Author: staceymeeker

  • Modernism and the Triumph of the Market

    for René Girard

    The association of art with mimesis goes back to Plato and especially Aristotle, and Girard’s notion of “mediated desire,” by whatever name we call it, was far from unexplored territory on the appearance of Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque in 1961. But although the publication eleven years later of La violence et le sacré may have come as a surprise to all but Girard’s intimates, its premise was already implicit in the earlier work: that mimetic desire, properly understood, is at the core of the human—although its specificity cannot be satisfactorily defined in the absence of the notions of deferral and of the sign.

    I have discussed elsewhere these differences from Girard’s originary conception, and attempted to explain why his healthy mistrust of philosophy led him to throw out the baby of language along with the bathwater of metaphysics. But the subject I take up here explores the mimetic basis of the esthetic from the opposite angle.

    Girard’s discussion of the novel returns chronologically from Proust to Dostoevsky in order to avoid dealing with the element of “modernism,” which embodies a second level of mimesis. It is one thing to say that the story of Julien Sorel or Emma Bovary or Dmitri Karamazov is a fictional rendering of the “conversion” of the authors of these novels through their personal transcendence of mimetic desire, and then to add Proust’s Marcel to their number. But the world of esthetic modernism is marked not just by the rejection of “naïve” representation but, and I think more significantly, by the introduction of a form of mimetic rivalry between the artist and his audience, a rivalry only vaguely hinted at by Marcel’s told but unshown transformation into “the novelist.”

    This development, with its roots in the Baudelairean irony of post-romanticism, was incompatible with the spiritual lesson that Mensonge was meant to achieve. If, as Girard’s epigraph tells us, every man “possesses a God or an idol,” then the sacrilegious breakdown of this distinction in an era when a urinal can be displayed in an art catalog could have no place in Girard’s spiritual demonstration.


    The simplest construction of the esthetic, as presented in the previous Chronicle, is as the oscillation of attention between a sign and the imaginary referent its perception constructs in the mind of the perceiver. This stands in contrast with the originary event and its reproduction in religious ritual, where the interdependence of the scenic center and the sign founded a communal, not an individual experience.

    Esthetic experience becomes distinctive only when the central referent is experienced as dependent on the sign qua artwork. As I suggested in the previous Chronicle, the very notion of the artwork, as opposed to, for example, the décor of a ceremony, is defined by the fact that the individual’s experience of it is not preordained but contingent, personal, even if it takes place in a public setting.

    At the time, I described the esthetic experience solely with reference to the oscillation between sign and imaginary referent. But unlike a linguistic/semiotic sign, the artistic “sign” is not part of a communal lexicon. Even the most elemental artwork, such as a stick figure, must have iconic properties of its own that enrich the semiotic reference, and through which the artwork acquires its status as an attempt, not necessarily successful, to generate in the individual a personal experience of significance/sacrality, one recognized as dependent on the work that contingently provoked it, that is, as a fiction.

    As soon as the sign becomes a fiction, and to even the least degree the personal creation of the artist, it becomes a communication between two human subjects, and consequently a potential element of rivalry. But the original roots of the artist in a communally accepted priesthood, and the prior satisfactions procured by artworks that have had, in Aristotle’s terms, a cathartic/purgative effect on the elements of human desire that conflict with the need for communal peace, have created over the centuries a general acceptance of the role of the artist as someone whose productions deserve at least a chance of providing such satisfactions.

    Above all, the institutionalization of art in the public square and the marketplace have naturalized the artist-consumer relation to the point where, unless we are ourselves artists competing for the same consumers, we are unlikely to feel a sense of rivalry. Nor are we under any obligation to “consume” a given artwork. Given that it is our time and/or money that is involved, we need have no compunction about closing the book, turning off the music, going on to the next exhibit, or simply out the door.

    The customer is always right. But only if he knows what he thinks.

    Modernism and Mimesis

    The most distinctive feature of modernism in the arts, and particularly in the plastic arts, is the questioning of the esthetic effect of its works, and by extension, of all artworks, as subject to the influence of conformism/anti-conformism, in a word, of internal mediation in Girard’s sense of the term. The rivalry in question is no longer with the tradition-bound arbiters of taste, whom the post-romantics a generation or two earlier had learned to dismiss, but with the iconoclastic moderns themselves.

    Rebelling like the romantics and then the post-romantics against “tradition” provides the satisfaction that not only is one asserting one’s individuality, but that the “traditional” norms against which it is being asserted will remain as permanent testimony to it. But having to measure one’s reaction against not the tradition itself, but the post-traditional rebellion of others, is a source of malaise. Not to conform to the mold of the non-conformist is a delicate matter: is it turning one’s back on history, an exercise in audacity for its own sake? Yet conforming to the latest non-conformism is no more to one’s credit than conforming to traditional taste in earlier generations. Whence the Angst of the modernist.

    Why should this affect my reaction to a work of art? Merely raising this question brings a new dimension to the question of “art appreciation.” For the individual’s relationship to the artwork, once it has become an accepted aspect of the culture, develops norms of its own, which are incorporated into the esthetic relationship as a second level of communal mediation.

    This mimetic relationship had always existed as the starting framework for rediscovering Kant’s universality of judgment. But it came undone in the crisis signaled by Duchamp’s Fontaine, once the artists’ drive to surpass their predecessors had reached the point at which the externally mediated desire to go farther along the road than one’s masters changed into the internally mediated desire to contest the validity of the road itself.

    And so the secure superiority of the post-Romantics (as manifested, for example, in the “vieux Coppées” exchanged by Verlaine and Rimbaud to mock a “bourgeois” poet) gave way to the Angst of the modernist—and by an inevitable process of mimetic contamination, to that of the modern “art appreciator.”

    Art and Anthropology

    I began my career in the conviction, which I shared with Girard and several generations of twentieth-century cultural theorists, from the Russian formalists and English New Critics through the agony of (American) French Theory, that the esthetic was the royal road to what they felt, although they rarely called it “anthropology,” to be the foundation of the human—a foundation which, let me remind you, neither philosopher-metaphysicians nor social scientists possess the means to understand. It is anything but a coincidence that the privileged form of art, although not to the exclusion of the others, was the one that explicitly depends on the fundamental cultural function of language. Hominins may have danced and “sang,” even lynched on occasion, but without the deferral implicit in language, they would never have become human.

    Nor is it a coincidence that the esthetic remains one cultural domain where, despite what increasingly appears to be the West’s surrender of all communal values to the sacralization of resentment, Kant’s universal “judgment of taste” retains a residual degree of truth.

    Yet this sense of universality is constantly threatened, less by disagreement than by a growing sense that there are no self-evident criteria by which to judge, that in many or most domains of art, the “community” can no longer expect to come to agreement, and as a consequence, by the fear that ultimately no work of art will escape the banal rule of thumb about the “judgment of taste,” far less exalted than Kant’s, that des goûts et des couleurs, il ne faut pas se disputer.

    Might this be one more sign of impending apocalypse to add to Girard’s prophetic remark that Hitler’s defeat is being avenged by the ruinous distortion of our souci des victimes—which is after all just a synecdoche for the Judeo-Christian civilization that Hitler hoped to replace with the Thousand-Year Reich?

    Classical Art

    One may well wonder whether the same men who drew those beautiful animals on cave walls had evolved to the point of telling stories about them. If I had to guess, I’d say no, because the technique of cave-painting, however sophisticated, does not depend on the communal possession of a narrative tradition, or even necessarily of a mature language. Such techniques, like those for tool making and the use of fire, are material discoveries that need not be put into a language more advanced than that of Wittgenstein’s “language games.”

    What this suggests is that the plastic/iconic arts, because they are at first associated with sacred places, and impart in their numinosity a sacralizing effect to their location—whence the similarity between art museums and such monuments as basilicas and mausoleums—are less easily “secularized” than literary works, especially those destined like novels for the individual reader.

    The residual sacrality of plastic art is inherent in its lack of portability. The esthetic effect of the art object is not, like that of a work of music or of literature, indefinitely reproducible. Whereas the latter consist in “structures” composed of reproducible signs, the plastic artwork is a thing, and therefore subject to the same kind of centralization as the originary scenic object.

    A painted image, even a photograph, implies a hard distinction between an original and its reproductions. A good copy of a classic painting may be scarcely distinguishable from the original, and like the reproductions in books or on the Internet, convey much of the work’s esthetic effect to those who are not at the moment standing before the original. And yet the discovery that a famous artwork is a “fake” is a serious matter, of great financial consequence, for the original’s uniqueness, not merely its “esthetic quality,” is the source of its value.

    Indeed, I have said nothing to suggest that the esthetic effect itself need be affected by such a discovery. That museum directors and art experts certify paintings as authentic or otherwise is only marginally a matter for esthetics—only with respect to the presumed diminution of quality in a work created as an imitation rather than a free composition. And why could a “forger” not improve on the original?

    Such questions must be understood in relation to a canon of classical works, consecrated by history, which stands in contrast to the proliferation of plastic art in the modern world. With respect to this canon, it is understandable that even a forger’s “improvement” must nevertheless be debarred from comparison with the original, the product of a different age with different techniques. This stricture may not be a purely esthetic criterion, but its neglect would destroy the element of sacrality that, even in “secular” art, requires us to respect the situation of a given artwork on its proper historical scene—a truth that extends as well to literary and musical works.

    The Cash Nexus

    But if we can be fairly sure how to judge the artists of past centuries in their respective historical frameworks, this is not true of our contemporaries. No one can know for sure what the “verdict of history” will be concerning a given painting or sculpture, let alone an installation whose very status as an “object” is often unclear.

    As a result, insofar as every artist hopes to establish himself, hopefully while still living, as a “classic” whose works merit a sure and growing market value, producers for the art market are constantly incited to problematize the state of the market from one day to the next in order to assure the triumph of their innovation over the others.

    But as Duchamp made explicit over a century ago, the more the market comes to reward “originality” in the sense of surprise and scandal, the less the esthetic effect of the work can be separated from the mimetic effect it generates within its audience, who tend to be for the same reason plugged into the discourses of the art world in a way that novel readers or moviegoers feel no obligation to be before judging the works they encounter.

    As a consequence, the arbiters of art can no longer base their judgment on qualities subject to the kind of discussion that creates a rough consensus around narrative works. In today’s art market, any claim of insight into the “value” (no one dares speak any longer of “beauty”) of a given work has come to be of significance only as a market indicator. Just as Warren Buffett is renowned as a skilled picker of stocks, so gallery directors and the like are skillful pickers of art—able to assess better than most which artists’ prices will rise and which will fall.

    It should therefore escape no one that a historical movement that began with the post-romantic revolt against traditional-classic “bourgeois” taste, one that in its heyday provided an exemplary model for esthetic creation, with such success that these artists and writers—Flaubert, Baudelaire, the symbolist poets; Courbet, Manet, the Impressionists; Rodin, Cézanne…—are universally acknowledged as the supreme masters of their era, the honored precursors of all modern art… that the course of this movement has led us to where what Marx denounced as the cash nexus is the only acceptable measure of quality. It is no longer the Baudelaires and Courbets, but ultra-rich collectors and their agents who define what passes for value in the plastic arts.


    Happily, beyond the uniqueness of objets-d’art, there remains what Walter Benjamin called “art in the age of mechanical reproduction”: the ability, made possible by technology, to encompass the entire world of our experience on our personal scene, and more specifically, screen, of representation. If human civilization is to survive, we must have faith that the screenic arts will survive the “Satanic” forces of internal mimesis.

  • The Paradox of Desire and Art

    Desire and the Sign

    In the previous Chronicle, I avoided speaking of desire in order to anchor the notion of paradox in the phenomenon of representation. Yet desire, as opposed to mere appetite, participates in the same paradoxical relationship as the sign between “horizontal” appetite and “vertical” deferral. In both cases, the object of what was an appetitive drive or gesture is interdicted and becomes thematized as an intentional object through its interdiction; this mediation is “recycled” into the original drive. The difference lies in how these phenomena relate to their cultural and natural environments.

    In the case of the sign, the aborted gesture, a sign of non-action in the animal world, becomes a communication to others of one’s renouncement, and hence of the sacred/interdicted nature of the gesture’s original objective. The reciprocal exchange of the sign makes deferral into a common project whose members form the core of the first human community.

    In contrast, desire “feeds on itself,” deferral making the object of appetite significant/sacred within the individual’s own scene of representation. The intentionality this gives rise to in the individual, unlike the expression of significance through the sign, makes him aware of his independence from the community. The circulation of psychic energy between the original appetitive drive and the “deferred” scene of representation  is the source of human creativity.

    Whereas language, as an instrument of shared communication, cannot exist without communally shared norms, even when these are violated, desire and the experiences it inspires provides the “libido” that fuels not only the individual’s participation in cultural phenomena but his impetus to create “his own” cultural world.

    It follows from this that whereas the mimetic element of the sign operates by effecting a common agreement as to its meaning, the mimetic element of desire contains a constant threat of conflict. Signs may be indefinitely multiplied, whereas objects of desire are “unique.” Their mimetically heightened value is the différend of all human violence—as well as the primary stimulus to employ human ingenuity in the service of further deferring this violence.

    Presented less as an anthropological discovery than as one of those lessons that life teaches us, the paradoxical nature of desire is one of the great truths of “mature wisdom.” As Pascal put it, one desires the chase, not the prey; the fun is in what you do until you get the prize. Unlike appetite, desire does not simply satisfy a need; it depends on the joys and frustrations of the deferral of satisfaction. And this is all the more true when the desire in question circulates between two lovers. Suis ton ombre, elle te fuit ; fuis ton ombre, elle te suit [Follow your shadow, she flees you ; flee your shadow, she follows you] was an adage long before Girard theorized mimetic desire in Mensonge romantique.

    Even in carrying out the biologically essential functions of eating and sex, we enjoy prolonging the act that leads to satisfaction rather than focusing exclusively on its fulfillment. I don’t believe there is any evidence that animals experience pleasure in this paradoxical manner, for this experience depends on the transcendental phenomenon of deferral.

    The Paradox of Art

    As readers of Chronicle 669 will recall, my first venture into paradoxical thinking, prior to any thought of “originary thinking,” was in the realm of the esthetic. Looking back after over 40 years on my writings on le paradoxe esthétique, it is perhaps not surprising that I am no longer altogether satisfied with these early formulations. But seen as a step toward originary thinking, the association of art with paradox contains an essential anthropological intuition that can be understood more clearly from the standpoint of the mature theory.

    Some years after I conceived GA’s theory of the sign, I rethought the esthetic relation in terms of the tension in the mind of the perceiver between (artistic) sign and (imaginary) object. As opposed to the obvious examples of temporal art—narration, music, dance, theater—I chose as my primary example our interaction with plastic art, the experience of which precisely lacks a regulated temporality. When the artwork is present all at once, the spectator must be induced by his perceptual experience alone to prolong his examination of the work beyond merely ascertaining its “subject.”

    It seemed to me that when contemplating a painting or sculpture, particularly those in the classical, representational mode, if we “keep looking” at the artwork it is because our attention is in effect oscillating between the art-object itself and the imaginary reality it conjures up on our imaginary scene of representation, and which the desire inspired by the work incites us to renew.

    In the case of non-objective art, this “reality” is no less a mental construct for being without analogy in worldly forms. But it has always seemed to me that, with rare exceptions, our absorption in such a décor is uncompelling, and that what replaces the charm of real imagery is largely the snobbery of feeling more able than the “bourgeois” to appreciate the beauty of patterns and colors, or simply of identifying with the artist’s chutzpah in disdaining the iconic.

    All of modern art is haunted by the fear that the “external” mimesis that circulates between the artwork and its evocation in our imagination is becoming less potent than our “internal” mimetic relationship with the artist and his real and potential public—a second-level paradox the classical manifestation of which was Marcel Duchamp’s 1917 display of a “ready-made” urinal (entitled “Fontaine”) in the catalog of the Arturo Schwarz Gallery.


    Like all artifacts of culture, the work of art builds on the originary experience of appetite and deferral that produced the first sign. The analogy between the structure of art and that of desire itself brings together the most salient modes of paradoxical experience that define the human.

    To the extent that the energy that circulates through the virtual presence of the group in the sign remains embodied in the originary central object, and in the memory of the object after its consumption, the appetitive interest of the object retains the element of deferral that defined it from the outset as an object of desire.

    The scene is defined by its center, but its constitution qua scene—as opposed to an unstructured terrain of potential conflict—depends from the outset on the sign of deferred appropriation that in effect defines the center. The oscillating attention of the peripheral participants between the reciprocally exchanged sign and its sacred central referent already has the structure of an esthetic experience, one that reinforces the scene’s peace-bringing suspension of action.

    Once it is realized that recreation of the scene begins with the sign, and that since recreating the sign is wholly within the power of any human individual, this provides an incentive both to the group and to its individual members to supplement the minimal sign with more elaborate representations of the scene in order to enhance the effect of its ritual repetition by serving as reminders of it.

    It is thus easy to understand how the sign in its minimality would come to be supplemented, at first by prolongations and extensions of the sign-exchange itself in ritually coordinated dances and chants, and then, once a “sacred space” has been established within the community for the recreation of the scene, the creation of iconic images of the ritual center, leading to the remarkably sophisticated cave-paintings of Lascaux and elsewhere that illustrate the communal basis for the rite in the overcoming of the animal that will provide the substantive basis of the ritual.

    Although the originary sign is not an “art-object,” it participates in the sacrality of the central object, which preexists it only virtually. What we imagine as the quasi-ecstatic repetition of the “aborted gesture,” no doubt accompanied by vocalizations similar to that preserved in “Yah,” the primitive name of the Hebrew god, is our first cultural act. It makes the sign a signifier not merely of the scenic center but of the scene as a whole.

    Art and Sexual Desire

    In contrast to the need for food, the sex drive, the other major source of human desire, is not suited to the public scene. If alimentary appetite must be deferred in the critical circumstance of collective feasts, in the sexual realm, one would speculate that by the dawn of language/culture, monogamy had already become the norm. The prehuman young, as a result of their larger brains and the narrowing of the birth canal resulting from erect posture, were becoming increasingly neotenic and consequently required more and longer maternal care. And we can easily enough imagine that sexual loyalty played an important role in undermining the Alpha-Beta pecking-order system. Terrence Deacon (see Chronicle 168 and passim) even speculated in The Symbolic Species that the first use of language may have been in a “marriage” ceremony for the purpose of insuring the hunters against their partners’ potential unfaithfulness during their absence.

    But although we may assume that the originary crisis that produced language occurred in the domain of food distribution, it is significant that the world of art pays little attention to the alimentary domain, other than as providing occasions for communal solidarity (as in the “equal feasts” of Homer’s epics). Art, in all its manifestations, is the product of the freedom that deferral procures to the human individual, separated from the natural world by the néant of deferral, to conceive the world for himself. Art’s detachment from the world of ritual reflects the individuation of desire and of its human subjects that is a byproduct of the deferral mechanism and its privileging of the sexual domain. Esthetic experience, which capsulizes the self-reinforcing and self-enriching structure of desire in the oscillation of the perceiver’s attention between the work itself and his imaginary construction of it, parallels the self-reinforcing and self-deferring pattern of the love-relationships that art so frequently depicts.


    On the one hand, contemporary social science is handicapped by its incapacity to appreciate either the originary necessity of language (as opposed to its apparent gratuity) or the degree to which the individual mind is dependent on its cultural community. Yet on the other hand, those who would apply the GA paradigm must not neglect to take into account the freedom that the possession of language provides the individual to engage, well before the existence of institutional “learning,” in what Lévi-Strauss called la pensée sauvage, a mode of thought without any institutional basis in established doctrine. Lévi-Strauss likened activity in this mode to that of the classic French tinkerer-hobbyist, or bricoleur. And throughout its entire history, no significant human activity remains as close to bricolage as does artistic creation.

    The most distinctive feature of human as opposed to animal mimesis is the drive, always virtually present, of the imitator to differ from his models, whether in small or large ways. It is by no means accidental that this phenomenon has above all been noted and studied in the arts, where the overt search for originality marks the opening up of what Voegelin called “compact” archaic civilizations.

    If we can define a moment at which the esthetic exceeds the domain of ritual, within which it certainly begins in any cultural sense, it is when its subject-matter is individualized to the point that the spectator becomes aware of its particularity rather than its conformity to an established ritual tradition. Regardless of the exact point of inflection, what we must note is the new possibility of individualized representation that adds a vast number of degrees of freedom to potential human creativity.

    It is in the artwork that the significance/sacrality inspired by individual desire, whether centered on a sexual object or one of worldly significance, can be shared with others as individuals rather than simply, as in ritual, by re-forming the originary collectivity. The public spectacles of the recitation of the Homeric poems and later, the Athenian theater festivals illustrate both their source in originary rites and the separation from them that art entails. The community constituted by a theater or cinema audience is formed by the intersection of individual experiences, even when, as in the old TV studios, the spectators were given instructions on when to laugh for the benefit of home viewers.


    The paradox of desire, which nourishes the world of art, is the foundation of the individual’s personal scene of representation in its deferred unification with the communal scene. This central mechanism of human intentionality realizes itself both in our private lives and in our ambitions to “leave our mark” on the world.

  • The Human Paradox

    This “plague year” seems an appropriate time to attempt to clarify what exactly I mean by paradox, and why I consider it, properly understood, as the minimal criterion of the human. Paradox encapsulates the revolutionary difference between the prehuman mind, which presents the world to itself through perception, and may be able to signal its perceptions to others of its species, and the human mind, which represents this world by means of a conscious, communally shared system of signs, that is, in language.

    I had been drawn to the phenomenon of paradox several years before I conceived the complex of ideas that evolved into generative anthropology. In 1975 I published with Nizet a pair of “paradoxical” essays, Le Paradoxe de Phèdre suivi du “Paradoxe constitutif du roman,” and in 1977, Essais d’esthétique paradoxale at the Editions Gallimard, my last book before The Origin of Language in 1981.

    As noted previously (e.g., Chronicles 389, 580, 641), the key source of this interest was making the acquaintance, via Alain Cohen, of the Palo Alto school of psychology headed by Gregory Bateson, and in particular of Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson’s Pragmatics of Human Communication (Norton, 1967), which develops the idea of pragmatic paradox, the classic example of which is the Jewish mother who tells her son: “Be spontaneous!” The priority of the pragmatic to the logical is a simple matter of common sense.


    Pragmatic or logical, in the absence of semiotic representation, paradox is inconceivable, and vice versa: the term “paradox” in its various guises always refers to a conflict between what a sign is and what it “says.” Visual “paradoxes” are such only by analogy; they are tricks of our perceptive apparatus, which itself makes no assertions about the world, whereas this sentence is false is not merely misleading: it claims yet possesses no stable meaning.

    Consequently, looking back on the prehistory of GA, I would add the element of paradox to the Girard-Derrida dialectic as the primary constituents of the originary hypothesis.

    The notion of la différance is presented by Derrida as a non-concept, but its anthropological root is in paradox. Derrida describes différance as taking place in the mind of the perceiver who seeks to match a signifier to a potential signified, situated in the experientially temporal but essentially ontological gap between perceiving a cat and identifying it by means of the word cat. In this model, the signifier cat is not itself deferred from referring to a worldly cat.

    As a metaphysician, albeit a post/anti-metaphysical one, Derrida does not examine the originary anthropological basis of signification, yet it is there that originary paradox is to be found. For différance is prior to the constitution of paradigms; it is inherent in signification itself. What is deferred/differentiated in the first place are appetite and its renouncement, a gesture of appropriation and the sign made from its deferral.

    It is this originary association of the sign with paradox that justifies the first sentence of the back-cover notice of Essais d’esthétique paradoxale: Loin d’être une anomalie du discours logique, le paradoxe est antérieur à la logique (Far from being an anomaly of logical discourse, paradox is prior to logic).

    Absent the propositional language in which logic is defined, paradox in the this sentence is false sense of the term is inconceivable. But generative anthropology, alone among the “sciences,” does not take the existence of the declarative proposition for granted in the human object-world that it describes.

    When I composed that French sentence, in the days before GA, it expressed the still inchoate intuition that a pre-logical, pragmatic form of paradox must have preexisted the possibility of its formulation in “logical” language—that paradox is more fundamental, and more fundamentally human, than the proposition—let alone than the literary forms that, as the New Criticism insisted, constantly embody it.


    As far as I know, before the publication of The Origin of Language in 1981, no theory of language origin had taken into account the familiar adage that necessity is the mother of invention—nor has, to my knowledge, any theory since. All other accounts, from divine creation to the gradualist just-so stories that the present generation finds unfalsifiably “scientific,” simply take for granted that language is a “good thing,” which, given God’s grace and/or our superior brain power, the species would one day come up with. And once we had it, of course, we would easily see how useful it might be. One imagines a time-traveling tour group of hominins, on witnessing the unparalleled success of our species, kicking themselves for not having thought of language first.

    How many otherwise serious social scientists have put forth the idea that language began when our brains began to generate “ideas” that they then wanted to “express” to others (see, e.g. Chronicle 553). The absurdity of such theorizing does not require knowledge of set theory. Just as we did not acquire legs because of a build-up of energy that made us want to go running, neither did we acquire speech because of a build-up of “ideas” that we wanted to “express.”

    But once we recognize that language was invented/discovered because, at some specific moment of our species’ history, it became necessary, then we should be willing to understand the fundamental meaning of “paradox” as embodying a new form of tension between alternative courses of action—alternatives for the group and not merely an individual—which could be resolved without self-destructive violence only by the introduction of a wholly new form of communication.


    What specifically was paradoxical in the situation of originary crisis as our hypothesis describes it?

    The crisis arises as the result of the breakdown of the Alpha-Beta pecking-order hierarchy that had regulated the division of food and sex among the males of what we can call the protohuman group. The key difference between such a prehuman hierarchy and those established by humans is that the animal community has no center. The Alpha animal is not the “leader” of the group, even if, as the dominant animal, he tends to “decide” in what direction it will move, for example. The animals being mutually mimetic, the dominant one will be imitated in preference to the others, but animals do not form a community in the human sense, capable of investing a leader with central authority.

    In our hypothetical example, the division of the spoils of the hunt, the Alpha takes the first portion and leaves the rest for the others; then the Beta does likewise, down to the lower-ranking members. In contrast with the elaborate procedures of human hunter-gatherer societies, there is no prior agreement on this division.

    It then suffices to assume that, as the lability of mimesis and its inherent facilitation of rivalry increases with intelligence, the Alpha’s position, which depends on the absence of group consciousness, becomes unstable. As students of ape behavior have observed, coalitions form that endanger such hierarchies, but without replacing them by more stable ones.
    The tension surrounding the central object increasingly becomes a source of group-wide contradictory impulses: on the one hand, each member of the group desires to appropriate it, on the other, each fears that by doing so, it is opening itself to the violence of the others. In what we may call its proto-communal state, where the group’s increasing symmetry is as yet unthematized in a community, the increasing likelihood of violence poses a problem that demands a solution.

    Under such circumstances, the object to be divided is an object of danger as well as of appetite. To take one’s share out of turn, or to gang up against one of higher rank, invites challenges and provokes internal conflict that distracts the group from the peaceful division of the spoils and, more generally, diminishes its overall “fitness” to maintain itself and its dependents over time.

    What we have called the “aborted gesture of appropriation” is precisely the result of this increased tension. We experience something of this when several hands reach out for the same piece of cake, or simply when deciding whether to take the last piece (anticipating the future disappointment of rival cake-lovers).

    The solution that becomes language, the recycling of the aborted gesture as a sign, cannot be understood as a simple mimetic effect within the group—I see another hesitate, and this makes me more likely to do so as well—although this effect is essential to its functionality. What is essential is the realization of each member, beginning, as Adam Katz pointed out a decade ago, with the “first” to become aware of it, that this abortion can be understood, not merely as the negation of an act, but as its voluntary renouncement, and that this renouncement is not just an individual decision but a communally significant act that is ipso facto a sign communicated to the group as a whole. That is, the aborted gesture already “communicates” its abortive nature, but the nature of the gesture, which is one of pointing, comes to be understood as a consciously formed sign designating the central object as sacred and not to be appropriated, deferring this appropriation until such time as it can be done peacefully by the newly formed human community.

    The abortive gesture as sign can then be reciprocally communicated by all the members of the group, establishing the deferral of any appropriation of the object until such time as intra-group tension has been lowered to the point where the newly established community can perform this appropriation in unison. This is classically exemplified within a tribal society by the camel sacrifice described by Robertson Smith in his 1889 Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, cited by Freud in Totem and Taboo; similar ceremonies are common among non-hierarchical societies.

    In this way, the paradoxical tension between desire and renouncement, moving both toward and away from the object, is transformed from a state of confusion into becoming itself, through its embodiment in the sign, the solution to the dilemma. The first sign is the first truly human act.


    The sign, and with it, “the human” in all its potential richness, resolves the paradox of contradictory impulses, not by reconciling them, but, to use Hegel’s term, by “lifting them up” (aufheben) to another level.

    From the standpoint of metaphysics, which is to say, of philosophy as first formalized by Parmenides and Socrates/Plato, propositional language is a tool for reasoning about “Ideas,” one more complex and arbitrary than mathematics, but of a similarly extra-anthropological constitution, and which the human brain had only to “download,” or “discover.” Metaphysical thinking recognizes the uniqueness of humankind as characterized by “reason,” but reason itself, that is, the use of declarative propositions possessing a truth-value, is not understood as a specifically human creation, just as most mathematicians find offensive the idea that numbers exist only as human artifacts.

    The process of language-generation (or more properly, syntax-generation) is most concretely represented by Chomsky’s LAD (Language Acquisition Device), which can be imagined as a neurological machine with a number of switches representing alternatives such as SOV vs OVS, subject-object vs topic-comment, etc.

    This is not simply naïve; it is a category error. Language is no more an “essence” of which the world’s languages are examples than Plato’s Ideas are “real.” What I call the metaphysical prejudice of human science makes here its fundamental misstep. To fail to acknowledge the anthropological nature of language is simply to misunderstand the significance of the human and of its emergence.

    The fact that people in all societies speak about God, or gods, or some other embodiment of the sacred suggests the undeniable reality, in human terms, of a transcendental domain, whether real or fictional, to which alone we as language users have access.

    The proto-evolutionary explanation (found, e.g., in Max Müller’s 1861 lectures at the British Royal Institution, published in 1864 as Lectures on the Science of Language), that primitive man was “awed” by nature and began to worship fearsome forces such as the sun and storms, is terminally naïve. Why didn’t our ape or hominin ancestors “worship” such things—or anything? How did “man” evolve from lower animals in such a way that he suddenly found familiar elements of his environment “awesome”?

    And yet the answer is obvious. Once more, necessity is the mother of invention. No other animals needed, certainly not “awe” of nature but a sense of the sacred, which Girard well understood as the embodiment of the danger of desire, to keep them alive.

    In the originary event, the signified object, which is understood by the participants to be inaccessible to human appropriation, is seen as separating itself by Sartre’s néant from the rest of the world at the center of a scene of representation with its human participants on the periphery. We are fascinated by it, but we cannot approach to appropriate it as a result of the mimetic danger implicit in this collective fascination. Thus we perceive it in a new, uniquely human fashion, one combining appetite with interdiction.

    The sacred is the quality that the first sign attributes to its referent—the first significant being, the world’s sole object of perception whose presence must be addressed, yet can only be addressed, and demonstrated by the human community that it is being addressed, by a sign. At the origin, sacred and significant are synonymous. Signification, which as language-users we take for granted, is in its origin the transcendental quality of sacrality. At this first moment, nothing else in the universe, whatever its appetitive/affective value, is meaningful—for nothing else is the potential cause of our self-destruction.

    The extension of significance to the entire universe of our experience—involving the attribution of signifiers to potentially all signifiable elements—can now be understood as an extension of this originary experience, which is conducive to the notion of the universe as itself merely an extension of the originary central object. Thus, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the world is understood as “God’s creation.”


    Where is paradox in all this? Recall the paradoxical state of Pavlov’s dogs, as illustrated by the medieval topos of Buridan’s ass, who starves to death when placed at an equal distance between two bales of hay.

    The solution operated by the sign is the conversion of the original, aborted gesture of appropriation into (1) a gesture that expresses desire for the object, that is, appetite mediated by a uniquely human form of mimetic desire that both encompasses the entire group, and of which all the members of the group are aware, as shown by (2) the sign’s constitution as reproducing (through “pointing”) the abortion of the gesture’s original aim to possess the object. The enunciation of the sign embodies the deferral of the original desire. The two halves of the contradiction, or what had been “paradox” in the animal world, are now placed on different levels: the expression of desire is thematized by (1) the enunciation of the sign expressing desire whose formal precondition is (2) the desire’s deferral.

    The idea of a logical paradox, the confusion of two levels of reference, as in “this sentence is false,” is possible only at the stage of the declarative proposition, once language has evolved to the point of supplying “information” about the world. But for the purpose of the present discussion, it is more important to note that the “self-inclusion” that is the standard sign of paradox in the world of logic (sets that are members of themselves, sentences that refer to themselves…) is already a feature of the originary ostensive.

    For, as we have seen, to “express” desire through the sign is to have already renounced acting on this desire, in which case its semiotic “expression” would be unnecessary. No doubt, in lives that have been like ours saturated with signs, the possibility of both expressing desire and acting on it poses no problem. But we must conceive the birth of language as an addition to a world hitherto lacking in signs of deferral, in which an animal chooses either between a positive act of appropriation or a pre-aborted act marking an inhibition, such as a play-bite between puppies.

    In sum, the sign permits the sharing of the unsharable. The sacred, significant central object is unique, but the sign that acknowledges its presence is inexhaustibly repeatable.

    The structure of the sign embodies the fundamental human paradox, the minimal definition of the human in its specific difference from the world of “nature.” This originary paradox may be understood as an unpacking of the meaning of representation in the generative-anthropological “definition” of the human that I provided in “Differences” (MLN 96; French, Spring 1981: 792-808), as the deferral of violence through representation.


    In short, the paradoxes that we find in logical self-inclusion, or, like Zeno of Elea, in phenomena such as infinite series, which cannot be “thought” in their entirety but only summed up, have their origin in our most fundamental human trait of language. As I hope to have made clear, language, even in its most elemental, ostensive state, is from the beginning paradoxical, duplicitous. It is inextricably both an objective mapping of the world that leaves it intact, and an instrument whose function is to modify it.

  • The Fatal Flaw II

    As if on order, the media supplied a perfect illustration of the connection, whose falseness does not remove its persuasiveness, between Christianity and victimary ideology:

    Giants’ Sam Coonrod had every right to stand, but his reason fell short

              Monte Poole NBC Sports BayArea Jul 24, 2020, 4:33 PM

    Sam Coonrod stepped into the sightlines of America on Thursday night, when he alone stood during an intended unified peaceful protest. A light followed him around Friday, and might stay with him for a while.

    All the Giants pitcher did was exercise the right that all Americans have, at least theoretically. Freedom of choice. The right for which millions of Americans fought, with many dying. For that reason, Coonrod’s decision to stand rather than join his kneeling manager and teammates during a pregame moment of unity at Dodger Stadium should be above criticism.

    He did nothing wrong.

    He said plenty wrong, though, offering up an explanation that slid off his tongue and went dribbling down his chest like liquid contradiction.

    “I’m a Christian,” he said.

    When did real Christianity opt out of humanity? Give a pass to injustice and inequality? Decide that it’s disrespectful to offer support, if not shelter, to those in need? Does Coonrod not realize that pastors of all faiths are joining crowds around the world fighting for these very ideals?

    Like so many others swimming against the tide of progress, Coonrod pointed to the Black Lives Matter network, saying he “just can’t get on board” with some of its beliefs. Nothing wrong with that. Again, having such a choice is among the purposes of freedom.

    But if Coonrod had taken a moment to inform himself, he would see motive behind this movement need not be affiliated with BLM but, rather, to bring greater awareness to the racial injustices that is its focus.

    Ian Williams, NBC Sports Bay Area analyst and former 49ers defensive lineman, responded to Coonrod’s reasoning by calling BS on it.

    “Let me make this clear,” Williams tweeted. “You don’t have to be on board with BLACK LIVES MATTER. But I do need you to be on board with EQUALITY FOR ALL and ENDING RACISM.

    “It’s simple. If you don’t want those 2 simple things, you know what you are.”

    Which is to imply Coonrod’s own interests are in conflict with protesting racial inequality.

    See, one need not be a card-carrying BLM member to decry the obvious wrongness of America’s ways. That some perceive the desire for equality as a “political” statement says a lot about them.

    It’s only political because some continue to place politics over the concept of humanity.

    It’s only political because certain elements of government perceive protesters — not all of whom are faithful to every element of BLM — as terrorists who must be silenced, if not crushed.

    See, what Coonrod did not say but surely crept into the minds of listeners and readers is that he believes the various evolutions of America’s two greatest sins — the other being stealing land from the natives — are acceptable. That equality is something for others to deal with.

    That Christianity has, somehow, disqualified him from the cause.

    There are only two rational explanations for what Coonrod said. One, he didn’t hear himself speak. Or, two, he heard every word he said and knows he did not say what he really meant.

    https://sports.yahoo.com/giants-sam-coonrod-had-every-233315317.html

    (my emphasis)

    If this piece does not strike fear into my reader’s heart, I don’t know what will. What I particularly want to point out is not the gratuitous vileness of “an explanation that slid off his tongue and went dribbling down his chest,” nor even the absurd extrapolation, backed up with words from a black footballer, that “Coonrod’s own interests are in conflict with protesting racial inequality,” but that his claim to be acting as a Christian is false and ignorant, if not deliberately hypocritical.

    This is hardly a “grain of truth,” but no matter. The importance of this diatribe lies in the unchallengeable fact that it enunciates a position that its author has reason to believe will command the allegiance of a majority of “respectable” American opinion.

    Which is to say that a sizeable fraction of those who either consider themselves Christians or consider the qualification of “Christian” a moral endorsement are, at the very least, willing to entertain the judgment that the action of not kneeling, although Coonrod’s undoubted right, was a sign of what is analyzed further down as condoning “America’s greatest sins” and believing that “equality is something for others to deal with.”


    Just as with the other ideas and activities of the “woke,” what is important is not to reveal, as is hardly necessary, their absurdity and/or indecency, but to seek the source of their persuasiveness. How could “Christianity” come to be charged with demanding a demeaning act as a sign of belief in moral equality?

    And once more, this document makes the answer clear: in its assertion of the “wrongness of American ways.” Where Jesus had merely opposed Caesar’s worldly kingdom to that of his Father, Poole explicitly asserts the ungodliness of American’s “almost chosen” people.

    Whereas the founders of the original liberal democracies modeled their idea of the “nation” on the Old Testament, the ambition of these democracies to embody a “New Israel” is now fundamentally contested. The so-called “newspaper of record” has sponsored a project purporting to show that the original raison-d’être of the United States was slavery—and the gestures of propitiation that BLM has been exacting from the bearers of White Guilt are all grounded in this fundamental sense that, far from being an agent for the good, America is and will remain unworthy of our loyalty until such time—as cannot possibly ever occur—that it will have effaced its last trace of “racism,” along with the various other bigotries that the masters of resentment have conjured up for it.

    Needless to say, I am not blaming the founders of Christianity for this “oversight.” My purpose is to diagnose the current ills of the Judeo-Christian West (from which Israel is by no means exempt), and to suggest, along with a number of others, such as Yoram Hazony (The Virtue of Nationalism, Basic Books, 2018), that the nation, which in my lifetime has gone from an object of fervent patriotism to one of contempt among its own elite, remains worthy of our loyalty, in the absence of which, our exercise of what purports to be moral judgment is no more than an expression of vicarious resentment.


    In 2007, when I published The Scenic Imagination, I was able to view Hobbes’ notion of what Rousseau would later call the “social contract” as a positive step along the path to the originary hypothesis. Which it certainly was; but at the time, I would not have thought to point out the danger inherent in the presumption, manifestly false from an anthropological if not from a Judeo-Christian point of view, that the individual human being, the possessor of “soul” and language, pre-exists the human community as such.

    Rousseau, writing after the anthropological imagination had been stimulated by a much greater acquaintanceship with surviving archaic societies, was astute enough to note in the Discours de l’origine de l’inégalité the paradoxical nature of the origin of language, but this question remains peripheral to his analysis of “society” in any form. The formation of what Rousseau calls la société commencée is both posterior to the acquisition of language (in the “state of nature”) and anterior to any form of what he would later call le contrat social, which is implicitly a product of the inégalité that he dates from the acquisition of private property (Le premier qui dit: ‘Ceci est à moi’), and which corresponds historically to the Neolithic Revolution and the beginnings of social hierarchy.

    Rousseau’s exposition is intended not as history but as a clarification of the self-consciousness of the political community, understood as defined by a contract between its members and the State that exercises over it the power of sovereignty. In this context, rather than realizing (as could hardly be expected) that the separation provoked by Christianity between the spiritual and the earthly realms had been the source of the unique creativity of Western civilization, he views it as a handicap to political unity: la loi Chrétienne est au fond plus nuisible qu’utile à la forte constitution de l’Etat. [The law of Christianity is finally more deleterious than useful to the strong constitution of the State] (Du contrat social, 1762 edition, IV, 8: 307). Which, from the standpoint of Caesar’s empire, it certainly was.


    The American Republic was created on principles similar to those enunciated by Rousseau, but on an unspoken (Judeo-)Christian foundation of “almost-chosenness,” which successfully outlasted the North-South divide and its Jim Crow remnants. Why then does it now appear to be succumbing to the forces of resentment?

    Paradoxes can never be “grasped,” only remarked on. And they remain functional only to the extent that they are not remarked on otherwise than as supernatural revelations. (One might rewrite the entire history of humanity from this perspective.)

    As we now see clearly, it is precisely the paradoxical structure of the Western church-state, spiritual-temporal relationship that led it to unleash the forces of modernity and “conquer the world.” But whatever illusions we may have nourished in 1989, the steady “canceling” of what had been until very recently implicitly guaranteed societal norms (quasi-universality of heterosexual marriage, illegality/clandestinity of abortion, drug use, pornography, and prostitution, interdiction of racial preferences, reverence for the Western cultural heritage and respect for its traditional religions) has led to an ever more frenzied search for systematic injustices as yet unsuspected—while the market system has continued to operate much as before.

    From guaranteeing America’s status as the New Israel that is to lead us into a glorious future, the Christian ideal has been reduced to an imperative of worldly equality at once timeless and unachievable. The Judeo-Christian paradox is reduced to a sterile contradiction, like the “paradoxical state” in Pavlov’s dogs. Instead of operating with the assurance that virtue will be generally rewarded as the nation works to realize its historic goals, the (non-victimary) citizen, independently of his social contribution, can seek salvation only in unending penance for his irremediable complicity in victimization (“white privilege”).

    This permanent state of moral disequilibrium has been sustained, with the complicity of minority politicians, by the perpetuation of the victimary status of stigmatized/sacralized identity groups, of which the blacks as bearers of the stigma and grace of slavery constitute the exemplary American model—one which, as the recent European “sympathy” riots have shown, has currency well beyond the USA. In exchange for the institutionalization of White Guilt and its compensation through targeted racial preferences, the overall structure of the social economy, including its other inherent inequalities, has been until now sustained at a modest cost, albeit with constantly increasing intolerance of truth-telling as the Emperor’s garments have been removed.

    But the dependency of this system on the resentment of its “victims” has now begun to generate, under the added pressure of the pandemic, what risks becoming runaway instability. Even if the black community might still be satisfied with the trade-offs characteristic of what Dinesh D’Souza calls the “plantation” (see, e.g., Chronicle 637), the frustrated non-black youth that make up Antifa as well as a considerable contingent of BLM are happy to piggy-back on black victimhood under the benevolent aegis of Democratic mayors and police chiefs, committing spiritual and physical mayhem at virtually no cost. When someone refuses to bow—kneel—down, the text reproduced above gives a good idea of what he can expect.


    A national community does not consist in a snapshot of its current membership, but above all in a collective desire for its own perpetuation. It must of necessity subordinate its respect for the moral model of reciprocity to the ethic that assures its continued flourishing. When Lincoln called the American people “almost chosen,” he was very much aware of our history of slavery. For it is the paradoxical dependence of moral equality on temporal inequality that permits the community’s survival as well as its eventual remediation of practices judged unjust.

    But exclusive reliance on the epistemology of resentment rejects the moral/ethical paradox inherent in the disparity of temporal horizons: all past history is called to the bar of moral equality and found wanting, while future history becomes an empty abstraction. To define America by “the obvious wrongness of [its] ways” is very different from seeking to reduce the “almostness” that separates it from exemplarity.

    Ultimately it is the loss, not of religion but of the communal will to survival that the original Spengler saw as the source of the death of civilizations, and that our contemporary “Spengler,” David P. Goldman, warns us of in his columns and in his book How Civilizations Die (Regnery, 2011).

    Generative anthropology does not provide a recipe for restoring this will, but by providing a clear explanation of the process that is driving our “decline,” it makes it easier to conceive policies that might still be capable of reviving it among the general population.

    To witness what, after our campuses and our media, our cities are now fast becoming should be incentive enough.

  • The Fatal Flaw

    The July/August 2020 issue of Commentary contains a review (p. 54-56) of a book with the charmingly old-fashioned title Our Great Purpose: Adam Smith on Living a Better Life, by Ryan Hanley (Princeton UP). The reviewer, Tal Fortgang, begins by dismissing what he observes to be the current alternative sources of moral inspiration for “disaffected Millennials”: the “father figures who provide order and authority” such as Jordan Peterson, and, diametrically opposed, what he calls

    the “dirtbag left,” a collection of self-righteous socialist trolls whose strategy for building a more caring society includes dancing on their political opponents’ graves. (54)

    Fortgang categorizes—I think unfairly, although I see his point—these “post-liberal responses” as having more in common than they would like to admit, in the sense that they offer stereotyped answers to real moral problems rather than facing them directly. Fortgang is happy to follow Hanley in praising “a third way”:

    The third way is that advocated by Adam Smith, the moral philosopher better known for his economics, but whose Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) provides all kinds of insight into the sources of youthful angst. (ibid)

    Far be it from me to denigrate the moral wisdom of Adam Smith, who instead of proposing abstract ideals of “freedom” or “equality,” sees “every person [as] empowered to look inward and cultivate virtue.” And Hanley relates this otherwise abstract notion of “virtue” to the communal values encouraged by “capitalism,” that is, the sense of a market in which an individual’s innovations are of value only if they are useful for others. How many millennials are likely to be convinced by such arguments is an open question, but there is no doubt that such reflection is a definite improvement, at least in principle, over blindly following either Peterson or the “dirtbags.”

    Yet as a work of moral philosophy, as Hanley’s work purports to be, I am sorry to say that, whatever its potential exhortative value, it documents precisely why today’s “conservative” thought is so politically impotent.


    There are still many in the West who remain loyal to the Judeo-Christian virtues and their secular extensions. But exhorting those who are not to “return to the faith” is clearly a self-defeating proposition. I would not discourage the efforts of those who seek to rekindle the embers of neglected faith. But new problems cannot be met with old solutions. The churches remain out there, not all of which have followed the “liberal” stampede to the victimary credo. Why then do they not suffice unto themselves?

    In order to induce the young to return to the traditional values that our current society has largely forgotten, and most of their generation never learned, ways of thinking based on these values are no longer sufficient. A more fundamental anthropological perspective is required to reground them in transcendence. It is no longer sufficient to evoke the Bible and Classical philosophy, the twin roots of the Western tradition, nor their later derivatives. We must return to the common originary source of both language and morality at the origin of the human.


    As I pointed out in Chronicle 665, the originary hypothesis provides the only explanation of human morality that neither presupposes language (in order to formulate it) nor treats morality as a “natural” phenomenon independent of language—one presumably “evolved” from various strands of animal behavior, which came together in a “sense of justice” at just about the time that various other strands of animal behavior were “evolving” into language, along with religion/sacrifice, art, etc. etc.

    The originary hypothesis allows me to explain the power of “woke” victimary thought while nonetheless not succumbing to it. It also allows me to articulate the central problem of the human community in a clear and simple fashion—which is in no way to provide it with a solution. On the contrary, the hypothesis is consonant with Hegel’s notion that history is its only “solution,” although the Hegelian notion of the “end of history” now appears even more fallacious than I had thought until recently.

    The peace brought about by the originary establishment of reciprocal morality, which at first imposes equal sharing, permits humans to use the tools of language-mediated cooperation to “conquer nature,” and in the process, to invent new techniques and discover new knowledge. Inevitably, this process leads some individuals and groups to distinguish themselves from others, a relation to which I have given the name, first used in this context by Adam Katz, of firstness. Whether one holds a patent on an invention, or is hierarchically placed in the direction of others, the human community cannot function in the absence of some degree of “meritocracy.” The strongest, the wisest, the most intelligent—and the most sexually attractive, those most easily liked by their fellows, the most apt at seduction in every sense—cannot be altogether prevented from exercising their talents, and societies evolve insofar as this exercise can be made consonant with the minimum of moral equality necessary to ensure the coherence of the community. All history is the story of this interaction.


    The reader has a right to ask why, if this idea is so powerful, has no one in any kind of authority, from René Girard to all our professors of Anthropology and Linguistics, even taken the trouble to try to refute it.

    I believe that this is simply a sign of its historical prematurity. When I published The Origin of Language in 1981, I certainly did not expect such a reception, nor did Jack Miles, who sponsored the book, nor the UC Press, which, unbelievable as it may seem, actually purchased an advertisement bearing my photograph in the New York Review of Books.

    Forty years on, I can understand this phenomenon much more clearly. It is not simply a matter of my not being in the field of linguistics, or my failure to flatter A, B, or C. Any such considerations merely mask the real problem of the incompatibility of the hypothesis with the “ways of thinking” of the West as they had evolved up to that point.

    It is with the recent evolution of the victimary, having begun in the sixties with the New Left and, as they say, marched through the institutions of liberal democracy to attain a cultural dominance today not far from that of Mao’s Little Red Book, that the explanation becomes much more obvious, as well as more ominous.

    If indeed we are now witnessing the first stage of, not the “decline,” as Spengler’s title is usually translated, but the Untergang, the going-under, the defeat of the West, then the current wave of “woke” victimary fanaticism and generative anthropology have one essential thing in common: they both reflect and “express” this defeat.

    But whereas GA, like all Cassandra-like prophecies, offers an open-ended explanation in which hope is balanced with despair, victimary thinking, the sterile heir to the resentful/revolutionary thought that has dominated the West since the Enlightenment, is intellectually bankrupt. Wasting the least energy in refuting its nonsensical affirmations, as do most of our “conservative” publications, is avant la lettre a sign of defeat. A mathematician does not waste time arguing with those who insist that 2+2=5, or that knowing how to solve a differential equation is a manifestation of “whiteness.” And neither should we.

    Thus the question for Western civilization must be, not “how can we remind young people of the universal value of the masterpieces/moral ideas of our civilization?” but “why it is that our civilization itself cannot maintain them?” That it is precisely our “seats of learning” that have since the 1960s led the way in this deconstruction of Western culture is anything but fortuitous.

    Why has it become virtually inevitable that teachers from kindergarten to graduate school would be conveying the same anti-Western message to their charges? The answer cannot be found in “disloyalty,” let alone some kind of communist/fascist/Islamist conspiracy; it can come only from the emergence of what increasingly appears as the central defect of Western culture itself.


    The understanding of generative anthropology as the synthesis of the two currents of thought that were at the base of “French Theory,” even if the Girardian strain was never given its due—today this trend has been partly reversed—allows us to analyze this development in terms of the fundamental constituents of the culture of the Judeo-Christian West.

    In essence, Derrida and the mainstream of French Theory formulate a critique of metaphysics in an attempt to escape from the “prison house of language,” which Nietzsche intuitively understood as the problem, not primarily of the “Greek” side of Western thought, but above all of its Judeo-Christian element: the ressentiment he associated, not altogether incorrectly, with the Jews.

    To refer to Nietzsche is to recall that the opposition between Greek reason and Judeo-Christian revelation is not absolute, as it seemed to the Enlightenment. The original synthesis of these elements that the Enlightenment sought to destroy has been so far the most successful way of advancing the interests of the human community. The Enlightenment drive to replace divine with worldly “reason,” thereby fetishizing language as a neutral instrument whose “discovery” by humanity became impenetrable, provides the simplest explanation for the political disasters of the 20th century, disasters whose potential for renewal has gradually revived since the 1960s, and has now been accelerated by the COVID19 crisis.

    Defining the problem is not solving it, but it offers the possibility of rethinking the fundamental constituents of what we call our “system of values,” the ethic that underlies the variants of liberal democracy practiced in the nations of the West. The anthropological foundations of this ethic were not, which is to say, could not have been discovered at any previous historical moment.

    Nor could the new way of thinking that is generative anthropology have been formulated at an earlier time. Before WWII and its revelations of mankind’s maximal potential for physical and moral violence, the insights that revealed its component elements were not yet available. But before going back over its past history, it is more urgent to apply its lessons to our present predicament, which it has so to speak been “designed” to explain.

    To witness how easily the whole edifice of Western culture can within the space of a few decades become an object of ridicule and vilification among its own elites for having been the creation of (mostly) white males forces us to seek a “fatal flaw” in the foundation of the ethic that has allowed this.

    This mindless condemnation of the culture’s works on victimary grounds does not deserve the least intellectual or moral respect. If this tactic, put forth by openly racist organizations such as BLM, suddenly appears unanswerable, so that the least attempt to express a timid doubt of its full justification, say, by claiming that “all lives matter,” is met with savagery and left undefended by the liberal establishment—such a calamity reveals the equivalent of a seismic fault that had lain deep within the Western ethos from the beginning, but whose destructive potential had remained hidden so long as its causes were producing other, beneficial, effects.


    It is significant that many people react with annoyance to my use of the Gallicism victimary. The term’s implication of “blaming the victim” evokes a knee-jerk response that overrides even the most obvious abuses. It is easy to mock the proliferation of victimary categories employed by the “woke,” but if they are indeed ridiculous, why then has their evocation been so effective?

    As I have been pointing out in these Chronicles, resentment, which is as close as we come to a “human instinct,” is an inevitable by-product of the moral model initiated in the originary event. It became a permanent anti-social force upon the usurpation of the ritual/communal center by the first “big-man” or his equivalent.

    No society can survive if such resentment is considered legitimate. We may presume that in early egalitarian societies, acts motivated by resentment of someone’s real or imagined violation of reciprocity were tolerated as the means of maintaining the egalitarian order, even if they frequently led to feuds and tended to make such societies much more violent than apparently “less just” hierarchical societies.

    With the institution of organized hierarchies, everyday resentments were simply repressed by force. The early “compact” empires were not happy places for most of their population, and agricultural technology in particular was very slow in evolving. As Rodney Stark points out in his excellent How the West Won: The Neglected Story of the Triumph of Modernity (ISI Books, 2015), a work that provides a worldly supplement to Eric Voegelin’s narrative of spiritual liberation in Order in History, it was the “chaotic” variety and rivalry of the Greek city-states that permitted the economic as well as intellectual breakthroughs that led, along with the Hebrew experience of Exodus, to the Christian synthesis that produced Western civilization.

    Far from opposing, as has been virtually universal since the Enlightenment, Christianity to the rational interpretation of empirical data that led to modernity, Stark demonstrates that the source of this modernity is to be found in Judeo-Christian culture itself, in contrast to the Platonic idealism that dominated even the Aristotelian branch of ancient thought.


    I have referred several times to Michael Tomasello’s Voltairean “explanation” of religion:

    One way that leaders throughout human history have sought to legitimate themselves and their laws from a moral point of view is to claim that they have somehow been anointed by a deity or in some other supernatural way. . . . A major source of wonder in human experience is where are [sic] our venerated ancestors who founded our society, and indeed, a key foundation of a religious attitude is the veneration and worship of deceased ancestors and traditions whose spirit somehow lives on (Steadman et al, 1996). Leaders then took advantage of this attitude and claimed supernatural sources for their leadership.

    A Natural History of Human Morality, Harvard, 2016, p. 131. (The remainder of this paragraph is cited in Chronicle 519)

    to illustrate an egregious blind spot in the minds of today’s social scientists. But this paragraph provides an equally mindless description of social hierarchy. It implies that any form of leadership is the result of deception. The leader, presented as sole agent of his leadership, legitimizes his rule by instilling and/or exploiting supernatural/irrational ideas in a credulous populace.

    Yet without the firstness of “leaders,” no society would survive to compete with others. The only more or less egalitarian societies are those which have not experienced the Neolithic revolution. The moralism that condemns inequality a priori is, precisely, the product of the epistemology of resentment whose flourishing is currently giving the lie to the West’s espousal of individual freedom.


    It is crucial to understanding the current crisis that what is fast becoming a bug in the Western tradition is a derivative of what had been its most significant feature. It is precisely the reversal of the worldly and the transcendental, God and Caesar, this world and the next, that has made the West great, a dichotomy that Christianity, rooted in Judaism, takes to the point of paradox: “the first shall be the last.”

    For a couple of millennia, this spiritual and institutional separation of church and state has allowed the individual, even be he a slave, to assert his human dignity. It was from an anthropological perspective a highly insightful recognition of the fundamental nature of the moral model at the foundation of the human, one that was eventually given substantive political realization in the American Declaration of Independence: all men are created equal.

    But the flaw in this noble model is that, because (moral) equality and (ethical) firstness are not on the same level, they cannot be reconciled within the individual in the absence of loyalty to an ethical community. The Christian sense of the sanctity of the victim was not intended to be directly applied to the social order. The ancient slaves who became Christians were not demanding worldly equality, but asserting their fundamental humanity. To the extent that their faith had a political component, it resided in the hope that shared belief in moral equality would eventually make slavery ethically unacceptable as well, as occurred, as conservatives like to remind us, only in the Judeo-Christian West.


    At the moment of the success of the Civil Rights movement in the mid-1960s, the elimination of obstacles to the advancement of blacks was heralded as the moment when they, along with everyone else, would be judged by the content of their character. But this was immediately taken to imply that if they were less successful, for example, on standardized tests, then the tests were instruments of racial oppression “by other means.”

    The question this poses is, why, after Dr. King articulated this goal in Christian terms, which had always been seen as consonant with the American idea that each individual (“created equal”) should have a chance (“life, liberty”) to prove himself (the “pursuit of happiness”), the situation was immediately reconfigured in terms of outcomes, requiring in effect open-ended compensation for past discrimination. And the answer is that, whereas the focus on individual “happiness” is founded on the transcendental value of the moral equality we derive from God, the loyalty of the individual to the community—what is due to Caesar, or to a putative American republic—is, significantly, not referred to in the Declaration.

    Caesar was an external force, not one included within the Christian orbit. Christianity extended the originary Hebrew vision of God to the whole world, but in so doing, it separated the sacred from the community, which was seen as external to the individual, save within the hierarchy of the church itself. Not that the Church ever set the individual in rebellion against the public authorities. But as now appears, this promotion of the individual soul over the community, which underlay the vast achievements of the West, also bore the seeds of its potential downfall.


    Let it suffice for the moment for me to repeat René Girard’s diagnosis of the result of WWII:

    Far from snuffing out concern for victims, [the Hitlerian enterprise] only accelerated its progress, but has left it completely demoralized. Hitlerism has avenged its failure by making the concern for victims despairing and caricatural. (Je vois Satan tomber comme l’éclair, Grasset, 1999: 271; my translation)

    I need only add that what has made Hitler’s “vengeance” possible is that the Christian concern for victims (le souci des victimes) denies—as the Hebrew did not—the transcendental connection between the soul’s moral equality and the body’s dependence on the worldly community.

    We can only hope that the coming to consciousness of the critical nature of this problem can return us to the Judeo-Christian principle of national unity on which our liberal-democratic polity was founded. E pluribus unum can function only if the union it describes is experienced as a recreation of the originary unity of the human community.

    To be continued…

  • Thermidor — or Untergang?

    In a recent online column in National Review, Victor Davis Hanson, one of our wisest and most independent-minded pundits, prophesies (“Year Zero,” July 7, 2020, https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/07/cultural-revolutions-start-year-zero ) that the current flurry of “Jacobinism” will be followed by a “Thermidorian reaction,” such as in July 1794 sent Robespierre and Saint-Just to the guillotine and, after the expected settling of scores, inaugurated with the Directorate a brief period of (very!) relative tranquility—to be followed by the Consulate and then the Empire of Napoleon Bonaparte.

    Although Hanson’s historical sense is generally acute, this reference to Thermidor strikes me more as wishful thinking than as a sober analysis of the situation. In the first place, Antifa and BLM, unlike the Jacobins, are far from having taken power in the society as a whole. The national imposition of PC along with rioting and vandalism is bad enough, but hardly comparable to the slaughter of thousands of French nobles and moderates after a series of show trials, and toward the end, without trial—along with such provincial variants as tying people together in pairs and tossing them into the Loire. Not to speak of ending the Old Regime, creating a calendar with a real “Year Zero” (which lasted until 1806), and beginning the implementation of the metric system.

    Hanson predicts that, analogously, the liberals who have been groveling before BLM will eventually tire of this and turn against their ideological masters. I would be as glad as he to see this, but his sense that these same “liberal appeasers,” whose eagerness for self-abasement he greets with justified contempt, are now “growing uneasy,” and are “on the verge of becoming Thermidor[ian]s” neglects the utter absence of the loss of control—and imminent threat of death—that the elites were reacting to in 1794.

    Indeed, without examining the balance sheets of our “cultural revolutionaries,” it is obvious that they are being funded by the very same elites whose superficial symbols they are destroying—but whose bottom line they are leaving intact.

    Why, if they are “growing uneasy,” would Disney sign a presumably multi-million-dollar contract with the egregious Colin Kaepernick—scarcely known for his expertise in television programming—to produce an “exclusive docuseries” on racism? Disney executives are hardly afraid of finding themselves in the tumbrils. On the contrary, they understand that racial virtue-signaling is good for business. The “revolutionary” victimocrats, for their part, are “Marxist” only in the sense that, like Marx, they are against capitalism, and if they take power will institute “socialism.”

    Take a look at the current non-fiction best-seller list, and you will see that, outside of Bolton’s revenge-book against Trump, almost all the others are about race. Whatever one thinks about Kaepernick’s potential contribution to the “docuseries,” his name is surely worth quite a bit, and what else really matters?


    “Black rage,” as Thomas Sowell and Shelby Steele and others (Kanye West!) will tell you, siphons off a great deal of resentment from the rest of the society. The “outrage” expended over the “structural racism” supposedly experienced by poor Mr. Floyd is by many degrees of magnitude disproportional to what a genuine Marxist would call today’s real structural disparities: the excessive rewards for the upper echelon of high tech and finance executives, while in the cities, living conditions deteriorate and middle-class neighborhoods—and the middle class itself—wither away.

    Rockefeller and Carnegie couldn’t write computer code, but they certainly had to work a lot harder for their big bucks than Bezos and Zuckerberg. I need not begrudge the latter their billions, but I had a good job with lifetime tenure that now provides me with a decent pension, whereas today, I would be “the wrong color and the wrong gender” to receive such advantages. The more white Americans, particularly recent college graduates, worry about denouncing their “privilege,” and wrecking Western civilization along with it, the less they are focused specifically on their economic interests—for so long, at least, as their “Jacobin” activities are financed by billion-dollar foundations and/or residence in Daddy’s basement.

    Our billionaires will become Thermidorians only when the mob starts tearing down the gates of their mansions. Except that then, some of its members might actually get hurt, which is not in their job description. Whatever else you can say about the sans-culottes and the Bolsheviks—and the Nazis—they were not just ruthless, but tough.

    I think the best we can expect by way of Thermidor is for the Trump deplorables, along with other traditional Americans who, like Professor Hanson and myself, are sickened by the current spectacle, to vote Republican in November in sufficient numbers to offset the efforts of the mob and their well-wishers. At least then, Western civilization will still have a chance.


    I was going to add an earlier version of the above as a “Coda” to the previous Chronicle, when I read Hanson’s July 9 follow-up column: “The Fragility of the Woke” (https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/07/woke-protesters-historys-ingredients-riot-revolution/#slide-1 ). This piece, which emphasizes the practical if not ideological contradiction between “revolutionary” activity and woke sensitivity to microaggression, might almost be read as a direct refutation of the Thermidor analogy. Whatever else you can say about the participants in past revolutions, no one ever called any of them snowflakes. The protection of Mommy and Daddy has never been more pathetically invoked than by the unnamed female Harvard graduate in Hanson’s piece who lost her summer accounting internship after posting a video on TikTok threatening to stab anyone who said “all [i.e., not just black] lives matter”—a punitive reaction which, if not a sign of Thermidor (although it’s that time of year), at least suggests some degree of sanity in the accounting profession.

    Those who overthrew the Jacobins had reason to fear for their lives; those who might secretly be skeptical about smashing statues of former presidents are concerned in the first place with their bottom line, which has thus far been entirely on the side of the mob. If even Chick-fil-A, whose management is sincerely Christian, understands its role as requiring disengagement from the Salvation Army and shining black people’s shoes, one wonders what powerful individuals or institutions would look with favor on a reversal of direction, let alone participate openly in it.

    The so-called “Chomsky letter” that appeared in Harper’s Magazine on July 7—whose association with the virulently anti-American Chomsky is touted as a guarantee of its “respectability”—is not a warning of the immanence of more drastic action, but a polite demurral from the excesses of their political allies in resistance [sic], by a group of intellectuals whose tolerance for dissent from left-wing views is prefaced by denunciations of Donald Trump and “right-wing demagogues.” Here is the first paragraph:

    Our cultural institutions are facing a moment of trial. Powerful protests for racial and social justice are leading to overdue demands for police reform, along with wider calls for greater equality and inclusion across our society, not least in higher education, journalism, philanthropy, and the arts. But this needed reckoning has also intensified a new set of moral attitudes and political commitments that tend to weaken our norms of open debate and toleration of differences in favor of ideological conformity. As we applaud the first development, we also raise our voices against the second. The forces of illiberalism are gaining strength throughout the world and have a powerful ally in Donald Trump, who represents a real threat to democracy. But resistance must not be allowed to harden into its own brand of dogma or coercion—which right-wing demagogues are already exploiting. The democratic inclusion we want can be achieved only if we speak out against the intolerant climate that has set in on all sides. (https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/ )

    I find it shameful that decent people would put their names to a document that cannot make a simple point in favor of “open debate and toleration of differences” without vilifying its political enemies. If all right-thinking people are presumably united in the belief that Donald Trump “represents a real threat to democracy,” how then is the opposite point of view to become a matter for “open debate and toleration”?

    In a word, this well-intentioned screed belongs in a textbook of pragmatic paradoxes, only far more long-winded and less amusing than the one about the Jewish mother who tells her son “Be spontaneous!”


    Neither “Spengler’s” nor my own expressions of admiration for Yuja Wang (see Chronicle 664) were intended as advertisements for Chinese Communist rule. Their point was rather to make us realize that the sublime self-confidence that followed victory in WWII and in the Cold War is no longer in season. Having stolen a good deal of our intellectual property, China has reached the point where it can if necessary advance on its own. And its current progress under a totalitarian form of government, which has led its leadership to the belief, which may not be altogether misplaced, that China can do without the window to the Western economy provided by Hong Kong, should at the very least make us begin to doubt that the decay of authority prevalent throughout the West—less in the US than in many other places—remains compatible with the kind of freedoms that had, over the past several centuries, proved most conducive to new discoveries in science and technology.

    This last has been the credo of the liberal-democratic world, which seemed confirmed in 1989. Yet the disappointing outcome of our middle-Eastern “democratization” policy may indeed reflect more than these societies’ unpreparedness for our form of government. I find troubling, as well as distasteful, the increasing degradation of our “commons” in ways unthinkable in previous generations: libraries become homeless shelters, mental hospitals emptied onto the streets, an increasing unwillingness, despite the demonstrated success of the “broken windows” anti-crime measures of Giuliani and co. in the 1990s, to punish criminals for “minor” offenses, or even to set bail for them—not to speak of the wholesale release of prisoners during the present epidemic.

    Thus far, I would not say that the fabric of our civic life has been permanently disrupted, at least not in the neighborhoods I frequent, although the growth of “no-go zones” (the French call them zones sensibles) is disquieting. Nor have everyday interracial relations deteriorated in my experience. But what is disturbing for the long term is the absence of any sign, not of “Thermidor,” but simply of a broad-based return to dignity and decency.

    The fact that the sight of mobs demolishing statues apparently makes “respectable” people, not offended, for heaven’s sake, but instead anxious to find “nice” ways of performing the same tasks, is a clear sign that, for the foreseeable future, “respectability” will mean following the lead of BLM and similar organizations.


    Even this does not make the USA less attractive than China. Being able to cry “F… Trump!” or publicly tear up his speech surely reflects a more decent society than one where the least hint of opposition to the Great Leader would be severely punished.

    But our social order will remain viable only to the extent that the resilience of our political system embodies a faith in the system itself that is stronger than the hostility to an elected president condemned as a “threat to democracy.” This seems to be less and less the case. The ever-increasing importance of the Supreme Court, coupled with that of the bureaucracy, is the direct result of the increasing impotence of our “deliberative” legislative bodies. Had the Democrats had a sufficient majority in both Houses, President Trump would surely have been removed from office on one pretext or another. As Beria used to say, Show me the man, I’ll find you the crime: Покажи мне человека, и я найду тебе преступление.

    To suggest that all this will go away if only someone other than Trump becomes president is in fact an admission of our system’s bankruptcy. If duly electing “the wrong person” suffices to create a crisis that requires systemic correction, then the only logical next step is to prevent such “threats to democracy” from ever holding office. After all, Hitler gained power by legitimate means—and when Trump won in 2016, many were the voices that warned of his imminent imposition of “fascism.”

    If the Democrats gain control of Congress as well as the presidency, I would not trust them, who stick together far more reliably than the Republicans (just observe the voting pattern on the Supreme Court over past few decades), not to remove whatever checks and balances pose a threat to their power, beginning with the filibuster and the “voter suppression” involved in requiring personal identification and in-person voting—all the while presenting this as defending democracy from “the forces of illiberalism.” Even in the best of cases, hopes for a speedy return to some level of cooperative or even civil interaction between the parties are dim indeed.


    I am not a pundit, and making predictions about the future is not the purpose of these Chronicles. What I believe we are witnessing here is not simply the irrational obstinacy of one political faction that needs only to be enlightened, but the breakdown of a delicate equilibrium.

    The greater freedom of the West, which has opened the entire world to modernity, has clearly been until now an asset lacking in the other great civilizations that, before the Industrial Revolution, rivaled it in power and military strength. The developments we have been witnessing are discouraging, not because our system is revealing itself to be suffering from such things as “systemic racism,” but because, as I pointed out twenty years ago (see Chronicle 652), “fairness” in the sense of meritocracy is, not so paradoxically, proving itself harder to endure than unequal “privilege,” which insulates the individuals within a given caste from the shame of failure. If you have to lose, it’s much less painful not to lose “fair and square.”

    Until the end of the 20th century, the advantages of Western freedoms, despite the man-made catastrophes of its first half, remained predominant. But the current wave of resentment-driven militancy puts them in doubt.

    Even were the West to produce a pianist as gifted as Yuja Wang, its problems would remain. But it should be a warning to us that it is totalitarian China that has given to the world today’s most outstanding interpreter and performer of its most complex manifestations of beauty, Western masterpieces once performed exclusively in the West. This should certainly lead us to ask ourselves in what other domains the world’s oldest and largest civilization might be poised to surpass us.

  • Originary Reflections on the Present

    It is a category error to seek to prove whether or not God exists. The one thing we cannot possibly prove about God is that “he” is a not only transcendent but independently existing agency, since we can think and speak about him only with the language that, in anthropological terms, we invented.

    But the notion of justice, in the sense of faithfulness to the “moral model” instantiated in the originary exchange of signs, can be defined without concerning ourselves with whether a preexisting God instilled this model in us or whether we invented it ourselves, given that the model itself, in the terms of the originary hypothesis, requires no outside intervention.

    While it would be tendentious to assume that everyone has an “innate” idea of God, independently of the teachings of his parents and more broadly his community, it seems obvious that we need no lessons in order to acquire the “sense of (in)justice” that is triggered, within a human/cultural framework, by social arrangements that strike us as unjust, that is, non-reciprocal. This injustice is, in the first place, our own; but the enhanced mimetic ability that made us human allows us to experience injustice on another’s behalf.

    The question as to whether we can experience an “act of God” such as an earthquake as an “injustice” may then be seen as a matter of cosmology rather than of morality, which concerns only relations within the human community. To call such a catastrophe an injustice cannot prevent us from distinguishing it from what we regard as the injustices inflicted upon us by other humans. This is made clearer when we identify this sense of injustice as resentment. No one ever resents an earthquake. To resent something is to experience it as a violation of one’s moral reciprocity with other humans.

    That resentment can exist only between moral equals is illustrated by the fact that, under the Old Regime (with presumed analogies in other caste societies), the term ressentiment was reserved for the nobility. A noble could resent an insult only from a peer, not a roturier—someone to be whipped rather than challenged to a duel. Such people, equally able to feel resentment, would not have presumed to use a word that at the time suggested a sense of noble outrage.

    Today, the world resentment has pejorative connotations, whereas “sense of justice” does not. But it is injustice that one senses, while what strikes us as just in the give and take of everyday civil life is simply its failure to trigger a resentful reaction.

    3/6 3/24/26, 4:41 PM

    The compatibility of this description of our fundamental moral relations with “common sense” belies the fact that, in the context of what is normally considered moral philosophy, it is altogether revolutionary, embodying a way of thinking that derives uniquely human values from a hypothetical model of uniquely human experience.

    The vast literature of reflections on morality, justice, etc., when it does not attribute its “laws” to God, explains them either in metaphysical terms, that is, by a model a priori embodied in language—Kant’s “categorical imperative” being the high point of such formulations—or in relation to our biological-ethological inheritance—whence the search for analogies of moral interactions among higher animals, in the same way as researchers seek the animal precursors of human language.

    In the first case, humanity, in its capacity for language and “reason,” must already exist in order that moral principles be understood as other than “instincts,” so that the morality we define is implicit in the instruments by which we define it—in a word, like mathematics, it is fundamentally tautological. In the second, whatever the interest of describing the pre-human precursors of specifically human phenomena, these precursors cannot by definition supply the reason why at some point a particular group of hominins found these behaviors insufficient and were motivated to replace them with the cultural apparatus of humanity itself.

    Generative anthropology explains morality both generatively and anthropologically, by reference to a hypothetical event, the experience of which was the foundation of human existence. Those who have remained faithful to this perspective, at least to the extent of reading this Chronicle, should not be surprised that its inherent significance is in inverse proportion to its notoriety. Gresham’s law has rarely been so applicable to foundational thinking as in our time. Who, beyond the official representatives of academic disciplines, has the authority to evaluate the difference between this present writing and the latest outraged tweet? And who would think to wonder, in this day and age, which they would prefer?


    In recent Chronicles I have expressed concern with our society’s increasingly unchecked reliance on what I have been calling the epistemology of resentment, which consists in accepting the reaction to perceived injustice as a definitive source of moral rectitude, dismissing the restrictions placed on it by the moral and legal codes with which we are, or once were, familiar. To make this faith one’s motivating principle, which is the central principle of revolutionary “consciousness-raising,” is to declare that any relationship that arouses this reaction, in particular one that embodies stable differences of “privilege,”  is prima facie immoral.

    As I pointed out in Chronicle 663, the use of the term “wokeness” to describe the “awakening” of the raised conscience is not mere propaganda. Its effectiveness derives from the simple fact that the resentment we are asked to “waken” to is our most primitive human emotion, transcended in the originary event by the reciprocal love of the participants as expressed in their peaceful exchange of signs, but always threatening to return outside the ritual context that reinforces this exchange.

    But from an anthropological standpoint, the current experience of wokeness simply demonstrates that no objective criterion allows us to condemn a violation of moral equality, independently of its context in a given community. To use an all-too-timely example, in the mind of a student listening to a professor, there is no a priori measure of the acceptable state of moral equilibrium that one may claim to have had perturbed by a “trigger” of some kind, an equilibrium that presumably becomes increasingly delicate as the student becomes more “woke” to the hidden implications of the professor’s words.

    The reason why there have always been religious and legal codes is that resentment is not an instinct, but a cultural reaction, and no such reaction is independent of the community within which it takes place. The existence of a social order requires that in this world, if not in the next, ethics trump morality. When they fail to do so, in order that the community survive, a new order must emerge from the ensuing chaos.

    Morality in History

    The use of resentment as a political weapon against the Burkean accreditation of traditional norms by the fact of having demonstrated their functionality, in contrast to those imposed ad hoc by the mob, brings to the fore the question of evaluating the eternal tension between ethics and morality in the context of societies less evolved than our own. It has become common to dismiss any form of caste difference (as well as that between the sexes) as a form of “oppression.” Slavery, in particular, is spoken of as a monstrous institution, dismissing its virtual ubiquity until recently in all societies since the Neolithic revolution—not to speak of its perpetuation in different guises today in the non-Western world, in particular, under the various forms of “socialism.” The forced-labor concentration camp, as Hitler would have been glad to admit, was an invention of the Bolsheviks that is still very much in use today.

    As for the relations between the sexes, to hear contemporary young people discuss the mores of the past, one would think that the traditional division of labor between men and women was simply the result of “oppression,” sometimes fancifully attributed to a brutal masculine reversal of what had previously been an idyllic matriarchy. Even the fact that men are physically stronger than women is resented as a form of divine injustice. The claim that all these “injustices,” which the labor-saving devices of the modern market economy get no credit for having largely done away with, find their origin in the fact that women bear children is rejected as just one more myth of the patriarchy.

    This infantile attitude toward history cannot, unfortunately, be simply ignored. Like wokeness, it reflects a genuine need, such as Rawls’ Theory of Justice attempted to supply: all non-reciprocity among humans must be justified. Yet in the absence of a transcendent commitment to one’s community, mediated by law and custom, there is no love to counter resentment—hence no guarantee that “wokeness” cannot be turned against any socially sanctioned manifestation of firstness.

    The word “Marxist” is thrown around a great deal today by both the radicals who profess it and their opponents who denounce it, but Marx would have laughed at a radicalism that, beyond its ignorance of his writings and doctrines, has no notion whatsoever of the economic and political structures of the “socialism” it intends to impose. Marx did not waste his efforts on moralizing about the evils of the different economic systems, but conceived their succession as a dialectical progression. As one who sought to demonstrate the theoretical necessity of capitalism’s supersession by socialism, one can only imagine in what terms Marx would have described the Green New Deal.

    A Word on “Race”

    As I said in the previous Chronicle, the current wave of thuggery and groveling depends on the fact that until now, the United States, and the West in general, had enjoyed an increasing level of general prosperity, with Daddy and Mommy always there to provide even for our naughty radicals, virtually all of whose misdeeds go unpunished. The real sufferings of the black underclass have been, sadly, since the 1960s a functional part of this prosperity, one whose perpetuation provides a useful distraction from the ultimate “injustice” of meritocracy—that, outside the fantasy of El Dorado, different individuals have different abilities to obtain rewards from any economic system. The only genuine solution to these sufferings lies in the old Booker T. Washington/Martin Luther King reliance on character—as promoted by the best of the charter schools—while doing away with “the soft bigotry of low expectations.”

    Responsible black thinkers like Thomas Sowell, who has just turned ninety, have been making this point for decades, but it is easy to understand how few followers he has found, when fame and fortune are rather on the side of the Ta- Nehisi Coates.

    Dinesh D’Souza describes this situation quite well in his Death of a Nation. But if there is one point that I would nuance in his description of the continuity of the Democrat “plantation” from slavery through Jim Crow through Johnson’s Great Society until today, it is that one cannot simply blame one of our two parties for this development. At 4/6 3/24/26, 4:41 PM least since the Hayes administration, it has been more like an element of our political division of labor. That is the grain of truth in our national “white guilt.”

    It is in this sense that national prosperity and relative stability have been dependent on “structural racism.” Maintain the black illegitimacy rate and the broad tolerance of black-on-black violence, along with the chaotic and ineffective inner-city public schools, and the rest of the population can purge itself of the subtler forms of resentment experienced in everyday life—when someone else gets the promotion, when someone else gets the girl, or boy, one desires, when one’s life ambitions are not rewarded—by thanking the fates that they are not subject to the far greater pain of “structural racism.”

    Of course, the proper expiation for this societal guilt would be to denounce the politics and the policies that perpetuate this black underclass, including those of groups such as BLM and those who condemn mathematics as “white.” The use of euphemisms such as “diversity” makes it harder, not easier, for racial disparities to disappear. Affirmative action should return to its original function: to affirmatively prepare for college and the professions those who have not previously benefited from the best preparation, in order that they may earn higher scores on examinations rather than be given extra points because of their race. Low expectations indeed.

    Resentment is, as no reader of Girard should need me to point out, a highly mimetic form of desire. The wave of national indignation over George Floyd is the product of a vast publicity apparatus that singled out this act of apparent brutality. Calling his unfortunate death “murder,” “tragic,” etc., is irresponsible virtue-signaling, unless we use this language for all such deaths, such as those documented by the (black) Hodge twins, who demonstrate the dubiousness of calling this one “racist” (see https://youtu.be/Q6FSoZBujeg ). That no one believes that poor Mr. Floyd deserved to die does not justify or excuse condemning the officer without a trial, let alone the police in general and the whole of American society. Nor will removing President Wilson’s name from a building raise anyone’s SAT score.

    Panic?

    What anthropology teaches us is really only common sense, and the tension between Burkean normality and the “sense of injustice” is not subject to any transcendental judgment other than that which the community and its individual members find in themselves. Hence “awakening” others to resentment is not a difficult task.

    Yet there is indeed a “sense” that opposes the “sense of injustice,” one yet more primitive than resentment, since it antedates the establishment of the human community: the unease—the panic—that we experience at the breakdown of the social order, and which begins to emerge when we sense that things have “gone too far.”

    Given the largely symbolic nature of the “revolution” thus far, we seem to be a long way from that point. The current revolutionaries are not the enraged mobs of the past, led by young people who had been allowed to walk to school by themselves and who sometimes even suffered a black eye in a fight. The most fearsome aspect of the current “cultural revolution” is rather how readily adults that had been presumed worthy of authority have joined forces with it.

    It is still too early to speculate about what kind of backlash all the sound and fury may provoke, or on who, aside from the “deplorables,” would be of a mind to participate in it. All I can hope is that they will all find a way to vote on November 3.

  • Getting to the Bottom

    If we truly believe in the ultimate salvageability of Western and of human civilization, we have to be able to “get to the bottom” of problems in order to face them effectively. The ever-festering race problem in the US, whose echo in Europe demonstrates that it is a problem of the West in general and not simply of the American experience with slavery that tends to serve as its catalyst, has demonstrated the potential of an unchecked faith in our “sense of (in)justice” to provide an inexhaustible pretext for the unraveling of liberal-democratic institutions, no longer countered by even the haziest concept of the social order (“socialism”) to be put in its place. This is not a defect but a feature of today’s radicalism.

    My use of the term “victimary,” which translates the French victimaire, irritates some people because they cannot bear to see the word victim used in a sense in any way pejorative. This moral inversion is central to Christianity (“the last shall be the first”), and was no doubt the principal source of its original attraction as an “other-worldly” religion that refused to endorse, if not passively accept, the hierarchies of “this world.” This antinomian element, in a rich dialectic with the acceptance of secular power (“render unto Caesar…”), unleashed over two millennia the social and intellectual creativity that enabled the West to become by the 19th century the world’s unrivaled center of intellectual, political, economic, and military power.

    Had Islam, Christianity’s rival for over half of this period, and which has been seeking to renew that rivalry on various fronts today, been the victor in its various attempts to subdue the Christian world, no “victimary” problem would exist. The victory of Islam would simply have demonstrated what its believers already knew, the will of Allah that all the world share its submission to him. And until its final defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683, Islam’s unselfconscious assertion of its unique truth seemed to have a good chance of conquering the Western world, always at least partially divided between church and state.

    But Christianity won out, although there was plenty of science and “civilization” in medieval Islam, because the dialectic of the revealed and the hidden, reality and appearance, matter and spirit, which permits the mechanisms of human thought to discover the unapparent structures of reality, is better served by Christian paradoxicality, which owes a great deal to its Hebrew sources, than by a culture that demands utter submission to the “uncreated” word of Allah.

    Yet the 20th century’s hot and cold wars between what could still be called the Christian West and the post-Christian (not non-Christian) totalitarianisms of Germany and the USSR, while the rest of the world appeared incapable of contributing usefully to modernity, seemed not unreasonably at their termination in 1989-91 to herald the “end of history,” not in metaphysical but in practical terms. What seemed demonstrated was the triumph of liberal democracy as the only system compatible with a modern economy grounded in ever-evolving science and technology. The end of racial segregation and colonialism in previous decades now seemed to herald an era of universal progress, with the concomitant reduction of international rivalries to manageable economic and secondary geographical conflicts—for which international bodies like the UN would provide helpful mediation.


    Today, China has come to present an unanticipated challenge at the same time political, economic, and military. Yet it is difficult to see this challenge as somehow at the origin of the West’s increasing inability simply to keep order in its cities and in its souls. The recent mob unrest that has been a magnet for the generalized malaise of resentment rather than the product of well-defined grievances could not have begun, let alone persisted, without the active complicity of the authorities against whom the mob is purportedly rebelling. China may have provided, presumably accidentally, the virus that has served as the catalyst for this development, but it is difficult to believe that even the Machiavellian genius of Xi Jinping could in any way have anticipated or planned it.

    In any case, unlike with Trump’s victory in 2016, no one so far has claimed a role for hostile powers in the shameful passivity of this nation and much of the West in the face of the current wave of amateur and semi-professional thuggery, however much it has profited from generous funding sources and Internet connections.

    The post-Christian category of the victimary that explains the West’s self-destructive behavior is well exemplified by the fact that today’s Christian leaders, as represented by the Archbishop of Canterbury (see https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/27/uk/justin-welby-jesus-scli-intl-gbr/index.html ), are more concerned with whether Jesus should be represented as “white” than with anything he said or did. And yet the attitude that gives rise to such thinking is a distant consequence of Jesus’ doctrine—concerning his ultimate complicity with which I would not presume to speculate.

    Be that as it may, Lars van Trier’s brilliant satire Dogville (2003), starring Nicole Kidman as “Grace,” aka Jesus, seems an increasingly accurate prophecy of the West’s current abjectness. Viewers of the film will recall how it ends—and how satisfying this ending is to the spectator who has witnessed poor Grace’s prolonged mistreatment at the hands of the humanity to whom she has sought to bring her Father’s message.

    Today it seems that all that remains of Christianity in Western society is an increasingly groveling respect for “victims.” But the lower the high sink, the less their sinking is respected. Removing the statues of Andrew Jackson from the Jackson County courthouse in Missouri and the name of Woodrow Wilson from buildings at Princeton and from his fellowship foundation (I was once proud to be a 1960 WW Fellow) is diametrically opposed to the Pope washing the feet of the poor at the Holy Thursday ceremony, or Father Zossima bowing to the “great sinner” Dmitri Karamazov. It is cultural self-abasement, not humility, and merits only contempt. And indeed, this contempt is its real purpose—contempt for the United States of America, and for “white” Judeo-Christian Western civilization.

    As Dostoevsky said in the same context, if God does not exist, everything is permissible. Those who thought that a kind of Spinozist Deus sive natura could suffice were unaware of the transcendence expressed by the sign at the moment of human origin, which, whether or not figured as a “personal” god, cannot be understood or experienced by us as a natural phenomenon.

    L’homme possède ou un Dieu ou une idole, the epigraph to Girard’s Mensonge romantique (see Chronicle 663), remains pertinent. Generative anthropology assimilates divine intentionality to that of the emergent human community, but to dismiss it as an implicit potentiality of the material universe is an empty tautology—on a par with the philosophers’ faith that mathematics, and propositional language as well, “existed” from the beginning of time, awaiting their “discovery” by members of our species.


    In the works discussed in The Scenic Imagination (2007), beginning with Hobbes’ “social contract” with the Leviathan, the central figure is not a victim but a sovereign. Since the institution of the big-man, whether or not it came about as Marshall Sahlins described it in Stone Age Economics, the stability of the social order has depended on that of its central authority, understood as the institutional focus of the community’s love and resentment.

    In the US today, the fact that a large segment of the opposition party has been in principle disloyal to the current president since even before he took office, using the term resistance and seeking from the outset a reason for his impeachment—”impeach the M…F…,” as a Congresswoman colorfully put it—is surely unique in American history. Yet this extraordinary attitude, shared by the mass media and most of the nation’s elites, is treated by them as just par for the course. No doubt the opportunity for political disloyalty is a prized American value; one knows how far one would get with an “impeach Putin” campaign. But the shamelessly outrageous “resistance” to Trump has gone far over the line—to the point where the Speaker of the House, third in line for the presidency, feels free to publicly tear up his speech at the end of an official State of the Union ceremony.

    There are few signs that this seditious spirit will be in any way diminished by the results of the upcoming election. If Trump wins reelection, things will continue in the same vein; if the Democrats win, they will consider their victory as not a normal succession, but the restoration of legitimacy after a usurpation—which they will make every effort to insure will not be repeated.


    There is in all this an air of unreality, as of little children performing mock-outrageous acts because they know that Daddy and Mommy will always be there to provide for them. I do not agree with those who explain the grovelers’ actions by fear. Their only “fear” is a metaphysical one; that somehow their “white privilege,” which derives from the hegemony that Western culture has exercised over the world during the past few centuries, can no longer be justified. Our world has sown the seeds of its own destruction, yet without arousing any real sense of oppression such as may be said to have motivated the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. Daddy and Mommy are still there for those who cry “burn it down!”

    Although the epistemology of resentment experiences all hierarchy as oppression, its basis is simply difference. No “theory of justice” can justify to our deepest human sentiment of moral reciprocity—being “created equal”—one person’s having more than, or authority over, his neighbor, even if he benefit the community a million times more. Only a central authority sanctioned by the transcendent unity of the human community can provide such justification. As one of those old enough to have celebrated our victory in WWII, I find it shocking to observe that respect for such authority is no longer forthcoming.


    A Happy Ending?

    We might explain the unanticipated permeability of the institutional fabric of digital modernity to the venerable hydra of “socialism,” with its endless capacity for growing new heads as the failed ones drop off, as a by-product of the vast new terrain for resentment opened up by the social media. But to explain is not to remedy the situation. Breakdowns of democracy since before Aristotle’s Politics have generally been followed by tyranny, which in the present case would mean the tyranny of the mob, our “forces of order” having shown themselves fearful of doing its participants even the least injury. Yet we may still hope that, as in the past, the “pendulum” of democracy will swing in the other direction.

    Meanwhile, whether or not we are fated to fall before long under China’s economic and/or political hegemony, we can at least be assured that, at the very least, the greatest works of Western music—the structural summit of Western, and of human, order in the cultural domain, today studied and played far more assiduously in China than here—will be lovingly preserved.

    As assurance of this, and to compensate for the ennui of these lamentations, I offer, courtesy of “Spengler” (David P. Goldman), our most erudite pundit as well as a trained musician, one among many of the beautiful musical performances of Yuja Wang available on YouTube—where watching her is at least half the pleasure. Wang has spanned virtually the entire classical repertoire, from Bach to Bartok and Shostakovitch (and Gershwin), and revels in the “impossible” concerti of Prokofiev. Spengler’s superlative evaluation cannot be dismissed, and I would not dissent from those who describe Wang, still only 33, as one of the great piano virtuosos of all time.

    Spengler’s assessment of her talents can be found here (the reader may wish to ignore the somewhat forced comparison with Milo Yiannopoulos), and the performance of Beethoven’s Hammerklavier Sonata (Op. 106) that Spengler comments on in detail is here.

    Ms. Wang is indeed lovely to look at, and takes advantage of this with her daring costumes, but for me, the loveliest moments of her performance are those that just show her fingers on the keys. Of all the performers I have ever seen, she is the one whose relationship to the keyboard is most fully symbiotic. There is no rhetoric in her fingering, only a confident intimacy. Nor can anyone fail to be moved by her obvious joy in performing and in sharing her enthusiasm with the audience. (I take Spengler’s anomalous description of Wang as “cold and impish” as describing not her, but the unique insight into Beethoven’s “demonic” music embodied in her performance.)

    I cannot imagine anyone like Yuja Wang in Nazi Germany or in Stalin’s USSR—let alone in Mao’s China, where lovers of Western music were beaten and killed by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Her very existence is a ray of hope for the future.

    To watch and hear Yuja Wang play the piano, even with YouTube’s low-fi audio, is a uniquely moving experience. It inspires the spectator with pride in belonging to the human race, whose uniqueness is, after all, defined by the sharing of signs. This process can arguably be said to have reached its highest degree of sensual intensity in these works, whose subtleties Wang’s performances so powerfully reveal to us. One may be fairly certain that the human mind will never conceive, nor the human body make available to our senses, more beautifully complex structures of tension and resolution—of love transcending resentment.

  • Apotheosis of Resentment

    Prologue

    Decades ago, when I was naïve enough to apply for research grants, I proposed a study of resentment as a central literary theme. I began with what seemed to me the striking observation that menin, the first word of the Iliad, although it is generally translated as “rage” or “anger,” really refers—as the word “rage” always does, if you think about it—to Achilles’ resentment of Agamemnon’s uncalled-for action in depriving him of his captive Briseis to replace his own, whom he had to return because her father was a priest of Apollo. Achilles’ resentment of this abuse of authority is the point of departure for the poem, and given that the Iliad is incontestably the oldest literary masterpiece of Western civilization, one may justifiably say, as I did, that resentment is “the first word of Western culture.” I then went on to cite Hamlet’s resentful behavior at Claudius’s table in Act I, and a few other salient examples.

    What struck me most in the comments that were sent me to motivate my rejection was their own resentful tone: “what chutzpah this fellow has to claim that resentment is really important!” Today, to read the mainstream press, resentment is a disgraceful sentiment that occurs exclusively on the Right. Leftists’ burning down buildings or trashing police cars is never described as motivated by anything but a forgivable excess of righteous indignation. Resentment only happens to bad people, not to Achilles or Hamlet. About the first, at least, Nietzsche would have agreed.

    Be that as it may, resentment is a fundamental component of our human makeup. It is, in the simplest terms, our reaction when we feel our sense of moral equality has been violated, by an offense to me personally, or on occasion, by identification with an offended third party. Which is to say that it is a direct product of the originary scene at the birth of humanity. In Genesis, resentment provokes the felix culpa of “the fall of man.” What I call the epistemology of resentment, our faith in this sentiment as a source of moral truth, is consequently a fundamental element of the human psyche.

    The point of this Chronicle is not to outline the history, even the literary history, of resentment, but to examine how in recent decades faith in the truth borne by resentment has so corroded our politics that the very spirit of liberal-democratic government, which depends on the possibility of constructive civil dialogue among partisans of different opinions, is no longer observed even in the breach. Speaker Pelosi’s publicly tearing up the text of President Trump’s State of the Union address this January speaks for itself as the most disgraceful public act by a high official—third in succession to the Presidency—that any of us have ever witnessed.

    The Prehistory of Modern Resentment

    Hence this is an appropriate time to assess the role of resentment, if not through the ages, then in recent political history, and in particular, the history that begins with the French Revolution. What was new in 1789, and has continued mostly on an upward path since then, is that our originary faith in resentment as a source of moral truth is less and less opposed by the religious and social norms that once contained it.

    Religions and their associated moral and legal codes have always stigmatized personal resentment, in contrast with the “righteous anger” commanded by God. The term itself acquired its current meaning only in the modern age. Under the Old Regime, le ressentiment was far from what Nietzsche described as the cowardly internalization of what had been the noble’s overt defense of his honor. In Corneille’s Horace, Camille’s diatribe in IV, 5, beginning: Rome, l’unique objet de mon ressentiment expresses not a shameful but a noble sentiment, a legitimate desire for revenge—although the fact that she is a woman makes the sentiment incapable of direct implementation, and may even be taken to prefigure its modern sense.

    The noble’s confidence in the epistemology of his resentment was unavailable to the roturier, who would not have dared to so define his sense of injustice. Such events as peasant revolts were no doubt motivated, beyond the sufferings of famines, etc., by a sense of injustice, but before the modern era, the only possible critique of the social order was millenarian and apocalyptic, not a proposal for socio-economic transformation. Not until 1789 did any revolt affirm, or even conceive, the right of its partisans to remake the entire social order on the basis of its intuition of moral equality. The revolutionaries’ attempt to create a new calendar, replacing the (Semitic) week with the (digital) décade, along with their more successful implementation of the metric system, suffices to demonstrate that theirs was not merely a political but a wholesale epistemological revolution. And the rationality they sought to enact was made possible in the first place by the “rage” of the Jacobins and sans-culottes against what they perceived as the injustices of the Old Regime.

    In the discourses of Robespierre and Saint-Just, this rage was justified not by visceral emotion but by cold logic; but the premises on which this logic is based were rooted in resentment, whose power derives from its direct application of the moral model to a given situation. Which is to say that, unchecked by the ethical forces of church or state, it puts in question every one of the hierarchical, “unequal” elements that have characterized every social order since the first big-man took advantage of his accumulation of a surplus to acquire a superior status.

    For a broad political movement to be able to take resentment as its guide to political/moral rationality only became possible as a consequence of the epochal weakening of the religiously grounded moral norms that had previously been shared by the entire society. This is not to deny the ultimate causality of the structural changes in the socio-economic order in early modern Europe. But the sacred conviction of human equality expressed in our Declaration of Independence is at its root an affirmation of the moral model as the source of “natural law,” and as its corollary, the implicit empowering of our resentment or “sense of injustice” as an objective measure of conformity with this model. Whatever justifications one gives for why one person should be better rewarded by his society than another are less anthropologically fundamental than the morality of reciprocal exchange, without which we would not have become human in the first place.

    Rawls’s “Original Position”

    John Rawls (A Theory of Justice; Harvard, 1971) begins his famous thought experiment by implementing our fundamental moral intuition in his fiction of the “original position,” where everyone is prevented by the “veil of ignorance” from knowing what social position (and presumably what sex?) they will occupy. This fiction of anonymous equality shares its dismissal of human differences with GA’s hypothetical state of originary reciprocity.

    Once we imagine ourselves in this state, Rawls then challenges each of us to design our “ideal society” without knowing in advance to which of its social roles we will be assigned. The result, as Rawls describes it, resembles Sartre’s idea that a society must be judged by its “least free” member. Given our equal chance at any role, we will presumably hesitate to leave any in abject misery: “There but for the grace of God…”

    The experiment is then nuanced with various secondary considerations. But in constructing a fiction rather than an anthropological hypothesis, Rawls is obliged to substitute the abstract value of humanity’s originary equality for the historical experience that has created over millennia humanity’s real social orders. His fiction proceeds as though each individual’s a priori judgment of how the worst-off would be best off could be substituted for the historical social practice of economic exchange in differentiated societies.

    Rawls’ noble effort, with its tantalizing resemblance to GA, is an attempt less to justify resentment than to rationalize it into a working principle, presumably as a rule of thumb to guide elected legislatures and similar decision-making bodies. Instead of consecrating the resentment we feel when someone is more fortunate than we, Rawls seeks to provide a rationale that would substitute for it a social ethic chosen in advance and to which we would owe our allegiance. Necessarily absent are the complex systems of rewards and responsibilities that permit societies to function as socio-economic entities, and in the first place, the market as an a posteriori creator of value. Rawls’ thought experiment nonetheless reveals with admirable clarity the fundamental human tension between firstness and moral equality.

    Resentment after 1789

    The epistemology of resentment is the basis for the post-1789 division of Left and Right, between those who “respect authority” and those who would justify social distinctions by a Rawlsian or other principle of “social utility.”

    It is no accident that Edmund Burke, the founder of modern conservatism, composed his major political work, the 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France, in reaction to its (earliest!) resentful excesses. Burke was defending what previously had not seemed to require defense; the way things are. He justified the status quo as such, no longer as the product of divine/transcendental providence, but simply because, in contrast with the chaos of revolution, it had demonstrated its capacity to function over the long haul. Burke defends tradition by attacking the hubristic arrogance of the revolutionary attempt to refound a time-honored social order on abstract moral principles. Which is to say that he tacitly recognizes the originary source of the intuition that gives value to these principles, even as he demonstrates via the French example its incapacity to recreate a functional and humane society.

    The subsequent political history of the modern age may be viewed as the interaction between the Right, the defender of Burkean prudence in maintaining the stratification necessary to the functioning of the “capitalist” market system, and the Left, which encourages those who feel themselves to be disadvantaged by this system to seek to modify it to their advantage. The possibility of peaceful dialogue between these two forces is the operating principle of liberal democracy.

    The Current Crisis

    What is new in the present crisis in the US, and in varying degrees throughout the West, is the growing dominance of victimary thinking, which has so far allowed the exchange system to function with a minimum of perturbation (bracketing for the moment the current COVID19 crisis), while focusing on its cultural and symbolic moral critique. But given that the increasingly “woke” population is disinclined to invest its energies in the traditional means of perpetuating a culture: having sufficient children to replace those who die, and identifying its own interests with the national community—the proximate consequences of this development are alarming.

    If the “freedom” of Western democracy comes to consist merely in being free to denigrate one’s own society while continuing to reap its benefits, while those who dare actively defend it are increasingly stigmatized and removed from positions of influence, then this “freedom” will have only a negative socio-economic value. As a likely consequence, the advantages of autocracy over democracy will extend from merely that of maintaining stricter order to permitting a greater degree of innovation than is possible in a society whose members are no longer loyal to it—and this, independently of such autocracies’ deliberate and varied efforts to subvert our own social order.

    In particular, if “PC” continues to increase its dominance over the expression of respectable opinion, violators being subject not merely to social-media abuse but to humiliation and dismissal, this will only serve to demonstrate the superior efficiency of the far more finely-tuned Chinese “social credit” system. Once we accept the necessity of social censorship in liberal democracy, why not learn from the professionals to do it right?

    Crybullying

    What differentiates our era from earlier times is the ever-increasing affirmation of the epistemology of resentment as the unique guarantee of moral truth. The idea of encouraging students to complain of having been “made to feel unsafe” by a teacher’s expression of a heterodox point of view or use of a “trigger word” is so repulsive that we fail to recognize its genuine anthropological roots, however perversely applied.

    There is a crucial difference between our crybullying and the superficially analogous activities of the Red Guards during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, one that goes beyond the latter’s far greater use of violence. In the current context, offenders are not accused of disobeying precepts spelled out in a “Little Red Book”; their offenses are not even metaphorically presented as infractions of a law or commandment. Instead, potential complainants are encouraged to detect the offense by heightening the sensitivity of their individual sense of moral injustice, in a word, their resentment.

    This sensitivity is not considered to be in any way implanted in these potential justiciers. They are instead asked to become woke, to awaken to the eternal moral implications of language that might in the past have passed without anyone noticing them. Nor should we think of the ever-expanding web of such implications as in any way the creation of those who claim to discover them. Any attempt at prior codification could act only as a restriction on the capacity of one’s “woken” moral sense to detect offenses to the spirit of moral equality. Terms such as micro-aggression suggest at once both the difficulty of such discovery and its urgency—in contrast with the Chinese case, where the culprits were accused of behavior defined in advance by categories such as the “Four Olds.”

    The mimetic nature of such procedures goes without saying. But it bears nonetheless remarking that, although “PC” has been expanding its domination of respectable (“Belmont”) society and its institutions over the past two or three decades, to my knowledge not a single book seriously lays out rules of “correct” conduct. On the contrary, books with titles such as The Official Politically Correct Dictionary are satiric, like Flaubert’s Dictionnaire des idées reçues.

    For the intuitive nature of the judgment of injustice, in other words, the feeling of (personal or vicarious) resentment, must be allowed to act on its own, on the example of what was once called one’s conscience. Save that the latter reacted exclusively to one’s own sins, whereas the inner voice that we now listen to reacts to the potential effect of any real or imagined sinful words or gestures. And the effect of the latter is less to give offense than, by reason of their demonstration of race/sexism, to arouse in the hearer a feeling of unsafety, as though we suddenly realized that we had been associating with a dangerous sociopath.

    From the standpoint of Western jurisprudence, this behavior is scandalous, but the source of its anomalous appeal is that it cuts through ethical norms to their moral root. If Rawls’ original position is a thought experiment, the woke rooting out of evil takes place in the real world.


    But this means that the woke critique lacks a positive payoff. Maoism, or Xiism, to coin a phrase, points to a positive agency, the Party and its leadership, whose will the student had been directed to enforce, and now simply to obey. In contrast, there is no victimary “system.” In what might be called the ultimate form of millenarianism, the model of moral equality, the a priori basis of human morality, is now defined as its only goal.

    Following the epistemology of resentment to the end leads only to purging the culture of non-victimary symbols of exemplarity and their replacement by victimary ones, a process that presupposes that the present victimary categories will be forever maintained in memory. The formerly Christian West now enshrines its eternal victims as its saints, just as the human agony of Jesus’ crucifixion justified worship of The Christ.

    Neither Christianity nor victim-worship is constitutive of a doctrine of political economy. But whereas the functional separation of Church and State allowed the political economy of the Western world to evolve and give birth to the “free market,” the “identity politics” promoted by victimary epistemology is indifferent to the economic system, provided that the various victimary groups be protected from discrimination, including that of “disparate impact.” We should note that none of the current storm of outrage is being directed at the “1%.” In contrast with the Russian and Chinese slaughter of nobles, “landlords,” and kulaks, our billionaires need only to hire the appropriate number of x, y, and z—as they have preemptively shown themselves more than willing to do.

    The more the victimary model of ascriptive equality becomes the social ideal, the more the remaining formal freedom of the economy to reward the productive would be restricted, as it currently is in the university—where, outside the hard sciences, “productivity” is of little worldly significance. It is better for our peace of mind not to attempt to predict the likely long-term effect of such policies on real national productivity, nor its consequences for our comparative economic and military strength.

    L’homme possède ou un Dieu ou une idole

    The conclusion of this analysis is that, from what Voltaire would have called le point de vue de Sirius, what is most significant about the current victimary crybullying is its anthropological radicalism.

    The Western liberal-democratic system that was a consequence, first of the desacralization of the polity through Christianity, and then of its Protestant reliance on the individual conscience, has over the past centuries maintained itself by means of “Burkean” social restraints, whose links to the originary sacred have gradually been lost. Today, our civilization has finally advanced to the point where we can in effect conduct real-time social experiments in which the most fundamental human sentiments are freed of these restraints, which had provided a modus vivendi for individual freedom/firstness alongside the equalitarian demands of resentment.

    This radicalism, however fascinating to a Sirian, provides no conceivable opening to the future. The implementation of an all-inclusive quota system contradicts the utopian aim of abolishing any such differences in a “race-free” society: abolishing objective examinations (bye, SAT!) or biasing them in favor of poor performers only accentuates group differences while provoking the resentment of the productive.

    This perpetual becoming of resentment-revealed “justice” can take place only at the expense of the nation’s standing in the world. Its debilitating effect on the United States and other nations that follow a similar path would provide great encouragement not only to the Chinese, who are already close to surpassing American productivity and reaching parity in military strength, but also to Islamists. For whatever their economic limitations, members of these communities are at least ready to defend, in many cases with their lives, the core values of their culture, while Westerners show themselves ever more ready to deny theirs.


    The coincidence of the emergence of this victimary strategy, which operates with no social ideology other than Alinsky-Marcuse formulas for disruption, with that of generative anthropology, which provides its explanation, is one that Hegel would surely have appreciated. But GA’s status as his owl of Minerva will be of small utility if its cry, far more obscure than Cassandra’s, remains unheard, given that its warnings, albeit they might preserve market society from destruction, are themselves devoid of market value.

    There is no such thing as “tragic thought.” Tragedy is a literary mode whose function is to reveal the failure of thought to solve the problems of life. The tragedy of our current situation is that the anthropological revelations made possible by victimary thinking—not unlike those provided by Nazi annihilationism—can be applied in practice only once the phenomenon itself has done its damage. Unless our social order can profit at an early stage from the substance of these revelations, we can only await our enemies’ future victory to demonstrate to us that even worshiping the Chinese Communist Party is less monstrous than worshiping resentment itself.

  • The Crisis of Firstness

    Firstness has been since the beginning both an essential and a problematic human characteristic. The originary hypothesis begins the human story with the abandonment of the Alpha-Beta pecking order that determined precedence, if not leadership, among our primate ancestors. The rejection of this hierarchical structure is exemplified by the fact that the first example of human firstness—the discovery/invention of the sign as the communicative function of the aborted gesture of appropriation, which, as Adam Katz pointed out, should not be understood as a spontaneous revelation to the group, but an idea that first arose in the mind of one or more individuals—was not, indeed, could not be retained by the new human social organization, given that the latter was initiated by means of the reciprocal, “equal” exchange of the originary sign.

    This moral model of reciprocity, as first manifested in the unanimous emission and reception of the sign, is the primary model of human interaction, the ultimate source of Kant’s categorical imperative. Yet, at the same time, human firstness, whose field of application the cultural deferral of instinct vastly expands beyond its animal equivalent, is the unique source of human progress; it can be suppressed only up to a point. Indeed, since the institution of social hierarchy, only the most stringent isolation can maintain the integrity of either primitive or modern societies that seek to extend the moral model to all aspects of material life.

    The Yin and Yang of moral equality and firstness have been in tension since the first moment of human history. The (ec)static moment of mutuality postulated in the originary scene is unstable; the moral model, which inspired Rousseau to understand the “state of nature” in terms so different from those of Hobbes, was not magically extended over the whole of society by virtue of the replacement of primate serial hierarchy by primitive egalitarianism. As anthropological field researchers have pointed out, these hunter-gatherer societies are as a rule far more violent than stratified hierarchical societies, because they have no way of effectively integrating human firstness into their social structure. Marshall Sahlins’ “big-man” was not a fat cat, but a Stakhanovite over-producer, and although the Athenians chose their magistrates by lot, that is certainly not how Achilles—or Pericles—got his job.

    To define firstness as humanity’s primary moral problem is not to provide a solution, but I think present circumstances require that we confront the implications of this definition in radical, that is, originary terms. The current language, not merely of the left but of everyday respectable Geplapper (Heidegger’s term strikes me as well-suited to the occasion), is that firstness in Western society remains overwhelmingly associated with white (male) privilege, which alone suffices to explain the “disparate impact” of modern socio-economic conditions on the various racial/ethnic groups.

    It suffices to compare the language used by officials of various levels in expressing their regret for the unfortunate and apparently culpable death of George Floyd with previous statements of the same kind to demonstrate, not that this was a greater outrage than previous acts of (apparent) police brutality, but that the formerly “liberal” wing of American politics is increasingly dominated by a degree of White Guilt that is tantamount to a cultural death-wish.

    Schoolchildren are commonly taught today that the US is a racist nation founded on slavery and genocide; expressions of traditional patriotism are increasingly stigmatized. The anti-discrimination legislation of the past decades has only scratched the surface, discrepancies between blacks and other groups in everything from examination scores to annual income are all but entirely attributable to the residual racism with which our society remains infested. Statistical analyses, such as those by Heather MacDonald (see, for example, https://www.manhattan-institute.org/the-myth-of-systemic-police-racism), are simply ignored, as well as the real problem of black crime, which disproportionately affects other blacks.

    Nearly the whole white professional class expends ever more energy in virtue-signaling activities that can only be described as motivated, not by a rational judgment about racial discrimination, but by a felt need for apotropaic gestures, doing penance for one’s “privilege,” whose relation to any kind of objective merit must be denied in principle, while reserving one’s wrath for those unwilling to proclaim their moral abjection.

    No analysis of the socio-political developments leading up to the present situation strikes me as sharper than the “plantation” phenomenon diagnosed by Dinesh D’Souza in Death of a Nation (Macmillan, 2018). But I think that by now we have gone beyond the point where any such analysis can suffice; fundamental anthropological questions have been raised, and these can be dealt with only in fundamental, that is, in generative terms.

    For it is becoming clear that Western culture’s increasing rejection of its hitherto dominant role, in the US but also in Europe, is rapidly reaching a point of crisis, whose outcome will decide in the coming decades whether our liberal-democratic system will remain the world’s exemplary social order, or whether its place will be taken by totalitarian autocracy, whether on the Chinese or another model. Crises, as they say, are opportunities not to be wasted, which from our perspective means opportunities to make the world aware of human truths that in less troubled times it prefers to ignore.

    This crux may perhaps be most simply expressed as our need to come to grips in human terms with what in Genesis is described as the “fall of man”—or in our terminology, the necessity of dealing with firstness—the human usurpation of the sacred center—in the context of our fundamental intuition of human moral equality.


    If Marxism was in its day a plausible ideology, and Mussolini and Hitler’s national socialisms not only “got the trains running on time” but succeeded in conquering most of Europe, the current left has no practical ideology at all. Nonsense like the Green New Deal, even if it could be implemented, would provide no benefits to the surplus elites. It would have to be coupled with free tuition, student loan forgiveness, and a “guaranteed annual income” that would replace Mommy and Daddy in financing their child’s residence in the basement—all supplied from the bottomless well of American productivity, only using energy from windmills and sunlight rather than fossil fuels. This is not even utopia; it is fairyland.

    Hence I will not attempt to add my own analysis to those of social critics such as Peter Turchin (“How ‘elite overproduction’ and ‘lawyer glut’ could ruin the U.S.; https://nationalpost.com/opinion/peter-turchin-how-elite-overproduction-and-lawyer-glut-could-ruin-the-u-s ), none of which conflict with my judgment that the digital age presents a watershed that, by removing the last bit of plausibility from Marx’s Labor Theory of Value, makes inevitable something like Charles Murray’s “coming apart” of the postwar American middle class, and the consequent breakdown of traditional two-party governance.

    I will focus my discussion on two points:

    (1) the increasing functional detachment of the epistemology of resentment, the motivational force of “modernity” and revolution since 1789, from economic reality, which makes increasingly inescapable the coming to consciousness of the fundamental tension between morality and firstness, an anthropological dialectic that must be grasped in originary terms before it can be dealt with in practice; and

    (2) the likely consequences of the current crisis for Western Civilization, and above all for the United States as its principal mainstay, in relation to China and the rest of the world.

    It increasingly appears that Francis Fukuyama’s happy equation of what has clearly been the freest social system and, ceteris paribus, the most productive, with the “fittest” in the long term was, to say the least, premature. We might remind ourselves of such events as the Fall of Constantinople, whose 567th anniversary we commemorated two weeks ago.

    To be continued…