Author: staceymeeker

  • The Feminine Novel and the Esthetics of the Modern Era I

    Since I ceased teaching nearly three years ago, I have spent a good deal of time catching up on authors I had earlier neglected and rereading old classics—not all of which have lived up to their reputations. Under the kind tutelage of Ian Dennis, I read most of the novels of Walter Scott, whose work I had long neglected, and discovered the objective correlative of Bakhtin’s “dialogic” conception of the novel in Scott’s even-handed presentation of the voices of Scotland’s Whigs and Tories. I read Vathek and The Castle of Otranto and Rasselas, and (after all these years) Dracula.

    But my real predilection has been British women novelists. In French, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that between Mme de Lafayette’s 1678 La princesse de Clèves, which, pace M. Sarkozy, is one of the few truly great novels of world literature, and the novels of Marguerite Duras in the 1960s, one does not find a single real masterpiece. Mme de Staël’s Corinne, and Ourika, Mme de Duras’ touching story of an African girl in French society, are no doubt worth reading, as are some novels and stories by Colette, or the pastoral tales of George Sand. The English tradition is on an altogether different plane.

    I have already devoted Chronicle 486 to Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote, for my money the most delightful novel ever written, although I’m not sure I have persuaded anyone else of this. Fanny Burney’s first two or three novels make her a worthy predecessor of Austen. And there are others: Frances Sheridan, Maria Edgeworth, Elizabeth Inchbald, Georgiana Cavendish, Duchess of Devonshire… Austen’s mastery did not descend out of the blue; her novels are the culmination of a British female Bildungsroman tradition that can be traced back to Eliza Haywood’s The Adventures of Betsy Thoughtless, which appeared in 1751, just a year before Lennox’s comic masterpiece, and whose focus is much closer to Austen’s than the title might lead one to think. This tradition continues after Austen in a less serene but more lyric vein with the Brontë sisters, who produced six novels among the three of them despite their early deaths—the probable consequence of drinking the water downstream from a cemetery—and later with the more prosaic Victorian George Eliot. Then in the twentieth century, after the slightly less important works of Edith Wharton, Virginia Woolf creates modernist novels less radical but arguably just as significant as those of James Joyce, her exact contemporary.

    One need not be a feminist to appreciate these authors. On the contrary, I find that feminist interpreters’ passion for sexual politics rather disserves them. These works not only share a common sensibility that one should not be afraid to call feminine, they are of an overall quality that allows one to make the case for a “feminine novel” as good or better than the masculine. That Austen is today rated above Dickens and Fielding is not in my view to be dismissed as PC. There truly is a perfection in Austen’s novels that one finds nowhere else, just as there is an incomparable power in the unsettling writings of the Brontës (in Charlotte’s Villette perhaps even more than Emily’s Wuthering Heights), and in Woolf. And Eliot, although lacking Austen’s concision or the Brontës’ lyricism, embodies a transition to a new era of feminine self-consciousness, creating a number of memorable heroines for whom no Darcy exists or is even conceivable.


    I was thinking about these matters recently when I received a request to write a few paragraphs on the question of modernity and postmodernity. This led me to wonder whether a literary perspective specifically focused on these feminine novels might not shed light on the nature of modernity and its paradoxical postmodern successor. Austen’s novels provide a point of departure in what we may simply call the “classical” novel, to which Woolf’s offer a modern(ist) contrast. For the postmodern era, where I admit my reading in British woman novelists has been neither extensive nor particularly rewarding, I have selected Marguerite Duras, whom I consider not only the most important female novelist in French since the 17th century, but the greatest French novelist after Proust.

    Tragedies and comedies are both sacrificial, but in comedy, the protagonist survives the sacrifice and is as a rule able to find happiness, if not the spurious bliss he or she sought at first. Austen’s comedies are particularly satisfying because they plausibly demonstrate the possibility of authentic fulfillment within bourgeois society. The women whose lives are central to them can define their happiness by the quality of their marriage, which will allow them to function in the world and bear children for the next generation. Women in the early 19th century were, needless to say, quite limited in their professional opportunities. But these limitations enter into Austen’s fictional world only indirectly, in the fact that, given her social and economic position, her own creative activity, with few exceptions the only form of artistic endeavor for which a woman of her era could receive public recognition, precluded her marrying and raising a family. (Most English woman novelists of the era—Eliza Haywood, Frances Sheridan, Charlotte Lennox, Fanny Burney, Elizabeth Inchbald, Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, and later, Virginia Woolf—lived in circumstances less restricted, if often even more financially constrained, than Austen, and did in fact have marital or quasi-marital family lives; Sheridan and Lennox drew upon their own less than happy marital experiences for Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph and Euphemia.)

    Social criticism can of course pick at Austen’s world, complain of its class structure, its tolerance of poverty, even its (partial) dependence on colonies and slavery for its prosperity. But what is blessed in art is that retroactive moralism only impinges on our experience of it from without. Even in slave societies, author and reader share the “moral model” that GA traces to the originary scene, and knows that we are all equally human. Austen’s ability, like that of her fellow novelists, to make the reader identify with a young woman’s search for happiness by finding the right man to share her life teaches us a lesson in practical ethics, in the value of constructing healthy social continuity, that our victimary age would do well to reflect on—before these novels are accompanied by trigger warnings and removed from politically correct reading lists.


    Whereas we learn little from the fact that the political views of male modernists ranged from Marxist to fascist to quite bourgeois, it is certainly significant that Woolf was very much a feminist, one who throughout her life insisted on the need to overcome the limitations of women’s creative and professional lives. Two books of essays, the 1929 A Room of One’s Own and 1938 Three Guineas, deal almost exclusively with these issues. One finds in them a strident tone thankfully absent from her novels, but whose reality is very much a part of her self-consciousness. Whereas one can debate the effect of a certain feminist-victimary strain in Eliot’s later novels—Daniel Deronda in particular never seems to be able to find a place for Gwendolyn, arguably Eliot’s most powerful heroine, with the result that feminine self-consciousness and novelistic plotting seem to be working at cross purposes—Woolf, like Duras in a later generation, was able to embody her vision of relations between the sexes in an original narrative form.

    I will take Woolf’s novels as exemplary of modernism in their departure from Austen’s classical ones. This implies the possibility of a less apocalyptic understanding of the novel’s history than Mensonge romantique, one that makes it possible to sketch a theory of the modern, which, like many things in Girard’s intellectual universe, is short-circuited by what he calls in Achever Clausewitz the montée aux extrêmes. There is no place for a modern suite to the series of works discussed in Mensonge, whose apocalyptic history of novelistic desire forecloses the possibility of modernism by situating Proust before Dostoevsky, a contemporary of Eliot and Flaubert. Girard admired the depiction of mimetic desire in The Waves, but not, as far as I know, as exemplifying a historically new stage of either mimetic desire or literary form.

    As our exemplary modernist, Virginia Woolf is not as extreme as Joyce in foregrounding the writer’s form over her content, but the prose poetry of her style organizes the characters’ experience into a lyrical totality, a tender and meticulous world-consciousness shared between author and reader rather than constructing, as in the classical novel, the characters life-narratives’ as models for our desire. Nor do the streams of consciousness that make up this totality subordinate their presentness to the exemplification of transhistorical archetypes, as does Molly Bloom’s concluding soliloquy in Ulysses.

    We may say that the essence of Woolf’s feminine modernism lies in her use of the novelist’s transcendent consciousness to go beyond the limitations of woman’s lives that concern her so passionately in her essays. The trauma of the Great War lies in the background of all her work. By depriving her male protagonists of the inherent guarantee of a meaningful life-trajectory possessed by their nineteenth-century predecessors, the war defines an era in which the predictable continuity of the social order that sustained Austen’s happy endings is broken. The whole point of the cruelly ironic Jacob’s Room (1922) would seem to be the negation of Jacob’s protagonist status. We surmise only implicitly on the very last page, when Jacob’s family is cleaning out the room that gives the work its title, that he has become but one more casualty of the war, his death among so many others not even requiring an explicit mention, ending a life whose promise remained unfulfilled.

    Nor are there characters in Woolf’s novels who fully embody, like “Marcel” and Stephen Dedalus, an authorial persona. We have only amateur painter Lily Briscoe’s discretely symbolic role in To the Lighthouse (see Marina Ludwigs, “Epiphany and Closure in Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse,” Anthropoetics 20, 1 [Fall 2014]), and Woolf’s satiric self-portrait as frustrated lesbian former actress Miss La Trobe, author of the English history pageant whose performance structures the gently ironic Between the Acts, and who disappears after the performance, unsure if she has gotten her message across. Briscoe, who unlike La Trobe ends her novel on a note of triumph (“It was done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue, I have had my vision”), is as close as Woolf ever gets to the heroine of a Kunstlerroman. Her redemption through art in an understated feminine register contrasts with the mock-heroism of Mr. Ramsey’s success in reaching the lighthouse ten years after the original project. Just as Austen may be said to be a great writer because she did not share in real life the happiness of her heroines, in her novels, Woolf can master the creator’s role only by insisting that no worldly glory, merely a personal sense of triumph, is attached to it.

    To sum up Woolf’s “feminine” modernism, as it extends through The Waves to The Years and Between the Acts, the authorial consciousness produces a detemporalizing transfiguration of the world of individual “masculine” action or praxis into one where all actions, great and small, contribute to a continuous but plotless epic in poetic prose. The totalization of English history in Between the Acts does not compete with the vast historical claims of The Waste Land and Ulysses; it rather reassures us, in almost Churchillian fashion, in the face of the implicit menace of renewed war, that the strength of English society lies in its ability to live on in its cultural clichés. This historical solidarity is movingly demonstrated at the end when Miss La Trobe has her actors represent the modern age by unexpectedly holding up mirrors to their audience—the readers as well as the village spectators. The “modern” is just we, who accumulate our historical past without dialectizing it into the “end of history.” Yet those who make up this we are indeed at the “end of history,” simply because, unlike all previous generations, they are here and now, and—unlike their postmodern successors—can be relied on to stand up and be counted.

    [first of two parts]


  • Learning from Chomsky

    I have often attributed the failure of generative anthropology to achieve popularity to my ineptitude for publicity. But if as I (we?) believe, GA is a genuine “new way of thinking,” a breakthrough in understanding language and the human in general, then it shouldn’t require a Donald Trump for its spokesman.  Nor is it enough to bewail the compartmentalization of the academic world. It’s too easy to say that linguists and anthropologists don’t read The Origin of Language (TOOL—a second edition of which is, btw, now in preparation) because it wasn’t written by a linguist, or simply because they aren’t interested in new ways of thinking about language. No doubt the book was not based on extensive fieldwork, but there’s enough empirical data there (“Fire!”, “Scalpel!”) to persuade a skeptic. The fact is that as a truly new way of thinking, GA’s theoretical and deontological implications are unsettling, perhaps to the point that I have not developed them as far as I should have. So I thought that to begin the new year (my 75th), I should do something to remedy this situation.

    When I came to write my second GA book, The End of Culture (UC Press, 1985), I wanted to add a subtitle. Still thinking in French, I transliterated the word génétique, “related to genesis,” into English and proposed Toward a Genetic Anthropology. But my editor pointed out that genetic implies not generation but genes, so we changed it to “generative,” despite the unfortunate confusion with Chomsky’s generative grammar, which had a much higher profile in the humanities than it does today. I have always admired Chomsky’s work in linguistics, including his decisive refutation of Skinner’s conception of language as a conditioned reflex, while finding his radical politics distasteful. But dispassionately to connect the two facets of Chomsky’s intellectual personality offers an important lesson, one that has made clear to me after thirty years that the term “generative” is indeed an object of contention between generative grammar and generative anthropology.


    Claiming that the originary function of language is to defer conflict rather than to enunciate truths would not be a controversial point if it were by enunciating truths, that is, by speaking in declarative sentences, that the conflict were alleviated. The difficulty lies rather in GA’s fundamental claim that language is in the first place ostensive and only derivatively declarative; that it is not predication and propositional structure that first bring peace to the human world, but that they are only possible once human violence has been deferred by means of more elementary syntactic forms. For example, in Max Müller’s 19th-century account, “early man” was beset by false beliefs as he tried to explain the natural world in crudely anthropomorphic terms, and human progress over the centuries was able to replace these false or mythical propositions with empirical ones; yet the question of the origin of the proposition itself is never raised. This is quite different from seeing the declarative sentence as a triumph of objectivity, a higher stage of the consciousness generated at the outset by the need to defer the violence attendant on mimetic desire by sacralizing the first collective object of human desire with the sign of the-name-of-god.

    It is the burden of this Chronicle to point out the intellectual connection between Chomsky’s linguistics and his extremist political views. However extreme these may be, we must understand them in the context of Chomsky’s powerful intellect. Most social scientists are on the Left, a political position that among other things embodies the Enlightenment’s hostility to religion. If Chomsky is farther left than the rest, he is also a stronger defender than the rest of the primacy of the declarative sentence, to the point that generative grammar would banish from linguistics theorizing about its origin in simpler forms, forms that visibly imply the common origin of signification and sacralization. It can hardly be a simple matter of idiosyncrasy that the West’s greatest proponent of the primacy of the declarative sentence is also an extreme oikophobe or hater of his own civilization, even going so far as to express sympathy with Holocaust denial.

    The ad hominem that concerns me here is not addressed to Dr. Noam Chomsky but to “man” in general, and more precisely, “man” in our own, most advanced civilization. What precisely is the link between the two halves of Chomsky’s intellectual identity, the primacy of the declarative and Western oikophobia? What relationship does his extreme political stance, which I will henceforth simply call “Chomskian,” bear to the Enlightenment rationalism that has made the West the source of modern science and technology?


    The originary hypothesis as developed in TOOL suggests that the relationship between the ostensive and the declarative is analogous to that between religion and philosophy: the second has its roots in the first, but denies them. The first, ostensive word is the “name-of-God”; in contrast, the predication that inaugurates the declarative is a substitute for the production of the object requested in an imperative (“Scalpel!” – “The scalpel is in the sterilizer”). For language to tell about the world, it must transcend its use to defer conflict through evoking or supplying sacred beings or objects. To deny this process and present the declarative as the basic linguistic form is to deny the religious origin of language itself and consequently, the emergence of objectivity from within the world of the sacred. Chomsky’s generative grammar radicalizes the traditional grammatical paradigm by classifying the imperative (and by implication the ostensive) not merely as defective sentence forms but as derived from the declarative. In this manner, every utterance can be considered a proposition: when I cry “Fire!” what I really mean is “there is a fire here”; by “Scalpel!” I mean “I want you to give me the scalpel.”

    Evolution normally proceeds from the simple to the complex. Those linguists who do consider the “incremental” as opposed to Chomsky’s “saltational” emergence of the declarative have no conception of an originary purpose of language, and content themselves with speculating on the passage from one-element to two-element and more complex utterances without any concern for motivation, let alone for an event-centered hypothesis. (See, for example, Brady Clark, “Syntactic Theory and the Evolution of Syntax” Biolinguistics 7:169.) Generative grammar is not concerned to follow the historical evolution of language even to this extent; it precludes the examination of this evolution, which is assumed to take place via a Darwinian “saltation” or leap.

    That the Jacobins, the most extreme of the French revolutionaries, opposed a deified Reason to the God of the Church clarifies the correspondence between Chomsky’s linguistic posture and his political radicalism. For the radicals of the French Revolution, the ritual world of the Old Regime had to be swept away. Meters replaced feet and inches. Heads rolled. The reign of the declarative sentence or proposition—of “facts” and their logical consequences, of empirical reason, of scientific method, has continued virtually unchallenged since the revolutionary era, giving rise to vast technological and scientific progress. Today the goddess Reason sits firmly on her throne—yet her worshipers remain as enraged as Robespierre. The generative theory that can explain this is not generative grammar but generative anthropology.


    After the fall of the Soviet Union, some claimed that “socialism” had not failed, but that “it was never really tried.” Should we perhaps say that the Enlightenment too, the attempt to organize human society on the basis of “reason,” of facts and deductions from them, has “never really been tried”? (Cf Bruno Latour’s Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, La Découverte, 1991.) In day-to-day political discourse, such broad questions are never asked—and one may wonder if this is not the highest wisdom, since taking the arguments to their logical conclusions would be debating our society’s very existence. So we talk about income inequality and the one percent, or couch complaints of injustice in ascriptive terms, as though all that keeps us from utopia is “white privilege.”

    Let me call the problem something else: firstness.

    Traditionally, liberal-democratic politics is a marketplace where “right” and “left” (terms that demonstrate that our politics, in contrast with our technology, have not really progressed since the French Revolution) work out compromises that reconcile equality and firstness on an ad hoc basis. But as Chomsky’s politics suggests, today’s Left, as opposed to that of Harry Truman or John Kennedy, no longer thinks this way. The post-Cold-War Left has a program but no goal. It has discovered what escaped it during the 200 years of revolution that ended in 1989: pace Marx, “socialism” is just a name for the rejection of any real system of exchange in the name of abstract equality.

    The unique basis for Chomsky’s condemnation of contemporary society is that it rewards firstness. Just as Chomskian linguistics denies the innovative firstness that led to the creation of the declarative sentence, so Chomskian politics denies reward to firstness in the socio-economic sphere. The point is not that people are rewarded under false pretenses, say, for “whom they know rather than what they know.” If anything, this is a conservative slogan, since conservatives believe that some varieties of firstness merit differential rewards whereas others do not. For the Chomskian Left, no differential reward is justified. Attacks on scandalous excesses—CEO salaries, billionaires, the affluent West as opposed to “third-world” societies—merely lend credibility to this general condemnation. Revolution must be permanent. The surprisingly successful revival of “socialism” in Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaign is a noteworthy sign that the mainstream Left is catching up with Chomsky’s extremism; the ideal of a permanent “progressive” revolution looks ever more attractive.


    In the hypothetical history proposed by GA, the sign was originally an ostensive gesture toward the sacred center of the originary scene, too desirable to be subject to the prehuman pecking-order mode of serial firstness. Human moral reciprocity, in other words, was originarily dependent on the unique otherness of the sacred. But as Adam Katz pointed out, the first use of the sign was itself an innovation, and as such must have been inaugurated by one or more individual participants whose understanding of their “aborted gesture” as a sign was subsequently imitated by the others. Subsequently, the progressive developments of human society emerge from individuals occupying the center of the scene to communicate with their fellows, and eventually obtaining power from this central position (along with the danger of becoming the victim or “scapegoat” of the peripheral participants).

    GA understands ethics as an equilibrium between the moral model of egalitarian reciprocity and the firstness by which individual innovation and leadership provide benefits to that community. It is the entrepreneur’s, the musician’s, the engineer’s, the manager’s ability to do something new that is the soul of the market economy; as Peter Thiel points out in Zero to One (Crown, 2014), every actor in the market is essentially a monopolist. The “socialist” solution is to accept the gift of this uniqueness, but not attribute to it any economic reward. But an exchange system in which helping the community suffices as its own reward can exist only in highly particular historical circumstances, for example, the kibbutzim in the first generations of Israeli settlement—none of which have continued to exist in their original, “socialist” form.

    Language was invented not to inform but to defer. The “information” that we see as the basic function of language is in the first place a substitute for the “magical” presentation of the desired object by the hearer of the imperative. Imagine a toddler for whom his mother is omnipotent. He calls out the name of an object—a toy, his bottle—and she presents it. But if the object is not available, she can give him only words in its place—his first experience of disillusion. Yet for the child as for humanity in general, the objective facts conveyed by predication are more useful in the long run than the mere supplying of the object. To see the declarative as a conquest over subjective desire lets us understand the point of God’s answering the request for his name in Exodus 3 with a declarative sentence (“I am that I am”). By this means we understand the One God of the Old Testament, like the mother who offers her child knowledge rather than desire-objects, as one who expresses his love for humankind by his gift of a world of “facts” that we must discover for ourselves rather than calling on him by name to magically supply our needs.

    The originary hypothesis grounds this biblical intuition in a theory of human origin that is also a theory of linguistic evolution. I cannot expect the Chomskians, militants of the two-hundred-year-old Enlightenment revolt, to give this hypothesis due consideration. In contrast, the partisans of liberal democracy, liberals and conservatives alike, would do well to realize that in the absence of broadly shared biblical faith, only GA’s originary hypothesis, or a close equivalent, can justify the intuitions of the Bible and the respect they embody for both firstness and equality. It may or may not be useful to revise Chomskian linguistics, but it seems increasingly obvious that the West cannot survive without a radical revision of its Chomskian politics.


  • Obama and Fukuyama

    Readers of these Chronicles know of my disappointment with our current president; elected as a figure who would heal our racial wounds and transcend partisan differences, he has implemented a victimocracy that is increasingly intolerant of even verbal opposition. Given this, I was taken aback to encounter former New Republic editor Peter Beinart’s thesis (“How Obama Thinks About Terrorism,” Atlantic Monthly, December 7) that the simplest explanation for Obama’s faith in history (most notably expressed by a quotation from Martin Luther King—really from the 19th century abolitionist Theodore Parker—that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward Justice”) was that he is in fact a disciple of Francis Fukuyama (FF).

    As my readers also know, I have continued to defend FF’s fundamental claim: that the Western creation of “liberal democracy,” a free market embedded in a democratic political system that can be described as a parallel market, is the “ultimate” form of large-scale social organization. For whatever the details of its specific implementation, and some are clearly more effective than others, its general design maximizes the chances for firstness in the economic realm and hence for technological innovation and economic growth, while in principle allowing the resentments of all factions, including the less successful, to be heard and their conditions improved. We have seen enough of “planned economies” to know they cannot outproduce even the most restricted of free markets.

    FF’s thesis, enunciated just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, was encumbered with the Hegelian idea of the “End of History,” seen through the eyes of Hegel’s most influential 20th century interpreter, the apocalyptic Russo-French quasi-Marxist Alexandre Kojève, which led FF to present it in what strike us today as embarrassingly literal terms. Thus he tells us that we are henceforth fated to live on, happy in our creature comforts, but permanently bored because nothing of historical significance will ever again take place. At least Marx thought that under communism we would enjoy hunting in the morning and fishing in the afternoon.

    Fukuyama would be best served if we forgot the End of History. For there are indeed plateaus in history that, barring some apocalyptic catastrophe, we can be confident we will not descend from: human language and culture itself, agriculture, writing, monotheism, geometry, the steam engine… Then why not add to these liberal democracy, not as the “end” of anything, but the best general solution to nation-level human social organization? There remain plenty of other things for History to do.

    There is nothing left-wing about so pro-“capitalist” an idea; FF’s admirers, most of whom have abandoned ship, were mostly on the right. FF’s thesis could in fact be taken as the basis for a neoconservative manifesto. The second Bush’s over-optimism about the chances for democracy in the Middle East—and who wasn’t impressed by those shots of Iraqi men and women showing off the purple stain on their finger?—can be understood as a corollary of Fukuyama’s thesis: if liberal democracy is the ultimate system, then it will eventually be that of all, so why not help the process along? Even today, can we really say that humans are so different that belonging to a particular society and religion makes some social groups intrinsically hostile to adopting the socio-political system shared by the most advanced societies?

    However unexpected, Beinart’s thesis that Obama’s often-noted passivity in foreign affairs reflects a Fukuyama-like faith in the inevitability of liberal democracy seems truer to the president’s view than the fantasies that tempt us in our exasperation: that he is either a closet communist or a secret adherent of the Caliphate.

    Indeed, a similar sense of historical inevitability may be said to be shared by nearly all “progressives,” at least in the US. With the end of Soviet communism, whose model the mainstream of the Western intelligentsia had in any case long rejected (first in 1956, and definitely in 1968), all but the most radical of leftist movements have presented themselves as “social justice warriors,” whose often intense resentments nevertheless remain internal to the West’s political system. No doubt these activists have even less tenderness than Obama for liberal democracy in its current state, but since the end of the Soviet era, there has been no move to offer a new social model, only to reject traditional social norms such as exclusively heterosexual marriage, and to the extent remotely plausible, economic ones (whence demands for a $15 minimum wage, but not $100), imposing the government’s political will on the market as far as possible, but never seeking to abolish it. However insistent their activism, post-Cold-War victimary groupings no longer challenge the liberal-democratic system as such.


    The hypothesis of a Fukuyaman faith in the superiority of liberal democracy allows us to explain Obama’s application of “Girardian” wisdom in playing down the IS threat. Imitating the Others’ violence not simply intensifies the conflict but ratifies them as authentic adversaries. If only we pay minimal attention to them, contenting ourselves with letting local forces do the fighting and supporting them with occasional airstrikes, IS will not get what Beinart calls the “massive shot in the arm” that would be generated by the presence of American forces. Treating them as other than a “JV squad” would be to fall into a mimetic trap.

    More generally, Obama’s sense of historical inevitability predisposes him to interpret the commission of any act of violence as a sign of weakness. We have already seen him describe in this way Putin’s aggression in Ukraine. He considers such military adventures as wastes of resources and above all as signs that one is “on the wrong side of history.” Obama’s judgment that, in Beinart’s terms, “the Islamic State is losing in the Middle East,” which is certainly far from the view of most observers, is of lesser significance than the a priori that presides over this judgment: violence is a sign of weakness, therefore the US should sedulously avoid mimetically doubling this violence by sending troops, lest our action lend our enemy greater impact and visibility, as Beinart puts it (quoting Obama), “allowing the Islamic State to use ‘our presence to draw new recruits.’”

    No doubt were we faced by the kind of existential crisis posed by Pearl Harbor, Obama would have to abandon this ideology; violence that truly threatens destruction or defeat cannot be experienced as an epiphenomenon. But precisely, when Pearl Harbor took place, we were not yet at the End of History, which WWII prepared. The defeat of the Axis, which led to the end of colonialism and other forms of ascriptive hierarchy, was indeed the second last great “historical” act before the finale—significantly, a peaceful one: the defeat of communism as a world force. Following the End of History, apparent dangers to the polity cannot by definition be more than illusions, rounding errors. Now that we have reached the ultimate social system, inferior ones such as that being created by the “Caliphate” cannot possibly threaten it; threats can come only from within the ultimate system itself, which alone has historical agency.

    Hence such incidents as the San Bernardino attacks, however regrettable, should not be taken as signaling a new level of danger. On the contrary, they give proof that the jihadists can do no more than organize the kind of mass shootings with which we are already all too familiar. Rather than compare this with the Paris incident, we should see it as a demonstration of “JV” IS’s inability to organize operations on the scale of 9/11. Referring to the conflict with IS as a “war,” as a number of Republican presidential candidates seem willing to do, not only “gives ISIL what it wants” but risks undoing the End of History’s finality, since as the agent of the world-spirit, Western civilization alone, in particular the United States, has the capacity to take us beyond the End to total destruction.


    Now that History in the strong sense is over, with regard to the mopping-up operations that remain, the key is to “lead from behind,” to stand back and rely on the residual force of the historical “arc.” The US has above all to be careful not to do “stupid s…,” seeking to impose History instead of letting it take its natural course. When Obama judges the postwar exercise of American power as on the whole oppressive, the chief point is not that this reflects the evil of capitalism and of Western civilization as such, but that it is counterproductive. Our past abuses of power do not contradict our being essentially on the “right side of history.” But we must not rush things; we must give our Others the time and opportunity to choose freely the democracy that we attempted, notably in the second Iraq war, to cram down their throats.

    Obama’s often-referenced 2009 Cairo speech made clear that, as opposed to Samuel Huntington’s clash-of-civilizations pessimism about the affinity of the Arab/Muslim world for liberal democracy, Obama agrees in principle with George W. Bush that we all really do have the same basic goals of individual freedom and economic development. The difference is merely that, now that the US has sought mistakenly and unsuccessfully to impose these goals by force, it must redeem itself before the Muslim world by apologizing for its arrogance and seeking to promote development through voluntary cooperation. Because Obama is far more familiar with the culture of Islam than most Americans, he felt at the time of the Cairo speech, and perhaps still feels, that he is ideally suited to heal the wounds inflicted on both sides by our Middle East wars.

    Beinart’s final point is that “[b]ecause Obama sees violent jihadism as ideologically weak and unattractive, he thinks that few American Muslims will embrace it unless the United States makes them feel like enemies in their own country—which is exactly what Donald Trump risks doing.” For Obama, Islamic jihadism, as opposed to Nazism or Soviet communism, cannot be attractive in itself. It has no pretensions of offering a “better life” to its citizens but is merely a resentful reaction to our heavy-handed intervention in the Middle East. Faithful to his Fukuyaman-Hegelian roots, Obama dismisses the specifically religious appeal of IS; religion, as a preliminary embodiment of the World-Spirit, is destined to give way to Reason at the End of History.


    No doubt the present interpretation presents Obama’s foreign policy as both more patriotic and less antithetical to that of his predecessor than one would imagine from the visceral opposition it inspires in most conservatives. But the difference between Bush and Obama is that the former took being “on the right side of history” as an encouragement to action, whereas the latter, in reaction to his predecessor’s activism, and no doubt believing that his is the authentic form of historical faith, sees History’s verdict rather as a sign that action is not needed, or as little as possible.

    Yet to think that one can defeat adversaries by declaring them “on the wrong side of history” is to commit a category error. Obama’s idea that his refusal to seriously engage American power in the fight against IS helps its ideology remain “unattractive” is a contresens. American inaction, or minimal action, is interpreted by IS’s potential recruits as a sign of weakness, not of strength—as proof that they, not we, are the “strong horse” on the right side of history.

    Whence my final point. I think, in contrast to Beinart, that Obama’s strategy of dismissal does not simply reflect a Fukuyaman faith in Western democracy. The faith is real, but it is conflated in Obama’s worldview with the victimary arrogance of such movements as “Black Lives Matter.” Obama treats IS with the same contempt that campus leftists show for the bearers of “white privilege.”

    Beinart fails to see that the model for Obama’s dismissive attitude toward “ISIL” is not a Hegelian vision of the End of History but victimary faith in “social justice.” The president’s sense of the historical inevitability common to both cases leaves him unaware that his disrespect for IS expresses not the contempt of the strong for the weak, but that of the weak for the strong. This was originally a heroic attitude shared by Gandhi and the Civil Rights movement in the South. Today’s campus activists parody this heroism, extracting concessions from supine administrators terrorized by the victimocracy, but their tactics remain, at least in principle, those of non-violent “witnessing” rather than physical coercion.

    But the crybullies triumph because their vision of history is sustained by higher authorities. The idea that the same smug conviction of moral rectitude that wins victories over “white privilege” in the Twitterverse and on campus will succeed in enlisting the forces of not only the West but Islam itself against the jihadist radicals—who are attacking this very same Western “white privilege” on an international scale—is a textbook example of mimetic blindness. We can only hope that, if nothing else, the pain inflicted by history itself—a pain no doubt still in its early stages—will force the US and the West to demonstrate before it is too late how much they really do believe in the historical superiority of liberal democracy.


  • Firstness: Death and Resurrection?

    Over the past year or so the deterioration of campus discourse in the face of militant victimocracy has coincided with the increased virulence of Islamic jihad in both the Middle East and the West. Nor can one help but notice that the more ferocious the Islamists become, the more universal the anti-Israel BDS movement becomes in the academic community and beyond. By now things have reached the point at which it is no longer useful to talk about Israel’s “shaping its message” or “improving its outreach.” The Western intelligentsia appears to have made up its mind that Israel is an evil colonial enterprise, that all the viciousness of Palestinian terrorism, from the murders at the 1972 Munich Olympics to stabbing old women in the street today, is to be laid at the feet of the “occupiers,” that the failure of the Palestinian Arabs to form a state is entirely Israel’s fault, and simply that the very notion of a “Jewish state” is illegitimate—after all, the real Palestinians insist that the Jews’ ancestors never lived there at all.

    In the December 3 Jerusalem Post, Caroline Glick points out the near-direct connection between not merely hostility to Israel but more specifically to Jews that is implicit in the ascriptivist identity politics practiced by the “crybullies” on our campuses. She points out that the Jews, long a stigmatized group, have never promoted or benefited from such policies, but on the contrary have always sought meritocratic, objective tests of qualification. (The same is largely true for Asian students, who have recently been protesting “racial” admissions quotas.) Although the relationship between high Jewish IQs and monotheism is uncertain, there can be no doubt that the superior success of Jews in adapting to Western modes of thought—and in creating a modern, technologically innovative Middle Eastern state—has contributed to its neighbors’ antisemitism.

    Glick’s argument is fully in line with my analysis that the greatest medium-term problem of the modern world is valorizing the labor of those less adept at manipulating mathematical and other symbols. As a sign of its thorniness, not only is alluding to the existence of these difficulties and to their unequal distribution among ethnic groups taboo, but the taboo extends to any affirmation of the validity of meritocratic measurement, which is all but equated with “racism”—the variety that humorists refer to as “the soft racism of low expectations.” (Cf., for example, the University of California racism guidelines.) For if some groups do less well than others, this cannot be blamed on either their nature or their culture (“blaming the victim”), only on “micro-aggressions” by the possessors of “privilege.” And today the BS of ascriptivism increasingly includes the BDS of anti-Zionism.


    Alas, the predictable effect of the San Bernardino incident—to which the first reaction of the mainstream media was to denounce the “gun epidemic,” notably in the New York Times‘ first front-page editorial in nearly a century—will likely be only to intensify the march of BDS, the delegitimization of Israel, and a creeping antisemitism through the universities and the workplaces populated from them.

    As I pointed out in the previous Chronicle, and this is not an “original idea,” the resiliency of the Western democracies that got them through WWII is, if not exhausted, worrisomely depleted. Shows of strength by our enemies, even “symbolic” ones of the kind terror produces—and there will surely be far more terrible ones if we let IS continue—generate the desire to “understand” them rather than to destroy them. Radical Islam is merely reminding the Christian West of its moral heritage: love your enemies and turn the other cheek, just as did the Bataclan survivor I quoted, who sympathized with his “Palestinian” suicide-bomber enemy—even though there were no Palestinians among the Parisian killers. Had this gentleman been a member of the ASA or AAA or MLA or WSA, he would no doubt have been all the more convinced by the slaughter he witnessed to forestall further Islamic fury by voting for BDS.


    And so I return to a frequent theme of these Chronicles: the need to maintain a moral justification of firstness. The Jews are for Western civilization and by extension for the modern civilized world the exemplars of firstness, and their sufferings have exemplified those occasioned by the resentment that firstness arouses. Western Christian civilization has been on the whole a successful integration of the Jewish component of firstness into the originally apocalyptic social order created by the first Christians out of its denial. It is important to note in this regard that the Renaissance and the subsequent development of modern science and technology were not primarily or even significantly the work of Jews, whose emancipation occurred only with the French Revolution. It was Christian society itself that created (with some Old-Testament inspiration) the modern nation-state and with it, the market system, into which the Jews were subsequently integrated.

    This integration occurred upon a background of Muslim retreat. The 1453 conquest of Constantinople was a hollow victory, since the real center of Christian civilization had moved to the West, and the Ottoman failure at the gates of Vienna in 1529 and finally in 1683 put an end to any appearance of parity between the Muslim Caliphate and Christian Europe.

    But the suicidal wars of the twentieth century undermined the West’s self-confidence. The rise of victimary thought after the Holocaust was the sign that the defeat of the Axis was not enough to heal the wound created by the Axis’ attempt to substitute for firstness in the Jewish mode the tyranny of ontological superiority. No doubt the one-word explanation for Nazi antisemitism is envy, the desire of the “Aryans” to take back their rightful place that had been usurped by the “sub-human” Jews, but the Jews as chosen people never saw themselves as a master race, either biologically or even culturally. The Jews were a “light unto the nations,” not in order to convert them to Judaism, but precisely in the sense in which GA uses the term firstness: they discovered first what others could learn as well. Monotheism is not like a sacrificial animal that offers its best portions to its first consumers. The Aryan “race” was another thing altogether, as its representatives’ behavior not only to the Jews but to other “inferior” peoples made clear.

    In short, the Nazi-Jew conflict internal to the Judeo-Christian West could be seen as a sign of the failure of the West— the failure of the Jews to shine their light effectively, and of the Christians to echo it unresentfully rather than attempting to extinguish it.


    Islam had always embodied a different conception of civilization. I have spoken of Islam as the religion and culture of the “outsiders” in the margin of Western civilization, and this is not meant as disparagement. The current success of radical Islam reflects many ugly things, but if there is one position I share even with those perversely inspired by every Islamic atrocity to obsess over the danger of “Islamophobia,” it is that Islam is not in itself dependent on the supremacist violence that its militants practice with such relish. The religion of “submission” offers a different, non-Western solution, in its own eyes no doubt the “final” one, to the problem of firstness—the problem that the West had seemed able to solve even after it nearly destroyed itself in the two World Wars, but that its final victory in the Cold War over what was after all only a variant of itself revealed that it had not solved.

    Obviously it is impossible to imagine that the conversion of the West to Islam along the lines of Michel Houellebecq’s ironic best-seller Soumission could provide a practical solution to this problem. How could modern technological civilization survive, let alone flourish, under even the most “enlightened” version of Sharia? (If you want to know how the real masters of Sharia deal with scientific questions, you might do well to examine some MEMRI materials on the subject, e.g., here.) But that is not the issue. If the victimary resentment generated within Western society continues to mount at its present pace, which currently gives the (hopefully illusory) impression of being on its way to destroying the university as an institution where free inquiry into human affairs is possible, it may come to pass that something like the Islamic solution to firstness becomes the only humanly practical solution, at whatever cost of the “comforts” we in the West have been taking for granted.


    Attacks such as that in San Bernardino are expressions of a faith both confident and desperate, nourished by vast resentment of a Western world blamed for the catastrophic failure of Middle Eastern Islamic societies. Syed Farook’s father pooh-poohed his son’s anxiety at the continued existence of Israel by reassuring him that it would be gone in a couple of years. This offers a telling paradigm of—many if not most—Muslim attitudes in the Middle East: to reject jihadist violence is not to accept to live in peace with Israel, but to have confidence that the global order itself will eliminate it because “no one wants the Jews there.”

    Islamist terrorism undermines the West’s self-confidence and obliges it to squander its energies in anticipating and defending against further aggression, not to speak of passing irrelevant gun-control legislation and self-righteously condemning “Islamophobia.” The greatest danger such killings pose is not their capacity to destroy Western society—although modern weaponry and IS’s growing sophistication make conceivable devastation far beyond the scale of Paris or even 9/11—but their power to stimulate by example all the resentments fostered by modernity within this society, particularly among those groups who can claim with any degree of legitimacy victimary status.

    Whence the recent upsurge of accusations of racism, the very attempt to contest which is considered proof of guilt. That antisemitism, which is after all the original model of “racial” accusations, only increases as a result—in contrast with the accusation of racism, always accepted as true because never attributed to any but the purest motives, the charge of antisemitism generates the counter-accusation that Jews and their “Holocaust industry” merely use it to slander others in order to protect their own selfish interests—is only one more indication that the problem is not race hatred as such, but the difficulties imposed by firstness in the postmodern economy. Whence, in another vein, the unexpected success of Bernie Sanders’ rerun of Eugene Debs nearly a century after the original. In Debs’ day, workers were poor; today, they mostly share the comforts of middle-class life, but their marketable skills have diminished and they fear having to survive on food stamps and disability payments.

    The bottom line is that, all rhetoric aside, the Left is correct that the fundamental pact of civilization is the moral equality of all. This means at the base, as the originary hypothesis makes clear, our ability to reciprocally exchange signs. As our civilization advances, the old operations of firstness that permit innovation and its transmission to all according to the “light unto the nations” model create billionaires and Twittermobs rather than universal solidarity. The more advanced the technology, the fewer and rarer the humans who can usefully contribute to this firstness, and by now we are reaching the point where many of the less symbolically/mathematically gifted are scarcely able to find gainful employment at all. This is not a matter of micro-aggression but of human dignity, and the sense of affronted human dignity that we call resentment does not always express itself in the most refined manner.

    What is above all apparent is the inability of the Western intelligentsia, in the first place, university officers (and soon, perhaps, those of high-tech corporations?) to resist the expression of and demands dictated by this resentment. Victimocracy, as its etymology suggests, is increasingly about power. In the US there seems to be no depth to which one will not sink to avoid being called “racist.” Democratic politicians are too terrified even to whisper “All lives matter” (and I haven’t heard it much from Republicans).

    But this is not merely a domestic fear. Let me quote once more Swedish cabinet minister Jens Orback’s prophetic remark back in 2006 (see Chronicles 337, 468, 481): “We must be open and tolerant toward Islam and the Muslims because [!] when we become a minority, they will be so toward us.” This fear reflects, like all expressions of White Guilt, a sense that the days of the West are numbered, that its civilization’s firstness is a source of resentment that can be allayed only by the most abject forms of… submission.

    Which seems to me the simplest explanation of the surrender of campus administrators to student mobs, the rise of BDS and campus antisemitism, and the West’s lack of alacrity in responding to the Islamic State and its potentially more dangerous Iranian variant. Perhaps needless to say, Islam, comme son nom l’indique, offers a more satisfactory solution to this problem than the Judeo-Christianity of the West. If human history—and René Girard—have taught us anything at all, it is that it is better to submit to even the most tyrannical law than to the rule of the mob: to forestall rather than experience mimetic crisis.


    But lest we succumb entirely to pessimism, there are signs among the reactions to the recent spate of Islamic terrorism of a resurgent faith in Western values, even if the literate class tends to refer to this as the rise of the “far right”: see, for example, this. Europeans sick of jihadist terrorism are becoming more favorable to Israel, with the French Front National’s Marine Le Pen in the forefront.

    The European intelligentsia will no doubt be the last group after the jihadists themselves to express sympathy for Israel (unless it be the American intelligentsia; but see also this), but it is the movement of public opinion that has the last word—and that can hopefully influence the political class to drop the anti-Zionist preening that, with self-satisfied perversity, is precisely what has made progress toward a “two-state solution” impossible. Why indeed should the Palestinians concede anything when any atrocities they commit are inevitably blamed on Israeli oppression? As the senior Farook put it, “no one wants the Jews there.”

    But as Richard Nixon went to China, perhaps Marine Le Pen can go to Ramallah.

    That offers an intriguing prospect to mull over while digesting our Christmas dinner.


  • Paris and Columbia, MO

    The current situation in American universities has gone beyond the point where righteous indignation, ironic mockery, or any other comparable rhetorical reactions are worth expressing. I am beginning to understand what it must have been like to experience the early stages of movements such as fascism: self-righteous mob rule that no one has the moral strength to oppose. One would like to offer the example of Jesus with the woman taken in adultery (John 8), even if the lone individual standing up to a mob doesn’t always fare well. But whereas in Jesus’ situation it was clear where power lay, and therefore where it could be persuaded not to exercise itself, the victimary world becomes a victimocracy (a term first used in our context by Adam Katz, but no doubt too obvious for anyone to claim first use) at precisely the point where power has reached the ambiguous status of remaining nominally in the hands of the “authorities” while being actually in those of the “victims.” For the former to assert their power to punish the latter would then be to “blame the victims,” which would be likely to get them in big trouble—with boards of trustees, the ACLU, and above all, the Obama administration’s Department of Education. The helpless woman whose stoning Jesus prevented is now a mob of students whose “grievances” are symbolic but who can exact real human sacrifices, not to speak of expenditures on diversity officers, sensitivity training programs, safe spaces, still easier “studies” courses, and affirmative action allocations.

    But this account of events, however reasonable, can be dismissed as just so much rhetoric, and those of us who understand that language is BS before it is logic realize that any argument is useless against the kind of ultimately religious convictions that the victimocracy is grounded in. Indeed, the current situation encourages us to take a step back and reflect about what “religion” means in contexts where it is not predetermined by ecclesiastical affiliation. In recent years we have increasingly been in the presence of a set of strongly held victimary beliefs that are not merely personal but have clear social implications; some of these (e.g., “climate change”) are presented as “scientific” when clearly, whatever their scientific basis, they partake of religious passion.

    As a student of René Girard, I am all too familiar with the “mimetic” argument that does away with all nuance and simply explains A’s actions/ideas/desires by his “mediation” by B. And however crudely Girardians often express this point, it is the fundamental one, because at the root of the rationalities of human language and its ability to differentiate is the centrality of the sacred and its unanimous recognition. In situations like today’s, as the level of violence, first intellectual and then physical, continues to rise, differentiations indeed fall by the wayside and adversaries grow symmetrical. Thus our lesson in religion includes the observation that at a certain point, even scientists spending millions of dollars in grant money can’t disambiguate natural reality from political mimesis. It’s certainly a first-level truth that we should be suspicious of those whose convictions about global warming go to the point of despising and conspiring to defame, expel, or even indict their adversaries—but then we realize that although this may be evidence that their case is far from definitive, it isn’t scientific proof that they are wrong, either.

    To claim as I have that the present victimocracy, and victimary thinking as a whole, is a reaction to the Holocaust and to Hiroshima, the twin revelations at the end of WWII of the ultimate perversion of human firstness on the one hand and the (potentially) unlimited violence of human conflict on the other, should not be taken as a “demystification.” This ongoing reaction is an auto-criticism of Western civilization that the West cannot ignore, and our current travails suggest that the responses it has come up with so far are still being tested and found wanting.

    Until the end of the Cold War, all opposition to Western power came from within, and this was true even of the colonial revolts that both borrowed their ideologies from the West (Marxism, socialism, etc.) and defined themselves in opposition to it. It is worthy of interest that the great Asian civilizations of China and India, along with their variants in Japan, Thailand, etc., have never challenged the West in this way. North Korea’s national-racial cult is little known and is grafted on the Western ideology of Marxism, much like Stalin’s “socialism in one country.” Japan, China, and now India have competed with the West on its own terms, which since WWII have been mostly peaceful ones, the exceptions (Korea, Vietnam) fitting once more into the framework of the Cold War.

    The victimary is a category internal to the West, which treats all externality to it in the context of its “colonial” domination of its Other. Or in other terms, in the victimary context, only the West has agency. Whereas the West’s internal dichotomies of men against women, “straights” against “gays,” “white” against “colored,” provide opportunities for “dialectical” rethinking that transcend the strictly victimary context, the “post-colonial” Other is defined merely as such; it supplies no new parameters, and however much resentment it expresses at its “othering,” offers no new modes of understanding. Said’s Orientalism was the crystallization of this truth. For all his denigration of the naïve self-centeredness of Western attempts to understand the “Orient,” Said never offers an “Oriental” view in opposition, nor even implies that such a view is conceivable. Said’s “Orient” is never other than the Other of the West, a fact that explains the disdain of professional Western orientalists for a work that displays no real concern with the cultures its author is purportedly defending. The implicitly suggested appropriate Western reaction to Said’s diatribe would be never to speak of the “Orient” at all—but then of course the West would be accused of disguising its colonialist past.

    Today, things are different. With its recent aggressions, an Islamic faction is now demonstrating to the West the existence of a real opposition, something other than an “Other.” Resurgent radical Islam embodies a true oppositional ideology, and when we look back at Islam’s seventh-century origins, we see it playing basically the same role in both eras. No doubt, as Girard liked to point out, Islam tends to mirror the West, but he knew that the validity of the argument that differences are merely cosmetic and the opponents are really doubles depends on a transcendent revelation, not on “the evidence,” since precisely “the evidence” of difference is what is being dismissed as irrelevant to an “essential” identity. Islam defines itself as our contrary rather than our mirror image, and “defining itself” is not a matter of ratiocination but of people being willing to blow themselves up.

    As they say nowadays, the Islamists attempt to impose on history a different “narrative,” except that even the adage that it is the victors who write history does not do justice to the phenomenon. One can apply this dictum to Stalin’s removal of Trotsky from the Soviet Encyclopedia, but not to the annihilation of an entire tribe by Genghis Khan. The Islamists have no intention of leaving the West the opportunity for alternative “narratives”: they would obliterate its culture and reduce its surviving members to dhimmis within their revived Caliphate.

    It is surely not coincidental that this first real challenge to Western hegemony since the seventeenth century, one that no longer seeks liberation but conquest, is exactly contemporary with the most abject manifestations of the victimocracy. In case we are not intellectually sophisticated enough to grasp the absurdity of the self-deconstructing notion of “micro-aggression,” its proponents are happy to openly demonstrate it in public, as iconically illustrated in the YouTube scene of a “communications” professor trying to get a student journalist “muscled” out of the protesters’ “safe space”—which we may define as one where no empirical facts are allowed to intrude on their resentment.

    But calling for us in the West to rally to our own defense suggests an overcoming of this resentment that cannot be the result of mere exhortation. The current “defense of the West” still relies on the victimocratic conviction that it is indeed the only game in town, the only source of agency, and that the nasty stuff done on the other side is merely a despairing reaction. Whence the widespread sympathy for Palestinians stabbing Jews young and old in the streets of Jerusalem. Or this, from Marc Weitzmann’s Tablet article of November 25, appropriately entitled “The Failure of Intelligent Explanations”: “Louis, 26, survivor of the Bataclan, interviewed by Radio France-Info: ‘I will never blame a poor Palestinian kid, who has suffered since he was born, for blowing himself up and taking me with him.’”

    The advantage of the Palestinian connection, with its transfiguration of antisemitism into the language of Western oikophobia, is to provide a religio-magical justification for the Other’s murderous resentment. Like the life-long micro-aggressions that purport to explain their victim’s objective failings, so do the life-long sufferings of the Palestinian explain his murderous act. But in fact, it is the act that retroactively “explains” the sufferings, and that also justifies the practice of terrorism. One thing we learn from terrorism, both on the grand scale of Paris and on the petty but still substantial scale of Columbia, MO, is that the so-called “Stockholm syndrome” is not an exception due to prolonged exposure to the terrorists’ lifestyle; it is the very point of the terrorist act. Reciprocal violence takes some effort and courage, which in our advanced societies is devolved on police forces, the French being among the most capable; they were on the scene in a few hours, in contrast with the ineptitude of the Indian response to the Mumbai attacks in 2011. But in the absence of violent symmetry, the only other mimetic response is violent empathy, and the story of Islamic terrorism has been constantly marked by such expressions of “understanding.” If these people are willing to lay down their lives just to kill me, then I, to occasion their hatred, must be complicit in something really horrible—Israel, for example.

    The IS terrorists have nonetheless given the West a learning opportunity of great potential. Since 9/11, but far more slowly than I had anticipated—for the resentments internal to the West have had much time to accumulate and gain legitimacy, and our propitiatory election in 2008 of an unrepentant exponent of Western oikophobia has done much to encourage them—we have been learning that, no, this is not simply the otherness that reflects our own hegemony, these are not emulators of Fanon’s Les damnés de la terre. The agents of IS are not victim-doubles but real doubles, competitors of the West, whose model is the euphoric conquering march of the Islamic armies that were finally stopped at Poitiers in 732. (Is it coincidental that the greatest of medieval epics, the Chanson de Roland, presents the Saracens as the rival doubles of the Franks, as the Trojans were to the Greeks?) The result of an IS victory would not be the conversion of revolutionaries into mirror-image authority figures, as in Genet’s Le balcon. When IS takes over, you are guaranteed to notice the change, provided you survive it.

    Yet mere terrorism may not suffice to persuade the West that its civilization is truly in danger. Terrorism is indeed a tactic of the “other,” one that seeks to persuade the hegemons to White Guilt and the lowering of their defenses. But the terrorism of IS is not in the service of a colonial revolt; the overall strategy is one of conquest, and such attacks as recently took place in Paris are merely opening skirmishes to disquiet the “privileged” population. I fear that something far more serious than Paris or even 9/11 may well be required to unite the West against IS, to reestablish American (and NATO) leadership, to impose on Western Muslims not “Islamophobia” but a reasonable restriction on incitement to sedition that has until now proceeded under cover of religious freedom (for example, in prisons), and above all to send a real army to the Middle East to clean up the mess that our withdrawal from Iraq and our mindless welcoming of the “Arab spring” have spawned.

    Will this have a counter-effect on the current campus follies? What force, one wonders, can put victimary resentment in its place? Conservative publications are happy to denounce it, but one hears little or no opposition from the Republican, let alone the Democratic candidates for the presidency. Are we expected to take Black Lives Matter as a legitimate spokesman for the black community? Will Al Sharpton be a guest at the White House in perpetuity?

    No doubt the only way to secure a long-term reduction in victimary resentment is to find a remedy for the drift of our society toward a Brave New World that allows smart people to become billionaires but has increasingly less to offer the ordinary ones. Domestic unrest has emerged as a black revolt because the black population is not only among the most vulnerable but can rely on reserves of historically justifiable resentment, as well as tactics inherited from the Civil Rights movement. But Charles Murray’s Coming Apart shows that the white population contains a far larger number of disaffected individuals, who in the absence of a symbolic cause like police brutality turn their resentment against themselves in alcohol and drugs and withdrawal from the labor force.

    The attractiveness of the Islamic model for those excluded from productive activity in high-tech society is that, although in no way would they “live better” under the Caliphate, the Caliphate would give them a social respectability they cannot obtain in current Western society—and would force them at swordpoint to remain worthy of it. (Judeo-)Christianity is grounded not on Islamic “submission,” but on active reciprocity in free exchange, which is, in the first place, the free exchange of what Peirce called “symbolic” signs. How to make this fundamental basis of democracy compatible with a world of increasingly complex technology is the most significant challenge for the human future. If we can solve this, the problems of “climate change,” whatever they may be, will surely become child’s play for the augmented powers of human ingenuity.

  • René Girard, in memoriam

    for Martha Girard

    Just at the point of starting this 500th Chronicle, I learned of the death of René Girard, without whose inspiration these Chronicles, if written at all, would surely have been very different. I have told the story of my encounter with Girard in various places, but I hope my readers will forgive me for returning to it on this sad occasion.


    Girard was still a young and relatively unknown Associate Professor when I arrived at Johns Hopkins from Columbia in 1960. He would achieve lasting fame with Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque, published the year of my arrival. Girard was my obvious choice for dissertation director; he was in the “modern” field (19th-20th centuries) and was a brilliant and compelling teacher. He directed my quasi-Freudian dissertation on Flaubert’s early works conscientiously and insightfully, and without imposing his own ideas, which nonetheless left their mark on my analyses.

    In those days of the French nouvelle critique, literature was considered a source of what we can simply call anthropological understanding, deeper than the overt ratiocinations of philosophy. But for René, the coherence of the literary narrative reflected the more fundamental truth that he saw revealed in the Christian “greatest story ever told.” Certainly Mensonge romantique, although not overtly a work of religious thought, saw literature as much more of a religious than a psychological-metaphysical experience: the very term conversion by which he defined the novelist’s arrival at an authentic understanding of mimetic desire makes this clear—as does the book’s concluding reference to Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov. (A common love for Dostoevsky was a point of contact with René; my adolescent self-consciousness was born with the revelation of Notes from Underground.)


    My first writings after my dissertation were not directly influenced by René. When I came to UCLA in 1969, Alain Cohen of UCSD interested me in the Batesonian notion of pragmatic paradox, and I applied this idea to that of esthetic experience, which oscillates between the esthetic “sign” and the imaginary construction it provokes in its audience. I became interested in applying this esthetic to our understanding of the basic structure of “mature” language, the declarative sentence, which focuses on a thing (noun) and then qualifies it with a predicate. Was not there an ostensive focus on the thing prior to predication? Is not predication the fundamental form of deferral of our potentially conflictive focus on the object of our attention?

    My thinking in this period was more psychological than anthropological. What turned me toward anthropology was the appearance of La violence et le sacré. Published in 1972, eleven years after Mensonge, it was my most significant intellectual revelation. The scene of the unanimous lynching of the “emissary victim” was a genuine hypothetical event of human origin, and as I gradually came to see, of the origin of language and representation in general.

    I only began to put all this together when in 1978 I was called to Baltimore for a visiting professorship that was to be the prelude to a permanent appointment. Girard was attempting to build a team, and had chosen me as his first collaborator. And I let him down. I believe my failure to secure this professorship was a factor in the disaffection that led to his leaving Hopkins a few years later for Stanford, where he remained for the rest of his life. As I have explained in the online Girardian Origins of Generative Anthropology, when I came to design the graduate course for my visit, instead of building on a course on Girard and Derrida that I had already taught successfully at UCLA, which would have been ideal for a department where Girard was present and Derrida came on regular visits, I decided hubristically to devote the seminar to my theory of esthetic paradox, without a textbook or even a prescribed set of readings, simply presenting and illustrating my ideas week by week. This was clearly a suicidal decision, and it is hard to blame the graduate students whose complaints soon made my appointment unthinkable. In retrospect it seemed that I had wanted to avoid not so much proximity to René as the pressure cooker of East Coast academe, as opposed to the intellectual isolation in which I worked at UCLA. Call it cowardice, call it prudence, I have never been comfortable with the academic establishment, and this even before I began to be offended by its left-wing politics and high-intensity networking (I was still something of a left-winger in 1978; I had voted—and I think René did too—for Carter in 1976, but for Reagan in 1984).


    The most important aspect of my abortive professorship at Hopkins was the time spent with René himself, who had just published the final work of what might be called his major trilogy: Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde, a work somewhat diminished by its dialogic format, but which nevertheless contains the essence of Girardian thinking about Judaism and Christianity within the anthropological context developed in La violence.

    Of our many conversations that year, I recall two in particular. First, in a parking lot behind Gilman Hall, I expressed some Jewish skepticism about a possible relationship to Jesus as a model, given that he was presented as“le fils de Dieu.” René answered, “nous sommes tous fils de Dieu.” That one sentence, whose orthodoxy I had no way of testing, has always seemed to me the simplest and truest definition of Christianity. In its very vagueness between metaphor and literalism, it assumes the burden of the nature of human language—inextricably truth and BS—that our proud philosophers think they can ignore.

    The other remark was one he made to me toward the end of my stay at Hopkins, when it was already clear that I would not be offered the job, but when I had begun to elaborate my ideas on language into what would become over the next year or so GA’s “originary hypothesis.” I had given a little talk on this subject to the department, with a dozen or so students in attendance, along with a professor or two. René, who had presented me, said to me afterward that modest gatherings like this were where great ideas had their start. It wasn’t clear to me that he thought my idea was a great one, but it was clear from this remark that he was giving it a chance. Coming from René, whose generosity toward ideas other than his own was not easily forthcoming, I took it not simply as a compliment but as a charitable gesture of encouragement, an act of grace.


    Once the Hopkins appointment fell through, as I half-understood at the time, the active part of my relationship with Girard was over. No doubt we remained in contact. The Colloque de Cérisy for his sixtieth birthday in 1983 brought together a number of Girardians, some old, some new, and although I wasn’t involved in the early years of COV&R, in the late 1990s I was made a lifetime honorary member, and for a few years was invited to give plenary talks. I also invited Girard to speak at UCLA several times, including at the founding of the local Center for the Study of Religion in 1995, coincidentally with the (wholly unrelated) founding of Anthropoetics.

    When I think of “what I learned from Girard,” what comes to mind is less “mimetic theory”—a term I never heard him use, but assume was intended to turn him into the “social scientist” he was described as in several obituaries but never really was—than a few basic insights, more important from a mimetic or simply from a human standpoint than specific points of theory. Perhaps the most central, an idea that comes more easily to (Catholic) Frenchmen than (Protestant) Americans, is that religious texts, correctly read, are not merely of moral let alone “literary” value, but sources of anthropological knowledge—and that the Judeo-Christian Bible embodies history’s highest understanding of the human as founded in violence contained by/in the sacred.

    A corollary of this, often more salient than the underlying proposition, is that what we call “philosophy” is not truly self-grounded and is in fact derivative of religion. René taught me a skeptical light-heartedness toward the philosophical or “Greek” component of the Western tradition, which he saw as having received an exaggerated amount of attention in comparison with the more profound Judeo-Christian element. I am perhaps more comfortable with philosophical discourse than René, but neither of us was trained as a “philosopher” (a term that always strikes me as pretentious when applied to professors of philosophy, particularly “analytic philosophy”), and whenever I am faced with philosophical ratiocination ungrounded in an anthropological model, I think of the little smile with which René, as what he would have called my mediator, would have reacted.

    No doubt I wish that René had been more open to the originary hypothesis and to my theory of language and representation. But he was not one to be curious about ideas that, however sympathetic to his thought and acknowledging their debt to it, diverged from it in any significant manner. Perhaps, speaking again from a mimetic perspective, this was really best; an indifferent or even slightly hostile father-figure affords one more freedom than one whose agreement and approval one is constantly seeking. I miss our early conversations and exchanges of letters—in those days we sent paper letters, often hand-written, by snail mail—but even had I stayed at Hopkins after 1978, there would surely have come a moment when collaboration of this sort would no longer have been useful to either of us.


    Implicit in the greatness of René’s thought was the audacity of his example. Joseph Bottum’s memorial piece on René in the November 23 Weekly Standard makes the point that his straightforward attempt to explain the human as a whole, in its essence—which is to say, to construct an anthropology in the strong sense of the term—was a throwback from the timidity of twentieth century social science to the systematic thought of the nineteenth century. This faith in human understanding put René, ever the non-Parisian, in clear contrast with the kind of anti-system found in “French theory.”

    René wrote to be understood, and above all, to make the world better understood. The post-structuralists certainly had the chutzpah to apply their ideas “universally,” but their ultimate aim was to defeat common sense rather than to enhance it. Derrida, the most powerful of these thinkers (and the one whose thought can most usefully be integrated into the framework created by René), attempted to “deconstruct” our common understanding, not in order to provide a better one, but to show that any intelligible vision of the world is really a form of “false consciousness” in the service of an ill-defined central authority. Understanding is tyranny; deconstruction makes us free. None of this takes into account what René understood to be the problem at the heart of the human: the need to defer mimetic violence. It is this “différance” that provides the adult reality within whose security philosophical children can dream of anarchy.


    As a man of faith, René agreed in his own way with Einstein’s point that God doesn’t play dice with the universe. Except that whereas physics, which is only peripherally about us, seems to become ever more confusing, anthropology, which is entirely about us, should not. I am forever grateful for having had the great good fortune to study with the one contemporary thinker who not only truly believed this but had the intellectual power to put it into practice.

    Rest in peace, René!


  • Firstness and Victimary Religion

    The concept of firstness as has been developed in GA over the past few years stands in binary contrast to the “moral model” of symmetrical reciprocity. The latter evokes a symmetrical exchange of signs each element of which, each individual sign, is in its own context an example of firstness. Every human act can be considered an example of firstness, whereas moral reciprocity is only possible within the spatio-temporal configuration that the sign brings into existence.

    Conversely, if we understand firstness as whatever is not reciprocated in the same configuration, given that the notion of “configuration” has no theoretical limit, all examples of firstness can be in principle included in the moral model. For example, the insight of Mauss’s Le don is to describe the act of gift-giving as in fact a form of exchange, and in teaching this concept I always found it helpful to point out that all human social life, including our own, obeys this structure. One reciprocates, but with a delay, and not “mechanically”: you don’t give an identical gift back to the giver; you don’t serve the same dishes that your host served when you reciprocate his dinner invitation. Yet we universally understand such series of actions as examples of reciprocity.

    All human conduct can be considered potentially reciprocal, even if modes that we call “violent” deliberately attempt to destroy the equilibrium of the relationship between perpetrator and patient. Violent reciprocity is a paradoxical form of behavior familiar to readers of Girard; even if murder cannot be reciprocated directly, it can be avenged, and feuds of various kinds can endure for centuries, all the while each side hopes to destroy its enemy “once and for all.” Indeed, the current rise of militant jihadism is clearly understandable as the renewal of the “clash of civilizations” that appeared to have ended with the lifting of the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683—not so long ago as all that.


    As the reference to Mauss makes clear, reciprocity outside a ritual or ritual-like context requires deferral and variation. Firstness in the strong sense of “historical significance” is innovation, doing something first that had not previously been done, and that humanity can preserve in its historical memory. Although all examples of firstness can be encompassed in a system of exchange in the most general sense, some provide greater value to the system and extract from it greater benefits than others. John Rawls’s theory of justice attempts to evaluate the rewards for firstness by the application of the moral model in a fictional “original position” not without resemblance to the scenario of the originary hypothesis.

    Rawls’s theory is generally associated with “liberalism” in the sense that was once the ideology of the US Democratic Party: concern for equality of economic reward that emphasizes both a “safety net” for those otherwise incapable of acquiring sufficient income for a normal life and improving the lot of those in less drastic circumstances through extra-market pressures such as labor unions. The basic premise is that the “natural” human condition is one of equality in goods, as is the case in hunter-gatherer societies and among ad hoc groups of “equals,” say, guests at a party or survivors in a lifeboat. Those who are wealthier are expected to contribute more to the system; their additional wealth can be justified only if it redounds to the society’s increased prosperity overall. Hence, for example, to justify differential salaries, one points out that when greater skill and effort is not rewarded, those capable of it tend to slack off; this phenomenon, for example, led to the near-universal abandonment of the egalitarian kibbutz model that dominated the first generations of life in Israel.

    Indeed, the left-right division that began in the French Revolution and can be traced in less binary form to the Whig-Tory division in English (and Scottish) politics in the preceding century depends on negotiating a roughly Rawlsian compromise between the free market with its pricing system and the moral model of reciprocity as enforced by the political “market.” The notion of the “end of history” raised by Fukuyama in 1989, which I have reexamined in recent Chronicles, is ultimately a model of the just society as a judicious balance between the market’s creativity and the overall prosperity of the citizenry, not all of whom are capable of benefiting from the economic marketplace without the help of the political one.


    The crisis of today’s liberal-democratic polity, where traditional left-right negotiations increasingly fail to arrive at viable compromise, leads me to believe that we must add to our understanding of firstness an additional parameter whose relevance Rawls and the liberal democracy of the past could not have comprehended.

    The human is in the first place the mechanism that, through the use of signs, prevents resentment from erupting in violence. Even without mentioning the influence of the Internet and cell phone in bringing into ever closer contact peoples of vastly different levels of wealth and competence, or the increasing dependence of economic productivity on symbolic-mathematical ability, simply the end of the Cold War, by eliminating our less successful competitor, removed the major factor in mitigating the resentment of “capitalism.” Instead of being grateful to be here rather than there, we are resentful for being somewhere rather than in utopia.

    Victimary thinking does not consider that the simple redistribution of some of the wealth of the “rich” to the “poor” is an adequate formula for the just society. In addition, it insists that the privileged pay moral reparations to their victims. It would be a mistake to see this arrangement simply as hypocritical, even though its effect is indeed to leave unchallenged great accumulations of wealth by “progressive” billionaires. Beyond hypocrisy, there is an anthropological point to be made concerning the attempt to “launder” firstness in the configuration of human equality.

    The old slogans about the market’s promotion of moral values followed the lines of “honesty is the best policy,” “make your employees happy and they will work better,” and so on. That is, the market itself was generally trusted to select the most moral alternatives compatible with economic survival. Government intervention was the exception rather than the rule. But more recently, along with increased governmental regulation, firms have come to advertise their moral qualities directly, emphasizing their charitable contributions, their non-exploitative working conditions, and their rejection of stigmatized components (GMOs, gluten, fur, trans fats, caged chickens) to the advantage of “natural,” “environment-friendly” ones. The consumer is no longer merely expected to contribute to the “natural selection” of the most efficient firms by following his own advantage, but to include in the construction of his consumer persona the firm’s victimary-moral standing.

    We can mock this exalting of consumer choice into the performance art of life, but it has been essential to the market system ever since Emma Bovary bought her first shawl at Lheureux’ dry goods store. And its new moral turn reveals how the market system is transforming firstness in the post-millennial context. It may well be that the fundamental transformation that we have observed over the past decades, and particularly under the current administration, cannot in fact be reversed even under a Republican president, that this new conception of firstness has become necessary to the networked “global village” that brings the extremes of economic success into constant contact. That virtually every inhabitant of the planet can converse with every other on Twitter or examine at least the external facets of the other’s persona on Facebook and dozens of other sites creates a promiscuity that only drastic measures can keep under control.


    Human culture, including every use of language, depends on the virtual existence of a scene of representation on which all humanity as language users are virtually present. But the other side of the coin is that the public scene, reproduced in ritual and figured in non-religious settings such as plays, family dinners, and classrooms, exists in contrast with the non-public scene, solitary or with few participants, whose distance from the public scene is of the essence. It is this private space, which the public scene makes possible, most notably through the “private” use of language that is thought, that is arguably the most characteristic human space—the space of freedom, of Sartre’s pour-soi. Nothing of great import can be invented on the public scene; the community can be rallied and stimulated to action, but the more collective the scene, the less creative it can be. An artist, for example, displays his work in a public forum, but it is rare that he is able to create it there, and when he does so, what we admire is his feat of maintaining subjective separateness from the collectivity that he at the same time entertains, as with performance art and musical and poetic improvisation. The originality of what appears on the scene must as a rule be created separately from the scene, and it is the deferral of the scene’s potential violence that permits this creation. The rhythm of public and private is the rhythm of human social, cultural, and economic life.

    The ubiquity of post-millennial electronic communication provides a pragmatic repudiation of privacy that has made this duality problematic, and with it, the great conquest of the private that we might call deferred firstness, in which humans are given the time and space for innovation. Not that firstness is itself in any danger. But it feels insecure enough to require henceforth the accompaniment of apotropaic gestures to ward off the resentment that had in the past been dismissed as sinful and unworthy. This is, ultimately, what “progressives” disdain others for not understanding.

    The world is divided into many communities, but the “global village” makes every conversation potentially include everyone. Whence the idea that statements made “privately” or “in confidence” are virtually addressed to everyone, so that any remark that might be offensive to a member of some group is stigmatized (cf. Donald Sterling). No doubt most economically useful practices of thought, calculation, and experimentation are unrelated to questions of ascriptive human groups and their relative success. But under the conditions of the “global village,” those who engage in such practices must be made to keep always in mind that their own professional conversation may not include equal representation from all ascriptive groups. Instead of taking the “justness” of their conversation for granted on its own terms, they are forced to see its ascriptive disparity as a form of victimization.

    Of course “discrimination” in a relatively meritocratic society is exercised much more importantly in testing competence than in embodying unconscious “prejudices.” But by focusing the mind on the latter, we associate our professional production of firstness with an apotropaic gesture toward universal human equality. Democrats are contemptuous of Republicans not for overtly practicing discrimination, but for refusing to admit the necessity of such gestures, refusing, in sum, to humiliate, or to use Doug Collins’ pregnant term, pre-humiliate themselves. In the past, such pre-humiliation was demanded only of entertainers and other non-heroic public figures. But today, when the Internet gives us all a chance to entertain the world with our 140-character pontifications, pre-humiliation, the victimocracy tells us, is a necessary article of faith, and its absence constitutes in itself a micro-aggression.


    What we need to understand above all is the religious nature of contemporary progressivism. The victimary is a revelation, and those who have received it view those who have not as unenlightened, not merely uninformed but unregenerate. In the days of the Civil Rights movement, it was thought that it sufficed to remove de jure discrimination and impose laws requiring equal treatment. But the victimary revelation is that human relations are victimary “all the way down,” that eliminating open discrimination only leaves hidden discrimination, that outlawing aggression leaves micro-aggression unaccounted for, that relationships among genders and races, and ascriptive groups in general, are by their nature invidious, as is—in the truly universal revelatory demonstration—the overall relationship of humanity to Nature. The exchange of goods and services is secondary; the human outcome of every personal interchange not explicitly “laundered” by the admission of victimization is the assertion, perhaps unconscious, of privilege. The original model of such interchanges is that of Nazi and Jew, where the common possession of human language becomes the paradoxical instrument of asserting the absolute privilege of humans over “vermin.”

    The point of the victimary belief-system, I repeat, is not doing away with the “capitalist” system, but saving it, literally as a social reality, and spiritually as a sinful condition of the soul. If you would understand the contempt of Democrats for Republicans, think of the Christian martyrs’ more humble sense of superiority to the Romans—or perhaps better, of the Muslims’ attitude toward their enemies at the time of the early conquests of Islam.


    Islam means submission, as in the title of Michel Houellebecq’s chilling novel Soumission, which came out coincidentally with the Charlie Hebdo massacre. If there is one thing that Western progressives have in common with Islamic “extremists,” it is their fervor for submission. I say this without irony. Strict Islamic observance drastically curtails the means of creating a modern economy. But, in compensation, it has no problem with firstness. This point is insufficiently appreciated. As I pointed out in Chronicle 435, the reason Western feminists do so little to protest the Islamic subordination of women that often goes to the point of rape and murder is not simply the desire to spare a political ally against Western “patriarchy.” It is the recognition that under a strict religious code, differential status is not victimization. A man can say to a woman, or even a master to a slave, “I obey God’s law in treating you as a subordinate, but were I in your place, I would submit to his law just as cheerfully.”

    In a word, submission is a mechanism for combating resentment. Progressives submit to different laws than Islamists, but what is essential in a religious act is the spiritual state it generates, not the details of the act itself. Perhaps that is one reason why those strident assertions of atheism so popular a few years ago are now forgotten. The Judeo-Christian ethos that the atheists attacked for its irrationality is now despised for its flaccid self-indulgence. Salvation requires more than half-heartedly accepting the Law or the personal love of Jesus. It requires genuine self-sacrifice, lacking which the privileged life is empty.

    But the parallel between the progressive-victimary religion and Islam only demonstrates their irremediable separation. Sharia is a well-defined, stable set of rules that consecrate a “compact” hierarchy into which firstness has congealed. Nothing similar is possible in the dynamic economies that still operate in the West. Submission is an Islamic reality, but as in Houellebecq’s novel, a Western pipe-dream. Firstness as a dynamic phenomenon in the West engenders the anxiety of White Guilt, not the self-righteousness of the Soldier of Allah.

    Our submission, like young Augustine’s, takes the form of “give me chastity and celibacy, but not yet.” It is nonetheless submission to revealed truth. If GA can do humanity any good, it will be in showing that, religion for religion, we are better off with the wiser anthropologies embodied in Judaism and Christianity, or for that matter in the humanistic Islam called for by Egyptian president Al-Sisi. Submission without God is submission to mimetic desire itself, to which Girard gives the name of Satan.


  • The Realm of Freedom

    Readers of these Chronicles know what to think of the victimary: of its origins in the Holocaust, of its turbocharging when victory in the Cold War no longer gave “capitalism” the benefit of an objective comparison with “the other” system, of its recent paroxysm coincident with the Obama presidency.

    And readers of these Chronicles also know that I have maintained a somewhat quixotic loyalty to Francis Fukuyama’s idea, first expressed in The National Interest in 1989, that with the triumph of liberal democracy over its communist rival, we had truly reached the “end of history,” the full revelation of the world-spirit that Hegel (as interpreted by his most influential 20th– century reader, Alexandre Kojève) had situated at the time of Napoleon’s “liberation” of Europe. Obviously this is a very specialized version of the end of history. But to reach the end of history is not, as Fukuyama rather naively proclaimed, to stagnate in a state of boredom, but to enter what Marx, Hegel’s great materialist disciple, called the realm of freedom.


    For a communist before 1989, there was some plausibility in arguing that whatever privations and cruelties one had to endure to “build socialism,” there would be a historical payoff; a better society, both more just and more productive, would be created. That is, that “history” in this particular, Fukuyaman-Hegelian sense was a spiritual project, and that one had as a goal to implement its “necessary” trajectory, to employ human will to bring about the “triumph of the world-spirit” that would transcend and realize this will. And in a non-apocalyptic vision of “the end of history,” this triumph would be realized, as Marx thought “socialism” would realize it, in the “realm of freedom.”

    But the liberal-democratic “realm of freedom” would not realize Marx’s Fourier-like dream of hunting in the morning and fishing in the afternoon while at the same time maintaining the efficient distribution system of industrial society. Rather, the “realm of freedom” would be an extrapolation of what is already the essence of the market, the “crowd-sourcing” of economic knowledge that does a better job of distributing resources through its pricing system than any participant or “central planner” could anticipate. If indeed liberal democracy is the ultimate system, that implies that any future improvements to the system cannot help but maintain its fundamental structure, the “double market” of economics and politics, where the free economic market is governed by a political system that is also based on a “crowd-sourced” system of electoral choice. The realm of freedom may thus be defined as the state in which, beyond confidence in these general parameters, no one can determine the political future any better than the economic future.

    In the “realm of freedom,” we would all be free to realize our potential; each person would have his or her own firstness. This is a point I used to be happy to associate, following Baudrillard and others, with the consumer society that lets each person create his or her own social persona and even “narrative.” One can understand the vogue for Facebook and related self-publicizing web apps as a natural development of this phenomenon. In the “realm of freedom,” consumption is a performance art, an amateur mode of production; even if one produces nothing for sale, each individual is encouraged to realize his or her potential to become a symbol-bearing being unique and desirable by every other.

    But in the last few years, this phenomenon strikes me as having become overblown. One indication of an unprecedented level of consumption-obsession is the recently accelerated flow of luxurious advertising supplements distributed with daily newspapers. Today I received with my Wall Street Journal a 156-page, profusely illustrated supplement on glossy paper and weighing 27 ounces advertising safaris (!), along with the WSJ “magazine” devoted entirely to luxury items and weighing another 13 ounces. This 2½ pounds of consumer snobbery is designed, no doubt, to counteract the White-Guilt-inducing pressures of the victimary; if we have to “check our privilege,” we might as well enjoy it.

    Yet the vision of the liberal-democratic world as the “realm of freedom” helps us to explain the victimary obsession of the post-Cold-War world as well. Why is the status of victim the only one we are permitted to covet? What is it indeed that has made us so sensitive to “micro-aggressions” and “triggers”? More troublingly, how can the liberal-democratic system manage the moral radicalism that accompanies the victimary, and that finds its political expression in a growing authoritarianism that tends to see the democratic process, aside from presidential elections, as an annoyance rather than a source of creative compromise? The early stages of the next presidential campaign suggest that, in reaction to these developments, the fundamental rules of the political marketplace are being questioned in new and disconcerting, if not alarming, ways.


    Here is the key point. The dystopias of science fiction and futurist literature always emphasize excess of control; the typical narrative centers on an anomalous individual who resists the universal control exercised over the population by “Big Brother,” whose latest incarnation is likely to be a robot or simply a Turing machine. But the realm of freedom that follows the “end of history” was not conceived as a world of determinism, whether controlled by robots or despots, but just the opposite: a world in which human interaction constantly generates the unexpected.

    To see the world in this way is, on the one hand, a refreshing change from the paranoia inspired by our resentment of a universe we experience as controlled by “others.” But on the other hand, to call it the “realm of freedom” makes clear an indelible aspect of market society that cannot be disassociated from its creativity: its unpredictability, and concomitantly, its discontinuity and non-uniformity, its inequality, which generates resentment regardless of the overall level of prosperity. While most of us are feeling “controlled,” stuck in a repetitive job doing the same old thing, or relying on “entitlements,” someone else is becoming a billionaire with a new, improbable idea such as Facebook, or Uber, or Snapchat, or fantasy baseball. The freedom to profit from this unpredictability is necessarily unevenly distributed. And as I pointed out in Chronicle 484, the dependency of success in the “digital age” on the ability to manipulate symbols tends to disadvantage less well-educated groups such as the white or black (often unemployed) “working class.” The “realm of freedom,” while producing enormous benefits for all, generates new resentments as it successfully recycles the old ones. Dystopian visions of total control and the “managerial” theory of society that embodies them may then be understood as sacrificial myths that react to the unpredictability of the “realm of freedom” by attributing its unfavorable outcomes to the sinister actions of a controlling Subject.

    Places such as North Korea that truly correspond to dystopian fantasy sacrifice freedom and productivity to allaying the fear of unpredictability. This was the case as well in the great totalitarian dystopias of the first half of the 20th century. The parliamentary system was despised because it generated unexpected results rather than obeying the decisive wisdom of such leaders as Hitler and Lenin. Hitler’s antisemitism, forged in Germany’s defeat in WWI, was an apocalyptic extrapolation from antisemitism’s 19th– century version, which attributed to the “scapegoat” Jews the non-existent role of the “Subject” of market society, as fictionalized in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The economic distress of postwar Germany could not be imagined to be merely an unintended consequence; it had to be the effect of the Dolchstoss, the stab in the back.

    Today, in the post-Cold War era, one no longer needs the Subject to have a market to dominate; he simply dominates “the other.” The ever-increasing insistence on victims in our “realm of freedom” can then be understood, if not sympathized with, as a means, effective so far, to permit the market’s continued cultivation of firstness. By symbolically taking the blame for the failures of less successful groups, the “privileged” beneficiaries of the system allow the market economy to pursue its ends while administering a few palliatives to its “victims.” This apotropaic White Guilt is both more and less lucid than overtly religious forms of sacrifice, demanding that the “privileged” individual repent not for sinful acts but for an unchangeable ascriptive reality. Those who fail this spiritual test are increasingly stigmatized, and public attention is thereby diverted from the truly difficult questions of responsibility, let us say, for improving educational opportunities or encouraging more stable family structures, to focus on inculcating the appropriate moral attitudes in the “privileged” population.

    The notion of micro-aggression is the apotheosis and reductio ad absurdum of the victimary, and at the same time an unlimited source of its quasi-religious sacrificial activity. If these aggressions are truly microscopic, then the claim that they are not mere annoyances but actual causes of the failure of victimary groups to attain the same degree of success as the “privileged” confers on the latter what can only be described as magical powers. And these powers are essentially indelible; like Superman learning not to crush humans with his superstrength, or the possessor of the “evil eye” to avert his deadly gaze, the privileged individual is asked to make constant efforts to avoid the careless, automatic gesture that would damage the fragile victimary ego unfortunate enough to come in contact with him. As opposed to merely feeling White Guilt, he must practice an unending askesis. Like a 17th– century Jansenist, his whole spiritual existence will ideally be devoted to ferreting out the last traces of micro-aggressive behavior. And given the microscopic nature of these traces, a lifetime will hardly suffice to wholly extirpate them.

    This apotropaic magic, which can only work if it is bought into with a true-believer sincerity that can only make observers admire in contrast the dignity and historical depth of Sharia—here is one rather touching example—is ultimately a myth of control. Just as the Jews were, and in many quarters still are, believed to control the uncontrollable market system, so the oppression of victims through micro-aggressions gives the privileged the illusion of control over the “realm of freedom.”

    None of this is very reassuring, and the worldwide effects of victimary thinking, which is by no means limited to the United States, may be proving truly disastrous. But until such time as the system’s dysfunctions reach the point of a definitive breakdown of order (which, although still unlikely, is far less implausible than seemed possible in 2008), I will continue to see our liberal democracy as still in force. If this is so, then the victimary quasi-religion must be understood as a way of maintaining the system rather than demolishing it—to put it more positively, a way of deferring its violent breakdown until such time as it can absorb the additional resentments generated by the unequal economic development in the digital era.


    The victimary will not go away with a new administration in 2017, even with a change of the ruling party. Just as the evident superiority of the liberal-democratic system was not enough to allow it to be adapted successfully, as most of us in 2003 thought it would be, to the tribally-divided nations of the Middle East, so the cultural inertia of the Charles Murray’s “Fishtown” and its minority equivalents will weigh against any domestic reform initiatives. Until some as yet unimaginable (but not inconceivable in principle) technological revolution makes it possible to integrate the bulk of the population into the digital economy as easily as it could be integrated into the “analog” economy of the postwar era—and this would be the real realm of freedom that all our efforts should ultimately aim for—those of “privilege” will be obliged to accept blaming themselves for micro-aggressions and the like, or at least to accept the commonplace expression of such blame by their more enlightened neighbors. This might seem a relatively small price to pay for the dream that our own sinfulness, indelible and yet somehow mitigated by guilt, is the sole obstacle to the realization of the Utopia that the realm of freedom essentially is.


  • Wordsworth’s ‘Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood’: An Anthropoetic Analysis

    Part I – A key

    In this first part of the article the aim is to provide the reader with an anthropoetic key to Wordsworth’s poem. Whether the attempt to unlock opens it up to a justifiable interpretation your assessment of the value of the key must decide. It has already been tested on works of Geoffrey Chaucer and Jorge Luis Borges (Wright, 2005, 2007).

    There is a common habit of referring to the poem as Wordsworth’s ‘great ode.’ Take Emerson’s characterization of it as ‘The high water-mark of intellect in this age’ (Emerson, 1983, 928) and Thomas Noon Talfourd’s declaration that it is ‘the noblest piece of lyric poetry in the world,’ ‘a rainbow linking infancy with the realms of blessedness beyond the grave’ (Talfourd, in his essay ‘The Genius and Writings of Wordsworth,’ 1820). For Coleridge the task of the poet was ‘to combine the child’s sense of wonder and novelty with the appearances which every day for perhaps forty years has rendered familiar’ (Coleridge, 1816, 86). For Gerard Manley Hopkins, after his reading of the ode, concluded that Wordsworth was ‘one of the very few men, who have seen something that made him tremble’ (Hopkins in one of his letters). There are other people who take a more openly religious line: Mary Wedd, for example, in a recent article, says that the ode resonates with us because ‘we are still in touch with the fountain light’; the child may only have had ‘a fleeting vision,’ she adds, but ‘there is a greater power that is everlasting’ (Wedd, 1996, 156). And from Father J. Robert Barth, of the society of Jesus, we get the expected assertion that the ode bears witness to ‘the existence of a reality that is ideal, eternal, and the true dwelling-place of the human spirit’ (Barth, 2002, 119).

    It is the aim of this article to propose an construal of the ode, not made before, that provides a key to how it can be read with good warrant without in any way acceding to a belief in pre-existence, or, for that matter, to post-existence. This would seen to run counter to the poet’s own use of the word ‘immortality’ in the title. One seems to be put in the position of asking the absurd question ‘How can a poem about immortality, not be about it?’ The venture appear doomed to contradict itself! But a principled answer can be given: whether the theory behind that answer is acceptable is what the forthcoming argument will try to establish.

    I. The Idealization of Reciprocity

    The interpretation is based upon the theory developed from an insight of the sociologist Alfred Schutz, one of those Jews who fled from the Nazis, finding an intellectual home at the School of Social Research in New York. At the core of his theory is the claim that a specific mutual idealization is what launches all linguistic statements. In talk, he suggests, we reach across the differences in understanding between us (differences that Wilhelm von Humboldt, together with many others, insisted upon, Humboldt, 1999 [1836], 63) by performing what he called an ‘Idealization of Reciprocity’ (Schutz, 1962: 11-12). Given the lack of fit between our own sensory and conceptual selections from the flows of the real around and within us and the selections of others, Schutz concluded that the first mutual move in a linguistic act was to get a rough-and-ready convergence of our perspectives in order that the speaker, who believes that he or she has an improving update to offer the hearer on the portion of the real in question, may bring it about. We couldn’t update the other in our dialogue unless there was a measure of overlap in the process; we would otherwise be talking, as we say, at cross purposes. After all, we are trying to tweak the other’s perspective so that our purposes come closer into line as regards future action together. If we value, even love the other, we must ideally aim—to use phrases of Ian Dennis’s—at ‘a fulfilment of all promises,’ at ‘managing and refining’ our desire, to get it impossibly as near as to being the same desire. As Dennis says, there is joy to be had if we can ‘break down the boundaries between self and other, humanity and nature’ (Dennis, 2010).

    It is worth noting that Humboldt’s insistence on differences of understanding between persons has been given some current empirical support by the neuroscientist Blair Armstrong of the Basque Centre on Cognition, Brain and Language, who has been able to show that brains respond uniquely to words, such that identification of persons via such brain events is precise enough to provide a substitute for fingerprinting (Armstrong 2015).

    II. The imagined singularity of ‘the Referent’

    So how, according to Schutz’s analysis, do we arrive at this partial convergence? Why, by acting in imagination as if we have already agreed on the ‘referent,’ as the linguists call it. Knowing perfectly well that we do not perfectly match in our referential selections, we collaborate in assuming for the nonce that we have already picked out what we call ‘the same thing’ or ‘the same person’ or ‘the same self.’ To put it more simply, of a portion of the real we are homing in on, we take for granted that we are confronting ‘the same entity.’ We are both counting an ill-defined region of the real up to one. You can say that we are digitalizing it. Nothing seems more natural than to believe in the universal application of the linguistic trick, that is, that what lies about us is, as familiarly say, everything. But because of the Humboldtian differences we have—note the first verb in this phrase—we take for granted that ‘the same entity,’ the ‘subject ‘of our statement, lies before us in a pure and timeless logical singularity. We are misled by the presence of the so-far-existing mutual identifications that we habitually make, and have to make to speak at all, and so move on in an unnoticed slide, to equating to believing that all can be counted. We do not notice that the word ‘count’ curiously has two meanings, to enumerate (‘one, two, three. . .) and to matter (“That doesn’t count for me”), as if there was nothing dubious about thus blurring the logical and the motivational.

    There really isn’t one, we only take for granted that there is ‘one’ there. So much in the past seems to confirm it. Once the match of ‘referent’ is taken to be mutually achieved, then the Speaker can add the clue to the new adjustment of that match, the so-called ‘predicate’ of the statement, which effects the transformation (the word ‘predicate’ incidentally, comes from the Latin ‘praedicere’ meaning to proclaim or to preach ― in adding a predicate, you are proclaiming a change in the language). The presumed ‘certainty’ of the mutual fix is shown in need of alteration. There was a custom among philosophers of the past to call the Statement a ‘proposition’—one can see how appropriate a name this is because the Speaker, in spite of entering into the imagined pure agreement with the Hearer, is really only proposing a change in the fit of a word to the real. I have already said elsewhere that, although both Speaker and Hearer from the moment of utterance and acknowledged understanding are content to move the assumed singularity of reference along to the next shared focus of attention, this ‘singularity’ is really only a kind of catalyst needful for speech to take place. However, in our convenient and optimistic habit, we cannot help believing it has joined all the other ‘things’ we can count in the world.

    Etymology gives us an unexpected insight here. So many of the words that we cannot help using in this process reveal a recurrent theme. There are many words that appear to home in on countable elements in our ordinary life which owe their origin to Old Saxon and Old Norse words that involve the two phonemes that our orthography without distinction indicates with ‘th’: ð [the voiced form, using one’s vocal cords], as in ‘the’ and ‘that,’ and θ [the unvoiced form], as in ‘moth’ and ‘thin.’ Look at this list: the, they, their, theirs, them, thou, thy, thee, thine, this, these, that, those, then, thence, there, thither, thing, think, thought, thus, and several derivatives (e.g. thereby). In the meanings of all of them lurks the notion of a mutually identifiable singularity or singular group.

    Interesting that where there is really nothing sensory to go on, scientists faced with the blankness of a black hole have to fall back on what the linguistic process demands if a statement is to be informative, for what do they say lies within a black hole? Since the only thing they have left to go on is the blank logical category that has been hiding under the dialogue all the time, they call it ‘the Singularity’—a playful sleight-of-hand if there ever was one, right in the middle of their scientific rationality!

    That we everyday speakers are sensitive to such distinctions is shown in the way we stress our words: to the implied question ‘Where is the cat? we will reply with emphasis on the new knowledge (‘The cat is on the mat‘); to the question ‘What is on the mat?, we will reply with emphasis on the linguistic predicate (‘The cat is on the mat,’ an example that makes the grammatical subject the linguistic predicate). Naturally we want to speak louder where the new knowledge is being conveyed.

    To clear up a minor point: these are not necessarily the grammatical ‘subject’ and ‘predicate.’ In ‘The cat sat on the mat,’ the cat is the grammatical subject and sat on the mat is the grammatical predicate. But the actual linguistic subject and predicate as regards ‘what is to be idealized as mutually agreed’ and ‘what performs the tweaking, thus updating the hearer’ depend on what question is at issue: if the question is ‘Where is the cat?,’ then the grammatical subject and predicate correspond to the linguistic subject and predicate, but if the implied question is ‘What is on the mat?’ then the state of the mat is the linguistic subject, the focus of the idealized pre-agreement, and ‘the cat’ is the linguistic predicate, the new knowledge that changes the Hearer’s take on the real. It all depends on what question is deemed to be asked. One could even imagine the unlikely question ‘What is the spatial relation of the cat to the mat? (where both the cat and the mat are idealized common identifications, the linguistic subjects) and ‘on’ thus being the linguistic predicate, what the Hearer didn’t know. An early 20th-century logician, John Cook Wilson, was the first to draw attention to this distinction (Wilson, 1926, I, 123-6), and by noting the dependence of meaning on the implied question, although he did not use ‘linguistic’ as his distinguishing adjective, but ‘logical.’ To have used ‘logical’ now would have hidden the Schutzian trick inside logic, for the strictures and structures of logic, we can now see, are within the mutually imagined character of the Idealization of Reciprocity (for a thorough discussion of the requirement in pure logic that we never refer to the real, see pp. 171-88 in Wright 2005; pursuing the intricacies of logic is a wonderful and justifiable activity, but to treat it as if any of its symbols actually referred to the structure of the real is to move into fantasy).

    III. The hidden mismatch and its relation to motivation

    What is hidden under counting is the mutual imagining of singularity, the convenient temporary forgetting of the rival desires (and fears) involved in it. Consider how odd this is considering that we would not be picking out that portion of the real if we were not interested in it. However, as Aristotle pointed out, what is six apples for the seller may not be for the buyer. Conflict hides in the very process of a linguistic statement. Eric Gans quotes Roy Rappaport on this point: it is a ‘formal act . . . not entirely encoded by the performers‘ (Gans’s emphasis); this mutual imagining is a sharing,—a ‘collective act,’ a ‘ritual imposing on those taking part’ (Gans, 2008, 187, Rappaport, 1999, 24; see also Erving Goffman on the social aspect of language, Fine and Manning, 2003, 55; Alfred Schutz influenced Goffman). Gans, reflecting on whether the sacred and language are coeval, says that, if they are so, they ‘are constructed round a sacred center’ (188), and, this theory must maintain, that centre is Schutz’s mutual Idealization. Gans’s word ‘imposing’ is significant here, for the idealized ‘ritual’ of language is being entered into on the supposition that it will lead to the ultimate happiness of all bodies, and all bodies ought then to adhere to it: yet the purpose of the rule is to achieve the ends of the body’s desire, so the ritual is always open to a suggested correction from a body of the rule’s criteria of application—each statement thus being an attempt at an ironic updating of the existing ‘custom.’

    Consider how democratic this view of language is, for any speaker has the right to propose an updating of the shared word, which makes the ‘imposing’ a far from hierarchical one. Those who are keen to extend surveillance say ‘If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear!’ but this neatly forgets that the better update may lie with the person being spied upon and not with those spying. It is not just ‘privacy’ that Big Brother’s watchers invade: they may be committing an ‘original sin’ of not being aware that the other they are watching can surprisingly point out something about them that they did not know. Theirs, of course, is an attempt to close down the novelty of the Statement.

    The focus of so-called ‘common’ interest is thus irredeemably ambiguous. What has been counted up to one can become multiple at any time. This is a stubborn problem. To go straight to the central difficulty: Ask ‘When two people who are bound to each other by human ties of affection and loyalty discover the failure of the idealization, do the rivalries thus revealed have to be regarded as open to resolution only by sacrifice, by one or both?’ The failure can be slight, in which case a comic outcome can be accepted; the ambiguity comes out as amusing, even perhaps for the one who suffers most. On the other hand, the situation can be tragic, as it was for Charles Dickens’s Pip in Great Expectations when Magwitch makes his startling revelation. It must be reiterated that all this applies not just to ‘two people,’ but to the rivalries between the ‘individual’ and the ‘authorities.’

    IV. Faith and the ‘dark conclusion’

    So faith can’t be left out. Faith brings the dark conclusion with it, the inescapable risk that, however ‘sincere’ or ‘loyal’ or ‘commonsensical’ or ‘objective’ or ‘trusting’ or ‘truthful’ you think you have been, the brute existence that lies behind a familiar word can break through your so-far-comfortable sorting of the world and gave you—and perhaps your hearer, perhaps someone so far treated as ‘an authority’—a salutary shock. It is, of course, a shock to one’s selfhood, a proof that selfhood is not solely yours to define. Conflict and the ways perhaps to resolve it should become the salient concern for both. It is faithful that both are then challenged to be. Faith is thus a very human quality, not divine at all; this is what gives it its ‘sacredness.’ It is thus an inescapable consequence of this theory that every-‘thing‘ you have objectively identified, including your-‘self,’ not only remains open to change but also owes its ‘certainty,’ not to some overarching ‘truth,’ but to human faith. All those people who confidently shout about the ‘certainty of truth’ are not aware that they are really making a hidden appeal, not to some natural, or even supernatural origin, but to whatever faith we human beings have managed to maintain together.

    This is all very well, for you may suspect that this argument is really playing a trick on you to get you to accept a sceptical argument down the road, and scepticism, many philosophers and theologians will tell you, has been blown out of the water long ago. This is because it brings the horror of ‘Relativism’ with it, where you are being seduced into believing that there is no such thing as truth or certainty, that the world doesn’t consist of recognizable things, that everything is a dream you are having, and that everyone can make up his or her own rules! He may have told you, for example, that the last pope, on taking up his post, said that relativism was the greatest enemy of the church. If it were true, said Pope Benedict, no one could rely on anyone else! And there is a surfeit of philosophical books that set out to prove why scepticism is a self-defeating argument. But the objectors are overlooking an essential consequence of the theory here proposed: that it cannot be egoistic in any way because one’s very self is up for updating too! Don’t you readily admit that others can tell you something about yourself that is entirely new to you and which, henceforth, you may have uncomfortably to accept? Hardly a tenet of an egoistic ethic! And then it has at its core, not Relativism, but a mutual pledge of faith: this is not ‘The Theory of Relativity’ à la Einstein, but the Theory of SOCIAL Relativity.

    But the argument is not yet over: its core feature has not yet been mentioned. There is something that Alfred Schutz did not explore even though it was an implied consequence of what he said. Some philosopher friend has probably told you that the ‘little mutual play-acting’ has trust hidden in it, that you couldn’t speak at all unless you trusted your partner in dialogue. That is what ‘granted’ means in the key phrase taken for granted.

    Why yes, of course. But one can ignore, as Schutz did, the ‘taken for’ in his own formulation. ‘Granted’ does mean allowed, permitted, exposed to no expectation of opposition of will and desire from the other: however, ‘to take for granted’ means to accept an illusion of real agreement as a perfect agreement, an apparent blending of wishes with another as a perfect fusing, as if there no violent disagreement were possible in the future, as if there were an item single in the same way out in front of you both. What this means is that there is a bit of play in every statement, ‘play’ both as looseness, and ‘play,’ that is, dramatic acting, which has to be done seriously if it is to work. It is a matter of keeping a straight face though you both know perfectly well that both of you are working on judgements that are not quite the same. Better as you speak , like Groucho Marx, to wink at your partner in language, the reason being that there can never be a perfect ‘reciprocity.’

    One oddity of the position objectors to this theory hold arises of the fact that one can ask them ‘How do would you distinguish between two persons in dialogue holding your view (that they are making mutual reference to real singular entities) and two people performing the singularity notion (knowing full well that it is only the would-be convergence of their differing Humboldtian hypotheses). It is exactly like asking them what the difference is between a pair who believe in Santa Claus and a pair who, in all earnestness, go through the motions of believing in him (as one sees in good actors) precisely because it is a poetic acting out of the generosity that ought to characterize Christmas. To answer the question above, then, one cannot avoid bringing up the place of faith in the language pact, which is, blatantly, what the shouters of “Relativism!” do not and, given the present set-up of their argument, cannot do.

    So, strictly speaking, although there is no denying that, since we are in the middle of an awesome real, capable of giving all sorts of surprises, good and bad, the ‘things’ and ‘selves’ that we so complacently ‘count’ from it are never exactly certain. Therefore one has to say to those who think that this is a solipsistic idealistic dream, it is, on the contrary, a hopefully courageous acceptance of existence: we are, as William Wordsworth put it, open to feeling the ‘blank misgivings of a creature / Moving about in worlds not realized'(ll. 149-50). It is insidiously easy to vanish comfortably inside ‘the’ observer that is ‘one’s’ ‘self’ and drop its unknown realness from the running of ‘one’s’ life. All this particularly when we have to hypothesize a singularity in ‘the’ self to speak at all! Our continuing practical successes in the world drive the hypothetical foundation of the Statement out of sight. Our mutual motivations, once carried through, seem to have nothing to do with the ‘identification’ of entities: we happily talk in logic of ‘satisfying’ equations without considering the significance of the word. The unethical move is to glorify the partial success with the aura of eternal ‘singularity,’ a move which hides the part that faith plays in the process, faith that has always to be alert to the risks of identification.

    One can now add to the remark above about this being ‘The Theory of Social Relativity’: it is also, not ‘The Theory of Everything’ à la Hawking, but The Theory of Every ‘Thing.’

    I saw on television a month or two ago a scene in a film where a little girl got very annoyed with her father, who was supposed to be pretending to be ‘the Big Bad Wolf,’ because he was giggling while he was doing it. She knew perfectly well what ‘playing’ means, what deliberately and mutually taking one thing for another involves. She didn’t for a moment believe that he was a wolf, but he had forgotten what a pretence that wasn’t an act of deceit could be. Those parents who try to convince their children that Santa Claus is real are also making a crude mistake, the reason being that children are quite capable of playing this great Christmas game seriously, consequently, as was said earlier, enjoying together the myth of worldwide, generous, familial love. This is also how to play the Language-Game of ‘God.’

    Children are gradually initiated into language. Faced with the bewildering becoming of the flux of bodily experience, he or she is daily encouraged into, as we say, identifying ‘things’ and ‘persons’ and ‘selves’ in the world. Children soon find out that words, in T. S Eliot’s lines in ‘The Four Quartets,’

    . . . strain,
    Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
    Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
    Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
    Will not stay still.

    But child and parent enter into the Idealization of Reciprocity with a will; after all it is what everybody else is doing even though no one is directly aware of it. It surely underlies all trust, especially that between child and parent—even more so in retrospect to Wordsworth, who lost both his parents at an early age, a fact that must have intensified the Idealization for him.

    Whatever is named takes on the glory—one might say ‘sacredness’—of the Idealization. The real behaves as if the promises are already fulfilled, as if the boundaries of self and nature were already breached. Instead of merely playing that the words have captured the real, children at first are likely to be tempted to believe the parents that the Idealization that binds him or her in love with the parental guides, the future that appears to promise joy and not fear, hallows all that is, as we say, identified a word, from the Latin idem facere, that means to make the same. And ‘making the same’ is what the child does,

    As if his whole vocation
    Were endless imitation. (ll. 107-8)

    V. Love

    ‘Love’—Inevitably the word has at last surfaced in the explanation as that which, hopefully, must guide the parent-child interaction. Ask, as Schutz did not, just what the phrase ‘Idealization of Reciprocity’ actually implies—and add one of his paraphrases for it, ‘the interchangeability of standpoints, the taking for granted that, if I were in your shoes, your standpoint would seem to be the same as mine, and you and I see things with the same typicality’ (Schutz, 1962: 11-12). This inescapably means, if one is to follow it out thoroughly, that motivations are presumed to match exactly, all desires and fears being precisely the same. This, one can see immediately, would be an absolute love— which is not only impossible but, further, paradoxical! The beloved other would be just a narcissistic copy of oneself. In loving other human beings you do not wish that every one of them has ‘precisely the same desires and fears’ that you do. Love has to embrace the fact that the other has different desires and fears; you wouldn’t be talking at all unless they did! But, openly paradoxically, you both have then to go on the impossible idealization of a single common end for your communication if love is what has to be shown. Schutz was nearer to the state of the case when he used the word ‘reciprocity,’ for that implies give-and-take, not a perfect identifying of the motivations of each in the social dyad.

    VI. Play

    Incidentally, the relevance of the word ‘paradoxical’ does not entail that we have moved into the realm of the irrational, merely into that of play. One could say of every statement that it requires the need to take the so-far ‘literal’ as newly ‘metaphorical.’ One is reminded of Gregory Bateson’s definition of play:

    These actions in which we now engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote. (Bateson, 1978, 152)

    On observing monkeys at play in San Francisco Zoo, he noted that a playful nip was not regarded as an act of aggression precisely because the ‘attacking’ monkey had a special grin on its face. Both meanings are simultaneously present: it is thus acceptable to use the word ‘paradoxical’ in this context without falling into any irrational trap. We can enter into the hypothesis of a perfect resolution of all our differences that the Idealization of Reciprocity is supposed to cancel out without losing sight of those irremediable differences. This is where the too logically-minded fall into error, especially those for whom poetry, fiction, music—indeed, all that is aesthetic—are to be regarded as suspect as against the certainty of the ‘Objective,’ the ‘True,’ etc., and for whom play is trivial, childish, immaterial—at its worst frivolous. This is where to remind oneself of Daniel Barenboim’s strange advice: that music should be given as much attention and investment in education as mathematics and English. To neglect the significance of play is to be lacking in faith. Music is the prime example of the pleasures and risks of play, for at every step through time it exhibits the familiar and the unfamiliar together, each caprice bespeaking obedience to what went before, yet each repetition is revealed as novel. So too for the Statement. One can, of course, add Drama to Barenboim’s list of the essential elements of education. Those who take a too-utilitarian view of education need to bring themselves up to date. Look through the poem to see on how many occasions Wordsworth refers to music.

    When the Idealization comes to reveal its impossibility, then the sacrifice of some so-far-cherished desire, as we have just seen, is required by faith. Trust, which at its worst complacently believes the other will do just as has been promised, is utterly inadequate; at the emergence of the unexpected mismatch of purposes it can only see the discord as betrayal (as the surveillance police believe). What a trap for any child who has not come to accept the ‘cracks’ and ‘strains’ of common speech as surprises that are inevitable if one is to love, and consequently that possible challenges to deep-seated desires must be courageously anticipated. The child, when it wants to amuse itself, may make all its mimeses the centre of its attention, as Wordsworth emphasizes (‘And see the children sport upon the shore,’ l.172), but we cannot possibly credit it with a philosophical understanding of what it is doing when it plays, although Wordsworth, with irony directed more at us and himself, calls it ‘Mighty prophet! Seer blest!’ (l. 115). It looks as though parents are untrustworthy, as indeed they are, if trust is not transmuted into faith. The little girl who reproved her father for giggling knew what playing was. But the situation is far worse for any child who has lost its parents, as Wordsworth had lost his.

    To use a crude contemporary analogy, take all the advice, example and admonition from the world of the grown-up as a vast program. It would include not only all moral persuasion (and unthinking misdirection) but also the foundational social requirements of selfhood, language, gender role, class, cultural preference, regional and national identification, and so on. This is what Humboldt insisted upon in his book On Language (1999 [1836]). Apply Schutz’s principle literally, and the program transmogrifies into a rigid input identical for all. This, it is plain, is where the program analogy fails, because programs represent a pure rationality. Unlike computers, (1) all the bodies subjected to the social persuasion and conditioning interpret them differently (recall Humboldt and Armstrong), and (2) human beings have the power to suggest changes to the program, either unconsciously by the differences in their performance of the input or consciously in proposing changes in words, customs, laws, and common habits. But this is what language exists for: to allow its evolution. Tyranny fearfully resists this challenge of evolution and ends in self-defeat. Yet if the principle is applied with faith in mind—and love in heart—one finds that the ‘program’ is held as the necessary hypothesis of initial agreement that allows the newly proposed transformation of the ‘program,’ the ‘common language,’ to be democratically assessed as possibly to be generally adopted, that is, as the little girl intuitively knew, mutually played as a hypothesis should be, and not held to rigidly as some kind of mechanical necessity.

    It should now be no surprise that our culture is continually exploring the ambiguous implications of robot behavior, of avatar motivation. To take one current example, that of the film Ex Machina. The engine of the plot works on the transformation of a robot that had been a perfectly obedient slave to its masters into a self-directed entity whose motivations come to be at odds with those who had commanded it—in other words, on the way to becoming human. The film can be seen as interpretable on many levels, but one key relevance here can be seen as a warning to those who believe that their own favoured ‘programs’ in life admit of no exceptions. The current television series Humans has the same form of plot, as does the new film Chappie. The robot is not supposed to interpret the daily commands as a human hearer would: it is supposed to hold to a rigidly unchangeable set of word meanings, as if Schutz’s Idealization of Reciprocity held perfect sway. Conversely, we humans hack into the ‘language program’ every time we utter a would-be informative ‘proposition.’ Consider also the allegorical message of much current fantasy of the Marvel Comics kind (the ‘Incredible Hulk,’ for example, runs on the superiority of love to the rules that, backed up with violent force, are imposed by the ‘authorities’).

    Recall Schutz’s method: in order to enter into the language-game, one has to begin by behaving as if the chosen portion of the real that is to be redescribed is exactly the same for Speaker and Hearer, which becomes the ‘Subject’ of the Statement, that which is to be updated; only then can one proceed to the updating of the selection of that portion by the ‘Predicate’ (for the value of the Joke as an analogy, see Wright, 2005). For this to succeed, it is not blind trust that must underlie the hypothesis of a common ‘Subject,’ but faith which at base countenances the inevitable risk. It should not then be difficult for a child, should it, to enter into the Play structure of language?—But are parents able to?

    Part II – Unlocking the Ode

    Now to use the key (as you will have noted we have already made a trial of the key: see the quotation above, ‘the blank misgivings of a creature / Moving about in worlds not realized’ [ll. 149-50]).

    Let us use it first on the actual title: Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood. It is the word ‘immortality’ that egregiously stands out. The word ‘intimations,’ with its connotation of reliable, intuitive clues, does nothing to qualify the openly old-religious character of the word. Yet there is a way of reading this poem that does transform what Wordsworth would have thought—and his presumed readers would have thought—about immortality. In the 21st century the notion is not to be naively accepted in its usual sense. What is to be retained is what has led to its use, and what is retained is not an aggressive, anti-religious element such as an old-fashioned atheist would produce. On the contrary.

    It has been seen that Schutz’s formulation cannot escape an imagined projection of a final total agreement by the two engaged in the language-game with regard to the portion of the real upon which both are endeavouring to bring their separate perspectives to merge. And the curious question arises: Just when will this occur? (in eternity?) The degree of overlap, if we may call it such, still remains incomplete. ‘Overlap’ is not even the right word because there will be regions of the real registering in their sensation-fields to which they have given no significance, regions different for both of them! One can’t draw a simple Venn diagram of two overlapping circles for this situation. The outcomes of further action, mutual or otherwise, can always indicate areas of misconstruction, of perhaps ironic misinterpretation the motivational significance of which can lead either to a discovery happy to both of the copartners in the game or to a shocking confrontation, leaving them as possible antagonists. Thus parent and child may, in the first case, laugh at the mismatch of their understandings; or, in the second, find themselves unexpectedly hostile to each other—the ‘dark conclusion.’

    The whole social ‘program’ comes with vast implications. It is not only a parent’s mundane and present wish that is loaded into the language-game, but humble speakers have to deal with the desires and fears with which the past has ballasted the words. To quote from another of Wordsworth’s poems, The Prelude; from a moment of guilt he came to have nightmarish thoughts and dreams (he had taken someone else’s boat to enjoy a row on a lake and had hurried back home in a guilty state):

    Huge and mighty forms, that do not live
    Like living men, moved slowly through the mind
    By day, and were a trouble to my dreams.
    The Prelude,
    Book I, lines 398-400

    This is the alarm bell that heralds awareness of the dark conclusion, that faith demands its acknowledgement of risk. It is almost as if this moment in literature sees Plato’s Forms for what they are, not divine certainties, but necessary but unreliable instruments of the imagination within language, and not nightmare rigidities ‘that do not live/ Like living men.’ This is not to say that we are all able to react safely to its warning, for the difficulties the attempt to be faithful brings with it have just been made clear. In particular we saw that the common aim is impossible of achievement because of the imagined nature of the coincidence of our desires and fears, as well as all the obstacles listed above which arise from the temptation to take our needful mutual imagining as literal. The trap lies in the fact that an unknown element of the real conceals itself in our attempt at ideal mutual understanding and neither of us has access to it; in addition, we each have a different sensing of it. The poets Emily Dickinson and Thomas Hardy have both presented the only possible notion of heaven as something forever out of reach, an acknowledgement that the goal was imagined. To believe that all words have a secure literal meaning common to us all is to turn our playing into the equivalent of religious fundamentalism, which takes the words of the holy book at their face value, whether it be the Koran, the Upanishads, the Bible or the Book of Mormon, etc. The Idealization of Reciprocity becomes an absolute guarantee of perfectly identical motivations, as if love were the exact match of all our longings. But the very belief in that final absolute eliminates all that love is, since love knows it must cope with the dark conclusion. At its heart such a belief in an absolute is timid, and, further, ignorant of what it is to be human, of what it is to be able to talk. No wonder that it was to the ‘blank misgivings’ Wordsworth gave his ‘thanks and praise.’

    VII. The hypothesized, the imagined

    A modern sociologist, Benedict Anderson, has called nations ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991), and the best way of grasping that is to see nations (and families) as similar to plays, in which actors maintain the dramatic world on stage by trying to harmonize their and our participation. All social life is a great drama moving through time like a Mexican wave through a crowd of spectators, though, unlike spectators, its subjects were not alive and vulnerable to injury before it reached them nor after it has passed through them. It is maintained as a play is, by participants working together, with the difference that the bodies involved really feel what is produced by the action, intended or unintended, namely the pleasure and pain, the joy and the suffering that results. As Humboldt insists:

    . . . the individual’s need for assistance drives him to combine with others, and calls for understanding through language so that common undertakings may be possible (Humboldt’s emphasis) (Humboldt 1999 [1836], 41)

    What matters is our contribution. Our only ‘immortality’ is the influence we have had upon the future actors of the drama and, one must add, we must try to make, in Philip Larkin’s words, love be what survives of us (in the last line of his poem ‘An Arundel Tomb’), although we must remember that the old-religious did make the wicked ‘immortal’ too, for it cannot be denied that their influence also survives them ⎯ the ‘spirit’ of Adolf Hitler is active, if not alive, today. Thomas Hardy was tempted to think that immortality resided only in the memories of the dead in the minds of the living (see his poem ‘Her Immortality’), but it rather lies in the thoughts and actions of the living that owe their origin to the influences at work in them that the dead have bequeathed, and those are indefinably complex and subtle, and, all the more important, the living may not be consciously aware of them. When the American historian David Blight discusses the ‘legacy’ of the Civil War, finding it in habits of body and language, in ideology, attitudes, traditions, and more, he is exploring such influences (Blight, 2002). Raymond Tallis has also explored these ‘ripples,’ as he calls them, that we make, consciously or otherwise, in the scenes of the great play that succeed us (Tallis, 2015, 327-32; see also Wright, 2011, 51-60; 2014, Step 6).

    It may seem odd but one can say that all utterances have this end in view, that we are in a sense speaking so that posterity will benefit. When Groucho Marx and Thomas Gray the 17th-century poet ask ‘What has posterity ever done for me?’ they did not realize that the final aim of all their talk was, theoretically, the happiness of posterity.

    VIII. The ‘spiritual’

    One ought not to be distressed by the thought that after the body’s death your-‘self’ won’t survive, for it was only ever a tentative mutual selection from the real, and what really has mattered about it will go on having a chance of influencing the succeeding language-players. It was never ‘individual’ in the first place! Isn’t that legacy really the basic ground of why we talk at all? ⎯ and that is something beyond your bodily life, isn’t it? So this is how the notion of individual post-existence is to be seen, not as a magical prolongation of biological life, either before birth or after death. It can comfortably called ‘spiritual’ if you like, as long as you see its existence as part of the ongoing great social drama; it is certainly not something supernatural even though the influence is apparently spirit-like in its ‘invisibility.’ The very idea of a literal bodily resurrection becomes nugatory (there is no ‘nut’ left, only a broken shell—the word ‘nugatory’ comes from the Latin for broken nutshells). Unsurprising that our primitive forebears used the idea of the dead returning to life as a poetic expression of the Idealization; the impossible future goal underpinned all they spoke. It was also an implied admission that bodies and the satisfaction of their desires are what the rules, the commandments, supposedly exist for (literal programs don’t exist for the laptops).

    Thus ‘pre-existence’ and ‘post-existence’ would at first seem to lie only in the particles of matter that were to become or had been the body, that is, if we stick to the human game of conceiving of matter as consisting of countable quarks or gluons or electromagnetic waves! Shakespeare makes Hamlet play with the thought that ‘the noble dust of Alexander’ may now be ‘stopping up a bunghole’ (Act V, sc. I, lines 184-5). Thomas Hardy, in a poem on some birds singing, ‘Proud Songsters,’ reminds us that those birds are now but

    only particles
    Of earth, and air, and rain.

    But, plainly, there is no identifying such remnants; the attempt is futile—even though we may, as a poetic ritual, revisit a grave or place flowers at the place of the battle or the disaster. The human identities that were fostered in those bodies by the grand program or drama or epic poem that is human life, are, not no more, but active in the influences they have upon that ongoing drama, both in the expectations of them and plans for them before they were born, and in the thoughts, feelings and actions of those they had come in contact with in their lifetime: this is the only thing their ‘pre-existence’ and ‘post-existence’ can be. The ritual actions of mourners are tributes to that influence.

    IX. The nature of a play

    It is worth considering what the existence of an actual play-in-performance is. If we are going to use theatrum mundi as a prime analogy, as Jaques, Hamlet or Prospero did, we ought to ask a scientist to give an account of it. It is obviously a shared imagined projection of the Anderson type, in which actors and audience join, and it proceeds through time as any playing does. One can learn from the little girl: we seriously join in a strictly false complex of actions such that their fictive import is treated for the nonce as if it were part of our own lives, whether as actors we are producing it or as spectators are watching it. And this is no surprise, as it thus falls within Bateson’s definition of Play. The next question is to ask its purpose: Are not Nation, Neighbour, Family and Individual, etc., but pieces in the game of trying to ensure that impossible future happiness, the impossible love that is the core of the Idealization of Reciprocity? Actual plays, whether on stage or screen, or part of children’s fun, are fragments ‘of [our] dream of human life’ (l. 92), contributions to our theories of what life is and should be. No wonder Wordsworth’s child ‘newly learned art’ of acting, of ‘Imitation’ (ll. 93, 108), presents actual occurrences in life, such as death, since they are our prime way of moving through and out of it.

    The ‘Individual’ is a piece like any other part of the social program applied to a body, and, as any other feature, able to be adjusted, as long as that intended adjustment does not constitute a brainwash, a wiping out of all that produced the application of ‘I’ and ‘Me’ and the rest to the ‘delicate warm motion’ that is the feeling flesh. Once the infant is no longer in-fans (‘not speaking’), no longer outside the symbolic universe of gestures and words that is matrix of our sense of self, he or she has become a player in the game, with a right to change the program for us all.

    In the early years, the Idealization can but enhance the parents’ naming of (partially) shared parts of the real. There can, for a child that is loved, be little suspicion of the dark conclusion; trust will not yet have grown into faith. No wonder then that all that is named takes on an original wonder, a wonder that can be traced to an unquestioned assurance of safety guaranteed by the parents, relations, friends— all the speakers to the child. The wonder is grounded both in the animal selections that the child has already been making for itself, the percepts that any advanced animal is enabled to make from those parts of its surroundings that produce pleasure and pain, but the additional power gained from the language (both of word, gesture, facial expression and body-language) supplied by his or her loving mentors. The ‘heaven that lies about us in our infancy'(l. 67) is derived from the shared Idealization, which is inculcated with every act of teaching, from the affection which hopes to ensure the future happiness of the child, and from the fount of original newness which marks every sight and sound. It gives a special connotation to the opening sentence of St. John’s Gospel: ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God.’ The Idealization can now be seen as what lies behind the philosopher Bishop Berkeley’s belief that God guaranteed our perception of things, although it is interesting that he allowed the Humboldtian caveat that each person perceived differently: you could say that he was one step away from Schutz’s insight, held back by his old-religious commitment (Berkeley in his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, 1713: see Luce and Jessop, 1948-51, II, 245-7, 212).

    The ‘shades of the prison-house’ which ‘begin to close upon the growing boy’ (l. 68) arise from the inevitable disillusionments which the use of language produces. He moves from the narcissistic conviction that a perfect trust in his parents (and in the great social order into which he is being inducted) will guarantee his immediate happiness, moves from this blind trust to the faith that some future time will fulfill their promises and assuage his sense of loss. Some of the ‘common undertakings’ which Humboldt speaks of are open to being found not common; recall T. S. Eliot’s lines. Yet the seemingly miraculous freshness of sensory experience retains much of its intensity, and the sense of all things named around one being blessed by the real affection of one’s familial mentors is not forgotten. However, Wordsworth at first arrives at the sad verdict that the grown man loses the initial wonder at gaining and using these first words for perceptions, using singularity as an essential part of the mutual method. The very singularity of a tree, ‘of many one,’ and of a field, ‘a single field that I have looked upon,’ bring the loss of that unique wonder to mind, a wonder based on an imagined identity with others that he cannot regain, although the memory of that wonder remains—the tree and field ‘speak of something that is gone’ (l. 54). So the contemporary critic of the poem, John Scott, who saw this progression as a shift from ‘beatitude’ to ‘apathy’ was profoundly mistaken (see Woof, I, 827).

    X. Pre-existence

    All we need to do now is sift through the lines of the ode for further signs of the Idealization at work (and it is not necessary to find every one of them, for many can be left to the reader). Take the cardinal theme on which the understanding of the poem must turn: the core notion of pre-existence. This has always been a problem for would-be appreciators of this poem, even for religious believers, who often give the impression of forgivingly tolerating this quirk in a poet who can thus still be drawn into the fold of the church. Examine these lines where pre-existence appears to be openly proposed:

    The Soul that rises with us, our life’s Star
    Hath had elsewhere its setting,
    And cometh from afar (ll. 60-2)

    Why should the child (and the adult) have this sense that all the marvellous identifications that are made at hands of our mentors ‘cometh from afar’? One can now see that ‘afar,’ rather than meaning from a pre-existent spiritual world where we existed with the Creator Himself means ‘afar’ in the sense of drawn from the history of all the speakers of our language for whom that identification had been part of the sublime language-game in progress, unmistakably the deliverance of all those thoughts and observations made by our ancestors, whose mutual idealizations subtly evolved into our time. No wonder many a primitive tribe worshiped their ancestors. It will not be a literally immortal evolution, because it will not outlive our race, the reason being that in time our race will come to an end, and leave not a rack behind. But the great and subtle play that is a language in its ongoing development, that exists in the interplay between speakers and in the thoughts that accompany it, will die with the last speaker. Is that a catastrophe? People like Stephen Hawking who want human kind to travel on forever seem to think it is, but there is no necessity to take that view.

    No wonder that we think of the identifications and our own consciousness as ‘spiritual,’ because they exist only as imagined within the twists and turns of language, but that ‘spirituality,’ nevertheless, as was insisted earlier, is a real performance in existing brains just as a play on a stage is, and is thus in principle is not outside science. It cannot be because those imagined concepts are sustained by actual pleasure and pain, joy and suffering in the bodies that are in play as they interact with the real. Our children playing ‘hobbits’ and ‘orcs’ do not turn into ‘wraiths,’ except in the story! One can accept that ‘the Soul’ is a construct within the language that our forebears spoke, and is one of the essential elements in that language-as-program. Feral children, who grow up unprogrammed, without the notion of being a ‘self’-reflecting single entity,’ are unable to think beyond the limits of the brain of an advanced animal. There is no logical ‘singularity’ in the ability of ‘an’ ‘eagle’ to catch ‘a’ ‘rabbit’: there is only the slow infinitesimal advance of evolution at work, in which the conditioning makes its advance through the aeons, imperceptible to us. Our ‘I’s’ and ‘Me’s’ come from the past historical endeavours of our speaking tribe to home in on the flows of the real of concern to it, and, being past, they seem to come ‘from afar,’ and the drama-like programming is hidden like a secret ‘spiritual’ plot within our actions, loving and otherwise. It is our mutual imagining that enables us to ignore the imperceptible advance of evolution as it involves us, but its very being a performance of the hypothetical, the imaginary, allows us to adjust to the evolution of our social life. Martin Heidegger, from a religious perspective, saw the discovery of ‘truth’ as an uncovering of a secret, an alethia (Greek for ‘a bringing out of concealment’ ; Richardson, 1974, 211-12); the speech and gestures of the mentors hides, both from themselves and from the children, what historically guides them. There is a presage of this, and of Wordsworth’s lines, in a poem of Friedrich Hölderlin’s, ‘Brot und Wein’ (the ‘they’ refers to the gods):

    Unperceived at first they come, and only the children
    Surge towards them, too bright, too dazzling this joy enters in
    So that men are afraid (trans. Daniel Whistler; see Bibliography)

    [Unempfunden kommen sie erst, es streben entgegen
    Ihnen die Kinder, zu hell kommet, zu blendend das Glück,
    Und es scheut sie der Mensch]

    There are several places in Wordsworth’s poetry where a moment of ecstatic excitement is succeeded by guilty fear (in Book I of The Prelude see the episodes concerning the Stealing of Woodcock and of Eggs from the Raven’s Nest, and the Appropriation of the Boat). He was well aware of this succession and of its power over him: he called it ‘a dark inscrutable workmanship’ (my emphasis):

    Thanks to the means which Nature deigned to employ;
    Whether her fearless visitings, or those
    That came with soft alarm, like hurtless light
    Opening the peaceful clouds, or she may use
    Severer interventions, ministry
    More palpable, as best might suit her aim.
    (The Prelude, Book I, 351-56)

    We can see why he reserves ‘The song of thanks and praise’ for the ‘severer interventions.’

    . . . for those obstinate questionings
    Of sense and outward things,
    Fallings from us, vanishings (ll. 146-8)

    These are ‘the blank misgivings’ mentioned above. The experience being recalled is that of his childhood, when the real, in its refusal to match the complacent identifications pointed out by his parents, escaped the presumed safety of them, and left him fearfully without support. These sublime failures of identification were the result, he says, of ‘High instincts before which our mortal Nature / Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised’ (ll. 152-3). Not ‘instincts’ within this theory, but the moments of dim awareness of the gaps and distortions in the program of guidance handed on to us. Here one can detect an ‘original sin’ in the program; compare the claim by John Taylor Coleridge that in the Ode’s glorification of the child, Wordsworth had ‘forgotten original sin’ in the child! (James Taylor Coleridge, 1821: see Woof, 2001, 807). There is in the recollection of these moments of guilt a sense of the human source of the ‘sacredness’ of the love that should guide us in our own use of language. Some of those failures of identification, nevertheless, are the source of the body’s proposals to change the language, of the very impulse to speak.

    There is a certain pathos in the poem where Wordsworth seems to actually attribute ‘blessedness’ to the child, but it is at a moment where he is seeing the child as it grows, provoking ‘the years to bring ‘the inevitable yoke’ of being adult:

    Full soon thy soul shall have her earthly freight,
    And custom lie upon thee with a weight
    Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life. (ll. 131-3)

    He is allowing himself to pity the child whose strivings are to join the supposed success of the parent in moving about in the ‘realized’ world. Yet in this very envy of the ‘innocent’ state he is forgetting the risk of faith to which the child must be awakened. Yet there is an ambiguity here because the child’s new response to the sensory spectacle around it contains the very freshness that can advance the language. We have all been amazed and amused by children interpreting words in unexpected ways. Language can indeed fall into desuetude as a result of ‘custom,’ the uninquiring acceptance of over-familiar interpretations; the impulse to speak comes from noticing what is not being noticed by others. This is one of the reasons why children have been divinized, for their supposed ‘misunderstandings’ have the form of all our attempts at updating others, all our statements. And, without question, sometimes they have updated us.

    In The Prelude Wordsworth twice draws on this thought. Here is the first:

    The song would speak
    Of that interminable building reared
    By observation of affinities
    In objects where no brotherhood exists
    To passive minds.
    (The Prelude (1850), Book II, ll. 382-6)

    In such cases, someone perceives for the first time a likeness in the sensory field that they have never captured before, and, in bringing it the notice of others, adds to ‘that interminable building’ that is the ‘common’ language and its so-far-successful hypotheses about the real. Wordsworth uses ‘brotherhood’ here to characterize the mutual task of selection from the real that is language. Wordsworth has become a virtual psychologist—or philosopher—of perception, distinguishing between our automatic sensing of the real, which contains no knowledge, and the mutual selections human beings can fuzzily make from it together. To sense is not to know; as the American philosopher Roy Wood Sellars put it, ‘Being is one thing and knowledge is another’ (R. W. Sellars père, 1919, 407). In ‘Lines written above Tintern Abbey,’ Wordsworth describes himself as a lover of all the mighty world

    Of eye, and ear,—both what they half create,
    And what perceive
    (Tintern Abbey,’ ll. 106-8)

    The ‘half-creating’ is what the mind does with the sensory intake, what we now would call the ‘perceiving’; for the actual sensing (in colour and tone and scent, etc.) he has used ‘perceive,’ but he clearly means the sensory input from outside. That our minds are engaged in the process of perception does not imply that our knowledge is without value: what we are continually ‘building’ (and readjusting) in the evolution that is language are our current theories about what best constitutes a ‘thing,’ a ‘self,’ etc. out of the sensory fields within us, themselves a part of the real, on behalf of the desires and fears in our bodies. The ‘Lifeworld,’ to use the Austrian philosopher Edmund Husserl’s term, does not disappear into idealism. We do our best to keep up with the flux of change, although ‘progress’ in the collaborative venture that is knowledge is not guaranteed. Our successes are only ‘viable’; the choice of word is that of Ernst von Glasersfeld (Glasersfeld, 1984, 25). To accept that all percepts are viable and that the language group is maintaining the co-reference of them by an act of faith is not easy to recognize or accept—yet it is a central tenet of the present theory.

    The second quotation from The Prelude bears witness to the imagined singularity which is constructed by the Schutzian idealization: he speaks of ‘transitory qualities’ which led to

    . . . manifold distinctions, difference
    Perceived in things, where, to the unwatchful eye
    No difference is (ll. 299-301)

    Whether it is a so-far-unnoticed likeness (as in the first quotation here) or a so-far unnoticed difference (as in the second), the speaker of an informative statement produces a clue which updates the now-sharing hearer who has not been able to ‘watch’—with ‘this most watchful power of love.’ Love of the other has ‘singled’ out something worthy of his or her perceiving, something worthy of speech. ‘Watch’ is a favourite word of Wordsworth’s: he takes ‘watching’ to be the action of ranging over the offerings of the senses while alert for newly significant likenesses and differences. These are what those, neglectful of the endless sensory novelty of experience, whose perceptions are bound by ‘custom,’ have missed. Ian Dennis (personal communication) draws attention, in the lines quoted above from the ode that express the fear that ‘custom’ lies upon us ‘with weight / Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life,’ that Wordsworth did use the word ‘almost.’ We are not forever condemned to be blind to what can be newly perceived in our sensations because we have others to help us to sort the real into the shapes they have discovered.

    Towards the end of the ode, one finds Wordsworth taking leave of ‘the radiance which was once so bright’ (l. 180) that he gazed at in his childhood. This is not nostalgia for lost innocence that he is recalling (that nostalgia is a Victorian sentimentalization), for he now in later life can recognize the child’s misconceptions of the source of language. What initiated it was the ‘brotherhood’ that sustains language at its best. He acknowledges the faith in the lines where he notes that there is a ‘strength in what remains behind,’ firstly,

    In the primal sympathy
    Which having been must ever be

    Which, with our key, can be taken to be the mutual faith that should sustain our every utterance to another, without which we cannot really speak. Secondly,

    In the soothing thoughts that spring
    Out of human suffering

    which is a part of a creed that accepts sorrow as the inescapable, paradoxical accompaniment of bonds that love creates, and, lastly,

    In the faith that looks through death,
    In years that bring the philosophic mind. (ll. 190-1)

    Faith is ‘looking through death’ both as death-as-bogy or death as eternal reward, when threats of eternal punishment or promises of endless joy are seen for the attempts at intimidation or inveiglement that they become if taken literally. Faith that is entered into with the expectation of the final erasure of the body accepts the animal fear as part of the commitment, nor could it accept the bait of ‘heaven’ as a compensation for the disadvantages of ‘being good.’ So, in this new interpretation, one can see that ‘the heaven that [lay] about us in our infancy’ was, understandably, an illusion, one born of the ignorance of the nature of faith, and that of death. Heaven must not lie about us in our maturity: it has solely to be accepted as the impossible goal that we all must imagine in the human performance that is language. It arises out of the poetic maintaining of the ‘primal sympathy’; it finds ‘soothing thoughts’ in contemplating the actions of those who try to palliate ‘human suffering’; and it looks ‘through death’ to see it for what it is, a false alarm. That there is no celestial city cannot fill us with regret, even though our every utterance should be an apparent attempt to construct ‘that interminable building’— Wordsworth’s own admission that it is no end in time.

    However, the hell/heaven talk was a response to our conviction that our presence in the world has had effects, and one can argue that influence you have had on the ongoing game is what all your talk had been about. It takes years to live with a ‘philosophic mind,’ not because we learn to take the denials, as we loosely say, ‘philosophically,’ but because we must learn where our responsibility lies in the negotiations of the sharing of sacrifice—if, luckily, that turns out to be possible. It may not be, for the bouleversement of desires and fears may demand too much in the nature of a brain-washing for the self to survive it. This is where even science has to say that tragedy is an ontological possibility for social ‘selves’ (see the last paragraph of Section iii). To deny its place in human life is to abandon faith since the motive in such a denial is a wish to limit the extent of the risks that must be faced. There is a finer way of facing death than that of those ‘martyrs’ who were expecting after death to garner huge reward or, worse, who were afraid of unending punishment!

    The ‘philosophic mind’ can also bring recognition of the power of imagination that embraces posterity, that our contribution will still have its influence long after our death, our real ‘immortality.’ There is an acknowledgement of this in the combined notes of hope and acceptance in the closing verse. He says that he can now

    love the brooks which down their channels fret
    Even more than when I tripp’d lightly as they (ll. 198-9)

    a reminder that now, in maturity, he no longer ‘trips lightly’ but is aware of faith’s confrontation with its denial. This matches Shelley’s account of hope:

    hope till Hope creates
    From its own wreck the thing it contemplates
    (Prometheus Unbound, Act IV, 473-4)

    For Wordsworth the great drama is seen to continue beyond the deaths of the bodies of its actors:

    Another race hath been, and other palms are won. (l. 204)

    His choice of the words ‘palms,’ that is, acknowledgements of worthy actions (as of wreaths of palm or laurel leaves about the head), expresses the hope that those influences after death that have aided humanity will have their recognition, even if not formally or directly attributable to their originators. It is significant that in his closing lines it is not to divine inspiration he gives thanks but to ‘the human heart by which we live,’ for the sacredness of the pact that is language arises, not from the action of a god, but from our more humble acts of love. This humility went too far for a contemporary of Wordsworth’s, John Scott, for whom these last lines were ‘mean and poor’ as a result of ‘raising what is low, and ‘reducing what is high’ (Scott; see Woof, I, 527). But the lines do neither: they acknowledge that God is the needful poetic instrument of our imagination. And one last comment: Wordsworth here goes beyond the grief of death, for the ‘thoughts’ inspired by the ‘meanest flower’ he finds to be encouraging to us all. We can be ‘much happier’ even at the moment of death, in the sense that Banquo was.

    Such an approach dovetails with Lionel Trilling’s comment on the ode, that in it, ‘Wordsworth is talking about something common to us all, the development of the sense of reality.’

    References

    Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. (1991). Imagined communities: reflection on the origin and spread of nationalism (Revised and extended). London: Verso.

    Armstrong, Blair (2015). ‘On differences between persons’ understanding of words.’ Website: Neurocomputing, DOI:10.1016/j.neucom.2015.04.025

    Coleridge, Samuel Taylor (1816). The Statesman’s Manual. London: Gale and Fenne.

    David W. Blight (2002). Beyond the Battlefield: Race, Memory & the American Civil War. Cambridge, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press.

    Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays & Lectures. New York: Viking Press, 1983.

    Fine, Gary A.; Manning, Philip (2003). ‘Erving Goffman.’ In Ritzer, George, The Blackwell Companion to Major Contemporary Social Theorists. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Gans, Eric (2008). The Scenic Imagination. Stanford U.P.

    Glasersfeld, Ernst von (1984). ‘An Introduction to Radical Constructivism.’ In Paul Watzlawick, ed., The Invented Reality. New York: W. W. Norton.

    Humboldt, Wilhelm von (1999 [1836]). On Language . Ed. Michael Losonsky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Luce, A. A. and Jessop T. E. (1948-51). The Works of Bishop Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. London: Thomas Nelson & Son.

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    Sellars, Roy Wood (1919). ‘The Epistemology of Evolutionary Naturalism.’ Mind, 28:112, 407-426.

    Talfourd, Thomas Noon (1820). ‘On the Genius and Writings of Wordsworth.’ New Monthly Magazine, XIV, 648-55.

    Tallis, Raymond (2015). The Black Mirror: Fragments of an Obituary for Life. London: Atlantic Books.

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    Wright, Edmond (2005a). ‘Faith and narrative: a reading of “The Franklin’s Tale”.’ Partial Answers, Vol. 3:1 (January, 2005): 19-42.

    Wright, Edmond (2005b). Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Wright, Edmond (2007). ‘Jorge Luis Borges’ “Funes the Memorious”: a Philosophical Narrative.’ Partial Answers, 5:1 (January, 2007): 33-49.

    Wright, Edmond (2011). Avatar-Philosophy (and –Religion) or FAITHEISM. Exeter: Societas.

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  • Virality and the New Ostensive: Ai Weiwei’s Leg-Gun Meme

    Introduction

    Digital communication has amplified the rate and efficacy of the transference of cultural information, and has participated in the generation of a mode of symbolic exchange that demonstrates novel features. This modality—and the novelty associated with amplified transference—is often referred to as “virality,” which is a label that resonates with Eric Gans’s Generative Anthropology, and his articulation of the originary singularity that marks the successful emergence of human language. For the symbolic sign to emerge, it must have carried a viral quality, able to be shared with contagious effect because of its intersubjective condition: such a pattern need not have unfolded at any particular speed, but by contrast with the evolutionary (biological) changes that language appears to supervene upon, the sharing happened suddenly. This is a circular argument—that language succeeded because it was successfully shared—but any engagement with the paradoxical emergence of the originary something of language from no-thing requires such a presentation. Every act of representation captures the mood of this inexplicable originary success, and thematises the knowledge that language is because it is shared. The paradoxical originary circumstances of language show us that while communities of language users may have risen and disappeared many times over without sharing their invention, the originary group of protohumans will have shared its invention within the group, and then contacted other groups of protohumans and “infected” them, and so forth, as part of a genealogy that demonstrates the generative impulse that has motivated the sequence of such scenes—the sum of which constitutes human history.

    Thus, language and the symbolic representation it involves is analogous to viral biological phenomena, and it is not surprising that with expanded access to digitally mediated communication has arisen the popular label “virality” as a means by which to describe the novel suddenness that marks the emergence of certain cultural phenomena. The potential number of individuals one can conduct asynchronous exchange with has had a significant impact on a popular imaginary, and the staging of this imaginary upon public scenes of culture. These staging procedures are imaginary transactions that reflect the protean sense of this potential, which is performed by each individual participant on the scene of culture in question. As such, the colour and shape of the performances are in keeping with the historical circumstances of popular culture, and hold with its characteristics whilst updating them to reflect a paradoxical enhancement of the individuated conditions of the scene. That is to say, unlike the precedent popular cultural paradigm of one-to-many communication that leads to complex patterns of grass-roots sharing and appropriation, on this scene of culture exchange unfolds one-to-one and one-to-many in simultaneity(1).

    The return to a biological analogy for this paradoxical intersection of the body with the symbolic is apropos, since (thus far) the scalable implication of language remains anchored by the originary force of the individual, embodied homo sapiens sapiens. There are immediately novel outcomes to this paradox, and interactions with what appear to be the markers of a larger shift toward a new set of epochal conditions. The current discussion pays particular attention to the aesthetic markers of this shift, and does so by examining a case study in virality: Ai Weiwei’s(2) “Leg-Gun Meme,” which began with a photograph of the celebrity artist in which he is holding his leg, aiming it like a gun (see figure 1). The purpose of this case study is not to explicate the conditions of so called “internet memes” (though it does employ this popular cultural title); instead it is to explore the large-scale reflexivity that seems to accompany the very use of the term in the first instance. The case study chosen is convenient for reasons too many to list here, but the ostensivity of the gesture in the image is crucial, in which he simply points with his leg. I argue that such ostensivity is a vital feature of media texts that inspire a viral response, because virality requires the parsimonious mode of the ostensive.

    figure 1. Ai Weiwei’s original leg-gun pose, posted on Instagram on 11 June 2014: Ai Weiwei/Instagram

    Ai Wei Wei’s Leg-Gun Meme

    On June 11 2014, Ai Weiwei uploaded an image to Instagram of himself aiming his leg as though it were a rifle. He sits in his studio with only black socks and boxer shorts on, and a traditional rice picker’s straw hat atop his head.

    Over coming days, his many Instagram followers posted thousands of imitative versions of the gesture on their accounts, of which Ai “regrammed” (republished via his own Instagram account) over 500 images within five days. This feedback loop promoted the virality of the phenomenon, the intensity of which gained the attention of the world’s news media. By the 13th of June this included stories in The Guardian and The Sydney Morning Herald, followed by coverage from several tech news blogs including The Daily Dot, The Verge and Cnet, as well as a number of major U.S. news outlets, including ABC News and The Washington Post.

    Attempts to discern the meaning of the gesture were made both from within formal media outlets and folksonomical circuits of exchange, which tended to focus on the proximity of the posting to the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the strong similarity of the gesture with the choreography in a ballet from the Cultural Revolution entitled “Red Detachment of Women.” The Guardian reported on the 13th of June that:

    One blog retweeted by Weiwei, Beijing Cream, noted the similarity of the pose to one seen in the Chinese ballet The Red Detachment of Women. The ballet was one of the eight model operas that monopolised the 1960s Chinese national landscape during the cultural revolution; a state-sanctioned depiction of one woman’s rise through the Communist party. (“Is That Leg Loaded?”)

    There does seem a strong similarity, though this was not directly confirmed by Ai whose silence on the matter certainly stimulated the discourse. He posted the image along with a caption that translates to mean “Beijing Anti-Terrorism Series,” and commented on the 16th of June in an interview with the Associated Press (AP) that this was in reference to an anti-terror campaign being conducted in China at the time. Ai said to the AP:

    “Power is being used in the name of protecting you,” Ai said. “But what they are actually doing is something which deserves a lot of discussion. And what is terrorism doing to you? It is hurting lives? Or is it putting a huge burden on everybody?” (“Kicking”)

    Attacks on civilians over the preceding year attributed to Muslim militants from the country’s far western Xinjiang region had seen many people arrested in Xinjiang, and security on subways throughout the China tightened, while police had now begun carrying guns. His comments on the need for a reflexive discourse about how these events inspired the use of punitive measures are clear in their intent, but perhaps more interesting was his interpretation of the strong response to his originary gesture. He discouraged any particular interpretation of the meme, observing that:

    “The Internet is flowing. You come up with something basic, and everybody will find it easy to express themselves based on that.” (“Kicking”)

    Thus, Ai comments that the original image is both laden with intent, in that he wishes to promote engagement with a particular agenda, but that this engagement should not be taken seriously, at least not at this, the primary tier of interaction inspired through digital networks of exchange. The intent, therefore, is caught up in a paradoxical arrangement with the exchange it inspires, since the attention gained in this way cannot be taken seriously. This I take as a primer for the discussion below.

    Virality and Digital Exchange

    Some important characteristics of memes(3) should be noted as context for this discussion. The meme, here, is interpreted as a kind of harbinger and indicator of less visible cultural impetus, and while the meme itself is not of any particular gravity or significance (it does reach a great many people but does not render a great deal of influence in its immediacy), the facility of the meme is of great interest. The meme-as-text discussed herein is taken to be an effect of patterns of symbolic exchange. This is related to Richard Dawkins’ originary articulation of the meme in The Selfish Gene (1976), though as evidence against the reductive scientism it promotes. For Dawkins the meme is a selfish replicator of cultural information that copies itself after the manner of the gene. There seems no need to repeat here the many and convincing deconstructions of this argument, instead it is enough to observe that the appropriation of the term in the popular cultural expression reminds us that symbolic representation does not enact culture as simple transference of the kind Dawkins’ theory presupposes, but as richly generative exchange. Subsequently, this discussion follows Eric Gans who argues that the meme has, in this way, become “a model of the cultural object and ultimately of the originary event of human representation” (“The Meme”). Indeed, the meme is of interest to us because of its basic emptiness, whereby as Gans asserts, “the meme does not convey useful information any more than the language of the sacred, it is an essentially esthetic object, a template for a minimal scenic event.” The meme, in sum, provides for us a text that is paradigmatic of the originary circumstances of virality. The materiality of these circumstances bears inspection and consideration as an access to the context of representation that unfolds in contemporaneity, as it is associated with such integral dimensions of culture as social subjectivity and patterns of language use. These secular artifacts, and the architectonic infrastructure of the digital networks through which they appear are kinetic just as the originary scene of language was kinetic, and generative of a potential that participates in the ongoing creation of the originary symbolic potential.

    The Subjective Paradigm of Ostensivity

    Two such dimensional quanta are: the discourses of selfhood and individual expression that accompany the “democratising” influence of digital (qua “access”) culture; and the paradoxical rise of ostensivity that seems to have accompanied the instantaneity with which digital modes of representation are shared. These two observations deserve some unpacking and will be further explored below, but it is worthy of noting that the typical meme is tangled up with broader patterns in culture associated with subjectivity that can be discovered to have been generated by shifts in scale and modes of attention on digital scenes of representation. Attention is drawn in real time via paradoxically asynchronous and aspatial mediation; paradoxical because these liminal qualities are a product of speed and access. In other words, this digital scenicity is generative of attention that is both sudden—potentially violently so—and scalable, but only because it is of mediation that is not constrained by spatio-temporality in the manner that other, less “virtual” mediation is. This attention is both more volatile and more enduring simultaneously, a fact reflected in the enduring quality of the digital trace (depending on when the power is shut off).

    Given that the individual plays a more prominent role in such a horizontally integral mode of representation and exchange, as it must for the virality to find its purchase, it follows that there is a paradoxical quality to the relation of individual and community in digital virality. The culture of the meme relies on the individual taking up and sharing via a variety of digital platforms of exchange (“social network” based ones in particular) information about or variations upon the originary meme event. This invokes the individual’s “taste,” or cultural discernment, and is thereby revelatory of any accompanying literacy as the subject stages “buy in,” or a willingness to be aligned with the growing affirmation of the meme’s value before the attention of the community. That value, however, is almost always based on the premise that this is a mode of attention predicated upon the destructible, or uncanny quanta in the meme that gave it traction in the first instance. This we see evidenced in the manner by which viral exchange unfolds, as the participants take up the media in question, modify it, and reinsert it into the network in patterns that reflect and update existing practices of modification. The individual thus delivers performances of selfhood in keeping with the abovementioned literacy by virtue of ritualistic deforming/reforming of the media on hand, which is transgressed after the fashion of the graffiti artist. Here, the surfaces of normally sacred artefacts such as audio recordings, photographs or films of domestic pets, celebrities and politicians are intruded upon and in some way treated as screens and stages available to the individual, permitting them to transact their relation with the community. This profane action is a reminder that such digital media and the modes of representation they generate are formats of culture at once removed from and intimate with the material reality from which they draw, elevating the intentional quality of the paradoxicality in play. Verisimilitude and distance are crucial to this sensibility, as the virtuous capacity of the digital for faithful representation is playfully disrupted with the effect of reminding the viewer just how far removed they are from the real Barack Obama/cat/Tyrannosaurus Rex/Wedding Fight/Einstein.

    It is of interest that the performances in question are frequently humour driven, and given the specificity of the culturally determined parameters to humour the meme offers an unusually broad context for such a generative cultural force to function within. Thus, the humour often originates as benign misadventure or animal behaviour caught on camera that lends itself to existing anthropomorphic frames (think, goats that scream like people). But beyond humour there appears to be a mode of attention in play that involves a return to the primal form of human language: ostensivity. The mode of attention associated with such ostensivity operates in a fashion not dissimilar to that which accompanies the modern function of celebrity. In secular societies, operating on massive scales of mediation, the celebrity has taken on a role of increasing significance. However, the celebrity as a focus for attention is, like the meme, not to be taken seriously. Despite their centrality, they do not, as Gans has argued, fill any integral societal function (“The Last Celebrity”). From such an instrumental perspective, their function would seem to lie elsewhere, as temporary foci for resentment. They are “prehumiliated” figures, and due to their lack of consequence are capable vehicles for resentment in the popular mode. Which is to say, they mediate the deferral of resentment via their centrality, becoming the victims of having successfully garnered attention. Thus, the schadenfreude that accompanies the unwarranted winning of attention by an individual on any given scene of culture is reserved for the celebrity. Similarly, though in more chaotic horizontally transmitted and mediated circumstances, the virality associated with the meme is wedded to a paradoxically granted attention: willingly individual and “democratic,” but by its granting, communal and homogenous at a scale and speed not permissible in cultural exchange mediated by non-digital means.

    Ostensivity and Eshelman’s Monist Aesthetics

    When we copy the desire of another; that model for our desire is in danger of becoming the obstacle to our attainment of the desired object. The threat of a mimetic crisis that places us in direct competition with the model for the object of desire is ever-present, and in the originary hypothesis adopted by Generative Anthropology is the driver for the emergence of the symbolic sign, and language. The mimetic impulse, in this explanation, creates a doubly paradoxical situation that marks all subsequent scenes of culture, rendering paradox the basic condition of the human, here considered to be coterminous with the originary emergence of language.

    Let us follow this doubling of paradox forward in time. The originary scene of language is firstly paradoxical in that the becoming-obstacle of the model that accompanies mimetic behaviour leads to a crisis as the subject and model compete for an object of desire. The model now doubles as an opponent, and the system that emerges to defer the violent potential in this paradoxical situation and to initiate the human community is language. The symbolic sign, here first emitted by a proto human and understood to be so by another proto human, is charged with the auratic weight of this moment. It is mutually understood to be the means by which the two individuals competing for the object can move beyond animal means of differentiation via hierarchical organisation, which having failed will yield either violence, or something else. Something that indicates the shared understanding of the need to defer this violence, and the origin of the human animal who no longer relies on the differentiation achieved by animal means alone. That something is language, but language thus leaves us with the second part of the paradox, by simultaneously yielding the only means we have to explain language: language itself. Over time, this paradoxicality gives rise to the depths of human culture as history, which is constituted by the sequence of scenes generated from this origin. This paradoxical human situation we see unfold around us in real-time, where language mediates and is generative of the fundaments of human experience, such as love and resentment, in simultaneity. A readily available means of access to these phenomena is the case of objects of desire that are in small supply, such as individuals. Romantic love, for example, is confirmed as a public phenomenon when we seek the affirmation from our close friends and family that this individual is indeed desirable, and a suitable partner. However, if in this situation my sister or brother covets the object of desire and eventually becomes a fellow suitor, the frequent result is eruption of sudden, ungoverned violence.

    Thus, the sensibility of post-postmodern(4) aesthetics, which are generated through secular, virtual domains constituted by horizontal networks of exchange in which the participants are continuously and reflexively engaged by the structure of mimetic desire. Post-postmodern aesthetics are realised during the event of the undecidable: a scene on which is continually staged and restaged performances of ambivalence and unresolved oscillation between modern and postmodern sensibilities. Here, conditions seem to have emerged that promote acts of representation that appropriate formally aesthetic modes of practice and media types from both precedent epochs as part of engagements that are intentionally paradoxical. These can be understood as attempts to mediate the reflexive relation to mimetic desire that is, arguably, the prime achievement of modernity, such that post-postmodern aesthetics are driven by an ethos of active resistance to the potentially destructive influence of the mimetic impulse. This yields a broad sweep of reflexive aesthetic engagement with the action of pulling back from the generative drive excited by mimetic desire.

    The rising motif of monism and the ostensivity it is marked by is a recurring feature of post-postmodern aesthetics. Raoul Eshelman (2008) renders an account of this patterning under the title “performatism,” setting out to provide analyses of aesthetic phenomena that do not fit within the range of culture we usually regard to be postmodern. Contrapuntally, Vermeulen and van den Akker began in 2009 to map the growing presence of dualist texts under the title metamodernism, asserting the emergence of conditions that permit a liminal mode of aesthetic representation and experience that takes the form of unresolved oscillation between modern and postmodern sensibilities (“Notes”). In all cases, though, each of these conditions relies upon the next. Monism relies on dualism, undecidable doubling relies on singular dedication, and both rely on the emergence of an absurd reflexivity that emphasises the double framing – or fundamental paradox – of representation. Eshelman(5) notices this, and appropriates Gans in asserting that the sign creates an inner frame that serves as its immediate referential structure. The inner frame forms the container for the primary format of signification: ostensivity. An outer frame surrounds the inner, allowing the sign to become meaningful in a particular context. This paradigmatic frame shows us that all syntax – or primary signification, such as gestural – takes on its depth of meaning through an outer frame, that gives us paradigm and context. However, once the inner/outer frame is realised, the human understands that they are in language. Thus, beyond the outer frame is something that is nothing. Out there is the unknowable, sublimity, in sum, the sense of the abyssal beyond. So language brings us into paradox, since we know that we don’t know what is beyond our knowing in language.

    This relation is complicit with the fundamental paradox of signification, since the sign is mobile from the instant it is emitted and does not indicate any particular object, but the object that it indicates as a performance. Thus, the sign is structured as follows:
    sign->(object the sign has indicated). Or as Gans represents it:

    (1) the sign refers to an object (S -> O)

    (2) by this very fact, this object is no longer a part of the object world, but the object-referred-to-by-the-sign (S -> (S -> O)) (“Fundamental”)

    Paradoxically, the necessity for the emission of the sign is a mimetic crisis that accompanies shared desire for an object. Here, the model for desire has become an obstacle, and the sign emerges in order to designate the object as sacred and mediate resentment, deferring its violent potential and representing the status of the object, which is now designated as beyond appropriation. The object is thus no longer any old part of the real, but that which the sign points toward and therefore, part of the human world and its intricately structured performances of sacrality.

    This intricacy changes with secularity, which by definition involves a shifting of emphasis away from formally designated centres of sacred attention, and the decline in significance of institutionally bounded spaces in which sacred rituals are performed. Instead, the secular scene of cultural exchange is marked by implicit sacrality, and when that secularity is mediated via digital networks that underpin growing horizontality of exchange, the effects are far reaching. Through digital mediation we are compelled to navigate the implicit sacrality of the secular scene of cultural exchange in a virtual setting, where the body remains integral, but representation is taken to a liminal space. Thus, undecidability plays a crucial role in post-postmodern aesthetics. What, after all, is at stake in the virtual is our humanity, since signification is a virtualising procedure, and our humanity is mortgaged on the back of a history that has generated culture through the sequence of scenes that constitute the passage of the sign forward in time. That non-space beyond the outer-frame of the human community, beyond context, gives us the continual sense of the impossible action of encompassing meaning through language, with its initial, virtual/transcendent removal of the sign from that which it represents. What occurs in the setting of viral cultural patternings mediated by digital modes of exchange reflects this founding in différance.(6)

    The Paradox of the Meme

    The unknowable beyond and the fundamental paradox of signification are not separable phenomena of course. Together, they create the human sense of the real, and mediated under the liminal circumstances of digital networks of exchange and the secular conditions of late modernity, become the ubiquitous condition of culture. It is fecund: it is the deep sense of the fertile universe exceeding its own boundaries and invading our attempts to similarly exceed language. In making our continual attempts to exceed language, as we do in explicitly aesthetic modes of representation, we have begun to trip over into that state intentionally. We are deliberately paradoxical. This intent is evident in the example of virality that is at the origin of culture. That virality was necessary to the spreading of the virtualising potential of the originary sign. It is therefore not surprising that viral exchange via the digitally mediated horizontal mode we label “meme” carries with it the post-postmodern tendency toward a return to the parsimony of ostensivity. Ostensive gestures have the broadest syntactic availability, and as individuals introduce paradigmatic information during their exchange, a paradoxical superfluity of meaning emerges. The minimal container of the ostensive gesture is appropriated and deployed during later acts of representation on scenes that in turn become the basis for still further processes of representation that grow in complexity, as do the resultant modes of cultural exchange.

    When the individual participants in such a community are “jacked in” to the “network,” they are linked one to one, and one to many, just as they are in any community. However, this potential is realised with novel facility and scale via digital communication technologies, and the meme by virtue of its popular definition is understood to exceed its historical precedents in and of the contagion with which it spreads. This potential we group together under the aegis “virality,” and in this discussion, I demonstrate an example in which the latency of the material that “goes viral” is attributable to its minimal ostensive intent.

    The originary mobility of the sign permits such parsimony to become the catalyst for large-scale exchange and appropriation popularly referred to as memish (“meme”-ish). It would be irresponsible to claim that all instances of memish virality are the kinetic outcome of an ostensive container, but my enquiry into this originary pattern is intended less as a proof for a universal explanation as to the circumstances of all “memes,” and more as an exploration of how it is that the originary hypothesis can permit us to explain the viral spread of individual instances of material culture through human interaction that we popular understand to be “meme”-etic. In establishing the originary and scenic parameters to particular circumstances of virality, we can thereby expose the machinery of a broader set of cultural circumstances, which in their richness display how it is that the participants in the network perform a reflexive engagement with the mimetic impulse.

    Taken to its endgame, this hypothesis suggests that the ironic mode of engagement unfolding through memes—frequently parodic, but unerringly polysemic—takes advantage of the uncanny dimension of contemporaneous cultural emergences to promote a pulling back from the mimetic impulse. In other words, these are typically irenic gestures; gestures of deferral, and these are individuals demonstrating a sensibility associated with a novel set of cultural circumstances. In doing so, they challenge us to find a position for this activity on the continuum created by the delineation of popular from high culture set down by Gans, who writes:

    Popular culture takes advantage of the world of representation to take revenge on reality, whereas high culture never loses sight of the fact that the originary function of representation is the preservation of the community through sacrifice (“Popular”).

    If we accept Gans’s premises, it is possible to observe that in appropriating an instance of popular culture, altering it and rendering by virtue of some artifice or other the renewal of the original artefact for further activity of exchange, the participants in the meme are positioned between the conditions of popular and high culture. Indeed, irretrievably so, since on the one hand the promotion of the meme takes its revenge on reality by contributing to the volatility of its spread; whilst on the other, it comments on this very action and promotes the reflexivity that might turn our collective attention toward the community itself. The key, then, is the intervention of the agency of the participants who do not permit the circumstances of the original act of representation to go untested, but instead remediate these circumstances as expressly individual. The participants in the sudden community that forms up around the circumstances of the meme show their willingness to be part of yet apart from the mass of individuals that perform the assemblage that is the meme. Here, we see in evidence the intentional paradoxicality, and the ambivalence— the inbetweeness—that I have previously argued is a primary feature of the post-postmodern sensibility.(7)

    The Context of Ai Wei Wei’s Leg-Gun Meme

    I would like to introduce key biographical information before expanding on the circumstances of the Leg-Gun meme. Section IX of this paper offers extended biographical notes about Ai for the interested reader.

    Ai is a Chinese contemporary artist and activist who is openly critical of the Chinese government. He comments in particular on the issue of human rights abuses and takes advantage of digital modes of communication to reach a global audience. He gained large scale attention for his participation in the successful proposal for the famous “Bird’s Nest” (see figure 2) design of the Beijing Olympic stadium (2008), on which he collaborated with renowned Swiss firm Herzog & de Meuron during 2003—though he would later adopt a critical attitude toward the stadium, and argue that it was part of the general pattern of deception associated with the Olympics, during which China presented to the world a “pretend smile.”

    figure 2. “Birds Nest at Night” by Chumsdock Cheng (CC BY-SA 2.0)

    In typical fashion, Ai drove the point home with commentary on his blog and published photographs of his opinion in his social media, such as his series of photographs, entitled “Fuck Off,” that capture him “flipping the bird” at Chinese government buildings during the period around the Beijing Olympics. This is, itself, a reference to the “Middle Finger” meme.

    His next major work was Sunflower Seeds, which opened at the Tate Modern in October 2010 and consisted in 100,000,000 individual hand crafted porcelain seeds, arranged as a very large, thick rectangular layer on the floor of the Tate’s Turbine Hall (“Ai Weiwei’s Sunflower Seeds”). Audiences were invited to interact with the seeds, to walk upon them, play with them and be immersed in them with no restriction.

    His passport was taken from him after an 81 day period of incarceration in 2011, but far from restricting his activities, this has only led to a heightening of his status and an invigoration of his work which has taken on a new authenticity as commentary on both Chinese and global conditions of culture.(8) He works with sculpture, photography, audio, video, and site-specific installations, employing simple forms and methods from conceptual and Minimal art, and deploying traditional furniture, ancient pottery, and daily objects in ways that question cultural values and political authority.

    His recent work continues to engage with ongoing investigation into the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and his detention and continual surveillance by Chinese authorities. He blogged frequently from 2006-2009, when his blog was closed down after vigorous and repeated criticism of the Chinese government, but he transitioned rapidly to Twitter and Instagram through this period, and posts to both platforms to the present day. His prodigious body of art has recently been represented in a twenty year retrospective entitled “Ai Weiwei: According to What?” which began in Japan in 2009 and was adapted for exhibition in 2012 at the Hirshhorn Museum in Washington and progressed to major galleries throughout the USA through to 2014. It was updated over time to include more recent pieces including fibreglass models that portray his incarceration in 2011, and installations constituted by large numbers of ceramic crabs, bicycles, and stools. He has also recently exhibited a range of works at Alcatraz in the US and Blenheim Palace in the UK.

    His work consistently incorporates aesthetic engagement with the paradoxical sense of a singular, protean mass made up of many individuals, and explores this moment via freighted symbols derived from the material culture of China. His oeuvre appears to be shaped by attempts to gain attention, responding to the media through which it realises publicity and in this way geared toward staging of spectacles that will command a larger audience than that typically dedicated to the consumption of works associated with the high cultural paradigm of art. He sets about contrasting historically and geographically delineated contexts of culture in order to generate comment, and the Leg-Gun Meme reflects this. He integrates the minimalism of an embodied, ostensive mode of delivery with his allusion to the high cultural format of ballet, and a paradigm heavily freighted with historical information. Paradoxically, his ostensive gesture intends the complexity generated by the reference. This effect is doubled, since the delivery adopts a popular photographic mode, but is not simply aligned with the popular because the pattern of consumption that becomes viral in the format of the meme demands interaction.

    As such, the Leg-Gun meme offers a convenient example of a minimal ostensive gesture. It is uncanny, in that it takes the leg to be a gun, and into the bargain is mimicry of mimesis itself: a paradoxical non-stance (pardon the pun). Who, after all, really needs to use their leg as a gun, when the fingers and extended arm will do quite nicely? No, the inconvenience of the gesture shows us that this is both ostensive and reflexive, whereby the extra step in the precession of simulated gestural behaviour takes the observer beyond minimal, monistic ostensivity and into the metamodern domain of oscillation between the pointing toward, and the pointing toward the pointing toward, ad nauseam.

    Each appropriation of the gesture follows suit, maintaining the surfeit of monism that seems to accompany the initiating intent. But what unfolds is a personalised gesture, as it must be, for to participate in the meme individuals are compelled to either mimic it in an embodied fashion, or create a representation that is recognisably mimetic of the model. The initial patterns of appropriation reinvigorate the originary circumstances of the artefact in what will build to propagate mimetic contagion on the scale of the meme, by making much of an ostensive potential that grows to become the more broadly realised condition of its humour/uncanny effect. In other words, the basis for the potency of the virality that subsequently emerges is both maintained in the gestures that follow, and commented upon in their remediation. This Ai encourages by remediating those who mimic the gesture, “regramming” their mimetic behaviour, and putting in place a further phase of intervention that becomes the real catalyst for the meme. This synthesis of the mimetic pattern of behaviour would not authenticate the meme in the usual circuits of culture, where such plastic intervention would itself become lampooned. The “authenticity” of memes is crucial, and where they are discovered to have been deliberately propagated they quickly atrophy, since to align oneself with the farce of intended virality is to naively participate in the vertically anointed hierarchical structure of the popular.

    Celebrities, for example, if discovered to have set about generating virality are lampooned for their sophomoric intent. The followers of Ai’s Instagram account are not participating in the popular with such directness, however, and instead are complicit with the agency of a celebrity artist who is both dissident and activist. His status is generated by the attention he deliberately commands as a celebrity does, but his broadly recognised achievements under the high cultural paradigm of art, and his genuinely heroic public presence, intervene to calibrate this celebrity. The effect is such that Ai is permitted to occupy the centre of our attention without being subject to the usual pattern of prehumiliation to which a celebrity exposed. For example, his first works to gain a broader attention were exercises in experimental conceptualism: The Coca Cola Urn (1994); and Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn (1995). In the former, Ai emblazoned a Han Dynasty urn with the Coca Cola logo in red lettering, in the latter he was filmed dropping and destroying a Han Dynasty urn. He is able to play the clown, to destroy sacred objects associated with Chinese history, and maintains his heroic status as a celebrity would not. One imagines that Jacky Chan would avoid such a course of action out of fear of public derision. Mind you, if Ai were to burn the American flag, a different reaction could be assured, and so this license is not extended indefinitely, but constrained by the parameters of his “cause.” These observations invite reflection on Gans’s hypothesis that celebrity adds to the secular scenicity of modernity “a supplement of sacred presence” that operates on “a supplementary scene of interaction” (“The Last Celebrity”). Thus, Ai’s actions fall outside of the usual constraints on agency, and this is realised as he commands attention on such an appended scene of interaction. However, his public presence adopts a mode of sacrality that extends beyond the prehumiliated domain of the relatively inconsequential celebrity and into the world directly via his status as artist and dissident.

    In his oeuvre of works we see a pattern of performances and stagings on scenes of culture that are aesthetically framed, and whose prehumiliated status seems to be acknowledged by the artist from the outset. These are quite definitely a product of globalised conditions of culture, and function according to the logic of a digitally networked audience-as-community.

    Conclusion

    There is a crucial discovery to be made about cultural exchange under conditions of late modernity in the viral patterning we associate with the “meme,” and this is revealed through originary inquiry. The willing assemblage of the participants in the meme shows us that the secularity of digital networks relies upon a scenicity that holds forth the necessity for some supplement of sacred presence that is reflected in the popular mode—thus the agency of the collective is corroborated by the individuals who take up the originary artefact and remediate it, leaving their mark, and demonstrating their sense of the sacred need for the community to be maintained. If the digital scene is a secular one, it is in keeping with modernity, where growing connectivity is characterised by immediacy, by suddenness, and the speed of this moment is the speed of loss. As Eshelman has argued, this has been realised in the growing success of the paradigm of ostensivity: monism. But as the metamodernists suggest, this monism is very rapidly consumed to become the oscillation that results from processes of remediation.

    If, however, there is some redemption to be discovered here it is in reflexivity that marks the viral speed and scale of exchange that is feasible under such conditions, whereby the likes of Ai Weiwei can escalate what is, in the end, the irenic intention of his gesture in the Gun-Leg Meme, whose convenient ostensivity reminds us that the originary intention was shared as a gesture of deferral, to prevent violence and promote peace.

    Extended Biographical Notes on Ai Weiwei

    Ai grew up during the Cultural Revolution, when a child’s education was primarily made up of working in the fields and studying the Little Red Book. The utopian socialism of this period is central to his work, but is also strongly influenced by the plight of his father, the poet Ai Qing, who was labelled an “enemy of the people” in 1957 just after Ai was born when he criticised the regime during the first Anti-Rightist Campaign. Before his political dehabilitation, Qing was a leading intellectual and supporter of the Chinese communist project. As a result, his family of five was sent to a prison farm, and his father made to endure:

    daily political humiliations, manual labour, re-education, and due to his particular fame and influence was assigned the most humiliating tasks. Ai Weiwei was too young to help, but he vividly recalls watching his father scrub the public toilets to nearly immaculate cleanliness. (Ai Weiwei’s Blog xvii-xviii).

    After the progenitors of the Cultural Revolution—the “Gang of Four”—were imprisoned, the family returned to the very liberal Beijing of 1976. Ai learned to draw, at which he excelled, and in 1978 enrolled in the Beijing Film Academy and participated in the so called Democracy Wall. This was a wall on which large posters were placed that commented on public affairs—its use was encouraged during the demise of the Gang of Four, but later became the site for growing calls for political change toward a more democratic regime. This led to severe punishment of the supporters and activists, and the result greatly upset Ai, who went on to participate in Stars from 1979, a loosely defined group of artists who resisted the prescribed dogmatic realism of the preceding decade and left the country as soon as the opportunity emerged.

    In 1981 he move to the USA where he enrolled in the Parsons School of Design with a scholarship where his remarkable technical skills set him apart and he was exposed to Marcel Duchamp and Andy Warhol, the two most influential artists on his work. He quickly dropped out after failing art history and losing his scholarship, but later claimed he was dissatisfied with feeling removed from the real world of art by the school. Instead, he participated in the art scene, making an income by doing manual labour, and obsessively attending art shows. He inhabited an East Village apartment that became a gathering place for Chinese expatriate artists and intellectuals, and while Ai exhibited few works of his own, he was immersed in the American cityscape with its cultures of resistance and creation for over a decade. This is evidenced now, as he obsessively photographed the period in a movement toward journaling his experience that is reflected in his later oeuvre of work. A small selection of the many thousands of photographs were exhibited in 2010 in Beijing and New York as Ai Weiwei: New York Photographs 1983–1993 . In one of these photographs you can see Weiwei with beat poet Allen Ginsberg. They became acquainted after a poetry reading where Ginsberg read out several poems about China—Ginsberg later travelled to China and met Ai Qing.

    On his return to China, Ai became a central figure in the avant-garde Beijing art scene, known as the Beijing East-Village, and helped author a series of underground publications, the Black, Grey and White “Cover Books” that gained cult status for their reflexive content, a new element in the Chinese art scene where self-analysis was alien. These emerged from 1994 onward, and Ai’s engagement with experimental conceptualism was stimulated through this context resulting in his iconic works, The Coca Cola Urn (1994), Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn (1995) and a photograph that lampoons the tourist gaze depicting Lu Qing, Ai Weiwei’s wife, lifting her skirt in 1994 to mark the five-year anniversary of the student movement that culminated at Tiananmen Square.

    Ai went on to establish and expand spaces that facilitate contemporary art throughout China during the 1990s and 2000s, and build his oeuvre into the context of architecture, designing his well-known Beijing residence and studio based on a photograph of Wittgenstein’s Stonborough house. He established an atelier called FAKE Design in 2003 (pronounced Fuck in Chinese) and went on to complete over seventy projects throughout China.

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    Notes

    1. The term “network” is applicable here, though used sparingly and largely replaced by the originary concept of the “scene” in this discussion due to the presence of an ongoing, over-determined discourse around the term that relies on a confusion of technological determinism. Here, networks of technological and subjective entities are too frequently imprecisely cited as being entangled in a poorly understood and articulated set of inter-relationships. As Adrian Mackenzie argued as long ago as 2010, “[a]fter a decade of heavily network-centric social, cultural, organizational, and mathematical network theory, there are reasons to begin to approach networks a little more diffidently. While it exhorts attention to relations, network theorizing can deanimate relations in favor of a purified form of networked stasis” (9). An analysis of this entanglement will no doubt form a very useful future engagement for Generative Anthropology, wherein it might be successfully argued that the scene and scenicity offer a less cluttered, parsimonious lens through which to view phenomena typically clustered around and under the term network. (back)

    2. Section IX of this paper offers extended biographical notes about Ai Weiwei. (back)

    3. Meme in this discussion refers to the general g category of phenomena popularly referred to by the label “internet meme”, unless otherwise designated. (back)

    4. My previous article on this topic conducts a broader exposition of the post postmodern conditions outlined here, see “Victimary Thinking, Celebrity and the CCTV Building.” (back)

    5. See pp2-6 of Eshelman’s (2008) Performatism, or, the End of Postmodernism. (back)

    6. For a fuller discussion of this relation, see pp4-5 and pp30-33 of Eshelman’s (2008) Performatism, or, the End of Postmodernism. Eshelman’s analysis of différance and its connection to cinematic time shows a very interesting link to Derrida and digital disturbances of the linear flow of temporality-as-history. (back)

    7. See “Victimary Thinking, Celebrity and the CCTV Building.” (back)

  • 8. After the completion of this essay, Ai’s passport was reissued on July 22, 2015. (back)