to say that, although Girard as a good Catholic would not have questioned the Resurrection or even Mary’s Immaculate Conception, he wanted to show that these miracles could be understood in anthropological terms—in the same way as GA’s originary hypothesis.

    As I pointed out in Science and Faith, in provoking Saul’s conversion on the road to Damascus, Jesus “miraculously” appears in the heavens and asks Saul why he is persecuting him. If the reality of Jesus’ resurrection can be understood as equivalent to his persistent presence in the minds of his persecutors, given that persecuting someone arguably implies being obsessed by him even after his death, then the Christian “folly” can be placed on the same level as the Old Testament miracles. Whence Girard’s insistence, in the absence of anything like paleontological evidence, that repeated scenes of human sacrifice in the form of emissary murder brought about the origin of the human.

    The vital core of Girard’s hypothesis, and of its anthropological defense of (Judeo)-Christianity, is its intuition that the fundamental element that made humanity what it is was not simply increased intelligence along with bipedal posture and the opposable thumb, but crucially, the incompatibility of this increased intelligence with the serial hierarchy of ape society (see Chronicle 534). Mimetic desire is indeed the key to hominization, but not in the direct way the emissary murder scenario implies. Frenzied lynchings may take place at moments of panic and plague, but the problem of dividing up the food supply is one of everyday survival. If the old Alpha-Beta system can no longer function in the face of mimetic conflict, scapegoating cannot furnish a substitute. The Aztecs didn’t start out by eating each other before discovering the advantages of consuming slaves and prisoners of war.

    Whereas the emissary murder is presented as a response to an extreme situation, sacrificial rituals take place at regular intervals. In a typical feast in a hunter-gatherer society, a large animal or stock of other food is consumed in common—the equal distribution of food being a universal practice in pre-hierarchical societies. The idea that sacrificial animals emerged as a substitute for human scapegoats is simply perverse; what were these protohumans eating in the meantime? Nor would they have acquired through such murders any need for symbolic language. Killing the scapegoat involves no interdiction, no deferral: the discharge of aggressive energy is precisely its source of satisfaction—which however provides no basis for energetic renewal.

    In Leviticus, the scapegoat was an arbitrarily chosen animal expelled from the human community into the desert, something quite different from the human victim of a lynching. The goat, the embodiment of a need to purge the community’s sins, is not itself guilty of any crime. Like the virgin thrown into the cauldron to improve the sound of a newly-cast bell, the scapegoat bears the community’s sins without being guilty of them; it is thus that sinless Jesus plays this role.

    But the term scapegoat as we understand it today transforms the originally understood arbitrariness into its misunderstanding by the frenzied crowd; we alone recognize that the point is simply to discharge the crowd’s resentment, whereas the latter are presumably convinced that the scapegoat is really to blame for the community’s (and its own) sufferings. What is curious is that now that the term has taken on this accusatory meaning, there remains no simple way of referring to its original conception—which not insignificantly involved an animal generally killed for meat and consequently, unlike the virgin in the bell, not expected to generate compassion among the sacrificers.

    How is this relevant to antisemitism? When a Jew claims that his people are being used as scapegoats for the ills of Christian and other societies, he is making the claim inherent in the modern use of the term: the Jew is blamed for the ills his sacrifice is meant to relieve rather than having been arbitrarily chosen as a souffre-douleur. Antisemitism can indeed be defined as the tendency to choose Jews either collectively or individually as scapegoats in the modern sense. At the same time, the curious double meaning of the term explains why Jews themselves, when they seek to understand their unique status, are seemingly blind to the obvious explanation for why they are so chosen—so much so that denial is the only reasonable diagnosis.

    This explanation is the Jews’ firstness (see Chronicle 530). Mocking them as God’s “chosen people” is quite obviously double-edged. While deriding their pretensions, the mockery rather overrides than hides a sentiment of envy: perhaps the Jews aren’t really chosen, but why then do we think of them in such terms? Suppose an African tribe considered themselves to be “the chosen people”; would Europeans take their claim seriously? Seriously enough, for example, to expend vast quantities of time and energy in attempting to exterminate them in the midst of a world war?

    The Jews are, after all, the kinsmen of Jesus; the people of the Old Testament, the foundation of the New. Which is to say that antisemitism, itself one of those holistic terms that cannot simply be analyzed as Jew-hatred—and its etymological sense as a “racial” term is no more enlightening—is, like scapegoat, constructed on an internal paradox. To be an antisemite is not simply to hate or dislike Jews, as if they were Frenchmen or Germans, or for that matter blacks or whites, but to resent their unshakeable firstness, their originarity, the fact that Christianity is dependent on their status as the “elder brothers” of Christians.

    Christianity presents itself as the “new Israel,” the improved successor to Judaism, just as the post-Noahic world was an improvement over the one destroyed in the flood. But this historical honesty bears the burden of accepting the firstness of the Jews, and hence of not simply desiring their conversion, like that of all humans, to the true religion, but resenting those who refuse the offer. Pagans have no particular relationship with the Jews, but once they become Christians they become aware of these “hard-necked” rejecters of salvation. By rights they should only pity them, but the Jews’ faithfulness to their status as “the chosen people” cannot help but exercise, as Girard would put it, a mimetic attraction to which Christians are forced to react. Some become “Judeophiles” and a few even convert to Judaism, but the more natural, more common reaction is one of indignation, as though the Jews’ refusal to adopt their clearly superior religion were an insult to the Christians themselves.

    Islam, in contrast, with its own kind of chutzpah, simply declares that both Judaism and Christianity, rather than its founding precursors, were inadequate early attempts at grasping its principles, for which reason Allah, tired of dealing with these inadequacies, decided to reveal to Mohammed his “originary” Koran so that it might replace the human-composed books of the Bible. As a result, and I think history confirms this, Muslims have remained less vulnerable to mimesis and able to feel superior to both Jews and Christians. The modernizing tendencies of such as Ataturk have had nothing to do with adopting Christianity, but only with adopting modernity, recognized as a value in itself independent of religion.

    The birth of modern Islamism with Sayyid Qutb’s American sojourn in the late 1940s, which he experienced as morally scandalous, found its power in separating 20th-century technology from its social mores and rejecting the West’s secularism, which not coincidentally rekindled the original Islamic drive to expand Dar-es-Islam to the entire world. Unlike fundamentalist Christian movements such as the Amish, the Islamists are not hostile to modern technology—especially not to modern weaponry. Their movement is no doubt utopian, but its persistent potency demonstrates by contrast the spiritual weakness of today’s West, and most crucially, that of the pseudo-Christian susceptibility to the victimary to which Islam is invulnerable. How many admonitions did we receive after 9/11 against incipient islamophobia?

    Might Islam’s invulnerability to the victimary become, in the context of the Abraham Accords, a source of the Abrahamic world’s renewed strength and incipient unity, of its ability once more to accept firstness as a goal rather than a pretext for resentment?


    Returning to Doran’s article, we see that the fantasy of right-wing university professors indoctrinating their students in antisemitism cannot simply be dismissed as a careless error. Arafat’s genius was to grasp the potential of the Palestinian “independence struggle” as a means to restore traditional European antisemitism to its rightful place.

    No doubt this required appealing to sentiments of the Left rather than the Right. The WWII Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, had told Hitler that he and the Arabs were “natural friends” as enemies of the Jews. But now that the Palestinians could present themselves as victims of Zionist colonialism, the Europeans who had survived the war and Nazism needed not for all that renounce their antisemitism, for it had been reborn with left-wing credentials. Which explains why all these Christian nations, Germany most of all, rather than seeking to help the Palestinians to rid themselves of their corrupt leaders and become Israel’s collaborators in modernizing the Middle East, lushly finance their efforts at “resistance,” hypocritically looking the other way when they turn to violence, whether in Europe or in and around Israel.

    Doran wants the Christian world to face up to this rebirth of antisemitism, and to do something about it. After setting aside the usual claptrap about antisemitism “beginning with the Jews but never ending with them,” his article concludes:

    . . . anti-Semitism is evil—not an abstract evil but very much in our midst. The problems of the Jews are Christian problems. The Christian response to this moment should begin with an honest inquiry into Christian anti-Semitism, without any fear of how widespread it may be.

    The reader can now understand in what sense this conclusion excuses Doran’s blindness to the source of the antisemitism on today’s college campuses, most of whose perpetrators are, if not themselves Muslims, strongly identified with the Palestinian campaign to delegitimize Israel. For Doran’s point is that what matters to his American Christian audience, and one might add, to a good part of his Jewish audience, is their own recognition that the creation and survival of Israel is of the greatest importance, not merely as a symbol but as a demonstration of the continued firstness of the West, currently once more under challenge by what appear ever more clearly as less worthy forms of human social organization. Were ISIS and the Iranian mullahs to succeed in their efforts to destroy Israel, their fulfillment of Hitler’s dream would indeed be a black day for our civilization and for all humanity.

  • “The Dawn of Everything”– Getting Unstuck

    The late David Graeber, an anthropologist previously perhaps best known for his role in the Occupy Wall Street movement, and his co-author, archeologist David Wengrow, provide food for thought for those concerned with the past and future of humanity in The Dawn of Everything (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021), completed just before Graeber’s untimely death in 2020.

    The authors’ methodological tools deliberately diverge from the usual terminology of either anthropology or political science, a feature at times frustrating in the absence of any attempt at theoretical justification. My sole example will be their tripartite categorizing of human freedom as (1) freedom to move away, to leave one’s present circumstances; (2) freedom to disobey orders—a paradoxical definition symptomatic of the authors’ countercultural bent; (3) freedom to reorganize social relations—a freedom that unlike the others cannot be exercised by a single person (p. 362). This lack of clarity is a symptom of a 1960ish New Leftism that lends this otherwise carefully researched volume a certain youthful charm. The sort of person who can fit comfortably into both (2) and (3) is the adolescent who feels free to disobey (parents’, professors’…) orders, yet is at ease in “reorganizing social relations” with his peers, as things were indeed in the 1960s—which Graeber and Wengrow could not have known, being born in 1961 and 1972 respectively.

    But quibbling with definitions does injustice to the real interest of this book, which is to open up vistas concerning la longue durée. Composed, as Wengrow’s preface tells us, over a ten-year period in a “dialogue” between the two authors, The Dawn of Everything provides in accessible form a great deal of information about the several millennia, roughly from 10000 to 4000 BC, between Mesolithic bands of hunters and the vast Bronze Age empires worked by slave labor.

    Dawn’s major achievement is to liberate us from the quasi-Hegelian dialectic in which ancient empire, its “medieval” decline, the Renaissance, and modernity appear as a series of inevitable consequences of the invention of sedentary agriculture. It enlarges our understanding of the life of both hunter-gatherers and those for whom agriculture first emerged as a mostly part-time lifestyle. One of Dawn’s most striking revelations is that for many societies during this period, the seasons of the year involved considerable changes in governance, from hierarchical to broadly democratic and/or from man-centered to woman-centered, depending on the season’s central activity.

    No doubt the authors’ overall perspective may strike us as perplexing. Their declared purpose in radically reconceiving the history of these millennia is above all to suggest an alternative to the unfreedom that they take as the “stuck” reality of modern life, in the West perhaps more than elsewhere. Nor is the notion of modernity theorized in any way, although given the authors’ focus on archaic economies, one might expect them to reflect on how the game has been changed by the vast acceleration since the Industrial Revolution of economic progress on all fronts, with its resulting transformation of technology, medicine, and general welfare.

    The powerful example of Kandiaronk, a late 17th-century member of the Wendat Confederacy (roughly, the Hurons) in the area of Lake Ontario, who had been sent as an ambassador to the court of Louis XIV (!), provides the authors with an insight into the input of Native Americans to what would become the emerging anthropologies of the 18th century, notably that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For the first reaction of these semi-nomadic peoples to Western civilization was negative: rather than marvel at their advanced stage of development, Kandiaronk saw Europeans as unfree.

    Whence the importance of stuck, a word that appears in the book fifteen times to describe what the authors judge to be our still intolerable state of servitude to our political and economic masters. (Let’s not forget Occupy Wall Street!) The most sympathetic way to read this work is as a parable that asks us to draw back from our stifling present to situate ourselves in the open air of l’histoire au long cours. The few hundred years of European history that have defined the world’s current economic and technological reality, during which sovereignty cum bureaucracy, accompanied by contests among “charismatic” political leaders, have become the world-wide norm, should not allow us to forget that in the distant past, as great empires rose and fell, despotisms alternated over long periods with far more egalitarian forms of social organization.

    No doubt being stuck can be a crucial problem only if we put aside that of being annihilated. But the fact that we now possess, as never in the past, the means to effectively destroy our species cannot enter into the authors’ perspective. Although both are Jewish, and the Holocaust only a single lifetime away, this extraordinarily long time of near-total peace that has allowed Westerners of my own and more recent generations to live their entire lives with no real experience of violence has allowed them to bracket the very possibility of a worldwide cataclysm.

    The authors’ key point, meant to give us hope for the future, is that although today’s political world is wholly divided into “states” understood as uniformly coercive, top-down oligarchies, given the contrast between our traditional view of the archaic period as one wholly dominated by despotisms and the reality the authors reveal to us of greatly varied and evolving forms of government, many far more democratic (and less oppressive of women) than we had imagined, we should realize that, taking the long view, the “human condition” as established over the past few centuries should by no means be understood as permanent. The book concludes with an exhortation not to lose hope in the New Left ideal:

    . . . We can see more clearly now what is going on when, for example, a study that is rigorous in every other respect begins from the unexamined assumption that there was some ‘original’ form of human society; that its nature was fundamentally good or evil; that a time before inequality and political awareness existed; that ‘civilization’ and ‘complexity’ always come at the price of human freedoms; that participatory democracy is natural in small groups but cannot possibly scale up to anything like a city or a nation state.

    We know, now, that we are in the presence of myths. (525) [my emphasis]


    The data the authors adduce are copious and fascinating, speculative only in minor details. As they freely admit, even with all the recent progress of archaeology, it is impossible to provide a well-rounded understanding of cultural life in preliterate societies from which only a small number of artifacts can be recovered. Whatever one thinks of their political philosophy—their general disdain for the political theories emerging from the early modern era is not altogether without resemblance to the anti-metaphysical bent of post-war Continental thought, while devoid of “French-Theory” obscurantism—one cannot but respect the research and reflection that went into what sadly turned out to be Graeber’s memorial volume.

    This should not prevent us from wondering what new insights into originary thinking this book might provide. No doubt it is overly simple to see modern, state-dominated political organization as comparable in “stuckness” to that of the ancient empires or even early-modern European monarchies. But the great difficulty we have experienced since the end of the Cold War in facing up to the evidence that what we have been calling “liberal democracy” is not the end of history, perhaps not even in the sense of putting an end to the pipe-dream of communism, makes it imperative that we reexamine our recent history from a critical perspective. And one very useful point of departure for such examination is provided by the book’s insistence that, before the rise of Western civilization, human social organization took on constantly changing forms.

    Unsticking Modernity?

    The most optimistic understanding of the steady intensification of victimary thinking since the 1960s that has led to the current mania of wokeness is that, like Bolshevism and Fascism, the utopian solutions of the first half of the 20th century, the victimary is but one more such temptation, and that this paroxysm is the sign not of its triumph but of its incipient failure—one that looks to be far less catastrophic than that of its predecessors.

    We observe a striking lack of charismatic leadership in the woke movement, in contrast with that of the 1960s New Left (the Chicago Eight; Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden; Huey Newton and the Black Panthers). The left once had major thinkers in its corner; compare this to the “theoreticians” of the woke era. Critical Race Theory is a sorry sequel to the Marxism that the BLM leadership absurdly professes to be “trained” in. And one cannot fail to note that while the eloquent Obama was hardly an effective leader on the world stage, his successors reveal the emptiness of his perspective by their ineptitude in defending it. That we are led today by probably the least distinguished human being in every sense among our 46 presidents, with a vice-president if anything even less impressive, is surely not coincidental.

    Perhaps the most sinister element of wokeness, against which the general public is now beginning to rebel, is its pseudo-Christian sympathy for “sinners” that allows those little affected by crime to sympathize more with the criminals than with their victims. The equation of incarceration with inhumanity and racism, the reduction and/or elimination of bail or of any penalty at all for “minor” crimes, grant the awokened a specious sanctity at the expense not only of the victims of crime, but of the social order as a whole.

    The recent shift of Hispanic voters away from the Democrats’ race-mongering seems to be gradually finding a parallel among the black electorate, hitherto the most loyal supporters of the Democratic “plantation.” For we must accept that, however contemptible the woke exploitation of White Guilt, it evokes the reality of past inequities. Rather than transiting directly via the 1964 Civil Rights Act from persisting segregation to M. L. King’s post-racial world where we will be judged by the “content of [our] character,” our passage through a victimary phase was no doubt inevitable, if only because the politicians who outlawed racial discrimination assumed, no doubt rightly, that to confront any remaining inequities in the system, they would find more profit in creating (as Ibram X Kendi advises) inequities in the opposite direction than in treating everyone equally.

    Wokism’s vision of compensatory “equity” is victimary politics’ reductio ad absurdum. Its ultimate resolution will necessitate the emergence of a new generation of black leaders, typified by such as South Carolina’s Tim Scott and Virginia’s Winsome Sears, to bring about the end of the “soft bigotry of low expectations” that still dominates the politics, if not, fortunately, the daily experience, of American race relations. We should look forward to this as to the bursting of a blister.

    Whether or not this optimistic perspective will have time to unfold before China and its hangers-on are able to mobilize to cripple the West rather than compete peacefully with it for the leadership of the world market is another question, one that the long view suggested by The Dawn… cannot help us to answer. The kairos of our era may be upon us sooner than we think. Nor should we imagine that this current episode will be the final internal challenge to the Western form of modernity. Crises will always be with us; our job as humanists is constantly to generate the ideas that will help us to solve them.

    One thing is certain. As both Jews and Christians have always known, and Muslims have never doubted, to love the sinner is not to excuse, but to hate the sin. That this needs once more to be explained only demonstrates that we have reached the pathological endpoint of our caricature of the West’s religious inheritance. We must remind the West that, whatever its religious practices, its survival depends on the acknowledgement of its Abrahamic heritage, whose anthropological insights are at the root of our “new way of thinking.” Which gives us one more reason to hope that the broadening of the Middle-East’s fledgling Israeli-Arab alliance may provide the moral stimulus to reverse our current descent into decadence.

  • Versions of the Sacred

    The sacred, in its simplest sense, is the restraining force on human appetite that gives birth to desire, mediated by the world of signs. Readers of these Chronicles will have remarked that over the past year or so, stimulated by exchanges with Bishop Pierre Whalon (see Chronicle 678), as well as by becoming an octogenarian, I have sought to explore the sacred as an anthropological category, one with which I had previously little concerned myself. Dealing with the sacred as a phenomenon distinct from the God and gods of human religions is perhaps the ultimate challenge to human self-knowledge.


    The three Abrahamic versions of the sacred make up a dialectic that, unlike Hegel’s forward-moving syntheses, loses as much as it gains, another way of expressing the essential paradox of the sacred itself, the key to which is its minimality. The sacred is a unitary phenomenon, a sense of obligation, ultimately to the human community, however defined. The Hebrew One God is the simplest formulation of this unity.

    The society in which the One God emerged could not conceive itself as even potentially “global.” The communal unity that God guaranteed was and is that of the Hebrew/Jewish people. Its principle applies to everyone, but it has no organic connection with other communities, above all not with those of the archaic empires like Egypt, through its Exodus from which the Hebrew people defined itself. And henceforth, the Jews with their religion kept apart, and were ultimately sent into exile for their resistance to full integration into the maximally inclusive Roman Empire.

    Christianity was a Jewish heresy that permitted those outside the Jewish community to accept and be “saved” by the One God. After years of persecution, the Empire was able to find a modus vivendi with Christianity because it distinguished the realm of God from that of Caesar. Yet in order for this to be theologically consistent, the One God was obliged to undergo the complication of the Trinity. The transcendental God of the Hebrews was separated from “his” people and incarnated as a human being who, although a Jew, was cast out by the Jews as well as the imperial Romans, and in his role as the exemplary exile from all communities could be recognized as the Son, the singular human individual in his filial relationship to the One God. God’s third “person,” the mediating Spirit, cannot simply be identified with language; it can just as well be understood as the sacred itself, detached from the willing beings of God and Man, but shared by both through language. The “personification” of this mediating entity should be seen as an important step toward what we can begin to see as a Christian “originary hypothesis.”

    We must not neglect the third member of the Abrahamic community. Islam is a return to the strict monotheism of the Jews, but in a mode that, unlike “tribal” Judaism, has been rendered invulnerable to the Trinitarian Incarnation and its corollary, the separation of the human and divine kingdoms. This invulnerability is achieved by taking the existence of the Judeo-Christian dichotomy as proof that neither religion could be the genuine expression of Allah as the named One God. Islam purports to be the originary religion of all humanity, first given to humanity incompletely before being revealed to Mohammed in its definitive form.

    The Muslim solution to the diversity of human societies and their gods is simply to deny the validity of any human community outside the Umma. The destiny of Allah is not simply to rule over the spiritual but the physical/political world, to unite all humans in a single community. This conception, which emerged as an alternative in the margins of the imperial world, was for centuries singularly effective.

    But with the beginnings of Europe’s modernization, Islam’s requirement of “submission” that made it fundamentally incompatible with secularization prevented it, in contrast with Christianity, from absorbing the economic and scientific advances of emerging modernity, many of which it had helped inaugurate. Thus Islam’s progressive conquests came to an end, although, in contrast with Christianity, its belief system still appears to show few signs of losing its potency. (But see contra Daniel Pipes on Muslim apostasy, https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-muslims-leave-the-faith-11596755143 [8/6/2020]; and https://www.yonkerstribune.com/2021/11/will-islam-survive-islamism-by-daniel-pipes [11/16/2021])

    The 20th-century secularizing tendency of Ataturk and other Muslim nations has been largely reversed largely as a consequence of the polarizing effect of the Zionist migration and establishment of the Israeli state. After many decades of stalemate, the Abraham Accords are a hopeful sign of the integration of Israel into an “Abrahamic” Middle East, one that would welcome Christians as well. For beyond its political benefits, cooperation between Israel and the Arab-Sunni world has the potential of finally healing the Muslim-Christian/Jewish breach that has existed since the emergence of Islam.

    Given that none of the three Abrahamic religions, much less any others, have been able to establish hegemony over all humanity, we begin to perceive the need for a fundamental notion of the sacred no longer as a substantive credo but, by analogy with language as such, as opposed to any specific tongue, as an essential agent of human social existence.

    Although we cannot expect to find in the human brain a neurologically specific “religion module” comparable to Chomsky’s “language module,” we may claim nonetheless that the sacred and language are the two poles of the human: the first, as the overall enabling principle of voluntary human self-control (the Superego), lacking which our communities could not maintain themselves, and the second, as a potentially limitless system of communication whose indefinite degree of différance, as manifested in Chomsky’s postulate of indefinite recursion, complements the unity of the sacred.


    Complementary to the Abrahamic world are the very different configurations of East Asian religion, which, while not having inspired the creation of a rival form of modernity, have given their societies, in contrast with those of Islam, the ability to adapt to its Western model, beginning with the Japanese of the Meiji era.

    It is tempting, if perhaps overly schematic, to see the contrast between West and East as embodied in that between the Western One God, whose authority reigns over every detail of the universe, and the essentially atheistic religion of Buddha, for which desire for the things of the world, and the very ability of language to contribute to its implementation, must be denounced as an illusion, in contrast with the passive contemplation of the scene of representation itself. Desire tempts us to defile this scene with worldly objects rather than maintain it in its state of pure virtuality, which is that of the Nirvana to which the Buddhist ethic would have us all aspire. Although the relationship of Indian religion to its social order is too complex to be dealt with here, it is the original source of the Nirvana doctrine, which the otherworldliness of Buddhism purified by rejecting the caste system and with it, the religious basis for the archaic Indian social order.

    I pointed out in Chronicles 515516 that at what might be called the extreme point of Buddhist otherworldliness, the paradoxical analyses of Mahayana Buddhist Nagarjuna reject the very idea of the declarative sentence as an instrument of meaning, in contrast with Zeno’s “Western” paradoxes, which anticipate the new mathematical branches of infinite series and calculus. (See Musashi Tachikawa, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nagarjuna, Delhi, 1997). Whereas the proposition as the primary instrument of mature language makes possible the establishment of empirical truths that can be connected through logical reasoning to construct complex artifacts and gain control of the natural world, the point of Nagarjuna’s conundrums is to deny to the point of paradox the possibility of any genuine correspondence between language and reality.

    This rejection of the very principle of human language is no doubt not really meant to persuade us to abandon use of the declarative sentence. Its purpose is rather to turn our desire away from the truths it formulates, given their complicity with worldly temporality. Only the contemplation of the empty scene of representation provides authentic assurance against possible disillusion, for only the scene itself is permanent, ontologically stable. Such Eastern belief systems may not have broken through to the construction of socio-economic modernity, but as the popularity of Yoga and various forms of “meditation” demonstrates, they provide many in the West with spiritual resources for dealing with it.

    It is not difficult to see how the Judeo-Christian reliance on the One God can be transformed into the Buddhist reduction of faith to the scenic, to the sacred as such. In so doing, the willfulness of the One God, or in moral terms, his interdicting role as Superego, is replaced by the conception that all temporal entities are ultimately ephemeral and meaningless, that rather than opposing God’s will to our desire, we should simply recognize the sacred truth of the illusory nature of desire as such, and of the language that proposes objects to it, phenomena that share the same birth and the same essence. The scene of representation as the true realm of the sacred is only truly itself when it has been disencumbered of worldly objects.

    It is nonetheless notable how well the cultures of East Asia have adapted to Western modernity. It strikes me as symptomatic that in Japan, the first such culture to “Westernize,” Buddhism tends to be accompanied by Shinto observances, experienced by the general public as solemn duties but not, to the extent that I have observed it, accompanied by the kind of prayerful reflection that such practices demand in an Abrahamic setting. Such signs of respect for ancestral beliefs are above all affirmations of ancestral, ethnic unity.

    Whereas modern technology and scientific research, creations of the Christian West, as Rodney Stark pointed out in How the West Won (Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2014), demonstrate by their results the fecundity of their intellectual basis, Eastern receptivity, not merely to Western artifacts (like AK47s) but to modernity’s organizational and institutional structures, reflects the fecund openness of the empty scene to worldly practices that can demonstrate their effectiveness.


    Last we come to China, whose foundational Confucianism-cum-Taoism, very different indeed from the post-Axial religions of the West, is much closer to the ethical systems of the old empires, largely shorn of their supernatural element and reduced to ethical principles of “good conduct” and “naturalness.” This belief system suits what has remained the “Middle Empire” in various but similar guises over several thousand years: an ethnically and linguistically diverse community united in a single polity with a single ruling hierarchy, for which the sacred provides formulas for good governance that ideally can be followed at every social level. That, detached from the Chinese imperium, the mindset created by this system is no less flexible than that of Japanese Shintoism-cum-Buddhism is demonstrated by the successful Westernizing of the breakaway domains of Hong Kong and Taiwan. In contrast, the insistence of mainland China that these domains be fully reintegrated into its imperial system reflects the scandal inherent in such violations of the founding principle of Chinese territorial integrity.

    In its general acceptance by the population, the sacralization of Chinese leaders such as Mao and now Xi (not to speak of the Chinese-style Supreme Leaders of North Korea) exceeds even the most idolatrous relationships to political leaders in the West. Despite China’s recent economic and geopolitical success, it remains unclear to what extent participation in the market-based “capitalist” world economy can continue to flourish under so autocratic a system. Beyond the disciplining of Hong Kong and the constant threats to Taiwan, recent government actions against major Chinese entrepreneurs such as Jack Ma, whose accomplishments had previously been fully accepted by the government (see https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/world/persecution-jack-ma-sends-red-signal-chinese-investors [1/23/2021]), reflect tensions within “socialism with Chinese characteristics” that may not be compatible with its long-run economic efficiency.

    But similar remarks can be made about today’s West, whose susceptibility to antinomic ideologies has not ceased to increase at the expense of what we might call its instinct of self-preservation. The “civil sacred” of Western liberal democracy is widely under attack by a left-wing culture that increasingly rejects its marriage of Judeo-Christian ethics and national patriotism, issuing sacralized imperatives such as ending the use of fossil fuels, insuring racial “equity,” and tolerating in the name of penal reform increasing levels of public disorder and thuggery—all premised on what I have described as the symbolic rejection of firstness. In a sequel to this Chronicle, I will attempt to reexamine this question with specific focus on its sacred roots.