Author: staceymeeker

  • Introduction to the 2017 Conference Issue

    This is a guest issue of Anthropoetics guest-edited by Marina Ludwigs and Elisabet Dellming, both of Stockholm University. This installment is dedicated to the 11th Annual Generative Anthropology Conference that took place on June 8-10, 2017 at Stockholm University, Sweden. We would like to thank Eric Gans and Stacey Meeker for their assistance in preparing this issue and editing the articles. We would also like to thank the English Department of Stockholm University for their support. In addition, we would like to thank The Swedish Forum for Humanities and Social Sciences as well as The Swedish Research Council for the grants they have generously provided to support our conference.

    The topic of GASC 2017 conference was “Pre-human, Human, Post-human: Generative Anthropology and Mimetic Theory in Conversation with Cognitive Studies,” which aimed to re-examine the origin of the human scene from humanistic and evolutionary angles. In reflecting this focus, the six authors featured in this issue return to the scene and illuminate it from the perspectives of Generative Anthropology, mimetic theory, phenomenology, anthropology, and film theory, writing on the subjects of myth, film, literature, and song.

    Magdalena Złocka-Dąbrowska examines the Hindu mythological narrative of Mahabharata and demonstrates that it could be identified as a primary form of narration that reflects the emergence of representation. Złocka-Dąbrowska shows that GA’s analysis of the origin of language and culture is fully applicable to mythological systems and can be used to illuminate them further.

    Bjorn Beijnon‘s paper demonstrates that cinema goers are not passive consumers of ideologies propagated by individual films but are active shapers of their cinematic experience. Using theories of Jean-Louis Baudry, Beijnon argues for the enactive approach to cinematic perception, which constructs the cinematic experience as a two-way street: while the cinema trains the viewers’ way of exploring the world and influences them ideologically, it also makes them aware of and teaches them to reflect on the ideological presuppositions that the films hold.

    Joakim Wrethed reads Tom McCarthy’s novel Remainder through the lens of Generative Anthropology and interprets the protagonist’s actions as a ritualistic reenactment of the originary scene. Wrethed shows how, by intensifying the successive reenactments and pushing the limits of representation, the protagonist aims to make the ritual “real,” but his attempts fail and lead to a collapse of representation and reification of the sacred. In the end, however, the sacred rebounds as an indestructible feature of the scene of representation.

    Elisabet Dellming conceives of the literary scene of representation as an imaginary stage on which the issues of epistemic justice and injustice can be adjudicated. Dellming analyses Penelope Fitzgerald’s novel The Blue Flower with the help of the existential phenomenology of Maurice Natanson and Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of the possible. Her analysis develops the idea of the fictive “irreal” as an alternative space where new forms of imagination-based knowledge can be constructed and lost possibilities recovered. Ultimately, the ethical aspects of literary meaning can be more fully appreciated as a result of literature’s capacity of invoking possible worlds that render justice to different kinds of knowing and knowers.

    Giles Whiteley does two things in his article. Firstly, he traces the provenance of René Girard’s familiarity with Walter Pater’s idea of “inverted rights” in relation to Shakespeare’s Richard II, demonstrating that Girard likely did not have extensive first-hand knowledge of Pater’s essay “Shakespeare’s English Kings,” but learned about it from Ernst Kantorowicz’s book The King’s Two Bodies. In the second part of his paper, Whiteley argues that Girard does not give proper credit to Pater’s astute anthropological insight regarding the inherent doubleness of the originary rite of coronation, which carries within itself the shadow of the “inverted rite” of deposition.

    Continuing his earlier line of investigation on the distinction between the tragic and melodramatic or high vs. popular art, Ian Dennis turns to the lyrics of Leonard Cohen and reads them through the lens of GA. In his paper, Dennis reflects on the growing centrality of the victimary in contemporary culture and the accompanying rise of resentment, which has been absorbed into popular culture by strategies of both imaginary appropriation of the center as well as the abolishment of sacred differences from public space. Cohen’s poetry, which comes closer to high art on the popular-high art continuum, according to Dennis, reinstates the difference between the sacred center and periphery and sustains this distance (which is a mark of high art) by means of irony and self-consciously Romantic posturing.

  • Generative Anthropology and the Mahabharata: Cognition, Narrative, Culture

    This paper will investigate connections amongst Eric Gans’s theory of Generative Anthropology (GA), cognitive studies (most of all in the area of cognitive anthropology) and the Hindu mythological narratives of the Mahabharata. We will begin by identifying the Mahabharata as primarily a form of narration, a mode of verbal representation seemingly natural to human consciousness.[1] We will assume a referential concept of narrative compatible with Gans’s idea of language as a representational system. GA concentrates on the beginnings of human language and culture and its application has been proven valid in many areas of the humanities, including analyses of literature, philosophy, art, and aesthetic and critical theory. To these the present article will add mythological systems of narrative, and in this instance, the Mahabharata.

    From the point of view of GA, where language is the source of human identification, it is worth attending to a comment of Roland Barthes who, even as he disavows any relation between narrative and reality, tends nonetheless to support Gans’s “generative” intuition. For Barthes, “What takes place in a narrative is from a referential (reality) point of view literally nothing; ‘what happens’ is language alone, the adventure of language, unceasing celebration of its coming.”[2] Here, in his own way, Barthes anticipates Gans’s scene of language origin, a scene of becoming through representation. And “any theory or logic of representation,” including that proposed by GA, Gans stresses, even if it is subject to objective ideal laws,[3] is still “wholly dependent on the human experience of representation.”[4]

    In the present context we will suppose that mythological transfers should be considered as narrative and representational at the same time. Such a view will be taken with regard to the Mahabharata, one of the two main Hindu epic poems, a derivative secondary work created and collected for centuries, and traditionally categorized as smriti.[5] This term has multiple meanings, and may be presented as “that which is remembered,” but also “remembrance, reminiscence, thinking of or upon, calling to mind,” or simply “memory”[6]—all of which directly point us towards the cognitive sphere. Due to its function in the smriti tradition, the Mahabharata transmits or transfers sacred and culturally important human ideas embodied in myths and may even be viewed as the source of a metaphysics of narrative communication. [7] GA, speaking about the source of the sign and the appearance of language, turns us to this dimension, as well. The sign, language, and narrative, which are indissolubly combined, in the end express something more than an easily explained reality. That is why the Mahabharata could be described as an attenuated form of the sacred, transcendence and meaning included in its various scenes of representation, whose metaphysical connotations are legible through GA. We may radically claim, then, that the transfers of this mythological narrative are “a sign of the power of metaphysical faith”[8] accumulated in such texts.

    Narrative communication is fundamentally or firstly deferral, the central conceptual category of GA. At the same time, GA can be understood as an original human science which enables the analysis of diverse mythical transmissions, [9] whose cognitive dimension I have previously discussed.[10] Mythological narrative may be viewed as a form of representation which in the first place demonstrates a wide spectrum of differentiated human desires, the counterparts of natural appetites, which in the whole process of representation of multiple scenes of origin become a mechanism for the deferral of violence.[11]

    Our point of reference will be both popular translations of Mahabharata from Sanskrit into English, and interpretations of its original Sanskrit songs in some selected analyses by Georges Dumézil. This is one way to extend the being of mythical narrative by taking it out of the shadow of the past and moving it into the present moment. We will perform an ”interpretation,”[12] ”transference” and ”transposition” from one discursive dimension (as GA is) to another (cognition and mythology) . We will try to find some convergences between GA and the cognition of Mahabharata’s civilization, not forgetting, however, that a narrative poem or epic from the distant past, as is the case for the Mahabharata, is always in a phase of continual creation, and that we are constituting a specific point of reference in choosing from the shortened, elaborated versions appearing today in a variety of publications.[13] These versions have transformed the old texts, expressing them in a banal interpretative mode, and combining with the hundreds of active commentaries on the Mahabharata’s stories that have mainly proliferated over the Internet.

    Firstly we will apply the rule known as “Ockham’s razor,” which prefers to solve problems using the simplest or fewest explanatory assumptions. I am going to elaborate an idea of the Mahabharata as a narrative which responds to the concepts of GA, but in two dimensions. The first dimension would be to see the Mahabharata as what could be called an anthropological manifestation of “Writing Culture,”[14] which in this case means its transformed, perfected version of “Written Culture” and a final consequence of the scene of origin. The second dimension involves what is called “Reading Culture,”[15] and uses GA as a method of analysing human thought. In this case, the mythical epic is understood as expressing human self-consciousness through language and narrative, and acting to ensure that violence is at least temporarily averted.

    To current, especially postmodern anthropology, which rejects all theoretical truths, propositions and theses about the completeness of culture studies,[16] the Mahabharata as an interpretative challenge for GA is surely problematic. Nevertheless, this text is full of deeper meanings, many dimensions, different layers and “undetermined places,”[17] which we might hope to demonstrate will respond to GA’s explanatory apparatus.

    I want to argue that the wide spectrum of GA and especially its concept of the scene of origin and its elaboration of that scene’s appearance and effect is, to use Leibnitz’ expression, an alphabetum cogitationum humanorum,[18] a companion to cognitive anthropology. GA’s scene of origin, understood as a singular episode and a precondition of culture, is replicated as well in the text of the Mahabharata’s myths.[19] Gans says that “the function of any hypothesis of the origin of man, including those that are traditionally called myths, is not to transform into a fictitious event something that was necessarily a gradual process, but, on the contrary, to present a plausible reconstruction of what must have occurred as an event.”[20] Gans sees the relation between origin and myth as what I read as a fundamental knowledge about the world, a knowledge also coded into the Hindu epic and based on something parallel to what we might call cognitive or mental files.[21]

    Traditionally, cognitive anthropology has placed itself in the realm of the social sciences, but like semantics, it is essentially a search for the meaning manifested in the presence of language and culture.[22] It deals with questions about the sense of other people’s cultural representations, sometimes collected in a shape of great narratives, whose common denominator is constituted in their existence as meanings. What I apply myself to in this paper, using GA, is the question of the deep layer of sense in the Mahabharata, indeed its extended and its continuous representation of meaning, not only a simple, multi-year narrative but also a huge meta-narration, a linked and unlimited sequence of micro-narrations. It is necessary to presume that without a narration in the form of linguistic, pictorial or sound signs the human world was not and is not able to manifest its being: being in the already existing state but also being in the process of constant expression of oneself.

    And so also the Mahabharata as a narration constitutes a project continually under construction, something already made and being made at present, through a constant process of inscription.[23] Let us then read the Mahabharata as a process of narrative textualization, which most of all is embodying culture as written, less locatable in space and time,[24] but nonetheless stable in its generative, grammatological being,[25] understood as epistemological and ontological at the same time.[26] Thus the Mahabharata, as epistemological evidence, a form of culture in the shape of large Hindu epic, could be understood as:

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  • a self-protective, instinctive narration representing a cognition of the human world that could be decoded by means of Generative Anthropology, and which simultaneously constitutes
  • the evocation of a possible world or reality already known to us[27] from the past.
  • It may be useful for us in this context to consider the understanding of cognitive anthropology developed by Ward Goodenough, who sees culture mainly as ideas, concepts, and knowledge, but also beliefs and values, which exist in the minds of individuals in society. This concept of culture relates to the order of reality or the reality of the ideational, where culture (amongst its other purposes) is used to support social orientation processes. Culture of course also involves the formulation of ideas, classifications, and interpretations of social behavior, and establishes certain patterns for behavior and indeed a veritable ”grammar of social behavior,”[28] all of which we find in mythological writings in almost limitless supply. Goodenough also sees culture as a source of guidance for appropriate behavior as well as an interpreter of the behavior of others in the society it governs.[29] At the core of culture is an accumulation of human knowledge,[30] and in particular knowledge concerning social conduct. Such knowledge becomes, that is, a control mechanism for human behavior. Coming back to GA, we may suppose that a parallel function is coeval with the appearance of the scene of origin. In the originary scene, through the emission of a memorable sign to avoid or defer impending human violence, the first cultural activity also responds to human social nature, and also becomes an expression and means of preservation of human knowledge for the purposes of protecting the social body. So the human knowledge which effects the creation of the sign could be called a generative knowledge, which facilitates the peaceful ongoing existence of human society. We find many examples of such knowledge being transferred through time in the Mahabharata, whose narrations build and represent social cognition about potential human violence. Indeed, a theory of deferral itself, in the sense that GA means it, is arguably embodied in the text of the Mahabharata.

    In his cognitive anthropology, Goodenough conceptualizes the order of phenomena and the order of ideals.[31] The latter we may discover in the principle of the deferral of violence dramatized in the Mahabharata’s extended narrative sequences. This ideological order is the basic norm of humanity, identical with the constant language-culture domination whose “defending” function against ubiquitous violence is primordial. The phenomenal order, in turn, is visible in the mass of individual episodes collected in the epic, including those in elaborated and transformed versions.

    The Mahabharata’s past, present and ongoing narrative meta-transmission and meta-transition of the events, and figures and patterns of human behaviour, seen in the light of postmodern intellectual trends, should modify our view of the classical epics, especially if we recall Jean-François Lyotard’s cautionary view of “grand narratives” or “master narratives.”[32] The Mahabharata, however, even equipped as we have been arguing with knowledge about the nature of the world, could instead be called a “huge, mythical story,” containing in turn an array of privileged, so-called “small stories.” Here we may take an approach that has already been abandoned in the ostensible “forefront” and “cutting edge” of anthropological research. This is to see the Mahabharata as a collection of mimetic micro and macro transfers, which represent human culture and its cognition in a long series of causes and effects that can be seen from the perspective provided by GA.

    Both GA as a theory and the Mahabharata as an epic, traditionally regarded by Hindus as a text about moral law and a history,[33] contain a collection of components of universal and global significance. Early Indologists generally failed to find a coherent structure in the epic.  Herman Oldenberg, for example, despite crediting the original poem with an immense “tragic force,” judged the full text to be a “horrible chaos.”[34] Moritz Winternitz imagined that “only unpoetical theologists and clumsy scribes” could have lumped the parts of disparate origin into such an “unordered whole.”[35] This view continues to prevail in our times. Essentially the Mahabharata—a long-lasting narrative discourse, mainly created and elaborated several thousand years ago—is ever being continued in permanently new translations, commentaries and discussions, all being different formulations of what I will try to demonstrate is the same originary hypothesis.[36] The contemporary presence of the Mahabharata on the internet may still be thought of as a realm of Hindu culture, but its components are universal and perform a sequence of “never-ending” cultural narratives, developed by different authors, telling different tales. Taken together, this constitutes a cultural phenomenon that, using Gans’s words, requires explanation.[37] We may paraphrase radically Jacques Derrida’s formulation ”There is nothing outside the text,”[38] saying that on the level of understanding, ”there is nothing of GA outside of the Mahabharata.” We may also go further and say that Gans, who redirected the theory of language and culture from surface descriptions to a generative and transformational basis, gives the explanation that can be combined with Paul Ricoeur’s statement that myth “has meaning as a narrative of origins,”[39] which in our case means a narrative of a specific scene of origin.

    The Mahabharata as “written culture” consists of texts understood, again using Ricoeur’s words, as “a set of utterances fixed by writing,”[40] but it mainly describes actions where the “reading” of that action reminds its reader of the reading of a text.[41] As a text inscribed in the Hindu smriti tradition, it could be also understood as a hypertext linked to other texts, rooted in the older shruti tradition.[42] In a broader sense, the smriti tradition includes, among others, the Vedangas, the puranas, and the metrical dharmasastras[43] and could hardly be disconnected from the past: it correlates and follows its predecessor, the shruti tradition.

    All this means that shruti and smriti texts are determined by the same cognitive system of which they form a part. This united tradition creates a sphere of intertextuality which also existed in the past,[44] where, however it was expressed by different technical means, corresponding to and meeting the needs of the epoch. An intertextual tradition has been continued in sequences of ever-emerging stories, up to the present day. This tradition is of constant commentary on and commemoration of both texture and episodes, and may be thought of as an aspect of the process of absorbing the world through consciousness-creating cultural cognition. This way the Mahabharata as an effect which we have today, may be viewed as a huge narrative inter-text, a hyper-text and a hyper-narration, which represents a hyper-cognition of the culture it is related to.

    The Mahabharata’s texts comprise a suite of events, tracing the adventures of heroes and gods and explaining their problems,[45] but most of all comprising a global story of the Bhārata dynasty, containing numerous series of actions in multi-faceted forms. Thus the epic becomes a manifest of knowledge about the nature of the human world or even more, as Hayden White claims, a way to impart sense to the world and life.[46] We may moreover see the Mahabharata as what F.W. Schelling in his Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation calls a “mythological consciousness,” which we may suppose corresponds most of all to what GA calls ”originary thinking” about consciousness and representation.

    From the point of view of contemporary anthropology, which divides its history into material and mental periods, the perspective described above recalls in fact the “first cognitive revolution” and the transition from “behaviourism” to “mentalism.”[47] In my understanding, the unity of these two dimensions constitutes the basis of Generative Anthropology. Applied to mythical epics, GA has the potential to unite behavioural and semantic analyses and rediscover the relation between the contents of the epics describing human behaviour and their more fundamental meanings. In other words, the content of the epic allows it to demonstrate rudimentary forms of the kinds of behavioural rules which could be explained by GA. Among those behavioural rules we find the human capacity for the sudden “production” of a sign, as an expression of the cognitive comprehension of the means of deferring and avoiding violence. This we could term an example of the epic’s generative cognition.

    This last statement leads us directly to Gans’s theory of myth in the origin of cultural representation,[48] as it develops from the human scene of origin.[49] The Mahabharata’s mythical narrations contain their own dramatic scenes, their own dramatic structure, their own mythical scenarios passed on for ages from one generation to another, in long-term transfers of generative scenes. These transfers carry an idea of the deferral of violence, a message for all societies of all times, as a ”heads-up” of a possible destruction of the world. The scene of origin in the epic thus attracts a reverent attention and manifests mythical consciousness. It is worth recalling Ricœur’s idea that the mythical consciousness in primary civilizations is almost the same everywhere[50] and represents “traditional narration” by which man “understands himself in this world.”[51]

    This form of myth as a traditional narration is present in the Mahabharata. Again, such a text could be understood as reflecting a universal mental state and as a cultural code defining the most basic actions of human beings,[52] and thus as a dual-functioned instrument which simultaneously describes and creates reality.

    Let us now move to the Mahabharata itself and demonstrate how some of its micro-stories exemplify references to the narrative scene of origin. These stories tend to confirm Gans’s interpretation of human culture in a generative spectrum, which could also have invaluable meaning for contemporary human experience and maybe even for futurist studies, to the extent that such studies concern themselves with peaceful human co-existence.[53]Already in the first sentences of the Book One, Adi Parva (“Book of the Beginning”) Section I, we find accumulated legends concerning the hypothetical but traditionally recognized author (Vyas) and also a first legendary recitation of the poem, which begins as follows:

    Om! Having bowed down to Narayana and Nara, the most exalted male being, and also to the goddess Saraswati, must the word Jaya be uttered.[54]

    I would like to draw attention to some components of this first part of the Mahabharata, where its very first sentence starts with the famous sound ”Om,” the mystical religious sacred syllable. This sound we may take as a precondition of the sign, which according to Gans’s explanation may represent an ostensive, ”intentional act of signification which calls attention to the presence, in principle verifiable, of their referent.”[55] In other words, it may be understood as an articulated, intentional sign, establishing human presence and signifying or performing ”deferral” in what Gans terms an ”intersubjective communication situation.”[56] The second sentence confirms the production of intersubjective communication by the utterance of the word Jaya, which initiates the narration.

    The next lines of Adi Parva give us the following scene:

    Ugrasrava, the son of Lomaharshana, surnamed Sauti, well-versed in the Puranas, bending with humility, one day approached the great sages of rigid vows, sitting at their ease, who had attended the twelve years’ sacrifice of Saunaka, surnamed Kulapati, in the forest of Naimisha. Those ascetics, wishing to hear his wonderful narrations, presently began to address him who had thus arrived at that recluse abode of the inhabitants of the forest of Naimisha. Having been entertained with due respect by those holy men, he saluted those Munis (sages) with joined palms, even all of them, and inquired about the progress of their asceticism. Then all the ascetics being again seated, the son of Lomaharshana humbly occupied the seat that was assigned to him. Seeing that he was comfortably seated, and recovered from fatigue, one of the Rishis beginning the conversation, asked him, ‘Whence comest thou, O lotus-eyed Sauti, and where hast thou spent the time? Tell me, who ask thee, in detail.’ Accomplished in speech, Sauti, thus questioned, gave in the midst of that big assemblage of contemplative Munis a full and proper answer in words consonant with their mode of life.[57]

    This part of Adi Parva demonstrates the expectation of the great sages to hear Ugrasrava, a main character of this episode, describe his life experiences. The scene, after presenting the name and surname of Lomaharshan’s son, starts by informing us that he is proficient in the Puranas, a source of narratives basic to the Mahabharata. The particular Puranas mentioned in this text demonstrate the line of transmission of traditional smriti narration into the Mahabharata, which prolonged and continued it. However, the center of the scene is the wait for the words of Lomaharsha’s son, in courtesy and respect, by the elders of the Rishis, as tradition demands. Great sages, sitting in a circle, are waiting for something very important, for that which will happen soon. They await the narration, which will commence with Ugrasava’s words. The whole assembly is focused on a narrative moment, on a narrative scene, on a scene of origin, a central generative event expressed in Ugrasava’s answer in words comprehensible to the Rishis.

    The events from the first book of the Mahabharata happen simultaneously on the human or terrestrial, and the divine or eternal levels. These levels co-relate, and influence each other. From the text we learn that gods and demons are in a state of eternal struggle; however, they need each other to obtain an elixir of immortality, even though the demons are mostly preoccupied with the lust of material goods and power. Still, the demons take part in religious observances, even as they aim to win power over the world and satisfy their “insatiable appetites.” Gans says that “in myth, each element of the story realizes desire that explains some aspect of social reality.”[58] Desire and its possible consequence—violence in various forms—are the Mahabharata’s dominant themes. Separate episodes show the power of destruction of human kingdoms through the uncontrolled lust of their kings. But there also appears a process of control: religious rituals and a path of law, understood as a way of dharma, which demands the renunciation and relinquishment—to use Gans’s terms—of those objects of desire,[59] “the chief battleground of modern thought,”[60] and indeed, of human existence.

    As do all great mythical narratives, the Mahabharata, even in its earliest sections, moves to memories of this eschatological war, an event, like many others, changed into a recited story where we find the originary scene. There, violence typically takes its prime position, most of all in the recollection of war, but it is preceded by a series of smaller but equally violent episodes, in micro-mythical stories, including a story about a dog, the son of Sarama, a bitch that is a messenger of Indra, the king of gods. We read that the son of the bitch dog was beaten brutally by three brothers of King Janamejaja and that the dog was beaten even though it hadn’t approached the sacrificial animal.[61] Then the dog’s mother Sarama says: my son was beaten, even though he hasn’t approached the sacrificial animal, or even licked it yet.

    This event constitutes the first example of violence in the first part of the epic. But the nature of this presence is special. Violence hasn’t appeared as a result of resentment or as a result of the violation of a ban, in this case the ban on touching or eating a sacrificial animal. It is said that the dog hasn’t even licked it. So the dog didn’t break the law or commit a crime; however, the violence has already appeared. The threat of violence, a cognition of violence, appear first, before anything else happened and appear indeed at the origin of the whole story, in the very first part, in its first lines. But let us note what happens afterward. Sarama says “Oh king! You allowed my son to be beaten, though he didn’t do anything wrong, so let a blow happen to you for no reason.”[62] This means that the dog’s mother, angry Sarama, puts a curse on King Janamejaja, making a gesture of resentment. Her words constitute an overt expression of violent resentment, yet their deep mental sense refers not to violence but to its deferral. Making a curse is to substitute speech for violence, to prevent an act of violence by speech, a version of the fundamental event of the scene of origin.

    We may evoke here Gans’s scene of origin in its classical / modeled version, from The Origin of Language and The End of Culture and further developed in The Scenic Imagination. The Mahabharata’s first, deeply significant story is told during a sacrificial ritual of King Janamejaja, a descendent of the Pandava line, who survived the apocalyptic war thanks to Krishna. As we already know, from the mimetic theory of René Girard and Gans’s Generative Anthropology, a sacrificial ritual substitutes for the shared feast or sparagmos and is central to human culture. On the battlefield of Kurukshetra, where our dog has appeared, the sacrificial ritual had already been performed. The community is gathered together on this field and surrounds the sacrificial object, a substitute for an object of desire. The community is concentrated on the object with all its lust. At the potential threat towards the sacrificial object posed by the bitch Sarama’s son, there appears the first moment of violence. Sarama does not respond further than by putting a curse on the king. She first of all speaks, albeit angrily. She doesn’t bite the king’s brothers, or even consume pieces of their torn bodies the way an animal, a dog might do, but speaks, puts a curse on King Janamejaja. Her resentment is changed into an oral utterance, into a curse which introduces (constitutes/establishes/determines) a narration instead of an act of revenge. Sarama also “follows a path of Truth,” and her name is to be understood as signifying both the ”Heavenly dog” and “Speech.”[63]

    So in the very first part of the Mahabharata we have a narration in the form of a curse, representing a deferral of violence, and the generative, anthropological beginnings of culture, much as Eric Gans has hypothesized human beginnings. “This mass of poetry,” says Dumézil, ”is an encyclopaedia, where the inherited mythical knowledge of the past becomes available for use.”[64] What we may develop and add here is the observation that the highest law of the Mahabharata seems to be to avoid needless violence and cruelty, atrocities which, paradoxically, are abundantly present in the epic.[65]

    As we can see, the Mahabharata refers to those times which are “always known and never forgotten” and may be viewed as exhibiting the universal pattern of all human existence, of the beginning of all beginnings of gods and humans, on both terrestrial and celestial levels. Participants in this theatrum maximum depict experiences which to a surprisingly explicit degree imitate and reconstruct a generative moment of language and culture where, according to Gans, “language and culture emerge not simply as products of our superior intelligence but with the explicit function of momentarily preventing or deferring an outbreak of violence.”[66]

    In the Mahabharata we may find more examples which correspond to many categories distinguished by Generative Anthropology: objects of desire, rivalry, resentment, sparagmos—all related to different forms of violence and its deferral. Among the many objects of desire present in the Mahabharata’s labyrinth, pride of place belongs to the central one, the realm over which the Pandava brothers and Kaurava want to rule. It concentrates all the discourse of the epic—a kingdom being an object of the rivalry to be won through the war of Kurukshetra, the most important event in the narrative. If we take the Mahabharata as a single, huge speaking scene or even sign, then following Gans’s idea we may say that it constitutes an example of the “use of representation”[67] to defer potential violence (in this case war) over a central object, a kingdom, and the possession of power over that kingdom. Moreover, this great scene or sign both shows and is a mechanism for the deferral of violence, being a global message to humanity concerning or modelling the means of preventing, at least for a time, our general destruction. So, it is not violence itself that determines the importance of the Mahabharata, although the story offers a limitless number of violent actions. It is the deferral of violence which establishes its position and significance in human cultural history.

    The Mahabharata contains a collection of knowledge of past societies, transmitted to future societies for the preservation of Being, where Being is “to be of culture,” meaning the protection of existence facilitated on a cognitive level. Gans’s narrative of a first sign developing into a collection of signs and culminating in writing, often in detailed narratives, suggests a “recognition of the importance of writing,”[68] as Alan Barnard puts it, of which the Mahabharata constitutes an example. Whether we like it or not, the Mahabharata returns us to the foundations of cultural world, where we cannot escape from Gans’s perspective, which unites differentiated areas of reflective knowledge. We don’t have to speak about social, ideological, mythical or historical distinctions.[69] They are united in the Mahabharata into a single generative vision based on cognitive rules.

    Perhaps we may conclude by referring to the ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel,[70] whose fundamental cognitive inquiry we may paraphrase for our own purposes as: ”What do you mean, Mahabharata? What is your message?” To which we may answer that the Mahabharata means that a narrative chain, which substitutes and defers violence, is essential for the human and for human culture. It also means that already in one of the oldest Sanskrit epic texts, the rule of scenic logic is present and preserved. It also means that fundamental knowledge about the world is even here contained in terms compatible with those formulated in GA, expressing itself in bundles of mental files which, taken together, code the crucial universal human project: the deferral of violence through representation.

    * * *

    Anthropoetics would like to thank Ian Dennis for his help in the preparation of this article.

    Notes

    [1] See: Hayden White, “The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory”: Jean-François Lyotard. Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, ed. By Victor E. Taylor, Gregg Lambert, Volume II, Routledge, London New York 2006 p. 504.

    [2] Ibid, p. 514.

    [3] Eric Gans, The End of Culture, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, p. 67.

    [4] Ibidem, p. 66. Emphasis added.

    [5] Smriti (Sanskrit: स्मृति,IASTSmṛti), See, Monier-Williams’ Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany.

    [6] Monier-Williams’ Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany.

    [7] Hayden White, “The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory”: Jean-François Lyotard. Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, ed. By Victor E. Taylor, Gregg Lambert, Volume II, Routledge, London , New York 2006, p. 524.

    [8] Ibidem, p. 66.

    [9] So far I have analyzed some examples from the Scandinavian mythical tradition of The Prose Edda of Snorri Sturluson. See : Magdalena Złocka-Dąbrowska, “Cratos as Cognition: Gans and Dumézil in Dialog on Language and Violence”, Anthropoetics XXII, no.1, Fall 2016.

    [10] Ibidem.

    [11] Eric Gans, The End of Culture, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, p. 70.

    [12] Hayden White, op. cit., p. 524.

    [13]  Listed below are examples of the prose translations of the Mahabharata from English into Polish, in adapted versions, published in recent years:

    Mahabharata : największy epos świata/ [adapt.] Krishna Dharma ; tłumaczenie z j. angielskiego, Iwona Szuwalska, Wydawnictwo Purana, Wrocław, Lubotynia , 2014. Mahabharata. Ks. 1, Adi Parva (w jedenastu opowieściach). Ks.2, Sabha Parva (w pięciu opowieściach), opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska ; napisane na podstawie Mahābhārata, 1. The Book of the Beginning, 2. The Book of the Assembly Hall, w ang. tłum. z sanskrytu J. A. B. van Buitenen, The Lintons’ Video Press, New Haven, 2007, Mahabharata Ks.3, Vana Parva ( w dwudziestu dwóch opowieściach), opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska ; napisane na podstawie Mahābhārata, 3. The Book of the Forest, w ang. tłum. z sanskrytu J. A. B. van Buitenen, The Lintons’ Video Press, New Haven CT, 2007, Mahabharata. Ks. 4, Virata Parva (w sześciu opowieściach). Ks. 5, Udyoga Parva (w osiemnastu opowieściach) opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska ; napisane na podstawie Mahābhārata, 4. The Book of the Virāta, 2. The Book of the Effort, w ang. tł. z sanskrytu J. A. B. van Buitenen, The Lintons’ Video Press, New Naven, 2009, Mahabhata. Ks. 6, Bhiszma Parva ( w czternastu opowieściach, Ks. 7, Drona Parva ( w czternastu opowieściach) opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska ; napisane na podst. Mahābhārata, w ang. tłum. z sanskrytu, The Lintons’ Video Press, New Haven CT, 2010. Mahabharata. Ks. 8, Karna Parva (w siedmiu opowieściach). Ks. 9, Śalja Parva (w sześciu opowieściach). Ks. 10, Sauptika Parva (w dwóch opowieściach), Ks. 11, Stree Parva (w trzech opowieściach) opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska; napisane na podst. Mahābhārata, w ang tł. z sanskrytu,The Lintons’ Video Press, New Haven CT, 2011. Mahabharata. Ks. 12, Santi Parva. Cz. 1 (w trzydziestu pięciu opowieściach) / opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska, The Lintons’ Video Press, New Haven CT, 2012. Mahabharata. Ks. 12, Santi Parva. Cz. 2 i 3, Mokszadharma Parva : o drodze do Wyzwolenia : (w pięćdziesięciu czterech opowieściach) / opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska, The Lintons’ Video Press New Haven CT, 2015.

    [14] See: Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, ed. by James Clifford and George Marcuse, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1986.

    [15] See: Reading Culture, Contexts for Critical Reading and Writing, ed. by Diana George & John Tribune, Harper-Collins, New York 1992 ; Burszta Wojciech, Czytanie kultury: pięć szkiców, Instytut Etnologii i Antropologii Kulturowej UAM, Poznań 1996.

    [16] Barnard Alan, History and Theory in Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 168.

    [17] See: Roman Ingarden, O dziele literackim, przeł. Maria Turowicz, PWN, Warszawa 1960.

    [18] Anna Wierzbicka, Język- umysł-kultura, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1999, p. 6.

    [19] Not forgetting the myths of other cultures as well as collections of other myths of Hindu civilization, for example the Ramayana.

    [20] Eric Gans, Science and Faith. The Anthropology of Revelation, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1990, p. 10.

    [21] Rachel Goodman, “Cognitivism, Significance and Singular Thought,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 263, April 2017, p. 236.

    [22] Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics, Culture and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1992, p. 355.

    [23] Kim Fortune, “Foreword to the 25th Anniversary Edition”: Writing Culture. Op. cit., p. vii.

    [24] Indologists and linguists conduct constant discussions on dating and authorship of the Mahabharata. See: Georges Dumézil, Mythe et épopée I, II, III, Quatro, Gallimard, Paris 1995, p. 61.

    [25] Kim Fortune, “Foreword to the 25th Anniversary Edition” [in]: Writing Culture. Op., cit., p. viii.

    [26] R. Radhakrishnan, History, The Human and The World Between, Duke University Press, Durham & London 2008, p. 120.

    [27] Stephen A. Tyler, “Post-Modern Ethnography: From Document of the Occult to Occult Document” [in]: Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, Op. cit., p. 139.

    [28] See: Ward H. Goodenough, In Pursuit of Culture [in] : Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol 32, 2003, p.1-12. See also : Ward H. Goodenough, Culture, Language and Society, Benjamin/Cummings Pub. Co., University of Michigan, 1981.

    [29] See: Ward H. Goodenough, “Componential Analysis” (Kinship studies in cultural anthropology are producing a new tool for semantic analysis), [in] Science, 02 Jun 1967, Vol. 156, p. 1203-1209.

    [30] Culture as knowledge is presented already in 1871, in the first scientific definition of culture by Edward Burnett Tylor (“Culture … is that complex whole which includes knowledge …, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”), where, as B.G. Blount says, the central concept is “capabilities,” meaning the ability of people to acquire and produce knowledge, beliefs, etc. Later also reappeared a number of concerns with the definition of culture as cognitive capacity, expressed usually as “ideas” and “knowledge” (See: B. G. Blount, “A History of Cognitive Anthropology” [in] A Companion to Cognitive Anthropology, ed. by David B. Kronenfeld, Giovanni Bennardo, Victor C. de Munck, and Michael D. Fisher, Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2011, p. 13.)

    [31] See: Ward H. Goodenough, Culture, Language and Society, Benjamin/Cummings Pub. Co., University of Michigan, 1981, p. 47-52.

    [32] Jean-François Lyotard, Kondycja ponowoczesna. Raport o stanie wiedzy (trans. Małgorzata Kowalska, Jacek Migasiński), Warszawa 1997, Fundacja Aletheia.

    [33] Dharma (moral law) and itihasa( literally “that’s what happened”).

    [34] Religion and the Authority of the Past. Edited by Tobin Siebers. With an Introduction by Wendy Doniger, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan 1993, p. 58, and Garima Sharma, “A Critical Survey of the Mahabharata”, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, ISSN(Online): 2319-7722, www.ijhssi.org//Volume 6, Issue 6// June 2017, p. 12.

    [35] These judgments by Moritz Winternitz come from his best-known work, Geschichte der indischen Literatur (C.F.Amelangs Verlag, Leipzig 1920), and have been broadly cited, including on current websites, such as: www.mahabharata-research.com (Evolution of the Epic: History of Mythology) and en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahabharata .

    [36] Eric Gans,The Scenic Imagination, Stanford University Press, Stanford California 2008, p. 5.

    [37] Ibidem, p.2.

    [38] Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1997.

    [39] Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, The Texas Christian University Press, Fort Worth, 1976, p. 86.

    [40] Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, Cambridge Philosophy Classics, Cambridge 2016, p. 136-137.

    [41] Ibidem.

    [42] Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, Textual Sources for the Study of Hinduism, Manchester University Press, 1988 p. 2-3.

    [43] Jan Gondha, “The Ritual Sutras” [in]:A History of Indian Literature, ed. by J. Gonda, Otto Harrassovitz, Wiesbaden 1977, vol. 1, p. 468.

    [44] María Jesús Martínez Alfaro, “Intertextuality: Origins and Development of the Concept,” [in] Atlantis, Vol. 18, No. 1/2 (Junio – Diciembre 1996), pp. 268-285.

    [45] Georges Dumézil, Mythe et Épopée I, II, III, Éditions Gallimard 1995, p. 105.

    [46] Frank Ankersmith, Narracja, reprezentacja, doświadczenie. Studia z teorii historiografii, Universitas Kraków 2004, p. 8.

    [47] One Discipline, Four Ways : British, German, French, and American Anthropology, Fredrik Barth, Andre Gingrich, Robert Parkin, Sydel Silverman, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2010, p. 384.

    [48] See: Eric Gans, The Origin of Language.

    [49] See: Eric Gans, The End of Culture. Toward a Generative Anthropology. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1985.

    [50] Paul Ricœur, Symbolika zła, Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, Warszawa, 1986, p.162.

    [51] Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan, Beacon Paperback ed., Boston 1969, p. 5.

    [52] See: Klaus Eder, “The cultural code of modernity and the problem of nature: a critic of the naturalistic notion of progress “[in]: Rethinking Progress. Movements, Forces and Ideas at the End of Twentieth Century, ed. by Jeffrey C. Alexander, Piotr Sztompka, Unwin Hyman, London 1990, p.67-89.

    [53] Ben Martin R., “The Origins of the Concept of ‘Foresight’ in Science and Technology: An Insider’s Perspective,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, t. 77 (9), p. 1438-1447.

    [54]The Mahabharata of Krishna – Dwaipayana Vyasa, Volume 1, Books 1, Adi Parva, Section I, Translated into English Prose from the Original Sanscrit Text by Kisari Mohan Ganguli (1883-1896). The text file scanned at sacred-texts.com, 2003, proofed at Distributed Proofing, Juliet Sutherland, Project Manager. Additional proofing and formatting of the text file at sacred-texts.com, by J.B.Hare, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15474/15474-h/15474-h.htm#bookone.

    [55] Eric Gans, The Origin of Language, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London,1981, p. 76.

    [56] Ibidem, p. 74.

    [57] The Mahabharata of Krishna – Dwaipayana Vyasa , Volume 1, Books 1, Adi Parva, Section I, Translated into English Prose from the Original Sanscrit Text by Kisari Mohan Ganguli (1883-1896). The text file scanned at sacred-texts.com, 2003, proofed at Distributed Proofing, Juliet Sutherland, Project Manager. Additional proofing and formatting of the text file at sacred-texts.com, by J.B.Hare, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15474/15474-h/15474-h.htm#bookone.

    [58] Eric Gans, The End of Culture, Toward a Generative Anthropology, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1985, p. 236.

    [59] Ibidem. p. 24-25 and first of all: Eric Gans, The Origin of Language, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London,1981, p. 45-59.

    [60] Eric Gans, The Origin of Language, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London,1981, p.44.

    [61] Mahabharata opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska, Księga I, Adi Parva (on the basis of The Book of the Beginning), English translation from Sanskrit J.A.B van Buitenen, The University of Chicago Press), The Lintons’ Video Press, New Haven, CT, USA 2007, p. 19.

    [62] Ibidem.

    [63] Nagendra Singh, Indian Legends, APH Publishing, 1997, 144-153. Sarama is also identified with Vāk or Vāc (Sanskrit: वाक्, stem vāc-, nominative vāk), the Sanskrit word for “speech”, from a verbal root vac- “speak, tell, utter”. Vac is the goddess of the spoken word, the personification of speech and oral communication. Michael Jordan, Encyclopedia of Gods, New York, Facts On File, Inc. 1993, p. 275; John Bowker, The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 1011.

    [64] Georges Dumézil, Mythe et Épopée I, II, III, op. cit., p. 105.

    [65] Mahabharata opowiada Barbara Mikołajewska, Księga III, Vana Parva (on the basis of The Book of the Forest), English translation from Sanskrit J.A.B van Buitenen, The University of Chicago Press, The Lintons’ Video Press, New Haven, CT, USA 2007, p. 12.

    [66] Ibidem.

    [67] Georges Dumézil, Mythe et Épopée I, II, III, op. cit., p. 2.

    [68] Barnard Alan, History and Theory in Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 159.

    [69] See : Danielle Feller Jatavallabhula, Violence Denied: Violence, Nonviolence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History, edited by Jan E.M. Houben and Karel R. Van Kooij, Brill 1999.

    [70] Harold Garfinkel, “Harold Garfinkel: Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities” [in] Readings in Social Theory: The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism. edited by James Farganis, NY: McGraw-Hill., New York 2011, p. 287-295.

  • Enactive Cinematic Perception: The Cinema as Exploration of the (Re)Presented World

    INTRODUCTION

    Since the arrival of cinema, film theorists have studied how spectators perceive the representations that the medium offers to our senses. Early film theorists have bent their heads over what cinema is, how cinema can be seen as art, but also over what cinema is capable of. One of the earliest film theorists, Hugo Münsterberg argued in 1916 that the uniqueness of cinema, or as he calls it photoplay, lies in the way it offers the possibility to represent our mental perception and organisation of the reality, or the world we live in: “the photoplay tells us the human story by overcoming the forms of the outer world, namely, space, time, and causality, and by adjusting the events to the forms of the inner world, namely, attention, memory, imagination, and emotion” (Münsterberg [1916] 2004, 402).

    Münsterberg was not the only theorist who examined how cinema functions in giving its audience representations of a recognisable world. Later theorists, like Rudolf Arnheim in 1933 and Erwin Panofsky in 1934, addressed how cinema has the possibility to transform the empirical world instead of replicating it. Arnheim even suggests that this transformation is connected to the human desire to explore the curiosities of our world: “by its very nature, of course, the motion picture tends to satisfy the desire for faithful reports about curious, characteristic, exciting things going on in this world of ours” (Arnheim [1933] 2004, 316).

    However, the later film theorist André Bazin argued in 1958 that cinema is about replicating the empirical world instead of transforming it: “today the making of images no longer shares an anthropocentric, utilitarian purpose. It is no longer a question of survival after death, but of a larger concept, the creation of an ideal world in the likeness of the real, with its own temporal destiny” (Bazin [1958] 1960, 6).

    It thus seems that many of the early film theorists looked into the question of what cinema really is and what it is capable of. In a certain way, they all address the audience’s perception of that what the medium represents, namely the film itself. How could Bazin, for example, argue that cinema is attempting to replicate the empirical world without taking into account that the audience must experience that which cinema shows to be a replica? The same goes for the arguments of Arnheim, Münsterberg and Panofsky; the perception of cinema by the audience has been a cornerstone for making their respective arguments. The questions of how spectators perceive cinema and what cinema is capable of thus seem closely interrelated.

    In the 1970’s, film theorists started to focus on the ideological effects of the cinematic medium and its apparatus. Laura Mulvey, for example, argued in 1975 that cinema has the ability to control the unconscious way in which the audience has to look at women, since the medium has control over the dimensions of space and time (Mulvey [1975] 2004, 68). Therefore, she states: “in reality the phantasy world of the screen is subject to the law which produces it” (61).

    Mulvey, however, is not the only film theorist in the 70’s who addressed the ideological effects of cinema. In 1970, Jean-Louis Baudry also suggested that cinema is capable of mobilizing the spectator’s fantasies via realistic visual representations while he or she is physically “chained” to a chair in a dark theatre (Baudry [1970] 2004, 354-355). Baudry thus not only concentrates on the medium itself as what influences the spectator, but also on the whole cinematic apparatus: “the cinema can appear as a sort of psychic apparatus of substitution, corresponding to the model defined by the dominant ideology” (354). Both the medium and the apparatus are thus capable of making the audience believe in a certain ideology that is represented in cinematic representations.

    To summarise: film theorists have since the emergence of the cinematic medium debated about the spectator’s perception of cinema. Later, in the 1970’s, theorists started to argue to what extent spectators could be influenced by a certain ideology through this medium and its apparatus while perceiving the represented cinematic images. The question, however, remains if cinema is capable of making us believe in an ideology through our perception. Is the human mind able to be influenced in such a way that it will easily follow an ideology that is “realistically” represented to it?

    In this article, I will look into the question that was raised by the film theorists of the 1970’s: how is cinema able to impose an ideology on the perception of spectators? To answer this question, I will first look into how human perception actually works; how do humans “make sense” of the world. Understanding human cognition is therefore one of the keys to answering my research question. I will explain cognition through the enactive approach, to later show how cinema is mediating our active exploration of the world. I will then look at the writings of Baudry to examine how his film theory can be understood in conjunction with contemporary knowledge of perception. With this article, I would therefore like to show how an older film theory, like Baudry’s, can still be found relevant in the light of present-day research on meaning-making.

    ENACTIVE PERCEPTION

    Over the last two decades, an enormous amount of research has emerged in the field of cognition. Mainly in the fields of philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence and neurology, scientists tend to be particularly interested in what human cognition is and how it works. Because this topic of cognition is shared among many fields, interdisciplinary research on cognition often occurs nowadays. This has resulted in the emergence of research fields that name themselves “cognitive neuroscience,” “cognitive psychology,” “comparative cognition,” etc.

    What does cognition mean? Dale Purves and his colleagues, having a background in cognitive neuroscience, explain cognition in their book Principles of Cognitive Neuroscience as: “‘higher-order’ mental processes” (Purves et al. 2013, 568). This definition remains quite abstract and therefore requires more clarification.

    A clearer definition is given by Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch in their book, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. In their book, Varela and his colleagues combine cognitive science’s approach with mindfulness in understanding how cognition works. The authors define cognition as follows: “cognition consists in the enactment or bringing forth of a world by a viable history of structural coupling” (Varela et al. 1991, 205). Cognition is thus not simply higher-order mental processes, but it is the subjective enactment of creating a world through someone’s own context. Cognition, and, consequently, ‘making sense’, are constituted through enactment.

    What then exactly is enactment? Varela and his colleagues explain the enactive approach to cognition as follows: “the enactive approach consists of two points: 1) perception consists in perceptually guided action, and 2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided” (173). Human perception thus depends on the environment and on how that environment gives us specific structures to guide our perception. These structures can then become a pattern for our senses which help us to interpret what we perceive. Perception is thus an active process; it is not simply the mirroring of a pre-given environment.

    To make the enactive approach clearer, I’ll give two examples. Firstly, the use of inverting glasses. These glasses consist of prisms that distort the light entering the eyes in an unnatural way, namely upside-down. Everything you see is therefore upside-down. Your first instinct would be that it would be very difficult to read a newspaper, for example. However, people who use these glasses get used to their way of perceiving the world after a few days (Taylor 1962). It is not that the upside-down world is inverted again by our minds, but we simply get used to seeing things the other way around. Our perception is thus not something that follows pre-given structures in our brain, but it is active in the sense that it is formed between the environment and the mind.

    The second example is about colour perception. In 2015, a picture of a dress went viral on the Internet. The girl who posted the picture asked the question what colour the dress was: was it blue and black, or gold and white? It appeared that not everyone had the same opinion on what colour the dress exactly was. Some people simply perceived it as being blue and black, and others as gold and white. This example shows that our way of perceiving things does not just lie in the environment, since people tended to see different colours in the same picture. It shows us that our perception lies between the mind and the environment; it is an active exploration of the mind in terms of what is presented to it.

    Varela, Thompson, and Rosch are not the only authors that use the enactive approach to analyse perception and cognition. Alva Noë, in his book Action in Perception, also uses the enactive approach to describe how we actively perceive that what is represented to us with the help of our sensorimotor skills. On visual and haptic perception, Noë argues:

    through attention, probing, and movements of the eyes, visual experience acquires content in much the same way that touch does. Vision, and touch, gain content through our skilful movements. We bring content to experience by action. We enact content.

    (Noë 2006, 100; emphasis in original)

    Just like Varela and his colleagues, Noë makes the point that perception is bound to skillful structures or, in his case, movements to help to experience that which is represented. Noë’s argument is therefore that phenomenological reflection on the character of that what is perceived suggests that certain features are present as available, rather than as represented: “The world is within reach and is present only insofar as we know (or feel) that it is” (67). We build our own “world” through the action in our perception of that world.

    The following statement of Noë aptly summarises the approach: “the world we inhabit and explore as perceivers is encountered in the first instance not as housing […] facts and properties, but rather as mediating our active exploration” (167). Again: we must not see our empirical world as holding facts (like colours) that are mirrored in our mind, but as a mediating space for our active perception.

    This is where film theory comes in. I would like to argue, with the help of Noë’s argument, that films we explore as perceivers are encountered in the first instance not as housing facts and properties, but rather as mediating our active exploration. The represented world of the cinema becomes the only empirical world for us because our perception is limited to the environment of the cinema. The cinema therefore becomes, just like “the big outside world,” the environment which is open for active perception. Cinema is then, just like “the world,” mediating our perception in the moment that we go to the cinema.

    IDEOLOGY AND ENACTIVE PERCEPTION

    The question that emerges is in what way cinema is able to ideologically influence someone. As stated in the introduction, film theorists like Baudry and Mulvey have already asked these questions in the 70’s. However, what these authors didn’t address was that filmgoers are active explorers in their perception of the world. I would argue that this is also true for a represented world: spectators are always actively exploring the environment in front of them in order to make sense of their view of a world. But what happens if the many facets of a represented world that are explored impose certain ideologies on the spectator?

    To see how cinema is able to transmit an ideology, I will do a close reading of the famous text ‘Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus’ by Jean-Louis Baudry. This article, which was published in Cinéthique in 1970, is often seen as “characteristic of the attempts that have been made to criticize the ideological underpinnings of previous film thought, and to ground new work in a more self-conscious and self-critical set of assumptions” (Williams 1974, 39). Baudry’s article is therefore representative of many writings on film that also focussed on the ideological effects of the medium and the apparatus.

    To find out how cinema exposes a spectator to an ideology, I will analyse how Baudry spoke of the ways in which cinema creates these ideological effects. In my close reading of his text, I will focus on three sub-questions that will help to answer my research question. These questions are:

    • Through what features is cinema able to expose filmgoers to an ideology?
    • How is the experience that cinema creates for the spectator addressed and explained?
    • How is the perception of film by the spectator addressed and explained?

    These three questions will be used to analyse Baudry’s article. The observations that I will make regarding his article, which will help me to give an answer to these questions, shall be followed by an elaboration on how these findings can be examined from the enactive approach on human perception.

    This form of analysis has its limitations, of course. In answering my research question about how cinema is able to convey an ideology through perception, I am only focussing on one text of an ‘ideological film theorist’. To get a broader view on how the topic of ideology in film has been undertaken, one can also look at the works of other theorists. For the scope of this article I have limited my research to one author, namely Baudry, who is representative of a larger group of authors sharing the same arguments (Williams 1974, 39).

    IDEOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE BASIC CINEMATOGRAPHIC APPARATUS

    The analysis of Baudry’s article is divided into two parts. The first part will focus on each of my sub-questions. In this part I will first show which features of cinema described by Baudry account for the medium’s ability to ideologically influence the spectator. After having described one such feature, I will look into Baudry’s description of the filmgoer’s experience, after which I will examine the way he addresses and explains the perception of the spectator. The second part consists of an elaboration on these features from an enactive approach.

    Features, Experience, and Perception

    Baudry identifies three clear cinematic features through which meaning is given to that what the medium represents: “the mechanical apparatus both selects the minimal difference and represses it in projection, so that meaning can be constituted; it is at once direction, continuity, movement” (349). Direction, continuity, and movement appear to be elements that the medium holds which help to provide an inscribed meaning (an ideology). I will explain in more depth how Baudry describes and uses these three elements.

    Direction

    When Baudry addresses the concept of direction, he talks about “the place of the instrumental base” that film can take (346). This instrumental base is “the site of inscription,” meaning that the one who holds the production of the film can ascribe a dogma to it. Baudry explains this directional approach as being twofold: it can be seen in how cinematic representations are cut off from “objective reality”, and it can be observed through the way something is framed.

    To elaborate on Baudry’s first point on direction: if a cinematic representation is cut off from the raw material (the objective reality), the representation does not allow the spectator to see the transformation that has taken place from raw to fabricated material. The direction of the spectators is thus always focussed on something that is fabricated and they therefore have to deal with a specific perspective on the raw material. The producer of the fabricated material can thus decide a perspective and has with that a certain power over the watching subject.

    Baudry’s second point on direction is about the methods to which the fabricated perspective is bound to. Découpage, the shot breakdown before shooting a film, and montage, the editing which is done after the shooting, are for Baudry two methods through which inscription in perspective takes place (346). These two practices can constitute a meaning through their apparent restoration of the objective reality from which they are fabricated. This meaning has then, of course, already been inscribed through these two methods.

    But how is the experience of this feature of direction described by Baudry? Baudry states that this feature

    lays out the space of an “ideal vision” and in this way assures the necessity of a transcendence—metaphorically (by unknown to which it appeals—here we must recall the structural place occupied by the vanishing point) and metonymically (by the displacement that it seems to carry out: a subject is both “in place of” and “a part for the whole”).

    (Baudry [1970] 2004, 348)

    The cinematic experience of the spectator is thus, just like directional feature itself, twofold: it creates a metaphorical and a metonymical feeling of transcendence. Due to the cut between the represented world and the “objective reality,” and because of cinema’s ability to frame representations in a specific way, someone experiences being in that world. This is stimulated by cinema, which gives a spectator an ideal view of a situation in the represented world. Direction therefore gives you the feeling and experience of being in the represented world.

    But how is it that we can perceive these features that create such an experience? According to Baudry, this is because the different lenses used in shooting the film give the spectator a conventional perspective on the world. This perspective is the same perspective as the one we have on the “objective reality”: “the use of different lenses, when not dictated by technical considerations aimed at restoring habitual perspective […], does not destroy (traditional) perspective but rather makes it play the role of norm” (347). Cinema is therefore not trying to create a new perspective on the world, but tries to give an ideal vision of it through representations that can be observed from a traditional perspective, namely the one we also use as the norm: our perspective on our daily reality.

    Continuity

    The second element, which holds the power to inscribe an ideology in a film, is continuity. According to Baudry, the cinema is able to create an illusion of continuity. Baudry explains this illusion in one of his footnotes as follows:

    we know that the spectator finds it impossible to notice that the images which succeed one another before his eyes were assembled end to end, because the projection of film on the screen offers an impression of continuity although the images which compose it are, in reality, distinct, and are differentiated, moreover, by variations in space and time.

    (Baudry [1970] 2004, 349)

    Baudry thus tries to make clear that film is nothing more than detached pictures that follow each other in a certain flow. The representations in these pictures are, however, different from the real world, since they are in a different space and time. However, film “lives on the denial of difference”: it constantly seems to suggest being in the ‘real world’ and therefore in “real space and time” (349). These differences must be effaced if an illusion of continuity wants to be maintained.

    What the spectator experiences in the cinema is thus, according to Baudry, a feeling of continuity: a logical flow of successive relations in a space and time. The spectator experiences this spatiality and temporality as the same space and time of objective reality. Baudry therefore argues that a filmgoer experiences film as being real because of its continuity, although it unreal in fact (351).

    The perception of this continuity is dependent on the persistence of vision. Our sight is structured in such a way that it restores the discontinuous elements (the static images of which a film consists) so that we are able to see coherence (349). It therefore seems that Baudry is suggesting that humans have an inbuilt structure which makes them already able to perceive a flow; it is in our nature. Baudry even suggests that having this ability gives rise to human consciousness (350). To summarise: seeing flow creates consciousness, and consciousness attributes meaning to that which is seen in the flow.

    Movement

    The last element of ideological inscription in film is movement. This feature is explained by Baudry with the help of the concept of the transcendental subject: the hallucinatory belief in the omnipotence of thought by a spectator (350). The manifestation of this belief seems to be fed by the mobility of the camera:

    if the eye which moves is no longer fettered by a body, by the laws of matter and time, if there are no more assignable limits to its displacement— conditions fulfilled by the possibilities of shooting and of film—the world will be constituted not only by this eye but for it.

    (Baudry [1970] 2004, 350)

    The displacement caused by the mobility of the camera can generate in the spectator a feeling of being omnipotent. However, the fantasy of this created reality is a manifestation of power over the subject: the mobility of the camera, which allows us to see many facets of a scene, is still formatted in space and time. This mobility can therefore generate an ideology.

    But how does Baudry describe the experience of the spectator that is associated with this movement feature? Baudry states that “to seize movement is to become movement” (350). Filmgoers become absorbed in the movement that is given to them in the many facets of a scene. According to Baudry, you simply become the movement of the camera; you are “the eye subject,” meaning that the artificial perspective of the camera becomes your sight (350). You thus experience the movement as something natural, while at the same time you seem to hold the power to change the movement, but actually you don’t.

    Humans are able to perceive this movement, just as with continuity, because of their natural dependence on vision. In fact, our sight can adopt the position of a camera because of its mobility, which will create coherence and meaning:

    one may presume that what was already at work as the originating basis of the perspective image, namely the eye, the “subject,” is put forth, liberated (in the sense that a chemical reaction liberates a substance) by the operation which transforms successive, discrete images (as isolated images they have, strictly speaking, no meaning, or at least no unity of meaning) into continuity, movement, meaning.

    (Baudry [1970] 2004, 354)

    A spectator has the ability to “become” the camera, and with that to become the perspective. Movements in this perspective and motion in the representations of the successive images may then create a sense of being transcendent.

    Enactive Cinematic Perception

    How then can these three cinematic features, that are able to impose an ideology, be read from an enactive approach on perception? According to Baudry, it is possible for cinema to expose an ideology through these features to the spectator, but is it still possible if we see this spectator as an active perceiver?

    Let’s first observe how this works with respect to the direction feature. It is of course true that cinematic representations are cut off from the raw material, which causes the representations to be only fabricated versions of the objective reality. An active perceiver is therefore always perceiving these representations as a world, since this represented world is the only available world for the perceiver: in a dark cinema, the attention of the spectator is drawn to the screen which becomes a window to a world; a world becomes available. It doesn’t matter for the spectators if this world is real or fabricated; they are simply satisfied when they are able to make sense of what they perceive.

    This can also be said for the continuity feature: the constant denial of differences between the space and time of reality and those of the distinct cinematic images. Again, it doesn’t matter for the spectator if the represented space and time are different from those in objective reality. What matters is that this space and time are the only available spatiality and temporality, and therefore become a world. However, Baudry states that this denial of the difference in spatiality and temporality is something which can structure an ideology through the belief that someone is observing the objective world in a cinematic representation. This is, however, not completely true: the spectators don’t recognise the representations in the continuity as being part of objective reality, nor do they recognise them as fabrications of that reality. What they recognise is simply an available world. Spectator don’t have to be familiar with the objective world to understand what is happening in it, but what is important is that they have senses through which they can perceive this world to bring forth a world by a viable history of structural coupling (Varela et al. 1991, 205).

    For the last of Baudry’s features, movement, a similar argument can be made: the feeling of the spectators that they are omnipotent, because of the mobility of the camera. The mobility of the camera causes displacements to happen, and the spectator can do nothing more than simply follow those movements. These formatted movements are therefore the only available movements for a spectator to perceive. It is then somewhat true that a spectator gets a feeling of omnipotence, since they get the same feeling of perceiving this available world as any other world, namely just like objective reality. It is however wrong to see a hierarchy between different sorts of worlds that can be available for a perceiver: it is not important if the world is as “real” as in “objective reality.” It is important that someone is able to perceive an available world. Becoming omnipotent through created mobility in the cinema is thus not an illusion; it is the available reality.

    It seems that, like what happens when humans put on inverting glasses, spectators adapt their way of perceiving to the reality that is made available to them. The power of putting an ideology in certain features therefore lies in what is made available for the spectator and what is not. Baudry however argues that it is more a question of how features are made available, because these features are in their availability structured by an ideology, which can then be exposed to a spectator. This is of course a way of interpreting how an ideology can be imposed on a filmgoer, but what must be taken into consideration here is that this person is always an active perceiver. That means that this perceiver is also a vulnerable perceiver: he or she can’t put something in the perspective of another world, but only in the perspective of the same world. But this is no less the case for the same perceiver in objective reality: this “objective reality” is in that case the only available world through which things can be put in perspective. Seeing a hierarchy of a raw and a fabricated world, and how an ideology is manifested in “objective reality” or in a fabricated form of this reality, is therefore wrong: the world that someone perceives is the only world in that moment, and the ideology that is disseminated in this world can therefore logically be perceived and taken over by the perceiver to make sense of the available world. However, when we leave the cinema, we are exposed to another available world with other ideologies. The point is that perceivers only get influenced by ideological features in the world that is available to them, but not necessarily in another world that is made available to them in the past or future.

    CONCLUSION

    In the above I have shown how humans use their enactive perception to make sense of the world that is represented to them. I have closely analysed how Baudry uses three features to describe how the cinema is capable of giving its spectators an ideology. What must be kept in mind here however is that a filmgoer is always an active perceiver. The represented world in the cinema therefore always becomes something like a “real world” for the spectator, since it is the only “world” that is available to be explored at the moment.

    Let us come back to the question raised by Baudry and Mulvey in the 1970’s: how is cinema able to ideologically influence its spectator through perception? It has become clear that cinema is only a mediator of our active exploration of the represented world in the cinema, which has become the only world for us to perceive there. If a film holds a specific ideology in the (showing of) its very own representations, then it would be logical that the spectators would take over this ideology since they become part of the film.

    However, I would like to argue here that when the film is over, and the lights are turned back on, we are able to reflect on what we have lived through. People are in this moment able to choose if they go with an ideology or not. This is because this is the only moment where we can see things in the perspective of two worlds: the represented world and the “objective world.” Seeing things in perspective becomes possible in exactly that one moment where the two worlds are still available for the spectator. One can then choose to go with a represented ideology or not. Being active in our perception, and thus having a constant changing state of cognition, implies that the structural and patterned thinking with an ideology is incompatible with the ability of active perception.

    Cinema is, I would suggest, the medium par excellence in training new cognitive skills. By going to the cinema, we can test and train our active perception in a represented world; we have the ability to make mistakes in our observations and to learn from them. The cinema is able to train our ways of exploring the world, while we, at the same time, can reflect on the ideology that a film assumes implicitly. Baudry and Mulvey were thus right when they stated that cinema has the power to make us believe in a certain ideology. It is, however, up to us to actively explore the possibilities of such an ideology in one world, and to reflect on it with the help of another world.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY

    Arnheim, Rudolf. [1933] 2004. “Film and Reality.” In Film Theory: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies. Edited by Philip Simpson, Andrew Utterson and Karen J. Shepherdson, 312-321. London: Routledge.

    Baudry, Jean-Louis. [1970] 2004. “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus.” In Film Theory: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies. Edited by Philip Simpson, Andrew Utterson and Karen J. Shepherdson, 345-355. London: Routledge.

    Bazin, André. [1958] 1960. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.” Film Quarterly 13(4): 4-9.

    Mulvey, Laura. [1975] 2004. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” In Film Theory: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies. Edited by Philip Simpson, Andrew Utterson and Karen J. Shepherdson, 57-68. London: Routledge.

    Münsterberg, Hugo. [1916] 2004. “The Means of the Photoplay.” In Film Theory: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies. Edited by Philip Simpson, Andrew Utterson and Karen J. Shepherdson, 401-407. London: Routledge.

    Noë, Alva. 2006. Action in Perception. London: MIT Press.

    Panofsky, Erwin. [1934] 2004. “Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures.” In Film Theory: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies. Edited by Philip Simpson, Andrew Utterson and Karen J. Shepherdson, 279-292. London: Routledge.

    Purves, Dale, Roberto Cabeza, Scott A. Huettel, Kevin S. LaBar, Michael L. Platt and Marty G. Woldorff. 2013. Principles of Cognitive Neuroscience. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.

    Taylor, James G. 1962. The Behavioral Basis of Perception. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. 1991. The Embodied Mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

    Williams, Alan and Jean-Louis Baudry. 1974. ‘Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Appartatus’. Film Quarterly 28(2), 39-47. 

  • “Inverted Rites”: Reading Girard reading Pater reading Shakespeare

    The discipline of literary criticism is built, in part, on a network of citations, a matrix of references which functions to authorize an author, permitting them to present their opinions and analysis to the other members of a discourse community within a complex system of mutual recognition. Deference is due to the past, to those critical giants of literary history on whose shoulders we stand; or at the very least, a proper name is invoked in order to maintain one’s distance, to allow the critic to distinguish more precisely their position from what has come before. There is a kind of bargaining here from the outset of any literary critical enterprise, where the author cites other figures in order to acknowledge their debts, and thereby take their place as a member of this discourse community. This bargaining, this structure of indebtedness, already speaks of a kind of anthropological event: it appears to be endlessly mimetic, a structure of displacement, where authority functions through a system of deferrals. Or perhaps this bargaining is rather like a kind of Faustian pact, the author invoking the proper name as a sorcerer invokes the daemon, in the hope that it will aid them in their hour of need.

    What is the status of the proper name for a writer such as René Girard? As a critic, he wrote extensively on Shakespeare, not only in A Theatre of Envy (1991), his book on the Renaissance playwright, but in chapters in other works, such as Violence and the Sacred (1972) and To Double Business Bound (1978). But in his writings on Shakespeare, Girard seems to partly stand aloof from the kinds of disciplinary conventions outlined above. Where are the references to prior works of literary criticism in his critical writings on Shakespeare? In other words, what does Girard’s approach to Shakespeare tell us about the proper level of deference due, the appropriate authority which should be invested in, the great names of the critical tradition?

    The answer to this question is not entirely straightforward. In a recent piece published in Anthopoetics on ‘René Girard’s Shakespeare’, excerpted from his book on Shakespeare’s Big Men (2016), Richard van Oort quotes the introduction to A Theater of Envy to begin to interrogate the knowing strategies that Girard adopts in seeking to justify his revolutionary approach to the Shakespearean canon.[1] Girard’s position is founded from the outset on the premise that ‘Shakespeare’ itself is a proper name; indeed, perhaps ‘Shakespeare’ is the proper name of the literary tradition, canonical in the sense in which we may also speak of ‘Homer’ or ‘Dante’. For Girard, Shakespeare transcends his age, and in justifying his radical approach, he foregrounds the ‘modernity’ of Shakespeare as ‘an original thinker centuries ahead of his time, more modern than any of our so-called master thinkers’.[2] But Girard’s preface eschews standard scholarly practice in appealing not to proper names, but simply to a theoretical fulcrum, his theory of ‘mimetic desire’. This theory of mimesis is all the authority he (claims that he) needs, an approach so revolutionary that it supposedly ‘solves’ the problems of the problem plays. We should, of course, be circumspect: Girard’s preface is, after all, a paratextual form of positioning, with prefacing a rhetorical technique in its own right, one which frames, sometimes artificially, but always strategically, the text which follows. In this case, the carefully crafted strategy he adopts allows Girard to present himself as though he were ‘writing in a vacuum’, as van Oort puts it.[3] Girard portrays himself, at least here in his preface, as though his readings of Shakespeare were peerless, in every sense of this word.

    But is this to say that Girard’s treatment of Shakespeare is wholly unprecedented? Even without a detailed knowledge of the contours of Shakespearean scholarship between the early 1970s and the early 1990s, most observers are likely to see antecedents in Shakespearean criticism for many of the positions that Girard will propose. Van Oort explicitly poses the question:

    Is Girard as original as he claims to be? What is to distinguish Girard’s reading of Shakespeare from, for example, Francis Fergusson’s reading of the ritual origins of Greek and Shakespearean tragedy, or John Holloway’s remarks on the sacrificial origins of Shakespearean tragedy? More generally, can’t we see a connection between Girard’s ideas about sacrifice and the work of James George Frazer or Émile Durkheim in the early twentieth century, both of whom were highly influential among critics of the early and mid-twentieth century? What about the ironic, late-romantic readings of Shakespeare by Wilson Knight or Harold Goddard? Finally, don’t Girard’s ideas about tragedy sound very similar to Kenneth Burke’s?[4]

    In what follows, I will take up van Oort’s point by focusing on another of Girard’s precursors which he passes over here, the late nineteenth century aesthetic critic Walter Pater.[5] In interrogating the idea that Girard’s Shakespeare has no critical antecedents in literary history, this essay will begin to unpack Girard’s use of Pater and the ways in which Pater’s reading of the play might inform an anthropological approach.

    * * *

    While A Theater of Envy is ‘almost totally devoid of references to previous scholarship’, as van Oort points out,[6] a brief if suggestive reading of Shakespeare’s Richard II in Violence and the Sacred is attended by a nod to Pater’s essay on ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ (1889). The citation occurs in the final chapter, entitled ‘The Unity of all Rites’, in which Girard’s concern is to show that:

    There is a unity that underlies not only all mythologies and rituals but the whole of human culture, and this unity of unities depends on a single mechanism, continually functioning because perpetually misunderstood – the mechanism that assures the community’s spontaneous and unanimous outburst of opposition to the surrogate victim.[7]

    The chapter links sacrificial rites with rites of passage to show both alike have a root mechanism. Considering, in this context, the idea of the Divine Right of Kings, and the rites associated with it, Girard turns to Shakespeare, whom he claims as master of the paradox of the way in which the king can be considered a kind of sacrificial victim.[8] For Girard:

    The dethronement scene in Richard II can be seen as a sort of coronation performed in reverse. Walter Pater described it as an inverted rite, but all rites demand that moment of inversion. The king acts as his own sacrifice, transforming himself by quasi-religious means into a double of all his enemies and their surrogate victims as well. He is himself a traitor, in no way different from those who do him violence.[9]

    Before diving in to unpack this citation, we should linger for a moment or two longer with Girard, because it will be important to recognize some of the rhetorical moves that Girard will make immediately after this citation of Pater. First and foremost, Girard continues by immediately quoting Richard’s speech in Act Four Scene One by way of evidence:

    Mine eyes are full of tears; I cannot see.
    And yet salt water blinds them not so much
    But they can see a sort of traitors here.
    Nay, if I turn mine eyes upon myself,
    I find myself a traitor with the rest;
    For I have given here my soul’s consent
    T’undeck the pompous body of a king[.] (4.1.244-50) [10]

    Now, immediately following this quotation, itself immediately following the allusion to Pater’s reading of Richard II as an ‘inverted rite’, Girard cites Ernst Kantorowicz’s book, The King’s Two Bodies (1957). Girard commends Kantorowicz for while ‘he does not touch directly upon the question of the surrogate victim, he gives an excellent description of the dual nature of the Shakespearean monarch’.[11] It is this ‘dual nature’ which interests Girard, this ‘doubling’ or ‘mirror’ structure which had also interested Pater.[12]

    Today’s reader may be slightly confused to see a reference to a writer such as Walter Pater at this point of Girard’s text, particularly given the dearth of other proper names from the history of Shakespearean criticism elsewhere in his work. What caused Girard to turn at this moment to a figure such as Pater, best remembered today for his role as the leading figure in the British aestheticism movement? On the surface, at least, one would image there would be more in common between Pater’s stylized take on the play’s protagonist and the ‘romantic aestheticism’ (the term is van Oort’s) which typifies the approach of a critic such as Harold Bloom than might be found between his works and Girard’s anthropological approach to Shakespeare.[13] Even more curiously, why did Girard turn to this particular text of Pater’s? The essay on ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ in question dates from relatively late in his career, with Pater dying five years later. From his letters to Arthur Symons, we can date the beginnings of its composition to around November 1888, and the essay was first published in Scribner’s Magazine in April 1889, before being reprinted in Pater’s collected volume of Appreciations later that same year.[14] The essay is something of an oddity in Pater’s career, languishing today in the critical shadow of his more famous texts such as his Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873), with its infamous conclusion, or his historical novel, Marius the Epicurean (1885), or his short stories, Imaginary Portraits (1887), or even his more famous essays, such as those on ‘Wordsworth’ (1874) or ‘Style’ (1888), or those on Greek mythology, philosophy and religion, published posthumously in Greek Studies (1895). Indeed, while Girard gives the citation in English, it is worth noting here that Pater’s essay has—to the best of my knowledge—still not been translated into French, so that Girard’s reference in Violence and the Sacred, dating from 1972, becomes all the more curious.[15]

    In point of fact, a closer analysis of the passage in which Girard quotes from ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ may give us cause to question the extent of his knowledge of Pater’s essay; indeed, such an analysis may perhaps even give us cause for doubting whether or not Girard had read Pater’s essay at all. As we have seen, in the same passages of Violence and the Sacred Girard also cites Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies, and it seems more than likely that he would have first encountered Pater from this source. In his chapter on Richard II, Kantorowicz writes:

    The scene in which Richard ‘undoes his kingship’ and releases his body politic into thin air, leaves the spectator breathless. It is a scene of sacramental solemnity, since the ecclesiastical ritual of undoing the effects of consecration is no less solemn or of less weight than the ritual which has built up the sacramental dignity. [The scene] has attracted the attention of many a critic, and Walter Pater has called it very correctly an inverted rite, a rite of degradation and a long agonizing ceremony in which the order of coronation is reversed.[16]

    Kantorowicz then proceeds to quote from the very same passage (4.1.203-11) which Girard had quoted immediately after citing Pater in the relevant passage of Violence and the Sacred, a passage which had itself immediately preceded his citation of Kantorowicz. It seems reasonable, in this context, to assume that, at the very least, Girard turned to Pater prompted by Kantorowicz.

    If these passages of Kantorowicz offer the hidden context for Girard’s interest in Pater’s essay on ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’, and for his approach to Richard II‘s ‘inverted rites’, we must still consider Pater’s own analysis of the play and the ways in which such an aesthetic analysis might inform an anthropological approach. These issues seem to be of particular significance given the ways in which Girard seeks to mobilize the authority of Pater’s proper name in these passages of Violence and the Sacred. As the title of Pater’s essay suggests, ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ aims to consider the English history plays taken as a whole, a series which ‘needed but the completion of one unimportant interval to possess the unity of a popular chronicle from Richard the Second to Henry the Eighth’.[17] In spite of these pretentions, however, Pater’s interest as the essay progresses comes to be more and more focused on one play in particular, Richard II. His argument has two strands: one formal, the other aesthetic. It is not surprising that Pater, who was a leading spokesperson for British aestheticism in the late 1880s, focused on Shakespeare’s poetry and was the first critic to propose a reading of Richard as the poet-king, a point which nearly every reading that followed Pater has also accentuated. Pater was also the first to associate Richard’s hamartia with his physical beauty, an aspect which has become canonical in performance, even while there is no evidence for this theme in Shakespeare’s text itself. Perhaps on these grounds, which is to say, on account of its aestheticism, Pater’s essay was not particularly well received at the time of its publication. Margret Wilson Oliphant, the influential Scottish critic, wrote in a review in Blackwood’s Magazine that the study was ‘a little too subtle’,[18] and even Pater’s biographer Arthur Benson wrote in 1906 that:

    The essay on ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ is rather a slight performance, and the analysis of a somewhat superficial kind. Pater, for instance, almost fails to realise the magnificence of the conception of Richard II, the tragedy of which consists in the fact that, at a sudden crisis, a prompt force and vigour are demanded of a ruler whose nature is full indeed of wise and fruitful thoughts, but whose position calls for a bluff and cheerful energy, when all that he can give is a subtle and contemplative philosophy.[19]

    There is a subtle coding in this term ‘subtle’, charged seemingly with approbation, connoting a kind of effeminacy on the part of Pater’s criticism; it is opposed to the ‘manly’ and active qualities of ‘force’, ‘action’ and ‘energy’.[20] Regardless, what is clear is that this ‘subtlety’ marks a supposed sense of distance separating Pater from his subject, with Benson concluding that ‘one feels like [Pater] does not enter the humanity, the profundity, of Shakespeare’.[21]

    Benson’s analysis is instructive, for while it is nearly wholly misjudged in its evaluation of the supposed limitations of Pater’s remarkable essay, he happens upon the central interest of the text in the context of our discussion of Girard: he catches sight of that formal innovation which lies at the heart of Pater’s reading of ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’.  In Pater’s critical essay, as is the case elsewhere throughout his corpus, the question of critical distance (an idea derived in part from the Kantian category of ‘disinterestedness’) is linked to the question of ‘irony’, one which divides the critic from the subject he is in the process of offering an appreciation of.[22] But in ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’, Pater does not simply mobilize critical irony in his own practice of aesthetic ‘appreciation’; rather, he sees that this formal structure also underwrites Shakespeare’s history plays. The ‘irony’ in question, then, is not simply Pater’s, but also Shakespeare’s. For Pater, Shakespeare’s history plays focus on ‘the irony of kingship—average human nature, flung with a wonderfully pathetic effect into the vortex of great events’.[23] Kingship itself then is not only subject to ironies, Pater maintains, but is itself endlessly ironic. Indeed, Richard, Pater argues, is ‘the most touching of all examples of the irony of kingship’.[24] This irony links the king to his subjects indelibly, both insofar as the king is simply another man whom the irony of great events has turned into a king, and insofar as king and subject end up in a kind of inverse relationship.

    It was precisely this kind of innovative approach to the irony of Shakespeare’s history plays which led Jeanne T. Newlin to include Pater’s essay in her volume of Richard II: Critical Essays (1984). For Newlin, the publication of ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ was a watershed moment in the play’s ‘rags-to-riches story’, and perhaps the key moment in the history of Richard II‘s critical reception, one which allowed the play to emerge from the shadows of its more famous Shakespearean relatives.[25] Newlin’s high estimation of Pater’s essay built upon foundations laid almost half a century beforehand by John Dover Wilson, who, in his introduction to his edition of the play for the Cambridge Shakespeare (1939), argued that Pater’s ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’, alongside his earlier essay on ‘Love’s Labours Lost’ (1878), constituted ‘the only critique with any understanding […] which appeared in the nineteenth century’.[26] We should pause with Dover Wilson’s rediscovery of Pater’s essay, because his analysis is significant to our attempt to unpack Girard’s citation in Violence and the Sacred. [27] In his introduction, Dover Wilson quotes from ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ at some length, and while he bemoans Pater’s aestheticized style, which ‘may strike the modern ear as itself too flowery’, [28] he lauds the essay’s formal analysis of Richard II in celebratory terms. For Dover Wilson, as for both Kantorowicz and Girard somewhat later, Pater’s fundamental insight relates to ‘the ritualistic character of Richard II‘.[29] Once again, Dover Wilson regards the core insight of Pater’s essay as lying in that ‘remarkable passage’ which treats Richard’s coronation as an ‘inverted rite’. This passage

    goes to the heart of the play, since it reveals a sacramental quality in the agony and the death of the sacrificial victim, as it were of the god slain upon the altar, which we can to-day only begin to understand by reading a book like The Golden Bough.[30]

    In this final allusion, associating Pater’s approach to the play to the anthropology of his contemporary James Frazer, Dover Wilson’s analysis links back, indirectly, to van Oort’s comment on Girard’s originality. If we peel away the ‘flowery’ language, Dover Wilson maintains, then Pater’s approach is revealed to be ultimately anthropological, and in its treatment of the sacrificial victim it anticipates Frazer in The Golden Bough (1890), a work published only a year after Pater’s essay.

    Dover Wilson highlights the sense in which ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ draws attention to the sacrificial aspect of Richard II, an idea which, as we have seen, also lies at the heart of Girard’s appeal to Pater’s proper name in the relevant pages of Violence and the Sacred. But in point of fact, the term ‘sacrifice’ never appears in the course of Pater’s essay. Instead, his discussion of the ‘inverted rites’ of Richard II originates, in another move which foreshadows Girard, in the course of a discussion of Richard’s ‘over-confident’ belief in Divine Right.[31] For Pater, the coronation ceremony must be understood as mimetic of the initiation rite of baptism. Richard feels that divine right is ‘sealed to him […] as an ineradicable personal gift by the touch—stream rather, over head and shoulders—of the “holy oil” of his consecration at Westminster’.[32] Indeed, Pater notes the way in which Richard’s coronation sets an aesthetic precedent ‘by the pageantry, the amplitude, the learned care, of its order’.[33] The aesthetic approach, then, is not an ornamental distraction in Pater’s essay, with the real substance his formal analysis, as critics such as Dover Wilson maintained; rather, the aesthetic approach fundamentally in-forms his formal insights.

    In the case of Richard II, the coronation is double, Pater argues, so that the ‘singular rites’ are simultaneously ‘supplementing another, almost supernatural, right’.[34] Pater links Richard’s sense of Divine Right to his narcissism, referring here to the ‘mirror scene’ (that is to say, Act Four Scene One). ‘The sense of “divine right” in kings’ in Richard II, Pater continues, ‘is found to act not so much as a secret power over others, as of infatuation to themselves’,[35] and he reiterates the point later in the essay when he ‘associate[s] Richard’s two fallacious prerogatives, his personal beauty and his “anointing”‘. [36] It is in this context, then, that Pater introduces the idea which Girard latches on to:

    In the Roman Pontifical, of which the order of Coronation is really a part, there is no form for the inverse process, no rite of ‘degradation’, such as that by which an offending priest or bishop may be deprived, if not of the essential quality of ‘orders’, yet, one by one, of its outward dignities. It is as if Shakespeare had had in mind some such inverted rite, like those old ecclesiastical or military ones, by which human hardness, or human justice, adds the last touch of unkindness to the execution of its sentences, in the scene where Richard ‘deposes’ himself, as in some long, agonising ceremony, reflectively drawn out, with an extraordinary refinement of intelligence and variety of piteous appeal, but also with a felicity of poetic invention, which puts these pages into a very select class, with the finest ‘vermeil and ivory’ work of Chatterton or Keats. [37]

    One notes in passing here the characteristic style, in the face of which Dover Wilson graciously saw fit to promote Pater’s essay. In this passage, the intricate syntax of the second sentence, full of subordinated qualifiers, and mobilizing Keatsian assonance in the ‘long, agonising’ precision of its terms, are mimetic of this ‘reflectively drawn out’ ‘inverted rite’ itself. It is careful crafting such as this that serves to put these pages of Pater’s prose, as much as Shakespeare’s poetry, ‘into a very select class’.[38]

    Pater’s point is originally intended to speak to Shakespeare’s originality: since there is no such ‘inverted rite’ in reality, it is ‘as if’ such a rite were in his mind. But for Girard, Pater’s conjunction ‘as if’ misses a deeper mimetic structure, a unity underwriting all ‘rites’ as such because, as he immediately interjects, ‘all rites demand that moment of inversion’. [39] It is not, Girard argues, that Richard’s reversed coronation is remarkably different, as Pater seems to him to be maintaining, but rather that this ‘mirroring’ shows a truth which underwrites every rite as such. According to Girard, the rite which consecrates the subject as king simultaneously translates this king into both his enemies and their victims: his Divine Right turns him into a Dionysian figure, both God and sacrificial victim. Indeed, while Girard doesn’t say as much, we may go further. As Slavoj Žižek has argued, in psychoanalytic terms, the conjunction ‘as if’ signifies disavowal (Verleugnung): it allows us to set up the real in the form of the Imaginary, under the sign of fantasy.[40] Girard’s point in immediately undercutting Pater is similar: the ‘as if’ here lets Pater think that this ‘inverted process’ is a Shakespearean invention, whereas, in point of fact, it reveals the anthropological structure at the heart of all rites.

    But perhaps Pater’s point is a little more ‘subtle’ than Girard seems willing to give him credit for. Readers of ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ who would privilege its ‘aesthetic’ approach to the figure of Richard as poet-king must keep in mind that Pater’s essay, in spite of its own ‘romantic aestheticism’, was written at the end of a decade or so of extensive philological work on ancient Greek mythology and culture. Beginning in earnest with his essay on ‘Demeter and Persephone’, first published in the Fortnightly Review, January-February 1876, Pater’s essays dating from this period demonstrate a nuanced anthropological approach to his various topics, and ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ shows the marks of this scholarly interest. Pater, after all, was one of the first Anglophone critics to take onboard the insights of contemporary German thought, as demonstrated by his essay ‘A Study of Dionysus’, first published in Macmillan’s Magazine in December 1876. [41] There, Pater demonstrates the ways in which the God Dionysus is always already ‘twofold’, ‘a Döppelganger‘ who, like Persephone, ‘belongs to two worlds’ simultaneously.[42] In this essay, as elsewhere, Pater shows a nuanced understanding of the ways in which mythological figures and the rites which commemorate them are always ‘double’, open to inversion and reversal. In ‘A Study of Dionysus’, Pater links such duplicity explicitly with sacrificial rites, and Dionysus with the figure of sacrificial victim:

    And now we see why the tradition of human sacrifice lingered on in Greece, in connexion with Dionysus, as a thing of actual detail, and not remote, so that Dionysius of Halicarnassus counts it among the horrors of Greek religion. That the sacred women of Dionysus ate, in mystical ceremony, raw flesh, and drank blood, is a fact often mentioned, and commemorates, as it seems, the actual sacrifice of a fair boy deliberately torn to pieces, fading at last into a symbolical offering.[43]

    Many years before Girard, then, Pater had made the question of the sacrificial victim central to his understanding of the foundational myths of Western culture, emphasizing the ways in which these sacrificial rites were mimetic of an originary event which had been forgotten, and which served a social function in preventing the contagion of wider violence which in turn would threaten the wider body politic.

    Indeed, Pater also understood instinctively something else: that the corollary of the mimetic crisis is the sublimation of desire into resentment, that ‘theatre of envy’ which Girard finds at work in Shakespeare’s tragedies.[44] For Pater, the ‘irony’ of the history plays lies in the way in which Shakespeare reveals that these seemingly great men are revealed to be weak:

    Shakespeare’s kings are not, nor are meant to be, great men: rather, little or quite ordinary humanity, thrust upon greatness, with those pathetic results, the natural self-pity of the weak heightened in them into irresistible appeal to others as the net result of their royal prerogative. [45]

    Pater’s language, of course, skirts the hopelessly self-occluded Malvolio of Twelfth Night, who holds himself as one shortly to ‘have greatness thrust upon them‘ (2.5.142), in another masterly moment of Shakespearean dramatic irony.[46] It reveals a vision of Shakespeare’s kings as human, all too human, and if my phrasing here implies Nietzsche, this is because there is something of ressentiment in Pater’s discussion, both in its topology, its displacement of reactive forces, and its typology, its reversal of values.[47] But more broadly, the weakness of Shakespeare’s great men speaks to an essential reversibility in the figure of the king, where the monarch’s humanity reveals that sovereign and subject are inextricably linked.

    It is this insight, ultimately, that lies at the heart of Pater’s reading of the ‘inverted rites’ of Richard II. Contra Girard, Pater does indeed understand that Richard’s rite was ‘inverted’, and not simply insofar as it performs another non-existent ritual ‘as if’ it existed, but because all rites are eminently reversible. The weak become great, the great—always having had their greatness thrust upon them even if, by an accident of birth, they happen to have been born great—become weak: this is what Pater reads into the ‘inverted rites’ of Richard II. It is this ironic distance that he maintains that allows him to see the ironies of history for what they are: the ‘inverted rite’ here lays bare the ways in which the plays taken as a chronicle narrate less the triumph of the Tudor line than the hidden ressentiment which propels this narrative, the melancholic loss that lies as the hidden corollary of this history of England. On the basis of passages such as these, one might hazard the following suggestion: if Girard did not actually read Pater’s essay on ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ when he wrote Violence and the Sacred, then he should have done so: he would have found much of interest, here as elsewhere in Pater’s work, in his approach to the question of those ‘inverted rites’ which found the social order as such.

    Notes

    [1] See Richard van Oort, ‘René Girard’s Shakespeare’, Anthropoetics, 21:2 (2016), online at https://anthropoetics.org/journal/ap-vol-21/ap2102/2102vanoort/, excerpted from Shakespeare’s Big Men: Tragedy and the Problem of Resentment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 188-199. I give page references to the book version of the essay.

    [2] René Girard, A Theater of Envy: William Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 6. The ‘modernity’ of Shakespeare is, of course, a common critical trope, although Girard’s specifically anthropological take on this question is different in emphasis. Compare, for instance, Matthew Arnold’s famous critical humanist approach in his discussion of Hamlet’s ‘dialogue of the mind with in his preface to Poems (1853), in The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, ed. R.H. Super, 11 vols (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960–78), 1: 1-15 (p. 1); for his influential neo-historicist approach, see Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: from more to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 [1980]); and for a poststructuralist approach, see Harold Bloom’s Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998).

    [3] van Oort, Shakespeare’s Big Men, 190.

    [4] van Oort, Shakespeare’s Big Men, 190.

    [5] Although van Oort does briefly allude to Pater’s essay in an earlier piece: see ‘Shakespeare and the Idea of the Modern’, New Literary History, 37:2 (2006): 319-339 (p. 331).

    [6] van Oort, Shakespeare’s Big Men, 190.

    [7] René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (London: Continuum, 2005 [1972]), 315.

    [8] See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 319.

    [9] Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 320.

    [10] Girard cuts line 245 of the speech when he quotes it; note also that the speech is taken from act 4 and not act 5, as is given in the reference in the English edition of Girard’s Violence and the Sacred. References to Richard II are taken from Charles R. Forker’s edition for the Arden Shakespeare Third Series (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).

    [11] Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 320.

    [12] For a development of Girard’s analysis of Richard II, see Naomi Conn Liebler, ‘The Mockery King of Snow: Richard II and the Sacrifice of Ritual’, in True Rites and Maimed Rites: Ritual and Anti-Ritual in Shakespeare and his Age, ed. Linda Woodbridge and Edward Berry (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 220-39.

    [13] van Oort, Shakespeare’s Big Men, 188.

    [14] See The Letters of Walter Pater, ed. Lawrence Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 89, 90, 93.

    [15] For a history of French translations of Pater up to 2004, see Stephen Bann, ed., The Reception of Walter Pater in Europe (London: Continuum, 2004).

    [16] Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997 [1957]), 35-36.

    [17] Walter Pater, Appreciations with an Essay on Style (London: Macmillan, 1944 [1889]), 192.

    [18] R.M. Seiler, ed., Walter Pater: The Critical Heritage (London: Routledge, 1980), 214-19 (p. 219).

    [19] Arthur C. Benson, Walter Pater (London: Macmillan, 1926 [1906]), 155. That Benson was critical at all here is of interest: published in Macmillan’s English Men of Letters series, there was a financial incentive for the publisher (also Pater’s publisher) to promote Pater’s works to his readers. On this point, see Laurel Brake, Subjugated Knowledges: Journalism, Gender, and Literature in the 19th Century (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 188-215, and Print in Transition: Studies in Media and Book History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 53-66.

    [20] On the question of the complex discursive response of the aesthetes and decadents to the question of effeminacy, see Linda Dowling, Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 5-31.

    [21] Benson, Walter Pater, 156. Benson also takes issue with the essay’s ending, which he feels strikes a bathetic note, in language again critical of Pater’s ‘subtlety’ – it constitutes ‘a subtle passage, not fully worked out’ (Walter Pater, 155-56). In point of fact, this passage, although peripheral to our current discussion, is anything if not ‘fully worked out’: it constitutes a major statement of Pater’s new aesthetic theory, one which takes issue with the dominant dialectical approaches to the history of poetics, and the relative status of lyric and dramatic poetry within these traditions, as developed by Schlegel and Hegel.

    [22] For a discussion of Pater and irony in a different, classical context, see my ‘Pater’s Heraclitus: Irony and the Historical Method’, in Pater the Classicist, ed. Stefano Evangelista, Charles Martindale and Elisabeth Prettlejohn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 261-73.

    [23] Pater, Appreciations, 193.

    [24] Pater, Appreciations, 196.

    [25] Jeanne T. Newlin, Richard II: Critical Essays (London: Garland, 1984), xii.

    [26] William Shakespeare, Richard II, ed. John Dover Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951 [1939]), xiii. Pater’s essay on ‘Love’s Labours Lost’ dates from much earlier in his career, written in 1878, although first published in Macmillan’s Magazine, December 1885. It would be republished alongside the later essay on ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ in Appreciations, with the two essays separated by another on ‘Measure for Measure’, first published in the Fortnightly Review, November 1874.

    [27] Perhaps Dover Wilson’s edition was the one used by Girard, offering this as an alternative source for his knowledge of Pater’s essay, although given the similarities between the relevant passages of Violence and the Sacred and The King’s Two Bodies, noted above, Kantorowicz remains the more likely source.

    [28] Dover Wilson, ed., Richard II, xiii.

    [29] Dover Wilson, ed., Richard II, xv.

    [30] Dover Wilson, ed., Richard II, xvi.

    [31] Pater, Appreciations, 203.

    [32] Pater, Appreciations, 203.

    [33] Pater, Appreciations, 204.

    [34] Pater, Appreciations, 204.

    [35] Pater, Appreciations, 205, and on Divine Right compare Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 319.

    [36] Pater, Appreciations, 210.

    [37] Pater, Appreciations, 205-206.

    [38] Compare, for instance, the famous final line of the second stanza of Keats’ ‘Ode on Melancholy’, ‘And feed deep, deep upon her peerless eyes’ (l. 20), where the assonance draws out the line seemingly beyond its own metrical limits.

    [39] Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 320.

    [40] See Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2009 [1989]), 32, and The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Women and Causality (London: Verso, 2005 [1994]), 91.

    [41] On Pater’s assimilation of recent German scholarship, as well as other pertinent material both classical and contemporary, during the period of composition, see Billie Andrew Inman, Walter Pater and his Reading, 1874–1877 (London: Garland, 1990), and on the significance of his turn to anthropology during the mid-1870s, following the negative critical responses to his Renaissance (1873), see Inman, ‘The Emergence of Pater’s Marius Mentality: 1874–75′, English Literature in Transition, 27 (1984), 100–23.

    [42] Walter Pater, Greek Studies (London: Macmillan, 1908 [1895]), 44. That Pater’s treatment of Dionysus in certain ways prefigures that of Girard is a point made by Albert Heinrichs in ‘Loss of Self, Suffering, Violence: The Modern View of Dionysus from Nietzsche to Girard’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 88 (1984), 205-40. For a Nietzschean approach to Pater’s Dionysus, see Robert and Janice A. Keefe, Walter Pater and the Gods of Disorder (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1988). Elsewhere, I address the question of Pater’s Dionysus in my Aestheticism and the Philosophy of Death: Walter Pater and Post-Hegelianism (Oxford: Legenda, 2010), 93-100, although here I distance Pater’s approach to the God, at least as the figure appears in his imaginary portrait ‘Denys L’Auxerrois’ (1886), from that adopted by Girard.

    [43] Pater, Greek Studies, 47-48.

    [44] For a development of Girard and Gans on the problem of resentment in Shakespeare, see van Oort’s Shakespeare’s Big Men.

    [45] Pater, Appreciations, 207.

    [46] William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, ed. Keir Elam (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

    [47] That Pater’s treatment of this ‘inverted rite’ should turn on something approximating to the mechanism of ressentiment may be less surprising given the ways in which, as I have shown in my Aestheticism and the Philosophy of Death (103-107), Pater’s thinking in the 1880s came to focus on a series of Nietzschean insights, with his collection of short stories, the Imaginary Portraits, published the same year that Nietzsche published his Genealogy (1887), and only two years before the essay on ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’. It is worth noting here in passing that Girard addresses what he considers to be the weakness (so to speak) of Nietzsche’s theory of ressentiment in Violence and the Sacred (199-200), although somewhat unconvincingly, since Girard, in reading Nietzsche here alongside Freud, seems to conflate the idea of ressentiment with that of resentment; which is to say, since Girard seems to understand the concept only topologically, rather than as simultaneously topological and typological. On the typological and topological in ressentiment, see Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 2005 [1962]), 104-09.

  • Benchmarks (Anthropoetics XXIII, no. 1)

    About Our Contributors

    Bjorn Beijnon is a lecturer at the Department of Media and Culture Studies, Utrecht University, the Netherlands. His interests lie in the embodied human perception of media and how humans come to create their own media. In his current research, he focusses on how the body is involved in understanding complex interfaces that are created by Virtual Reality (VR).

    Elisabet Dellming is a lecturer at the Department of English, Stockholm University, Sweden. She received her PhD in 2015 for her doctoral thesis “Unsought, presented so easily”: A Phenomenological Study of Awe in the Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins. Her current research focusses questions concerning epistemology in the fiction of Marilynne Robinson.

    Ian Dennis is Chair of the Department of English at the University of Ottawa and Secretary-Treasurer of the Generative Anthropology Society and Conference. He is the author of four novels, of the Girardian study Nationalism and Desire in Early Historical Fiction (Macmillan 1997), and of Lord Byron and the History of Desire (Delaware 2009), a work of literary criticism making substantial use of both mimetic theory and generative anthropology. He was the chief organiser of the 2009 GA conference in Ottawa, and co-organiser in 2013 at UCLA.

    Marina Ludwigs teaches English Literature at Stockholm University. She has a PhD in Comparative Literature from UC Irvine and has worked with, and presented papers on, both Girardian theory and Generative Anthropology. Her current interest is bringing into dialogue narratology and Generative Anthropology.

    Giles Whiteley is Docent (Reader) in English Literature at Stockholm University, focusing on the eighteenth and nineteenth century. He is the author of Aestheticism and the Philosophy of Death: Walter Pater and Post-Hegelianism (2010), nominated for the Balakian Prize, and Oscar Wilde and the Simulacrum: the Truth of Masks (2015). His forthcoming monograph on Schelling’s Reception in Nineteenth Century British Literature will be published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2018.

    Dr. Joakim Wrethed currently works as a lecturer in English Literature at Stockholm University. He has hitherto mainly worked in Irish Studies but he also explores the contemporary novel in English more generally without any primary emphasis on national boundaries. Dr. Wrethed has published articles on several contemporary authors, including John Banville, Margaret Atwood, and Tom McCarthy. Phenomenology, aesthetics and theology are overarching themes in his scholarly work.

    Magdalena Złocka-Dąbrowska is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszynsky University in Warsaw, and a member of GASC since 2015. She is the author of a book, Analyse de l’œuvre de Georges Dumézil, un maître à penser (Toruń 2013) and articles that include “Puja. Hindu Temple Rituals”; “Comprehension ethnologique de l’oeuvre de Georges Dumézil”; “Metaphors, Simulacrum and European Imagination”; “Conception de la tripartition: Georges Dumézil et l’ensemble indo-européen” and others. Her current projects, “Consecutio Modorum: Mediation Between Two Concepts of Culture, Analog and Digital”, “Cratos as Cognition: Gans and Dumézil in Dialogue on Language and Violence” and “Generative Anthropology in the Cosmic Realms of the Mahabharata”, enter into the pathway of originary thinking and scenic logic. Professor Złocka-Dąbrowska is the organizer of the 2018 GASC, which will be held at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University.

  • Imagination, Irreality, and the Constitution of Knowledge in Penelope Fitzgerald’s The Blue Flower

    While it is hardly surprising that Penelope Fitzgerald’s novel about Novalis should be critically considered primarily in terms of historical fiction,[1] my examination of The Blue Flower relies on two main assumptions about fiction which means approaching the novel from a slightly different perspective. The first of these assumptions is that all artists, to a certain extent, are phenomenologists in that they perform reductions, that is, they ask us to suspend our belief in “the world” (what Edmund Husserl termed the natural attitude) and open ourselves to life’s irreality, that is, its fictive possibilities, that which could happen and could have happened but never was actualised. Here I draw on Maurice Natanson’s suggestion that “the fictive does not replace the real but strikes the anvil of possibility in such a way that ‘pieces’ of fire illuminate reality” (Natanson, 146).[2] This claim relates to my other assumption, drawn from the first one, namely that fiction, because of its irreality, constitutes an epistemological mode that has the capacity to account for knowledge and knowing not readily available in any other way. Fiction, in that particular sense, is to be considered a form of knowledge.

    As Natanson points out, “[p]hilosophy cannot survive without significant metaphors” and literature provides such a metaphor (146). Fitzgerald’s choice of epigraph for the novel, “Novels arise out of the shortcomings of history” from Novalis’ Fragmente und Studien tells us some important things about how to or, perhaps, how not to read the novel. We are warned against regarding The Blue Flower as biography, we are called to distrust history, and we are encouraged to be intrigued by witnessing the coming-to-givenness of fiction as we, with a sense of discovery, see it “arise out of” what we are told are “short-comings.” Clearly, such shortcomings can be of different kinds; I am, however, here primarily interested in history’s shortcomings in terms of experience and epistemic justice. While the choice of epigraph to some extent aligns the author with Novalis (the irreal, rather than actual subject of the novel), it also places at centre stage questions about fiction when it comes to knowledge—in varying degrees of reliability. With this focus in mind, Fitzgerald quite decisively shifts our attention away from the natural attitude and the chimera of the personal history of Novalis. We should then not mistake Fitzgerald’s meticulous research into late 18th century Germany and into the life and fragmentary writing of Novalis for an attempt to tell us the history of Novalis in novel form. Indeed, in a significantly “irreal” move, Fitzgerald, by using that particular quote, takes her cue from Novalis himself. The implication of these assumptions for my reading of Penelope Fitzgerald’s novel The Blue Flower is that I do not appeal to history as a corrective account of what (really) happened in the actual life of Novalis, but to Fitzgerald’s fiction as non-actualised possibility, and in doing so I explore what the fictive can and does do as an irrealisation of history,[3] one of the consequences of which is that the fictional lives of the forgotten are redeemed.

    This redemptive quality is precisely what Ricoeur’s philosophy of the possible highlights.  He suggests that we owe “the forgotten ones of history” to respond with “our poetical and ethical powers” in order to “recover their occluded voices from the past” (Kearney 54), in fact, a notion similar to the concept of epistemic injustice Miranda Fricker speaks of. According to Fricker “any epistemic injustice wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge, and thus in a capacity essential to human value” (5). In other words,  what a person feels, experiences, believes, or is (in terms of identity) is dismissed or disregarded. From the perspective of Fitzgerald’s mode of fiction, then, human value is not necessarily granted in historical/biographical accounts and is part of the shortcomings of history, those same shortcomings prefaced in the epigraph to the novel. Epistemic injustice, as Fricker points out, can lead to the ultimate injustice, that is, preventing someone “from becoming who they are” (5).  What I suggest then is that Fitzgerald’s novel, by way of the irreal, makes that epistemic recovery in Ricoeur’s sense, allowing the fictionality of her characters to “arise out of the shortcomings of history” and thus “becoming who they are.” Ricoeur’s philosophy helps us see the ethos of this position:

    It may be said that every event, by the fact that it has been realized, has usurped the place of impeded possibilities. It is fiction that can save these impeded possibilities and, at the same time, turn them back on history; this reverse-face of history, which has not taken place, but which had been able to take place, in a certain way has been, only however in a potential mode (On Paul Ricoeur, 187)

     In The Blue Flower we are quite explicitly asked not to trust history as a source of epistemically just knowledge but to consider “its cut-off possibilities of actualization rather than its successes” and the exploration of the “potential mode” (Kearney, 54). In phenomenological terms, we are encouraged to suspend our belief in history’s account of the past altogether. As Kearney points out, Ricoeur’s way of looking at (non-actualised) possibilities of history has political, poetical, as well as ontological implications (55). In addition, I would argue that it has clear epistemological implications, particularly as we bring the notion of epistemic injustice to bear on the issue.

    This brings us to why reading The Blue Flower as an historical novel limits our perspective. While Laura Savu quite successfully stresses the idea of the author in respect to the novel and the alignment/convergence between her and her subject, I suggest that to reduce The Blue Flower to “historiographic metafiction” (Savu, 77) fails to account for imagination as knowledge within the novel’s life-world and it consequently fails to account for the fictive possibilities of epistemically just knowledge in fiction as such. Savu’s post-structuralist approach sees Fitzgerald’s novel as a meta-reflection on creativity, authorship and biography and suggests that Fitzgerald, metaphorically speaking, writes “in the margins” of Novalis’ incomplete novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen, that her novel is a “pseudobiographical replica” of that “endless” novel (77).  Although Savu’s use of Novalis’ own work as a point of comparison tends to lend credibility to The Blue Flower as pseudo-biography, it simultaneously, if inadvertently, takes away its imaginative autonomy and, curiously, reduces it to something close to tautology. An epistemologically and ontologically more viable approach, I suggest, is to look less at what connects Fitzgerald with Novalis (and indisputably, as Savu shows, there are connections) in order to legitimise her “method” and, instead, focus on how Fitzgerald’s novel constitutes knowledge by way of imagination in the first place.

    For this reason, my reading will start at the opposite end to that of Laura Savu and others who read The Blue Flower as an example of historical (meta-) fiction. I will bracket Novalis and focus on the irreality of the novel; I will suspend belief in the existence of Novalis in order to focus on the fictive rather than on historical connectivity. In other words, it is precisely The Blue Flower’s suspended belief in “Novalis” (the irrealisation of Novalis) that makes it an entrance into reality proper in Natanson’s sense; the irreal of the imaginary illuminating reality. Here I would like to suggest that what is signified epistemologically by “fictive possibilities” is precisely its refusal to take for granted the priority of historical knowledge and biography over fiction as a source of knowledge as well as a method to produce epistemically and ethically viable knowledge. Significantly, through the fictive’s conscious irrealisation of Novalis, that is, by making him an obviously and explicitly fictive character, we can no longer take for granted his actual existence but would have to rely on the possibility of Fritz.

    From this perspective then, “the short-comings of history” become the very condition of possibility for imagination and knowledge. Here I would like to do a foray into how knowledge can be said to connect to imagination as it is presented to us as fiction. Rita Felski’s discussion of the complex relation between knowledge and fiction offers some insights in this respect:

    The worldly insights we glean from literary texts are not derivative or tautological, not stale second-hand scraps of history or anthropology, but depend on a distinctive repertoire of techniques, conventions, and aesthetic possibilities, Through their rendering of the subtleties of social interaction, their mimicry of linguistic idioms and cultural grammars, their unblinking attention to the materiality of things, texts draw us into imagined yet referentially salient worlds. They do not just represent, but make newly present, significant shapes of social meaning; they crystallize, not just in what they show but in their address to the reader, what Merleau-Ponty calls the essential interwovenness of our being in the world. Their fictional and aesthetic dimensions, far from testifying to a failure of knowing, should be hailed as the source of their cognitive strength. (Felski, 104)

    In terms of my claim regarding fiction as knowledge, Felski’s point about “the fictional and aesthetic” as literature’s “cognitive strength” is precisely how the fictive allows for the irreal to take precedence over the actual and to suspend our reliance on preconceived notions about reality. Felski also points out that “reading fuses cognitive and affective impulses” (132) and in doing so, I suggest, hints at the constitution of fiction’s epistemological ethos.  To put it slightly differently, fiction makes available to us a space of as well as for imagination, for fiction to engage with the “shortcomings of history” that The Blue Flower explores, and to show recognition of what is lost. Indeed, “the shortcomings of history” condition our imagination as a scene of representation and are generative of our ability to construct meaning.  From this also follows that fiction by way of imagination is key to the construction of epistemically just knowledge about the world, that is, knowledge that takes into account subjects’ status as knowers (in Fricker’s terms). Novels contribute fiction to our sense-making of the world, not as appealing gap fillers but as explorations into the irreality that illuminates imagination and human consciousness. Clearly, from this point of view, Fitzgerald does more than to simply borrow the identities of Fritz von Hardenburg (using the diminutive Fritz rather than Friedrich to separate his identity even further from the actuality of Novalis), his family, and (sometimes fictive) contemporaries in order to irrealise them; the novel consistently calls attention to fictive possibilities, and the metaphors of loss through its small failures, forgotten regrets, in fact, mixing the small failures with the larger ones.

    One significant aspect of The Blue Flower in its “potential mode” is its  thematisation of this overarching current of loss, and as such it serves to highlight loss in all its different aspects.  This “loss” is thematised in different ways: as the anticipated series of loss of young lives to illness, to death, but also the theme of loss as the never actualised or even verbalised possibility of Karoline Just’s love for Fritz and the Freifrau Hardenburg’s flash of realisation that “she was forty-five, and she did not see how she was going to get through the rest of her life” (TBF, 201).  This current of loss functions as a metaphor for the attempt at recovering lost possibilities as a larger philosophical project for the novel. Fictive possibilities, in The Blue Flower, are important for imagination and consequently for knowledge. When Fritz towards the very end of the novel—and the end of Sophie’s life—fails to turn back to her room as he has done before, the novel implicates him in her suffering: “Sometimes he would be on the point of leaving and then dismount and run back again across the hall, up the two staircases which were nothing to him, into her room to say to her once again, ‘Sophie, you are my heart’s heart.’ This evening that was not the case, and he did not come back” (TBF, 280). In a way, the entire novel perpetuates the moment of loss in its potential mode as it at so many junctures predicates the possible that did not happen either through failure to act (as in this last instance, or failure of understanding, as in Fritz’s failure to realise Karoline is in love with him) or simply the failure of things to work out as hoped or expected, as in the Freifrau’s whole life or the romance between Fritz and Sophie.

    The failed painting Fritz has commissioned is a case in point: He engages an artist to draw a picture of Sophie in what seems like an attempt to recover something from impending loss, not necessarily of life, but of youth, of innocence. The (imagined) picture becomes a fictive possibility, an intended irrealisation of Sophie, something, as Fritz puts it, he needs because he does not “altogether understand” her (TBF, 153).  However, the artist, despite several attempts, in the end literally cannot paint Sophie. He gives this explanation of his failure to do so: “‘I could not hear her question, so I could not paint her”‘ (TBF, 154), an explanation based on the notion that there is in every entity a question, and that it is this question that gives it substance, a notion derived from German early Romanticism but which, in phenomenological terms, can be read as a metaphor for that current of loss that is illuminated through the irreal. Significantly, when Fritz’ relates his conversation with the painter to his sister, explaining that there are only a few sketches, this irreal aspect of the project is highlighted: “they are a kind of notation only—a few lines. A cloud of hair. He declares she is undrawable” (157). These “few lines” then, and the “cloud of hair” both speak to incompleteness and, precisely because of this, to its numerous but elusive possibilities. Indeed, to be undrawable is to be granted subjectivity.

    Irrealisation serves yet another purpose in the recovery of loss signified by the “potential mode,” namely insofar as it both highlights the transient aspect of life and defamiliarises it. When Maurice Natanson said that “literature is an entrance to reality” (19), he meant that if we are able to see “the fictive possibilities,” the strangeness that appears to defamiliarise the everyday, we will have, from a phenomenological perspective, a more illuminated sense of reality. This I consider a key aspect of The Blue Flower’s commitment to the strangeness of the everyday, the strange being, as Natanson puts it, “a hiddenness uncovered by the familiar. Not ‘set off against,’ then, but hidden within” (Natanson, 16).  The Blue Flower’s imaginary world arises immediately out of everyday experience while consistently making the everyday appear both strange and fantastic. One passage which demonstrates this quite clearly is when Fritz enters for the first time the home of the tax collector Coelestin Just to whom he has been apprenticed and with whom he is to board: “he looked around him as though at a revelation. ‘It is beautiful, beautiful’” (TBF, 62). This observation, however, is dismissed by Just’s wife, but Fritz goes on to exclaim that Karoline, Just’s niece, is also beautiful and at Just’s wife’s renewed denial he goes on to reassert his point:

    ‘But I did mean it,’ said Fritz. ‘When I came into your home, everything, the wine-decanter, the tea, the sugar, the chairs, the dark green tablecloth with its abundant fringe, everything was illuminated.’

    ‘They are as usual. I did not buy this furniture myself, but–’

    Fritz tried to explain that he had seen not their everyday, but their spiritual selves. He could not tell when these transfigurations would come to him. When the moment came it was as if the whole world would be when body at last became subservient to soul. (TBF, 63)

    What is significant here are the “transfigurations” of the everyday presence of household items perceived by Fritz. For some reason, he does not take them for granted. He enters the world of the Just’s in a state of anticipation. Suddenly “transfigurations” appear. This passage, in all its brevity, accomplishes a phenomenological move, insofar as it demonstrates a certain cognisance with the irreal as a proper field of examination. More specifically, Fritz lives the suspended belief in “the world” at the heart of Husserl’s phenomenology. This state of affairs is perhaps made even clearer later on in the novel when Fritz expresses a sense of awe in the strangeness hidden in the familiar, in a distinctly phenomenological manner:

    We think we know the laws that govern our existence. We get glimpses, perhaps only once or twice in a lifetime, of a totally different system at work behind them. One day when I was reading between Rippach and Lützen, I felt the certainty of immortality, like the touch of a hand.—When I first went to the Justs’ house in Tennstadt, the house seemed radiant to me, even the green tablecloth, yes, even the bowl of sugar.—When I first met Sophie, a quarter of an hour decided me.—Rahel reproved me, Erasmus reproached me, but they were wrong, both of them wrong.—In the churchyard at Weissenfels I saw a boy, not quite grown into a man, standing with his head bowed in mediation on a green space not yet dug up, a consoling sight in the half darkness. These were the truly important moments of my life, even though it ends tomorrow. (TBF, 272)

    The assertion Fritz makes here is phenomenologically meaningful in several respects. First, the suggestion that meaning and “truly important moments” do exist “in spite of everything” and are meaningful “even though it ends tomorrow” is significant. Indeed, the anticipation of ultimate loss is in itself constitutive of this particular sense of meaning. Secondly, speaking in terms of “glimpses” that undermine what we take for granted about “the laws that govern existence,” Fritz effectively challenges the natural attitude. Fitzgerald in yet another irreal move is placing Fritz in the position of the artist-phenomenologist, giving him the epistemic authority to speak as a subject, a “knower” who ultimately extends “history.” I think this should be read as a metaphor for the emergence of fictive possibilities as an illumination of reality, its equivalent to the “cloud of hair” metaphor of the failed painting of Sophie.

    What follows from this  assumption is that a person’s lived experience in itself is a form of knowledge, and that epistemic injustice stems from a failure on the part of others to recognise the validity of this experience, that one be recognised (in Fricker’s terms) as a knower. Read from this perspective, the epigraph of the novel (“Novels arise out of the shortcomings of history”) foregrounds how imagination by way of the fictive not only adds to but also alters the very premise of human knowledge, by appropriating or taking advantage of the space constituted by assumed as well as imaginary “shortcomings.” We should then consider the term “shortcomings” as a metaphor elucidating literary fiction’s ultimate condition of possibility, and, indeed, its generative impetus.

    The final chapter of The Blue Flower is called “Afterword,” and despite its formal nod to non-fiction, its half poetic, half-prosaic catalogue of the fates of the principals of the novel is of course part of the fiction. Facts, in that particular sense (and in line with Savu’s argument), appear to converge with fiction. As James Wood points out, “[w]hen characters in historical novels die, they die as fictional characters, not as historical personages” (Wood, 2013). More important, however, is that they not only die as fictional characters, they live as fictional characters as well, and, in fact, only live as fictional characters in the irreal world of the novel. The structure of fiction allows characters (to borrow another phrase from James Wood) “to float away from [their] factual underpinnings” (Wood, 2014). However, what the novel puts into question by its fragmentary structure as well as through its magnifying lens on the everyday is the disproportionate arbitrariness of what is deemed “factual” in the first place. Fitzgerald’s attention to peculiar details (how laundry was done, what food 18th-century Germans of the lower nobility were likely to eat, what Christmas gifts they would make) shifts focus not necessarily away from “big” events but from the idea that big events holds priority over the mundane. What Fitzgerald’s method suggests is that a novel has redemptive qualities insofar as it has the capacity to epistemically shift this balance. The function of fiction (and those novels called, however misleadingly, historical novels in particular) is not, as was pointed out above, primarily a question of filling in the blanks (it is often quite the contrary) but rather about an epistemic practice that to a larger extent than any other practice can account for lived experience and acknowledge its fictional subjects as knowers.

    This peculiar state of affairs also has implications for the understanding of knowledge and how true, accurate or fair knowledge relies on experience and imagination “arising out of it” or generated from it. Art’s capacity to expand existence as remarked by Robert Lowell in the poem “Epilogue” points to an equally prominent factor in Fitzgerald’s exploration of the anticipation of loss. Lowell’s insistence at the beginning of the poem that “I want to make/ something imagined, not recalled” and the final lines’ statement “We are poor passing facts,/ warned by that to give/ each figure in the photograph/ his living name” both serve to reiterate imagination’s role in a transient world when it comes to affording justice to “each figure in the photograph” regardless of their historical insignificance. Fitzgerald’s brief, mock “factual” summary of the short lives and deaths of the young von Hardenburgs speaks most clearly to this notion, and in doing so grants an emblematic epistemic justice through the potential mode of the fictive. The “living name,” in this context, I take to mean not Novalis, but the fictive possibilities of the “imagined, not recalled.”

    Hence, imagination takes priority over memory as well as over history. The Blue Flower foregrounds this position on history in the chapter aptly named “What is the Meaning?,” a chapter which highlights how imagination works with as well as as history in the novel: When Colestin Just complains that the French Revolution has not produced what it was meant to, Fritz responds:  “But the spirit of the Revolution, as we first heard of it, as it first came to us, could be preserved here in Germany. It could be transferred to the world of the imagination, and administered by poets” (TBF, 76). Fritz is quite clearly not really considering the historical events of the Revolution (or its after-effects; indeed, it could be inferred that he was critical of them).  Rather, our attention is directed towards the “spirit” or idea of Revolution as such.  The phrase “as we first heard of it” is key here, insofar as it predicates how the idea as it is received constitutes an assimilation of the sublimated idea of Revolution “transferred to the imagination,” ultimately to be “administered” by “poets.” In the context of The Blue Flower, this “Romantic” notion takes on epistemological significance. What the novel, through Fritz, appears to be saying is that the generative aspects of the event of the Revolution (or any historical event) can only be assimilated (or even grasped), and consequently operate as a phenomenon transferred to the world of the imagination and conveyed through the aesthetic. In other words, its (truly) transformative effects can only take place through an aesthetic appropriately adapted to its purpose. But an epistemically fair history, as Fitzgerald’s novel shows with such distinctness, cannot be reduced to the interpretation of famed men’s thoughts and the key events of their lives—however revolutionary. What The Blue Flower does is to account not for the feelings and longings of Novalis, the romantic poet/philosopher, but for the irrealisation of Novalis, the (fictive) young man Friedrich (Fritz) von Hardenburg before and beyond his existence as Romantic poet and influential philosopher.

    But this is not what the novel primarily tells us about knowledge and imagination as it relates to epistemic injustice. What it does highlight and gives weight to is the recovery of “the occluded voices” of Fritz’s circle of family and friends, allowing them to become “who they are.”

    For Fritz, Sophie von Kuhn is the incarnation of the sacred of the blue flower, and we are as readers only momentarily tempted to accept her as such. However, the narrative appears to be at pains to stress her ordinariness and, in a way, her failure to appear as sacred is what grants her status as a proper subject, as a knower in Fricker’s sense. Fritz sees Sophie as inscrutable and even “cold through and through” but the novel uses the epistemic authority of the narrative perspective to show her to be an ordinary girl:

     ‘Now tell me what you think about poetry?

    ‘I don’t think about it at all,’ said Sophie.

    ‘But you would not want to hurt a poet’s feelings.’

    ‘I would not want to hurt anyone’s feelings.’

    ‘Let us speak of something else. What do you like best to eat?’

    ‘Cabbage soup,’ Sophie told him, ‘and a nice smoked eel.’ (TBF, 103)

    The humour in this passage is not all on Fritz’s side: Indeed, the narrative here foregrounds Fritz’s obvious lack of the understanding or imagination to allow Sophie her subjectivity. Sophie is far from accepting being assigned the sacred figure role given to her by Fritz. In the fictive world of the novel, a remote correlate of the symbolic blue flower, she is a subject, to use Fricker’s word, a “knower” in her own right. The way then in which the fictive contributes to knowledge where history fails counteracts the epistemic injustice inherent in historical practice. The aesthetic or fictive then offers a way to reconsider “our epistemic practices,” that is, in its capacity to account for “the failings of history” where someone like Sophie becomes a minor figure and thereby to recover, in Ricoeur’s terms, a voice “occluded by history.” In this, fiction’s inventive power manages something more than mere history. The significance of Sophie then, in the end, is something both less and more than the blue flower; stressing her very ordinariness constitutes a way to grant her epistemic justice: she is not a merely a symbol, but a human being, slowly dying of an enormously painful disease, something to which Fritz appears, in the end, incapable to respond. The “potential mode” of Fitzgerald’s fiction, however, does respond. Sophie von Kuhn becomes, in such a response, not merely the elusive object of Fritz’s desire but a subject with her own life-world and her own epistemic authority within the world of the novel.

    There is however also some symbolic value at stake here. Turning to the blue flower of the title provides a different kind of challenge, a resistance which also extends to efforts to impose preconceived notions of meaning. The emblematic force of the blue flower is put into play as Fitzgerald has Fritz telling Karoline Just a story and then asking her “What is the meaning of the blue flower?” The story is about a young man who lies alone in his room remembering “the stranger and his stories”:

    I have no craving to be rich, but I long to see the blue flower. It lies incessantly at my heart, and I can imagine and think about nothing else. Never did I feel like this before. It is as if until now I had been dreaming, or as if sleep had carried me into another world. For in the world I used to live in, who would have troubled himself about flowers? (TBF, 78).

    In Fritz’s telling of this story, there are several points to be made about knowledge and imagination and imagination and meaning: Fritz clearly constructs the story as a scene of representation, whereby to ask, as in the title of the chapter where it first appears: “What is the meaning?” Significantly, however, it is a fragment that he never appears to be able to contextualise and give closure to; the fragment is equally mysterious to him, its author, as it is to his interlocutors. Indeed, the blue flower and its fragmentary narrative irrealises the inner workings of fiction as fiction as it predicates fiction’s eidos (and indeed ethos): its capacity to explore the possibilities of human consciousness and through imagery express the longing for what is essentially impossible to grasp but which, all the same, constitutes a form of knowledge.

    In the “Afterword” we are told that at his death-bed Novalis told Schlegel “that he had entirely changed his plan for the story of the Blue Flower” (TBF, 282). In this laconic note, the narrator is not merely turning on its head the notion of meaning but is also pointing to the ultimate triumph of imagination. In other words, it is not only that, ultimately, we are not given the key to the mystery of the blue flower, but rather that pointing to the final withholding of “facts,” the fictive, imaginary possibilities of narrative are stressing the figurative over the literal and the literary over “facts.” Literature then is not only employed as a metaphor to explain philosophy but as a metaphor to illuminate history.  As in the story fragment, the blue flower of the title constitutes not so much a deferral of meaning in a Derridean sense as (by way of its elusive significance) a correlate of the fragmentary, glimpse-like structure of the novel and, by extension, of the process of the constitution of meaningful knowledge by way of imagination. Consequently, the blue flower becomes emblematic of both imagination as knowledge and the consistent dependence on imagination for the potential recovery of any true or fair knowledge.

    As has been argued in the above, Fritz’s experience and imagination does not become the privileged mode of knowledge about him as a precursor to a future (famed) author figure.  What is created as to “arise out of the [one might add, epistemic] shortcomings of history” is something quite different. A passage from the novel where this becomes quite clear is when Fritz comes home and wants to speak to his mother in the garden to inquire about his father’s response to his proposal to Sophie:

    An extraordinary notion came to the Freifrau Auguste, that she might take advantage of this moment, which in its half-darkness and fragrance seemed to her almost sacred, to talk to her eldest son about herself. All that she had to say could be put quite shortly: she was forty-five, and she did not see how she was going to get through the rest of her life. Abruptly Fritz leaned towards her and said, ‘You know that I have only one thing to ask. Has he read my letter?’ (TBF, 201).

    Fritz is here portrayed not as the perceptive Romantic poet and philosopher but as a flawed, self-centred adolescent who is, to a large extent, failing in a deeper understanding of who his mother is. Being the nominal subject of a fictional biography has not given him the epistemic authority of “his” story-world. Indeed, in only one sentence, his mother’s whole life and world is irrealised, illuminated and, to some extent, also recovered. Like Sophie, the Freifrau is a subject and is, by virtue of her lived experience, a knower. The novel’s conflation of experience, knowledge and imagination makes for an epistemically more just understanding of such subjects.

    The irrealisation of numerous aspects of the everyday that The Blue Flower suggests to us is intimately connected to the recovery of loss in the “potential mode” that characterises the fictive.  This is what simultaneously stresses the inevitability of loss and the illumination of possibilities prompted by that very inevitability. Richard Kearney, with reference to Ricoeur’s explorations on the subject of the possible, speaks of a middle-road between “extreme presence and extreme absence,” what he calls “an itinerary guided by a wager to render human existence, in all its frailty and finitude, capable of meaningful being in spite of everything” (Kearney, 50; original emphasis). It can be said that The Blue Flower navigates this middle-road as it, like Ricoeur, engages with the fictive as “a concrete description of the living human being as it acts and suffers in the everyday world” (50). The Blue Flower, forever in the experience of not yet loss, not yet death, aesthetically illuminates the notion of “meaningful being in spite of everything” that Kearney speaks of.

    Works cited

    Cornis Pope, Marcel. “Reinventing a Past: Historical Author Figures in Recent Postmodern Fiction.” Symploke. 18:1–2 (2010), 309–315 (Review).

    Felski, Rita. Uses of Literature. Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 2008.

    Fitzgerald, Penelope. The Blue Flower (1995). London: Fourth Estate. 2013.

    Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2007.

    Kearney, Richard. “Capable Man, Capable God” in A Passion for the Possible: Thinking with Paul Ricoeur. Ed. Brian Treanor and Henry Isaac Venema. New York: Fordham UP. 2010.

    Natanson, Maurice. The Erotic Bird: Phenomenology in Literature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP. 1998.

    On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation. Ed. David Wood. London: Routledge. 1991.

    Savu, Laura E. Postmortem Postmodernists: The Afterlife of the Author in Recent Narrative. Madison & Taeneck: Farleigh Dickinson UP. 2009.

    Wood, James. “Late Bloom: Hermione Lee’s Biography of the Writer Penelope Fitzgerald.”       New Yorker. 24 November, 2014.

    —. “Why? The Fictions of Life and Death.” New Yorker.9 December, 2013.

    Notes

    [1] E.g. Sudrann, 1993; Gitzen, 1997; Knapp, 1998; Ottenmer, 1998; Stonebridge, 2005; Savu, 2009; Wood, 2013, 2014.

    [2] Natanson describes the distinction between the “real” and the “irreal” using the following example: “‘Irreal’ does not mean ‘unreal’; ‘irreal’ signifies a turn away from the given fact or event in a situation of any kind to, instead, the possibility of that fact or event. But the point goes further. In the ‘fact-world’ of daily life, the ‘reality’ of a sign in the window of a restaurant, announcing ‘LUNCH BEING SERVED,’ is irrealized if it be noted that the restaurant is closed–closed for good. Indeed, there is still the fictive possibility there for lunch being served (and it may, at any time become real again)” (Natanson, 26-27).

    [3] There are obviously several ways of dealing with novels about historical figures but common to all, regardless of whether we call them fictional biographies or historical fiction, is still that the fictional world takes priority over any historical fact, and it is this fictional aspect that I wish to highlight.

  • The Phenomenology of Representation, Ritual, and the Sacred in Tom McCarthy’s Remainder

    Tom McCarthy’s novel Remainder has attracted a great deal of academic attention. Its philosophical depth and intellectual challenges obviously demand a scholarly response. Published articles hitherto display considerable hermeneutic diversity. Media, technology, trauma, and the position of the novel in our contemporary media landscape are the most common topics critics tend to focus on. Christina Lupton, for instance, investigates what McCarthy’s narrative says about the status of the novel in our times. By means of the “future anterior” concept (505), Lupton claims that Remainder is an example of novelistic fiction that contemplates itself and its place on our more and more multifarious and complex media scene. According to Lupton, Remainder investigates itself as printed medium and the relation between itself and other media forms (511), but she also suggests that it ponders the intricate relation between representation and reality more generally, since it “show-cases the limits of its narrator’s mind” (510). Pieter Vermeulen sees McCarthy’s work as a challenge to the traditional, psychologising novel that insists on realist subjectivity as a firm narratological ground. Instead Vermeulen propounds that Remainder forwards subjectless “dysphoric affects” as an alternative traumatic expression, thereby reviving the novel form by means of “a genuinely undead, improperly buried subject that cannot help but continue to transmit trackless, dysphoric affects” (564). In contrast, Daniel Lea contends that there still is a tension remaining in Remainder as concerns authenticity and subjectivity. He argues that McCarthy is not “willing to dispense totally with the idea of the irreducible self” (464). Clearly, the work opens up an array of philosophical questions about subjectivity, identity, the function of memory, and the possibilities and limitations of representation.

    As indicated, the novel contests a number of well-established ontological distinctions. For instance, Jim Byatt traces a problematisation of yet another ontological border: that between life and death. He forwards the concept of “peritraumatic dissociation” as the moment on the threshold of death in which time is stretched out, providing a space for near-death experience in the form of narrative. According to Byatt, the whole of Remainder is, at least potentially, told from within this peritraumatic space. Like Sheherezade, the narrative holds death at bay and thereby at least temporarily transcends the seemingly rigid border between life and death. In addition, Sydney Miller uncovers the corroboration of other lines of demarcation. In focusing on the centrality of the accident in the novel, as a fall suspended in mid-air, Miller argues that Tom McCarthy challenges the distinctions between author and reader, as well as that between author and critic. He claims that the function of the accidental in Remainder takes away interpretative agency from the reader, but only to inexorably hand it back again: “[T]he confession that is Remainder challenges the form of the novel itself by collapsing the work of fiction with its critical apparatus, indulging in its own expository weightlessness while self-consciously scrutinizing its inevitable fall into explication” (658). Finally, Remainder has been situated in the context of film studies, which of course comes as no surprise considering the re-enactment’s filmic qualities. Vincenzo Maggitti examines the novel in the context of film and memory as thematised in literature. He explores the idea that Remainder “resembles the making of a movie when the film of memory is no longer available” (64).

    When regarding the scholarly diversity in this way, it becomes clear that Remainder is an experimental as well as deeply philosophical novel that by means of a patiently implemented zetetic (Socratic) method probes a number of ontological dilemmas. In all, McCarthy’s novel poses questions about what the novel form—or more broadly, fiction or representation—is supposed to be in the cultural context of the early 21st century. Thereby it implicitly considers what possibly constitutes a human being. It might perhaps be convenient to see Remainder as part of an altogether anti-humanist project that posits the fragmented human as a helpless product of a fragmentised and technified society. However, in my view that would be to prematurely close down the vast hermeneutic scope that McCarthy’s novel offers. Among the other themes highlighted above, Remainder actually investigates the limits of representation and thereby the very basis of human culture. If the readings to a great extent explore the contours of ontological distinctions, the following analysis seeks to uncover the collapse that follows another such problematisation, but here in terms of a transgression.

    Disregarding the theme of trauma, the reading presented here will instead zoom in on the more primordial cultural aspects of the narrative. If Remainder stages the fact that “transcendence is denied” (Lea 468), it also inevitably contains an immanent resistance to this move. Traces of that resistance can, for instance, be seen in Lea’s suggestion that there are residues of an irreducible self in the narrative. It shall be argued that this selfhood is made manifest in the form of ritualised repetition, which is a stronger version of the repetition of any signification practice. The concept of the ritual will be further defined and specified below, but even a rather plain explanation secures its relevance for Remainder. The OED stipulates that ritual is “[a] ritual act or ceremonial observance” but “[a]lso in later use: an action or series of actions regularly or habitually repeated” (OED Online S.v.: “Ritual”). As we shall see, both of these wordings fit the re-enactments displayed in McCarthy’s novel. Ritual makes manifest the identity of the protagonist over and against the sacred object of the ritual that is present in its absence.

    The argument below will first explain and establish the relevance of the generative anthropologist Eric Gans’s primary and secondary hypotheses, and then go on to claim that the narrator’s re-enactments may be regarded as rituals in which the sacred as absence attracts and provokes the protagonist to the degree that he feels an urge to reify it. That reification is then argued to be fatal in that it leads to the collapse of representation and thereby the move symbolically obliterates the foundation of human culture. This trajectory is mirrored in the protagonist’s obsession throughout the narrative.

    Eric Gans’s theory about the originary scene of representation is attractive in its minimalist precision. The deferral of conflict concerning the originary appetitive object—by means of representation and signification—presents a prolific cognitive structure for anyone interested in contemplating the centrality of art and fiction in any culture. Four related components in Gans’s theory are essential in the inquiry that follows: the cultural memory of the originary scene, desire, ritual, and the sacred. These concepts will be scrutinized through a phenomenological analysis of Tom McCarthy’s novel. Before turning to the novel, we need to establish an understanding of the key concepts.

    The originary scene of representation serves as a fundamental unit in the hypothesis we examine here. The founding cultural event is based on an abortive gesture. This gesture frees the energy and repeatability of signification processes.

    The original scene of representation . . . requires no external motivation, although such activities as hunting generate plausible settings. Fear of conflict is the sole necessary motivation for the abortion of the original gesture of appropriation. The minimality of our hypothesis indeed requires that this “abortion” be in its origin no more than a hesitation sufficiently marked to designate the object. The activity of appropriation can then proceed, but on a new basis. For the hesitation will have sufficed to make each member aware not merely of the appropriative intentions of the others but of their renouncement, expressed in the designating gestures, of merely appetitive (that is, “instinctual”) appropriation. Thus the act of representation, however brief, must lead to a nonviolent communal division or sharing of the object. (Gans 20; emphasis in original)

    Thus, representation holds the group together in two interrelated ways: to avoid conflict and to bind together in signifying practice. If we jump a few steps we understand the central position of narrativity and acting. Language makes possible more elaborate practices of representation. Immediately linked to the originary scene is also the concept of desire. Desire arises as the imaginary compensation for the aborted appetitive object. Gans’s definition of desire is “as appetite mediated by the appearance of its object on the scene of representation” (24). The realm of imagination is closely tied to desire as such. The inaccessibility of the appetitive object enhances its importance within the imaginary.

    The scene of representation is real, but it is also reproduced in the mind of each participant as the origin of what we may call his desiring imagination. The public significance attributed to the object makes his private representation of it a form of imaginary possession that not merely augments its appetitive attraction […] but radically transforms this attraction into a phenomenon of potentially general significance. (Gans 26; emphasis in original)

    The scene of representation and imagination serves to accomplish the deferral of appropriation of the appetitive object. But if we take the whole thing one step further we realize that the referential function of language is nevertheless effectual. Thus, the reproduction of the original event is according to Gans equal to a ritual in which the object is sacred.

    The sign, reproduced on the scene of representation, suffices to effect the deferral of appropriation of the designated desire-object and thereby to avoid conflict. But the reproduction of the event as a whole takes place not on the scene of representation but in the real world. It is this reproduction that we call ritual, and the status of the object in it, sacred. (43; emphasis in original)

    In all, the hypothesis outlined here posits the appetitive object as the basis for the subsequently elaborated levels of cultural practice. But what if the desired object is obscure and fragmentised by amnesia and trauma? What if the object is a non-entity that has only its gravity of unknowing as attraction? What if the desiring subject is forced to desire representation itself? What if that desire turns into an obsession, which subsequently turns into ritual that eventually becomes “real” and collapses the whole system? It should be mentioned that in the analysis that follows, Gans’s hypotheses are initially treated with an emphasis on their synchronic aspects. The diachronic dimension of cultural evolution will become more prominent towards the end. This may come out as a certain amount of theoretical violence, but hopefully the argument that follows has some creative value if regarded holistically.

    The problematisations outlined above indeed constitute the premises for Tom McCarthy’s novel Remainder. The unnamed protagonist has had an accident involving some kind of technology falling from the sky. But “the event [is] a blank: a white slate, a black hole” (McCarthy 5). The narrator receives 8.5 million pounds compensation for his injuries on condition that he not speak at all about the incident. Apart from other physical damage, he suffers from severe memory loss. Therefore he at first spends most of his time and money on trying to reconstruct fragments of his memory. He creates a scene with hired actors in order to get at each memory fragment. The first big project is to recreate a block of flats where the protagonist used to live at some point in time before the accident. The setting has to be perfectly in accordance with his memory down to the minutest details. Parts that are blank in the memory have to be blank in the re-enactment scene too. The protagonist is just supposed to walk down the stairs on his way out and what he sees has to perfectly match his memory.

    Here the sensations started returning: the same sense of zinging and intensity. My concierge was standing as instructed—standing quite still in the middle of the lobby with her white ice-hockey mask on. Behind her, to her left—my right—there was a cupboard; beside that, another strip of white, neutral space. As I walked around her in a circle, looking at her from all sides, her stumpy arms and featureless face seemed to emanate an almost toxic level of significance. (McCarthy 133)

    The near poisonous level of meaning is reached when the narrator comes close to an accurate match between the memory and the representation. If he desires the actual memory or the actual past, he cannot know exactly what he desires. Thus, the desire partly shifts towards the representation. He clearly covets being inside the re-enactment.

    The “white, neutral space” that recoils from representation is the most significant phenomenon in the present reading. Since the protagonist could potentially fill the space with memory substance, should his memory return, it does not seem to be an absolute nothingness. However, here it functions as the sacred. An unfilled space seemingly devoid of meaning still carries meaning in the overall signification process. It simultaneously marks the empty space that creates the suspense for the protagonist and thereby for the whole narrative. To fulfill its ontological function it must remain as a powerful emptiness. As rituals, all the re-enactments are underpinned by an unknown variable that the protagonist attempts to reify in order to reify himself over and against the object’s materialisation. This is the desire that turns into a monomania.

    As the narrative progresses, the obsession increases as well. In the re-enactment of the block of flats he has a pianist rehearsing as the aural backdrop. The pianist has to practice and make mistakes, only to repeat the passage until he gets it right. On one occasion he catches the pianist in the hallway while the music is playing. It is obviously a recording, which makes the protagonist furious. He presses the pianist for answers.

    “But there are mistakes in it!” I said. “And loopbacks, and…”

    “A recording of me. I made it myself, especially. It’s the same thing, more or less. Isn’t it?”

    It was my turn to go white now. There were no mirrors in the building, but I’m sure that if there had been and I’d looked in one I would have seen myself completely white: white with both rage and dizziness.

    “No!” I shouted. “No, it is not! It is absolutely not the same thing!”

    “Why not?” he asked. His voice was still monotonous and flat but was shaking a little.

    “Because… It absolutely isn’t! It’s just not the same because… It’s not the same at all.” (McCarthy 141)

    The protagonist’s fury matches his inability to explain the differences between the two levels of representation, which makes him end up in a tautology. That the recording does not reach the level of authenticity required goes to show that the re-enactments are closer to the “real” in whatever sense of that word we prefer. The scene reveals that the protagonist does not want to accept some kind of Baudrillardian ontology of the hyperreal (endless repetition without an original). It is rather a situation that comes closer to ritual. Since the essence of ritual is built on repetition, the re-enactment too has to be suffused with repetition. But the narrator has to know for certain that his imagination is backed up by the pianist really playing. Mere signification is not enough. The physical sensation of “zinging and intensity” that the protagonist experiences in the actual re-enactment has to be triggered by the real-world existence of ritual as the substitution for the originary scene of representation. Without the pianist really playing, the whole set-up collapses. The re-enactment of memory fragments does not challenge Gans’s theory of the originary scene. Its structure could underlie the protagonist’s desire for authenticity by means of access to his lost past. The challenge rather comes from the obsession with repetition and ritual. The irony planted into this passage is that—when upbraiding the piano player for destroying the component of the real—the narrator sees himself from the outside as a character going white with rage within the scene. He remains a prisoner within representation while trying to escape it by means of his invented quasi-ritual.

    This brings us to the next step in the investigation. As the novel develops, the narrator drifts away from his original plan of re-enacting memory fragments and picks up concrete events. First he re-enacts his experience at a tyre repair shop when he has his windshield-washing fluid refilled and it gushes out all over him into the interior of the car. The narrator becomes fascinated by the possibility of the washing fluid disappearing, transubstantiating into thin air. He has his crew build an exact replica of the car repair shop and he hires several teams of re-enactors who re-enact the series of events in a continuous loop. The next phase in the main character’s series of obsessions is with a set of shootings. A drug related shooting is the only one that gets re-enacted. The protagonist himself plays the victim and the actual space of the re-enactment becomes sacred ground.

    The spot that this had happened on was the ground zero of perfection—all perfection: the one he’d achieved, the one I wanted, the one everyone else wanted but just didn’t know they wanted and in any case didn’t have eight and a half million pounds to help them pursue even if they had known. It was sacred ground, blessed ground—and anyone who occupied it in the way he’d occupied it would become blessed too. And so I had to re-enact his death: for myself, certainly, but for the world in general as well. (McCarthy 178)

    It gradually becomes obvious that not even ritual is enough for the narrator’s compulsive behaviour. What holds up ritual and distinguishes it from ordinary representation is the prevalence of the referent. The referent is here the actual event of the victim dying in a certain spot. What the protagonist wants to achieve is something impossible. He wants to revive or relive the “real” event to attain something of its “realness”. There are at this point two discordant features in relation to Gans’s minimal and secondary hypotheses. Firstly, according to the theory, representation should appear as a form of release from the appetitive object. But gradually, the protagonist becomes imprisoned within the representation itself. He becomes secured within the representation-dimension of the ritual. It is as if the objective of restoring his memories gets lost on the way. But instead of actively working on memories in order to regain his identity, he instead turns towards ritual in order to reach for something that is real and by means of which he himself should become real, or differently put, to amalgamate with the sacred object. Secondly, the re-enactment is according to the secondary theory supposed to preserve the referential object, which is always real somewhere else. The narrator attempts to transgress these boundaries and become one with the referent through his obsession with the event’s spatial location. This goes to show that the attempt at reversing the originary scene of representation is doomed to failure and that the protagonist’s trajectory actually collapses the signification system that makes fiction possible.

    This development comes to full fruition in the final re-enactment project, the re-enactment of a bank heist. At first the planning is done as before. They build a replica of a particular bank and rehearse the robbery in every miniscule detail. But when the ex-bank robber hired as an expert tells the protagonist that they used to pre-enact the robberies in advance of the real hold-up, the narrator changes his mind about the whole thing. He wants to do the robbery in the real bank, a point which he makes to his companion Naz.

    “But what about the staff? We’ll have to replace the real staff with re-enactors.”

    “No we won’t!” I told him. “We’ll just stand our staff re-enactors down and use the real staff.”

    “But how will they know it’s a re-enactment and not an actual hold-up?”

    “They won’t!” I said. “But it doesn’t matter: they’ve been trained to do exactly what the re-enactors have been trained to do. Both should re-enact the same movements identically. Naz? Are you there?” (McCarthy 233-34)

    The protagonist has become addicted to the component of the real in the ritual. His goal has shifted from trying to re-live memories to becoming real in the re-enactment. The closer the ritual gets to reality, the more the narrator feels real himself. He wants to move towards “the point at which the re-enactment merge[s] with the event” (McCarthy 236). There are at least two consequences of this move. The appetitive object amalgamates with the sacred object of the re-enactment itself. Thus, the ritual cannot fulfil its function as the repetition of the event in which the object is substituted with a repeatable object of signification. The real bank fills the position of the appetitive object. The addictive trajectory of the protagonist seems to want to reverse the secondary hypothesis into the originary scene. This also means that the ethical component that arises in the ritualised phase disappears too. The protagonist completely lacks ethical awareness. His monomania has one single telos.

    And me? Why had I decided to transfer the robbery re-enactment to the bank itself? For the same reason I’d done everything I’d done since David Simpson’s party: to be real—to become fluent, natural, to cut out the detour that sweeps us around what’s fundamental to events, preventing us from touching their core: the detour that makes us all second-hand and second-rate. I felt that, by this stage, I’d got so close to doing this. Watching the re-enactors’ movements as they practised that day, their guns’ arcs, the turning of their shoulders, the postures of the prone customers and clerks—watching all these, feeling the tingling moving up my spine again, I had the feeling I was closing in on this core. (McCarthy 236)

    Of course the real re-enactment goes wrong and one of the re-enactors gets shot by mistake. The whole thing falls apart. But for the narrator it is all beauty. For him the aesthetic dimension reaches perfection when signification and what builds human culture collapses. As an aesthetic object, Remainder ultimately draws attention to the impossibility of being authentic in the way the protagonist imagines. That which most clearly emphasises this fact is that the cultural reversal ends up in violence and death. According to the originary hypothesis, the abortive gesture is introduced in order to avoid conflict and violence. The protagonist attempts to get rid of signification and representation in order to get at the “real.” The consequence is that violence is introduced as the naked core of events.

    Phenomenologically speaking, there are at least two conspicuous things to consider at this point. I shall present these in the order of increasing complexity. The first and perhaps most obvious stratum is the paradoxical ontology of the fictionalisation of the dissolving of fiction. Seen through the lens of Gans’s hypotheses, this is achieved through an attempt at reversing cultural evolution through the insistence on the ritual form. If it were in any way possible, the protagonist would want to violently seize the appetitive object itself. But since this can only be achieved on a fictional level, the protagonist remains imprisoned in the cage of representation. It is as if the novel attempts to give fictional form to the painful birth of the posthuman by means of the prehuman in the originary scene.

    The other level I wish to emphasise is more elusive and complex, but it also concerns another aspect of the ritual form. If the modern society depicted in Remainder is an example of our advanced culture, it phenomenologically plays out the persistence and centrality of ritual itself. In order for the sacred to remain sacred, it can never be obtained. So what is sacred in the 21st century? What is the remainder of Remainder? From a more theologically oriented phenomenological perspective (e.g., Paul Ricoeur), the philosophical tragedy of the narrative consists of its mistake in construing the sacred as a lack that has to be filled. In contrast, the sacred could be seen as akin to the blank spaces in the protagonist’s first re-enactments, but then rather as a form of charged space that should not be filled, in order for it to retain the potential of driving thought as well as narrativity. I claim that this type of sacredness actually is a remainder in the open ending of the novel.

    If Remainder investigates the status of the novel form and the phenomenology of representation more generally, it most certainly has a very radical response. Not because it brings something new, but because what it draws attention to is so primordial that it tends to go unnoticed. The protagonist’s blank memory and the blank spaces in the re-enactments are withdrawals from representation but also paradoxically still part of them. In a similar way, the sacred gives energy to any cultural system and the elimination of it collapses the equilibrium of desire, imagination, and representation. Paul Ricoeur summarises an existential dimension that may very well function as a description of what the protagonist in Remainder goes through:

    We exist because we are seized by those events that happen to us in the strong sense of this word—such and such entirely fortuitous encounters, dramas, happinesses or misfortunes that, as one says, have completely changed the course of our existence. The task of understanding ourselves through them is the task of transforming the accidental into our destiny. The event is our master. Each of our separate existences are like those communities we belong to—we are absolutely dependent on certain founding events. They are not events that pass away, but events that endure. In themselves, they are event-signs. To understand ourselves is to continue to attest and to testify to them. (34–35)

    The narrator gets drawn into a violent construal of this existential call. Instead of patiently living through the enduring event he attempts to act on it. He pushes these actions all the way to the collapse of representation and the elimination of the power of the sacred, but only to experience its renewal. In any case, we can read the ending as a form of redemption. On the escape aircraft after the failed robbery, the narrator forces the pilot to keep flying away and back in the flight form of an eight, that is, by graphically manifesting the sign of infinity, the lemniscate, onto the thin air.

    Our trail would be visible from the ground: an eight, plus that first bit where we’d first set off—fainter, drifted to the side by now, discarded, recidual [sic], a remainder. . . . I liked this turning back and forth in mid-air, this banking one way, straightening, then banking back another, the feeling of weightlessness, suspension. I didn’t want it to stop. (McCarthy 274)

    To be suspended is to endure the experience of never reaching the object of desire or the sacred object of the ritual. In terms of representation and literature it is to accept suspense as an inevitable component of its basic structure. Remainder makes manifest the sacred as the powerful transparency of the air that surrounds us.

    Bibliography

    Byatt, J. “Being Dead? Trauma and the Liminal Narrative in J. G. Ballard’s Crash and Tom McCarthy’s Remainder.” Forum for Modern Language Studies, vol. 48, no. 3, 2012, pp. 245–59.

    Gans, Eric. The End of Culture: Toward a Generative Anthropology. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1985.

    Lea, Daniel. ʻThe Anxieties of Authenticity in Post-2000 British Fiction,’ MFS Modern Fiction Studies, vol. 58, no. 3, 2012, pp. 459–76.

    Lupton, Christina. “The Novel as the Future Anterior of the Book: Tom McCarthy’s Remainder and Ali Smith’s The Accidental.” Novel: A Forum on Fiction, vol. 49, no. 3, 2016, pp. 504–18.

    Maggitti, Vincenzo. “‘A Film Run in Installments’: Memory and Cinema in Tom McCarthy’s Remainder.” Textxet: Studies In Comparative Literature, vol. 82, 2015, pp. 49–64.

    McCarthy, Tom. Remainder. Surrey: Alma Books LTD, 2015.

    Miller, Sydney. “Intentional Fallacies: (Re)enacting the Accidental in Tom McCarthy’s Remainder.” Contemporary Literature, vol. 56, no. 4, 2015, pp. 634–59.

    Ricoeur, Paul. “Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation.” The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 70, no. ½, 1977, pp. 1–37.

    Vermeulen, Pieter. “The Critique of Trauma and the Afterlife of the Novel in Tom McCarthy’s Remainder.” MFS Modern Fiction Studies, vol. 58, no. 3, 2012, pp. 549–68.

  • Songs of Leonard Cohen: Postmodernity, The Victimary, Irony, A Blaze of Light

    An Age of Song

    The 2016 Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to Bob Dylan, but for many commentators the choice recognized, perhaps belatedly, a whole genre.  And surely for at least a century, in reach, popularity, achievement, even sheer volume of production and reproduction, song has had claims to be amongst the most significant and influential of art-forms, in the West and ever more globally. Has any other been integrated more deeply into the life-narratives, aspirations and imaginings of so many, across so wide a spectrum of aesthetic sophistication? Brought so much comfort and release, been so loved?  Only cinema might compare.

    We should attend to this, to such a focalization of desire.[1]  The present paper attempts to use the heuristic and insights of generative anthropology (GA) to better understand a few of the productions of one notable song-writer of our time.  There are a number of reasons to single him out, amongst which is his distinctive negotiation of the popular to “high” art continuum, something this essay will try to explore.  His songs are also less closely or permanently associated with his own recorded performances and stage persona, and have been sung and recorded widely, even in “definitive” versions by others, allowing us a clearer focus on the particulars of the works themselves.  And it is finally the insights of these remarkable and widely performed songs, their gifts and revelations, that recommend them to us.  They not only express the ethos of their time—apt vehicles as so many songs have been for the evolving desires and resentments of an era—but in their characteristic double vantage provide new understandings of the human scene itself.

    Avalanche

    [2]

    I stepped into an avalanche

    It didn’t pursue or overtake me, I met and entered it.  But it is an avalanche, potent and destructive, a worldly force beyond me.

    And it covered up my soul

    It buried, obliterated my previous spirituality, dominating me, carrying me along in its awful momentum, taking me over.

    When I am not this hunchback that you see

    That you see now.

    I sleep beneath the golden hill

    The Golden mountain of Buddhism, Mount Meru or Mount Sumeru in the northwest wild beyond Kashmir; in Buddhist and Hindu cosmology, the center of the physical, spiritual and metaphysical universes, round which the sun and the planets circle, the abode of Lord Brahma, at whose summit lies the gateway to the divine, a mountain like Dante’s Mount Purgatory … and were I not pursuing another mode of transcendence, I would be climbing it.  But I sleep below it now. I do not ascend.

    You who wish to conquer pain
    You must learn, learn to serve me well.

    I am your model, for the task of conquering pain, for the escape from desire, from subjection itself.  I am the model for transcending other models, now that you see me, now that I have taken the hunchback form, stepped into the avalanche.

    You strike my side by accident
    As you go down for your gold
    The cripple here that you clothe and feed
    Is neither starved nor cold;
    He does not ask for your company
    Here at the center, the center of the world

    Sacrifice is accidental now, this “spear of the age” in the side of this new Christ for whom I speak,[3] whose place I assume, random, accidental, the mere action of individual desire; you wound your models as you pursue, ever downwards, what you think are your interests.

    But this supposed cripple at the center of the world—of whom and as whom I speak—is not the victim you imagine, nor does he need you or your desire;  centrality itself is his now, is mine.

    When I am on a pedestal,
    You did not raise me there

    Your attention, your desire has no such power—I am autonomy, the power you long for…

    Your laws do not compel me
    To kneel grotesque and bare

    … for if I am here at the center of your attention, vividly kneeling, compelling your gaze with the nakedness of my sufferings, it is not through you, not through your commands, the seeming compulsion of your desires, the laws of desire itself

    but because…

    I myself am the pedestal
    For this ugly hump at which you stare

    The hypnotic attractiveness of my mark of victimhood, capturing your eyes, compelling your stare, is not me myself, but that which that self supports, that crowns my power over you; because my identity is that pedestal, the altar upon which a new kind of sacrifice is made, the center at which all gaze.

    You who wish to conquer pain,
    You must learn what makes me kind;
    The crumbs of love which you offer me,
    They’re the crumbs I’ve left behind

    My power transcends your gestures of pity, your condescending crumbs, and if you wish to understand what I model for you, how I am able so kindly to give you this, you must understand the source of my power.

    Because…

    Your pain is no credential here,
    It’s just the shadow, shadow of my wound

    Your suffering cannot compete with mine, it has no authenticity, no credential in this new situation of my dominance; it’s mere imitation, a mere shadow of mine.

    But even as I have been able to dominate you …

    I have begun to long for you
    I who have no greed
    I have begun to ask for you
    I who have no need.

    For you see, I really am kind, in my absolute security; I am able to love you, I really can and do offer you the paradoxical tribute of my desire, the desire of the one who has no desire…

    You say you’ve gone away from me
    But I can feel you when you breathe

    You can’t escape, you can’t ignore what you know is the center, you can’t spurn it or make your own. Your desire for it and for me is as basic to you as your breathing, your very life.

    Do not dress in rags for me
    I know you are not poor

    But nor can you attain it by doing what I did.  Your imitations of my suffering betray your inauthenticity; don’t even try, and …

    Don’t love me quite so fiercely now
    When you know that you are not sure

    Because you hear me, don’t you? Don’t try to make love do the work of imitation, the paradoxical work of desire. What you thought was love for me is undermined by your sense that you cannot ever truly rival me, your sense of your own weakening ambition, making you unsure of what you really feel about me, tilting you towards helpless resentment.

    But…

    It is your turn beloved
    It is your flesh I wear

    … do not resent me.  In your desire to have and be me was indeed hidden a desire to be beyond me, to triumph over me, to establish yourself at the center.  But now you know you cannot do that, you have actually learned my lesson and your subjection to me is complete: you see me wearing your own flesh, being everything you want to be. But when you see that, when you have so completely become me, then your turn has actually come, your turn to exert the power I taught you, the power I exerted as I taught you, to be me in your own flesh.

    This difficult but suggestive song, that is, can be read as an account—early, even prophetic—of the advent of what generative anthropologists call “the victimary.”  It’s a term with a particular valence in GA—although perhaps not entirely fixed in meaning even there, despite its frequent use—but echoed as well in various forms in the wider culture, especially towards the end of the twentieth century and into the new millennium.[4]  The thematic connection in “Avalanche” seems so pointed, and the issue important, that a short digression to consider what’s at stake might be appropriate.

    There is considerable diversity of opinion amongst scholars using GA as to the relative power and extent of the victimary in the contemporary world—indeed this is probably the most pressing question now facing our scholarship, and one which requires fuller debate than it has thus far received.   Still, there is basic agreement as to the reality of the phenomenon, and the broad usefulness of the GA heuristic for identifying and analyzing it.  A couple of other principles are also widely shared.  Firstly, the victimary is but one facet of a large and consequential historical development with origins in Christianity’s explicit centralization of the victim—its making the last first—from which a new ethics continues to emerge.[5]  Secondly, but by the same token, the victimary—as opposed to victimhood per se—is a social phenomenon.  One may quite properly speak of the victim of a flood, of a falling tree or bolt of lightning, or even of being born in the wrong place at the wrong time, but the victimary is a function of mediated desires, specifically desires for the centrality—the concentrated human attention—that victimhood of any kind increasingly generates.

    The victimary, then, encompasses a broad range of behaviors—it might generally be considered an attitude, or posture.  Those practicing it, whether fleetingly or habitually, seek centrality through victimhood, and do so deliberately or at least self-consciously: argue, bargain or perform for it, for the attention and desires of those around them.[6]  To put it another way, the victimary is a variety of “feedback,” of the great mechanism, the very engine of market culture—the imitation and counter-imitation that René Girard called “internal mediation.”[7]  All Christian-inflected or “modern” centrality being by definition desirable, even the centrality conferred by suffering feeds back mimetically into the behavior of those around its periphery, of those indeed who created it.  Such behavior may aspire to the more secure centrality of a lost sacral order, but in its present historical context is ineluctably enmeshed in reciprocal effects.

    The relevant ethical question for the epoch in which the victimary is ascendant—and of course an extension of the question facing the GA community—is thus how to respond to its mimetic force, how to measure its claims on our own desires.  How or when, on what grounds, are we to concede or resist victimary centrality?  Or seek it ourselves.  We may call this the question of authenticity.

    The modifier “authentic” has tended in our era to be applied to behaviors in which we cannot detect deliberate attempts to attract our desires, “inauthentic” to those in which we can.  We are able and indeed impelled to resist the latter, as rivalrous efforts to dupe us, to rob of us of our selves, our identities, our own centrality. Responding to the former, to what we deem authentic, we can at least imagine that we have made a choice, reflecting our own autonomous character and judgement, and that we are thus receiving something in return, if only a sense of our own virtue.  Free or fair exchange is the foundational ethic of market life.  The inauthentic seems to present a unilateral demand, the authentic to offer an exchange.

    Victimary claims on centrality may, however, be sincere or indeed well-founded, even as they do detectably attempt to evoke specific responses.  If centrality—sympathy, attention (not to mention attendant material benefits)—is to be granted to certain forms of suffering, misfortune or subjection-by-others, those who actively claim it may logically “deserve” it as much as those upon whom it has been bestowed without conscious effort on their own parts, those whom we do not perceive as “playing the victim card.”  And surely justice itself must sometimes be claimed.  Surely, even, long-harbored, deliberately nurtured resentment—resentment, the feeling of exclusion from centrality,[8] inevitable corollary of desire—even resentment may be justified in victims we ultimately decide to be legitimate.

    So, there are other, more crucial measures of authenticity, as we must concede even in the teeth of our own resentments, the rising irritation we feel at the latest importunate claim, or indeed the experience of “guilt” which is perhaps the most inarguable token of a victim’s conquest of centrality.  How and when did the asserted victimization come about?  Was it really a victimization?  If so, could the victim’s own actions have prevented it, and would it have been fair to expect such actions?  What other claims to centrality deserve it as much, or more?  And so forth.  As these ethical struggles continue to play out, as such phrases as “through no fault of their own” or the “deserving poor” fade into the naivety of the cultural past, replaced by ever more expansive language and sophisticated argument, we need our deepest spirits, our best artists amongst them, to help us with the means to judge, to feel, even to act.  Because our resentment is certainly real, a human fact not to be lightly dismissed.  Only too prone to encouragement, it proliferates ever more luxuriantly, equally well directed at putative victims or their presumptive human oppressors.  And there are certainly artworks, popular artworks, ready and eager to help, offering denials and rationalizations, self-serving identifications, sectarian solidarities, moral triumphalism or mere distraction, and many another salve. But a better and deeper understanding of how these processes now work may offer more hope of preserving the ethical progress of the centuries since the rise of Christianity, progress that such mimetic effects, such feedback, might seem almost to obscure or threaten.  And for this we require, if not High Art per se, let us say a higher art.[9]

    “Avalanche” at least clearly understands the desires it dramatizes as reciprocal and mimetic.  Its “I” and “you” openly compete for the status of victim, and one of them—the teacher, the model, the hunchback—wins that competition, it seems decisively.  The desire of the other, the subject, is treated to merciless demystification—do not dress in rags for me / I know you are not poor—that masterfully imputes a core of inauthenticity.

    But then that master, for his own part, has deliberately stepped into the onrushing historical avalanche of the victimary.  This action seems even to have been the source of his power—apparently the standard of authenticity does not apply to him. The category itself seems only to function as a tool, a weapon even, in this context.  If a self or identity is “a local monopoly of attention,”[10] the song dramatizes the paradoxical quality of the new human relationships that generate such sources of quasi-monopolistic power.  The teacher not only discovers, but also explicitly initiates his listeners into a new praxis of identity, by which he himself has been formed.  And before, just before, we might begin to resent his power, that self-proclaimed occupation of the center of the world, we become conscious of a second strain running through the song, of enigmatic humility, even love.  The disciple is also the beloved, for whom the model longs, for whom he asks, although he claims no human need.  From within his supposedly impermeable security, the model teaches a transcendence of and through his own modelling, a path through absolute abjection into an ultimate and apparently necessary intimacy, the very sharing of flesh, a proffered turn at the center.  Certainty through uncertainty, victory through defeat, firstness from lastness, but in the specific terms of the victimary paradigm.  Love from resentment.  They are a “holon,”[11] a unity-in-rivalry, a very particularly obsessive pair of lovers. They, we, are in it together.  We glimpse the final intensity of feedback, an oscillation, taking of turns, that is a new kind of identity itself.

    Popular art clears the road to imagined appropriation, or resentment at its imagined denial.  Higher art defers such imaginations, creates a space of deferral in which deeper understandings may form.  As befits its higher art, “Avalanche” offers but hints, sketches—far from a full and workable program.  By no means able, in themselves, to lift the living baby of human betterment safely from its victimary bathwater.  But in a lesser singer, one marketing a more standard transgressive autonomy, the lesson would either have been embraced with triumphalist ferocity, or treated with sarcasm and denial.  Hymns to the suffering self; sneers at broken pedestals, rejected gurus.  In “Avalanche” the effect is of a tender and knowing irony.  We may take this as a possible opening into more adequate ways of responding to the world-historical phenomenon the song so presciently announces.

    Leonard Cohen[12]

    In 2016 we also lost Leonard Cohen.

    The present essay reads the late Canadian singer and writer as indeed an ironist of the postmodern order—including the victimary, but encompassing also many other expressions of the ever-expanding market—and as an elegist for the order it supplants.  Like many Romantic elegists—and we would claim Cohen for the Romantic tradition—he lamented the human costs of world-historical change in the name of earlier values, and bore witness both to such loss, and to the new ethical possibilities made visible by this tragically inflected dramatization of value.   For better or worse—and of course one needn’t agree—he rejected the horizontal transactions of the market in the name of the verticality of Buddhist mountains and lonely wooden towers,[13] including a tower of song,[14] and was thus greeted as a prophet of spiritual value for modern life, a purveyor of marketable “alternative” lifestyles and, ultimately and in one of the strangest codas in the history of the art, the depressive singer of an astonishingly inclusive and multi-purpose hallelujah[15] of response to the world he ostensibly rejected.

    One key to the rhetoric of Cohen’s songs—and we will limit ourselves to them here—is their accommodation of postmodern trends even as they critique and resist them.  They often deploy a not fully reliable first-person position—a dramatic irony of sorts.  We hear voices that we understand to originate at some distance from the intelligence of the songs themselves.  At times, self-mockery and self-pity slide into a kind of ironized victimary posturing that undermines itself, or perhaps we should say, protects itself against resentment.  This is a more Romantic and perhaps more subtle procedure than that suggested by the “two audiences” theory of Shakespeare’s theatre advanced by Girard, even if it has broadly the same purpose.[16] Cohen, too, is a popular artist, at least in the songs, past master at voicing and flattering resentment, and if he half-inhabits such voices, it should not concern us—the shiver of ironic self-awareness is always there.  If, as we say, most pop singers flaunt transgression, Cohen is clearly more haunted by sin—and this is rarer.  As Eric Gans reminds us, all sins are derived from originary resentment of the sacred center[17] and in Cohen we find this derivation rendered with a particular explicitness.  That center, be it invested in human life or human sexuality, Cohen’s singers repeatedly find themselves desecrating with their own unrestrained and unhallowed desires, their blind and sacrilegious violence, a process conveyed in a vocabulary that constantly and at times bewilderingly mixes the cool and the infernally hot, worldly slang and biblical religiosity.  The voice that proclaims in tones at once prophetic and profoundly ignorant—”I have seen the future, brother, and it is murder“—can only conclude by again and again asking, “when they said, repent, I wonder what they meant?”[18]

    A related device, whether or not such a voice is heard, is to hold up a contemporary posture or practice to injurious comparison with a biblical one, or at any rate one older and implicitly more genuine.  And the paradigmatic practice, of course, is that which religions have always placed at the foundational center of social order, and which modern pseudo-religious centralities inauthentically mimic:

    You who build these altars now
    To sacrifice these children
    You must not do it any mor
    ….
    You were not there before.
    ….
    And if you call me brother now
    Forgive me if I ask
    “Just according to whose plan?”[19]

    In its various forms, the technique is in fact so integral to his art that the last line quoted might stand as an emblem or motto for all of Cohen, a master-phrase offered for life in our era, a talismanic defense against untethered mimeticism itself.

    Romantic art, Gans has written, teaches us about the scene of origin,[20] the means by which, by ever again becoming human, we preserve ourselves as such.

    First We Take Manhattan[21]

    In print, Leonard Cohen was originally known as a poet of the Holocaust, especially in Europe where his reputation in any of his genres has always been higher than in North America. He wrote of it before many others did, offered Flowers for Hitler[22] in darkly ironic terms, an early voice, once again, speaking into the interval of relative silence after 1945.

    His aspirational revolutionary, too, asks us to

    See that line there moving through the station[23]

    As Gans has insisted, the victimary age originates in the Holocaust.  Its absolute asymmetry grounds and organizes the rising resentments of the postmodern era, “assimilates” them “to its unambiguous model.”[24]

    The association thus anchors our revolutionary’s status, his authenticity.

    I told you, I told you, I told you, I was one of those.

    And, especially in the celebrated recording by Jennifer Warnes,[25] there is an almost operatic scale and power here, opening onto the sorrows of history and eloquently voicing the imperative never again to be passive, to act, to resist.

    But Cohen’s own, slightly later version[26] is less grand. The lines are sung not by the soloist or in a soaring voice like that of Warnes, but by a clattering, tinny chorus of female backup singers, whose pop pedigree is obvious.  The effect is quite different, shocking even, particularly if one has known the song first from Warnes’ stately cover.

    What is the complaint of this soi-disant victim, who is one of those blurry news-reel Jews boarding that train, as he tells us, and tells us, and tells us?  He says he’s been sentenced to “twenty years of boredom,” the boredom of trying to work within the political and cultural mechanisms of the postwar Western order.  He’d love to live with us, really he would… after all, he does desire us, body and soul, well, and our clothes.  He’s guided not by ideas or dreams but by the birthmark of his own identity, by the beauty of his weapons—the aesthetic obviously precedes the functional in such an operation.  This is end-of-history terrorism or revolutionism, with no serious goals, no new system to propose or impose.   Yeah, we’ll take Manhattan … the way a new fashion “takes” it.  And as happens in a number of Cohen songs there is a punishing declension from the attractive opening posture, the defiance, the scornful superiority, down into goals and passions far more trivial.  Really, it’s the fashion business that’s the problem, and if ever there was a revolutionary ripe for co-opting into that business it’s this guy—here Warnes’ video,[27] like so many music videos, is instructive, quite unable to grace its ostensibly serious content with anything more than dancing young people, garbed in the latest, posing as rebels or running victims.  In Cohen’s lyric the final stages in this descent are, again somewhat typically, both incoherent and petty: oddly arbitrary mockery of flimsy consumer goods and adolescent-vengeful sneers at Father’s Day.  These verses are notably omitted from Warnes’ version.  This is the voice—one of Cohen’s most characteristic—of a shapeless resentful violence, arguably the same that has, since the song was recorded, struck out at Manhattan, or in some ways “taken” both it and Berlin.  Listeners may decide for themselves whether these erstwhile “losers” really have “won.”

    The same declension, the final randomness of the targets, the pettiness of resentful passions, is even more vivid in “Everybody Knows.”[28] This very popular song is perhaps Cohen’s best flattery of those passions.  What everybody knows is of course common cynicism, the posture of superiority to the desires or hopes of others that confers or promises to confer model status in a competitive market.  (The contrasting strategy of optimistic belief, of trust, is not unheard of and not without power, but much harder to pull off and thus much less, well, common.)  The song alternates between the big issues, the ostensibly serious objects of resentment, the poor stay poor, Old Black Joe still pickin’ cotton, and the cheapest of cheap shots, sneering at the benighted bourgeois Other and her long-stem rose and so forth. The darker expectations of infidelity—faithful… except for a night or two—are of course prophylactic and the cynical “lover” can and regularly does take protective comfort here, the imagination of the worst reduced to a commonplace knowingness, a cool superiority.  And besides, everybody knows painful fantasies are somehow the truth, even when they’re not.

    But if everybody really does know these things, what kinds of purposes are served by (so insistently) saying so?  Cohen certainly doesn’t risk anything close to an implicit suggestion that the poor are not all staying poor, or even that Old Black Joe‘s condition might have improved a bit.  The song instead invites us to sing—or sneer—along, and as we do, in its monotony, its self-satisfaction, to experience, some of us anyway, from a slight and slightly uncomfortable distance, the pleasures of our own cynicism.

    It’s now or never … it’s me or you.  Says who?  According to whose plan?  Who, finally, are we imitating? When a Romantic ironist reminds one so many times of what everybody knows, is it advisable to be quite so hasty to know the same things?

    And then, as the irony must of course work both ways, does everybody actually know, or believe, that the Plague is coming?  Is everybody, or anybody, really quite ready to take one last look at this Sacred Heart / Before it blows?  Like so many Cohen songs, “Everybody Knows” doesn’t quite stay in the place it begins.  Maybe nobody knows what everybody knows.

    No Cure for Love[29]

    Another thing everybody knows is that heterosexual love is an artefact of the past, indeed that such love is, in terms Generative Anthropologists ought to relish, a dead scene.  Of course, there are still such couples, but they no longer command centrality, prey perhaps to what Gans describes as “the postmodern suspicion of sexual difference as … the original sin of humanity.”[30]  Their obsolete bed is itself the outmoded public scene, its meter needle dipping towards zero.  Undoubtedly, the advent of the market era has changed the experience of gender, a formerly sacred category of difference, now cut loose and subject to the pervading forces of imitative desire and rivalry, the no-holds-barred struggles for identity and transcendence.  In this context we might pause at Cohen’s poignant early image of Joan of Arc,[31] riding through this dark and smoky night, with her plaintive,  I’m tired of the war / I want the kind of work I had before.  That traditional work is gone, though, the bridal whiteness, the swollen belly of pregnancy replaced by another, more troubling “appetite.”  For all the sympathy, indeed, the pity mixed with desire that saturates this memorable song, there is something rather merciless in its diagnosis.

    Joan of Arc’s glorious donning of the armor of masculinity to make war on the erstwhile or ostensible restrictions of gender, is subverted into another kind of wedding, her proto-feminist victimization sexualized, indeed, hetero-normalized.  To abandon her previous vocation, ride to battle without a man to get her through the night is not, it seems, to reject or transcend a sexual identity, but only to take on a new and more demanding masculine lover, indeed another kind of husband.  The song is finally about the violence of that war, of the fire through which it seeks to purify our motives.  If this is the new ground for the interaction of women and men, it asks, and if we will nonetheless still long for love with each other, for the light we bring to each other, must it come so cruel, must it be so bright?  The answer—I saw her wince, I saw her cry, but also, I saw the glory in her eye—is that, apparently, yes, it must.  The melodramatic stage we surround and upon which we behold what Gans describes as the “romantic equivalent of tragedy … the victimization of a superior individual who is in at least unconscious complicity with the operation,”[32] this new site of sacrifice, this new centrality, to which Joan has voluntarily come riding, even if no price is too high to pay for its glory, is a very bright, very hot place indeed.  And very unfree.  He will not make his body coldHe is fire and she therefore must be wood, no less than once she was destined to wear something white.

    Ain’t no cure for that, for gender difference, or for sexual love in any of its forms.  Cohen’s songs ever and again rebuke the assumption of freedom or even fulfillment in love, rebuke or qualify the forms of transcendence love might seem to offer.  For Cohen, as just about everyone has noticed, the sacred and sexuality are always connected, which is to say that complete sexual fulfillment is as impossible as being God, or simultaneously appropriating and worshipping the object at the center of the scene.  Here again is the folly and failure of a secular society, but instead of fiery prophetic utterance or bitter irony, this time we have a sweetly sad and comforting country song.[33]

    The rocket ships are climbin’… the doctors workin’ day and night.  Still, there’s no cure and the song smiles now at the culture that seems to think there could be—therapies of every kind, gender erasure, social engineering—because nothing’s pure enough to be a cure for love: love is the sacred, and the gap between it and us can never be bridged.  Once we understand this, then the crucial, the redemptive truth is that “I don’t need to be forgiven, for loving you so much.”  Where there’s no cure, there’s no crime, a proposition, needless to say, unlikely to be taken much to heart in the victimary dispensation of sexuality, where crimes and cures are both essential.

    Desire, to put it all another way, dissolves identity.  And sexual desire, proportionate to its strength, most efficiently.  What does it mean to say to a woman, “I’m your man”?[34]

    The leading general prescription for success in the market world is, simply put: be cool.  We should avoid the biographical here, but it’s hard to resist the anecdote that has Cohen, in New York City, scrawling on a restaurant placemat, KILL COOL![35]  To be cool is to avoid betraying desire, so as to be its object.  To be cool is to have a secure identity that resists the mimetic buffeting of the market.  Desire for oneself attracts desire, subjects others, from the fastness of identity.  But of course to do this all the time is monstrous. Or impossible.  “I’m Your Man” enacts a canny compromise with desire—how it’s sort-of cool to admit one is not.

    Overtly the song is about how desire trumps identity, channeling it into the myriad forms of a longing only too unstable, unable finally to know the shape of its own intent.  But surely a true, a unitary self, once revealed, heroically maintained, is what’s rewarded in the manner most commensurate, with female sexual attention!  Well, “I’m Your Man” tells us, believing that, a man will spend a lot of nights alone.

    It’s a song of sly irony, of course.  The malleability produced by desire is a knowing sort of joke for the initiated.  Don’t let’s kid ourselves, ladies, that you are attracted by essences or their recognizable opposites.  Masked and unmasked are not meaningful categories; there are no essences or clever subversions of them either, nothing men should simply be or simply are.  There’s only desire: what the goddess wants, she’ll get … and that’s why men are the way, the various ways, they are.

    And were they not, were you to insist upon sincerity, you’d see quite another kind of spectacle, rather less pleasing:  panting, howling, groveling, abject—a dog in heat—oh no, unclothed uncool desire is not a pretty thing.  But he’s your man too.

    Knowing this, of course, overstating it for effect, is at once to join the everybody knows crowd and at the same time to patch up a kind of humility, offer another of the many apologies for sexual misconduct that litter Cohen’s songs.  Or it’s to make an almost passive-aggressive concession of subjection and weakness.  That’s also in Cohen—one remembers the cuckolded narrator of the Famous Blue Raincoat,[36] self-lacerating, still desiring, forgiving, helplessly obsessed.  But at “I’m Your Man” we smile, knowingly, even ruefully, holding off the danger of this particular contagion, holding it at a sufficient distance.

    Democracy is Coming

    Firstly and throughout, “Democracy”[37] is an incongruous catalogue, implying a characteristically serio-comical set of questions.  Most obviously, what is this thing we call democracy, that isn’t exactly real, or real but not exactly there, that’s always coming, always imminent, but has never arrived?  And why on earth do we think we want it?

    Missing, of course, are any of the characteristics usually associated with the ideology or mode of governance, aspirational or not: representation, voting, popular will or at least consent, accountability. And so on.  Missing, too, most of the ways the U.S.A. has usually imagined and praised itself, entrepreneurial, freedom-loving and dynamic, fair-minded, independent.  All that.

    The song as Cohen recorded it,[38] though, starts as marching music with a rattling military drumbeat, then settles into something pulsing, rising, anthem-like, that reinforces the periodic grammar of the lyric, together conveying a strong sense of the impending, the potent, hopeful and (surely) inevitable.   The content of that lyric, however, is nothing like that of any normal anthem and in another variant on the now familiar Cohen procedure the song triggers an initial or easily accessible emotion or expectation—the promise of pop—which then subtly or insidiously leads those who feel it into unfamiliar and uneasy-making higher-art territory—if they attend, that is, to the details as they accumulate.  (Details that include, musically, the squawking—mocking?—little squibs of mouth organ, accenting, or is it commenting on that onward march.)  Here, though, that initial emotion and the ironical or complicating refraction continue in a canny balance to the end.  The song, to put it the other way, somehow, convincingly, stretches itself a remarkable way along the popular-high art continuum.

    Generative anthropologists will note the staggering account / Of  the Sermon on the Mount amongst the sources of democracy, buffered again, protected from resentment, by the mediation of a voice of postmodern obliviousness, of one who can’t pretend to understand it at all.  To that first-person witness, too, the Christian source is only one item on the list, a list chanted out in the apparent belief that somehow, for all their incommensurable confusion, their violence and despair, all these things are signs, portents, causes even of the longed-for fulfillment.

    Reference is made to Otis Redding ‘s “The Dock of the Bay”[39], an eloquent soul-song of hopelessness and waste, of waiting, watching endlessly in loneliness.  A salute is offered to the battered heart of Chevrolet, the once mighty brand humbled by its competitors in countries where the desires it fed have spread—Chevy the most democratic, perhaps, of the great American auto-makers, mass-producer of the people’s car, the automotive average, finally, the mediocre, the inadequate.[40] The crushed rebellion in Tiananmen Square, the hobo fires of the homeless, incinerated gay people, a cacophony of sirens, of riot and disorder and domestic war—all in the same, incongruously inspirational mode.  Is it that with so much that is bleak, defeated, almost unbearable, that revolution, apocalypse even, must be upon us?  Is this the rending pain of birth and transformation?  Or are we to savor a final irony, a satire even, at the expense of a stubbornly blind American exceptionalism that imagines in even its most egregious failures the last, best hope of mankind?

    The song certainly expresses a bottom-up vision, without a theory, not driven by the exchanges of the global, liberal-democratic elites, but not by resentments of them either—its voice signals no appetite for taking Manhattan or Berlin, nor any of the pessimism or superiority that smugly recites what everybody knows. Indeed, this singer, from the midst of his catalogue of miseries, bursts into what sounds in context like hopelessly naïve anticipation, that somehow from all this

    … we’ll be making love again
    We’ll be going down so deep
    The River’s going to weep
    And the mountain’s going to shout Amen

    In the more limited sense, this presumably expresses (or ironizes) the common hope that freed from their previous roles and differences the sexes will experience a renewed erotic energy, the love of equals.  But the amorous array in which Democracy will arrive is clearly more than that.  Do suffering and desire, thwarted or deferred desire itself, then, drive democratic change?

    Or is such desire itself democracy?  Because surely the common element in such closely juxtaposed phenomena as a spiritual thirst and broken families is desire unmoored from its traditional, indeed its ancient “sacrificial” restraints.  Whence, of course, the gender role release that produces the homicidal bitchin in the kitchens—the demotic version, or consequence, of Joan‘s high-toned ride to war.  Whence also the many struggles for new forms of exchange, and the anger and violence consequent on all such dissolutions of sacred differences, the throwing of more and more of the erstwhile certainties of human experience into rivalry and competition, into the restless mediations of the market.  Small wonder that the ship of state of the leading market nation must navigate shores of need, reefs of greed, through squalls of hate.  That hate burned the homosexuals.  To that need the newly visible legions of the lonely bear witness. (Another, even more famous song[41] asked where they all come from, and in its own way, “Democracy” provides an answer, or a list of them.)  As to greed, Cohen himself, in an earlier, less ironic phase, as a sort of poet laureate to the “me generation,” was wide-eyed:

    I saw a beggar leaning on his wooden crutch
    He said to me, “you must not ask for so much.”
    And a pretty woman leaning in her darkened door,
    She cried to me, “Hey, why not ask for more?”[42]

    By the time he sings “Democracy,” it seems some of the reasons why not have been hoving into view, no doubt personally, but also from the bridge of that ship. Apparently, though, there’s no turning back.  These waters must be navigated, we must ride this tidal floodDemocracy is coming.

    Of course other artists and other singers have borne witness to such things.  But few have done so with as clear a recognition of the paradoxes inherent to the process, of the prices to be paid—product, to note it again, of Cohen’s ironical vision, his historical, elegiac awareness and Romantic-conservative posture.

    It’s tempting to see that posture revealed with more than usual openness in the voice of the final stanza of “Democracy.”

    I’m sentimental if you know what I mean
    I love the country but I can’t stand the scene

    He would not be the first or last Romantic to lament the loss of grace that accompanies these transformations, as the aesthetic of the public scene dissolves into a multitude of lonely communions with various objects of desire—many of them projected on that hopeless little screen.  These motions of desire a more explicitly cultural or religious conservative would brand “deviated transcendence.”[43]  But such a lament is not the whole story here, or even as much of it as was told in most of the songs discussed above.  As we note, there is a persisting balance, a complex mixture of tones.  The singing voice really imagines no transcendence at all, no celebrity.  I’m junk he rather startlingly claims, but with no whiff at all of the passive aggressive or victimary in his voice.  Because he is also sturdy and stubborn—in a wonderfully “metaphysical” conceit, worthy of a postmodern Donne or Herbert[44]—like a plastic garbage bag that won’t break down and return into the soil again.  Yes, democracy is synthetic, not organic, indeed stubbornly inauthentic, consumerist, doggedly shallow.   It cannot finally be imagined, cannot be achieved, only striven and longed for.  Although the bouquet held up for it here is small enough, the gesture laced with various ironies, the song still does move with a kind of faith that something really is coming, fed by our desires; that our despair, our anger, even our hopeless passivity feeds it; that there is a redemptive power in suffering and failure themselves that might still be imagined as a politics—an affirmative one, and too universal to be truly victimary—if not quite as what it once was, a religion.

    Hallelujah

    More completely than any of Cohen’s other songs, “Hallelujah[45] has escaped the orbit of its original recording and performer, indeed become a veritable “standard,” spangling across our skies now in a thousand versions, and to as many purposes.[46]  Here, in the imaginations of its many performers and audiences as much as in that of its composer, the popular and high impulses are surely comprehended.  Records and live performances in styles and modes beyond counting, plus parodies thereof, TV hospital dramas and talent competitions, movies, benefit telethons, Olympic Games ceremonies, orchestral concerts, satirical sketches, weddings, church and synagogue services….[47] This is a phenomenon of great interest, suggesting intersections, commonalities of desire, potentially more significant than the generic, political or other distinctions that usually organize our understanding of how artworks influence or express our culture.  Such polymorphousness also helps define our interpretative challenge, especially given that the song itself is far from stable in form.  Accounts differ as to how many verses were ultimately composed for it,[48] and its myriad performances vary widely in their selection of those lyrics.  Still, most performers do choose from seven stanzas[49].  The order of performance varies, although the first two are fairly constant.

    Of course, the astonishing range of affects and meanings the song seems to have supported might suggest another Cohenesque irony of incomprehension, acted out now not just by a first-person voice but by the legions of those singing along in the world the song has conquered.  Verses of defeat, of painfully, intimately explicit sexual longing and loss—and a chorus of apparently religious uplift.  One might adopt the approach reputedly taken in some churches, of singing out in hopeful tones the repeated word of the latter, and merely humming the former.[50]  Or, one may risk becoming a further victim of that irony, by seeing if GA can offer any interpretative purchase.

    All I ever learned from love
    Is how to shoot somebody who outdrew ya.

    They’ll do that, outdraw you, the somebodies who attract your desire more than you do theirs. But how to bring them down or to heel?   How not to be subjected by them, how to give up or conceal that desire so as to subject them to you?  All he’s consciously learned, in short, are the techniques of rivalrous power.  And thus of losing love.  And isn’t this the most characteristic maneuver of the market world, the refusal of obeisance to the sacred in favor of competition, of autonomy, of victory in rivalry?

    The whole song is about the loss of power, though, the thrones of self-possession broken, romantics, for their trouble, tied to kitchen chairs, undergoing the fate of Samson.  For all their love and art, like David, held to account by the inexorable laws of possession and desire.  God, who’ll punish the baffled king for adulterously appropriating the woman he saw by moonlight—no, God doesn’t really care for the music of seduction, or the seductions of music.   Whatever we think we have learned, our little maneuvers, will not be enough.

    We will know loss.  I remember when I moved in you. The association of sacred and sexual is too close here even to be called metaphor or metonym—almost unbearably close.  The lover, the woman, is God, who can show us what’s going on down here in the genitive “below;” when she or He chooses to, can draw from us as well the orgasmic hallelujah.[51]  And then take it away again, [52] leaving us only to remember that state of unfallen blessedness, the presence of a sacred in which we had no choice but to believe, when our every breath helplessly paid it homage.

    But what is suffered is never, finally, solitude, and the song insistently affirms, for all its horrors, the life of the couple, lovers: not your brother love but that other love.[53]  I may have lived alone before I knew ya, but, hallelujah, I did know ya. For that knowledge, even and especially that biblical “knowing,” there is nothing on the song’s tongue but hallelujah.  Defeat in this crucial context is better than victory, as victory is aloneness, and aloneness is worse; those who are defeated have escaped the struggles of the market—those who win are alone, gunfighters with only the dead for partners.  A broken and yes a lonely hallelujah is still the one we sing out of the experience of sacred and sexual love.  Loneliness is not solitude, loneliness is shared, can only be known through love and thus loss.  Or loss, and thus love.

    There is no reconciliation, though, no communion ….

    You say I took the name in vain
    I don’t even know the name
    But if I did, well really, what’s it to you?

    …. except at the very most basic level of human exchange, with our God, our sacred, each other.

    There’s a blaze of light in every word
    It doesn’t matter which you heard
    The holy or the broken Hallelujah 

    We would not be the first to suggest that these lines, and especially the first quoted just above, are the core of the song[54]—or a privileged version of it—and even of Cohen’s art.  But has anyone expressed more beautifully what we may also take to be the core of GA?  It doesn’t matter which you heard because signification itself, that blaze of light, matters more than significance.

    “The language of faith,” Gans tells us, “is ostensive before it is declarative.  It points to and affirms the center, before it can assert anything concerning its existence, and the words of a credo are less important than the ‘profession of faith’ they underwrite.”[55]

    The much-loved chorus finally reconciles through the single medium of the word itself, one word, Hallelujah, the sacred substitute for the lost or inaccessible object.  It performs the redemptive deferral of longing, recovers and remembers the lost felicity that Romanticism always laments, the unmediated communion with the object of desire, a condition of life itself become this word, where the sexual act and the life of the word were and are one, where God was and is with us, and our every breath a Hallelujah.

    Notes

    [1] There has been a rich vein of GA-inflected critical writing on cinema and of course literature, but with the notable exception of Matthew Schneider’s work on the Beatles, very little as yet about song. See Matthew Schneider, The Long and Winding Road from Blake to the Beatles, Nineteenth Century Major Lives and Letters (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

    [2] Leonard Cohen performing “Avalanche” : YouTube, uploaded by Ben M. on December 8, 2010, https://youtu.be/SQe88ybEIe8 . Lyrics published in Leonard Cohen, Songs of Love and Hate [monograph], (London: Wise Pubs, 1972).  See also “Avalanche,” Songs of Love and Hate (New York: Columbia, 1971).

    [3] “Why do you stand by the window / Abandoned to beauty and pride/ The thorn of the night in your bosom / The spear of the age in your side”.  Leonard Cohen, “The Window,” Recent Songs (Columbia, 1979). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxNUFwWFm-g

    [4] “White males and Zionists feel victimized on campus.  Christians feel oppressed by the courts.  Women feel victimized in tech. The working class feels victimized everywhere.  Even Taylor Swift seems to feel victimized by celebrity.” Influential New York Times columnist David Brooks, even as he reports on something he seems to believe is new, attributes such feelings to eternal “human nature” and advises, in effect, that we all just say “no” to such perennial urges to resentment. David Brooks, “In Praise of Equipoise” [opinion] The New York Times, September 1, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2wWEK7h

    [5] For a brief account of the whole process, with particular focus on the pivot into modernity during the Romantic era, see Eric Gans, “The Victim as Subject: The Esthetico-Ethical System of Rousseau’s Rêveries,” Studies in Romanticism 21 (Spring 1982), 3-31.

    [6] We are indebted here to a definition recently offered by Chris Fleming: “The ‘victimary’ is the self-conscious use of moral progress to feed one’s own resentments.” (Personal Communication, August 30, 2017.)

    [7] “We shall speak of external mediation when the distance is sufficient to eliminate contact between the two spheres of possibilities of which the mediator and the subject occupy the respective centers.  We shall speak of internal mediation when this same distance is sufficiently reduced to allow these two spheres to penetrate each other more or less profoundly.”  René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, Translated by Yvonne Freccero, Johns Hopkins, 1965, 1990, p. 9.

    [8] Eric Gans: “Resentment … is the sentiment of exclusion from the center where significance is generated.” https://anthropoetics.org/chronicles/chronicle286/

    [9] The present author has offered ways to try to measure the “Popular/High Art Continuum” in an earlier article in this journal. See “Reflections on the Popular / High Art Continuum: Seven Small Essays, Ventures, Somewhat in the Original French Sense of the Word essai,” Anthropoetics XX, no. 1, Fall 2014, https://anthropoetics.org/journal/ap-vol-20/ap2001/2001dennis/

    [10] Eric Gans, Originary Thinking: Elements of Generative Anthropology, Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 128.

    [11] The term proposed by Jean-Michel Oughourlian to reflect “interdividual psychology” and the “constant interaction between the self and the other.”  The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, and Hypnosis, translated by Eugene Webb, Stanford University Press, 1991, pp. 16-17.

    [12] Websites devoted to Cohen include leonardcohen.com (the official site) and leonardcohenfiles.com.  Lyrics are also available from Leonard Cohen, The Lyrics of Leonard Cohen: Enhanced Edition (Omnibus Press, 2011), and from various other sites, including AZLyrics  In the present paper directly quoted words from the songs are presented in bold.

    [13] Leonard Cohen, “Suzanne,” Songs of Leonard Cohen (Columbia Records, 1967). The tower in question, from which Jesus “spent a long time watching,” is clearly the cross.

    [14] Leonard Cohen, “Tower of Song,” I’m Your Man [studio album] (Columbia Records, 1988).

    [15] Leonard Cohen, “Hallelujah,” Various Positions (Columbia Records, 1984)

    [16] “Shakespeare deliberately resorts to the power of scapegoating. . . . During much of his career, he combined two plays in one, deliberately channelling different segments of his audience towards two different interpretations . . . : a sacrificial explanation  for the groundlings . . . and a nonsacrificial, mimetic one for those in the galleries.”  René Girard, A Theatre of Envy, Gracewing, 2000, p. 6.

    [17] Gans, “Sin and Resentment,” Chronicles of Love and Resentment no. 457 (Saturday, March 29, 2014, https://anthropoetics.org/views/vw457/

    [18] Leonard Cohen, “The Future,” The Future (Columbia Records, 1992)

    [19] Leonard Cohen, “Story of Isaac,” Songs from a Room (Columbia Records, 1969)

    [20] Originary Thinking, p. 170.

    [21] Leonard Cohen, “First We Take Manhattan,” I’m Your Man (Columbia, 1988).

    [22] Leonard Cohen, Flowers for Hitler [monograph] (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975).

    [23] Leonard Cohen, “First We Take Manhattan,” I’m Your Man (Columbia, 1988)

    [24] Gans, “The Ethical Mission of GA,” Chronicles of Love and Resentment no. 38 (Saturday, April 13, 1996), https://anthropoetics.org/views/vw38/

    [25] Jennifer Warnes performing “First We Take Manhattan” posted on YouTube by Mark Gough on October 29, 2010 : https://youtu.be/8uy7Zb5C-XU . Jennifer Warnes, “First We Take Manhattan,” Famous Blue Raincoat [LP] (1986)

    [26] “Leonard Cohen’s official video for ‘First We Take Manhattan,’” (Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 1988), published on YouTube by LeonardCohenVEVO on May 9, 2011, https://youtu.be/JTTC_fD598A.

    [27] Jennifer Warnes performing “First We Take Manhattan” posted on YouTube by Dave Joern on January 25, 2012, https://youtu.be/W0rZ2CPCYBQ . Jennifer Warnes, “First We Take Manhattan,” Famous Blue Raincoat [sound recording] (Toronto: Attic and Los Angeles: Cypress Records, 1986).

    [28] Everybody Knows,” I’m Your Man (Columbia Records, 1988). Leonard Cohen’s official video for his live performance of “Everybody Knows” (Sony Music Entertainment, 2014) published on YouTube by LeonardCohenVEVO on November 12, 2014: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8IfmiKnZi3E

    [29] Leonard Cohen, “Ain’t No cure for Love,” I’m Your Man [studio album] (Columbia Records, 1988).

    [30] Gans, “Virtues Old and New: Toward an Analysis of Victimocracy,” Chronicles of Love and Resentment no. 459 (Saturday, April 12, 2014), https://anthropoetics.org/views/vw459/

    [31] Leonard Cohen, “Joan of Arc,” Songs of Love and Hate (Columbia Records, 1971). Cohen performs “Joan of Arc (Live at Québec City Soundcheck, 2012),” LeonardCohenVEVO, YouTube, published on April 27, 2015, https://youtu.be/drqgPNNv3K8 .

    [32] Originary Thinking, p. 169.

    [33] Leonard Cohen, “Ain’t No Cure for Love,” I’m Your Man [studio album] (Columbia Records, 1988)

    [34] Leonard Cohen, “I’m Your Man,” I’m Your Man (Columbia, 1988).  Cohen’s official audio for “I’m Your Man,” LeonardCohenVEVO, YouTube, published on November 18, 2014: https://youtu.be/-MlR6tFh8Gs . Official video for his live performance of “I’m Your Man,” (Sony Music Entertainment, 2014): LeonardCohenVEVO, published on YouTube by LeonardCohenVEVO on December 2, 2014, https://youtu.be/YuCpTi0EtbU. See page for lyrics.

    [35] Quotation attributed to Leonard Cohen and cited to David Sprague, “Leonard Cohen and the Death of Cool,” Your Flesh magazine, 1992 posted on Concentric: Leonard Cohen Considered by DrHGuy on December 29, 2015, https://cohencentric.com/2015/12/29/the-notion-of-cool-has-been-destroying-the-heart-for-years-leonard-cohen-1992/

    [36] Leonard Cohen, “Famous Blue Raincoat,” Songs of Love and Hate (Columbia Records, 1971). Cohen performing “Famous Blue Raincoat” (Sony Music, 2014) published on YouTube by LeonardCohenVEVO on November 18, 2014: https://youtu.be/ohk3DP5fMCg .

    [37] Leonard Cohen, “Democracy,” The Future (Columbia Records, 1992).

    [38] Leonard Cohen performing “Democracy” [music video] (Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 1992), LeonardCohenVEVO, YouTube, published on March 10, 2010, https://youtu.be/DU-RuR-qO4Y .

    [39] Official video for (Sittin’ On) “The Dock Of The Bay” by Otis Redding, published on YouTube by Rhino on November 20, 2012, https://youtu.be/rTVjnBo96Ug .

    [40] To be fair, maybe Chevrolet still shows some of that bravery and boldness, as its hybrid Volt sails successfully enough on into 21st-century markets: http://www.hybridcars.com/top-selling-chevy-volt-crosses-100000-us-sales-milestone/

    [41] The Beatles performing “Eleanor Rigby” [digital release music video celebrating the 50th anniversary of Revolver (Calderstone Productions Limited (a division of Universal Music Group) / Apple Corps Ltd. / Subafilms Ltd., 2015, TheBeatlesVEVO, YouTube, published on August 12, 2016.

    [42] Leonard Cohen, “Bird on the Wire,” Songs from a Room (Columbia Records, 1969).

    [43] See Girard’s “Conclusion” to Deceit, Desire and the Novel, page 294 and elsewhere.

    [44] “Metaphysical Poets,” Wikipedia, September 26, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_poets

    [45] Leonard Cohen, “Hallelujah,” Various Positions (Columbia Records, 1984).

    [46] See Alan Light’s “Introduction” to The Holy and The Broken: Leonard Cohen, Jeff Buckley and the Unlikely Ascent of ‘Hallelujah’, Atria Books, 2012.  This work as a whole is a valuable source of information and co-ordinates for the most notable performances and recordings of the song.

    [47] A few examples.  Perhaps the most influential recorded performance, indeed one that may have kept the song alive, was that of Jeff Buckley in 1994: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8AWFf7EAc4.  At the Olympics: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tcOQSk_cMO0&feature=youtu.be.  In a TV hospital (featuring another influential performance, by Rufus Wainwright): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Or-D-8IbprQ.  With entirely new, conventionally religious lyrics: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNZK7DantOk&feature=youtu.be.  And a (more deliberate or self-conscious) parody: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRmxdu4oGWA&feature=youtu.be.  Many more can be found with a simple search, or by referencing Light.

    [48] Cohen himself suggested as many as eighty.  Light, p. 3.

    [49] These lyrics are available in various places and somewhat different forms.  The versions provided in The Lyrics of Leonard Cohen (see above) differ in some relatively minor details from those frequently performed by others.  See also Light, pp. ix-x.  Finally, there is no stable or definitive text here—that is, of the “standard” itself.  The lines quoted in the body of the present essay are taken from frequently performed versions, including those of Cohen himself, and are at least representative.

    [50] Light, pp. 181-82.

    [51] The connection of chorus to climax has been made by a number of observers.  See Light, pp. vii, xxiv.

    [52] And why?  As the title song in Cohen’s impressive final album has it, as yet another blind, suffering, resentful voice addresses its God, it can only be because You want it darker. “Leonard Cohen’s official audio for ‘You Want It Darker’ (feat. Cantor Gideon Y. Zelermyer” by Leonard Cohen, published on YouTube by LeonardCohenVEVO on September 21, 2016, https://youtu.be/v0nmHymgM7Y

    [53] “Ain’t No Cure for Love,” Wikipedia, February 15, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ain%27t_No_Cure_for_Love&oldid=765573957.

    [54] Light, p. 24.

    [55] Gans, “Virtues Old and New,” https://anthropoetics.org/views/vw459/

  • Some Victimary Reflections

    The September 25 issue of the Weekly Standard featured “The Joy of Destruction,” a Girardian analysis by Joseph Bottum of the recent statue-destroying epidemic. Bottum sees this as uniting the community around “scapegoating selected examples of those we can get away with naming our foes.”

    Bottum alludes to a point that Girard makes in Je vois Satan tomber comme un éclair and elsewhere, that the demeaning postwar competition for victim status made Hitler the ultimate victor of WWII. But this historical insight is not specifically applied to the current iconoclasm, which is simply described as a set of events that fit the scapegoating model, along with mimetic competition for the victim role.

    My point here is not to criticize Bottum, one of the few political commentators capable of appreciating Girard’s importance. But since for Girard scapegoating is associated with “mimetic crisis,” its historical occasion must be given special attention. Indeed, Bottum’s comparative examples of iconoclasm occurred during revolutions and periods of social turmoil. He is certainly justified in comparing the current rash of statue-mutilations with the Taliban’s 2001 destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, but he does not pursue the religious analogy with the “Leftism” that Daniel Prager has called “the most dynamic religion in the world of the last 100 years.”

    What then is my explanation for the unrelenting march of the victimary through our cultural and civic institutions? No doubt it becomes an object of mimetic rivalry, but so do patriotism and racial purity and whatever other values are prized by a given social group.

    The human community is held together by the reciprocal symmetry of symbolic exchange, what GA calls the “moral model,” which in the simplest human communities is correlated with an egalitarian system of material exchange. Yet any ethnologist will tell you that these “Rousseauian” communities are more prone to violence and murder than more advanced, hierarchical societies, since any deviation from equal distribution can be taken as a personal offense necessitating revenge. Indefinitely prolonged series of revenge killings are one of Girard’s favorite topics. Which is to say that the direct application of the moral model to human social organization, however philosophically satisfying, is not much better than Hobbes’ state of universal war; life in such societies, although not “solitary,” is nonetheless “poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Firstness cannot be dismissed, as it presumably was in the originary event; it must be given a major role in human society, even if, as all the higher religions affirm in their way, the moral model remains the ultimate basis of human sociality.

    It is no accident that in reaction to humanity’s final full-scale war, with its escalation of scapegoating into industrial extermination, the less radical forms of de jure discrimination, including American racial segregation, were brought to an end. This abolition began a secular social upheaval whose consequences are still playing out, and which supplied the original impetus to the victimary radicalism Bottum describes.

    The celebration of the end of de jure discrimination, when people would finally be judged by the content of their character, lasted about 10 minutes. Then people started complaining about de facto discrimination. But this is an open-ended category, since “discrimination” ultimately just means reaction to difference, and need not involve anything more immoral than preferring those who score highest on a test. The elimination of de jure institutional firstness leads by analogy to the designation of all disparities in the distribution of benefits among ascriptive groups as instances of discrimination. Whence such groups—more precisely, certain privileged members of them—come to benefit greatly from being accorded victim status. Making the victimary label into an object of mimetic desire, the very embodiment of the Sklavenmoral, is what Girard was referring to when he deplored Hitler’s ultimate triumph.

    The current epidemic of iconoclasm and deconsecration is just a new application of the post-Hitlerian pattern. Would we put up a statue of Hitler? Name a university building after him? Hence to the extent that Jefferson, or Columbus, or Benjamin Franklin, can be said to have shared with Hitler a notion of racial superiority, we are justified in disrespecting their image. Even Bottum, while deploring the “mimetic” and “scapegoating” nature of the new iconoclasm, cannot bring himself altogether to reject this line of reasoning: “perhaps those who take to the streets in protest are right in their choices.”

    Perhaps indeed they are. A former student of mine, himself a Latin-American, after giving a presentation about Columbus in a Spanish class, was obliged to apologize to a Hispanic student who claimed to be “distressed” by the explorer’s purported mistreatment of the Indians. The “offense,” as we see, was not in the deeds themselves, but in the non-stigmatized presentation of their alleged perpetrator. Now that October 12 has become, in Los Angeles as in Canada, Indigenous Peoples’ Day, can “Columbia, the Gem of the Ocean” be long for this world? My old alma mater (whose school song shares the tune of Deutschland über alles) may soon become “Native American University.”

    Resentment is a human universal. What we must be sensitive to is the affirmation given to it in the public sphere. When individuals are validated in their claims to be “distressed” or “offended” by what they perceive as symbols of discrimination, there is no limit to what can be alleged as a source.

    It used to be accepted that we were all sinners, and in the Christian world, at least, beloved of God despite our sins. But now “sins” are no longer the purview of God, the judge of all mankind. They are acts of oppression, less individual than generic, that implicitly or explicitly affirm ontological distinctions among human groups (classes, races, sexes…) and consequently violate the moral model that we all share. We can no longer punish those of the past, but we must always be vigilant in detecting and condemning them.

    As Trevor Merrill points out, the victimary attitude has much in common with Calvinist predestinarianism, that most paradoxical of religious doctrines. The condemnations leveled at the great men of the past are not really in reaction to their sinful acts, but to their irredeemably sinful natures. The point is less that Washington or Madison or Jefferson owned slaves or was enriched in the slave trade than that their souls were permanently stained by occupying privileged positions in a world of victimary injustice.

    By taking these figures as exemplary, by raising or even maintaining statues to them, we are implicitly absolving them, and by extension, ourselves, of White Guilt. Yet as sinners hoping against hope for a sign of God’s grace, we can never claim to have sufficiently repented for our White Guilt, but must express it on every possible occasion. If, as a result of some neglect in this regard, a member of a victimary group, or a white person who seeks penance by identifying with the sufferings of such a group, is offended by a statement/image/epithet/name/institution/statue/song lyric that we have allowed to enter or remain in the cultural stream, then our guilt has been once more confirmed, and our most abject apologies are in order.

    As Trevor points out, “virtue signaling” is not merely a mode of mimetic rivalry. By giving proof of one’s vigilance against the racist tendencies deep in our soul, it provides the signaler with a satisfaction like that of Weber’s capitalist finding intimations of predestined salvation in business success. While the Antifa signal their virtue by righteously bashing the racist oppressors, the more peaceful victimary faithful feel a glimmer of hope in providing evidence that they have been given the grace to denounce their own white privilege.

    I have traced the victimary attitude to our reaction to WWII. More recently, we have witnessed the “coming apart” (to quote Charles Murray’s title), stimulated by the digital revolution, of college-educated manipulators of symbols and working class speakers of “ordinary language,” whose formerly lucrative physical skills are of decreasing value in the labor market. From the perspective of GA, this strikes at the reciprocal exchange of signs that is the very source of the moral model, hence at the unity of our species itself.

    On the simplest level, victimary thinking is the promotion of the moral model of universal reciprocity as excluding all forms of firstness. The moral model is what makes (acceptably) peaceful human society possible. But the peaceful scene of representation on which we situate the objects of our contemplation offers each of us the freedom, Sartre’s liberté, to construe things independently of others, and as a result, to construct projects, ideas and blueprints for action. The two things go together. Girard was right to emphasize what he calls the interdividual or mimetic aspects of human desire, but the very word implies anything but the monolithic zero-sum symmetry of mimetic rivalry to which some of his disciples reduce it. We constantly seek new means for obtaining analogous goals. As did Girard himself who, although he enjoyed calling himself très mimétique, was anything but a slave to intellectual fashion.

    Hence we can understand why allowing firstness to assert itself is more stable than denying its existence. Firstness is the moral model’s necessary accompaniment, and whether it be facilitated by a despotic caste system or a double-blind meritocracy, it is in tension with moral reciprocity. As I attempted to show shortly before 9/11 (“Originary Democracy and the Critique of Pure Fairness,” in The Democratic Experience and Political Violence, ed. David Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg, London: Frank Cass, 2001, 308-24), the “fairest” system is in fact likely to arouse the most resentment, since the superior outcomes of some over others are experienced as “unfair” in themselves.

    But that essay did not anticipate the central importance that would increasingly be given to ascriptive, that is, visible and inalterable group identity in the quest for victimary status. After all, Hitler’s crime was not privileging high-scoring individuals over others; it was according different degrees of humanity to different ascriptive groups. And, lo and behold, on objective, impersonally administered tests, some such groups do systematically better than others. Which is to say that members of the lesser-performing groups are being systematically “discriminated against”: disparate impact, we call it. Whence the redefinition of affirmative action from “affirmatively” helping members of less successful groups to achieve higher scores to simply compensating them with extra points.

    As we have seen, firstness is the evil twin of moral equality, and justifying its necessity is the fundamental task of religions and the secular world-systems that purport to replace them. In the very broadest sense, all such justifications are “Rawlsian”: they affirm directly or indirectly (e.g., by appeal to God’s providence) that the inequalities of the world order are necessary, in that the world would be made worse by abolishing them. What is unique to the current victimary epidemic is the rise of an attitude of intolerance toward any inequality of outcome associated with a victim group. No one complains that women make up over 60% of college admissions, but it is unimaginable that the opposite imbalance would not be denounced in the same breath as the low percentage of women executives at Google.

    Victimary thinking is limited only by the imagination of its initiators and the spinelessness of its followers. Last year no one thought of tearing down statues of Columbus. Yet way back in 1945, we tore down the statues of Hitler. The comparison has been available ever since; the only question was when it would be asserted.

    And here, it seems to me, is an easily forgotten key point. The acts of contemporary iconoclasm do not prevent the intricate machinery of the social order from functioning. The victimary as a symptom of the weakening of the social fabric resides in the margins of the overall system of social and economic exchange, in what we call its culture.

    What the current intensification of victimary activity in fact demonstrates is the increased marginality of the cultural-symbolic domain in which it operates. The economy is not severely handicapped by being obliged to increase expenditures for “diversity,” so long as few real incompetents are appointed to sensitive positions. I sympathize with Ryszard Legutko’s ironic surprise (The Demon in Democracy; Encounter, 2016) that in leaving the Warsaw Pact for the “freedoms” of the West, the Eastern European nations found themselves in a European Union hardly less repressive of dissenting ideas. But the difference between the systems is clear enough in economic terms. Although arguably equally stultifying, unlike “socialism,” the victimary “human rights” dogma of Western Europe has until now done only minor damage to Europe’s relatively healthy liberal economy.

    This volatility of our belief-systems is a relatively new phenomenon, one that deserves attention in itself. Resentment will always be with us, and it discharges itself where it can. Although cultural values have traditionally been integrated with the material economy, Marx was prescient in seeing the capital-driven economy as increasingly the locus of the controlling constraints of advanced modern societies. The cultural values once enforced by authoritative religions were not always, but have increasingly become, a “superstructure.”

    The economic machinery has to function in increasingly complex ways, whereas in an age of crowd-sourced thinking, desire follows the path of least resistance. The “coming apart” of cultural solidarity in the digital era focuses resentment on ascriptive discrimination because it is directly assimilable to the model furnished by slavery and colonialism, whose “irredeemable” nature was demonstrated in the Holocaust. The more I can attribute either my failures or my modest successes to “white privilege,” the less I need feel personally inadequate. Where this is not possible, among the white/native working classes whose marginal postwar ethnic and national advantages have eroded, drink, drugs, and disability benefits provide the only relief.

    It is because of its so far relatively mild effect on the overall social order that the victimary ideology endures and continues to infect new areas of the culture. It progresses less because it gains in intensity than because each successive outrage is shown to have nugatory effects. As a few new scapegoats are stigmatized, the “diversity” industry continues to flourish in the margins of the universities and corporations that supply the economy with personnel and capital. Those who depend on these institutions, whether they profit from white or victimary privilege, need only learn to avoid pressing the wrong buttons while doing so.

    But Trump’s victory is not without its effects. Some of the symbolic victories of the Obama era are being rescinded. Betsy DeVos has revoked the infamous “Dear Colleague” letter that made accusation of sexual misdeeds tantamount to conviction. Various draconian environmental regulations have been lifted. The economy as a whole is more optimistic.

    Donald Trump remains infuriating, but that is his genius. His reality-TV trolling of the victimary forces in the media and elsewhere will remain the only available remedy until, as we can still hope, we become able to hold a reasonably rational political debate on how to face the challenges of the digital age.

    Addendum: The Trump-NFL controversy

    I have seen no evidence of Trump’s “racism,” but many demonstrations of his effectiveness at provoking responses from victimary activists that reveal the White-Guilty’s abjectness to the world at large. At the 1968 Olympics, one might have had some sympathy for the two black athletes who raised their fists to the Star Spangled Banner. But the multimillionaire gladiators of the NFL?

    Men are being fired for opposing gay marriage or daring to suggest that the two sexes may not have identical ambitions, but to recommend doing something similar for disrespecting our national flag on national TV is decried as an act of fascism. For my money, Trump can only benefit at the polls from his tweet-crimes. And as a wise pundit put it, whatever the players and owners think, the NFL fan base thinks like Trump.

  • The New Origin of Language: Supplement to the Introduction — The Linguistic Dialectic

    The most significant difference between this work and other accounts of language origin lies in its proposed outline, on the basis of the hypothetical originary event of language/culture, of the evolution of the basic utterance-forms, from the ostensive through the imperative to the declarative.

    Given the lack of empirical evidence to guide this account, it may remind philosophically minded readers of Hegel’s Logik and its dialectical derivation of the categories of thought via the principles of negation and synthesis. I have always admired Hegel, the greatest of all metaphysical system-builders. But my use of a dialectical series is much less ambitious. Its purpose is to offer an understanding of how the hypothetical originary event can furnish a model for the emergence of a mature culture capable of elaborating, as GA does, a theory of its own emergence. That is, I propose a model, beginning with the originary event of the sign, of how using signs can eventually produce the theory that describes their beginning in the originary hypothesis, thus completing the circle and justifying the elaboration of the theory in its own terms.

    The telos of the dialectic of linguistic form is the emergence of the “objectivity” of the declarative sentence from the “irrational” privileging/sacralizing of the central object in the originary ostensive. This irrationality is central to the Girardian scapegoat scene, described as an act of méconnaissance. But we do not require emissary murder to understand why language in its originary form lacks the objective detachment that the deferral at the heart of the formal pour-soi makes possible.

    We might be tempted to say that the very structure of human consciousness in its contemplative relationship to its intended objects warrants a means to communicate “objective truths” about reality. But of course such reasoning is impermissible; it can be engaged in only a posteriori. I offer it only to point out that metaphysics has always not merely made this inference, but taken it for granted. For GA, the Achilles’ heel of philosophy is its failure to understand the secondarity of the declarative proposition to language—hence to the human—itself. Whence the need to elaborate a model of the dialectic connecting originary language to the declarative form.

    Once humans learned to defer mimetic violence through signs, they were faced with the dialectical tension that the following chapters describe between the use of language to express the desire of a speaker and its prolongation in the acts of his interlocutor, to whom this desire is alien. The communal symmetry of the originary scene, with the humans on the periphery surrounding the sacralized central object, remains the model of all cultural communication, but the individual elements of this symmetry, the separate “conversations” between the participants that will serve as models for future non-ritual uses of language, embody an asymmetrical relationship between speaker and hearer. In the originary event, we may assume that all emit and perceive the “same” sign, and that this sameness is guaranteed by the success of the signing in preventing violence. All realize that the gestures of the others “mean” the same thing as their own, which is to say, renunciation of the immediate act of appropriation of the central object desired by all.

    But the importance of modeling the formal dialectic that generates the declarative form, the presumably universal basis of fully evolved or “mature” language, is to make clear how the interplay between symmetry and asymmetry in the use of language can acquire the flexibility without which “language” and “culture” would have remained merely ceremonial activities. The point is to show how this new mode of consciousness, this pour-soi freed from “instinct,” in which the subject is separated by a néant from its object, could find a functional means of making objective, or more precisely, objectivizing use of this detachment.

    The historical invisibility of this evolution makes it understandable that human thought should have been divided since its inception between, on the one hand, attributing language as a whole to God, who “always already” possessed it and made a gift of it to man, and on the other, taking the proposition as a given without conceiving of the necessity that it be generated from its “natural” substrate. If for this reason alone, it is useful to reflect on the dialectic from which the declarative emerged. (In The Scenic Imagination [Stanford University Press, 2007], I examined various philosophical accounts of the origin of language in the early modern era; none of these philosophes, as far as I know, ever attempted to describe the evolution of the declarative proposition from more elementary forms.)

    This series of dialectical “moments” is constructed on the basis of a logic whose plausibility has not been tested experimentally; I would be happy to see empirical psychology attempt such a test. But although the specific steps in the sequence are open to doubt, the whole is not. The endpoints of the ostensive on the one hand and the declarative on the other can hardly be questioned. At the origin, pointing/designating/representing in the new mode of joint shared attention; at the conclusion, the fundamental information-conveying sentence. And the placement of the imperative between these two poles is equally hard to deny.

    In this dialectical sequence, the tensions provoked by the asymmetry of the speech situation are deferred by the generation of new linguistic forms. This seems to me the model that linguistics must always follow when describing formal evolution. And indeed, it does so when it can make use of historical evidence, for example, in studying the loss of morphology and its replacement by detachable elements, which in a world of widespread literacy are much less likely than in more primitive times to themselves degenerate into morphological particles; or the rise of attention-getting forms that lose their emphatic status and are replaced by others; or the emergence of “prestigious” forms such as the elision of ‘r’ in New York speech, as described by William Labov in The Social Stratification of English in New York City (U of Pennsylvania, 1966), which winds up being associated rather with the pretensions of the lower-middle class than with the elite its speakers had hoped to emulate. But whereas these developments take place on the surface of mature language, whose basic functionality can no longer be substantially improved upon, the developments hypothesized here involve the emergence of its fundamental forms.

    The idea that language used to convey objective information first emerges as an antidote to desire is not one to be disdained by moralists. I cannot prove that things really happened this way, but on this occasion at least, si non è vero, è ben trovato is more than a bon mot. To the extent that desire differs from mere appetite, it is as a result of its mediation by representation, and it is this mediation that allows it to be deferred in the indefinitely complex ways that the declarative makes possible. And conversely, it is only because the originary model of the objects of our desire is the sacred that we can bear to have their presence deferred by chains of representations that may or may not permit us eventually to attain them.

    In the original edition of TOOL, this formal dialectic was prolonged by a discussion of the super-linguistic categories of dialogue and discourse. But in reviewing this material thirty-five years later, it seems to me to lie outside the limits of a discussion of the origin of language and its fundamental forms. Once the declarative sentence has emerged, the ways in which sentences can be put together in longer units is no longer truly an element of the formal theory of representation, but belongs to the history of cultural institutions. Hence I have not reprised this material in this new edition.