Author: staceymeeker

  • Pascal’s Pari

    It has been a long time since I last opened Blaise Pascal’s Les pensées, which is a fragmentary set of notes rather than a completed work—for a project not in philosophy, but Christian apologetics. I was reminded of the fact that I had spent nearly 50 years teaching French literature, which in French, as opposed to English, includes the classics of French thought.

    Pascal (1623-1662) is indeed best appreciated not by a “philosopher” in the Anglo-Saxon post-linguistic-turn sense, but by a practitioner of la nouvelle critique, that peculiarly French brand of wide-ranging postwar theorizing that includes everyone from Girard to Derrida—a highly politicized version of which came to be known in the US at a somewhat later date as French theory. Someone, in a word, a little like a generative anthropologist.

    Thus the sentence I quoted from memory in the previous Chronicle (Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie) stands outside the metaphysical universe of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel by its appeal to the esthetic. The final m’effraie—which doesn’t work in English because you would have to put “me” at the end, so you should really translate it by I fear the eternal silence of these infinite spaces—adds a “poetic” effect that is inseparable from most of Pascal’s better known aphorisms, a feature you will find nowhere in Kant

    and rarely in Hegel, although it reappears in Nietzsche and Heidegger.

    Another peculiarity of the French is their respect for people who are good at math. For example, an independent candidate for the 2020 Paris mayoralty election is Cédric Villani, who dresses like a 19th-century dandy, but who is a winner of the Field Prize in mathematics, the equivalent of a Nobel. Show me a big-city mayor here who could win a Field prize; Mike Bloomberg (a fellow Hopkins man) is about as close as we’ll get.

    I was pretty good at math, even won an award at Bronx Science, but nowhere near the Field category. Pascal, on the other hand, was, like Descartes (the founder of “Cartesian” geometry), a world-class mathematician, the inventor of “Pascal’s triangle,” a student of conic sections, and the constructor of perhaps the world’s first calculating machine at the age of 19. His most famous theo-philosophical construction, the “wager” or pari, was the direct product of his contribution to the nascent study of probability, stimulated by the 17th-century popularity of games of chance. I can easily imagine Pascal as a particularly brilliant student at Science, though he probably wouldn’t have made the handball team.


    Pascal’s thinking is not easily classifiable. It is focused on our unknown (divine and/or worldly) human origin, yet unconcerned by “anthropological” questions such as the origin of language. His unique concern is to demonstrate the validity of Christian faith, but not by seeking to prove the truth of religion by rational argument. Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point (the heart has its reasons that the reason does not/cannot know) is typical of Pascal’s deliberately paradoxical rhetoric. No doubt he is using the word raison here in two different senses: as a “reason to believe” and as “logical reasoning,” but his point is that what really counts are the “reasons” that are to us questions of life and death, and which cannot, contra Descartes, be demonstrated by (logical) reasoning.

    No philosopher is more aware than Pascal of the mimetic component of human nature, of our slavery to “custom” and to “vanity,” as well as to divertissement or frivolous diversions that distract us from the ultimate questions. Indeed, it is not difficult to situate Girard in the Jansenist vein of French Catholics such as Pascal and Racine, Christians aware that given our fallen nature, our “mediation” by the judgment of others is even more powerful than indulgence of our appetites.

    A powerful conversion experience in November 1654, recounted in the Pensées in the “Mémorial,” put an end to the “worldly” phase of Pascal’s life and solidified his ties with the Jansenists. This Augustinian and near-Calvinist sect was under suspicion by the Church, then dominated by the Jesuits. It would be condemned in 1661 and its members forced to sign a “formulary” condemning its eponymic theologian Jansenius. (Pascal, already in very poor health, did not sign; his sister Jacqueline, a nun in the Jansenist convent of Port-Royal, did so, and died shortly afterward.)


    The earliest telescopes and microscopes had taught Pascal’s generation that the natural universe included “infinities” both great and small beyond the realm of normal human perception. Our more recent discoveries, including that of our presumably “finite” universe, have only transformed the proto-Newtonian space-time of Pascal’s day into a cosmos ever less commensurate with our earthly capacities. What indeed would Pascal have made of the “dark” matter and energy that at last report make up some ninety-six percent of the universe?

    If we speak, as it has become common to do, of human language merely as a new “trait” or “technique” that certain creatures have acquired at a certain moment in the history of life, then the only distinction we humans can grant ourselves is the vague one mentioned in Chronicle 611: “something profoundly distinct…” But if we take seriously the originary equivalence of sacred and significant, not simply as presiding at the inaugural stage of humanity, but as expressing its permanent essence, then we are able not only to grasp the anthropological relevance of Pascal’s thinking, but to see it as the beginning of the development that will lead to the “overcoming of metaphysics”—and to GA.

    Given that Girard’s central anthropological breakthrough was to provide, in the enhanced mimetic abilities and dangers resulting from our increased mental capacity, the necessity that was the mother of invention of language, we can already see in Pascal the first stages of this translation of religious revelation into anthropological and psychological terms. For the human sharing of representations not merely grants us enhanced abilities in practical matters, it is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the human social order. The fate of the nascent human community depends on the shared interdiction of the sacred and the rules for its non-conflictive sharing, and this same cultural foundation holds for our far more complex social systems.

    In some relatively rare historical moments, such as the immediate postwar era in which I had the good fortune to spend my childhood, social harmony is relatively unproblematic. But as we have all been aware in the US and the West since the 1960s, this is increasingly less the case. The decades since victory in the Cold War, while by no means invalidating Francis Fukuyama’s judgment of the superiority of liberal democracy, has certainly put it in doubt. We have learned the renewed relevance of Benjamin Franklin’s ominous quip, “a Republic, if you can keep it,” which Justice Gorsuch chose as the title of his recent book. Such critical moments, to the extent that they have not (yet?) led to catastrophe, allow us privileged insights into the fragility of the shared sacrality/significance that remains the basis of any social order, however this sharing is distorted by the inevitable power hierarchies that control the terms of the “conversation.”


    Pascal’s religious convictions gave him an insight into the fundamentals of human nature that is quite compatible with that of GA. He presents the dichotomy between man-creates-God and God-creates-man in the form of an opposition between those he calls “Pyrrhonists” or doubters, and “dogmatists” or believers. In Pascal’s world, the latter accept the biblical creation story, and the former admit of no belief whatever. Unlike Descartes, Pascal has no faith in the power of reason alone, as illustrated by the Cogito, to convert doubt into certitude. At most he will say that nature prevents us from truly respecting the terms of universal doubt, which remains always an ideal construct—a point that Dr. Johnson supposedly made against Berkeley’s solipsism by kicking a stone.

    Today we use different arguments, but must ultimately face the same antinomy. Somehow the universe has permitted us to exist on this planet—an extraordinary thing given what we know about the rest of it, which is why, against all (absence of) evidence, astrophysicists seem incapable of writing a paragraph about “exoplanets” without discussing their “suitability for life.”

    But even this suitability refers merely to self-reproducing/perpetuating life, which before the existence of humanity was unable to question its own existence. In the case of humans, not only did the universe “allow” us to evolve, but more pertinently, it has arranged matters so that our species’ continued existence has depended from the first on our shared representations, both “formal” and “institutional,” not in a merely mechanical sense, as the equivalent of feeding or reproductive mechanisms, but in order that we be able to keep the threat of internecine conflict, and subsequently, of external conflict, at a survivable level. Many human societies have perished, but the species still thrives, more numerous and vigorous than ever.

    In the religions with which we are familiar, and appreciably already even in more primitive ones, the “will” attributed to divinities is essentially that of enforcers of moral/ethical laws. The “higher” the religion, the more this element prevails over the attribution to the god of cosmic powers. Girard always made the point that in Christianity, we should see God as not at all a purveyor of violence. Our violence is our own, as was already the essence of Judaism, although lacking the paradox of the Cross. But even the most primitive religions, however crudely, implement this principle. The Aztecs too maintained their society through a moral code, albeit one that involved butchering and eating large numbers of their neighbors.


    Why are we interested in the biological-anthropological origin of language and of the human, if not as a means of self-understanding? Pascal seeks a way of putting this question in terms that need no extrinsic explanation. Whence the pari or “wager,” which by all indications was to be the central argument, addressed to the libertin (unbeliever) as well as the pious, of his defense of Christianity. The pari was designed as a means to paradoxically unite Pascal’s two spiritual families, elsewhere described as the esprit de finesse (intuitive, “esthetic” judgment) and esprit de géométrie (strict logical reasoning).

    Here is Pascal’s clearest exposition of the pari, following what he called les lumières naturelles, our worldly power of reasoning:

    If there is a God, he is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, he has no relation to us. We are therefore incapable of knowing either what he is, nor if he is. This being the case, who will dare attempt to resolve that question? Not we, who have no relation to him.

    Who then will blame Christians for not being able to justify their belief, they who profess a religion for which they cannot provide a rational basis? They declare, in presenting it to the world, that it is a foolishness, stultitiam; and then you complain that they do not provide proof! If they proved it, they would not be keeping their word; it is in lacking proofs that they do not fail to make sense. — “Yes; but . . . that does not justify those who accept Christianity.” — Let us then examine this point, saying “God is, or he is not.” But which side should we opt for? Reason cannot determine anything: an infinite chaos separates us. A game is being played, at the extremity of this infinite distance, that will come up heads or tails. Which will you bet? By reason, you cannot . . . justify either choice. So do not accuse of falseness those who have made a choice . . . — “No, but I will blame them for having made, not this choice, but any choice . . . the right thing is not to bet.” — Yes; but you must bet. It is not voluntary: you are already embarked (vous êtes embarqué). Which then will you choose? . . . Let us weigh the gain and the loss, in betting that God is. Let us evaluate the two cases: if you win, you gain everything; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager then that he is, without hesitating. — “That is admirable. Yes, one must bet; but perhaps I am betting too much.” — Let us see. Since there is an equal chance of winning and losing, if you would only win two lives for one, you could still bet; but if you would win three, . . . you would be imprudent, given that you are obliged to play, not to risk your life to win three in a game where there is equal chance of win or loss. . . . But there is here an infinity of infinitely happy life to be gained, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you are betting is finite. This removes all doubt; wherever there is infinity, and where there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, you must give everything. (Pensées 233-418; my translation.)

    Pascal’s argument is that we should accept to wager the finite content of our earthly life against any non-zero chance of the infinite happiness of salvation. Which is to say that, turning our backs on superfluous earthly satisfactions, we should live every moment in function of our hope of salvation. The force of the argument is that once one grasps the terms of the wager, one must not merely feel obliged to participate in the wager, but one must realize that one is already participating—vous êtes embarqué. How you live your life is “always already” the expression of your “wager” on what in the previous Chronicle I spoke of in reference to Kant’s categorical imperative as “doing the right thing.” To which Pascal adds the historically attested element of faith: even if there is a tiny chance that it is justified, its promise of eternal beatitude still provides a better bet than the ephemeral pleasures of worldly vanity.


    If I have insisted on defining metaphysics by its refusal to concern itself with the (human) origin of language, it is because, by taking language as a given, it provides itself with a neutral medium in which to exercise its “rational” speculations, which is to say that for philosophy, the existence of the human with its culture is a given, and from this point of departure, it seeks to deduce, by speculating on “the nature of things,” the conditions of the “good society.” This is the ultimate subject of all Plato’s dialogues, even of Aristotle’s Organon, to the extent that knowledge of the things of this world are of potential use to this society.

    In contrast, Pascal’s paradoxical language reflects his desire to go to the very root of our species’ existence, to refuse to turn away from our need to understand, not simply its evolutionary causality, but its cause. For the originary hypothesis proposes for humanity a cause, the need to control our potential mimetic violence, a necessity to which our invention of language and culture was the response.

    The simplest way to understand such a cause is as a purpose, whence the eternal division between the believer and the skeptic. I am sure that among Pascal’s many readers over the centuries, few indeed have been persuaded by the pari to bet on the Church’s promise of eternal happiness. But it is also true that, beyond the so-called anthropic principle, which is in its formulation strictly biological, using the same reasoning for humanity it could have used for the amoeba—however little amoebas themselves would be capable of it—we are obliged to understand the universe as somehow, after billions of years, making possible the existence of a society of creatures whose mimetically driven appetites made it necessary for them to develop a transcendental system of representations, as well as the concomitant “consciousness,” whose essential difference from that of other species we are still far from understanding in much greater detail than as our “scene of representation.” In a word, we are obliged to take Pascal’s bet, perhaps not on our soul’s eternal happiness, but on the continuing, and as far as we know, unique significance—and sacrality?—of our species.


    The power of Lars Van Trier’s film Melancholia comes from the fact that we do indeed need to “wager.” Kirsten Dunst’s Justine (the name’s Sadian origin is surely not accidental), whose death-wish dominates the film, is a modern version of the Pyrrhonist whom Pascal condemns. Her chilling lines: “The world is evil. We don’t need to grieve for it. Nobody will miss it.” have been heard lately on all too many lips.

    To be continued…

  • Toward a GA Synthesis

    I was struck by Adam Katz’s reaction to my recent series of “philosophical” Chronicles. He found the last one, about the Phenomenology, more focused than my previous remarks about Descartes and Kant, and this because I treated Hegel as a proto-originary thinker, that is, as a precursor of GA. Whereas in the other cases, I merely attempted to show that the originary hypothesis allowed us to enrich our understanding of the Cogito and the Categorical Imperative. Which is all very nice, but it would be more coherent to show that Descartes and Kant too, in their way, were precursors of GA, moments in philosophical history leading eventually to the “suspicion” and “overcoming” of metaphysics and to its “deconstruction,” yet (and this is GA’s own contribution) leading not to the ruin of metaphysics but to a new synthesis.

    I hasten to say that, in keeping with our good cop-bad cop roles, Adam’s preference for my discussion of Hegel does not imply that he is altogether happy with my attention to the metaphysical domain. But whether we consider the dialectic of history as inclusive, as Hegel would have it, or destructive, as philosophers from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche to Heidegger to Sartre and Derrida would prefer to see it, is really just a matter of rhetoric. In either case, the new replaces the old, and seeking the antecedents of GA in philosophy, as in religion—and in empirical science—is not, as opposed to what we found in Heidegger and even Derrida in Chronicle 535, an expression of nostalgia for the metaphysical faith of the past, but a means of understanding it as a stepping stone to the present.

    I think that by this time we are tired of “God is dead” and “the overcoming of metaphysics.” GA is not the de…struction of anything, but an attempt at a construction that makes up for the deficiencies of other modes of thought—while explaining as well as we can the paradox of why we cannot “transcend” the transcendent itself and reduce the claims of faith to a “material” mechanism.

    Which is to say that, although Hegel’s dialectical scheme is no doubt Eurocentric and confining, the history of thought, or of anything else in the human cultural sphere, is by nature “dialectical,” both extending and reacting against the modes of the past, destroying old and creating new syntheses. Beyond such banalities, GA allows us to rethink the previous history of thought in terms of a new telos: that of retrieving the origin of the human itself, which is synonymous with the origin of language.

    In this context, the Cartesian “turn” toward the individual subject is of great consequence. We should not let the fundamentally communal structure of the originary hypothesis obscure the significance of the human individual. If ever there was a dichotomy of which both sides must be preserved, it is this one. What I reproach Girard’s “interdividuality” with is its too-easily-followed suggestion of debunking the self-substantiality of the individual soul, reducing it to the equivalent of an ant in an anthill, or the member of a lynch mob. Such things happen, and all too often, but to warn, as does Mensonge romantique, that those who give themselves up unthinkingly to mimetic mediation put in jeopardy their “immortal souls” is to point out that although the mimetic collectivity and the human individual are unthinkable one without the other, each individual, with or without divine intervention, is responsible for his own salvation.

    Descartes’ Meditations owe their crucial place in the history of thought to their adoption of a critical epistemology that seeks within the self itself the ultimate source of its (self-) knowledge. There is no need to revise the critique of the Cogito outlined in Chronicle 633, but it should be situated in a broader, more generous context.


    What this suggests to me is a still somewhat vague idea for a parallel volume to The Scenic Imagination (Stanford, 2008), which dealt with the scene of human interaction and only peripherally with individual self-consciousness. Descartes seems like the appropriate point of departure, although those of a less mathematical disposition might begin with Montaigne and his new Renaissance sense of self, the product of the mise en question of Church authority by the Reformation and its reverberations.

    The “history of the modern self” has no doubt been written many times, but never from the retrodictive standpoint of the originary hypothesis, that is, in terms of the rediscovery of the minimal anthropological roots of the human “soul” or “spirit,” and in such a way that the individual and the community are shown to have a common— “dialectical”—origin.

    As for the philosophers who would fill the gap between Descartes and Derrida—both not coincidentally French—they would certainly include representatives of the existentialist tendency, from Pascal through Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre. Nor should we neglect the “sensationalist” school of Locke and Hume. Rousseau belongs in any such list as the most fearless early explorer of the contradictions and mensonges romantiques of the modern self; as I pointed out in Chronicle 618, that Derrida chose l’époque de Rousseau as the prime target of deconstruction was surely no coincidence.


    What follows is a tentative set of problems and questions out of which, hopefully, a coherent study will emerge.

    —If indeed the individual is from the outset linked to the community, what is the significance of modern philosophy’s birth in Descartes’ solitary poêle (heated room)—a gesture repeated by Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations, and essentially by all modern thinkers, none of whom exercised their profession in the Socratic agora? (I can attest that GA is no exception, however much its birth may have owed to the stimulation of spending a semester with Girard at Hopkins.) However revolutionary the Cartesian self may appear in contrast with the—more anthropologically accurate—collective imagination of the Greek philosophers, it is one more example of the back and forth movement of the historical dialectic, returning to the individual away from the community, but only to eventually integrate the two, as the originary hypothesis as well attempts to do. And let us not forget the quasi-martyrdom of the individual, Socrates, that stands at the origin of philosophy itself.

    —If Descartes enters his poêle for the purpose of meditation, Pascal inaugurates a series of philosophers for whom isolation is an existential, not to say, existentialist, attitude. Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie (The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me) is not a sentiment we would find in the works of Descartes. And if the latter puts metaphysics on a seemingly more secure basis, with Pascal begins the current that will lead to its questioning and eventual “deconstruction,” or what Hegel describes as the unhappy consciousness. How is this a source of fundamental anthropological knowledge, even if it appears to contradict or even “lie romantically” about the individual’s dependence on the community?

    —Kant deserves a more thorough discussion than I have provided up to now, either in the Chronicles or in Chapter 4 of The Scenic Imagination (on the Critique of Judgment). As Adam points out elsewhere in his message, the categorical imperative does not provide a very perspicuous basis for an ethic. Kant’s related idea that lying is never permissible is anything but a sure-fire recipe for moral conduct, e.g., under oppression.

    My aim is not to reconcile GA with all the metaphysical lucubrations of the past, neither Kant’s nor anyone else’s. It is rather to allow us to understand the valid anthropological kernel of Kant’s formulation which, as with all formulas of ultimate morality like “the golden rule,” which Kant is essentially attempting to recast in more formal terms, can be traced to the “moral model” first evinced in the originary reciprocal exchange of the sign before the sacred central object. The “Golden Rule” formulation “do unto others…” makes one’s own sense of self-preservation the criterion for action rather than the abstraction of a “law,” reintroducing an element of reciprocity that Kant no doubt felt was too subjective to pass muster in a Critique.

    But in the case of a conflict of authority, no lesson learned in the originary moment of universal unity can be directly applied. One must judge which authority is more valid—let us say, whether to reveal the whereabouts of a criminal hiding from the law, or of a Jew hiding from the Nazis. Ultimately, one must decide on the basis of what one considers a valid order for the human community, and in that sense one indeed acts so as to exemplify a universal moral law. Put in such terms, the Kantian formula becomes the truism that whatever we do, we should always be able to defend our action as “the right thing to do under the circumstances.”

    (There is a considerable literature on this topic. Helga Varden’s 2010 Journal of Social Philosophy article “Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door. . . One More Time: Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis” https://philpapers.org/archive/VARKAL.pdf points out in Kant’s defense that he never refers to the categorical imperative in this context. Nonetheless, the very need for elaborate arguments to justify so blatant an offense to our moral intuition strikes me as refutation enough.)

    —How do we deal with the question of “freedom,” the paradoxical dichotomy of necessity and spontaneity, that constitutes one of Kant’s “dynamical” antinomies of pure reason? The originary hypothesis makes clear that our originary sense of freedom derives paradoxically from an awareness of the interdiction and consequent deferral of our “thoughtless” instinctive drive toward the appetitive object. Which is to say that this intimate sense of freedom, like the sign and everything that derives from it, is not a feature of “the human individual” but of the individual within the community. Not that our sense of freedom is a lie; it is an extrapolation, and a necessary one, since our personal scene of representation is connected only virtually to the community with whom our representations are shared. And indeed, when Sartre in particular insists on our freedom, what he emphasizes is our responsibility before our fellow humans for our acts, which under the Occupation often had life-or-death consequences.


    Finally, two fundamental questions:

    —Philosophy’s excursions into language origin. In The Scenic Imagination, I included a few cases that purported to offer a hypothesis of the originary scene of language. Of these, the most anthropologically plausible was Condillac’s 1746 Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, which situated the scene after the Flood, at which point humans had arguably lost the faculty of speech granted to them in Eden, and the successors of Adam and Eve were a solitary couple of children. Condillac’s speculation is that the first post-Edenic words derived from cries for help from one of the two to the other. But the key point to retain from his discussion is that, although at first “instinctive,” these cries became elements of human language only after the children had learned through habit to produce them consciously, i.e., with the intention to demand aid or some specific object from the other.

    My book also mentioned Herder’s famous, and to my mind far less impressive scene, from his 1772 Essay on the Origin of Language, of the sheep’s bleating as providing the original “bow-wow” (or “baa-baa”) inspiration for the first human word.

    No doubt the minimalism of the Genesis scenario, beginning with the first man and woman, which Condillac repeats with his pre-pubertal couple, is not the way new species are formed in the biological universe. But why, even after the discovery of biological evolution, did such speculations take so long to lead to an originary hypothesis like that of GA?

    The “overcoming of metaphysics.” Hegel’s “end of history” is the signal for philosophy to seek to put an end to its end by non-dialectically transcending the dialectic of history. I need not repeat the tedious tale of “revolutionary” thought, “philosophizing with a hammer,” “turning Hegel on his feet,” “putting an end to master narratives,” post-modernism and tutti quanti. Few things grow tiresome faster than the endless series of debunkings of our supposedly cherished illusions. Epater le bourgeois has been around for close to 200 years.

    The ultimate and most intellectually sophisticated version of this overcoming was surely Derrida’s “deconstruction” of what he calls presence, the fiction of the immediacy of the connection between speech and the speaker’s mind or intention which, in Derrida’s usage, derived from his interpretation of Husserl in La voix et le phénomène, founded the logocentric guarantee furnished by the speaker to his words, as opposed, in Plato’s terms in the Phaedrus, to his “absence” from a written text. As Derrida points out, all use of language is “writing” (écriture) in the sense, precisely, that it is deferred/differed from any immediate (i.e., instinctive, necessary) transmission of the speaker’s “will” or intention.

    I think this point has been sufficiently dealt with in my analyses of la différance in terms of the originary hypothesis (e.g., Chronicle 631). My central point is that la différance is precisely what characterizes language as such, in opposition to “reflex” or “instinct.” If the myth of metaphysics may indeed be described as the myth of the “presence” of language in speech, the reduction of all language to écriture corresponds, as I have pointed out, to the insertion of a Sartrian néant between the subject and the object of his “intention” in the phenomenological sense, which, in contrast to the myth of “presence,” is a minimal anthropological description of the human, as opposed to the prehuman, relationship to the world.


    There will surely be additions and changes to this outline, but even as is, it offers the promise of better integrating the history of philosophical thought into the paradigm of originary thinking. Such a program can only help advance GA’s quasi-Hegelian ambition to transcend the previous separation between metaphysics/philosophy and empirical science, while hopefully providing new insights into the horrors and glories of modern history.

  • Being and Languaging, Heidegger and Hegel

    I

    Marina Ludwigs pointed out to me that in my previous Chronicle (633), I used the term “Being” in two somewhat different senses:

    You say: “The presence of the sacred, which we too easily call a god or just God, but which in its simplest form is better represented by the old-fashioned term godhead, unlike the physical presence of a sacrificial animal, is not divided among the participants, but shared by all of them. It is this distinction that founds the sense of essence or Being, what is contained in the word as a signified, and which allows us to grasp its transcendent standing with respect to the objects of nature.”

    And then you say:

    “Heidegger’s ‘man is the shepherd of Being…’

    In the second, the easily mystified term ‘Being’ expresses the substantiality of the original sacred/significant object. Were we not its ‘shepherds’ but merely, as a superficial reading of Girard might suggest, its sparagmatic destroyers, there would be no human at all.”

    In short, in the first paragraph, I treat “Being” as a purely transcendental, or “metaphysical,” construct; in the second, I attribute to it the “substantiality” of the original sacred/central object. Which is it?

    I responded to Marina by explaining, as I no doubt should have done in the text itself, that these two meanings of Being corresponded to two stages in a process. In order to get to the abstraction of the “godhead,” one must begin with the object. The reason we have language and not merely “spirituality” is that the first locus of the sacred must be in the real objects that animals like ourselves value in the real world. Whence the “aborted gesture of appropriation.” If the sacred were always already a “spiritual” value—and in an antithetical fashion, Girard’s mimetic rivalry is, despite the concreteness of the violence it inspires, equally “spiritual” in having no positive worldly aim, merely a pretext for destruction, like the gâteau (cake) in Baudelaire’s eponymous prose poem that two little boys fight over until it is reduced to inedible crumbs, we would never have discovered/invented it. The “worship” of the sacred as practiced in our hypothetical originary scene would never have arisen without a real-world payoff such as the sparagmos provides.

    This explication of the double sense of Being also explains the inherent “mystery” of the term that Heidegger exploits so skillfully. The sacred object acquires a “second nature” by becoming interdicted to normal worldly appropriation; the sign, precisely to the extent that it does not merely designate the object but is itself a sign of it (whence the ambiguity of the pointing gesture, which Raymond Tallis [The Hand] and in another context, Michael Tomasello see as the ur-sign of the human in its command of shared joint attention, but which remains an element dependent on this configuration and not susceptible to becoming, as does the true sign, independent of it). The sign, even if it originates as a pointing, is retained in the memory not as an indexical gesture but as a (symbolic) sign, and as such, it necessarily acquires a “meaning,” a signified that the sign represents or designates. It is this that can change with its use. And the most significant change is that from “this object” as the referent of the sacred to “this configuration” of sacrality. Unlike words representing the things of nature like “dog” or “tree,” words like “God” can have no specific worldly referent. The first sign, as the sign of sacrality and interdiction, cannot be permanently associated with an object that, once eaten, is no more. Since it is the configuration of the scene of representation that is the crucial factor in its emission, we must assume that whatever other signs come to be invented to designate elements of the sacred/sacrificial practice, the originary, most universal sign through which the actor’s renunciation acquires a memorable form will be the locus of a continued rethinking of the sacred of the kind that the word “God” or its equivalent—and for metaphysicians, the “secular” term Being—inspires in those of the Judeo-Christian West.


    For those among us who have been brought up to take rationalism for granted, the necessity of accommodating the transcendental in our vocabulary is a source of frustration. At least GA can explain why words of transcendence, so often expelled, always find their way back, even if in the guise of rational constructions of the sort that “dialectical materialism” once made familiar: they always come back because they were there from the beginning, or rather, what was there from the beginning was the transcendence itself, from which language emerges. I no doubt did not pay particular attention to this in TOOL, for that was a book about the origin of language, and even if its theories of syntax and morphology, let alone phonology, left much to be desired, it was nonetheless predicated on the fact that the originary sign would eventually give birth to “mature” language, and thence develop into that of religion, philosophy, the arts, the sciences, and… GA. But the most interesting thing about the hypothesis may well be its more immediate consequences. In a language with only one word, that word’s “meanings” are of a very different quality from the prehuman indexical signals associated with danger, food, mating, etc., and we may assume that the birth of the scene of representation would permit a transition from index to sign.

    An example of how this might work would be expressions like “Ouch!” or even “Wow!” which do not have verbal roots but clearly mimic the calls that express pain and surprise. More interesting is rather how the words of the sacred might have differentiated themselves, while articulating a new human sensibility peopled by agentive subjects. But as we might expect, any speculations on these matters take us into a grey area between the originary hypothesis and historical evidence, a domain in which the hypothesis supplies only general principles. The point to retain is that the principle of deferral, as Derrida well understood from within the philosophical tradition, is a principle of explanation that is also a setter of limits to our reasoning from its presence at the origin—which is why Derrida was careful not to call it a concept in the Hegelian sense.

    That is, in the animal world, to whatever extent actions can be premeditated, they cannot be planned in a communal context and their non-immediate consequences anticipated and calculated. But once the sign exists as not merely separate from its referent but as belonging to an independent sphere, a scene of representation on which it subsists in the absence of the actions with which it is associated, an element of indetermination or “freedom” is introduced that can never be fully expelled, but that on the contrary will inevitably induce further elements of indetermination. If logic tells us that there must have been a first “word” or ostensive utterance, it is rather the opening up of the différance, the néant between the word and the scene of the first representation that makes it impossible for us to understand it, as the old materialism would like, as “one thing substituted for another.”

    I don’t think I have to argue here for the difference between the transcendental status of the sign, which exists as a type instantiated in verbal “tokens,” but also simply in “the mind,” which itself is a concept rather than a concrete reality, and the substantiality of the objects of the real world. But the direct implication of this is that any one-to-one or one-to-many correspondence can only be posited; there is no objective connection, and no way of being sure of the limits of the class of referents. Whence the impossibility of predicting how, from the “first word,” other words would proliferate. What we must retain is simply that even the first word for the sacred, although it partake of sacrality, because the sign is not itself an object that can guarantee collective desire, is always already in the process of secularization, whence the possibility of profane repetition, and consequently of both distortion and of differentiation.

    The sacred is one, but the word that represents it cannot encompass it nor reproduce its full effect. It must, as Derrida would say, be supplemented, and all of culture emerges from this supplementation—which is also a falling-away, an “original sin,” but one that is a simple consequence of the very existence of the sacred/significant. It also justifies the neologism différance, which implicitly derives from the act of deferral the difference that separates members of a paradigm, and more broadly, any two members of the class “sign.” But the relationship is not “metaphysical,” inherent in the notion itself; it reflects the separation of the sign from the sacred that is paradoxically the direct result of its sacrality. Sacrality cannot fully reproduce itself; but the result of the process is not simply a loss of potency that eventually leads to a new “mimetic crisis,” but a positive gain in differentiation that nourishes the human intellect.

    II

    Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit is generally considered the masterpiece from which the rest of his mature oeuvre derives. In contrast with Kant’s Critiques that seek to found the domains of “pure reason,” “practical reason,” and “judgment” cum taste on minimal principles, Hegel begins with a minimal model of the human-in-the-world and seeks to derive the categories of thought from the “dialectic” of his interaction with his environment—in a word, a kind of originary anthropology, albeit one that retains the metaphysical principle of the preexistence of language.

    To reread the Phenomenology from the perspective of the originary hypothesis would surely make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the evolution and eventual “overcoming” of metaphysics. Given the intricacy of Hegel’s analyses, I can only offer here the most limited suggestion for how to proceed.


    The Logic, as we all know, begins with the “thesis” of Being, which is dialectically opposed by its “antithesis,” Nothingness, producing in Hegel’s triadic system the “synthesis” of Becoming. But this dialectic does not purport to reproduce a historical process of human thought. The Phenomenology, in contrast, begins with so to speak a “minimal” human mind, like the sensate statue of Condillac in the Traité des sensations. The first two stages of the evolution of Consciousness, which will be followed by Self-Consciousness and then Reason and Spirit, are sinnliche Gewissheit (sense-certainty) and Wahrnehmung (taking-as-true, i.e., perception). Their progression takes an “originary” self who can experience only the here-and-now to one who retains the sense of beings existing in time, or as Hegel puts is, from the Diese (This) to the Ding (Thing).

    Sage ich ein einzelnes Ding, so sage ich es vielmehr ebenso als ganz Allgemeines, denn alle sind ein einzelnes Ding; und gleichfalls dieses Ding ist alles, was man will. Genauer bezeichnet, als dieses Stueck Papier, so ist alles und jedes Papier, ein dieses Stueck Papier, und ich habe nur immer das Allgemeine gesagt. Will ich aber dem Sprechen, welches die goettliche Natur hat, die Meinung unmittelbar zu verkehren, zu etwas anderem zu machen, und so sie gar nicht zum Worte kommen zu lassen, dadurch nachhelfen, dass ich dies Stueck Papier aufzeige, so mache ich die Erfahrung, was die Wahrheit der sinnlichen Gewissheit in der Tat ist; ich zeige es auf, als ein Hier, das ein Hier anderer Hier, oder an ihm selbst ein einfaches Zusammen vieler Hier, das heisst, ein Allgemeines ist, ich nehme so es auf, wie es in Wahrheit ist, und statt ein Unmittelbares zu wissen, nehme ich wahr.

    Last paragraph of Chapter I, Phänomenologie des Geistes,
    http://public-library.uk/ebooks/05/51.pdf: 32

    When I say an individual thing, I at once state it to be really quite a universal, for all things are an individual thing: and in the same way, this thing is anything we like. More precisely, as this piece of paper, each and every paper is a this piece of paper, and I have thus only said what is universal. If I want, however, to help out speech—which has the divine nature of immediately turning the meaning around, making it into something else, and so not letting it just come to words—by pointing out this piece of paper, then I get the experience of what is, in point of fact, the real truth of sense-certainty; I point it out as a Here, which is a Here of other Heres, or is in itself a simple ensemble of many Heres, i.e., is a universal; I take it up then, as in truth it is; and instead of knowing something immediate, I ‘take’ [nehmen] something ‘truly’ [wahr], [i.e., I perceive it].

    Translation modified from The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. James Baillie, London & New York: George Allen & Unwin / Macmillan, 1931, p. 160

    If I had another couple of lifetimes, I would surely spend one of them reading through Hegel’s works in German, and one could do no better than to start (and end) with the Phenomenology, which was according to legend completed during Napoleon’s victorious passage through Iena. If I have anything in common, aside from Jewish origin, with that old antisemite Karl Marx, it is my admiration for Hegel, the only philosopher whose grave (in the East Berlin Dorotheenstadt cemetery) I have visited. I would venture to say that the distinction Hegel makes en passant between “speech” and “words” is precisely that between language and languaging that I referred to in Andresen’s Linguistics and Evolution in Chronicle 632: the speech-act makes the linguistic “meaning” or intention something other than “just words.”

    As for the substance of the evolution this passage describes, understood simply in psychological terms, its nature makes clear why Hegel has recourse here to what is for him a rare reference to language. For the “perception” of this piece of paper as opposed to the universal generality of any piece of paper, and more generally of any “this,” is something we may wish to attribute to a non-human animal, but it cannot effectively be demonstrated save by the use of language.

    And seen from the perspective of the originary hypothesis, we can describe this transition in more concrete terms, since our scenario allows us to distinguish between the stage at which the sign designates the sacred as a whole, hence as a “this,” but not one among other “thises,” but as the only this, and the stage at which the specificity of the sacred object, presumably once it has been torn apart in the sparagmos, is recognized in its spatio-temporal individuality. Wahrnehmen, perceiving in the sense of taking-as-true, that is, as exercising what Kant called the “judgment” (Urteilskraft) to determine what concept/word “truly” applies to a given object, is in our terms the moment when what I called the “threshold of significance” has been lowered to the point where such distinctions between objects of perception can be made, that is, a moment when the mind is not wholly occupied by the sacred and its interdictive power.


    Presumably the remainder of the Phenomenology, which most readers know only from Alexandre Kojève’s famous exposition of the Master-Slave dialectic, could be similarly interpreted as offering, in advance of any empirical knowledge of human prehistory, in contrast to Kant’s atemporal one, the outline of an a priori historical anthropology.

    For however much Hegel’s philosophy of history differs from that implicit in the originary hypothesis, I think it is safe to say that it is only when we begin the story of the human mind, not either from the birth of the child, as is the current tendency, nor from the contact of an “ideal” mind with “reality,” but from a hypothesis of the origin of the human mind, that we can elaborate a dialectic that is, if not falsifiable by empirical reality, at least falsifiable in terms of its founding hypothesis.

    This is the sole conceivable mode of the salvation of metaphysics, and the very least that can be said of it is that it is worth trying. As Hegel showed, it has indeed been tried, but by a philosopher as yet too timid to include in his “dialectic” the discovery of language itself.

  • Benchmarks (Anthropoetics XXV, no.1)

    Ben Barber is an Assistant Professor of English Language and Literature Studies at United International College: Hong Kong Baptist University – Beijing Normal University. He teaches courses on literary theory, world literature, composition, and rhetoric. His previous publications in Anthropoetics have addressed nineteenth-century British poetry, early modern drama, and the work of Hunter S. Thompson.

    Article: Immanence, Transcendence, and Interdividual Desire in Nietzsche, Bataille, and Levinas

    Abstract: This paper will explore how interdividual desire in the sacred and aesthetic experience is the basis for the contemporary posthumanist valorization of theories of immanence over and against theories of transcendence. Both René Girard (in his study of social undifferentiation in religious rites) and Generative Anthropology (in its account of the appearance of language) locate the most powerful experiences of interdividuality—as ambivalently both immanent and transcendent—in sacred awe, wherein a mimetically desired centre alternately attracts and repels a periphery of desiring subjects. Deploying both Girard’s anthropology and Eric Gans’s theory of cultural origin, I will suggest that the current posthumanist penchant for theories of language’s immanent embeddedness arises from Nietzsche’s and Bataille’s visions of totality insofar as posthumanism is informed by Derridian deconstruction. Ultimately, I will explore how the primordial self’s encounter with the face of the other—as described by Emmanuel Levinas in Totality and Infinity —brings about the transcendent experience of the infinite via interdividual desire. By setting Nietzsche’s, Bataille’s, and Levinas’s respective theories of immanence and transcendence alongside each other, I will illustrate how the mimetically engendered conception of immanence competes with mimetically generated theories of transcendence. I hope that, by placing these theories in mutual conversation through the medium of Girard’s mimetic theory and GA’s originary thinking, the tension between theories of transcendence and immanence—a tension which signals a kind of ideological mimetic doubling—may be deconstructed.

    Keywords: interdividual desire, sacred, René Girard, generative anthropology, immanence, transcendence, Bataille, Levinas

    Adam Katz is the editor of The Originary Hypothesis: A Minimal Proposal for Humanistic Inquiry, a collection of essays on Generative Anthropology, and of new editions of Eric Gans’s Science and Faith and The Origin of Language. He publishes regularly in Anthropoetics, and posts often on the GABlog. He teaches writing at Quinnipiac University in Connecticut.

    Book Review: Nemesis: The Jouvenelian vs. the Liberal Model of Human Orders, by C.A. Bond

    Abstract: This review brings out the relevance of Chris Bond’s Nemesis for GA. Bond draws upon Bertrand de Jouvenel’s On Power to develop a model showing how power relations in which the central power (first king, then state) generated modern liberalism, with its abstract, rights-bearing individual. Beyond pointing out the corrosive implications of Nemesis for almost all mainstream accounts of liberalism (which present it as a gradual process of emancipation, rather than centralization and control), the review contends that the book calls on us to open up the discussion of the meaning of the “center” in GA. Eric Gans has argued for an understanding of modern “market society” as an “omnicentric” social order, with “omnicentrism” bearing both empirical and normative valences. That is, the more mature the social order, the more distributed the centers generated within it. This review draws upon Bond’s argument to counter this claim by asserting that what appears to be a distribution of equalized centers is in fact a strengthening of the social center, or central authority, which has been constitutive of every social order since the Big Man, as discussed in Gans’s The End of Culture, first “usurped” the ritual center. One implication would be that ethical and moral discourse needs to be directed away from generated new centers implicitly subversive of the authoritative one and toward the question of how our relations with the social center are to be ordered. 

    Keywords: center, power, high-low vs. middle, liberalism, individual 

    Andrew J. McKenna, Ph.D. Johns Hopkins, is professor of French at Loyola University Chicago and a member of the Anthropoetics editorial board. He is the author of Violence and Difference: Girard, Derrida, and Deconstruction (U of Illinois P, 1992), as well as of numerous articles on Molière, Pascal, Racine, Montesquieu, Baudelaire, Flaubert, Fellini, and critical theory. From 1996 through 2006, he was editor in chief of Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture. He is a board member of Raven Foundation and of Imitatio, foundations devoted to research and education in mimetic anthropology.

    Article: Shakespeare’s Linguistic Turn in King Lear

    Abstract: Richard van Oort’s Shakespeare’s Big Men: Tragedy and the Problem of Resentment affords a productive encounter between Girard’s mimetic theory and Gans’s generative anthropology. GA’s structural model of social organization as center/periphery serves as interpretive template for Shakespeare’s play. The king’s abdication of the royal center precipitates a lethal mimetic vortex all along the periphery in this apocalyptic tragedy. By rigorous contrast with Hamlet, it is the king’s resentment that unleashes “a theater of envy,” where madness figures centrally, literally, in letterly way, as cultural meltdown.

    Keywords: van Oort, Shakespeare, King Lear, René Girard, tragedy

    Richard van Oort is Professor of English at the University of Victoria. In 2014 he organized the GA conference in Victoria and in 2018 was elected to the office of President of the Generative Anthropology Society and Conference. He has published over 20 articles and is the author of two books, The End of Literature: Essays in Anthropological Aesthetics (Davies Group, 2009) and Shakespeare’s Big Men: Tragedy and the Problem of Resentment (University of Toronto Press, 2016). Links to his articles can be found here.

    Article: Shakespeare’s Heroines and the Constancy of Love

    Abstract: Shakespeare’s tragedies tell the story of the hero’s failure to remain constant to love. Brutus ignores Portia’s pleas, Hamlet rejects Ophelia, Othello accuses Desdemona, Lear disowns Cordelia, Macbeth murders his king, and Coriolanus would burn all of Rome. Shakespeare leaves us in no doubt about the consequences of the hero’s decision. He might have been saved, but in the end he fails both himself and those closest to him. Yet it might not have ended this way. The pattern need not have been one of doom to dusty death. Shakespeare wrote life-giving as well as death-dealing plays. The comedies depict a similar struggle with the forces of negativity. Here, too, the protagonist is tested and found wanting. It is clear the story might take the same path as tragedy. But there is a crucial difference. The heroine does not die. She may die a symbolic death, which is Shakespeare’s way of indicating the fragility of the hero’s allegiance to love. The forces of negativity are strong and the threat to the protagonist’s soul constant. But in the end love prevails and resentment is overcome. This fundamental conflict between love and resentment may, I think, be found in all the plays. In this paper, I demonstrate how Shakespeare elaborates the conflict in a single comedy, Much Ado About Nothing.

    Keywords: Shakespearean comedy, Much Ado About Nothing, Shakespeare’s heroines, love in Shakespeare, resentment in Shakespeare

    Matthew Taylor is Professor of English at Kinjo Gakuin University in Nagoya, Japan. He teaches courses in English as a Foreign Language (EFL), academic writing, teacher training, and culture. He has written on EFL pedagogy, literature, film, social issues, mimetic theory, and generative anthropology. He has co-authored EFL textbooks with National Geographic Learning and Macmillan LanguageHouse. His articles for Anthropoetics have explored social phenomena in Japan, socioeconomic issues, and mimetic elements in Jane Austen’s novels.

    Article:Beholding the Beholder’s Eye: Beauty and Mimetic Effects in Jane Austen

    Abstract: Mimesis dictates that beauty must be neither objective nor subjective (in the eye of the beholder) but intersubjective: beholding the eye of the beholder. Such dynamics play out constantly in Jane Austen’s novels, and more than superficially; they often propel the plot and determine the fate of principle characters. Yet Austen, focused upon romantic attraction and the marriage market, is too much a realist to ignore the “objective” aspects of beauty. She works with an interplay between objective, subjective and intersubjective aspects of beauty.

    With Henry Crawford (Mansfield Park), Austen’s treatment is wryly satirical; Henry is a relatively plain man who quickly becomes the most attractive man anywhere he goes. He is a classic Girardian “pseudo-narcissist.” However, Rebecca Adams has argued that René Girard’s “pseudo-narcissism” can be reconfigured to model something positive, something that confers agency and affirmation. Anne Elliot (Persuasion) and Fanny Price (Mansfield Park) exemplify Adams’ model. They demonstrate the affirming power of mimetic desire, most obviously (but not only) manifested in physical beauty. Anne and Fanny “become beautiful” before our eyes but are in no way trying to achieve this effect. In certain scenes, aware of being admired, they glow reciprocally. This is much more than a “Cinderella factor” to captivate readers (though it certainly is that); it is an outward sign of a positive intersubjective transformation. Austen’s treatment of these mimetic effects makes Adams’ insights concrete and suggests a fresh approach for exploring “positive mimesis,” a longstanding and controversial puzzle in mimetic theory.

    Keywords: Jane Austen, René Girard, mimetic theory, intersubjective,“pseudo-narcissism,” Rebecca Adams, positive mimesis

  • Beholding the Beholder’s Eye: Beauty and Mimetic Effects in Jane Austen

    Beauty is sometimes thought to be “objective,” where everyone agrees on who or what is beautiful. Beauty is other times characterized as “subjective,” in the eye of the beholder. In René Girard’s mimetic theory beauty must be “intersubjective,” not in the eye of the beholder but in the beholding of the eye of the beholder. That is, beauty is mimetic; it is mediated by others.[1] Such intersubjective dynamics play out constantly in Jane Austen’s treatment of beauty, and more than superficially; they often propel the plot and determine the fate of principal characters.[2]

    Yet Austen, focused as she is upon romantic attraction and the marriage market, is too much of a realist to ignore the objective aspects of beauty and their ruthlessly determinative influence.[3] Charlotte Lucas in Pride and Prejudice, a sharp and observant character and Elizabeth Bennett’s close friend, exemplifies this utilitarian realism about beauty. It is strongly implied (though never stated outright) that Charlotte is not particularly attractive, and she “settles” unapologetically for the comically ridiculous Mr. Collins—Austen’s most cringe-worthy pairing. As Charlotte explains to Elizabeth,

    “I am not romantic you know. I never was. I ask only for a comfortable home; and considering Mr. Collins’s character, connections, and situation in life, I am convinced that my chance of happiness with him is as fair, as most people can boast on entering the married state.”[4]

    Charlotte deals (or so she sees it) with the cold, hard facts of life. It would be difficult to convince her that beauty is an intersubjective phantom. And though readers will agree that she deserves better than Mr. Collins, even that she could do better, few are under any misapprehension that Charlotte could secure a Darcy or a Charles Bingley.[5]

    On the other hand, Charlotte knows better than anyone else that beauty is hardly the only thing that matters; much more important is how one plays one’s hand, as her own finessing of Mr. Collins demonstrates. When Collins is rejected by Elizabeth after his comic debacle of a proposal, Charlotte deftly places herself in his way, presents herself as a sympathetic listener, and very quickly (within a few days) manages to get him to look upon her as a helpmate and desirable life partner: massaging his bruised ego, re-channeling his resentment toward Elizabeth, and redirecting his gaze toward herself.[6] However opportunistic and calculating, Charlotte’s engineering of the situation relies entirely on “intersubjective” factors.

    Charlotte contrasts usefully with Jane Bennett, Elizabeth’s elder sister, who is, objectively, the great beauty in the novel but has no such situational awareness and much more difficulty securing a partner. Jane and Charles Bingley have a strong mutual attraction and are, in the common phrase, “made for each other,” but Jane very nearly loses him because she fails to sufficiently display her attraction. Charlotte, appropriately, is the first person to notice that this is going to be a problem. As she prophesies to Elizabeth,

     “. . . there are very few of us who have heart enough to be really in love without encouragement. In nine cases out of ten, a woman had better shew more affection than she feels. Bingley likes your sister undoubtedly; but he may never do more than like her, if she does not help him on.”[7]

    But Jane is a very sincere person with a calm, serene temperament. She is not one to make a presumptuous show of her feelings, and if anything underplays them.

    Left to their own devices, Jane and Bingley might find their way to happiness and invalidate Charlotte’s misgivings. Unfortunately, it is not solely a matter of Jane looking at Bingley or of Bingley looking at Jane, but also of Bingley’s friend and mentor, the imposing Mr. Darcy, looking at Jane looking at Bingley. Darcy cannot perceive in Jane, as he reports later, “any symptom of peculiar regard” for Bingley—precisely what Charlotte predicted—so he separates the two.[8] Bingley in turn, insofar as he yields to Darcy’s counsel, is looking at Darcy looking at Jane looking at himself.

    These unhappy circumstances are fortunately resolved later: Darcy withdraws his disapproval and gives his blessing, but only because he can now see Jane through Elizabeth’s eyes, that is, look at Elizabeth looking at Jane looking at Bingley. Bingley in turn renews his attention toward Jane after looking at Darcy looking at himself, looking at Jane.[9]

    Even without the benefit of mimetic theory, we can see that beauty in Austen’s world, however objectively self-evident, is very much socially embedded. With Austen there is constant interplay between objective, subjective, and intersubjective aspects of beauty. Yet it is the intersubjective, the mimetic aspects, that are the most revealing, the most interesting, and the most determinative. This extends to our experience as readers, since Austen’s description of beauty tends to be minimal, mostly suggestive, and left to our imagination. We, too, nearly always experience beauty in Austen through the eyes of other characters.

    While human beauty can be both very powerful and very superficial, the advantage of beauty in this context is that, being both powerful and superficial, it is also very obvious. In Austen’s hands, beauty brings certain mimetic effects into sharp relief. This study will explore these effects primarily through three characters: Henry Crawford (Mansfield Park), Anne Elliot (Persuasion), and Fanny Price (Mansfield Park).

    With Henry Crawford, Austen’s treatment of beauty is wryly satirical; Henry is a relatively plain man who can leverage his personal appeal to quickly become the most attractive man in any social setting. He is a classic Girardian “pseudo-narcissist,” meaning that he projects self-love, gets women to imitate it, and feeds off the ensuing stream of desire, from an indefinitely long stream of women.[10] However, Rebecca Adams has argued that Girard’s “pseudo-narcissism” can go beyond méconnaissance (misrecognition, or the “Romantic lie”). Adams repurposes Girard’s psychology to propose a model of “loving mimesis.”[11] Adams suggests an alternate scenario by which this mimetic relation, instead of being “objectifying,” confers agency and affirmation. The center of attention in the putatively “narcissistic” relation can experience, sustain, and augment desires that are positive and non-appropriative. Quite interestingly, Adams was inspired to formulate her model after watching a Star Trek episode (described below) premised on the power of romantic attraction. Adams’ thesis is highly suggestive, though it remains underdeveloped and unelaborated through further examples.

    Anne Elliot and Fanny Price are exemplary subjects for further developing Adams’ model. They demonstrate the affirming power of mimetic desire, most obviously (but not only) manifested in physical beauty. Anne and Fanny blossom through series of interactions that ultimately confer personal value and agency. They “become beautiful” before our eyes but are not in any way trying to achieve this effect. In certain scenes, aware of being admired, they glow reciprocally. This is much more than a “Cinderella factor” to captivate readers (though it certainly is that); it is an outward sign of a positive intersubjective transformation. Austen’s treatment of these mimetic effects makes Adams’ insights more concrete and suggests a fresh approach for exploring “positive mimesis,” a longstanding and controversial puzzle in mimetic theory, which is nearly always focused on envy, rivalry, doubling, and violence.[12]

    Henry Crawford and “Pseudo-Narcissism”

    “Objectively” speaking, Henry Crawford is rather short and relatively plain. However, he somehow manages to be the most handsome man wherever he goes. Austen captures the process brilliantly and economically when Henry first makes his appearance at Mansfield:

    Her [Mary’s] brother [Henry] was not handsome: no, when they first saw him he was absolutely plain, black and plain; but still he was the gentleman, with a pleasing address. The second meeting proved him not so very plain: he was plain, to be sure, but then he had so much countenance, and his teeth were so good, and he was so well made, that one soon forgot he was plain; and after a third interview, after dining in company with him at the Parsonage, he was no longer allowed to be called so by anybody. He was, in fact, the most agreeable young man the sisters had ever known, and they were equally delighted with him.[13]

    Julia and Maria Bertram being “equally delighted” with Henry is of course a sign of trouble from a Girardian point of view, and indeed, it turns out to be exactly so.[14] But for present purposes it is worth asking, how does Henry manage to become the most handsome man in world after only three meetings? These “runaway” effects are powerful enough that even readers (not unlike Julia and Maria) fall victim to them; it is difficult to remember even a few chapters later that Henry is, objectively speaking, not particularly good looking.

    Over the course of the novel we observe how Henry achieves these effects. He has immense personal charm and superb conversational skills. He takes command of every situation, effortlessly projecting self-assurance, self-confidence, and self-admiration—while avoiding the foppishness of someone like Robert Ferrars in Sense and Sensibility.[15] Henry flatters women with extreme art but does not fawn over them—as the hapless Rushworth does with his fiancé Maria Bertram. Instead, Henry teases women with suggestive barbs that keep them off balance, and always stays just out of reach; women everywhere fall in love with him yet never get more than a plausibly deniable return for their attentions. He is a serial heartbreaker, quick to move on to his next conquest when his current situation becomes uninteresting, or unsustainable.

    All of this conforms to Girard’s analysis of the classic “pseudo-narcissist.”[16] For Girard, genuine “narcissists” (those who desire themselves independently of the desires of others) cannot exist. Those who appear to be narcissists are in fact imitating the desire directed at them, then re-presenting it (mostly unconsciously) as their own self-love, something that projects a potent self-sufficiency. When successful, the “pseudo-narcissist” attracts even more ardent desire and can create a semi-stable, irresistible field of desire around his or her self.

    The pseudo-narcissist is surrounded by desiring supplicants who imitate his or her self-love, thereby feeding it and perpetuating the charade, strengthened and sustained by this positive feedback. But the pseudo-narcissist cannot unequivocally reciprocate this admiration, because the fawning admirers, by very virtue of their admiration, have demonstrated their low value, but also their necessity as fawning admirers; their role is to feed energy into the system. To return the admiration in equal measure would disrupt the field of attraction.

    Girard identifies Olivia in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night as the quintessential pseudo-narcissist, though she is hardly aware of what she is doing. Her aura of complacent self-love, sustained by fawning admirers, is punctured in an instant by a critical interloper (Viola, pretending to be her brother Sebastian), who scolds her for her neglect of the lovelorn Orsino. Olivia immediately falls in love with Sebastian/Viola, the only one who fails to admire her.[17] Girard also finds the same pattern prefigured in a minor exchange in As You Like It, when Rosalind (like Viola, also disguised as a man) chides the country girl Phebe for keeping her forlorn lover Silvius contemptuously dangling. Then, Phebe immediately falls in love with Rosalind:

    Sweet youth, I pray you chide a year together:
    I had rather hear you chide than this man woo.[18]

    In contemporary street wisdom, this is a strategy that every “pick-up artist” claims will get beautiful women into bed: puncturing their self-regard with negative comments and thereby triggering insecurity in women otherwise supremely self-confident. Henry deviates from Girard’s analysis insofar as he is a male rather than female instantiation of the pseudo-narcissist, and insofar as his strategy is, like the pick-up artist’s, conscious and deliberate. In this sense, Henry is operating at a meta level, a “pseudo pseudo-narcissist.” Nevertheless, very much like Olivia, he is upended by his own strategy.

    Henry lacks respect for the women who are captivated by him, exactly because they are captivated by him, and offer so little challenge. The only woman he can fall in love with is Fanny Price, who genuinely dislikes him, is unmoved by his flattering insinuations, and never gets caught up in the Henry fever depicted above; Fanny—the objective realist in this context, and in that sense an important “reality check”—remains convinced that Henry Crawford is not particularly good looking. Yet her resistance to his charms makes her irresistible to him. As he expounds to Mary,

    “I do not quite know what to make of Miss Fanny. I do not understand her. I could not tell what she would be at yesterday. What is her character? Is she solemn? Is she queer? Is she prudish? Why did she draw back and look so grave at me? I could hardly get her to speak. I never was so long in company with a girl in my life, trying to entertain her, and succeed so ill! Never met with a girl who looked so grave on me! I must try to get the better of this. Her looks say, ‘I will not like you, I am determined not to like you’; and I say she shall.”[19]

    Henry “discovers” Fanny’s beauty simultaneously as he encounters her impermeable resistance. For Henry, Fanny presents a completely new challenge, first as an object of psychological seduction, then eventually, as his efforts continue and he makes no progress, an object of love.

    Fanny is the Viola to Henry’s Olivia, the Rosalind to Henry’s Phebe. After the climactic ball, Henry falls deeply and publicly in love with Fanny, even to the point of reveling proudly in his chains like the most pitiful supplicant.[20] He forgets his own script, imagining—though his accumulated experience should have taught him better—that such fawning beggars (i.e., Rushworth) get nowhere. Fanny for her part, though not following Henry’s script, remains mostly unmoved by his protestations. She thinks that she can simply wait him out until he forgets about her. (She is not exactly right, but close enough.)

    Fanny has exactly the effect of a coquette, but it is the farthest thing from her mind. Austen has a robust understanding of the psychology around “pseudo-narcissism.” However, her interpretation is quite a bit more nuanced than Girard’s, or perhaps it is better to say broader and more generalizable, which is why Adams’ model becomes necessary for the sake of interpretation. Something more is at play. In the meantime, it is worthwhile to look briefly at a larger assembly of Austen’s female “coquettes.”

    There is no dearth of them, and they come in different shapes and sizes. Lucy Steele in Sense and Sensibility and Lady Susan Vernon in Lady Susan could be considered “successful” coquettes, not in the sense that they finally get what they want (arguably Lucy Steele does, in her twisted way) but insofar as the machinery of coquetry is fully operational. By contrast, Isabella Thorpe in Northanger Abbey acts the part of the coquette but is transparent and incompetent; even the naïve protagonist Catherine Morland sees through Isabella in the end.

    In Pride and Prejudice, we have seen that Charlotte Lucas is not above being coquettish. Her friend Elizabeth Bennett has an engaging way with men which Darcy misinterprets as coquettishness; she does not speak critically to Darcy or engage pleasantly with other men in order to get his attention, but that is exactly what he thinks she is doing when he first falls in love with her. He thinks he is falling for an irresistible coquette, even against his own better judgment.[21] Thus Elizabeth succeeds as a coquette without in fact being one. Some of the personal qualities around being a coquette can therefore be considered positively after all; being personable, being friendly, openly and critically engaging with others. These are successful ways to “win friends and influence people.”

    Mary Crawford in Mansfield Park, another great Austenian beauty, has these gifts but deploys them in a deliberately coquettish way. Mary is a very “high functioning” coquette, an extraordinary fictional creation, whom we can neither love nor hate. Edmund is to her as Fanny is to Henry, but the feelings aroused are reciprocal and we cannot help wanting the romance between Edmund and Mary to somehow work out. Mary hybridizes the wit and vivaciousness of Elizabeth Bennet with the moral unsavoriness of Lady Susan, yet Austen gives Mary an underlying humanity that makes her moral flaws not vicious but careless and strangely (since she is hardly an idiot) blinkered and stupid. Mary, like Henry, is something of a tragic figure who misses her chance at redemption, at what we might call authenticity.[22]

    Elizabeth Elliot in Persuasion aspires to be the sort of “pseudo-narcissist” that Olivia is in Twelfth Night: the beautiful woman at the center of attention, condescendingly proud and self-assured but universally admired. Elizabeth cannot, however, attract any romantic attention at all, and only comes off as arrogant and off-putting. She suffers quiet distress as she sees the window of her desirability slowly closing around her. Elizabeth is a failed coquette, a failed “pseudo-narcissist.” If she were not such a mean and unpleasant woman, she might be another tragic Austenian figure like Henry or Mary.

    Pseudo-Narcissism Reconsidered: Rebecca Adams’ Model of Mimetic Desire

     The term “pseudo-narcissist” may be unfortunate insofar as it automatically implies méconnaissance (misrecognition, Girard’s “Romantic lie”) wherein people are misreading their own motives and playing games with each other. While this can be true, even with Girard’s examples the case is overstated. For instance, Viola launches the tirade that turns Olivia’s head; Viola thus disrupts the flow of desire and inadvertently reconfigures it around herself.[23] The reconfigured desire has essentially the same structure for Viola as it did for Olivia. But does this make Viola another “pseudo-narcissist”? The same could be asked of Rosalind in relation to Phebe in As You Like It.[24] Likewise, Fanny’s rebuff of Henry accentuates his desire and makes her—unwittingly, then unwillingly—the center of attention. Yet Fanny is not being coy or “playing hard to get.”[25]

    The more salient point about “pseudo-narcissism” may not be misrecognition after all, but rather the configuration of desire, the structure. Since the object of desire is a person with desires, she/he can also be both a model and a subject of desire. The three points of Girard’s mimetic triangle—subject, object, and model of desire—can thus collapse into a single person, with a field of attraction around him/her: a singularity of desire, as it were.[26]

    Such a structure must have negative implications for Girard because, by definition, it involves “internal mediation” (subject and model inhabit the same sphere of desire and are in competition for the same object). Internal mediation in Girard’s system usually implies an intensification of mimetic desire and hence, by implication, a greater distortion of awareness, an intensification of rivalry and conflict. Insofar as Girard could conceive of mimesis positively at all, it was almost always in the realm of “external mediation,” as in benign role modeling, where the subject and model are not in competition.

    Rebecca Adams, who famously elicited key statements from Girard about the “goodness” of mimetic desire,[27] struggled with his thought on precisely this point. External mediation may be less conflictual, but it can also mean exclusion, being cast into outer darkness (that is, putting yourself out of the game when you have a legitimate stake in it). Renunciation may be virtuous, but it can also mean a kind of Freudian “self-mutilation,” (that is, denying or being denied legitimate desires). Internal mediation may pull us into the vortex of doubling rivalry, but for Adams it can also be transformative and can confer genuine agency.

    Adams articulated this in her model of “loving mimesis,” a significant though still underappreciated contribution to mimetic theory.[28] Adams redrew the mimetic triangle using the example of our coquette, Girard’s “pseudo-narcissist.” Adams repurposed the mimetic relations in and around the “pseudo-narcissist” to imagine an alternate scenario, by which this mimetic relation becomes a truly “intersubjective” one, which for Adams means that no “objectification” takes place (the “object” is instead affirmed as a desiring subject).

    Adams’ exposition is unfortunately opaque. It is split between the highly technical and abstract presentation of the model in one book,[29] and a highly compelling and accessible personal story about how she came to discover it in another.[30] The latter is particularly relevant here because the central insights are, as noted above, gained through a story involving romantic attraction. It is worth revisiting Adams’ personal account in some detail.

    Adams’ epiphany came specifically from an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation (“The Perfect Mate”).[31] (Adams is a Star Trek fan.) The central figure in the episode is a “metamorph,” Kamala, a genetically engineered female alien “literally with no mind of her own.”[32] Endowed both with empathic (telepathic) abilities and an ability to perfectly mirror and mold herself to the desires of her partner, she has been raised to be a “gift” that will help facilitate peace between two warring planets (a conflict originating, interestingly enough, in a rivalrous conflict between two brothers over the same woman).

    While aboard the Enterprise, Kamala is awakened from her dormant state prematurely (by nefarious premeditation of Ferengi on board), before the bonding with the official for whom she is intended can take place. At her discovery, Captain Picard objects in the strongest terms that her condition amounts to little more than slavery, and that her concealed transportation on his vessel is nothing less than trafficking. The quickened Kamala is given free access to the ship as any other passenger would. However, comically, Kamala, wreaks some havoc on the Enterprise through her interactions with men, with whom she cannot help being potently and irresistibly seductive as she mirrors back their deepest desires.

    Because of this, she needs to be sequestered. Picard looks in on her and begins to take an interest in her well-being and her fate. Then, under the influence of her own impulses, Kamala permanently bonds with Picard. Adams explains,

    However, because Picard has no desire to possess her, or even to serve as a model for her at all, but has only expressed a wish that she could become an independent agent capable of making a free choice and choosing a noble destiny, from within the strict confines of her mimetic nature she indeed becomes an independent agent. This was the surprise twist of the story. As I watched, the story demonstrated the possibility that mimetic desire need not entail enslavement, rivalry or violence, but could actually open up into regard for freedom for another. I had my answer to my theoretical problem with Girardian theory.[33]

    Adams elaborates, “Unable to desire this freedom for herself or even understand it until it was made possible by the desire of another, she has been transformed from an object, something which is desired and acted upon by others, into what philosophers call a Subject.” Adams outlines what subjectivity is in the context of mimetic desire:

    . . . we sense there is something inauthentic about having a subjectivity purely derivative of someone else’s point of view. The only alternative has traditionally appeared to be conceiving human beings ideally as totally free, autonomous agents, an idea central to pure Enlightenment individualism but which I suspect we also know to be untrue, because people are clearly social and interdependent beings. The Star Trek episode offered a way to think about a third alternative: human beings might be understood as deeply mimetic and thus as profoundly relational (as Girard and many postmodernist thinkers have stressed), yet this would not preclude the possibility of authenticity, defined not as absolute autonomy of action and consciousness, but as the capacity to participate fully in a loving dynamic of giving and receiving in relation to others.[34]

    I have objections to some of Adams’ assertions (not overviewed here),[35] but none of them should detract from the importance of what she has done. She has worked out how positive mimetic desire might work within the context of internal mediation (remembering here that since the “pseudo-narcissist” is simultaneously subject, object, and model, the mediation is internal, by definition). Adams also generalizes the structure of “pseudo-narcissism” to show that there need not be anything particularly “pseudo” or “narcissistic” about it. It allows for agency, subjectivity, or what we could call authenticity.

    Another example Adams might have used is the romantic comedy Runaway Bride.[36] Julia Roberts’ character in the film is essentially a “metamorph,” a woman who keeps trying to be “the perfect mate” for a long series of men, but gets cold feet at every wedding, sensing (it is implied) that her agency will be subsumed in the melding of her identity with each groom’s desires. Roberts’ character is a serial coquette, who traps herself (and others) in inauthentic desires, but at least has the sense to bolt each time. Richard Gere’s male lead is a critical interloper who plays a role comparable to Picard’s, though in this case the relationship becomes a reciprocal and romantic one. Though there is risk here of succumbing to Girard’s “Romantic lie,” surely a vast number of romantic comedies contain at least this kernel of truth: that we need other people to become “authentic,” and it ought to be those who can see through our inauthenticity.

    What is most unfortunate about Adams’ model is that it was not pursued further, since she withdrew at that time from active scholarship. Her model can and should be fleshed out with further examples. Obviously, Kamala is a highly idealized, perfectly mimetic being. (As noted, the Star Trek episode was not included in the formal explication of Adams’ model, and in addition, Adams later developed other misgivings about Kamala.[37]) The idealization helps Adams work through the problem schematically, and achieve a genuine breakthrough, but having worked it through, other examples would have been helpful. Further support for her model can be found with Austen’s coquettes, especially the inadvertent ones who are not coquettes at all: Anne Elliot in Persuasion, and Fanny Price in Mansfield Park.

    The “Second Spring” of Anne Elliot

     Girard often compared escalating mimetic effects to positive feedback in engineering or to speculative bubbles in the stock market.[38] Beauty in Austen can manifest these effects, as was shown earlier with Henry Crawford, who can produce and harness them at will, even without being particularly attractive. With Fanny Price and Anne Elliot something very similar happens, but the beauty is “objectively” quite real. Moreover, the “objectively” real beauty is interlocked with mimesis, further producing discernable physiological effects, which, being noticed, feed back into the mimetic cycle, feeding back again into the “objectively” perceived beauty, and so on.

    Adams was on the right track not simply theoretically but in a down-to-earth, verifiable way, and not just as an idealized extrapolation from a science-fiction drama; we have all seen people “glowing” from admiration or affection—people who are literally more beautiful for having received it. Experiences with groups can “socialize” people, transforming them into confident, engaging individuals where they were previously mousy or inhibited, and a radiance can manifest even physiologically from such a transformation. These effects become apparent with Anne Elliot and Fanny Price.

    Since they are the type of women least likely to parade their beauty, the effects are the more striking to readers. The “Cinderella” patina to both of their stories—oppressed women shoved to the periphery who come into their own and are brought to the scenic center—allows us to enjoy the effect aesthetically, because potential resentment is neutralized.[39] Especially in Anne’s case (Fanny’s relationship with readers is a great deal more complicated),[40] she has earned her happiness and is barely aware of her good looks. But pragmatically, from an analytical perspective, the lack of vanity helps to isolate the relation of mimesis and beauty, for someone not seeking that kind of attention, and to understand how inside and outside are being affected. That is, the process described by Adams can be clearly and realistically depicted through Anne’s character arc.

    First, it is necessary to consider Anne’s “bad looks,” which also have mimetic origins. They constitute “pseudo-narcissistic” effects, operating in reverse. Eight years prior Anne was persuaded to give up Frederick Wentworth, then a dashing and brilliant lieutenant. Wentworth denounced her at the time as weak and overly yielding and has still not forgiven her. Anne neglects her body as a form of self-mortification, laying upon herself the burden of his unforgiveness in her prematurely faded appearance. This is an outward sign of an inner wasting away. She conforms to Wentworth’s denunciation, becoming excessively deferential to everyone around her, in precise contrast to Wentworth’s confidence and brilliance, though Anne in fact has natural charm and considerable interpersonal skills with men. She becomes the woman Wentworth accuses her of being, physically wilting under his denunciation for eight years.

    Anne values herself downwardly according to the value projected on her by Wentworth. The two captains, Rebecca Adams’ Picard and Jane Austen’s Wentworth, are having opposite but structurally comparable effects. While Picard confers and facilitates agency and subjectivity, Wentworth resentfully withholds them, so long as he withholds acceptance or forgiveness.

    It is precisely this belated forgiveness (so I have argued) which launches Anne’s “second spring.”[41] Her re-blooming is in fact an extremely complex process, finely detailed by Austen, and involves a great deal of social interaction, but chronologically, it can be traced back to a little gesture of Wentworth’s in chapter ten, when he takes her hand and helps her into a gig. Anne interprets this small token as a sign of reconciliation. Thereafter, being in the presence of Wentworth is less mortifying, and she goes on to win the favor of everyone in his social set. Her natural personableness comes out, and her interactions, especially with men, initiate a reciprocal process of positive feedback that begin to affect her appearance.

    Anne’s long faded beauty reappears strikingly on the beach at Lyme, after being noticed by a fine-looking stranger (who later turns out to be her cousin, Mr. Elliot):

    When they came to the steps, leading upward from the beach, a gentleman at the same moment preparing to come down, politely drew back, and stopped to give them way. They ascended and passed him; and as they passed, Anne’s face caught his eye, and he looked at her with a degree of earnest admiration, which she could not be insensible of. She was looking remarkably well; her very regular, very pretty features, having the bloom and freshness of youth restored by the fine wind which had been blowing on her complexion, and by the animation of her eye which it had also produced.[42]

    It is worth noting that Mr. Elliot first notices Anne’s beauty objectively (remembering, though, that he is responding to a beauty that has a mimetic genesis elsewhere). It is thereafter conspicuously noticed by a great many other people, even Anne’s father, a ridiculous man comically obsessed with looks. Mr. Elliot’s initial admiration, followed by Wentworth’s imitative admiration, followed by a near universal admiration in Bath, amplify her beauty still more. Wentworth’s renewed proposal finally transforms her into a radiant beauty who all but transfixes the guests at her father’s card party in the penultimate chapter.

    These are the mimetic “runaway” effects under discussion earlier, but at this point it is difficult in the end to separate the mimetic effects from objectively, physiologically verifiable beauty—a radiance, an animation, a flush—so closely are they interlinked. Beauty, being so obvious, brings out mimetic effects that are taking hold under the skin, and which are quite positive. Anne becoming beautiful is inseparable from Anne acquiring agency and subjectivity, and both are reliant on the intersubjective relation, which is the core of Adams’ model of mimetic desire.

    The Coming of Age of Fanny Price

     Nowhere is a woman’s beauty depicted by Austen with so much care, with so many delicate brushstrokes and over so long a span of the narrative, as it is for Fanny Price in Mansfield Park. It is not pure coincidence that Fanny is Austen’s most controversial and sometimes quite heatedly debated character. Many disgruntled readers perpetually hope that this elaborate attention to Fanny’s appearance is undertaken for the sake of a match with Henry that, to their great frustration, does not takes place. Henry is the prince with the glass slipper and Fanny refuses to stick her foot into it. Austen is “trolling” us all, for reasons that cannot be elaborated here,[43] but for present purposes, the relevant point is the magnification of Fanny’s beauty.

    Her beauty unfolds in ways that are very similar to Anne’s, and ultimately amplifies with the same escalating mimetic effects (which we saw also with Henry). Fanny’s social awkwardness and mousiness[44] are, also like Anne’s in Persuasion, connected to emotional trauma, in Fanny’s case her sudden displacement to her uncle’s home as a young girl. Her inhibition is, also like Anne’s, reinforced by years of under-appreciation and neglect.

    Unlike Anne, Fanny’s coming into beauty coincides with her coming of age, in this way making her more akin to Catherine Morland in Northanger Abbey. Catherine is an earlier bloomer, starting out as a tomboy with “a thin awkward figure, a sallow skin without colour, dark lank hair, and strong features.”[45] Catherine’s physical maturation is dispatched very quickly (though delightfully) by Austen:

    Such was Catherine Morland at ten. At fifteen, appearances were mending; she began to curl her hair and long for balls; her complexion improved, her features were softened by plumpness and colour, her eyes gained more animation, and her figure more consequence. Her love of dirt gave way to an inclination for finery, and she grew clean as she grew smart; she had now the pleasure of sometimes hearing her father and mother remark on her personal improvement. “Catherine grows quite a good-looking girl–she is almost pretty today,” were words which caught her ears now and then; and how welcome were the sounds! To look almost pretty is an acquisition of higher delight to a girl who has been looking plain the first fifteen years of her life than a beauty from her cradle can ever receive.[46]

    The description makes a glaring contrast with the words Fanny hears from her uncle before he leaves for Antigua, so glaring, in fact, that it seems likely Austen worked it in deliberately for comparison:

    “If William does come to Mansfield, I hope you may be able to convince him that the many years which have passed since you parted have not been spent on your side entirely without improvement; though, I fear, he must find his sister at sixteen in some respects too much like his sister at ten.” She cried bitterly over this reflection when her uncle was gone; and her cousins, on seeing her with red eyes, set her down as a hypocrite.[47]

    Sir Thomas, in his characteristically unartful way, means that Fanny has not changed or matured much since her arrival at Mansfield; she is still girlish, awkward, socially and possibly physically underdeveloped. What a great contrast, then, when he meets her next, on his unexpectedly early return to Mansfield, and Fanny is eighteen:

    As she entered, her own name caught her ear. Sir Thomas was at that moment looking round him, and saying, “But where is Fanny? Why do not I see my little Fanny?”—and on perceiving her, came forward with a kindness which astonished and penetrated her, calling her his dear Fanny, kissing her affectionately, and observing with decided pleasure how much she was grown! Fanny knew not how to feel, nor where to look. She was quite oppressed. He had never been so kind, so very kind to her in his life. His manner seemed changed, his voice was quick from the agitation of joy; and all that had been awful in his dignity seemed lost in tenderness. He led her nearer the light and looked at her again—inquired particularly after her health, and then, correcting himself, observed that he need not inquire, for her appearance spoke sufficiently on that point. A fine blush having succeeded the previous paleness of her face, he was justified in his belief of her equal improvement in health and beauty. He inquired next after her family, especially William: and his kindness altogether was such as made her reproach herself for loving him so little, and thinking his return a misfortune; and when, on having courage to lift her eyes to his face, she saw that he was grown thinner, and had the burnt, fagged, worn look of fatigue and a hot climate, every tender feeling was increased, and she was miserable in considering how much unsuspected vexation was probably ready to burst on him.[48]

    This sequence is vital. We have been with Fanny for fourteen chapters without noticing that she has become very pretty; Sir Thomas notices it before we do.

    As with Anne Elliot, it is worth asking how this transformation came about: what has made Fanny so pretty? In Fanny’s case the answer is more complex. There are certainly “baseline” objective factors: first, that Fanny has come into physical maturity since Sir Thomas left, and second, that Fanny has natural endowments to begin with. The Price family, like the Bertrams, are a good-looking set of people, as becomes clear late in the novel, when Austen describes them on their way to church in Portsmouth: “The family were now seen to advantage. Nature had given them no inconsiderable share of beauty, and Sunday dressed them in their cleanest skins and best attire.”[49]

    A parallel description of the Bertrams, when Fanny is first transplanted to Mansfield, shows how physical beauty runs in the extended family:

    They were a remarkably fine family, the sons very well-looking the daughters decidedly handsome, and all of them well grown and forward for their age, which produced such a striking difference between the cousins in person, as education had given their address; and no one would have supposed the girls so nearly of an age as they really were. There were in fact but two years between the youngest and Fanny. Julia Bertram was only twelve and Maria but a year older.[50]

    This early tableau also shows how far the shy, beleaguered Fanny lagged behind in her self-presentation—the ten-year-old Fanny whom Sir Thomas later thinks is “too much like” the Fanny at sixteen. While the objective factors (physical maturity and natural endowment) are obviously important, it was Fanny’s mousy girlishness and social inhibition which were most prominent before. Now, something has effected a change, and it can only be the intense socialization that Fanny has undergone in Sir Thomas’s absence.

    The mature situations and emotions she has had to deal with, the interactions she has had to engage, most conspicuously in the Sotherton scenes, with the private theatricals, and through being forced to observe and endure the ongoing romance between Mary and Edmund (with whom she is secretly in love)—these experiences have given her the kernel of an adult consciousness, notwithstanding the drama, nonsense and selfishness of those around her. Fanny has begun to come of age. It has been through social interaction, and it is manifesting physically, not just through puberty, but in the same process we saw with Anne. This is what Sir Thomas is noticing.

    The issue of Fanny’s “coming of age” was explicitly canvassed much earlier, before this transformation had begun, when Mary Crawford inquired about her:

    “I begin now to understand you all, except Miss Price,” said Miss Crawford, as she was walking with the Mr. Bertrams. “Pray, is she out, or is she not? I am puzzled. She dined at the Parsonage, with the rest of you, which seemed like being out; and yet she says so little, that I can hardly suppose she is.”

    Edmund, to whom this was chiefly addressed, replied, “I believe I know what you mean, but I will not undertake to answer the question. My cousin is grown up. She has the age and sense of a woman, but the outs and not outs are beyond me.”

    [Mary:] “And yet, in general, nothing can be more easily ascertained. The distinction is so broad. Manners as well as appearance are, generally speaking, so totally different. . . . A girl not out has always the same sort of dress: a close bonnet, for instance; looks very demure, and never says a word. You may smile, but it is so, I assure you; and except that it is sometimes carried a little too far, it is all very proper. Girls should be quiet and modest. The most objectionable part is, that the alteration of manners on being introduced into company is frequently too sudden. They sometimes pass in such very little time from reserve to quite the opposite–to confidence! That is the faulty part of the present system. One does not like to see a girl of eighteen or nineteen so immediately up to everything—and perhaps when one has seen her hardly able to speak the year before.”[51]

    The explicit connection of socially accepted rites of passage to Fanny (however amusing and satirically it is conveyed in this extended conversation) is significant, since the novel is in effect Fanny’s bildungsroman. Fanny is shown here in an indeterminate state, between childhood and womanhood; she has not yet been properly introduced to society:

     “But now I must be satisfied about Miss Price. Does she go to balls? Does she dine out every where, as well as at my sister’s?”

    “No,” replied Edmund; “I do not think she has ever been to a ball. My mother seldom goes into company herself, and dines nowhere but with Mrs. Grant, and Fanny stays at home with her.”

    “Oh! then the point is clear. Miss Price is not out.”[52]

    The Fanny that Sir Thomas sees is seen after the intense period of socialization—after Sotherton, the theatricals, and everything between. They have served informally as social rites of passage. Mary’s mention of balls is important because Sir Thomas, not too long after this, will give a ball in Fanny’s honor, a formal rite of passage. In the meantime, his very favorable and public approbation of Fanny is a sanction for everyone else to do the same. As Edmund tells her:

    “Your uncle thinks you very pretty, dear Fanny—and that is the long and the short of the matter. Anybody but myself would have made something more of it, and anybody but you would resent that you had not been thought very pretty before; but the truth is, that your uncle never did admire you till now—and now he does. Your complexion is so improved!—and you have gained so much countenance!—and your figure—nay, Fanny, do not turn away about it—it is but an uncle. If you cannot bear an uncle’s admiration, what is to become of you? You must really begin to harden yourself to the idea of being worth looking at. You must try not to mind growing up into a pretty woman.”[53]

    Fanny’s beauty, “objectively” very real, is also externally mediated by Sir Thomas, and begins increasingly to make its effect felt by others (including Fanny herself) as they react to his reaction. Her beauty begins to undergo the escalating effects we saw also with Anne and Henry.

    When Maria and Julia leave Mansfield, Fanny grows still more in consequence but also in the projection of beauty, which, I think it is fair to say, has been unleashed by Sir Thomas, in the sense of being socially sanctioned. It is at this point in the novel that Fanny draws the attention of Henry, first as a target for his nefarious designs. As he rapturously exclaims to Mary:

    “. . . I assure you she is quite a different creature from what she was in the autumn. She was then merely a quiet, modest, not plain-looking girl, but she is now absolutely pretty. I used to think she had neither complexion nor countenance; but in that soft skin of hers, so frequently tinged with a blush as it was yesterday, there is decided beauty; and from what I observed of her eyes and mouth, I do not despair of their being capable of expression enough when she has anything to express. And then, her air, her manner, her tout ensemble, is so indescribably improved! She must be grown two inches, at least, since October.”[54]

    But, as noted earlier, Henry’s attraction to her is inseparable from Fanny’s impermeable resistance to his (pseudo-narcissistic) charms.

    Post-return, the imposing Sir Thomas puts restraints on how Henry can operate; this is no longer the unrestricted playground of the Sotherton scenes or the private theatricals. Much more art is required for Henry’s game, so much so that he literally falls into his role and starts believing his act. Within the orbit of Sir Thomas, as well as through Sir Thomas’ coronation of Fanny at the ball, Henry’s unsavory designs morph into sincere and socially sanctioned ones; Sir Thomas provides the “role model,” in Girardian terms the external mediator, that Henry’s dissolute uncle could never be. Henry, too, is being socially mediated in a new way, as he begins to fall in love with Fanny.

    The ball at Mansfield is the climax of Fanny’s physical beauty, from the objective point of view, though it is inseparable from mimetic effects. Fanny achieves universal admiration, which is, again, a factor of youth and natural good looks vastly supplemented by the sanctioning admiration of Sir Thomas, and of Henry Crawford, and of other attendees at the ball. These powerful interlocking effects with beauty are neatly captured by Austen:

    Her uncle and both her aunts were in the drawing-room when Fanny went down. To the former she was an interesting object, and he saw with pleasure the general elegance of her appearance, and her being in remarkably good looks. . . .

    Fanny saw that she was approved; and the consciousness of looking well made her look still better.[55]

    Young, pretty, and gentle . . . she had no awkwardnesses that were not as good as graces, and there were few persons present that were not disposed to praise her. She was attractive, she was modest, she was Sir Thomas’s niece, and she was soon said to be admired by Mr. Crawford. It was enough to give her general favor.[56] (Emphasis mine.)

    This is the climax for the escalating mimetic effects we have been observing since the return of Sir Thomas, with Fanny now as the radiant center of attention, and it duplicates similar effects we saw with Anne Elliot. Henry is not unaffected; after the ball he determines to marry Fanny, his nefarious designs now definitively transmuted into socially acceptable ones. Fanny’s being “in remarkably good looks” designates her being objectively beautiful; she is having a “good hair day.” But objective beauty is inseparable here from the mimetic effects, as we see Fanny, others seeing Fanny, others seeing others seeing Fanny, and Fanny seeing others seeing Fanny, in tightly locked and mutually augmenting mimetic relations.

    Still Better: Toward a Model of Good Mimesis

     Fanny has much yet to undergo, and quite a bit to endure, but this is an appropriate place to conclude, and to consider the interlocking effects of beauty and mimesis. “Fanny saw that she was approved; and the consciousness of looking well, made her look still better”:[57] this sentence encapsulates Adams’ model of loving mimesis. Fanny is technically a “pseudo-narcissist” here, Girard’s “coquette”: Fanny, the center of attention, is receiving admiration; she is aware of the admiration; she experiences an augmentation of her beauty, even physiologically, through that awareness. Everything should point to Girard’s méconnaissance, yet it does not: Fanny’s beauty and her consciousness are clear, much as were Anne Elliot’s; Fanny’s is a perfectly natural reaction, and Austen achieves a very touching effect.

    Fanny, like Anne, is an excellent subject for elaborating Rebecca Adams’ model. The physical beauty is important mainly insofar as it highlights the mimetic structure, but with Fanny it is not finally about beauty but about agency, subjectivity, and personal integrity. These become increasingly important in the remaining chapters of the novel, even to the point where Fanny stands up alone to a sort of collective victimization.[58] The manifestation of beauty is tied to the acquisition of agency, but we cannot forget that this acquisition, like the beauty, has been mediated by others, especially (if imperfectly) by Edmund.[59]

    In his famous interview with Adams, Girard emphasized (with genuine regret) that “good mimesis” is important but not salient. It does not address the great problems of human co-existence. It is not what religion and the great literature are about: “I agree with Gide that literature is about evil. That doesn’t mean evil is the whole of life.”[60] Yet Girard did not really believe this, because it is not reflected in his own literary analyses; the great literature for Girard is about conversion, transformation. Literature must be about good, or there would be nothing to convert to.

    I think that Rebecca Adams’ reconfiguration of mimetic desire opens the way for a fuller elaboration of “Girardian” literary criticism, and of mimetic theory itself. Adams, and Austen, can make mimetic theory “still better” by theoretically unlocking this aspect, the affirming aspect, even within the inferno of mimetic desire and internal mediation. It is appropriate to give Adams the last words. Her model, so superbly instantiated in Anne Elliot and Fanny Price,

    . . . fully meets the criteria Girard exhaustively sets out as characteristic of mimetic desire: it is “acquisitive”; it leads to doubling; it escalates in a feedback loop; it transforms subjects and objects; it has a metaphysical character; and it even describes a “twin narcissism” (wherein desiring you is really desiring myself). Yet in this case all these characteristics are not only nonviolent but actively constructive.[61]

    Acknowledgements

     This paper was originally presented at the 2019 Generative Anthropology Summer Conference in New York City, and the research has been generously supported by Kinjo Gakuin University. I am grateful for the constructive comments of participants of GASC 2019, and most particularly for the invaluable editorial advice of Michael Cholewinski and Ian Dennis. All views, and any defects, are my own, including my interpretation of Rebecca Adams’ thesis. It should not be assumed to be equivalent to her own.

    Notes

    [1] Mimetic desire was first and best explicated in the first half of Girard’s Deceit, Desire and the Novel, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 1-152.

    [2] For instance, I have argued that Frederick Wentworth in Persuasion falls back in love with Anne Elliot by imitating a series of male admirers, in “What Persuasion Really Means in Persuasion: A Mimetic Reading of Jane Austen,” Contagion 11 (2004), 110-121. I have analyzed how mimesis drives Austen’s plots in two other studies: “Traipsing into the Forest: Landscapes and Rivalry in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park,” Anthropoetics 14, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2009), anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap1402/taylor.htm , and “Mansfield Park and Scandal,” Anthropoetics 16, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009), https://anthropoetics.org/journal/ap-vol-16/ap1601/1601taylor/

    [3] John Mullan canvasses beauty in Austen very usefully. See “Chapter 4: How Do Jane Austen’s Character’s Look?” What Matters in Jane Austen? (London: Bloomsbury, 2012) electronic edition.

    [4] Pride and Prejudice, Norton Critical Edition, ed. Donald Gray (New York: Norton, 2001), 85.

    [5] It is worth noting in passing, though, that Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre would later succeed in making a “plain Jane” both romantically discriminating and passionately desirable.

    [6] Ibid., 82-83.

    [7] Ibid., 15

    [8] Ibid., 130-131.

    [9] Ibid., 221 (the exchange of glances occurs literally here) and 242.

    [10] The idea of “pseudo-narcissism” is brilliantly developed in Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 367-393.

    [11] Adams, “Loving Mimesis and Girard’s ‘Scapegoat of the Text’: A Creative Reassessment of Mimetic Desire.” Violence Renounced, ed. Willard M. Swartely (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000): 277-307; Adams, personal commentary on “Loving Mimesis,” untitled and inset in Vern Neufeld Redekop’s From Violence to Blessing (Toronto: Novalis, 2002): 260-269.

    [12] See the useful review by Petra Steinmair-Pösel, “Original Sin, Grace, and Positive Mimesis,” Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, 14 (2007) 1-12. See the essay collections edited by Vern Neufeld Redekop and Thomas Ryba: René Girard and Creative Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013) and René Girard and Creative Mimesis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016).

    [13] Mansfield Park, Annotated Edition, ed. Dierdre Shauna Lynch (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2016), 82.

    [14] I explored this mimetic entanglement in “Traipsing into the Forest” (par. 34-43) and “Mansfield Park and Scandal” (par. 14-16, 25).

    [15] Sense and Sensibility, Norton Critical Edition, ed. Claudia L. Johnson (New York: Norton, 2002), 176-177.

    [16] See note 10.

    [17] Girard, A Theater of Envy (Leominster, Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2000) 106-120.

    [18] Ibid., 100-103; As You Like It, 3.5.69-70 (quoted in A Theater of Envy, 102).

    [19] Mansfield Park, 158.

    [20] Many other factors intensify Henry’s desire for Fanny, but the ball appears to bring it to a head.

    [21] Darcy admits as much the conclusion of Pride and Prejudice, 241. I have treated this misinterpretation by Darcy in “Traipsing into the Forest” (par. 6).

    [22] I.e., Henry can play-act the worthy suitor but never crosses over completely into being one.

    [23] See note 17.

    [24] See note 18.

    [25] At various times Henry, Sir Thomas (e.g., in his interview with Fanny in the east room, Mansfield Park 348), and even Edmund make this assumption about Fanny: her resistance to Henry must be an elaborate (and tiresome) display of feminine delicacy. Despite ample evidence to the contrary, many readers seem to come to a similar conclusion.

    [26] It can be noted how the three points of Girard’s mimetic triangle correspond to the objective, subjective and intersubjective aspects of beauty.

    [27] Most famously excerpted in “The Goodness of Mimetic Desire,” The Girard Reader, ed. James Williams (New York: Crossroad Herder, 1996): 62-65.

    [28] See note 11.

    [29] “Loving Mimesis” in Swartely (note 11).

    [30] Personal commentary in Redekop (note 11).

    [31] “The Perfect Mate,” written Gene Roddenberry and Reuben Leder, Star Trek: The Next Generation (Paramount Television, 1992).

    [32] Personal commentary in Redekop (Note 11): 261.

    [33] Ibid., 262.

    [34] Ibid., 263.

    [35] My objections are elaborated in an unpublished draft paper, “Rebecca Adams’ Model of ‘Loving Mimesis’: An Overview and Assessment,” uploaded to Academia (April 2019), https://www.academia.edu/38790661/Rebecca_Adams_Model_of_Loving_Mimesis_An_Overview_and_Assessment_Draft

    [36] Runaway Bride, dir. Garry Marshall (Paramount Pictures, 1999).

    [37] Personal communication, July 8, 2015.

    [38] For instance, he applies the financial analogy to Phebe in A Theater of Envy, 102.

    [39] “Periphery” and “scenic center” are terms from generative anthropology (GA). Restrictions of length prevent this analysis from incorporating GA, which is unfortunate given GA’s incisive insights into aesthetic effects and resentment, not least in relation to beauty. Among many other things, GA takes the appetitive dimension in the desired object much more seriously, and so (unlike in mimetic theory) tends less to downplay the “objective” aspects of beauty and attraction. For a superb recent treatment see Ian Dennis, “Human Beauty and Reciprocity in the Market World: A Preliminary Inquiry,” Anthropoetics 24.2 (Spring 2019) https://anthropoetics.org/journal/ap-vol-24/ap2402/2402dennis/ . See also Eric Gans’s moving study of the Hollywood icon, Carole Landis: A Most Beautiful Girl (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2008).

    [40] This is developed in “Mansfield Park and Scandal” (note 2), par. 30-41.

    [41] “What Persuasion Means in Persuasion” (note 2), 121-122.

    [42] Persuasion, A Norton Critical Edition, ed. Patricia Meyer Spacks (Norton: New York, 2013), 75.

    [43] See note 33. Again, the scandal of Fanny is explored in “Mansfield Park and Scandal,” par. 30-41.

    [44] Her cousin Tom Bertram teases her for being a “creepmouse”: Mansfield Park, 183.

    [45] Northanger Abbey, Norton Critical Edition, ed. Susan Fraiman (New York: Norton, 2004), 6.

    [46] Ibid., 6-7.

    [47] Mansfield Park, 73.

    [48] Ibid., 215-216.

    [49] Ibid., 442.

    [50] Ibid., 53.

    [51] Ibid., 87-88.

    [52] Ibid., 88.

    [53] Ibid., 234-235.

    [54] Ibid., 264-265.

    [55] Ibid., 305, emphasis mine.

    [56] Ibid. 310.

    [57] Ibid., 305.

    [58] Universal pressure to accept Henry’s proposal. My mimetic analysis of that portion of the novel is in “Mansfield Park and Scandal,” par. 30-40.

    [59] The affirming mimesis in the Fanny-Edmund relationship, which bears comparison to Adams’ Kamala and Picard, is a subject for future study.

    [60] “The Goodness of Mimetic Desire,” 64.

    [61] Adams, “Loving Mimesis,” 292.

  • Shakespeare’s Linguistic Turn in King Lear

    Richard van Oort’s Shakespeare’s Big Men: Tragedy and the Problem of Resentment affords a productive encounter between René Girard’s mimetic theory and Eric Gans’s generative anthropology, where the center/periphery structure is the model of cultural origins and subsequent organization. Lear’s abdication of the royal center precipitates a lethal mimetic vortex all along the periphery of an apocalyptic tragedy. By rigorous contrast with Hamlet, it is the king’s resentment that unleashes “a theater of envy,” where madness figures centrally, literally, as cultural meltdown (12-21).

    In his preface, van Oort states that he could have included King Lear in his analysis of five Shakespeare tragedies (Julius Caesar, Hamlet, Othello, Macbeth, Corialanus). That is what I undertake to do here, drawing from his keen insights into tragedy, which are clearly nourished by Girard’s work for all that his principal model is drawn from Gans. On occasion I will invoke the literary humanism advanced by Harold Bloom, as a foil to highlight the more coherent and cognitively productive understandings afforded by Girard and Gans.

    Hamlet is the drama of the son who seems stymied by his complex relation (which is Oedipal for too many critics) to a father and a king, his paternal namesake, murderously usurped by his uncle who marries his mother. King Lear is the drama of a father-king reduced to nothing by his two daughters. This “nothing” is a capital word in the play, betokening its nihilism for Harold Bloom: “‘nothing begets nothing’ could be the pragmatic motto of fatherhood in Lear’s play” (515).

    The symmetrical antitheses do not end here. In Hamlet, crown and queen are arrogated by a rival brother, setting the stage for the cardinal theme of revenge that for the prince, as for his admirers, is so inexplicably, inexcusably deferred. In King Lear there is no usurpation, but its thematic opposite: the aging monarch abdicates his throne in favor of his daughters, rashly declaring his intention to bequeath to them in proportion to their expressions of love for him.

    Lear‘s subplot, in which the bastard Edmund deceitfully turns his father Gloucester against his legitimate brother, Edgar, and then acquiesces to his father’s destruction, serves to underline this symmetry, indeed the very notion of symmetry itself. We can state this symmetry again in terms of the usurpation by brother against brother that goads the son to deferred revenge in Hamlet, versus a father’s resolute abdication to daughters whose “filial ingratitude” arouses the thoroughly impotent vengefulness in Lear—”I shall do such things—/What they are, yet I know not” (2.4.279-280)—that is the wellspring of his nihilating intuitions: “Is a man no more than this,” he says of the half-naked Edgar, “unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings. Come, unbutton here” (3.4.109-111). Regicide and frustrated revenge are the common denominators of the two tragedies, whose pathos in both cases springs from the agonizing postponement of reprisal. Villainy is ultimately defeated, as it is in Macbeth and Othello, but, as with these plays too, the audience derives no sense of justice restored: retribution is a violent muddle in Act 5 of Hamlet, as Bloom and Van Oort aver; Cordelia’s death in Act 5 of Lear deprives us of any consoling sense of wrongs righted, as it inspires in her mournful survivors a genuinely apocalyptic sense of devastation:

    Howl, howl, howl, howl! O, you are men of stones: Had I your tongues and eyes, I’d use them so That heaven’s vault should crack. (5.3.260-65)

    Lear’s lament prompts Kent to ask: “Is this the promised end?”  Edgar’s rejoinder—”Or the image of that horror?”—suggests their drama as a foretaste of biblical apocalypse, which Albany’s shuddering declension only confirms: “Fall and cease” (5-6).

    Bloom wants to save Shakespeare from the critical “School of Resentment” but Girard and Gans rightly see in Hamlet himself the archetype of resentment, which is the name for failed rivalry, vengeance deferred, balked reprisal: “It is no accident if the sanctity of revenge provides a perfect vehicle for all the masks of modern ressentiment,” which, Girard writes, engages “that specifically modern space where everything becomes suffused with sick revenge” (1991, 288). His remarks here find their equivalent in many of Gans’s Chronicles of Love and Resentment (e.g. nos. 9 and 290).

    His resentment is doubtless Hamlet’s appeal to Romantic writers, amongst whom we find a cult of sensitivity and intelligence, of Bloomian inwardness to be sure, that the vulgar bourgeois does not reward, but this resentment is fueled by what is often only weakly acknowledged as the callous indifference of industrialized capitalism in which there is no official patronage and no market, no monetizable use or exchange value for spiritual and esthetic experience. This is romanticism’s objection to modernity. Perhaps the majority population of academic humanists fuels its resentment by rerouting it via everything from Bloom’s genteel nostalgia for high culture to “radical critiques” of “social arrangements,” “hegemonies” etc., that Gans copiously censures on the left in his Chronicles.

    Bloom’s “Western hero of consciousness” is in fact Western theater’s first anti-hero. Foremost among Hamlet’s progeny is Dostoevsky’s underground man, with his manic-depressive musings on “the sublime and the beautiful,” interspersed with fantasies of “sick revenge” on the world’s indifference to his intelligence and sensibilities. He admits to craving “a more literary quarrel” (176) to the commonplaces that his peers are wont to exchange. Dostoyevsky’s other-obsessed narrator, self-described as an antihero at the end of his contradictory ruminations, shares with Hamlet the problem of anyone self-consciously on the periphery of imaginary or usurped centrality, who lucidly “does not even believe in himself” (van Oort 79).

    The issue joined by Girard’s and Bloom’s Shakespeare is between a sublime self and an other-centered self, between an individualism rooted in self-consciousness and a conception of the self as “interdividual,” to cite Girard’s only neologism, as it evokes our “self/other-centeredness” (1991, 133). Girard avers that we are inextricably in-between self and other; our mode of being, or non-being, our non-entity, in sum, our essential eccentricity or relationality, is constituted by mimetic desire which binds our identity to actions that others model for us:

    This is the paradox of the human self, the mysterious unity of self-centeredness and other-centeredness in all human beings. Even though the two drives go in opposite directions and can never become complementary, they are always combined and their combination binds people inextricably to one another, even as it tears them apart internally and externally. It becomes an endless source of conflicts among entire societies as well as inside each individual. (1991, 147)

    In a sense, then, the issue turns on Bloom’s assertion that Shakespeare’s “energies are not primarily social” (9). This leads us to ask why he wrote theater at all, to which Bloom’s answer is for the presentation of character, requiring a context—or a mere pretext—from which to emerge saliently and soulfully.

    At one point Bloom asserts that “Western culture, if it is to survive its current self-hatred . . . must become only more Hamlet-like. We have no equally powerful and influential image of human cognition pushed to its limits” (419). Girard’s argument about the melancholy Dane is that we have indeed become more Hamlet-like in our misgivings about revenge, if only because we are rightly terrified by our own weaponry (1991, 284), as we find ourselves in a scene in which violence itself usurps agency, occupying center stage as “king and father of all,” according to Heraclitus (fragment 60), whom Girard cites as “a clear summation of the origins of myth” (1977, 88). “Some,” the fragment continues, “it makes gods, others men, some slaves, and others free.” In his analysis of Greek tragedy, Girard identifies violence as the “true subject” of mimetic conflict. In elaborating his generative anthropology, which is an expansive articulation of Girard’s inchoate comments on language, Gans has further argued that it is resentment itself, as a deferral of violence, that opens up a space, a temporal interval, for reflection, to which we owe our greatest cultural achievements.[1]

    Between Hamlet and King Lear there appears a chasm of differences, unless we conceive them in the figure of chiasmus, as I suggested earlier, that is, as an inverted repetition. And here too, the grandiloquence of the aged king’s tirades can, like the brilliance of Hamlet’s soliloquies, blind us to the situation, the structural dynamics that occasion them. Bloom remarks that “Goneril and Regan have usurped authority” (514), but just the opposite is the case. The first scene opens with an announcement of a royal abdication, while foreshadowing the fraternal rivalry between Edgar and Edmund in Gloucester’s impolitic insistence on the latter’s bastardy to Kent. All the notoriously “falling action” of the play derives from the terms of Lear’s decision to divide his kingdom. First stated as a wish to prevent his heirs fighting over it, his fanciful pledge to divide it in proportion to the expressions of his daughters’ love for him triggers a rhetorical battle with ultimately lethal consequences. A mimetic mechanism kicks in as from a tripwire for competition.

    As Girard notes (1991, 179-83), this aberrant decision sets the stage for rivalry among the three daughters, each of whose gain can only be the others’ loss in what ultimately becomes zero/sum competition that plays out so devastatingly in the rest of the tragedy. The potential antagonisms of rival desires among nobles and heirs that the king and father is supposed to mediate from without, and sovereignly from above and beyond the sphere of contentious parties (see, for example, Richard II and van Oort on Macbeth, 134-61) are given free rein when the sovereign’s munificence is made an object of desire, where the king’s desire of their desire is set out before his children as an object of contention. The king induces the collapse of external mediation into internal mediation, the plunge from reference to a vertical authority onto the horizontal plane of mutual interference, which can only breed a contagion of internecine rivalries. To state the case in terms of generative anthropology, absent the royal center, the sisters on the periphery will go at each other, finding in the bastard Edmund an object of mutually murderous competition. As van Oort writes, “Tragedy reminds us that the convergence of desire on the object is but a hair’s breadth away from the violent disorder of the mimetic crisis” (135).

    The devil is in the details. The essentially mimetic, derivative, or decentered structure of the rivalry that is unleashed by this paternal whim is evidenced in the way that Regan can only second her sister Goneril’s hyperbolic phraseology “I find she names my very deed of love;” adding “Only she comes too short” by way of declaring herself an “enemy to all other joys” (1.1.73-75). Cordelia immediately apprehends her dilemma as the third, youngest sister, who by her very position in the family and in speaking order is the person most susceptible to mimetic behavior, as Girard observes. Her very first words, “What shall Cordelia speak? Love and be silent” (1.1.64), express a conscious reflection on the mimetic role thrust upon her, as they mirror Goneril’s words a very few lines earlier about “A love that makes breath poor and speech unable” (1.1.62). Thus Shakespeare sets language, rather than character, center stage in a way that is of interest for Gans’s originary theory of language (1981): the sisters’ ostentatious claims clearly qualify as declarative utterances but their showy rhetoric also bears an ostensive, performative stamp.

    Why does Shakespeare have Cordelia utter those words, and those only, her very first, in an aside which effectively cues the audience to her dilemma, if it is not to indicate the reflexive nature of the action of the play and to expose reflexivity—action as reaction—at the motivational core of its characters? “Cordelia’s rugged personality is something of a reaction-formation to her father’s overwhelming affection,” Bloom writes (479), whereas, quite to the contrary, what we witness in this scene is a reaction-formation to her sisters’ bombast. What counts here is not personality but positionality (Girard 1991, 182).

    Shakespeare’s conception of character is in every sense dialectical; it emerges in dialogue and it functions in relation to other characters rather in the solipsistic isolation in which it is cast by Bloom, along with most other critics. “Without Cordelia’s recalcitrance there would have been no tragedy, but then Cordelia would not have been Cordelia,” writes Bloom (485), a tautology that all but makes her, rather than her father, the cause of the mayhem. Here we have an example of the humanistic, psychological criticism that van Oort regularly and rightly warns us away from.

    I do not arrive at this mimetic view of behavior and its consequently dialectical version of character by any source that is external to the dramatic interaction in the plays themselves, which is why Girard mostly ignores the critical contributions of the Shakespearean guild, which van Oort consults abundantly in favor of Girard’s ideas (while chiding Girard in a coda to his book about claims to originality). When Girard describes the author of Troilus and Cressida as “not merely a dramatic illustrator of mimetic desire but its theoretician” (1991, 121), he is identifying literary masterpieces as a “discovery procedure,” in Gans’s terms (1997, 140); they are agents of human self-understanding rather than objects of knowledge that we need theories about. The works explain one another and us better than we can explain them when we impose our belated theories and methods on them. King Lear, for instance, can be seen as a full-blown, five-act dramatization of the crisis of difference that Ulysses analyzes in his famous speech in Troilus and Cressida (1.3) on the “neglection of degree,” of hierarchical difference, and on the “envious fever of pale and bloodless emulation,” or mimetic rivalry, that perforce ensues from it and will lead to self-destruction. It is an archetypal passage about cultural collapse often cited by Girard (1977, 51-52; 1991,160-63).

    When “degree is suffocate,” we have “disorder,” “mutiny,” and “discord” (1.3.75ff.), the very same words used by Gloucester (1.2.155ff.) to describe his troubled times and which he superstitiously attributes to celestial dislocations. For Ulysses, cosmic disorder is only a metaphor for social dissolution that occurs “when degree is shaked,” which is just what occurs when Lear steps down as arbiter of potential rivalries. “Take but degree away, untune that string,” Ulysses declares,

    And the rude son should strike his father dead; Force should be right; or rather, right and wrong, Between whose endless jar justice resides,— Should lose their names, and so justice too. Then everything includes itself in power, Power into will, will into appetite; And appetite, an universal wolf So double seconded with will and power, Must make perforce an universal prey And last eat up himself. (1.3.115-124)

    These last six verses fairly summarize King Lear. It is not the royal vacancy alone that initiates disorder, but the “envious fever of pale and bloodless emulation” that Lear infects his daughters with by the terms of him resignation.

    Shakespeare cannily hints very early on at the devastation to come when, alone together for the first time, Goneril and Regan agree to “hit together” (1.1.306), which some of our notes tells us means to “agree,” but the verb cannot fail either to mean “strike.” The sisters mean to act in concert against the old king, and they later collaborate mimetically in bidding down to zero his knightly retinue; but, with him literally left out in the cold, their blows cannot fail to strike each other. It is only little after the abdication that Goneril, bridling at the unruly behavior of the king and his knights in her palace, unwittingly enunciates the paradox of desire that will make a rival and an enemy of her sisterly accomplice in expelling the king. Ordering her servants to be discourteous to Lear, she states:

    If he distaste it, let him to my sister, Whose mind and mine I know in that are one, Not to be overruled. (1.3.15-17)

    The sisters are of one mind, a unity underlined phonemically, phono-logically, by the near rhyme of “mind” and “mine,” and by the “one” ending the line, harping on “n.” It is one mind that brings them together in degrading the king and will just as surely set them against each other thereafter. Thus ever the conflictual law of mimetic desire: 1 + 1 = 1.

    Here it is that the prophecy of Enobarbus, in Antony and Cleopatra, concerning the foredoomed alliance between Octavian and Antony, forecasts the rivalry between the two sisters: “But you shall find the band that seems to tie their friendship together will be the very strangler of their amity” (2.6.128). It is a remark that Girard takes as definitive of the double bind of mimetic desire (1998, 131-32), and Goneril’s closing words in this scene can remind us of its skewed, recursive dynamic: “I’ll write straight to my sister/ To hold my course” 1.3.26-27). That is good advice for expelling an enemy, and Regan will make good on it as well when she follows the same course as her sister for the possession of Edmund and entire rule of the kingdom. When Albany rebukes his wife, we find him repeating Ulysses’ analysis of de-gradation leading to universal predation:

    That nature which contemns its origin Cannot be bordered certain in itself; …………………………. Humanity must perforce prey on itself, Like monsters of the deep. (4.2.32-33, 49-50)

    It is no accident either, I think, that the very names of these two rival doubles are literal transpositions of each other, even more so than “Edmund” and “Edgar,” with “Regan” all but replicating “Goneril,” but for some vowel changes and an extra syllable. (I often confuse these mirror doubles myself.) By the beginning of Act 2 there is word of impending war “twixt the Dukes of Cornwall and Albany,” a fact underlined twice in Act 3 (3.1.19; 3.3.8). Civil war is the inevitable next step in the gradual degeneration of order, of which the king’s mental disorder is the psychic embodiment, the reduced model, with the storm as objective correlative. Such storms are blowing all around the world today, with a concomitant deterioration in political rhetoric, which should remind us of the prophetic vocation of literary masterpieces. More on that later.

    Holed up in a cave, a delirious Lear asks of the destitute, mad-mimicking Edgar: “‘[T]was this flesh begot/ Those pelican daughters?” to which Edgar rejoins: “Pillicock sat on Pillicock Hill. Alow, alow, loo, loo”(3.4.75-76). Edgar’s words, simulating madness, pick up only on the syllables of Lear’s “pelican,” and thereafter decline progressively into mindless phonemic repetition, as Shakespeare dramatizes the desymbolization (Girard 1977, 62) that issues from the omnivorous violence of doubles. In sum, a world of “sound and fury signifying nothing” in which words devolve into meaningless signifiers.

    When Cordelia laments Lear’s madness in Act 4, we find she has recourse to the same musical figure of the untuned string that must be wound up or rewound that we encounter in Ulysses’ speech:

    Cure this great breach in his abused nature Th’untuned and jarring senses. O, wind up Of this child-changed father. (4.7.15-17)

    In Lear’s jarring senses we may hear, too, an echo of Ulysses’ “endless jar where justice resides,” since his “Reason in madness,” as Edgar calls it, is all about thwarted justice.

    I do not say that these echoes are deliberate, but that the playwright’s immense image repertory, by which we recognize his poetic genius, are the resource for structural intuitions, for insights into the dynamics of order, of social organization and disintegration as a whole. Graham Bradshaw  makes a case for this kind of poetic thinking, which he distinguishes from the “step-by-step process of logical, discursive thought” (72), in revisiting the Renaissance notion of “concetto” as it retains connotations of “thought” or “idea,” while especially denoting a thinking in forms or images. Bradshaw quotes from Alma Altizer’s study of Renaissance rhetoric:

    A “conceit” in the later narrower sense, is an “ingenious or witty imaginative conceptual figure”; a concetto, in the older, richer sense, in “an imaginative-intuitive figure that brings together seemingly disparate images or ideas” in an act of intuition, a direct apprehension of underlying forms of experience. (73)

    Shakespeare’s conceits, his figures and images, his “quibbles” as Dr. Johnson famously labeled them, are not decorative but dynamic; they are not an adornment of thought, but his way of thinking, of developing connections and uncovering patterns that are unavailable to the conceptual language of abstract reasoning to the extent that the latter trusts in the stability of entities and concepts which for the playwright are only ever in relation, dialectical, unstable, and fragile. That does not make him any less, but, to the contrary, all the more a thinker “than,” to use Hamlet’s famous quip to Horatio, “is dreamed of in our philosophies.” The process of metaphor, as seeing one form (Achilles…) in another (…= lion), to use Aristotle’s model, is conducive to the perception of structures, continuities and likenesses, of analogies and homologies that stretch the imagination and stress the boundaries of concepts to the breaking point. Once committed to this imaging process, the opportunities for structural intuitions are vastly increased, and not least regarding institutions like monarchy—and their collapse. There are authors who think in images, and Shakespeare is clearly one of them; or to put it in Gansian terms, authors whose thinking is strategically and rhetorically scenic (2007).

    As Girard writes at the beginning of the English translation of Mensonge romantique et verité romanesque,

    Literary interpretation must be systematic because it is the continuation of literature. It should formalize implicit or already half explicit systems. To maintain that criticism will never be systematic is to maintain that it will never be real knowledge. (3)

    “Cognitively feeble” is the way the social anthropologist Ernest Gellner (cited in van Oort, 4) has characterized humanistic studies, by contrast with the rigor and precision, and the real-world predictability, iterability, and efficacy of the hard sciences. This judgment no longer applies, as van Oort shows, when we see how mimetic theory and generative anthropology draw their conclusions about human interaction and institutions from recognized masterpieces of literary realism, narrative and dramatic.

    It is van Oort’s argument that Shakespeare’s real knowledge of human subjectivity and social organization is one that deconstructs, decentralizes, and relativizes the notion of character and consciousness that Bloom, along with myriad humanists, holds up as the register of his genius. Gans’s defining or emblematic model is the circle whose more or less sacralized center convenes the ambivalent attention of those on the communal periphery; mark out any segment of the circle and you have Girardian triangles of rival subjects on the periphery as models and/or obstacles for real or imaginary objects. As van Oort shows, modernity is marked irrevocably by the stresses among those on the periphery that define the center (130). In what van Oort calls “the classic aesthetic,” the focus is on the center. Beginning with Shakespeare and all through modernity the focus is on the rivalries among those all along the periphery. Van Oort’s remark about Othello points to the historical shift from external to internal mediation. “Rather than the center defining the periphery, it is the periphery that defines the center”(130.) Thus Gansian emphasis on resentment and Girardian on envy overlap, intersect.

    Bloom’s Shakespeare is “inconceivably wise,” a phrase he draws from Emerson’s encomium of the poet in Representative Men:

    Shakespeare is as much out of the category of eminent authors, as he is out of the crowd. He is inconceivably wise; . . . For executive faculty, for creations Shakespeare is unique. (1995,40)

    Bloom’s fondness for the heresiarch of American individualism is true to form, whose proclamation of the bard’s uniqueness rivals in banality the companions of Zverkhov, the underground man’s rival for centrality, who boozily concur that “Shakespeare is immortal” (185). Unmoored from a coherent anthropology, inanities and clichés are bound to proliferate. As to the role of the crowd in social organization, Girard has shown the author of Julius Caesar to be our teacher. And we stand to learn less about ourselves by harping on Shakespeare’s uniqueness than if we appreciate the structural insights he shares with Cervantes, Molière, and Dostoevsky, inter alia.

    Claims for originality and unique interiority became the clarion call of Romanticism, with which Bloom identifies unabashedly, as he does with Hamlet, whose “inwardness is his greatest originality; the ever-growing inner self, the dream of an infinite consciousness” (416). Van Oort shows that this inwardness is plumbed over against the royal court’s fawning obeisance to Hamlet’s uncle; it is born of his resentment, hewn and hollowed out by it, as the mind’s recoil to “the law’s delay” and other contumelies.

    I think we can say the same of Lear’s “sublimity,” which Bloom finds to be “surpassing that of the biblical Solomon’s” (513), the king’s “greatness,” his “grandeur” being his “patriarchal sublimity” (478). But the wretched figure’s sublimity is not there at the outset—au contraire; it is not deployed as a property of his personality, still less of his divine election, but wells up as a consequence of his sordid rejection by his conniving daughters. What Bloom describes as the “ultimate nihilism of the play” (492), as so eloquently portrayed in its two mock trials (3.4; 4.6), is the king’s, not the play’s. Lear’s insights into the arbitrariness and fragility of the social order have nothing primordial about them; they are the Juvenalian discharge of his vengeful helplessness, his impotent rage. They are his rhetorical revenge upon the world, as he extrapolates hysterically from his own fate to our delusions of social order. And they bear on positionality, placement, rather than persons: “…see how yond justice rails upon yond simple thief. Hark, in thine ear: change places, and handy-dandy, which is the justice and which is the thief?” (4.6.153-56). “Handy-dandy” is a nice conceit, clearly implying arbitrary, merely phonemic, difference between mirror doubles.

    This is not to deny the validity of Lear’s insights—”a dog’s obeyed in office”—or to demur from Bloom’s assertion that that “there is no universal moral order” (732). Any such order is just what Ulysses’ speech belies, calling instead for an arbitrary respect of degree, of difference, in its place. But Lear’s nihilism is not Shakespearean wisdom, of which we must speak instead in terms of a thoroughly achieved realism, a coherent anthropology; van Oort argues for a “Shakespearean anthropology” (199) and I shall argue shortly for a wider, biblical scale.

    The play’s bleakest perceptions—”the worst is not/So long as we can say ‘This is the worst’” (4.7.27-28)—might encourage retreat to a sublime solitude, but they must be set off against a heartening and hopeful correction, against a vision of possible transcendence, though of a different, real-worldly kind that is unavailable in isolation or solitude. Lear’s nihilism is expressed from a point of view within the play, to borrow from Van Oort’s configuration concerning Macbeth’s “signifying nothing” (160). There is another perspective expressed from without its mimetic traumas that the old man, restored to sanity, invites us to entertain.

    When Cordelia, now captive of Edmund, seems prepared to give vent to her own well-founded resentments—”Shall we not see these daughters and these sisters?”—Lear can reprove even this daughter, with a mind fully alive to the true value of things, and giving voice to a vision of bliss, of heaven on earth, where a prison will serve as ironic sanctuary of communion against the outer world’s inanities and vainglories:

    No, no, no, no! let’s away to prison: We two alone will sing like birds i’ th’ cage: When thou dost ask me blessing, I’ll kneel down And Ask of thee forgiveness: so we’ll live, And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues Talk of court news; and we’ll talk with them too, Who loses and who wins, who’s in, and who’s out; And take upon’s the mystery of things, As if we were God’s spies:  and we’ll wear out In a walled prison, packs and sects of great ones That ebb and flow by the moon. (5.3.8-19)

    That this irenic prospect is ruined by Cordelia’s murder should not blind us to its real this-worldly sublimity, which Shakespeare can entertain because it describes in a global way his own theatrical achievement, from the courtly comedies and romances through the many violent interregna that are the scenes of his tragedies and history plays; they all exhibit the same mimetic pathologies. In this moment of “moral awakening,” to use van Oort’s phrase regarding Coriolanus (177), we find a giddy caricature of the author’s own creative euphoria. In sum, among “god’s spies” we can count Shakespeare, whereby he rejoins the optics of Israel’s prophets in their myriad satires of idolatry (e.g., Isaiah 44.9-20), their grounding in forgiveness (Isaiah 1.10-18), not to mention Ecclesiastes: “Vanity of vanity, all is vanity,”; “The race is not to the swiftest,” etc.

    Granted that this play, with its invocations to gods and Apollo and such, is emphatically cast in a pre-Christian culture, the author does not need the church’s institutional trappings to include a glimmer of its salutary vision. Van Oort reminds us that Shakespeare’s ethics and esthetics are framed by “Christian anthropology” (58, 176). That is true enough, indeed a commonplace in Shakespearean criticism, but Girard’s biblical anthropology sharpens the focus when it shows how Shakespeare sees the social world through mimetic lenses.

    Blessing and forgiveness, and prayer and song, are the deritualized speech acts of Lear’s jubilation, a vision of this-worldly transcendence as immunity to the contagion of rivalries governing society. We have no reason to disdain, deride, or underrate this vision, as its elements are among the very last notions that Shakespeare bequeathed to his stage audience, namely, in his farewell to the theater as spoken by Prospero in the epilogue to The Tempest; this farewell is uttered from a point of view from without the comedy of revenge Prospero stages for his captives. It is a text that even Bloom, for all his desire to rescue the playwright from the intellectual discredit of traditional Christianity, concedes as “recognizably Christian” (688):

    And my ending is despair, Unless I be reliev’d by prayer Which pierces so, that it assaults Mercy itself, and frees all faults. As you from crimes would pardon’d be, Let your indulgence set me free. (5.1.15-20)

    For Bloom, Prospero too is a nihilist (681), but he is so perhaps only in the sense that Jesus, who is the textual model for these last words, was for Nietzsche, who is Bloom’s mentor in nihilism, and whose Twilight of the Idols vaunts Jesus as one indifferent to the differences valued by worldly powers-to-be. The figure recalled here is the one who taught his followers to ask forgiveness of God as they forgive others. For Bloom “‘indulgence’ is audacious wit as it aligns the church’s pardon with the audience’s applause” (688). But this theme must be reconnected with the entire dynamics of the play. Prospero’s request for pardon follows upon his manifold pardon of his real-world enemies, his usurpers and would-be assassins, and this at the suggestion of Ariel, his model here, a fact that critics rarely notice.

    The conclusion of The Tempest, with its epilogue, completes an arc which was sprung from the very beginning of the play, from the first scene, where the storm evokes curses among its noble passengers, Sebastian and Antonio—”A pox o’ your throat you bawling, blasphemous, uncharitable god,” and “hang cur, hang you whoreson, insolent noisemaker”—and prayer from the seamen: “All lost! to prayers, to prayers. All lost!” (1.1.40,43,50). The symmetry of prayers and curses, which are anti-prayers, is emphatic. The violent scene of disorder, with noble passengers disrupting, usurping the work of the crew (“you mar our labor!”), ends with Gonzalo’s “Thy will above be done, but I would fain die a dry death,” a nice conceit of its own, as well as announcing the paraphrased Pater at the end.

    We can grant with Bloom that Shakespeare has no illusions about a divinely sanctioned universal moral order without conceding anything to illusions about an autonomous self or self-sustaining inwardness which might transcend it, and which King Lear, among other plays, reveals as the by-product of unresolved conflicts with others. These are conflicts to whose repentance/forgiveness solution Shakespeare more than hints at, and more than only once, as Girard argues in his chapters on the later romances. Such positive wisdom as we get from him is about reciprocity and loving exchange, not exile. His anthropology is fundamentally social and relational, and I don’t hesitate to say biblical, in the sense that I derive from the chapters on Mosaic and Pauline revelations (3 and 4) in Gans’s Science and Faith, and as confirmed by prominent exegetes of the Hebrew bible, whose God is relational through and through and all round (Birch et al, 36-37; see Goodhart for a Girardian reading of the prophets). Shakespeare’s wisdom is not “inconceivable,” as Emerson and Bloom aver; it’s just that we have no single-minded concept, such as character or personality, or psychology, to describe it accurately. So for the time being at least, absent the superb resources of his conceits, we are better off with a neologism, like Girard’s interdividuality, which nicely condenses Gans’s observation about real human (self)knowledge that “human interaction is a more fundamental category than being.” The play’s the thing after all.

    WORKS CITED

    Birch, Bruce, Brueggemann, Walter, Frethem, Terence, Frethem, David. A Theological Introduction to the Old Testament. Nashville: Abingdon. 2005.

    Bloom, Harold. Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human. New York: Riverhead. 1998.

    Bradshaw, Graham. Shakespeare’s Skepticism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. 1987.

    Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. “Notes from the Underground” in Best Short Stories of Dostoyevsky. Tr. David Magarshack. New York: Modern Library. 1962.

    Gans, Eric. The Origin of Language. CA: U of California P, 1981.

    ——-. The End of Culture: Towards a Generative Anthropology. Berkeley, CA: U of California P. 1985.

    ——-. Science and Faith: The Anthropology of Revelation.  Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield.  1990.

    ——-. “Paradoxes of Love and Resentment.” Chronicles of Love and Resentment (9, September 9, 1995). Anthropoetics: The Journal of Generative Anthropologyhttps://anthropoetics.org/chronicles/chronicle9/

    ——-. Signs of Paradox: Signs of Paradox: Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP. 1997.

    ——-. “On Looking into Branagh’s Hamlet.” Chronicles of Love and Resentment (141, June 20, 1998). Anthropoetics: The Journal of Generative Anthropology. https://anthropoetics.org/chronicles/chronicle141/

    ——-. “The New Antisemitism and the Bankruptcy of Victimary Thought.” Chronicles of Love and Resentment (290, November 1, 2003). Anthropoetics: The Journal of Generative Anthropology. https://anthropoetics.org/chronicles/chronicle290/

    ——-. The Scenic Imagination: Thinking from Hobbes to the present Day. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP. 2007

    Girard, René. Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. 1965.

    ——-. Violence and the Sacred. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. 1977.

    ——-. A Theater of Envy: William Shakespeare. New York: Oxford UP. 1991.

    ——-. “Victims, Violence, and Christianity.” The Month: A Review of Christian Thought and World Affairs.  259: 1564. April 1998.

    Goodhart, Sandor. The Prophetic Law: Essays in Judaism, Girardianism, Literary Studies, and the Ethical. Lansing, MI: Michigan State UP. 2014.

    Van Oort, Richard. Shakespeare’s Big Men: Tragedy and the Problem of Resentment. Toronto: U of Toronto P. 2016.

    *Portions of this essay have been adapted from an article published in Italian as “Shakespeare: teoria e pratica,” Studi perugini 5:10:123-146 (Spring 2002), and so without the benefit of Richard Van Oort’s luminous reading of Shakespearean tragedy incorporated herein.

    Notes

    [1] Chronicle 141, “On Looking Into Branagh’s Hamlet,” https://anthropoetics.org/chronicles/chronicle141/ .  See also The End of Culture, ch. 1.

  • Introduction to the 2019 Conference Issue

    This Fall’s issue is the first collection of essays based on papers presented at GASC 2019, “Returning to the Linguistic Turn,” to be published in Anthropoetics.

    Ben Barber’s “Immanence, Transcendence, and Interdividual Desire in Nietzsche, Bataille and Levinas” studies the philosophical roots of anti-humanist theory and philosophy’s commitment to immanence and repudiation of transcendence. Working with Girard’s notion of “interdividuality” and the understanding of transcendence generated by Gans’s originary hypothesis, Barber works through a genealogy of the reduction of sacrality to immanent totality through the privileging of violent sparagmos in Nietzsche and then Bataille. Barber concludes with a proposal for a dialogue between GA and Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of alterity.

    Andrew McKenna finds a linguistic turn in Shakespeare’s King Lear, following the mimetic crisis initiated by Lear’s resentment into linguistic doublings and meaninglessness. McKenna reminds us that understanding Shakespeare as a mimetic thinker allows a full appreciation of his accomplishment and place in Western culture while dispersing the mists created by mysticisms of “genius” like those of Harold Bloom.

    Richard van Oort’s Shakespeare’s Big Men was the inspiration for MacKenna’s return to Shakespeare, and van Oort’s essay here contains the first fruits of a new project, complementary to Big Men, dealing with Shakespeare’s comedies. Van Oort starts mapping out the “laws” of Shakespearean comedy, in “Shakespeare’s Comedies and the Constancy of Love.” Focusing on Much Ado About Nothing. Van Oort finds in the comedies a turn away from the public sphere addressed in the tragedies toward the private, economic sphere, presaging the deferral of resentment effected by the modern marketplace.

    Matthew Taylor’s “Beholding the Beholder’s Eye: Beauty and Mimetic Effects in Jane Austen” addresses what we might see as the equivalent of the materialist/idealist problem in mimetic theory. Mimesis adds to the desirability of the object, but does the object “really” remain as it is, with desire operating solely in the imagination of the subject? Or is the desired one actually transformed by the attraction of others? Taylor examines some characters in Austen’s novels and shows that, for Austen, beauty is not merely objective, with desire a superadded mimetic effect, but, rather, genuine, physical beauty can (in complex, qualified ways) be conferred upon (and appropriated by) the desired one. For Taylor, this conclusion suggests a solution to the problem of “good mimesis,” which has created difficulties for mimetic theory.

    Finally, I initiate the new book review section of Anthropoetics by reviewing C.A. Bond’s Nemesis: The Jouvenelian vs. Liberal Model of Human Orders. Perhaps it will inject new political questions into GA, especially regarding the anthropological foundations of liberal democracy.

  • Book Review: Nemesis: The Jouvenelian vs. the Liberal Model of Human Orders, by C.A. Bond

    177 pages
    Ebook $9.95
    Print: $15.95

    The way people speak about their relation and attitude toward the liberal democratic social orders most of us live under tends to be, upon reflection, odd. It seems simple enough to say something like, “I am loyal to King ____”; or “I am a faithful servant of the king”; even if we have a suitably modern, that is, resentful, disdain for such formulations, the relation between the one expressing and the one receiving that expression of fealty is clear. But it’s strange to say “I have faith in,” or “believe in,” liberal democracy. It’s even worse if we get more institutionally precise: do I “believe” in the Constitution, or the “balance of power” between executive, legislative and judicial branches? “Belief” and “faith” imply some suspension of rational, critical judgment—but isn’t that what the Enlightenment-informed liberal democracies would have us refuse to do? In the U.S., we even speak of “faith” in the “individual,”—which means what, exactly? Faith in the individual’s capacity and the likelihood of him/her/xir exercising that capacity to do what? All, individuals, all the time?

    Shouldn’t citizens of liberal democratic orders think along the following or similar lines? As adherents of the scientific method, which provides us with the only way of knowing anything about reality and acting intelligently upon it, we assume any particular social order is essentially experimental, with its effects to be regularly assessed according to scientifically constructed criteria of social and human flourishing. So far, the hypothesis that establishing institutions predicated upon the assumption that social order must be erected upon, and serve to preserve and measure, the consent of each individual to that social order, remains unfalsified. In the meantime, we not only remain open to, but actively solicit and assimilate evidence challenging this hypothesis: indeed, a central purpose of the secular social sciences that have developed alongside of liberal democracy should be to test and organize that evidence in order to continually determine whether the anomalies (relative to our ongoing reconstructions of liberal democratic political theory) they might point to can be reconciled within the existing paradigm or make it incumbent upon us to develop new, more inclusive ones.

    Needless to say, the “belief” in “consent” is one of many articles of faith of liberal democracy, rather than a hypothetical proposition to be empirically tested. But this belief is itself an anomaly in political theory, now systematically, if involuntarily, parodied by the ever shrinking micro-aggressions and lowered thresholds for “sexual assault” so central to contemporary political discourse. If one could violate the other without knowing it by, for example, reproducing markers of past violence of which the victim herself need not be aware (a third party could point it out), then “consent” is alluded to (the notion of “violation” is unintelligible without it) without the possibility of reconstructing any intentionality informing it. This suggests that the “consent” upon which the entire order hangs cannot be seen with the naked eye. I’ve already started to violate the first rule of liberal democracy, which is to not look too closely at how the concepts central to liberal democracy work, or are produced. But those of us interested in helping GA become a powerful, comprehensive mode of social thought would do well to join others in disregarding this rule, because of the flimsiness of liberal democratic thought itself, the vagueness of liberal democracy’s institutional claims and justifications and, above all, the emergence of serious critics of liberal democracy in the midst of what those critics (and how many others?) see as a crisis of this social order—a crisis best embodied in the now seemingly unassailable belief that “belief” in (“consent to”) one’s gender must be “re-affirmed” at every moment.

    A particularly important critic, C.A. Bond, who blogged for several years at Reactionary Future, has come out with a new book, Nemesis: The Jouvenelian vs. the Liberal Model of Human Orders, which synthesizes and further develops the work done on that blog. To situate Bond’s book within concerns critical to GA, I will begin by looking at the moment in his book where he explicitly refers to the originary hypothesis:

    What would an anthropology in accordance with the Jouvenelian model look like? Possible alternatives include the mimetic anthropology of René Girard and the linguistic developments made by Eric Gans, which we can briefly review.

    In the anthropology inaugurated by René Girard, the sacrificial order of society, which Jouvenel himself recognised as key to early human societal formation in the form of magical Power, is not the creation of human individuals and separate from them, but an integral part of them. In the work of Girard, the move from a pre-human society of mimetic beings to a (still fundamentally mimetic) human society was the result of a mimetic crisis. Girard’s theory is based upon the observation that humans are, therefore, inescapably mimetic. The nature of desire is such that it is not, as assumed by modern liberal anthropology, inherent to the individual and sovereign—the individual does not face society with his own desires to then be satisfied within a marketplace, but learns these desires from others. For Girard, this mimetic desire is a source of conflict and tension within societies, and it is mitigated through the act of focusing the cumulative mimetic desires of a society on a single individual who becomes a scapegoat. In the act of killing this scapegoat, the individuals become aware of both the violence towards the scapegoat blamed for this collective animosity and the dissipation of this animosity. The sacrificial scapegoat becomes at once the cause of all the society’s ills, and also its salvation from these ills. The scapegoat then becomes a sacred object.

    In the work of Eric Gans, this model is presented as an explanation for the origin of language, where the creation of the first sign, and therefore the beginning of language, results from an abortive ostensive gesture in the process of mimetic descent on (most likely) an animal which has been killed. This abortive sign is hypothesised to be a representation of the object at the centre of the group’s collective mimetic desire. In both intensely mimetically desiring the object, yet also being aware of the violence that will ensue if members of the group all descend on the object, the sign takes on a sacred nature. It is in the wake of the collective attention created by this event that language is first generated from an ostensive syntactical form which has subsequently evolved into a number of further forms, these being the imperative and then the declarative. Thus, in this scheme, language is a product of mimetic desire, is generative, and as in Girard’s account, presupposes an anthropological model implying that humanity has resulted from a process of shared attention around a centre external to any of the individuals. The human individual of modernity makes no sense within such a system, since everything from language to thought (which always occurs within a language) is premised on a mimetic relationship that is incomplete without reference to this shared external centre.

    The reader may raise issues with hypothetically entertaining such anthropological accounts, but before dismissing them we must acknowledge that these accounts present far fuller explanations of human orders, and that they provide grounds for a deeper understanding than that of the modern anthropology of atomistic individuals possessing a radical subjectivity. We can go even further and claim that this modern anthropology is not only incompatible with the Jouvenelian model, but that its development is, in actuality, explainable by the model as a side effect of the Jouvenelian conflicts which have occurred within the Western world. To this end, we shall first review the development of theories of political legitimacy and sovereignty in light of the Jouvenelian model in order to provide a context within which the individual of the modern model can be fully understood. (25-7)

    The “Jouvenelian model” Bond is referring to, and which his book is opposing to the liberal model, starts from the assumption that “there is in every society a centre of control” (24). What Bond aims to show in his book is that political reality is generated by the struggle of final power centers against intermediate power centers which interfere with the governing imperatives as determined by the final center. Familiar examples would be a medieval king contending with the nobility as he attempts to levy taxes to prosecute a war or some other project; or mid-20th century attempts on the part of America’s federal government to assimilate the recalcitrant Southern states into a fully modern, liberal order. Bond is using mimetic theory to challenge liberal individualism: for liberalism, the individual precedes society, which means that society must be explained as separate individuals joining together voluntarily. Bond, in the passage quoted here, is pointing out that, while the history of power that Bertrand de Jouvenel advanced, in particular in his On Power, according to which the power center (the monarch and then the state in modernity) increases its power relative to the “middle” by mobilizing the lower members of society against that middle, presupposes an non-individualist anthropology, Jouvenel himself continues to rely upon an individualist anthropology. Bond, in refining and strengthening the model he adopts from Jouvenel, finds it necessary to follow Jouvenel back to his own account of (“magical”) social origins and challenge that (still residually liberal) account with a more powerful one. That more powerful account is the originary hypothesis, which enables us to see how we could never think of human orders apart from some center. I would take this reference as an invitation to thinkers within GA to take on the task of questioning liberalism and theorizing outside of its terms.

    Nemesis is a relentless demolition of liberal concepts. This demolition is carried out by demonstrating, in a thoroughly documented manner, that all the concepts of liberalism—”equality,” “sovereignty,” the “individual,” “human rights,” and so on—are produced, not by moral advances, theoretical or philosophical inquiries, or “bottom-up” revolts of the oppressed, but, rather, by powerful actors within or close to the heights of state power levying powerless groups against institutions such as the Church, the aristocracy, the paternal authority of the family and, more recently, institutions maintaining law and order, education, business, dependent states, and more. Bond traces this process back to medieval Christendom, in struggles within the Church and between the Church and the early European monarchs, through transformative events like the Reformation and the French Revolution, and up to contemporary movements like Black Lives Matter. It’s probably best to focus here on the concept of the “individual,” which Bond focuses on in Chapter 4, as the origin of perceptions, thoughts and experiences. The “individual,” as Bond shows, is an especially strange concept. The entire problem of modern political theory is an essentially false one: how do separate individuals, with their own self-generated and self-legitimating desires and interests, gather together into a social and political order? The obvious observation that there could never have been a time when people were not parts of a social order seems to be disregarded. The “individual” had to be “chipped off” of the social order in which any individual is integrally embedded so as to stand alone, and Bond shows the process through which this occurred, first of all in the Protestant theology of “Sola Scriptura,” then in the epistemology and political thought of early modern thinkers like Descartes and Hobbes, and, finally, as the bearer of ever more complicated and rapidly changing “rights” in the postmodern West. Bond charts the way in which each step in this development involved one power center invoking a more discrete individual in order to break down some intermediary institution that interfered with the process of centralization desired by that power center. Even so-called “identity politics,” supposedly focused more on groups than individuals, is, Bond points out, organized through rights granted to individual members of those groups and deployed against the authority of intermediary institutions.

    We can see that the more the individual comes to be seen as separate from any social ties, and stands alone as a psychological, moral and legal subject, the more comprehensively regulated the individual is by the state. So, for example, same-sex marriage is presented as a new frontier in individual liberties and equality (liberal notions of freedom, equality and rights all depend upon liberal anthropology), while providing for more unrestrained interventions on the part of government into the ways businesses are run, the way parents can raise their children, the way adoption services can determine suitable candidates, and the ways schools can discipline and educate the children they are responsible for. It’s hard to see how one could dispute this, or that this is the case with the other rights revolutions, especially those concerning sex and race. Bond lays out a carefully documented account of why this is the case, and why these concepts and these political developments make far more sense according to the Jouvenelian model, as opposed to self-celebrating Whig histories. Once you have seen Bond’s account, say, of the way in which various state and supposedly private but actually “para-state” actors (like corporately established foundations) orchestrated the civil rights movement for what were really geo-political purposes (taking away a Soviet “talking point” in the Cold War competition for the allegiance of the newly decolonized states), you cannot “unsee” it. One awaits the Jouvenelian dissection of other sacred concepts of liberalism, in particular the “market” (which Bond briefly touches upon in his chapter on the corporation, and tangentially in his discussion of the use of money in ancient Greek democracy), and one suspects that very little of what liberal citizens and the vast majority of liberal intellectuals take for granted will be left in intact.

    If Bond’s book can induce thinkers within GA to rethink liberal concepts, the main question to be faced will be, how do we understand the concept of the Center? We assume the center of the originary scene; that this scene of ritual and distribution is eventually “usurped” by the Big Man; that the occupation of the center by a human figure continues through the ages of kingship and the gigantic ancient empires, with very few and not very successful exceptions (and perhaps only apparent exceptions) up until the emergence of modern liberalism and democracy. So, at this point, is there a social center, occupied or unoccupied? At certain points in his thinking, Eric Gans has proposed a post-Christian, which is to say post-sacrificial, omnicentric market order that would eschew any single center, perhaps most explicitly in the penultimate paragraph of Originary Thinking: “[t]he historical movement of descralization operates neither through the endless deconstruction of the originary center nor through its definitive rejection, but through its omnicentric multiplication. Even ‘decentralization’ is a dangerous term; what is required is rather the universal proliferation of centers—every human being a center” (219). It is not clear to me how much this should be taken to be prospective rather than descriptive. After all, every country on earth has a president, prime minister or king (indeed, absent such figures, there could be no “international relations”); every country has a political capital, while most have other, economic and/or cultural capitals. Is it possible to speak of an individual as his/her/xir own center without that individual being amply provided with the armor of protective rights? And is it possible to think about rights without thinking about a highly centralized state enforcing those rights? In an omnicentric order (in what sense would it be an order?), would Hamden, Connecticut, have to be as central as Washington, D.C. and New York? If omnicentrism is to accommodate asymmetries between centers, how would that be different than saying that there is a social or final center, with other centers dependent upon that one? If, in fact, there is always a center, and it is always occupied by a human, however often that human is replaced or how much resentment is encouraged towards him/her/xir, then we would have to speak of the mimetic field of desires and resentments in the contemporary world very differently than we do now.

    Bond’s book is mainly ground clearing, which is very important because there is a lot of ground to clear—it might better be called Augean stables cleaning. He provides a power analysis of the most cherished concepts of liberalism—precisely those concepts which operate effectively and serve power because they seem to be power-free. Once “individual,” “rights,” “equality,” “liberty” and the rest lose their self-evidence, many other concepts upon which the legitimation of institutions depend will be fatally compromised. We may be able to imagine a social order in which, when people hear the word “individual” made central to an argument they immediately think of what power play is being set in motion while nothing else really changes. That is, we can imagine a book like Bond’s merely ramping up the widely shared cynicism to 11: “you speak of rights because you want me to…” Bonds refers to Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique, in particular in After Virtue, of liberal morality and liberal social sciences—in its way as destructive to liberal ontology as Bond’s Jouvenelian analysis—and MacIntyre’s reconstruction of a morality that would presuppose the embeddedness of the individual in a web of social obligations, but a Jouvenelian approach would need a more sustained engagement with MacIntyre than we see here.

    Bond’s concluding discussion of future prospects for beneficial change within the existing global liberal (dis)order is appropriately tentative—Bond is well aware that he’s initiating a discussion, not concluding one. Still, these concluding reflections are interesting—Bond points to the need and the possibility, given contemporary technology, of developing spaces for social thought outside of the liberal dome to take place. He also suggests, rather provocatively given the anti-globalizing and re-localizing tendencies of much of dissident (such as alt-right) right-wing thought, that, since liberal theoretical projects of de-centralization have been the most effective means of centralization, perhaps the deeply resented processes of centralization, often called “globalism,” will have to be more positively engaged:

    [p]aradoxically, it would seem that a clear recognition and acceptance of this centrality could prove to be the more effective means by which this centralisation can be negotiated. The act of formalising the relationships currently in existence would logically lead to a reduction in the need for centralised power centres to engage in the Jouvenelian mechanism to shape a given order. With a clear recognition of the validity of this central power altering orders as necessary, the warping effect of power in all areas of existence would be better accounted for, and a more coherent and possibly non-coercive order could be instituted. (162)

    A formalist politics, which, rather than protesting against existing power relations by evoking some pre-political liberal notion of freedom or equality, simply acknowledges existing power relations and makes them formal, official, and therefore accountable, is indeed the logical conclusion of Bond’s Jouvenelian model.

    But while an acceptance of the necessity of power and hierarchy could be expected to have a pacifying effect and to make the social order more reasonable, the need to think through questions of obligations and reciprocities would not only remain, but would pose itself in new ways. Here is where an open field for developing originary moral and ethical thought lies. Morality would have to be thought of in “vertical” rather than “horizontal” terms—that is, there is no reciprocity that is not mediated by a center. Mimetic rivalry always concerns some object, however distant, abstract, or illusory it might be, and that object is always framed by some authorized way of seeking to appropriate it. If we think about resentment less in terms of sheer inequality (which doesn’t make much sense because there’s clearly no correspondence between “degrees” of inequality and “intensity” of resentment) and more in terms of the resented other’s violation of the authorized way of appropriating the desired object, then resentment always directly references some failure (perceived or real) of authority. That is, resentment is always directed towards some disregard of the center. The reconstruction of moral thought around the notion of “reciprocity,” then, would repudiate accusations of the other as desiring centrality in favor of insisting that the other fulfill the responsibilities implicit in the centrality claimed. The moral model, then, is not realized person to person, but by reference to our shared acceptance of the center upon which we model our actions.

    I hope everyone interested in GA will read Nemesis. At the very least, it will give us something new to talk about, and hopefully provide a touchstone for testing the uses and effects of liberal concepts within GA. The prevailing narrative within GA, that draws a line from the retrieval of the originary intuition of equality-on-the-scene by the Christian revelation to modern liberal democracy and market society[1], needs to be challenged. Perhaps it will withstand the challenge and emerge stronger. After all, no version of GA accepts the liberal ontology which presupposes a pre-social individual—GA tends to see liberal individualism in more Hegelian terms, as the result of an evolution whereby individuals are formed and enriched as post-sacrificial moral centers. What, exactly, sustains them as moral centers, though? How much does this conception of the individual continue to rely upon liberally derived notions of rights and equality? At any rate, taking up arguments like those advanced in Nemesis will be unavoidable if GA is to have anything to say to emerging political alignments in a world in which World War 2 and the Cold War are really over and questions of authority and political identity come to be scrutinized in increasingly unfamiliar and radical ways.

    Nemesis is published by Imperium Press, which “was founded in 2018 to supply students and laymen with works in the history of rightist thought.” Imperium has focused primarily on the republication of classic works, like Robert Filmer’s Patriarchia, Joseph de Maistre’s The Generative Principle of Political Constitutions, and Fustel de Coulanges’ The Ancient City, with contemporary introductions. I believe that Nemesis is the first new book Imperium has published, and its publication is a good sign that other contemporary writers thinking outside of liberal terms might find a home.

    Works Cited

    Gans, Eric. Science and Faith: The Anthropology of Revelation, 2nd Edition. (Aurora, CO: Noesis Press, 2015)

    ———-. Originary Thinking: Elements of Generative Anthropology. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993)

    Jouvenel, Bertrand de. On Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth (New York: Viking Press, 1949).

    MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.)

    Notes

    [1] A concise formulation of this trajectory can be seen in a footnote of Gans to Science and Faith: The Anthropology of Revelation: The modern market-system, as exemplified by contemporary “consumer society,” is a system that generates ever more elaborate means of differentiating among its members.  Although resentment is certainly not abolished, each individual is taught by the market-system to treat all others as equally unique individuals. Imperfect as it is even as an abstract model, highly differentiated consumer society (and not the uniformized utopias of socialism) is the historical realization of the decentralization of the Gospel utopia: the most moral society for the greatest number. (106)

  • Benchmarks | Abstracts | Keywords (Anthropoetics XXIV, no. 1)

    Roman Katsman is a Full Professor in the Department of Literature of the Jewish People, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. He is the author of the books The Time of Cruel Miracles: Mythopoesis in Dostoevsky and Agnon (2002), Poetics of Becoming: Dynamic Processes of Mythopoesis in Modern and Postmodern Hebrew and Slavic Literature (2005), At the Other End of Gesture: Anthropological Poetics of Gesture in Modern Hebrew Literature (2008), ‘A Small Prophecy’: Sincerity and Rhetoric in the Works of S.Y. Agnon (2013), Literature, History, Choice: The Principle of Alternative History in Literature (2013), Nostalgia for a Foreign Land: Studies in Russian-Language Literature in Israel (2016). Beginning with his article in Hebrew on GA in Agnon’s works (2001), Katsman has written on the issues of GA in almost every one of his publications in English and Hebrew. Also his new book Laughter in the Heaven: Symbols of Laughter in the Works by S.Y. Agnon that is expected in 2018 incorporates originary thinking in its method.

    Article: Crisis of the Victimary Paradigm in Contemporary Russian Literature in Israel (An applied case study of Eric Gans’s Generative Anthropology)

    Abstract: The article describes the paradigm shift that can be viewed as a constitutional characteristic of the contemporary Russophone literature in Israel: the rejection of, in Eric Gans’s terms, victimary thinking. The analysis reveals that the narrative of hero and warrior in the works of such writers as Dina Rubina, David Markish and Alex Tarn has been challenged by the narrative of aborted gesture of appropriation and return to the originary scene, the narrative that seems to become the most inherent and dominant chronotope in the works of such writers as Dennis Sobolev, Elizaveta Mikhailichenko, Yury Nesis, Yakov Shechter, and Anna Fain.

    Keywords: Russian literature, Israeli literature, Generative Anthropology, victimary thinking, violence in literature, contemporary prose

    Marina Ludwigs teaches English Literature at Stockholm University. She has a PhD in Comparative Literature from UC Irvine and has worked with, and presented papers on, both Girardian theory and Generative Anthropology. Her current interest is bringing into dialogue narratology and Generative Anthropology.

    Article: Cringing and Other Desacralizing Affects in Post-Millennial Aesthetics

    Abstract: This article argues for the emergence of a new film aesthetic that evokes and plays on the viewer’s extreme discomfort, cringing, and a feeling of awkwardness. These effects and affects build on exploiting what Generative Anthropology refers to as the scene of human communication and representation. While earlier, postmodern, experiments worked on deconstructing the narrative form, such as subverting the audience’s assumptions about the plot structure or violating the separation between the story and narrative frame, the new aesthetic, by contrast, overturns the conventions of narrative ethics. The main claim here is that some recent films deliberately disrupt narrative communication on the performative level by undermining the scene that enables it. The viewer, who is first invited to share in laughing at a person or situation, later realizes that it is he or she who is the object of the joke. What distinguishes this moment of self-recognition from other, more conventional satirical treatments that include the audience as the target of satire is the way the postmillennial staging of this moment utilizes and underscores the temporality of aesthetic response. The audience experiences a cognitive and emotional “turn”—a swing from the feeling of inclusion to that of exclusion and betrayal.  It is the temporal nature of this experience that is crucial, it is argued. By making temporality palpable, the new aesthetic strategies highlight the performativity of narrative communication, which, in turn, reveals and thematizes the scene.

    Keywords: postmodernism, postmillennialism, metamodernism, performatism, high art, low art, the cinematic narrator, rhetorical affects in film

    Richard van Oort is Professor of English at the University of Victoria. In 2014 he organized the GA conference in Victoria and in 2018 was elected to the office of President of the Generative Anthropology Society and Conference. He has published over 20 articles and is the author of two books, The End of Literature: Essays in Anthropological Aesthetics (Davies Group, 2009) and Shakespeare’s Big Men: Tragedy and the Problem of Resentment (University of Toronto Press, 2016). Links to his articles can be found here.

    Article: Sad Stories of the Death of Kings

    Abstract: This paper reviews Simon Simonse’s recently updated monograph Kings of Disaster. One of few anthropological studies documenting the scapegoating of kings among African societies, Simonse’s field work would seem to provide irrefutable evidence for René Girard’s theory of the violent origins of human social organization. I summarize the author’s argument and offer some criticisms of the underlying theory. Simonse’s account of human origin, like Girard’s before him, assumes precisely what it needs to explain, namely, the reasons why humans engage in scapegoating in the first place. These reasons cannot be reduced to a biological drive to defend the home or territory. On the contrary, they exist only within the cultural and symbolic context of the hypothetical scene of human origin. Once this fact is recognized, we are free to modify the model to include only those elements necessary for anthropological explanation.

    Keywords: Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster, rainmaker kings of central Sudan, dualism, centralism, scapegoat, René Girard, Eric Gans

    Dr. Joakim Wrethed is associate professor and senior lecturer in English Literature at Stockholm University. He primarily explores the contemporary novel in English without any particular emphasis on national boundaries. He has published on several contemporary authors, including John Banville, Margaret Atwood, Don DeLillo and Tom McCarthy. Phenomenology, epistemology, aesthetics, technology and theology are overarching themes in his scholarly work.

    Article: Suffering as the Embodiment of the Sacred in Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s “A Letter” and “Tale of the 672nd Night”

    Abstract: In Eric Gans’s theoretical framework, the sacred may be seen as a ritualised re-enactment of the inaccessibility of the appetitive object. This set-up calls attention to more formalised situations in which the separation of the profane and the sacred are upheld. Drawing on the work of C. Jason Throop, as well as Gans, the present article attempts to trace the blurring of this distinction in terms of embodied suffering in two short stories by fin de siècle author Hugo von Hofmannsthal. Throop highlights the encounter with the sacred not only in terms of an experience of a limit or a zone of the unknowable, but also as a phenomenological transformation of aspect (what Wittgenstein called “aspect-dawning”). This experiential conversion in itself obscures a clear line of demarcation between the sacred and the profane. In Throop’s words, the instants focused on are “moments in which the reality of our singularity, vulnerability, and finitude is made manifest. The seeds for such forms of phenomenological modification are also found in more mundane, profane, and everyday experiences. This includes everyday experiences of pain and suffering.” The article analyses literary manifestations of phenomenological modifications that display the suffering of the lack of adequate language as manifestations of the sacred in the fiction of Hofmannsthal. 

    Keywords: generative anthropology, sacred, embodied suffering, Gans, Throop, limits of language 

  • Shakespeare’s Heroines and the Constancy of Love

    Resentment, whose patron saint must be Iago, has many allies. Envy, jealousy, contempt, hatred, malice, cynicism: all are negative emotions and they plague Shakespeare’s protagonists. Opposed to the multiple and varied forces of negativity, however, stands the unchanging force of love. Iago says to Roderigo, “I am not what I am.” Florizel says to Perdita, “What I was, I am.” Constancy to love is an ethical principle to which Shakespeare remains remarkably faithful in his plays. If the protagonist stays true to love, as Florizel remains true to Perdita, he wins the fight against the many faces of negativity.

    The tragedies tell the story of the hero’s failure to remain true to love. Brutus ignores Portia’s pleas, Hamlet rejects Ophelia, Othello accuses Desdemona, Lear disowns Cordelia, Macbeth murders his king, and Coriolanus would burn all of Rome. Shakespeare leaves us in no doubt about the consequences of the tragic hero’s decision. He might have been saved, but in the end he fails both himself and those closest to him.

    No image is more revealing of the hero’s predicament than Hamlet in Ophelia’s grave. Hamlet’s proclamation of love is, in this context, utterly hollow. As he shrieks his love to the world, his actions demonstrate that death, not love, is on his mind. For he and Laertes are locked in a death struggle. Laertes has already declared his allegiance to death:

    To hell, allegiance! Vows, to the blackest devil!
    Conscience and grace, to the profoundest pit!
    I dare damnation. (4.5.134-6)[1]

    Allegorically, Laertes personifies revenge, and his sudden reappearance in the fourth act indicates the inversion taking place in Hamlet’s soul. Love dies and the path is cleared for revenge to range unchecked. “Laertes shall be king!” the people cry (4.5.109). It is an illogical statement until we realize that Laertes represents the kingship of Hamlet’s soul. In the graveyard, we see the ethical consequences of this insurrection. Hamlet’s avowal is to death. As John Vyvyan beautifully puts it, “A soul that makes itself the grave of love inevitably becomes the womb of hate.”[2] And the same may be said of Othello when he kneels with Iago:

    Yield up, O love, thy crown and hearted throne
    To tyrannous hate! (3.3.462-3)

    In the tragedies the hero is swept up by the forces of resentment and the consequence is death.[3] Portia, Ophelia, and Desdemona die and the protagonist’s doom cannot be stopped. Allegorically, the heroine’s death represents the extinguishing of love in the protagonist’s soul.

    Yet it might not have ended this way. The pattern need not have been one of doom to dusty death. Shakespeare wrote life-giving as well as death-dealing plays. The comedies depict a similar struggle with the forces of negativity. Here, too, the protagonist is tested and found wanting. It is clear that the story might take the same path as tragedy. But there is a crucial difference. The heroine does not die. She may die a symbolic death, which is Shakespeare’s way of indicating the fragility of the hero’s allegiance to love. The forces of negativity are strong and the threat to the protagonist’s soul constant. But in the end love prevails and resentment is overcome.

    This fundamental conflict between love and resentment may, I believe, be found in all the plays. Here, I shall try to demonstrate how Shakespeare elaborates the conflict in a single comedy.

    In Much Ado About Nothing, we see a young man searching for love. He sees the beautiful Hero and falls in love. It is not the first time Claudio noticed the girl. But to this point his mind had been occupied by war:

    I looked upon her with a soldier’s eye,
    That liked, but had a rougher task in hand
    Than to drive liking to the name of love. (1.1.286-88)

    The references to war may seem insignificant but they are not. In the tragedies, war is omnipresent. Brutus’s assassination of Caesar unleashes civil war, Hamlet’s Denmark is menaced by Fortinbras, Othello is called to fight the Turks, Macbeth’s violence is born in Scotland’s bloody civil war, Lear’s ill-conceived love test divides the nation, and Coriolanus’s unmatched contempt is a product of Rome’s fanatical military culture. In each of these cases, war has a symbolic as well as literal meaning. It portends the approaching battle within the protagonist. The witches propose to meet Macbeth “when the battle’s lost and won” (1.1.4). Their meaning, of course, is that though Macbeth wins the physical battle, he loses the battle for his soul. It is a cardinal rule with Shakespeare that when the forces of war are in the ascendance, love cannot flourish. War is the memorizing of Golgotha, a monument to the graveyard. Shakespeare never hesitates to draw on this imagery of the duel between love and war. When Claudio declares his allegiance to love at the beginning of the play, we are meant to applaud it. The hero is inexperienced and hesitant, but he is at least heading in the right direction. The shift from prose to verse underscores the seriousness of the change within Claudio:

    But now I am returned and that war thoughts
    Have left their places vacant, in their rooms
    Come thronging soft and delicate desires,
    All prompting me how fair young Hero is,
    Saying, I liked her ere I went to wars. (1.1.289-93)

    For guidance, Claudio turns to his companion, the prince Don Pedro. Who better to teach him how to love? “My liege,” he says, “Your Highness now may do me good.” The prince replies,

    My love is thine to teach. Teach it but how,
    And thou shalt see how apt it is to learn
    Any hard lesson that may do thee good. (1.1.279-81)

    “My love is thine to teach” seems to mean, “I am at your disposal, tell me how I can help.” But I think Shakespeare is drawing on Plato’s philosophy of love, as distilled through Marsilio Ficino and Baldassare Castiglione,[4] and means, quite literally, that the prince’s love has the same transcendent source as Claudio’s: “My love is also your love, teach yourself how to love this girl.” The prince is telling Claudio to look inside himself. The hero has to find that which already exists within him, if only he can discover it.

    But Claudio is unsure of himself. He has only vague ideas about what love is, ideas that he has gotten from books and romantic tales. The prince warns him against these distractions:

    Thou wilt be like a lover presently
    And tire the hearer with a book of words. (1.1.294-95)

    It is not books that Claudio should be looking to but the woman herself. That is why the prince makes the decision to break with her father and bring Hero directly to Claudio. If Claudio is to learn how to love, he must focus on the woman, not the poetry.

    Now the hero’s first test occurs. The prince woos Hero, winning both her consent and her father’s. But Claudio succumbs to Don John’s malice. He believes he’s been betrayed by the prince, who has stolen Hero from him. He swears never to trust love and declares beauty to be a witch. “Farewell therefore Hero!” (2.1.176). In a fit of petulance, the hero abandons love. Beatrice identifies Claudio’s diseased state of mind:

    The Count is neither sad, nor sick, nor merry, nor well; but civil count, civil as an orange, and something of that jealous complexion. (2.1.279-81)

    The prince intervenes to dispel the looming spectre of resentment:

    Here, Claudio, I have wooed in thy name, and fair Hero is won. I have broke with her father and his good will obtained. Name the day of marriage, and God give thee joy! (2.1.284-87)

    Claudio and Hero are betrothed. Resentment is, for the time being, banished. Love is once again in the ascendance.

    The prince now turns his attention to the second pair of lovers, Beatrice and Benedick. He successfully uncovers their love for one another, enabling them to drop the scornful façade they have created for themselves. It seems his work is done and, more or less in the middle of the play, he prepares to leave Messina. He says to Claudio:

    I do but stay till your marriage be consummate, and then go I toward Aragon. (3.2.1-2)

    But love will be tested again. As is typical in Shakespeare, the final assault occurs in the third act. Again it comes from the prince’s false brother. Don John infected Claudio’s ear in the first act, and we saw how vulnerable to resentment Claudio was. This first conflict warns us that the protagonist is weak and we are unsurprised when he fails his second test. Claudio is told that Hero is unfaithful. He witnesses an assignation that suggests the story might be true. What does he do? He shames Hero publicly on her wedding day.

    O Hero, what a Hero hadst thou been,
    If half thy outward graces had been placed
    About thy thoughts and counsels of thy heart!
    But fare thee well, most foul, most fair! Farewell,
    Thou pure impiety and impious purity!
    For thee I’ll lock up all the gates of love,
    And on my eyelids shall conjecture hang,
    To turn all beauty into thoughts of harm,
    And never shall it more be gracious. (4.1.100-108)

    The words might have been uttered by Hamlet or Othello. The scene is the equivalent of the nunnery and bordello scenes from the tragedies. Allegorically, we witness the casting out of love from the protagonist’s soul. Of course, nothing Claudio says of Hero is true, no more than Hamlet’s slander of Ophelia was true, or Othello’s of Desdemona. As so often in Shakespeare, the speaker is deceiving himself. What he thinks applies to the woman he reviles, applies with far greater accuracy to himself. It is Claudio, not Hero, who is polluting love. And it is Claudio, not Hero, who is guilty of confusing foul and fair, purity and impurity, piety and impiety.

    Love, however, can be reawakened. But first remorse and sorrow must visit Claudio. The friar proposes it be given out, falsely, that Hero has died. Claudio will hear how he has killed her with his slander and the trial of his redemption will begin.

    When he shall hear she died upon his words,
    Th’idea of her life shall sweetly creep
    Into his study of imagination,
    And every lovely organ of her life
    Shall come appareled in more precious habit,
    More moving-delicate and full of life,
    Into the eye and prospect of his soul,
    Than when she lived indeed. Then shall he mourn,
    If ever love had interest in his liver,
    And wish he had not so accused her,
    No, though he thought his accusation true. (4.1.223-33)

    Claudio must recreate Hero in his imagination. Her truth and beauty may then shine through the slander. It is an important stage in the progress of Claudio’s soul. Like Castiglione’s courtier tasked with recreating the ideal image of his beloved, Claudio must purify Hero’s image of the pollution wrought by his imperfect senses.

    Meanwhile, in the other plot line, Benedick, who has found love, stands faithfully by it. He proves himself worthy of love in four ways: first, he refuses to abandon Hero; second, he suspects Don John’s villainy; third, he counsels Leonato to accept the friar’s plan; and fourth, he swears his love to Beatrice. In a test of love, she gives him a task. He must challenge Claudio to a duel. Benedick accepts the challenge and prepares to meet Claudio.

    Looking at the scene allegorically as a test of the lover’s worthiness, we can see that one lover passes while the other fails. Claudio rejects love. And in doing so he gives in to the forces of resentment represented by Don John. Claudio, however, is not the only one to fail. Both the prince and, even more shockingly, Hero’s own father are swept up by the forces of resentment (“Let her die!” [4.1.154]). This makes Benedick’s fidelity to love all the more impressive. Benedick, who was once so contemptuous of love, is the only member of the prince’s party to remain true. The proposed duel between Benedick and Claudio is symbolic of this contrast. Benedick proves his fidelity to love by rejecting his allegiance to Claudio, a man who has proven himself unworthy of love.

    Claudio’s redemption occurs in the final act. Many find it unsatisfactory. Claudio shows no remorse when he hears of Hero’s death, and it is only when he learns of Don John’s treachery that he regrets his actions. Part of the problem, I think, lies in the compression of events. Shakespeare needed to draw his plot to a swift conclusion. We get in rapid succession: (1) the discovery of Don John’s treachery, (2) Claudio’s repentance, (3) his redemption and (4) the rebirth of love and, therefore, of his bride Hero.

    When Claudio learns that Hero is guiltless and he was deceived, he says to Leonato:

    Choose your revenge yourself;
    Impose me to what penance your invention
    Can lay upon my sin. (5.1.267-9)

    Claudio’s penance is to make public Hero’s innocence and to pay his respects to her tomb. The next morning, he must marry Hero’s cousin. “And so,” Leonato says, “dies my revenge” (5.1.287).

    If we look at the play with an eye to its allegorical structure, the ending appears much more satisfying than if we were to focus solely on the hero’s psychology. In focusing on the conflict between resentment and love, we are less apt to worry about Claudio’s motivations. Instead, the death and rebirth of Hero may be understood as an allegory of the death and rebirth of love within the protagonist. Claudio must learn to love his bride and this means that he must not be distracted by what others say about her.[5] He must trust her utterly. This is certainly a theme with Shakespeare. (“Who chooseth me must give and hazard all he has.”)

    When Claudio is betrothed to Leonato’s niece, she removes her mask. Claudio is stunned. “Another Hero!” he says. She replies,

    Nothing certainer.
    One Hero died defiled, but I do live,
    And surely as I live, I am a maid. (5.4.62-4)

    To which Leonato adds:

    blockquote>She died, my lord, but whiles her slander lived. (5.4.65)

    Hero is killed by slander. It is a symbolic death, of course. What dies is something inside the protagonist, as is made clear by Leonato’s line. As long as Claudio’s slander lives, love will be dead to him. As long as resentment rules, love cannot flourish.

    We can summarize Shakespeare’s comic pattern as follows. The pattern divides into five distinct stages that are roughly equivalent to the five acts of the play.

    Act 1. Claudio declares his love for Hero; Benedick and Beatrice, their scorn for one another.

    Act 2. The prince wins Hero for Claudio and tricks Benedick and Beatrice into recognizing the illusory nature of their scorn.

    Act 3. Don John tricks Claudio into accepting the illusion of Hero’s infidelity.

    Act 4. Claudio publicly slanders Hero who is now dead to him: “I’ll lock up all the gates of love.” Benedick avows his love for Beatrice and swears to dissociate himself from hatred: “Kill Claudio!”

    Act 5. The illusion of Hero’s infidelity is lifted, vengeance averted, penance undergone, and love restored. Hero died “but whiles her slander lived.” Now she lives to be Claudio’s “other wife”: “And when you loved, you were my other husband.”

    *     *     *

    I realize the above remarks are rather schematic. I have tried to demonstrate Shakespeare’s allegorical pattern in one comedy. I believe the pattern is worth investigating because it suggests Shakespeare’s approach to a fundamental ethical problem. How do societies deal with the problem of resentment? Were resentment to remain unchecked, it would destroy the community. Where tragedy tells the story of resentment unchecked, comedy tells the story of the defeat of resentment by love.  Many questions still need to be addressed. What are the historical conditions of romantic love? Is Shakespeare reproducing the “allegory of love” of the medieval poets?[6] And, if he is, what does he do differently from them? It would be foolhardy to attempt to answer these questions without further analysis of Shakespeare, but I hope I might be permitted some preliminary thoughts on the matter.

    Shakespeare’s early work is dominated by the romantic comedies. It appears that he was developing a fairly systematic picture of romantic love. Doubtless he was influenced by the allegorical method of the medieval poets. Love, however, is challenged by resentment, and in the tragedies of Shakespeare’s middle period resentment triumphs. In the later tragedies, however, including King Lear, Antony and Cleopatra, and Coriolanus, resentment comes very close to being defeated, and in certain plays from this period, including the tragicomedies Measure for Measure and All’s Well that Ends Well, resentment, which looked like it was heading for another victory, is defeated. John Vyvyan argues that Shakespeare’s final period, which is dominated by the romances, is a dialectical synthesis of the comedies and tragedies.[7] In the tragedies, Shakespeare explored the problem of resentment, which he then “solved” in the tragicomic experiments of the romances. I am sympathetic to Vyvyan’s general view of the matter, but I also think that his analysis of what he calls “the Shakespearean ethic” could be sharpened by an application of originary thinking.

    In the tragedies, we see the sacrifice of the “big man,” whose usurpation of the centre must be punished. In the comedies and romances, the public scene of tragedy is abandoned for the more intimate sphere of romantic love. In The Tempest, for example, Prospero defers his resentment by forgiving, rather than avenging himself on, his enemies and former persecutors. This act of forgiveness may strike us as unmotivated, until we realize that Prospero’s defeat of resentment is represented allegorically by the romance of Miranda and Ferdinand. Tragedy is averted because the scandal of Prospero’s exile, which could easily escalate into violent reprisal, takes a backseat to the “brave new world” represented by the pair of lovers. When during the play’s final scene Prospero gestures towards the couple playing chess on the inner stage,the triumph of love over resentment is explicitly represented. The former rivals for the tragic centre gather around a new intimate centre, one that models the reciprocity of romantic love rather than violent conflict.

    This opening of the scene to romantic love corresponds to an opening in the economic sphere. The early modern era was the first era to possess something resembling a free market, in which the moral equality of participants promotes the free exchange of goods and services between strangers who share no prior relationship to one another other than that of the human community itself. The asymmetry of ritual exchange gives way to the “centreless” exchange between peripheral selves. The freedom of the self stems not from the centre, accession to which leads to violence, but from the periphery, which is constituted by the reciprocity of multiple desiring selves. When Prospero breaks his staff and promises to forgo magic forever, he is abandoning the public scene and the frustrated desire that attends it. But the answer to frustrated desire is not resentment but love. Rather than being scandalized by the other’s occupation of the centre, the self learns that the asymmetry between periphery and centre is an illusion, not because the centre doesn’t exist, but because it is only one among many possible centres.

    Notes

    [1] All references to Shakespeare are to David Bevington’s The Complete Works of Shakespeare, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009).

    [2] John Vyvyan, The Shakespearean Ethic (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 2011), 44.

    [3] I have explored the tragic hero’s failure to control his resentment in Shakespeare’s Big Men: Tragedy and the Problem of Resentment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

    [4] See John Vyvyan, Shakespeare and Platonic Beauty (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 2013).

    [5] René Girard, in A Theater of Envy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), points out that Claudio is hampered by his extreme dependency on others, most notably, the prince, Don Pedro, who functions as a kind of celebrity to whom Claudio remains unhealthily attached. He cannot love Hero unless the prince endorses his choice. Hence the alacrity with which he believes the prince woos for himself. If the prince truly admires Hero (as Claudio secretly hopes), the prince will inevitably want her for himself. When it turns out that the prince wasn’t really interested in Hero, Claudio’s desire also wanes. Hence his willingness to believe in her faithlessness. Without the endorsement of the prince, she can be no better than a common stale. W. H. Auden, in Lectures on Shakespeare (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), makes a similar point when he notes that many of the characters are snobs who simply accept whatever the prince believes. Leonato, for example, is a snob because he believes the prince rather than his own daughter.

    [6] See C.S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936).

    [7] John Vyvyan, The Shakespearean Ethic.