Author: staceymeeker

  • The Decline of the Western

    Clint Eastwood’s four-Oscar-winning 1992 Unforgiven has one of the most watertight reputations among latter-day Westerns; some say it was the last “real” Western. So although my distaste for Eastwood’s maso-sacrificial sadism has led me to skip many of his films, I decided to spend 2:14 catching up on this classic.

    I found it distasteful but at the same time, extremely instructive. Eastwood, after all, is not a man of the Left; he is surely one of the few Hollywood celebrities who voted for Trump. And I’d guess that “deplorable” Trump voters are among the biggest fans of this film. Yet precisely for that reason, I think Unforgiven tells us much more about the victimary-PC epidemic, now in full force 25 years after its release, than the usual focus-group-vetted TV and cinema fare.

    For to compare this exploitation of Western clichés to the great Westerns of the past, such as The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance or High Noon, or even to the Leone spaghetti Westerns that made Clint’s reputation, is to witness the degrading of the saga of the West for the greater glory of PC.

    For those who find this judgment shocking, one point should make it clear. The West was not the South or even the East, and interracial friendships in a Western are at least believable, but what is not is that Morgan Freeman’s highly sympathetic character is not once in the entire film described as black. No doubt this is refreshing in comparison to the obsessive focus on race that we must endure today. But the idea that in 1878 a black man could enter an all-white town, sleep with white prostitutes, then be captured and whipped (and who knows what else) to death to gain information about his cohort’s plans, and finally be displayed in a standing coffin like the statue of a martyred saint in a medieval church, without either friend or foe ever mentioning his status as the sole black person in the entire film… We all know what epithet Gene Hackman would be using as he flays poor Freeman to force him to reveal the names of his companions. Indeed, as in the widely banned “racist” Huckleberry Finn, Freeman would no doubt have used the n-word himself, as black people still do in jest. But no; the fiction is that Freeman is “just a man,” his skin color no more important than that of his eyes.

    For were race to be mentioned, it would become a historical issue, in relation to which the characters, “good” and “bad,” would be forced to situate themselves, and clearly the necessarily ambiguous moral status of Eastwood’s hero would be destroyed if he came across as a forward-looking champion of racial equality in the days of post-Civil War Jim Crow.

    Yet Freeman’s unmentioned blackness is there for a purpose, and not just for the sake of “diversity.” Who, after all, is the true martyr in the film? Poor English Bob, so proud and cocky, is savagely beaten and humiliated by Hackman, jailed, and run out of town, a pathetic shadow of his former self. Whereas Freeman, under the whip, his arms tied to the cell bars in a pointedly Christlike pose, never loses his dignity, and we never see the presumably more distasteful violence he suffers before his death. Can it be an accident that of all the characters, it is the single black man who is the film’s Christ figure, one who turned away from violence only to be savagely persecuted?

    It is this martyrdom that provides the pretext for Eastwood’s inevitable climactic outburst of savagery, the thing his fans had been waiting two hours for. This has nothing, and yet everything, to do with his being black. Clearly we have come a long way from To Kill a Mockingbird, or for that matter from Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? or those Sidney Poitier portrayals of black dignity; clichés, no doubt, but honest and well-meant, not used as pretexts for the usual Dirty Harry maliciousness that Eastwood fans relish. By going “unnoticed,” Freeman’s victimary blackness becomes the incarnation of humanity itself, which Eastwood defends against the oppression of Hackman’s “law and order.” This film, made in the year of the Rodney King LA riots, anticipates Black Lives Matter by two decades.

    And then, as a few of the IMDb faithful have pointed out, the slashed and mutilated prostitute, whose revenge the whole plot is built around, when we finally see her, appears lightly scarred in a way that would probably have done nothing to diminish her earning power in the Big Whiskey brothel. The Kid’s description of her as having had her eyes gouged out and ears and breasts cut off, as one might well imagine from the wild knife-swinging in the opening scene (a man’s revenge for having his penis size mocked—Trump-detractors beware), is perhaps meant to suggest to the sophisticated viewer less the Kid’s hyperbole than the idea that that’s was wirklich geschehen ist, but we can’t show it on the screen, since if we did, you couldn’t bear to look at her (and her offer of a “free one” to Eastwood would be grotesque rather than attractive).

    But precisely, if mutilation is indeed the basis of the plot, we wouldn’t have to look at her. By showing the victim as only minimally damaged, the message that comes across is the same as that conveyed by today’s crybullies complaining of micro-aggressions, asking for safe spaces, and profiting from Obama’s Title IX policy of punishing men on the basis of “a preponderance of the evidence”: hyperbole in the service of victimary ideology is no vice.

    Debunking an old film is not a terribly meaningful activity, even if its lionization by a majority of viewers, and the AMPAS to boot, is of some minor sociological interest. But I think this case is worthy of more sustained reflection. It offers a window into the pervasiveness of the victimary mentality already in the Clinton era, not only among leftist radicals but among the majority population, most particularly, that of Eastwood fans and eventual Trump voters. After all, my analysis of Trump’s significance has been founded from the beginning on the idea that, with the exception of Ben Carson, who is now serving in his cabinet, Trump was the only candidate who stood up to the PC-victimary forces. How then can I claim that the Trumpians’ favorite film star, one of the few Republicans in Hollywood, pays homage to PC and gets his fans to go along with him?

    The point is, of course, that no one sees this as PC. Among the relatively few negative remarks that temper the hyperbolic praise on the IMDb, I have seen criticism of the lightly scarred prostitute and mention of Freeman’s presence as an example of racial tokenism, but no one criticized the film’s very central theme as PC. Yet the victimary element is absolutely central to the plot, and the way it intersects with the Eastwood stereotype of converting Christ-like martyrdom into Satanic violence in a good cause is most instructive.

    An archetypal example of this formula may be found in Every Which Way But Loose, which I saw many years ago and have forgotten except for this one scene. Clint is seated at a bar, having a drink, not bothering anyone. A guy comes into the bar, and starts picking a fight with him. At first Clint does not respond, but when the guy gets to the point of throwing his drink in his face, he finally gets mad and beats him up. This paradigm of martyrdom-as-a-pretext-for-violence, here in its minimal form, is developed in baroque fashion in Unforgiven. Here Gene Hackman, cast as the villain, in fact the film’s most impressive character (and an Oscar winner along with Eastwood), gives Clint the same treatment he had previously meted out to English Bob / Richard Harris, both of whom had come to town to earn the prostitutes’ $1000 reward for killing their colleague’s mutilators. And as in many similar revenge epics (Revenant is a recent example), the severity and humiliating nature of the injuries inflicted on the hero is a way of justifying what William Flesch calls the villain’s Comeuppance (Harvard UP, 2007). But the comeuppance of the typical bully/villain, although morally akin to that of the violator of the victimary code, has no political implications, since the “villain” by definition is one whose behavior is in violation of generally accepted norms of social behavior not subject to partisan debate. Whereas in the victimary situation, it is precisely these norms that are taken to task as immoral and deserving of punishment.

    To sum up, the plot in Unforgiven is driven by offenses against America’s canonical victimary groups, women and blacks. As Eastwood says in his final words to the survivors after massacring an uncountable number of bad guys, if they want to stay out of trouble, they shouldn’t kill his friends or “cut up any whores.” The “tropic” elements in both cases—the “real”/visible scarring and the pointed non-mention of Freeman’s race—have already been noted.

    In thus motivating himself as hero, Eastwood not only had to give a baroque turn to the martyrdom and lengthy recovery that precedes his revenge, but to confuse, in what can only be called a less than forthright fashion, the hero’s motivation for seeking the reward in the first place. When the Kid informs him of the ladies’ offer, Eastwood at first rejects it, since his sainted wife had apparently cured him of the bloodlust that made him a vicious killer. Then, when he changes his mind, leaving his children to fend for themselves, he still insists that he has no desire to kill, but is acting only for the reward money, this being presented as an everyday commercial transaction. And even after he kills the first victim with his rifle, before the morally significant action begins, he speaks in solemn tones of how serious it is to kill a man, indicating that he is acting reluctantly. We hear nothing yet of punishing those who “cut up whores,” although at this point he and the audience presumably believe the girl was truly mutilated. It is notable that it is at this stage that Freeman decides to drop out of the party; he cannot bring himself to fire, even though we know he is the best rifle shot. He senses a disproportion between his motives of friendship and even desire for money and the evil of killing, and decides to return home.

    Similarly, at a later juncture, the Kid, who has admitted that he had never killed anyone before, after the initial thrill of seeing himself a killer (of the wrong man), realizes that killing is simply not his vocation. With this second departure, Eastwood’s neutral motivation for killing has now been morally rejected by both his partners. Had Freeman returned home safely, Clint-Munny would have faced the uncomfortable dilemma of whether or not to kill for money but without passion, given his wife’s supposed effect on his character. Freeman’s martyrdom, by changing the equation, is the indispensable trigger of the plot’s final resolution.

    On one level, this is a “right-wing” film. In its choice of the “flawed but necessary” protagonist William Munny, we are given to understand by contrast that his two partners are, one, too weak and un-self-aware, the other, less too good than no longer vicious enough, to perform the kind of cold-blooded killing that “justice” nevertheless demands. As for Hackman, the official representative of justice, although one may assume that his brutal methods for keeping order are the only practical solution in a town like Big Whiskey, his villain status is signaled from the outset by his sexism, as shown by his refusal to mete out the death penalty or something close to it for the mutilation of the prostitute. (We should no doubt see this rather as “classism,” since the same crime committed on a respectable woman would no doubt have entailed a very different punishment; but this just illustrates the truth of “intersectionality.”)

    In short, society needs the death penalty, and the hero has to carry it out at the expense of a reluctance to kill that is ultimately revealed as, at best, self-indulgent “niceness” rather than true Christian love of one’s fellow man. To truly love those who deserve love, one must kill those who do not. The town keepers of order were complicit in the murder of the innocent Freeman, and this sin makes even clearer in retrospect the evil nature of their complicity in the mutilation, for which they demanded only a few horses in compensation.

    But the girls’ reward, and their refusal of the offered compensation, although it constitutes a revolt against the patriarchy, remains one that depends on and is therefore complicit with masculine violence. We are not yet at the stage of Kill Bill, where the woman takes over in caricatural fashion the role of the avenger.

    Yet we might just as well be, since all this “macho” violence, a given of the Eastwood character, after having been put away under a woman’s influence, is summoned back to life as indispensable in a world beset by crimes against “women and minorities.” This is not the heroism of High Noon, where we encounter a brave man (and woman!) willing to face down evil when abandoned by cowards; what we need now is a sociopathic killer, a flawed hero who must respond, no longer to a circumscribed danger of alien evildoers, but to a society flawed at its very core, one that needs not merely to be shamed but decimated to demonstrate its ultimately indelible moral stain. This is already a version of the world of which the heroine of Lars von Trier’s Melancholia, facing its imminent physical destruction, says “nobody will miss it.”

    I’m sure he wouldn’t care for the comparison, but in the last analysis, Eastwood as William Munny is a not-so-distant precursor of Antifa. As an alternative, I’ll have a large Leone, and please go heavy on the marinara sauce.

  • The New Origin of Language: (Tentative) Conclusion

    Having come to the end of this second edition of The Origin of Language (TOOL), the reader may wonder whether taking up this “new way of thinking” based on the originary hypothesis is worth the trouble. Why should the intellectual world reject its current division of labor, evolved over generations, that leaves the question of human origins, including that of language as only one of humanity’s many distinctive components (opposable thumb, bipedalism, neoteny, “aquatic ape”…), to empirical scientists, whether paleontologists, neuroscientists, primate ethologists, laboratory psychologists, or of course, linguists, while the more abstract aspects of human consciousness that can be systematized by some kind of logic are left to philosophers?

    Generative anthropology (GA) is the creation of a humanist, and it is no accident that until now it has interested virtually only humanists. Yet all who are concerned with understanding what is specific to humanity should have an interest in this “new way of thinking” (see A New Way of Thinking, Aurora, Colo.: Davies Group, 2011) that offers a framework for the productive synthesis of empirical anthropology with religion and philosophy. This is not the kind of quasi-philosophical mish-mash known as “French theory,” which despite its great intellectual creativity disdained to construct rigorous systems of thought. For as Jacques Derrida, its greatest exponent, made clear, its purpose was de-construction, the undoing of the metaphysical dogma of the objective reality of the philosophical proposition, the declarative sentence, while affirming nevertheless that nothing else could be put in its place.

    The framework offered by GA is not a magical synthesis of previous modes of thought, but a scenario that provides a plausible path from “nature” to “culture.” Let me give one simple but potent example: that of Jean-Paul Sartre’s distinction between the pour-soi and the en-soi, an “existentialist” elaboration of Hegel’s distinction between the an sich and the für sich. L’être et le néant consists of a long and intricate analysis of the specificity of human consciousness. One would think that this analysis, in a book of over 900 pages, might be of interest not just to philosophers and “historians of ideas” but to anyone concerned with the specific difference between humans and the higher animals. The latter can “ape” human behavior but cannot be taught language, let alone taught to teach it to their young, and they lack all but the most rudimentary degree of the facility for (triadic) joint attention that permits us to communicate by exchanging representations.

    Yet frustratingly, Sartre’s depiction of the pour-soi, although referring pointedly to negation, which Sartre explicitly recognizes as dependent on language, makes no direct reference to linguistic communication, let alone to the question of its origin. As in all metaphysics, the declarative sentence is tacitly understood to have existed from eternity, as it presumably existed for God when he gave his “name” as “I am what/that I am.” Without this, he could not have begun the world with the imperative, “Let there be light!” Or as John later put it, In the beginning was the Logos, which is less the Word than the Sentence, although the genius of Christianity is to understand nonetheless that the Word comes first.)

    But when one situates Sartre’s formulations within the scenario of the originary hypothesis, although they lose nothing of their philosophical rigor, they gain immensely in concreteness. Sartre’s pour-soi is a scene of consciousness internal to the human mind, the locus of the separation between the mind and the thought-objects that it contemplates, but one that can only be understood as reflecting an earlier, communal scene of separation.

    I doubt if Derrida ever imagined that this scene could provide the archetype of what he called deferral, la différance. This is another French-theory term that, as they say, has made flow a great deal of ink because it seems to correspond to nothing in everyday experience; yet nothing is more banal than the uniquely human phenomenon of stepping back from our potentially appetitive relationship with objects in order to contemplate and think about them, and vocally or tacitly share our impressions with the rest of our species.

    The scenario of the originary hypothesis, whatever its accuracy in portraying “how it really was” when humans first emerged as speaking creatures, allows us to situate the birth of the pour-soi and triadic joint attention in a plausible scenario in which the motivations of the proto-human actors and their invention/discovery of the sign is explained as motivated by the need to prevent/defer violence. Both Sartre’s mysterious néant as well as the Derridean notion of différance are given the same simple worldly counterpart. I challenge any other mode of thought to thus make “philosophical,” that is, metaphysical concepts, accessible to the anthropological imagination.

    The integration of religious discourse into the anthropological context, building on the insights of René Girard, is perhaps of even greater importance. GA allows believers and non-believers alike to acquire an anthropological understanding of not just “the religious” in the Durkheimian sense of the domain of communal as opposed to individual values, but of the sacred in its originary manifestation. Rejecting the trivialization of religion in recent years (God Is Not Good, The God Delusion…), GA situates the god-creates-man/man-creates-god dichotomy at our hypothetical point of origin, granting to both sides an equivalent understanding of the anthropological issues involved. By following Ockham’s razor and minimizing the parameters that define the human, GA thus opens the door to a creative synthesis of the domains of anthropology, philosophy, and religion, as well as the humanistic “French” theory that has somewhat haphazardly attempted to synthesize them.

    One hears a great deal nowadays about a “post-human” era, whether inhabited by humans with digitally enhanced bodies and brains or by cyborgs who will have replaced us as the world’s dominant “species,” as they have become the world’s best chess and now Go players. GA’s understanding of our relationship to language allows us to clear up some of the confusion surrounding this subject.

    The human scene of representation, in inaugurating a wholly new mode of intraspecific communication, cannot be understood simply as a feature of the individual human mind. It is easy to show that the absurdity of the currently fashionable ideas concerning language origin stems from their failure to take its communal aspect into account—for example, the solipsistic notion that we begin to speak because we have “ideas” that we want to “communicate,” as though, given a certain level of neuronal complexity, “ideas” can spring up by themselves even without the means to communicate them.

    It would be foolish today, in what is still the infancy of the cybernetic era, to assign limits to the future accomplishments of artificial intelligence. But the Girardian thesis that it is the deferral of human violence that is the critical factor in the origin of language suggests that our fears that machines may acquire the ambition of conquering the world are merely projections of the real dangers of our own violence. Suspecting computers of wanting to do away with us, as though some kind of Darwinian process independent of human will would drive their “evolution” in this direction, allows us to forget that well before any such thing became remotely conceivable, human beings bent on conquest and/or destruction will be able to command programmable machines to carry out their desires. We are already on the verge of being able to create robot-drone armies whose programmed aggressiveness needs no secretly emerging robot DNA. If we can find a way to survive the next century or two, I think we can be sure that our fears of robot take-overs, even more than those of apocalyptic “climate change,” will no longer be at the forefront of our preoccupations.

    The ultimate criterion of a valid anthropology, using this term in the most general sense, is its ability to enhance our ethical self-understanding. This is not a matter of seeking a Pollyannish formula to transform our vale of tears into a realm of sweetness and light. But adding the ethical insight of GA to those supplied by history’s great religious revelations will in the current state of affairs enhance our ability to combat the victimary dogma that has largely taken over the ethical consciousness of the educated classes in Europe and increasingly in the US. It is not a matter of countering “lies” with “truth,” but of proposing a better model of human behavior that has some chance of persuading those of the victimary faith to begin to doubt its commandments.

    GA is not a “philosophy of the Right.” It accepts as the basis of all moral thinking the primordiality of the moral model that understands humanity as founded on the reciprocal exchange of signs on the originary scene, an exchange that gives us our intuition of moral equality. The Left has committed many crimes both before and since attaining its modern self-consciousness in the French Revolution, but the reason that these crimes never arouse the same opprobrium as the excesses of the Right, so that Russia’s and China’s mass murderers have escaped their Nuremberg trials, is that the Left’s often hypocritical egalitarianism nonetheless has its roots in our moral intuition, whereas dogmas of racial superiority, however they may appeal to those on the winning side, strike us as simply evil. Whence the horror that ensues when our scruples are overcome and we learn not merely to murder millions of human beings in good conscience but to consider these others as something less than human.

    The horror of the Holocaust is clearly enough the origin of the victimary ethic that has only grown stronger as memories of the war have faded, and this because it increasingly seems to provide an answer to all the problems of “inequality” that face humanity today, perhaps more urgently than ever now that poor people are increasingly able to live well enough to resent those who live better.

    GA allows us to understand that what keeps the victimary alive is that it offers a comforting explanation, however absurd, of the “digital divide” that is increasingly creating a gulf between those who are able to educate themselves to manipulate symbols skillfully and those who cannot. (See, for example, Chronicles 484 and 541.) I suggest that this division is a new phenomenon in human history, not because it makes manual labor increasingly less valuable, but because it challenges for the first time the moral model of universal human equality by putting into question our common ability to reciprocally exchange signs.

    It goes without saying that in the past, differences of symbolic competence were far greater than today: most people were simply illiterate. But such differences could be explained by social conditions: a peasant would not expect to be educated like a cleric. It sufficed that, in the West, Christianity taught that all souls were equally loved by God; worldly inequalities were not the fault of the unequally favored. In today’s world, such explanations are no longer credible. Whence the increasing use of victimary thinking to explain these inequalities: if whites (Asians?) do better in school or on intelligence tests, it is the result of their “white privilege.” It is far less offensive to our moral sense to explain inferior results as the result of ascriptive discrimination rather than individual and collective failings. GA’s understanding of the moral model that provides us with our sense of equality gives us a clearer idea of how to address this problem than catering to the resentments of those who know only that they are being hurt by it.

    “Pure” science is an activity pursued for knowledge’s sake, independently of practical considerations, but in the faith, borne out time and again throughout history, that seeking the truth about whatever we are curious about, be it dark matter or the origin of human language, is our best way of improving our practical grasp of reality. It is in this spirit that I offer this new edition of TOOL.

  • The New Origin of Language Part 13: The Esthetics of Linguistic Forms

    The declarative sentence, as a “context-free” model of reality, offers us the possibility of an objective understanding of the universe. It is the foundation of scientific dis­course, which makes explicit and rigorous the decon­textualizing elements of the declarative model by calling for empirical verification/falsification, eventually in the controlled environment of the laboratory. But the declarative is by the same token the origin of fiction, which exploits its liberation from the discursive context in the opposite fashion, as a source not of objectivity but of the free representation and transcendence of desire.

    The esthetic relation is constituted by our oscillation between contemplating the sign and its sacred referent that originates on the scene of representation. But this space and attitude of contemplation (Sartre’s pour-soi) once constituted can then be evoked by real-world objects, which are no longer perceived in the “instinctive” framework of appetite but can in various ways acquire an aura of sacrality. Although there is no point in speaking of mimesis itself as an esthetic phenom­enon, the forms of what René Girard describes as mimetic desire (see Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque, Grasset, 1961) include an esthetic dimension that depends on the scene of language, if not on language itself.

    Imitation of another’s behavior can of course be performed for strictly practical reasons. But in this form of desire, the subject imitates a model whom Girard calls the mediator, whom he regards consciously or unconsciously as an esthetic object. The perceived reality of the model alternates with an imaginary being that embodies an inaccessible, sacred essence. The subject may subsequently attempt to acquire the objective components of this being for himself, in which case his mimetic activity rejoins the domain of the practical. But in the esthetic moment of mimetic desire, the non-equivalence between being and act, or substance and appearance, presents itself to the imagination of the subject.

    The esthetic imagination as so defined is not practical, anticipating possi­ble future activity, but paradoxical. On the one hand, posses­sion of the appearance appears to include within itself the possession of the being that is expressed by it; but on the other, because the appearance is an expression of this being, the being must be acquired before the appearance and is therefore inaccessible through it.

    This esthetic element is not dependent on language, nor indeed on any formal system of representation, except insofar as such systems lend significance to the appear­ances to be imitated. Yet it is important to insist that the moment in which the “being” of the other is contemplated, as opposed to “instinctively” imitated as in animal mimesis, is a mode of deferred action dependent on the human scene of representation. Thus it is no accident that the desiring subject’s contemplative “possession” of the real or remembered image of his model is homologous to the speaker’s “possession” of the sacred object in the originary event through the intermediary of the sign, the object of the ontological faith expressed in the inappropriate ostensive.

    For the subject of mimetic desire, the image of his model in the act of appearing is a kind of private representation. This appearance is like an ostensive sign that, because its utterance accompanies in principle the presence of its referent, comes to be employed inappropriately, with the same paradoxical conse­quences, in order to obtain the presence of this referent in its absence. Hence although the desire is purely mental, it is nonetheless an effect of representation, a cultural phenomenon.

    Yet the means of expression furnished by the ostensive, although adequate to this task, can scarcely be said to constitute an esthetic object in itself. The ostensive sign does not specify a particular mode of appearance of its referent, but the appearance of the referent per se; it stands for the substance of the referent, just as in mimetic desire a particular phenomenal aspect of the model can be said to stand for his being as a whole. Ostensive language does not express the content of the mimetic esthetic imagination but is only its formal sign, and what we have called ontological faith in language is precisely that this sign, given the conditions of linguistic presence, is sufficient.

    A case in point is the magical use of a person’s name to “possess” his “essence,” a quasi-universal phenomenon in archaic societies, which is often guarded against by the expedient of maintaining this essence in a secret, sacred name re­vealed only to privileged members of the family group. The name is a merely formal attribute. But if its use is thought to give access to the substantial being of its bearer, then contemplation of the name may be taken as a linguistic equivalent to the contem­plation of some more palpable manifestation. Mimetic desire is ultimately concerned after all not with appearance but with substance, appearance being only a means to an end.

    The inadequacy in our eyes of the esthetic that expresses itself in the evocation of a name in order to “possess” its bearer comes, not from the impotency of ostensive lan­guage, but, on the contrary, from its excessive power, its proximity to the sacred. The desiring subject only contemplates as much of the model’s appearance as he needs in order to assure himself that it expresses the latter’s being: if a name suffices, he need go no further. Indeed, the concrete appearances that function in the same fashion in the extra-linguistic imagination tend to be of a similar fragmentary, un-esthetic character, as in the possession through a piece of cloth­ing, a lock of hair, etc., exercised by practitioners of voodoo and similar rites.

    Yet in the iconic realm, there is no clear frontier between the magical and the esthetic. Although a stick figure or voodoo doll might suffice to permit “possession,” the cave painters of the animals whose beauty still amazes us today were almost certainly not displaying their skill for the sheer esthetic satisfaction of their fellows; these paintings, like the art displayed in cathedrals, clearly had a reverential purpose, as well as an ultimately alimentary one.

    In the formal, minimalistic domain of language, however, the distinction between the elementary linguistic forms and the declarative is critical. Although the elementary forms produce an esthetic effect, the dependence of the sign on the speech situation precludes the development of an esthetic internal to linguistic communication, that is, a literature. This is merely to reformulate in esthetic terms the dependence of the elementary linguistic forms on the linguistic scene that makes them incapable of furnishing objective models of reality. The “excessive power” of the ostensive-imperative that transcends the esthetic sphere is the exact counterpart of its non-objectivity; the failure to distinguish between desire and reality is in both cases inherited directly from the originary scene of representation.

    Hence what we may call the esthetics of the elementary forms can only be grasped by going beyond the linguistic models themselves to the entire scene on which they are presented. The pragmatic paradoxes generated by the use of these forms in specific situations can then be understood in esthetic terms and the emergence of first the imperative and then the declarative “solu­tions” to these paradoxes as steps in the evolution not merely of the objective representation of reality, but of esthetic expression.

    In this perspective, because the ostensive is dependent on the presence of its object, its own “esthetic value”—its capacity for evoking when contemplated by its hearer the being-for-desire, or simply the significance of this object—is limited to the moment of deferral in which it presents itself as a representation of the object. In the development leading to the constitution of the impera­tive, this deferral is prolonged in an awaiting in which the sign designating the object becomes for the hearer the stimulus to a practical performance. Here, for the first time, the utterance can function outside its practical use as an object of esthetic contemplation. Insofar as the imperative remains an “inappropriate ostensive,” its utterance, rather than being realized in practice and thereby annulled as an expression of desire, may be merely contemplated as a sign of the absent desire-object.

    But it would not be accurate to speak of the object of such contemplation—the linguistic expression of mimetic desire—as an imperative utterance. Rather, the dialectic of the inappropriate ostensive may be said to lead to two complementary results. One is the imperative, in which ontological faith in language is made the basis for a praxis that resolves the paradox it contains. But the other is the esthetic contemplation of the linguistic sign, in which this paradoxical faith is not tested in practice but enacted, without resolution, in the imagination. This enactment may be said to be the birth of esthetic expression as such; but its effectiveness remains dependent on the linguistic presence that gives the sign a potential albeit unused power over its real referent. Thus “inappropriate ostensive” language can be said to afford linguistic expression to mimetic desire, but only to the extent that it takes real beings as its models, for the relation between the substance of the model and its (linguistic) “appearance” or attribute must be guaranteed in the real world, and not, as in esthetic representation proper, within a fictional universe.

    With these considerations in mind we may now turn to the declarative form, which by providing a context-free model of reality, possesses by the same token a “context-free” esthetic. Here the linguistic object presented for contempla­tion is not a mere sign attributed to its referent by the speaker under the guarantee of linguistic presence, but an articulated model consisting of topic and predicate, in which the topic sign refers to what may at this point truly be called a signified, to which the predicate furnishes a context-free attribute. The declarative begins where the ostensive-imperative ends, with the designation of an object of desire guaranteed implicitly by a preceding imperative, that is, by the implicit interest of the hearer, and not merely in general terms by “ontological faith.” But instead of replacing the sign by its referent as with a successful imperative, the declarative “comments on” the referent with a predicate that explicitly constitutes it as inac­cessible to the desire of the (imperative) interlocutor. Thus the declarative model, because it is indifferent to the “magical” power of desire as expressed in the impera­tive, obliges the subject of this desire to contemplate its object esthetically, within the representational confines of the model, producing the mental oscillation between sign and imagined referent that defines the esthetic experience.

    The relation thereby established between speaker, hearer, and object is structurally identical to the “triangular” model of mimetic desire put forth by Girard, which it can be said to “express” in the same way that inappropriate-ostensive language expressed the desiring subject’s ontological faith in the sign. Thus in the sense in which desire may be defined as an intersubjec­tive relation, it can only be said to emerge at this stage. But to define desire by its fully evolved configuration would lend itself to the same criticism as the choice of grammarians and linguists to define linguistic form on the basis of the declarative sentence. Such definitions foreclose the possibility of generative analysis.

    In Girard’s model, the mediator openly or covertly designates, by means not specifiable in advance, the desire-object to the subject. The vagueness of this designation is analogous to the indeterminate nature of the relationship between the declarative speaker and the predicate attributed to the object. This predicate, as we have seen, is necessarily temporal, and its temporality designates a moment, real or imaginary, of the declarative speaker’s experience that is presumably not shared by his interlocutor. But this experience of the object is not presented as such in the declarative model, from which the speaker qua speaker is absent; the model is merely under­stood to be founded on temporal experience as the source of its predicate.

    In what Girard calls “internal” mediation, the medi­ator may well be invisible to the subject, or even an anony­mous on/Man of social judgment. Here the field is less the domain of an overtly privileged model than that of social experience in general, and the specific value of individual objects of desire is wholly dependent on their status in a given social group. Triangular desire is thus both more objective and more subjective than the desire expressed by the imperative. On the one hand, it depends on the “objective” form of predication, but on the other, because the source of this predication—that is, the media­tor—is absent from the declarative model, the valorization of the object is cut off from the public presence implicit in the ostensive sign.

    The declarative sentence, taken as an objective model of reality, is the foundation of metaphysics. (See “Plato and the Birth of Conceptual Thought,” Anthropoetics 2, 2, January 1997; https://anthropoetics.org/journal/ap-vol-2/ap0202/plato/ .) Predication, its distinguishing feature, is both the source of its objectivity (as it situates the topic outside linguistic presence), and at the same time, the expression of the mediating role of the (declar­ative) speaker between his hearer (the speaker of the original imperative) and the object of his desire (the topic). When this role is grasped explicitly by the hearer, the intersubjective situa­tion is that of the dialogic schema discussed a propos of the imperative (see Chronicle 545). But in the esthetic contemplation of the declarative model, the speaker does not appear; instead there is only predication “in itself.” Thus it is not the predicate but its predication of the topic that reveals to the detached observer what it hides from its desiring hearer: the presence of a second subject as mediator of his desire.

    We can now understand more concretely the position of the declarative in the dialectic of desire. The first (impera­tive) speaker of the imperative-declarative dialogue already desires the object, because he pronounces its name in order to acquire it. The declarative response transforms this desire into its “triangular” form by providing a mediator in the person of the second speaker, and a predicative attribute independent of linguistic presence. The subject’s original desire was founded on the magical power of language to make present its referent; now this making-present­ becomes purely imaginary, and at the same time, defined for him by another. The second speaker acts as an unavowed mimetic rival, maintaining the desire-object in its inaccessible position in the declarative model through his act of predication, although at the same time not revealing his own agency within his utterance.

    In practical terms this utterance carries information that may be of use to the first subject in realizing his desire. But insofar as the utterance itself becomes, on the scene of representation, an object of con­templation, the declarative expresses the inaccessi­bility of its topic within the real world. Thus to realize the desire, the speech situation would have to be abolished rather than, as in the imperative, fulfilled. Worldly fulfillment thus now appears as incompatible with the scene of representation, which generates an imaginary, or more precisely, a fictional universe. The pro­longation of the linguistic presence of the declarative thus leads in the opposite direction from that of the imperative, because the hearer remains thereby immersed in a fictional world in which his desire is incapable of practical fulfillment. The fiction of the declarative sentence can only prolong itself in fictional discourse, which is to say, in literature, where the imagined object is constantly reconstructed synchronously with the temporal progression of the work.

    The great flaw of “esthetics of literature” is that they begin with an anesthetic notion of language proper and are then obliged, in order to understand its literary use, to posit a “literary language” defined by some mysterious “esthetic” difference from “ordinary” language, like the “opacity” by which Sartre distinguished poetry from prose in his 1948 Qu’est-ce que la littérature? The indefensibility of this position is apparent even from the limited perspective of pragmatic linguistics. But it is not enough to speak vaguely of the “esthetic element” in language without making clear the structural relation between linguistic form and the esthetic.

    Thus the question must be turned on its head. Language is from the outset an esthetic phenomenon as much as a communicative one, the two functions being only fully sepa­rable at the discursive level. Even the ostensive, which in linguistic presence merely designates a present referent and thus can operate as an esthetic expression only during the quasi-instantaneous (although repeatable) time of deferral, functions esthetically in signi­ficant memory, and lacking this function, its inappropriate use as an imperative—but also, as we have seen, for the esthetic contemplation of the ostensive sign—would be inexplicable.

    The marginality of the esthetic, as exhibited in such phenomena as the bohemian life of artists and the estrange­ment of esthetics from the mainstream of philosophical analysis, perpetuates its original and never-quite­-forgotten connection with the sacred. This connection is as real, if less salient, in the minimal, formal domain of language as in that of iconic representation. Yet no student of painting or sculpture considers the pictorial or plastic components of artworks as in themselves devoid of esthetic interest, apprehended and integrated by means of a formal “compe­tence” to which the esthetic is irrelevant. If we are less likely to insist on the fundamentally esthetic nature of language, it is because the esthetic’s irrelevance to the practical world of science and technology makes it appear as a “supplement” to language rather than part of its original essence. This mind-set is that of meta­physics become no longer an auxiliary but a substitute for religion. The arbitraire du signifiant in the world of declarative language is a rootless world of “structures” that are “applied” to nature but shorn of their own natural, let alone anthropological, ontology.

    The revelation of the internal contradictions of the meta­physical world-view, long relegated to the marginal domain of esthetics, has since Nietzsche become a staple of continen­tal philosophy, of which Derrida was no doubt the ultimate exponent. Analytic, “Anglo-Saxon” philosophers have safely ignored this trend, which they not unjustifiably dismiss as tainted with estheticism. Thus as both schools increasingly concentrate their attention on language, one attempts to deconstruct its basis without examining its forms, whereas the other attempts to construct its forms—increasingly in the context of “artificial intelligence”—without examining their basis. Generative anthropology, by demonstrating the centrality of the esthetic/sacred element in the genesis of language, and understanding the “context-free” declarative as a product of linguistic evolution that liberates us from the immediacy of the speech-situation, would substitute a historical dialectic for this dialogue de sourds.

  • Toward a Preface to the New Origin of Language II: Sign and Event

    The originary hypothesis is close to forty years old, having first been formulated during my visit to Johns Hopkins in 1978. Not only have some of its basic constituents changed, notably the dropping of Girard’s lynch mob conception not long after the 1981 publication of The Origin of Language, but over the years I have tended to emphasize different elements of the scenario. This seems like a good opportunity to recall a couple of those aspects that I have had less occasion to reiterate in recent years, but which strike me as having a renewed relevance in our day.

    Minimality

    The Origin of Language put great emphasis on the Ockham’s-razor minimality of the hypothesis. When I opened the book with Mysteries should not be multiplied beyond necessity, I saw the creation of as simple a scenario as possible as the theory’s greatest virtue.

    At the time, this seemed uncontroversial; but times have changed. My impression is that in the era of big data, simplicity is no longer a value in itself. Anything that smacks of non-empirically grounded intuition is looked upon with suspicion; where is your data set? Hence, for example, the contempt for religion that I noted in Michael Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Morality (see Chronicle 519). This is a man who recorded every utterance made by his child for over a year. In contrast, religious language makes wild assertions without the least attempt at furnishing empirical proof. No wonder Tomasello feels religion can be dismissed as nonsense conjured up to reinforce one’s authority over credulous followers.

    In any event, getting the causality right is surely more important than minimizing the list of parameters. But as opposed to the natural world, where the farther we go the more complex everything seems, Ockham’s razor in human matters is more than just a rule of thumb for efficiency in the laboratory. A corollary of the big-data approach to causality is to consider that any simple cause-effect explanation is just a kludge to which we were obligated back in the small-data days when we couldn’t handle all the parameters. Even today, this is difficult. But just wait another few years when we’ll have million-qubit computers; then we’ll really be able to understand causality. Or rather, we won’t understand it at all, but our computers will, and at any rate they’ll be able to make predictions with currently unimagined degrees of precision.

    Forgetting my doubts about this approach to the natural world, the beginnings of which, whatever their benefits, have made it no longer possible for the layperson to have the faintest idea of the fundamental composition of the universe, well over half of which appears to be undetectable (“dark”), I think I can say with some authority that we are obliged to give credence to simple explanations in cultural as opposed to natural matters. This is more a matter of attitude than of “fact.” The physical-physiological causality involved in forming the first sign is no doubt as complex as your big-data equipment has the capacity for. But to understand it from within human culture is to grasp it in its own terms from the standpoint of the creatures who were motivated by a conscious judgment that could only explicitly take a small number of factors into account.

    It is the big-data temptation that leads to the ludicrous assertion that language “emerges naturally” when our cognitive level reaches such and such a threshold. The absurdity of treating language as a biological-cognitive function whose communicative setting is simply irrelevant reflects the big-data reduction of causality to a web of correlations none of which “means” any more than another, whatever the naïve participants in the activity may think about it. After all, economists and psychologists have shown us that people ceaselessly misunderstand the “real” motivations for their acts. The first users of language may have fancied they were designating a significant/sacred object, but what they were really doing was finding a new outlet for their overactive neurons.

    Eventfulness

    All of which leads me to a related and even more important element of the originary hypothesis. The most pertinent way of describing the minimality of our hypothesis’ causal chain is that it is an event, a memorable occurrence that establishes a new category of activity, the marking of the deferral of appetitive appropriation by a sign that originates as an aborted gesture of appropriation. It is conscious in a way no animal action can be conscious because its conscious nature is inherent in the sign that is shared with the other members of the group. That is, it is marked by the very act that constitutes it, an act that finds its purpose outside itself, in designating the object of its renunciation as sacred/significant, which minimally means that, rather than seen as an object for appropriation, it is understood by the newly funded human community as something that can only be approached via the sign.

    A corollary of this reflection is that not just the originary use of language but every use of language must be understood as an event, a term that must be understood as referring to an exclusively human, cultural phenomenon.

    Language and “Writing”

    One of Derrida’s most famous and significant points about language was that, in contrast to the apparent immediacy of speech, the truly exemplary form of linguistic communication is rather writing, l’écriture. This assertion generated among the faithful many delectable paradoxes for the purpose of denouncing the oppressive central authority that Derrida associates with the “myth of presence,” by means of which it persuades its subjects that its decrees are of divine origin. In undermining this authority, Derrida, while deconstructing Rousseau’s metaphysical faith in the immediacy of speech and the decadence of writing, in fact extends this decadence backward from writing to language itself. For Derrida, to claim that language is “really” writing is to claim that all language makes a false claim of presence, of sacred authority, which is only a mask for political authority. That primitive human societies are egalitarian rather than hierarchical is a fact too trivially “anthropological” for Derrida to consider.

    Nevertheless, like most of Derrida’s intuitions, his idea of the primacy of “writing” is essentially true, if only we return to GA’s primary point about language, which is that it is a mode of deferral. A sign is not a signal; it is a product of conscious renunciation, just the opposite of an assertion of immediate “presence.” Which is to say that, as Derrida himself never realized, it is precisely this différance, this espacement, this écriture, that is what presence is. Language is present to its referent the way we are present at a theatrical performance: in its presence, in which we know ourselves to be existing before it, not stuck up against it, as Sartre describes the beings in the world of the en-soi.

    And just as writing embodies deferral more obviously than speech, emphasizing the author’s distance from both the referential world and his interlocutor, so does writing emphasize more clearly than speech its inscriptive or record-making character. Scripta manent, verba volant is true only for societies that have a written language; purely oral cultures preserve their sacred texts in memory.

    Properly understood, the “inscriptive” character of language is evident; there is no need to assert it as a Derridean paradox. By marking the language-event with a sign, the user of language, oral or written, inscribes it in the universe of human culture, and more specifically, makes it an object of personal and collective memory that belongs to the cumulative history of humankind. Whence my insistence that we understand the origin of language as an event, even if the heuristic model furnished by the originary hypothesis will most likely never be identified with a specific time and place. Yes, the sign must have emerged through a number of stages. But there is gradualism and gradualism. A series of events is not the same as a series of unmarked occurrences such as take place among animals.

    Just as it is absurd to say that at some point we begin to have “ideas” and that speech emerges because we “want to express them”—an absurdity that has nevertheless become almost a truism in the recent literature of the human sciences—it is equally absurd to speak of animals as “unable” to mark the events of their lives by signs. Neither the action nor the desire are part of the animal repertory, un point c’est tout. Lacking a sign-system, the animals have no way of referring to, hence of culturally sharing these occurrences. The first signing event was no doubt repeated a number of times before its discovery of sacrality/significance became universally accepted, but it was an event from a start, a memorable occasion, if not the memorable occasion that we find in “myths of language origin”—or in the first sentence of Genesis.

    Philosophy and Anthropology

    Philosophy understands all this, in its way. Hegel’s world-spirit is in fact the historical spirit of human culture, historical because conscious of being part of a series of events. Beginning with Being and Non-Being in a universe of prehuman abstraction from which consciousness in and for itself eventually emerges, Hegel provides the most thorough depiction of the metaphysical organon. Here, even in the supposed absence of humans or of an anthropomorphic God, the universe is driven by ideas, which is to say, by the human scene of representation and its contents. But although today Hegel’s speculations are dismissed as “metaphysical,” it is not enough to deconstruct them in what are in the final analysis equally metaphysical terms. Philosophy cannot find its ground in itself, but it cannot find a ground either in the denunciation of its groundlessness—although the paradoxical configuration of this activity prepares the way for GA’s more rational approach both to the origin and nature of human culture and to paradox itself.

    In Science and Faith, written over thirty years ago, I criticized the social sciences for their dogmatic gradualism, which Big Data has only reinforced. On the principle that natura non facit saltus, cultural innovations are described as proceeding by imperceptible steps so that no moment of sudden revelation is ever envisaged. As for the revelations that our religions are founded upon, the task of science is to study their gradual emergence, their revelatory reality being “bracketed” for use in the non-scientific universe of ritual devotion.

    Hence the primary challenge that GA responds to, even before attempting to fulfill its mission of providing a plausible scenario for the origin of language, is to persuade the intellectual community that such a revelatory origin both can and must be thought. The originary hypothesis describes the emergence of a totally new form of behavior that could only have appeared as a revelation to its participants because the very categories that it inaugurated were categories of revelation.

    Unless the first object to become the referent of a sign was the focus of common attention in a wholly new way, it would not have been so designated at all. There is no gradual path from animal signals to human signs. The only gradual element of the process is getting it to stick and be reiterated until it becomes expected rather than extraordinary, so that from a unique event the use of language becomes banal—although, even at its most banal, every use of language remains an event, an inscription.

    Even after nearly forty years, it is still asking much of a reader to entertain the hypothesis presented in these pages, which has no doubt more in common with the speculations of “French theory” than with the more positivistic modes of scholarship favored in our hypervictimary age. It seems no longer necessary to follow Derrida in unveiling the oppressive nature of the myth of linguistic “presence” now that, in the academy at least, (Western) oppression is universally acknowledged. Hence we believe that our only chance at objectivity lies in undertaking a data-driven study of human behavior without recourse to metaphysical niceties, forgetting that it is these niceties alone that differentiate us from our animal brethren.

    But on the assumption that there is nonetheless a potential audience for these ideas, this second edition of TOOL is intended to present the underlying theory in a more concrete and logical fashion than the first, where I still relied on Girard’s human-sacrifice scenario of the originary event. The text is more clearly written, and disencumbered of many secondary observations and reflections on the linguistics of the 1970s.

    I can assure my reader that, at the very least, the originary hypothesis that an event inaugurates the human world of representational culture still stands, undamaged and undaunted, as solitary now as it was when I first formulated it in 1978. If only in tribute to its ability to survive on its own for nearly four decades, I hope you will be willing to give it a second look.

  • Toward a Preface to the New Origin of Language

    For years my intellectual universe has been increasingly characterized by dissociation. On the one hand, nearly forty years ago I formulated a heuristic hypothesis that I believe revolutionizes our conception of human language and culture. On the other hand, although this idea first appeared in 1981 in a major university press book that was well publicized, and has since been refined and reproduced in countless print and web publications, it remains virtually invisible and is never referenced in “scientific” works dealing with the origin of language.

    On the third hand, a small group of academics have nonetheless remained attached to this idea, allowing Anthropoetics to appear uninterruptedly since 1995, and more recently created a Generative Anthropology Society (and Conference) that has held a series of eleven consecutive annual conferences, with a twelfth scheduled for 2018. Although, on the fourth hand, it would be presumptuous for me to claim that all or even most within this core group share my conviction of the transformational nature of the originary hypothesis.

    Why do I believe that my little scenario of language origin is so important? While thousands of intellectuals spent decades enthralled, as some still are, with the Derridean idea of la différance as exposing the lie of the “presence” of the sign to our consciousness and debunking the oppressive dominance of the Center privileging male over female, white over black, right over left… only a tiny handful appreciate seeing deferral explained simply and graphically as a stepping back from mimetically enhanced “instinctive” violence, an inversion of Girard’s victimary idea that I think more faithful to its spirit than his own sacrificial formulation.

    Deferral in this sense, which establishes within a group of proto-humans the first scene of representation, is as far as I know the only non-metaphysical and non-supernatural explanation anyone has ever come up with of the difference between human, sign-mediated consciousness and that of other creatures, the only anthropological model of the unique human pour-soi that has been the focus of philosophy since Descartes, culminating in Sartre’s L’être et le néant, the “last word” of metaphysical analysis, but which, because it remains a work of metaphysics, describes our consciousness as an individual rather than a communal scene and, neglecting language, deprives itself of the possibility of bridging the gap between natural science and philosophy.

    Nothing that has happened since I first formulated the originary hypothesis has in any way altered my judgment of its importance. But having reached the relatively ripe age of seventy-five (the new fifty?), it seems to me that I owe it to those who have remained interested in this idea, and even more, to the idea itself, to put away the usual resentments and attempt to outline a strategy that would maximally preserve GA’s chances for eventual success. This will depend on our ability not simply to persuade the intellectual world of the plausibility of the originary hypothesis but to demonstrate its usefulness in reinterpreting humanity’s cultural legacy. Republishing The Origin of Language in an updated and streamlined version is a first step in this direction.

    Although, as with philosophical constructions, and even some anthropological ones—e.g., Mauss’ notion of the gift as confirmed in the contemporary world by social rather than economic exchange—GA’s hypothesis can be confirmed in vivo by the examination of the scenic structures of our own lives, it is doubly handicapped. Not only is it not empirically falsifiable, but I think more importantly, it does not bear the imprimatur of an authority in linguistics or the related social sciences. Had such as Derek Bickerton or Terrence Deacon formulated the originary hypothesis, it would surely have been widely discussed, no doubt further elaborated, and might well by now have acquired general acceptance.

    Yet such an eventuality would have been highly unlikely. Our hypothesis is too paradoxical, too humanistic to appeal to, or even to occur to, a social scientist. The day of “natural philosophy” is over, and GA as a new way of thinking is not merely lacking in appeal to those whose work is resolutely empirical, it is far too revelatory for the tastes of those who enter and are trained in these fields. These include analytic philosophy, which today is a highly technical subject, not one friendly to armchair speculation.

    None of this makes GA less necessary than it would be otherwise; on the contrary. But it requires that we become aware of the need to persuade social scientists of the need for this kind of speculative “theory” as opposed to the incremental conceptions that emerge from empirical study, and which conceive of human culture as an emergent structure in the sense of adding a new layer of recursion without understanding its paradoxical, faith-based essence: the human attribution of sacrality/significance as pre-existing the human. Or to put it more simply, the inextricable unity of God creates man/man creates God.

    We must also undertake the hopefully less arduous task of persuading humanists that grounding philosophy and its ethical foundation in anthropological reality is both necessary and made qualitatively simpler by means of a hypothesis that begins with the constitution of the human community in an event, the origin of language and culture.

    No doubt these programmatic suggestions are easier to propose than to realize in practice. I have attempted to implement them over the years in a number of books, as well as in these Chronicles, but whatever insights I may have achieved, these writings could not demonstrate sufficient mastery of the fields of world culture to persuade the specialists in these domains, let alone the intellectual public, of their value. It is clear in hindsight that The Origin of Language, which introduced the originary hypothesis to the world, would have benefited from a clearer idea of what GA could accomplish. Most of the early books—Science and Faith is an exception—lack a strategy of composition; they are extended thought-experiments rather than satisfying wholes. I would no doubt have done better to focus more closely on the relationships between my new way of thinking and the various older ways with which it intersects, philosophy in particular, rather than attempting to rewrite in outline the history of Western literary culture.

    At this point in my life, I believe my time is best spent in returning to the foundations of GA in hopes that by clarifying its relationship to these other domains I might stimulate workers in these fields to explore its consequences. In preparation for this, I offer a few watchwords whose visibility as corollaries of GA is not as obvious as I would like. Failure to accept these points almost inevitably means falling into a compromise position in which one combines GA with other ultimately incompatible ways of thinking in a lazy eclecticism. GA has its roots in “French theory,” but even more than Girard’s writing, it is allergic to being name-dropped into a mix of other fashionable notions. Although GA’s notion of deferral derives from Derrida’s idea of différance, the two cannot simply be “used” alongside each other.

    1. Language is not “about reality”

    William Flesch, whose presence at our recent Stockholm GASC I greatly appreciated, is one evolutionary-psychology-oriented literary theorist who does not accept the rationalistic clichés of the genre, but understands the paradoxical nature of human culture. Flesch rejects the facile notion of identification as an explanation of the reader’s relationship with fictional characters, insisting rather on the anomalous, not to say paradoxical nature of our interest in fictional beings; how can they affect our lives if they do not “really” exist? As he points out quite correctly, our relationship to literary characters is like that we have with people in the real world; we judge their acts, and espouse or oppose their desires, depending on what I would simply call our sense of justice, as providing validation for our community-oriented values, notably our penchant for what he calls “altruistic punishment.” That is, our moral sense makes us willing to forgo personal satisfaction (thus to act “altruistically”) in order to punish those who violate the norms that maintain the human community on the right side of the “prisoner’s dilemma.” Whence his provocative title, Comeuppance (Harvard UP, 2007).

    I would respectfully append to Flesch’s analysis a basic notion that should simplify the question of our relationship to fictional beings. It derives directly from GA’s central idea about language: language is not in the first place “about reality.” It is not “about” anything; it is a means for deferring violence (not simply “aiding cooperation”) by communicating/renouncing desire in the present in lieu of acting on it in order that it may be subsequently acted on without conflict. The fictional characters that we meet on our mental scene of representation are in cultural terms more significant than our problems in the “real world,” because they engage us directly with the communal scene of culture. (Which is why we cry so easily at the movies.) Durkheim saw religion as embodying the values of the community that individuals would not otherwise adopt for themselves. This is true enough, but backward, since we would have no “values” at all in the absence of the scene of representation that exists in us as individuals only because it was first created in and along with the community.

    Although the absence of originary about-ness is obvious once one realizes that language cannot have begun with declarative sentences, this is no doubt the most difficult aspect of GA for others to grasp. This is particularly true of scientists. Their language is disciplined by truth-value, and they obey very strict rules concerning what can be affirmed. To them, it seems obvious that language emerged so I could make to a fellow proto-human the falsifiable statement that “the food is over the hill.” What they fail to realize is that had this been the originary purpose of language, we would have evolved like vervet monkeys, emitting different signals for the different objects of interest in our environment.

    Particularly since the Enlightenment, we have lived in a rationalistic world in which our language is supposed to be “falsifiable.” Hence we tend to understand Nietzsche’s critique of objective truth as a debunking, when it might more usefully be seen as an insight into its evolution (see Kieran Stewart, “Nietzsche’s Early Theory of Language in Light of Generative Anthropology”). Truth-seeking is a beautiful thing, as are the achievements and applications of natural science. But the originary function of language cannot have been to “convey information” about “reality.” Frankfort’s ironic concept of BS (see Chronicle 475), comes closer to its original purpose, which is, to use Durkheim’s term, to create “solidarity.”

    1. The sacred and the significant are originarily identical

    They only come to differentiate themselves on the scene of representation that their common manifestation inaugurates. The notion that it is we who attribute significance to objects of experience is, like the declarative sentence, not an originary one. The first significant object, by being designated by a sign, is thereby distinguished from every other object in the universe as something to which we cannot relate through our “instinctive” appetites. We do not need “supernatural” categories to define the sacred; it is thus already defined.

    The sacred/significant is the originary cultural supplement to what has been revealed as the dangerous inadequacy of our “natural” pre-human restraints. This danger is deferred by the imposition of the sign between us and our “instinctive” nature. The sacred understands itself as a desire that cannot be fulfilled and for that very reason is desire and no longer mere appetite. Unlike the rational uses of language that we falsely think of as fundamental, it is the use of the ostensive sign to designate the originary sacred object that is the founding gesture of language, the stepping-back or deferral of appetitive interest that inaugurates the notion of significance/sacrality, our first idea.

    This is not to suggest that there is no difference between religious and rational thought. But discussing such differences as though they were grounded in an unchanging cultural ontology is the action of a “historian of ideas,” not a thinker. The very point of GA is to show the common root of our ways of commemorating / reproducing / perpetuating the originary scene, both in order that their differences can be appreciated and in order to find better ways of recombining them.

    The contemporary Judeo-Christian West’s loss of faith is a serious matter. Whether genuine organic substitutes for religion exist beyond Europe’s abstract human-rights “Ethical Culture,” or whether the traditional faiths can be revitalized, as seems to be occurring in various places, the purpose of GA is not merely to register these developments but to contribute to them by providing a new level of human self-understanding.

    Finally, as both these lessons demonstrate,

    1. Our human essence as symbolic language-users is ineluctably paradoxical.

    Because natural language attributes significance as if it were independent of this attribution, it can never be “understood” as a formal system. All works of cultural significance, whether of art or religion, function to let us experience the paradoxical emergence of significance, or to put it in spatial terms, the emergence of verticality from the horizontal world of pre-human interactions. This is a “mystery” whose existence cannot be explained since it concerns the sign-system in which the explanation must be given.

    But this third lesson is best kept in the back of our minds, since insisting on it risks conveying to the world of science the impression that GA is a kind of mysticism. On the contrary, GA’s first words, from the first page of The Origin of Language in 1981, are: Mysteries should not be multiplied beyond necessity. To allow us to better understand ourselves by grasping the pre-rational foundation of language and culture is GA’s purpose. It is also, I believe, that of human science.

  • Stockholm GASC: Anna Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantics and Generative Anthropology, Part 2

    Anna Wierzbicka (AW) makes Jesus’ doctrine of what she calls living with God, who is both a someone not like people and living, the key to all Jesus’ moral preaching, from the Sermon on the Mount to the numerous parables found in the synoptic gospels. For AW, the “kingdom” into which God invites us is not reserved for a posthumous future but is present as well in this world (“But [is the kingdom] in this world or the world to come? In my view, Jesus’ answer is clear: in both.” p. 18). “Eternal life” is nothing more than this same presence in God’s kingdom. God wants us to want to live with him and will reward us for this with his presence. Since want is a primitive, there is no need to define it; similarly, living with God is simply what is good for us, although we may not realize this and although it may not always appear to be in our immediate best interest.

    Thus AW’s conception of Christianity, by reducing all terms to her minimal set, reduces the concrete imagery, the metaphoric and consequently history-bound context of these texts to a level at which no effective distinction between the material and the spiritual world is possible. For example, although in Imprisoned in English she lists “father” and “mother” among the “primitive” kinship terms, in the case of “God the Father,” she describes the metaphoric attribution of paternity as follows:

    God wants to do good things for all people
    God can do good things for all people (p. 189)

    I don’t have time to discuss any of AW’s analyses in detail, but will give two examples from well-known parables, The Prodigal Son and The Good Samaritan, as well as her ultimate conclusion, to illustrate the tone and thrust of these readings as well as how their linguistic simplification is at the same time their reduction to the simplest ethical terms, which at this level become the simplest moral terms.

    The Prodigal Son is a parable I assume we all know. I won’t go into the story itself, but just offer AW’s “translation” of its moral lesson into NSM, which seems to me to sum up as well as any single passage in her book the overall sense of Jesus’ doctrine concerning God’s love for humanity.

    The NSM text below corresponds just to the first part of the parable referring to the prodigal’s return, not the second part about the resentment of the “good” son who remained.

    1. God wants to do good things for all people
    2. God feels something because of this
    3. All people can live with God
    4. God wants this
    5. When a person wants to live with God this person can live with God
    6. If a person lives with God this is very good for this person
    7. If a person doesn’t live with God this is very bad for this person
    8. Sometimes a person doesn’t want to live with God
    9. If a person doesn’t want to live with God, this person can not live with God
    10. God doesn’t want this person to think: “I have to live with God”
    11. God wants this person to think: “I want to live with God”
    12. When a person doesn’t want to live with God
      God feels something bad because of this
    13. God wants this person to want to live with God
    14. God does many things because of this
    15. If afterwards this person wants to live with God
      God feels something very good because of this
    16. God is like this

    The second example, the Good Samaritan, another well-known parable, illustrates her interpretation of Jesus’ doctrine concerning our relations with our fellow humans:

    1. It will be good if you want bad things not to happen to other people,
      as you want bad things not to happen to you
    2. It will be good if you think about all other people:
      “these people are people like me”
    3. It will be good if you want to do good things for all other people
    4. If you know that something bad happened to someone
      it will be good if you feel something because of this
    5. It will be good if you think at the same time:
      “I want to do something good for this person”
    6. It will be good if you do something because of this
    7. If you know that something bad happened to someone
    8. If will be bad if you think:
      “I don’t have to do anything for this person”
    9. It will be bad if you think”
      “I don’t want to do anything good for this person”
    10. It will be bad if you think about some people”
      “these people are bad people
      these people are not people like me”

    What I find most striking about these readings is that the childish simplicity of their language corresponds quite literally to the childlike innocence which Jesus always spoke of as appropriate to his audience (e.g., Matthew 18:3, “Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven”), and whose minimalism reflects both its simplicity and its fundamental nature.

    Finally, AW sums up the point of Jesus’ preaching:

    . . . if the purpose of people’s lives is to live with God forever, they need to know how to live to be able to live with God.

    One can say that Jesus provided two answers to the “how” question: one in his own life and person and one in his teaching; or rather, one answer in two different media, spoken and lived. . . .

    Jesus’ ethical teaching offers signposts: “If you live like this you can always live with God.” Jesus’ own life offers a model: “if you live like this you can always live with God.”

    A constant theme of GA is paradox, the unstabilizable disequilibrium created by a sign-system that not only can formulate “paradoxes” such as “this sentence is false” but that is paradoxical in its very origin, where signs confer significance as if it already existed. Thus it is of great interest that AW’s simplification of Jesus’s teaching reveals its paradoxicality with great clarity in its ethical dimension. Basically, God wants us to want to “live with him” and if we do, he will “do good things for us.” In this living with God we will want to do good things for others, even those (our “enemies”) who “do bad things to us.” But we must not think that God will reward us as a result of our good actions, but do them simply for the sake of “living with him,” not as a reward, but a good in itself. And in many places, AW’s Jesus tells us that we must not think of the reward we will receive when we do our good deed (whence the condemnation of the jealousy of the prodigal’s “good” brother). But we should not describe this objurgation as a pragmatic paradox of the same family as “be spontaneous” or “don’t think of an elephant.” On the contrary, this paradox is itself the sign of the sacred, something that GA can help us understand by relating it directly to the moral model.

    The limitations of AW’s methodology become apparent only when, in Imprisoned in English, she takes up the question of language origin. Here she attributes to chimpanzees a set of “primitives” exemplified in the reasoning processes implied by their manifestations of intelligent behavior. She follows such thinkers as Tomasello in proposing that the chimps and their proto-human relatives already had “syntax” before they began to speak, and realized that as a result they “had something to say”:

    Arguably, the [human] insight that “I can say things to people with words (spoken words)” was preceded by the realization that I may have something to say because at many times I have some thoughts in my head, and these incipient thoughts required some foundational words and syntax. (166-67)

    This reasoning is simply a category error. There is no reason to refuse to chimps, or to lower animals for that matter, the capacity to “think,” to combine ideas/images in mental space in ways analogous to, even homologous to human thought. Yet as AW’s own researches have admirably pointed out, it is only because we are “imprisoned in English” that we consider that our syntax corresponds simply to the structures of reason, as did the 17th-century French authors of the Grammaire de Port-Royal. But every language has different syntactical nuances, and languages far from English, like the Australian languages discussed in the collective volumes, such as Semantic and Lexical Universals (1994) and Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective (2001), compiled to demonstrate the universal applicability of her NSM, have few parallels with English syntax. And yet when it comes to reasoning, every language embodies the same logic.

    We should note in AW’s text a highly uncharacteristic hedging between the internally quoted passage, as thought by a human, and the following “that” clause, in which “I may have something to say” is “thought” by an intermediate creature who cannot speak but can somehow formulate thoughts in a form analogous to that of (English) language.

    However commonly it may be done as a way of avoiding the need for a real hypothesis of language origin, I will not hesitate to say that it is simply absurd to conceive of language as the “expression” of “ideas” already “thought” before language existed. Conversely, once we have a plausible scenario for the origin of language, then the idea of reasoning in language becomes plausible as well. But this is possible only once the scene of representation on which we exchange signs undergoes what I call in TOOL the “lowering of the threshold of significance” to accommodate worldly matters in addition to those of our “ultimate concern,” which, as Girard rightly pointed out, is the need to control human (mimetic) violence, and which fall in all but the most recent cultures under the rubric of the sacred.

    But although it could not be integrated into the methodologically rigorous system of NSM, the place of the sacred, and more concretely, of the Judeo-Christian God with his personal, central role, can be understood from the standpoint of GA as the most powerful anthropological elaboration of the originary use of the sign. AW scarcely touches on the fourth gospel and never translates into NSM its first verse: “In the beginning was the Word,” en arche en ho logos. In distinction from Girard, for whom this text, which is the epigraph to Des choses cachées…, provides the (tacit) reason why he never feels obliged to talk explicitly about language, GA begins from the elucidation of John’s fundamental intuition.

    Yes, Jesus “is” language, because language is, like Jesus for a Christian, both human and divine, whether this divinity be posited as existing beyond the human sphere or simply as an emanation of it. Hence the God who wants to do good things for us, who wants us to do good things for each other, who wants us to want to live with him, and all the rest, is someone, because he possesses language, and yet not like us, because his possession of it is not dependent on mortal life and its fear of death. If we imagine GA’s originary scene in which the object of common desire is made/revealed as sacred, and by interdicting its own appropriation becomes by that same process both the referent of the first sign and at the same time its “subject,” the original that the sign can only represent, we will find that AW’s simplified religious language applies more directly to this scene than any more elaborate vocabulary.

    All the terms to which AW reduces Jesus’ doctrine apply, without Procrustean manipulation, to our hypothetical originary event. That the key aim is “to live with God” is in fact a description of this scene, where the first humans find peace by “living with God” as the embodiment and referent of the sign through which they find unanimity and peace. That God loves us is easy enough to interpret if we apply my definition of love as the transcendence of resentment. He doesn’t want us to do good to seek reward, but because we want to live with him, just as the participants renounce the immediate “reward” that would come from appropriating part of the central animal for the sake of the peace and safety of the scene. That they later receive a “reward” in the sparagmos that divides up the animal is so to speak the originary model of Providence that maintains the Darwinian viability of the human and its fledgling system of representation, but cannot have been the motivation for their original renunciation, which was quite simply the desire to avoid the danger of conflict, which is to say, the transcendence of their mutual resentment. Similarly, love thy neighbor as thyself, even love thine enemy, are exemplified in the cessation of all rivalries in the unanimous expression of the originary sign.

    Thus although, as a good social scientist, AW follows the consensus in adopting the usual boilerplate about thinking apes suddenly deciding to speak, the core of her semantics is fully compatible with the basic ethical and anthropological ideas of GA. She has not simply studied religion as a mode of socialization from the standpoint of evolutionary psychology—in which a thinker like Rodney Stark has produced some very valuable work—but provided us with a deeper understanding of the elementary constituents not simply of our vocabulary but of our fundamental ethical ideas and intuitions.

    Let me end by thanking once more Adam Katz, who has been many times a source for me and for all of us of new ideas, perspectives, and readings, for pointing out to me the importance of AW’s work. As she is (at 79) alive and apparently well, perhaps if we hold the GASC in Australia in the near future, she might be invited to give our keynote address. I hate to play identity politics, but it would indeed be nice to see a distinguished woman thinker in this role.

  • Stockholm GASC: Anna Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantics and Generative Anthropology, Part 1

    Before I begin my “official” talk I would like your indulgence to address a couple of other matters:

    1. First of all, sadly, two people associated with GA have passed away since our last meeting; both were in their 80s. Edmond Wright, who loved Japan (his son teaches in Hokkaido), who was so happy to attend last year’s Nagoya conference, and who was vigorous enough to climb the steep hill to the campus from the railroad station—I felt guilty to pass him by in a car—died unexpectedly, as I understand it as the result of a concussion received in a fall. Edmond was not really a practitioner of GA, but he regularly attended our conferences and wrote for Anthropoetics, because he saw that his paradoxical, self-reflexive philosophical view of language had great affinities with ours. Edmond’s refusal to take language for granted as a “transparent” means of communication was manifest in his love for poetry, of which he wrote some of his own. Hearing him recite masterpieces of English poetry from memory had for me the effect both salutary and sad of reminding me of the cultural wealth of past, pre-Internet generations. Witty and kind as well as learned, Edmond was irreplaceable, and I’m sure I speak for all of us who knew him in remembering him with great fondness and regret.
    2. Another loss was that of James “Keith” Davies, who published a number of GA books, beginning with Adam Katz’s collective work The Originary Hypothesis in 2007. I understand that his family is planning to maintain his publishing operation and I hope the series that Adam was beginning to edit will continue. I never met Keith in person, but his interactions with me were always cordial and supportive, and thanks to Adam he was quite favorably disposed to the GA community and happy to publish our work.
    3. Finally, a more positive point. This is the tenth anniversary of the first “GA Thinking Event,” organized with much hard work by Andrew Bartlett at UBC in Vancouver in 2007. We are now at our eleventh annual meeting.

    Permit me to recall for a moment the film The Pride of the Yankees, the story of Yankee first baseman Lou Gehrig, who gave his name to the disease that killed him in June 1941, a few months before I was born. In the movie, Gary Cooper gives a speech, taken from life, where, knowing he has little time left, Gehrig tells the crowd at Yankee Stadium who are all cheering for him that he is the “luckiest man on the face of the earth.” Well, I’m still in pretty good health for an old guy, so don’t take out your handkerchiefs, but I wanted to use this tenth anniversary as an opportunity to express my personal appreciation to the members of our group, particularly to those who have like Marina taken on each year the immense burden of organizing these conferences. This is something I used to do as chair of the UCLA French Department, but it’s a lot harder when you don’t have an administrative assistant to make all the arrangements. As these conferences have succeeded one another, I have found that the degree of engagement with the principles of GA has continued to grow, and I think the result has been reflected as well in the articles in Anthropoetics. There is no way I can repay you for your loyalty and your interest in my ideas. Without comparing myself to Lou Gehrig, I do feel very lucky indeed to have attracted such a worthy group of associates, and with so little to offer you by way of fame, fortune, or academic prestige. Thank you!

    In the past few years, I have given a conference talk and written a couple of Chronicles debunking several high-profile works in areas related to GA’s core concerns. In 2013, I noted that Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos attempted to smuggle teleological notions into philosophy in a superficial and anthropologically naïve manner.

    More recently, I was a bit saddened to read Incomplete Nature, Terrence Deacon’s long-awaited follow-up to The Symbolic Species. This book contains the most persuasive attempt I have seen to explain how self-reproducing, that is, living creatures might have emerged from inorganic matter. But it wholly avoids talking about language, which was the subject-matter of Deacon’s previous, groundbreaking book. Life is marvelous enough, but language, as Deacon knows as well as anyone, is a different ball game, and Darwinian selection isn’t enough to explain it. Maybe he’s preparing a third volume, but my impression was one of a certain failure of nerve.

    Finally, I was struck by the extreme contrast between the meticulousness of Michael Tomasello’s accumulation of data in the domain of child language acquisition and his disgracefully naïve one-line dismissal of religion in his Natural History of Human Morality: “One way that leaders throughout human history have sought to legitimate themselves and their laws from a moral point of view is to claim that they have somehow been anointed by a deity or in some other supernatural way.”

    This is not to say that among the cognitive and constructionist linguists whose work I have been reading in preparation for this conference, I have not encountered much of interest. Although I have never been one to denigrate Chomsky’s contribution to linguistics, his political extremism notwithstanding, I am happy to see a more pragmatically focused linguistics replacing the formalism that dominated the field for so long. My own view of language is that it is about human meanings and interactive realities and that the formal qualities of language are a distillation of these rather than a priori structures whose essence is independent of meaning, so that colorless green ideas sleep furiously can serve as our model sentence.

    The virtue of this new linguistics is that it explains linguistic constructions as motivated, in the first place by showing that the observation of children learning language does not confirm generative grammar’s paradigm in which a Language Acquisition Device consisting of a set of pre-established parameters need only be “set” by the language learner for him to learn a specific language. Chomsky’s conception of the “poverty of the stimulus,” according to which a child’s ability to learn a language would be inexplicable in the absence of such a device, is shown to be simply incorrect; children learn language as a technique that they are no doubt genetically adapted for, but they require no specialized mechanism for language acquisition beyond those of our general cognitive facility.

    While I think we should welcome this rejection of structuralist dogmatism, which takes away an artificial filter between our use of language and our experience of the world, when it comes to explaining how it is that we came to use language in the first place, the general tendency of cognitivism/constructionism has been to extrapolate from the fact that language doesn’t require a specialized “device” in the human brain to the unfortunate notion that language is simply a by-product of our cognitive development, not much more than what Stephen Gould would have called a “spandrel.” Thus it is not uncommon to read that, having reached a certain level of what we might call IQ, we simply begin to talk to each other. For example, from Gilles Fauconnier & Mark Turner’s 2002 The Way We Think, p. 181:

    Language arose as a singularity. It was a new behavior that emerged naturally once the capacity of blending had developed to the critical level of double-scope blending. [double-scope blending is combining analogous ideas from two different registers, roughly, the creation of metaphors, which the authors consider the key to advanced thinking]

    Independently of the cognitive development described, I submit that as an account of language origin this is utter nonsense. It is a category error of an entirely different magnitude than Chomsky’s LAD, which is in its essence a methodological postulate rather than a theory of language origin. Language may facilitate cognition, but its function is communication. And if humans inaugurated a new means of communication, this obviously reflects their increased cognitive ability, but can only be explained by a need to communicate, not by the brain’s “natural” urge to display its prowess.

    But putting language origin aside for the moment, I am happy to report that I have found one post-Chomskian linguist who truly understands that the core function of language is the communication of meaning. Her work strikes me as of real value to GA’s core mission to articulate the analogies and differences between significance and sacrality, or in more general terms, language and religion, the formal and institutional elements of culture.

    It was my friend and collaborator Adam Katz who recommended to me the work of the Polish-Australian semanticist, Anna Wierzbicka of the Australian National University at Canberra. I wonder how many of you are familiar with her. The quality and quantity of her scholarly work over the decades is really remarkable: a couple dozen books and several hundred articles.

    As far as I know, there is nothing comparable to her comparative studies of speech acts and syntactic constructions in different languages, or her in-depth analyses of such phenomena as the different families of collective nouns. To give a very small sampling of the “idiomatic” constructions that she analyzes and classifies in semantic categories: oats is plural and wheat singular, yet you can’t say an oat any more than a wheat, though you can say both noodles and a noodle, a pea and peas; we eat and drink, but we can have a drink but not have an eat; we say cucumbers but not lettuces, the French speak of grapes as we do of rice, so you can’t say un raisin; a bunch of birds can be all robins, but a bunch of furniture can’t be all chairs; a pair of gloves is two gloves, but a pair of scissors is not two scissors, in English you wash your face and raise your hand, but in French on lève la main but on se lave le visage. Or her common-sense explanation of the distinction between nouns and adjectives (color and shape are parallel categories, but shapes are more “nouny” than colors, so we say “a circle” but not “a red”).

    Every aspect of language she touches, from the formal structures of syntax and morphology to questions of vocabulary, is understood as language has too rarely been, by linguists at least, as facilitating the expression of meaning. Wierzbicka’s fundamental semantic vocabulary, the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM), reduces meaning to the maximum simplicity of a few dozen “prime” words/concepts that she claims, after considerable research, to be exemplified in every human language, including the native languages of Australia. AW’s constant point is that constancies in language always reflect in one way or another constancies in meaning. The overall purpose of NSM is a practical one: how to permit mutually comprehensible translations of socially determined concepts and constructions from one language to another, and in particular, from the world-language English, in which she has warned us in several books against becoming “imprisoned” (Imprisoned in English is her most recent, published in 2014), to the other languages spoken around the world.

    A point that Adam made to me en passant about Wierzbicka’s work is that, however valid her judgment may be concerning the elementary categories of human meaning in her NSM, they cannot be truly elementary, in the sense that they do not include the notion of the sacred, the name-of-God that was in effect the first signified, and whose meaning is no more than significance/signification itself. For whatever species of animal was at the center of the originary scene—the first generation of GAers spoke of it as a “tasty bison”—it was as the name-of-God that the first word was produced as the aborted gesture of appropriation. Yet I think that in a broadened understanding of the originary hypothesis, not only can AW’s minimal semantics be shown to be compatible with it, but her use of it to reduce Christian doctrine to its simplest terms does much to facilitate our understanding of the connection between the elements of our hypothetical originary event and the Judeo-Christian religious insight that is at the core of GA.

    For AW is far from displaying the cognitivists’ often churlish indifference to religion. Among her books is a 500-page tome entitled What Did Jesus Mean?, published by Oxford in 2002, whose subtitle is Explaining the Sermon on the Mount and the Parables in Simple and Universal Human Concepts. And this work, directed more to the student of religion than to her fellow linguists, more than lives up to the subtitle.

    AW demonstrates an exhaustive familiarity with a century of scholarship and commentary on the synoptic Gospels. (Writing at the beginning of the century, she could not take into account the recent renewal of interest in the fourth gospel and its very different set of references.) Describing herself as a practicing Catholic, AW is above all concerned to place her semantic techniques in the service of understanding Jesus’s teaching, partly to help carry out the task associated with the Jesus Seminar of separating out his authentic sayings from the supplementary material supplied by the evangelists, but principally to provide the most universally comprehensible—and translatable—understanding of the foundational texts of Christianity.

    Although it is not presented as a work of theology or religious apologetics, I think any reader of this book must recognize that it was motivated primarily by the desire to demonstrate the human—I won’t say anthropological—truth of the Gospels and of Christianity in general, without in any way violating the strictest criteria of social science. In this we can draw a fruitful parallel with another Catholic thinker, one who had little interest in the study of language, although he certainly knew how to use it, and who taught that religion in general and Judeo-Christian religion in particular is a primary repository of human—now I will say anthropological—truths. I am referring to the spiritual father of GA, the late René Girard.

    The NSM contains no terms specifically related to religious practice. AW’s NSM “definition” of God (p. 21) is representative of her approach:

    1. God is someone (not something)
    2. This someone is someone good
    3. This someone is not someone like people
    4. There isn’t anyone else like this someone
    5. This someone exists always
    6. Everything exists because this someone wants it to exist
    7. People exist because this someone wants them to exist
    8. This someone exists because this someone exists, not because of anything else
    9. This someone lives

    Every culture, and therefore every language, has some acquaintance with the sacred, and we may assume that the idea of God is universal, but it is scarcely a simple idea. In AW’s 9-part definition, which includes autonomy, uniqueness, immortality, responsibility for the universe (although not its creation), and the particularly Christian category of being a “living” God, the closest she comes to the notion of the sacred itself is the negative “this someone is not like people.” The absence of a more specific term respects the deliberate limitation of her method. AW’s semantics is based on a methodological postulate that should be understood as making no claims on the anthropological source of language, which on the contrary it helps us to elucidate. Following Peirce, she adheres to the principle that signs can be defined only by other signs. It follows that semantics is necessarily a self-contained subject that requires that we put in brackets the means by which we enter the universe of signs in the first place.

    And consequently we need not take “literally,” or better put, ontologically, the principle that words can be defined only by other words. AW’s definition of God is not designed to give the classical person from Sirius an idea of what the “generic” human God-concept refers to, but to allow all human cultures to understand the Judeo-Christian God in their own language. Yet it has been my contention, as it was certainly Girard’s, that the Judeo-Christian complex is anthropologically more revelatory than earlier (sacrificial) religions, even than religions such as Buddhism that are arguably on a comparable ethical plane. Although I share Girard’s view in general terms, my divergences reflect a “Jewish” skepticism of the specific post-sacrificial intuition at the core of Christianity: human culture need not begin with human sacrifice. In this respect, it is of interest that Jesus’ trial, crucifixion, and resurrection play no role in AW’s reading of the Gospels, which analyzes only the dicta and parables of his preaching; the words cross and crucifixion are not even found in the index.

    Those familiar with GA’s originary hypothesis know that the first sign is accompanied by, and dependent on, the propagation among the participants in the first scene of representation of the moral model of reciprocal exchange that is our species’ founding “social contract,” and which provides the missing link between the world of signs and that of human life. This model is not the origin of the affects that link the members of the group, but it provides a literally consecrated model of behavior that is the ancestor of the morality of mutual love as it evolves in Judaism and then Christianity, as well as, in different forms, in all religious traditions. What AW seeks is to simplify this morality to its most universal terms for the purpose, as in all her semantic work, not of reducing all religions and their moral/ethical doctrines to “the same,” but of permitting anyone from any culture to distinguish the specific traits of each one of them.

    (Part 1 of 2)

  • The Moral Model

    Now that the GASC meeting is behind us, I would like to respond to Adam Katz’s argument in his June 2 blog “(Im)morality and (In)equality” that, to reduce his point to what appears to me its essence, human language, although it may inspire the moral model of essential human equality, should in fact be described as guaranteeing only a potential reciprocity which in no way presumes the ontological equality of the interlocutors.

    Adam gives the example of a peasant who might perhaps give the king useful advice on some point, but is in no way “equal” to him. And no doubt in most senses of the term, as regards wealth, prestige, or the resources the society is willing to invest in preserving his life and well-being, the two are in no way equal. Yet the Judeo-Christian idea that we are “all equal before God” is not one to be cast aside as mythical, and rather than seeing it as a notion accessible only to an “advanced” civilization such as ours, GA invites us to see it as the fundamental intuition at the basis of the social order, one affirmed explicitly in primitive, egalitarian societies, but whose implicit reality underlies hierarchical societies as well.

    Hence I do not think that we should see the reciprocity language makes possible in the narrow sense in which society under rare circumstances permits peasants to speak to kings rather than in the maximal sense in which our common participation in the scene of representation subordinates any worldly hierarchy to a fundamental ontological equality. The fact that in principle a child taken from any culture can be successfully brought up in any other, and is not intrinsically incapable of rising to the same heights of cultural achievement as those native to that culture, is both a refutation of biological racism and an affirmation of the liberal-democratic principle that “all men are created equal.”

    In spontaneously formed groups up to a certain size and in a context that makes the sheer exercise of force impossible (in contrast to the “savage” groups favored in apocalyptic disaster films), people tend to cooperate democratically, profiting when necessary from the specific skills of individuals but not choosing a “king,” and the same is true in juries, where the foreman is an officer of the group rather than its leader. Democracy in this sense doesn’t deny that some people may have better judgment than others, but it permits unanimous cooperation, and I venture to say, corresponds to “natural” human interaction since the originary scene.

    In the past, presumably, women would have taken a subordinate role; now they do not. We can only applaud this change, while noting how secondary it is to the fundamental principle involved, just as the female vote has not modified in principle the solidity of democratic systems any more than the abolition of Jim Crow. In all such cases, the implicit lesson is that the newly imposed equality was always there, and regardless of ideological explanations for its former absence, always primary as the reflection of human ontology.

    I think Adam and I are in agreement that the “digital age” engenders an intensification of human difference that puts in question, along with the Marxian notion of “labor power” as an overall equalizing factor in evaluating human worth, the very foundation of human moral equality in our common ability to exchange linguistic signs. Differences in intelligence have always existed, and differences in language use by social rank exist in all languages even today. But whereas in the past, the peasant could see himself as inferior to the king by a kind of social fatality prior to any question of intrinsic worth, an attitude consecrated by Christianity, today many people unable to manipulate symbols in a sophisticated manner, whether in the STEM fields or in contexts like the business world, law courts, or publishing houses, are forced to see themselves as without value in the labor force, replaceable by machines that can do their jobs better than they, and hence either lose their sense of worth or subscribe to victimary explanations of their misfortune.

    Whereas I have expressed dismay concerning this seeming refutation of the moral basis for the social order, Adam appears to see it as the revelation of what had always been true but that for the sake of the moral model we had hypocritically ignored. The philosophically minded reader will recognize this as Nietzsche’s position, and while I have always been struck by the hypocritical facility with which thinkers of the Left adapt Nietzsche’s fundamental idea of human difference to the contrast between the progressive vanguard and the clingers and deplorables, I hope I am wrong in my impression that Adam seems ready to accept this position with no hypocrisy at all as simply the reflection of reality.

    It seems to me that in articulating his points of disagreement with Chronicle 549, where I express concern for the future of Western civilization, and with it, the liberal-democratic equilibrium between economic necessity and political equality, Adam poses a direct challenge to the moral model itself. This provides me with a useful opportunity to elaborate on the centrality of this model, whose self-evidence he correctly points out that I have been essentially taking for granted. And since we must prefer the “Brave New World” to which the Nietzschean vision leads to the void that would remain if our failure to control human resentment brings on the long-anticipated nuclear apocalypse, I can hardly turn my back on the argument that, given the quite extraordinary—and increasingly violent—levels of irrationality attained by the victimary defenders of the moral model today, it might be preferable to give it up altogether, all the more so given my (our) own membership in the “privileged” class of (non-STEM) sign-manipulators.

    First, I think it important to correct the possible misapprehension that, in speaking in Chronicle 549 of tyranny as “immoral,” I was indulging in what could be called moralizing. I recognize as well as Adam that applying contemporary moral values to the past is at best naïve. My reference to the “immorality” of tyranny refers to its objective conflict with the moral model; this reflects the eternal tension between morality and ethics that can be decided only by “history,” that is, precisely what cannot be determined in advance.

    Whence, to return to my original point, the advantage of a political market in which “values” can be evaluated in practice. Authoritarian systems can no doubt outperform liberal market society in the short run, but we have seen absolutely no indication that these systems can renew themselves successfully even on the economic plane, without speaking of the “quality of life” in societies that lack the opportunity for free discussion. China may have made great strides since it jettisoned the Maoist fanaticism of the Cultural Revolution, but it has certainly not yet provided its population with anything comparable to the level of prosperity in the West, even in the cities where, for example, the pollution problem is far beyond the point at which Western cities such as Los Angeles instituted smog control decades ago.

    What is disturbing in the current environment is that Western democracies have increasingly found themselves obliged to pay homage to victimary myths in order to provide moral justifications, or perhaps we should call them “indulgences” like those that aroused Luther’s ire, for the unequal results (disparate impact) of modern meritocracy. For although the law of supply and demand cum “safety net” is arguably the most efficient means of maintaining general prosperity, no metaphysical power makes humanity as a whole capable of achieving a Fourier-like overall harmony of talents and inclinations.

    What I reject in “neo-reactionary” thought is what I consider the basic flaw in all Nietzschean thinking: the idea that seeing/telling the truth about human difference is a courageous act that reveals the lie behind the moral model, which Nietzsche associated explicitly with what we have come to call the Judeo-Christian. That the only modern social system to take Nietzsche’s “truth” as its explicit foundation is the historical archetype of evil, reaction to which has engendered the victimary era, never seems to trouble the Nietzscheans, of whom Heidegger at least never disavowed his Nazism, although many others have been happy to do it for him.

    I am old enough to remember, if at second-hand, a time when people could think of themselves as Nietzscheans independently of Hitler, as in Huxley’s novel, or the infamous 1924 case of Leopold and Loeb. One wonders what is so exhilarating about realizing that not all humans are equally useful to the community, which is really all this amounts to. What makes us human is rather that we can all, with trivial exceptions, share language and hence culture—the heart-warming lesson of the (linguistically incredibly naïve) film Arrival.

    What, paraphrasing Girard, we may call Hitlerism’s revenge (see Je vois Satan tomber comme l’éclair [Grasset, 1999]: 271-72, and Chronicle 491) is the postmodern insistence on human equality not only in the moral sphere but implicitly in all others as well, all real-world differences being blamed on “racism” and its ever-multiplying victimary cousins. The virtue-signaling of the partisans of victimary thinking outdoes Molière’s Tartuffe as a secular caricature of Christianity. Unlike Enlightenment rationalism, it insists on both the necessity of passing moral judgment and our “unworthiness to judge” society’s “victims.”

    Thus it is no surprise that at the same time as “post-Christian” Christianity caricatures itself by “forgiving” Islamic thugs and murderers, Christian churches are being converted to mosques all over Europe. It is an interesting paradox that, in Israel at least, the Jews, who went so long without any governmental power at all, have retained a respect for the ethical that makes societies function at a time when “mainstream Christianity” has largely dissolved into a support group for victimary enterprises whose core despises it. But to combat victimary absurdity by identifying moral worth with social functionality is denial of the very essence of the human.

    Although I have no sympathy for the alt-right, I do have sympathy for Adam’s interest in it as the Nietzschean response to the pseudo-Christianity of the victimary. If real Christianity does not deserve Nietzsche’s contempt, the latter certainly does. And borrowing Nietzsche’s ideas is not necessarily a worthless venture. But the moral model, the fundamental framework of human interaction founded on the originary reciprocity of language, is not comparable to the excesses of affirmative action. Making linguistic reciprocity the foundation of our ontological equality does not imply that we need find a victimary explanation for every form of collective difference; on the contrary.

    If GA’s fundamental anthropology is valid, then we should be able to overcome the present crisis, but we must first recognize its specificity. Nor is it a coincidence that the increased domination of symbol-manipulation over physical activity also greatly favors the Jews, both in Israel and elsewhere. This is not the place to go over Slezkine’s arguments about the advantages of the Mercurians over the Apollonians in modern society, but hating the Jews as having higher IQs as opposed to hating them because they “discovered” the One God at least brings this hostility closer to good old-fashioned envy, just as in hostility to Israel, antisemitism normalizes itself as “ordinary” xenophobia.

    To make turning the unique hatred of the Jews’ firstness into “ordinary” rivalry the criterion for a Fukuyaman “end of history” is admittedly Hegelian speculation, but the Jews have been the canary in history’s mineshaft since the beginning of monotheistic civilization, and whether their unique role be the sign of apocalyptic catastrophe or universal reconciliation, it is as productive and plausible a metaphor for the fate of humanity as any.

    And let us not be afraid to see in the emergence of Generative Anthropology’s “new way of thinking” the passage of this problematic to a higher level, whether of conflictual intensity or mutual understanding, peace or self-destruction. Humanity may have more productive things to do than to contemplate its “ultimate” destiny, but the lesson of the twentieth century, and all the more of the twenty-first, is that it cannot afford to ignore it either, whether in the pursuit of Eros or of Thanatos, love or resentment.

  • GASC’s Tenth Anniversary

    The Generative Anthropology Society and Conference has now concluded its eleventh annual meeting, something few of us would have anticipated when Andrew Bartlett organized the first “GA Thinking Event” in Vancouver ten years ago. I will provide in the near future the text of my talk, focused on What Did Jesus Mean? by the Polish-Australian semanticist Anna Wierzbicka, and hope to put together shortly material for a dialogue with the stimulating and paradox-friendly ideas on narrative of keynote speaker William Flesch (see notably his Comeuppance, Harvard 2007). But first, a few words about the meeting as a whole and some thoughts that emerged from it.

    To the extent that GA remains North America-based, meeting on other continents no doubt cuts into attendance. I counted only two Americans, Peter Goldman and myself. But this disadvantage is outweighed, it seems to me, by the increased outreach of GA among people who would otherwise not have heard of it, and who are, unlike the denizens of today’s American universities, not imbued with the prejudice that increasingly attaches not merely to what is “not PC” but to any mode of thinking not explicitly victimary.

    Thus my first and delighted surprise was to note in the course of this conference the absence of the phobiaphobic language to which we have sadly become accustomed. No name-calling, no automatic denunciations of “capitalism”—this might be said to be expected at a GA conference or even at a Girardian one, but never have I witnessed to this extent the irrelevance of victimary thought. In contrast, my impression has been that, particularly since the Victoria conference in 2014, the seriousness of the general engagement with GA’s core ideas has slowly but steadily increased. As the essence of GA has become clearer in my own mind, it has slowly manifested itself in these conferences, notably by the diminution, although by no means the absence, of “geopolitical” references to GA and mimetic theory as the intellectual equivalent of great powers that must be reconciled to avoid conflict.

    To the extent that GA is indeed a “new way of thinking,” its adoption can be justified only by a genuine crisis in the old ways. But GA’s job is to convince its potential public of its positive benefit to self-understanding, not to insist on the weakness of the competition.

    To the end of clarifying the place of GA in our intellectual scheme of things, it now seems to me necessary to situate it with regard not merely to science and religion, but to philosophy. The secondary status of philosophy in GA’s self-consciousness reflects a necessary element in its foundation, the product of Girard’s important intuition that religion rather than philosophy is humanity’s primary source of self-understanding. But I have come to understand that merely situating GA on the cusp between science and religion so that God-creates-man and man-creates-God are balanced so to speak on its knife-edge does not supply a sufficient justification for preferring the speculative nature of GA’s hypothesis to the more concrete-appearing models provided by paleontology and the other human sciences.

    There is no need to spend time on a systematic critique of these models, whose eventless gradualism is self-evident. Social scientists turn away from the speculative scenario of our “minimal hypothesis” on the ground that their own gradualist scenarios are self-evidently more minimal. The fact that they demonstrate no significant boundary-crossing and consequently utterly fail to explain the origin of human language, even when tacitly admitted, is taken as a proof of their Ockhamian virtue.

    It has become clear to me that the dichotomy between religion, which posits the prior existence of what may call the human pour-soi, and science, in which this pour-soi is ignored and human language and culture hypothesized to emerge as a by-product of our “cognitive” progress, is too wide to be breached as such. The insertion of GA’s way of thinking into the gap can only be done by contrasting it with philosophy, whose prior concern with the pour-soi and everything it provides, with the paradoxical but necessary exception of language which in fact is its own source, has long established it as independent of both religion and human science.

    Philosophy, the “queen of the sciences,” is not habituated to being opposed by an alternative mode of thought, as are religion, founded on faith, and science, founded on empirical evidence supplemented by logico-mathematical calculation. Philosophy, in contrast, is founded on “reason,” and endlessly debates its own foundations, which can never be reduced to the simply “natural” and dealt with through the processes of “natural science”—even when, as with Materialism, this is a particular philosophy’s fundamental postulate. How then does it help to clarify the situation of GA with respect to science and religion to contrast it with philosophy?

    Scientific models do not have the purpose of explaining why reality is what it is, but merely of predicting and retrodicting what occurs in it. However complex its epistemology may appear from within, from without, science is simply oriented to this task of prediction. Hence the scientific method can be applied to human behavior as well as to that of animals, plants, and inanimate objects. The methods of human science since Durkheim treat human activity as productive of “social facts” analogous to the empirical data provided by natural phenomena, and are certainly not without predictive value.

    Yet the scientific method cannot truly respect the difference between “free” human action and the activities of other living creatures, let alone of inanimate objects. Any result of a social-science study can in principle be made available to those whose behavior is being studied, permitting them to change their actions in consequence, a feedback beyond the scope of non-human beings. This is not necessarily a practical problem for social science. The opportunity of changing one’s behavior on the basis of a scientific conclusion is on the contrary a sign of its potential usefulness; a study of smoking that discovers a correlation between smoking and lung cancer may well lead to a welcome diminution in the number of smokers. It means nonetheless that science must remain incomplete unless it is able to model the emergence from “nature” of the feedback loop itself: the phenomenon of representation, and specifically, of language.

    As I have shown via several examples (see e.g. Chronicles 519, 525, 528), recent “cognitive” social-science accounts of the origin of language are essentially nonsensical. Although we know that language is radically different from animal signaling, involves neurons in a different part of the brain, and is obviously a mode of communication rather than a mere deployment of cognitive activity, we are offered  wholly gradualist models that either affirm or imply that language is a mere byproduct of the superior cognitive abilities of the human brain. At best, specialists tell us that the increased troop size of proto-human societies makes language “necessary” for social control.

    It seems that until some as yet unknown method can provide an empirical demonstration of something like GA’s originary hypothesis, the principle will remain that natura non facit salta, and the lack of a missing link between language and animal signaling will be taken as itself a sign of the wholly gradual, “Darwinian” nature of its emergence, like that of the eye from the light-sensitive invertebrate eye-spot.

    The question then arises as to what category of thought GA’s originary hypothesis falls into. Is a wholly speculative scenario, however “minimal,” compatible with social science? Is not postulating a hypothetical event as the moment of emergence of a radical new phenomenon contrary to the core principle of scientific thought? Certainly the common judgment of social scientists who have been confronted by GA is that it is founded on a “myth” rather than an acceptable scientific hypothesis.

    The progress of thought is not fueled by boundary disputes. My own judgment, that GA is indeed a new way of thinking, is confirmed at best negatively by these reactions. Yet I wonder if anyone would explicitly deny that the “accepted” explanations for the origin of representation, with its thorough remaking of human behavior and its natural surroundings, are wholly devoid of explanatory power.

    At this point it might seem necessary to contrast the cultural phenomenon of religion, which explains language and all else by postulating a being external to the world (or somehow immanent in it) that “always already” possesses the otherwise exclusively human capacity for representation in a hyperbolic mode that permits not merely the creation of fictions but the creation of worlds. Social scientists are capable of theorizing the social benefits of religion, but their only explanations for its existence are of the a posteriori variety that explains things by the fact that they are already there. Claiming that we postulate god(s) to explain what we find inexplicable all too obviously depends on our prior conception of such beings: why indeed are we able to “postulate” anything? From Max Müller to Roy Rappaport, different thinkers have hypothesized the coeval emergence of language and religion, which in my view puts them on the right track, but in no case has there been a convincing account of how or why this happened. Before GA, that is.

    Why then introduce philosophy into the religion-science opposition? Because tacitly it has been philosophy that has been allotted the task of reflecting on the unique characteristics of human consciousness that are associated with our capacity for representation, under the even more tacit condition that this consciousness not be understood as having a “natural” or biological origin that must somehow be scientifically explained, which could only be done through a theorization of the origin of language. From the outset, philosophy/metaphysics has taken the existence of mature, propositional language for granted. Philosophical/anthropological attempts at creating an “originary scene” of language, many of which I discussed in The Scenic Imagination from Hobbes to the Present Day (2007), have always been anthropologically naïve and marginal to the philosophical enterprise, and the greatest modern philosophers, such as Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, have left this subject to les philosophes.

    By situating propositional language at the end of a hypothetical evolutionary history of its own, GA radically breaks with this tradition, and dares to consider the link between the “natural” and the “cultural” that (1) science cannot formalize because it has no way of distinguishing ontologically the cultural/representational from the rest of nature; (2) religion understands all too well but refuses to analyze further than attributing it to a preexistent representational-intentional consciousness; and finally (3) that philosophy analyzes in terms of the specificity of human consciousness (Sartre’s pour-soi as opposed to the natural en-soi) without concerning itself with the “worldly” question of the emergence of one from the other, that is, once more, of the origin of language.

    “Radical” does not mean “true,” but the greatest truths can be grasped for the first time only by radical means. The origin of language is the origin of the human itself, and it can only be given its rightful place in the scheme of human thought by means of a new way of thinking that puts the emergence of scenic, representational communication and thinking at the originary center of all human thought.

    I have been making this point in different ways since the publication of The Origin of Language in 1981, and I will continue to make it, hopefully with increasing clarity, until the end of my days. The Stockholm conference is one more step toward public recognition of GA, and I can only thank the participants for their open-mindedness toward this fundamental idea, which the “world” has so far been unwilling to take the trouble to understand. I owe my especial thanks to Marina Ludwigs for her personal loyalty and affection and for organizing a splendid conference with a stimulating variety of participants. I look forward to next year’s conference in Warsaw, hosted by Magdalena Złocka-Dąbrowska, as a further step in the right direction.

  • Scenes of Distress: Reflections on Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History”

    “For the days are surely coming when they will say, ‘Blessed are the barren, and the wombs that never bore, and the breasts that never nursed!’30 Then they will begin to say to the mountains, ‘Fall on us’; and to the hills, ‘Cover us.’”
    Luke 23:29-30

    Introduction: Geopolitics, Fukuyama, and Japan

    Current international news presents a challenge, to put it mildly, for Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that liberal democracy and free markets comprise the inevitable, triumphant system of human organization. With the resurgence of ideology, nationalism, and authoritarianism around the globe, with the re-assertion of regional and cultural identity, and with a growing ambivalence, if not outright hostility, toward globalization, “history” in Fukuyama’s sense of the term seems to be returning with a vengeance. A quarter century after Fukuyama’s essay (“The End of History,” 1989) and book (The End of History and the Last Man, 1992), the world appears to be taking on a decidedly “Huntingtonian” cast. Samuel Huntington’s rival thesis, the “Clash of Civilizations,” predicted that cultural primacy among the world’s great civilizational blocs would drive events and override the forces of globalization, the basis for Fukuyama’s more hopeful projections.(1)

    However, the dramatic, real time repudiation of Fukuyama’s thesis distracts from a question that is equally important, if not more so. Let us suppose that the “end of history” were to proceed as Fukuyama projected, and that all ideological alternatives were indeed discredited and abandoned. In such a case, could the “end of history” succeed, not against ideological opponents, but on its own terms? This question, as to whether Fukuyama’s post-historical society could survive its own success, worried Fukuyama himself, who was convinced that the end of history would succeed. He wrote the “last man” section of his book to address precisely this concern.

    Real world examples are not lacking, though. Japan presents a particularly interesting case for exploring this aspect of Fukuyama’s thesis, for investigating what the end of history would look like, and for asking what kind of society, what kind of person it would produce. Fukuyama himself made much of Japan as a kind of advance guard for post-historical developments.

    Yet Japan is not the same country it was when Fukuyama first advanced his thesis a quarter century ago. Japan’s “bubble economy” was already collapsing when Fukuyama’s book came out. A continuous period of stagnation and economic insecurity has followed, along with persistently elevated rates of suicide and depression. The widespread psychological distress, excellently documented by Junko Kitanaka (Depression in Japan), has ushered in the trend of mass palliative medication, and to some extent, redefined the terms of social existence itself. There has also been a rise in social isolation with substantial numbers of people removing themselves from society, or any social interaction at all. Furthermore, the burgeoning population of the elderly has presented increasingly urgent, even intractable problems of care in a society no longer buffered by the bonds of extended families. Given these demographics, democratic mandates tend more and more to be socialist in nature.

    Any one of these developments would present problems for an optimistic reading of Fukuyama’s thesis. Taken together, they might be considered a looming catastrophe at the end of history, indicating that Fukuyama’s world is not sustainable. Insofar as his “end of history” succeeds, it carries within it the seeds of its own unraveling. It establishes a society that cannot renew itself, and which must inevitably collapse under its own weight. While the twin forces of liberal democracy and free market capitalism do indeed have, as Fukuyama so well observes, a forward momentum that is unstoppable, they leave in their wake a spent and nonviable social and economic order; one whose weaknesses are already becoming apparent. I hope to make this case economically, psychologically, demographically, and politically, by examining these four factors in Japan: the very nation Fukuyama regarded to be a showpiece for his thesis.

    In the background of this reflection is Eric Gans, the founder of generative anthropology (GA), who has consistently endorsed Fukuyama’s thesis (for instance, Chronicles 174, 227, 498, 503, and 527). Like Fukuyama, Gans sees liberal democracy and the market system as the best hopes for establishing a stable, peaceful, and flourishing human order. The main downside Gans identifies in this system is “victimary thinking” which can be broadly understood as identity politics. However, in Japan, where identity politics are as yet a novel distraction, the unraveling of the social order has little to do with victimary thinking. Thus, I would argue that the peculiarities of Western partisan politics may work to limit the conceptual focus of GA, and distract from what are more important civilizational dilemmas.

    In this reflection I first offer a brief overview of Fukuyama’s “end of history” argument. I then outline what I regard to be its strengths, including its resonance with GA. In the main section of this essay I elaborate on the challenges to Fukuyama posed by contemporary Japan, indicating a failure at the “end of history.” Finally, I conclude with more general reflections about the global predicament and the direction of GA. Overall, this reflection is not intended as an attack on Fukuyama’s thesis, which in many ways is admirably clear-sighted, but as a critical engagement. Fukuyama’s problem was not that he was wrong per se but often, if anything, more right than he realized. Specifically, he was not wrong to put Japan, and by extension East Asia, at the cutting edge of history. Yet developments in Japan call into question the sustainability of his “post-historical” future, and Japan’s demographic trends in particular seem to augur a disconcertingly literal interpretation of “last man.”

    Fukuyama’s End of History in Brief

    The context of Fukuyama’s essay and book was the end of the Cold War, dramatically realized with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the “Iron Curtain,” the rapid collapse of communist governments in the Eastern bloc nations, and soon after that the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. However, Fukuyama pointed out that long-standing authoritarian regimes around the world had also been collapsing, often bloodlessly, on the right, for instance in Spain (in the late 1970s), and Chile, South Korea and the Philippines (in the late 1980s). The trend was clear: the world was turning steadily, swiftly, and often unexpectedly, toward liberal democracy and free market capitalism. Together they were proving to be the ultimate, optimal, final, and triumphant system of government. It was no longer a question of if but of how long the rest of the world would take to enter the fold.

    Fukuyama argued that this process would continue until the entire world had effectively adopted democracy and capitalism. He called this the “end of history,” a term and idea taken directly from Hegel.(2) Fukuyama’s thesis is from beginning to end a Hegelian one, though he also made much use of Hegel’s 20th century interpreter Alexandre Kojève. The “end of history” did not mean that time or human events would cease but that “history,” if it is defined as the great contest of empires and ideologies, would simply cease to exist as such. The default winner was liberal democracy and capitalism. All viable alternatives had been or were in the process of being defeated, discredited, or dissolved. While there would certainly be holdouts and even regressions along the way, the overall direction was clear. It might be useful to think of the “end of history” as a milder, secular version of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s “Omega Point,” a singularity of integrated human development that would introduce a qualitatively different level of consciousness. Likewise, the “end of history” is the “end” of one state but also the beginning of another.

    Fukuyama made much of Japan as a model for his thesis. Not so very long ago Japan had invested its all in the fascistic, expansionist State Shintoism of Imperial Japan. Following its devastating defeat in World War II, a democratic constitution was imposed on Japan by the U.S., as occupiers. This small, crowded, ruined, impoverished and humiliated nation, poor in natural resources (and hardly a natural heir to liberal democracy), rose through wits and pluck and human capital to develop into a solid civil society with stable democratic institutions, and became an industrial and economic powerhouse. Fukuyama focused on post-war Japan extensively in his book, paying particular attention to its “economic miracle” and Japan’s famous worker culture. Fukuyama was impressed with the corporate culture of the overworked “salaryman” who gave his all to the company, receiving in recompense a sense of belonging, or Hegelian “recognition,”(3) meaning roughly, sufficient respect or acknowledgement as an autonomous human agent.

    Yet Fukuyama was impressed not just that Japan had adopted liberal democracy and capitalism with such astonishing (and unexpected) success, but that it had become one of the great evangelists for both, through the marketing of its high quality products around the world. Japan had become the promoter of a sophisticated global consumer culture and presented an example of national success that was already becoming the envy of peers, particularly in East Asia. Fukuyama noted in particular the Asian “Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) that were set to reproduce Japan’s success.

    Fukuyama developed the “last man” component of his thesis to consider what kind of human being would emerge when the end of history’s triumph was complete. The last man was taken from Nietzsche,(4) and Fukuyama also made use of a parallel idea from C. S. Lewis, “men without chests.”(5) These were the small-minded, rationalistic, materially preoccupied, self-interested humans who would emerge as the norm at the end stage of a materialistic or technocratic society. Fukuyama worried likewise that in a post-historical world where no more great battles or great causes could inspire humanity, we would lose some essential component of heroism, of idealism. Fukuyama was concerned that humanity would lose its soul, or in C. S. Lewis’s stark terms, “man” as such would cease to exist. Fukuyama took these concerns quite seriously but was guardedly optimistic, and argued that while it was true there would no longer be great causes or battles to rally behind, those of heroic bent could find—were indeed already finding—their “niche” in activities provided by the free market in a free society. They could, he observed, test their mettle in courageous physical challenges such as rock-climbing, hang-gliding, whitewater rafting, or equivalent pursuits.

    Positively Assessing Fukuyama’s Thesis

    Fukuyama’s geopolitical projection has been arguably the most widely cited and discussed since the end of the Cold War. Its closest rival is the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis explicitly developed (also in an essay and book) by Fukuyama’s teacher Samuel Huntington as a refutation of his former student’s position. Fukuyama’s thesis is thought provoking, well stated, well-informed, and deeply informative. It provides a powerful framework even for those who would contest it, including Huntington.

    On some levels, it is very hard to quarrel with Fukuyama. For instance, whether or not one applauds the spread of liberal democracy, consumer capitalism, and globalization, it is hard to deny that they have spread, and have been extremely powerful forces, often virtually unstoppable. Like the Borg civilization in Star Trek‘s Next Generation series, they seem to conquer and co-opt the strengths of nearly every system in their path. In the words of the Borg, “Resistance is futile. You will be assimilated.” To those ambivalent about or hostile to globalization, Fukuyama was, if anything, too correct.

    Fukuyama was also right about Japan and Asia, more than he would have predicted. Japan is more politically mature than it was 25 years ago (Fukuyama found Japan’s then one party rule by the Liberal Democratic Party underdeveloped), and the “Asian Tigers” now include other emergent or emerging economies like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and before long Cambodia and Myanmar. China has quickly grown to dominate global markets while (contra Fukuyama’s thesis) retaining an official communist ideology and pursuing nationalistic goals and aggressive territorial ambitions, so it remains to be seen if China will ultimately follow a “Huntingtonian” course. Nevertheless, it could plausibly be argued that political and economic developments of this “Asian Century,” taken as a whole, vindicate Fukuyama’s vision.

    What of GA? Eric Gans has consistently endorsed Fukuyama’s thesis, though never without caveats, including the term “end of history” itself. It is important to note the general consonance between Fukuyama and Gans. The consonance is a natural one because of the emphasis in generative anthropology upon the market and the exchange system, both real and symbolic. Though originating in mimetic theory, GA does not see the world in the same apocalyptic terms, especially those spelled out in Rene Girard’s last great work, Battling to the End. In the GA view, the exchange of signs and goods can and does defer violence. In this regard, Fukuyama and Gans use different terms but talk about very similar things.

    For Fukuyama, the key to understanding participation in political and economic life in a liberal democratic order is that it allows people to get a sense of Hegelian recognition. Gans tends rather to interpret the same things in terms of resentment: voting and economic participation allow people to discharge and recycle resentment, and transform it into positive good for society. More recently, Gans has seen both the administration of Barack Obama and the election of Donald Trump as operating more or less successfully within Fukuyama’s paradigm, where ongoing negotiation of values between left and right (in this case specifically about “victimary thinking”) unfold within the framework of liberal democracy and the market system. Obama’s “arc of history”—that the direction of history was inherently toward social justice—essentially took an end of history perspective (Chronicle 503), while Gans argues that Trump’s election has renegotiated the terms of victimary thinking (Chronicle 527). In other words, identity politics present an ever expanding range of seemingly non-negotiable propositions, based on resentment, which threaten the give and take of a functioning democracy. The right re-negotiates this range, hopefully at a pace faster than or at least equal to the generation of new resentments. Yet both left and right actually work within the same framework and toward the same end: the triumph, in one form or another, of the market system and the liberal democratic order.

    Failure at the “End of History”: The Case of Japan

    As noted, geopolitics is moving away from rather than toward Fukuyama’s ideal, but the challenge I issue to Fukuyama is from within his system rather than without, societal rather than geopolitical. I argue that Fukuyama’s world is not sustainable, and make the case economically, psychologically, demographically, and politically, by examining these respective factors in Japan.

    Scenes of Economic Distress

    Fukuyama made his analysis of Japan with its “economic miracle” in mind. A quarter century later, we are better able to assess this aspect of Fukuyama’s thesis, but even at the time his essay and book came out (the early 90s), Japan was experiencing what came to be known as the collapse of its economic “bubble.” The bubble in specific terms related to extraordinarily inflated land prices that were tied into banks and the lending mechanisms that underwrote “Japan Inc.” (corporate Japan in the bubble years). Now it has come to signify more generally the surreal extravagance and frivolity of the era, roughly equivalent to “the Gilded Age” in the U.S. In popular culture, the “bubble jidai” (bubble era), particularly of the 1980s, is looked upon both sardonically and nostalgically as a great, wild, naïve, fun-filled illusion.(6)

    Post-bubble Japan presents a much different economic picture, one characterized by stagnation, uncertainty, and decline. The long recession, first called the “lost decade” of the 90s, extended itself into the 2000s, and up to the global financial crisis of 2008 (Tsutsui and Mazzotta, 67-73). That crisis further undermined many of the great manufacturers Fukuyama so much admired, including Toshiba (which he praised for introducing the joys of consumerism to Iran), now in a state of imminent disintegration after hiding its losses for years (Fuse). Olympus lied about its finances for decades and is now a shadow of its former self (Hawkes and Goodley). The electronics giant Sharp was recently sold off to a Taiwanese manufacturer after suffering continuous losses, and Sony, Hitachi and Panasonic have only survived by scaling back and refocusing production, while their more limber Asian competitors now lead the fields they once dominated (Yoshida). Thus, to the extent that Fukuyama was right economically, namely, the replication of Japan’s success in other East Asian nations, it has also meant that Japan’s economic and industrial power have steadily eroded as its competitors become the newer centers of vitality.

    It is important to recall in this context Fukuyama’s focus on the then famous work culture of Japan, as exemplified by the overworked but dedicated salaryman, the lifelong employee who got a sense of Hegelian recognition from his company identity, however poorly he might be rewarded or enriched personally relative to his output. Fukuyama generalized this, somewhat naïvely though understandably, to the entire worker culture of Japan. However, the post-bubble period, which in a sense introduced real capitalistic forces into Japan, as opposed to a somewhat benign corporate paternalism, also introduced risutora: restructuring, or downsizing. Many workers have lost or can lose their jobs as companies struggle to cut costs and compete with more vibrant economies, or relocate or outsource industrial production to other Asian countries.

    Lifelong job security is by no means the norm at present; for instance, the percentage of workers who are working either part-time or hired on short-term contracts has risen dramatically, standing now at about 40% (“Plight of Irregular Workers”). Thus, an increasing number of workers find they are only as valuable as their skill set until the termination of their contracts, or the bankruptcy of their company, or its cannibalization through mergers and acquisitions. This has introduced, increasingly, a two-tiered society in Japan, and a growing split between the stably and unstably employed, who very often work side by side. The Japan that Fukuyama so much admired was in many ways a universally middle class society, and his characterization of Hegelian recognition applied rather well when this social compact was in force and everyone’s contribution to society was valued, if not equally, at least sufficiently. Clearly this is no longer the case.

    Another recent development is that both the stably and unstably employed may find themselves in shamelessly exploitative work environments typified by notoriously ruthless “black companies,” which focus aggressively on the bottom line (Suzuki). This is indicative yet again of the advance of “real” capitalism in Japan, as opposed to paternalistic corporatism. Again, even if one can see merit in this relatively unbridled mode of capitalism, in the form, for example, of more economic vigor, one certainly cannot see Fukuyama’s “recognition,” however well such a characterization may have applied during the bubble years. The contemporary work culture of Japan bears little resemblance to the one Fukuyama described. He was describing a temporary—and depending how one looks at it, illusory—period of economic success, not a permanent aspect of society.

    This is a crucial point because Fukuyama’s projection is long term by definition: the “end of history.” If he held up as exemplar what amounts to a temporary stage of economic development lasting a decade or two, then clearly Japan as it was in the bubble years can no longer be considered valid support for his thesis. Conceivably, one could look to reinforce Fukuyama’s thesis elsewhere, for instance, by looking at Japan’s successful Asian competitors. Yet it would be just as easy, and more plausible, to see that success, too, as a temporary stage of economic development, and one that will end in more or less the same way: stagnation, uncertainty, and decline.

    One could in fact project a wave of prosperity for global consumerist capitalism, advancing as Fukuyama describes but leaving everywhere in its wake not stably prosperous societies but a hollowed out economy and labor force. The “end of history” is, in other words, a kind of global economic bubble. The “cutting edge” of the bubble surges ahead like a tide, disruptive, destructive, with no regard to consequences, and with no reference for success other than itself. Unfortunately, the bubble brings along more than just economic debilitation.

    Scenes of Psychological Distress

    Unsurprisingly, the period following the collapse of the economic bubble in Japan saw a dramatic increase in clinical depression, along with elevated levels of suicide that were already quite high in comparison to other industrialized nations. Depression became as much an issue among the stably employed as among those who were experiencing the brunt of the economic decline, and to the surprise of few in Japan, the overworked salaryman, so lionized by Fukuyama, easily became someone whose depression caused him or her to be hospitalized. In fact, many high profile cases of suicide—high profile because they resulted in litigation, leading in turn to new laws and workplace guidelines—concerned victims who worked for prestigious corporations, whose depression and suicide were directly linked to the workplace environment.(7)

    The widespread depression necessitated a new public consciousness; while there was traditionally a strong stigma associated with emotional illness and a reluctance to talk about it, openness was needed now because depression had become too large a problem to ignore. This process, superbly documented by Junko Kitanaka in the book Depression in Japan: Psychiatric Cures for a Society in Distress, was a complex and multifaceted one, but it could roughly be characterized as twofold. On the one hand, depression was medicalized, and approached as a biological illness that could be treated with medicine. For instance, Kitanaka notes prominent ad campaigns for pharmaceuticals that called depression a “cold of the heart” (14). This sort of campaign lifted the stigma of depression by characterizing it as nothing to be ashamed of, comparing it to catching a common cold, and facilitating the acceptance of psychotropic medication. In this way, mass medication for depression was introduced to Japan. On the other hand, and at the same time, a somewhat contradictory public narrative about depression emerged that identified its nexus in intractable situations, social expectations, and human relations, particularly in the work environment. To no small extent, this led to a subtle redefinition of social existence itself; it was a potential scene of distress that might overcome anyone, anytime, anywhere, for any number of reasons.

    The psychosocial scene in Japan indicates that the “last man” is (contra Fukuyama, Nietszche, and Lewis) not a small-minded person but a deeply distressed one. The twin forces of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism, even when most successful—perhaps especially when most successful—appear to be poorly calibrated toward fulfillment or human happiness, at least not for the multitude that need to stay medicated.

    Another sign that the social order has become increasingly dysfunctional in Japan is that many are withdrawing from it.(8) In childhood, this has often taken the form of futouko (“school refusal”): prolonged absence from school. In adolescence and young adulthood it has manifested as various forms of co-dependence, most strikingly hikikomori (“pull-inside”), who for extended periods, sometimes indefinitely, do not leave their home, and sometimes even their bedroom. Other kinds of social isolation have been emerging among the middle aged or elderly.(9) The term muen shakai (“no relationship society”) was for a short time an umbrella term (no longer current) for people who live alone and have virtually no meaningful social relationships. The most striking manifestation of this phenomenon has been kotokushi (“lonely death”): isolated individuals who die alone in their homes, often undiscovered for days due to their lack of social contact.

    There is certainly a tendency, inside and outside of Japan, to sensationalize such developments. Nevertheless, taking these psychosocial trends as a whole, it is fair to observe that debilitating neuroses and social isolation have become a common and even normal condition in Japanese society. This appears to be the legacy of Japan’s economic miracle, the last man at the end of history.

    Scenes of Demographic Distress

    A grim irony is that the last man may literally become the last man. Japan’s population implosion is now widely known, with fertility and birth rates far below replacement level, a rapidly aging society, a depleted labor force, and a strained safety net emerging as the nation struggles to allocate resources while fewer and fewer tax-paying workers support more and more aging retirees (Eberstadt, Pilling). Less well known outside Japan (though a constant topic in media within it) are the concrete difficulties involved as the nation comes to term with its aging population. Directly or indirectly, virtually everyone in Japan has been affected by the problems of the aging society.

    Much of this is not immediately apparent in the middle of the bustling urban centers, but rural areas have been hollowing out for decades, and it is now in the areas ringing cities that the texture of life in an aging society can be most strikingly observed (“Desperately Seeking Young People”). In some areas, it is rare to see any children or young adults. Care facilities for the aged, both live-in accommodations and day care facilities, continue to proliferate in suburban neighborhoods. Care is now a growth industry and a major source of employment, often a default one with the decline of formerly vibrant sectors in the lingering post-bubble recession. Since 2000, government-supported care increased in response to families overwhelmed with the care of aging parents (Holder). Now the government typically supports 90% of care through insurance (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research) which has been incentivizing its growth and spurred the current explosion of facilities. However, these facilities may become less financially viable when government support is inevitably reduced (Brasor and Tsubuku). At any rate, they are not sufficient to accommodate the projected aging population, and there is also expected to be a shortage of care workers (Japan Nursing Association). Work in the care industry is often difficult and poorly compensated, and there are frequently cases of depression and fatigue connected with it (Eberstadt, Japan Support Center).

    To the extent that publicly assisted care is reduced, the burden of care for the aged will increasingly fall back on families (Oi, Japan Support Center). A key difficulty is that families themselves are much smaller now, often down to two or three people, and the caretakers themselves may be quite old, a phenomenon now called roro kaigo (“care of the aged by the aged”). Many people middle-aged or older may experience a sudden downward mobility into poverty when they quit their jobs to care for aging parents (“Japan’s Middle-aged Workers”). It should be noted that caregivers like these are often facing the situation alone; no family is available to care for them when their time comes.

    Senile dementia is a particularly acute problem for caregivers. It is projected that by 2025 one in four people in Japan over 65 will have senile dementia, which is one in twenty people in the general population (Eberstadt). This is already an urgent public safety concern and incidents connected with it such as fatal traffic accidents, fires, and missing persons, are now quite common (McCurry, Japan Support Center, “Car Accidents Rampant,”). Care for dementia can be extremely difficult, and there have been cases of abuse when caregivers at facilities snap (Japan Support Center), or even murder-suicide among distressed family members who are caregivers, famously including the tragic case of a former pop singer (Brasor).

    Turning back to Fukuyama, it is striking that demographic issues were not touched upon in his essay or book, even once. This most famous of expert prognosticators failed to see what in a very short time would become the most pressing concern in Japan, the centerpiece for his post-historical future. In retrospect, it ought to have been easy to predict the population collapse and its associated ills; there was enough data available to extrapolate with small nuclear families using a little math. That Fukuyama, along with more or less the entire educated world through the 60s, 70s, 80s and even 90s, could not imagine such a demographic crisis coming, either in Japan or beyond, cries out for explanation. How did such conceptual blindness become so pervasive that educated people could not grasp the fact that modern society might need babies?

    A provisional answer is that a “population crisis” was conceptualized only in terms of swollen populations, scarce resources, and privation. Fukuyama seems to have adopted this view, albeit tacitly, as axiomatic. Thus, the good life in the paradigm of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism was equated with small families (if children were even considered at all) and the bad life with overpopulation and poverty, what the end of history was destined to overcome. But Fukuyama, along with most of the rest of us, missed the fact that children are the wealth of a given society, not its detriment. This “lost wisdom” is now blindingly obvious, but it seems to have been rediscovered too late to reverse the downward demographic spiral.

    Scenes of Politics: The End of Capitalism?

    It is easy look at Japan from the perspectives of partisan politics in the West, but post-war Japan, whether in boom or bust, has nearly always been governed within a statist consensus, wobbling slightly between center-right and center-left, and generally with very low voter turnout and widespread emotional detachment from the “political process.” It seems clear now that Japan as a political order is morphing de facto into socialism, whatever name is ultimately applied to it. Japan must of necessity veer more and more to the “left,” but not for ideological reasons. It is simply that there’s nothing remaining for it to do; society has to make arrangements for the aging and the incapacitated, and to step in to provide basic benefits (e.g. insurance, pension supplements, welfare) for the workers who can no longer get the kind of positions that used to provide such benefits when the economy was booming.

    These dependent groups also constitute voting blocs that—assuming the constituents vote at all—will likely vote in the end not for robust capitalism but for their particular self-interest, meaning the public safety net standing between them and total destitution. Thus, if Japan is any indication, Fukuyama’s system relies on a reciprocal synthesis of liberal democracy and free market capitalism that must, as a democratic order, progressively vote capitalism out of existence. However, to look at this in terms of right or left seems to be like adopting opposite and reinforcing errors, at least in the Japanese context. In these views, either capitalism has failed and we need to adopt socialism, or socialism fails to produce growth and therefore we need to go back to capitalism. In fact, capitalism has succeeded spectacularly well and, because of its success, has undermined the basis for growth. As a result, it must now morph into socialism. Socialism ultimately cannot sustain itself because it does not generate sufficient wealth, and capitalism cannot sustain itself because it generates a preponderance of wealth best enjoyed by singles, childless couples, or if one insists on children, at most small nuclear families. This demographic decline leads to a society that cannot sustain growth, whether it is governed on the basis of a progressive or conservative approach: in the end it will be progressive by default as the statist, interventionist dispensing of public welfare benefits becomes the paradigm.

    From a post-historical perspective Japan, the near perfect exemplar for the end of history, simply cannot sustain its success. The end of history is in fact the “end of capitalism” insofar as the state must intervene increasingly to fill in the gaps in social support that cannot be addressed by the market economy. This is certainly the case now as the focus of intervention shifts increasingly from futile initiatives to boost the birthrate, or attempts to revive Japan’s national success via monetary policy like “Abenomics,” toward an attempt to manage the social decline in practical and reasonably humane ways—essentially a throwing up of hands. This consumes more and more of the energy of government and, so to speak, sucks all of the other air out of the room.

    Conclusion

    Japan, limited militarily by its own constitution, is not among the world’s top military players, nor is it torn by such polarizing ideological struggles as those that roil so much of the West. The very fact that Japan has existed in this kind of blessed, if now more precarious, isolation makes it particularly illuminating for assessing Fukuyama’s thesis, apart from the “noise” of history. Japan shows that the ideal society Fukuyama describes cannot viably propagate itself long-term. Even in the absence of imminent external threats, as is evidenced by Japan’s national security and access to trade under the protection of the US military umbrella for decades, and even as a “post-ideological” country, the end of history can’t work in Japan. If it cannot work here, of all places, how could it ever work anywhere? It is little surprise in this regard that Japan’s problems, particularly its demographic problems, are being replicated in Europe and in other East Asian countries (Pilling), and before long will be spreading to the developing world (Roser).

    A group of analysts led by Susan Yoshihara and Douglas Zerlov have recently begun connecting demographic decline with the Huntingtonian projections presented at the beginning of this reflection.(10) Counterintuitively, the “geriatric” nations may not be the calm and rationally calculating ones but will likely be prone to use military force in impulsive and unpredictable ways from a sense of their own depleted position of strength. Likewise, neighbors may sense the weaknesses of demographically challenged nations and may be duly emboldened. Thus, demographic decline could very well introduce a new and destabilizing calculus into the so-called “clash of civilizations.” Whether or not this view, or for that matter Huntington’s, turns out to be vindicated, what is less in dispute is that demographics will be directing and shaping the world in upcoming decades, much more than the post-historical forces that were the focus of Fukuyama’s analysis.

    That Gans continues to endorse Fukuyama’s thesis raises the obvious question, in the context of this reflection, of whether he is correct to do so. There is no intellectual diktat that Fukuyama’s thesis and GA must converge, but there are prominent commonalities, as mentioned earlier, particularly with regard to participation in the market and democracy as a way of negotiating resentment, usually subsumed by Fukuyama under the treatment of recognition. One way to reconcile the resonance between Fukuyama and GA with the manifest shortcomings of the former may be this; just as Fukuyama astutely observed the forward momentum of liberal democracy and the market economy while failing to predict their aftermath, so has Gans insightfully analyzed the same process from the GA perspective, though neglecting the downsides, unless they have to do with victimary thinking. As I have argued earlier, though, and as I hope this reflection has shown at a minimum, Japan demonstrates that there are profound economic, psychological, social, and demographic problems at the “end of history” that have nothing to do with identity politics.

    How might GA, with its unique perspective on “the human,” address these quintessentially human problems connected with labor, social relations, psychosocial pathology, or demographics? I am not competent to analyze Hegel but can at least offer the intuition either that GA premises do not align particularly well with the “master-slave” dialectic, or that GA needs to develop a much different approach to it than Fukuyama.(11) Fukuyama seems to have gone astray with his application of the dialectic in his treatment of recognition, since, equipped with this “anthropology,” he could not grasp the most basic components of a human scene, and certainly not enough to anticipate current conditions, not even at a birds-and-bees level (population and reproduction). In contrast, GA by its very nature apprehends “the human” as existing within a communally signifying scene that, as a matter of course, encompasses the problems of co-existence, reciprocity, distribution, and long-term survival and flourishing—as opposed to one-to-one contests of will. It seems that for GA to rise to its potential here, it needs to play to its own strengths. Or, to consider it another way, to apprehend communal or societal dysfunction, GA may need to move beyond resentment. As a social model, GA certainly has an advantage over mimetic theory, which cannot comprehend social cohesion as anything other than an effluence of sacrificial violence.

    One surprisingly hopeful contribution—surprising because it is a literary study concerning non-humans in dystopian science fiction—is Andrew Bartlett’s Mad Scientist, Impossible Human. In addressing the objectification of the human vis-à-vis science and technology, Bartlett takes pains to articulate an alternate vision of the human as communally situated, both humanized and humanizing through participation in labor, consumption, and exchange, as well as social, romantic, family, and community life: the agony and horror of Mary Shelley’s monster is that he cannot share in any of this. Bartlett’s vision, thoroughly informed by GA, is a deeply humanistic one and quite useful in thinking through the human within a different dystopian context—namely the currently unfolding one, as described in this essay. Another relevant contribution is Benjamin Matthews’ analysis of alternative work environments in the present issue of Anthropoetics. Matthews shows how such emerging communities structure the chain of command in such a way as to acknowledge and “humanize” the contributors, without ignoring market realities.

    In my view, both Bartlett’s and Matthews’ studies connect with the original “social justice” that developed in the context of 19th and 20th century Catholic social teaching to articulate the principle of subsidiarity, or the scaling down of social responsibility to the lowest practical levels, and the economic philosophy of “distributism,” where ownership and production are established as far as possible at the smallest human scale.(12) These twin concepts were proposed to address the inherent weaknesses of socialist collectivism and capitalist corporatism, both of which stripped human beings of property and alienated them from their own labor, their fellows, and their sense of worth. In fact, Japan’s “post-historical” crisis is unfolding uncannily closely to what was predicted by distributist thinkers: the inexorable morphing of capitalism into socialism, a nonviable social and economic order, and a disfigurement of the psyche.(13) It may be worthwhile, therefore, to follow up this reflection by considering subsidiarity and distributist thought from a GA framework, and to examine alternative business and community models along the same lines that Matthews has explored digital collectives.

    As a final note of concession to Fukuyama, the implausibility of Japan serving as a model for the “end of history” is not an occasion for smug naysaying, but something to be truly regretted. The qualities that make Japan such a pleasant and interesting place are very “Fukuyaman” ones: including the advanced infrastructure, the civic culture, and the in many ways fair and egalitarian social system, all coexisting alongside Japan’s strong retention of cultural distinctiveness. A global civilization structured along such lines might have been a very fine one indeed. One can hardly fault Fukuyama for having recognized a good thing when he saw it, and it is arguable that no nation has made a better “go” of realizing Fukuyama’s ideal. The inherent fragility of advanced, industrialized democracies is tragic for it indicates the end, not of history, but of a very grand dream.

    Acknowledgements

    I am grateful to my wife Emi for guiding me through current trends in Japan and much relevant data, to Benjamin Matthews for extensive and invaluable editorial support, and to my interlocutors at GASC 2016 in Nagoya, Japan for helpful comments. The views in this paper, and any defects, are my own.

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    Notes

    1. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. (back)

    2. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. (back)

    3. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. (back)

    4. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (back)

    5. The Abolition of Man. (back)

    6. For a representative recent example see the au “1980 Shock!” television commercial for Y!mobile phone service. The humorous time travel premise, featuring actress Mirei Kiritani and a cameo from the 1980s diva Minako Tanaka, pokes fun at the dazzling but ridiculous spirit of the bubble years. (back)

    7. The most emblematic recent case is the suicide of 24 year old Matsuri Takahashi, which led to the resignation of the president of Dentsu Corporation. Her mother now leads a campaign for the reform of labor conditions. See Rothwell. (back)

    8. I described these phenomena in a previous article for Anthropoetics, “Strategies of Dissociation.” (back)

    9. I surveyed this phenomenon in the Anthropoetics article, “Not with a Bang but a Whimper.” (back)

    10. The title of their edited volume, Population Decline and the Remaking of Great Power Politics, is a nod to Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (back)

    11. The Phenomenology of Mind. (back)

    12. See for instance G.K. Chesterton’s The Outline of Sanity, Hilaire Belloc’s The Servile State, and E. F. Schumacher’s well-known update of distributist ideas in the 1970s, Small Is Beautiful. (back)

    13. See for instance Chesterton, 40-43, and Cooney. (back)