Author: staceymeeker

  • The Posthuman Turn in Dave Eggers’ The Circle

    In this essay, I will discuss the “panpsychic” turn within posthumanism and situate it vis-à-vis Generative Anthropology by reading Dave Eggers’ The Circle from 2013. I will roughly term these developments, after Brian Massumi, “the turn to affect” and trace it to his 2002 book Parables for the Virtual. These particular strands of thought take their provenance from some of the earlier philosophers’ attempts to heal the Cartesian split by thinking in terms of becoming instead of being. Names that are frequently mentioned by these posthuman theorists are these of Deleuze, Alfred North Whitehead (the author of process philosophy), Gilbert Simondon (the philosopher of individuation), but also Baruch Spinoza and Leibniz. Another, independent, source of influence is Foucault, who appeals to these thinkers presumably by the fact that his ideas of power and biopower are conceived as delocalized forces. They also share his political engagement and critique of capitalism. What unites these thinkers is their commitment to thinking not only outside of the human subject but also outside of the subject-object-relationships paradigm. Can affect exist outside of the human or animal body? If so, how can it be conceived in an impersonal way?

    In his interview with Mary Zourzani, Massumi explains what a wider understanding of affect implies by saying that affect is not an expression or experience of a particular emotion that belongs to a subject but a wave-front of energy associated with an individuated entity which has a potential to affect and be affected. “[W]hen we feel a particular emotion or think a particular thought, where have all the memories, habits, tendencies gone that might have come at the point? . . . There is no way they can all be expressed at any given point. But they are not totally absent either, because a different selection of them is sure to come up at the next step. They are still there, but virtually—in potential” (3).

    Conceiving of affect and agency in impersonal ways invites a rethinking of the very notion of materiality and the matter-spirit separation. Thus, Jane Bennett argues for a vitalist conception of matter, writing that life and matter can no longer be separated, with matter being regarded as an inert and inactive substance serving the needs of and being shaped by human actors. Bennett explains that her “aspiration is to articulate a vibrant materiality that runs alongside and inside humans to see how analyses of political events might change if we gave the force of things more due. How, for example, would patterns of consumption change if we faced not litter, rubbish, trash, or “the recycling,” but an accumulating pile of lively and potentially dangerous matter?” (viii).

    Similarly, Karen Barad has been arguing for expanding our notion of materiality. The disjunction between nature and culture, human and nonhuman, and material and discursive has been deepened, according to her, in the aftermath of the linguistic turn whereby language has been granted too much power. She also sees it as problematic that “matter is figured as passive and immutable” (132), proposing instead a model of discursive practices that are not human-based or language-derivative. Matter, in its broadest sense, is discursive because discourse, as she explains her position, “is not a synonym for language.” Instead, “discursive practices are material conditions for making meaning” by staging “specific material configurings of the world through which determinations of boundaries, properties, and meanings are differentially enacted” such that “the world articulates itself differently” (335). The meaning that is extracted makes intelligible the causal operation of various components in a given configuration created by what she calls an agential cut. In contrast to the absolute Cartesian cut between the object and the subject, an agential cut divides the universe contingently into anobserver, or the measurement apparatus, and an observed. Since the two parts of the system are not separate, the relationship in which they engage is not that of interaction but what Barad terms intra-action or a kind of action that illuminates or delineates a so-called “exteriority within phenomena” (135, 140). “’Observer’ and ‘observed,’” as she explains, “are nothing more than two physical systems intra-acting in the markings of the ‘effect’ by the ’cause’; no human observers are required (though humans may emerge as being part of practices)” (340). In other words, what Barad argues for is an expanded, non-localized view of agency that makes no separation between matter and meaning. This new understanding of the entangled nature of material-discursive practices has implications for political action. She writes that “we are responsible for the world of which we are a part, not because it is an arbitrary construction of our choosing but because reality is sedimented out of particular practices that we have a role in shaping and through which we are shaped” (390).

    Both Barad’s theorization of the intra-active agential cut and Massumi’s broader concept of affect bear important similarities to Alfred North Whitehead’s idea of prehension that underlies his process philosophy. For Whitehead, prehension is a form of grasping or apprehension that is non-anthropocentric, in that it does not have to originate from a human agent and have a symbolic component. Even unconscious or non-cognitive entities are capable of prehending other entities and phenomena in the sense of influencing them and being influenced in return. Prehensions display the property of space-time to make actual entities appear connected and coherent and form the perceptive glue that underlies our intuition of causes and effects. “The unity of a prehension,” Whitehead writes, “defines itself as a here and a now, and the things so gathered into the grasped unity have essential reference to other places and other minds” (69). In using the concept of prehension, Whitehead articulates a teleological view of reality in which directionality and purposefulness do not arise from human consciousness, desire, and goals but are part of metaphysical causal connectedness and flow of what is.

    Another recent theorist (roughly in the same group) influenced by Whitehead’s idea of prehension is the author of Contagious Architecture, a “humanistic” interpretation of algorithms and computation, Luciana Parisi. Similarly to Massumi’s claim that affect is not tied to a human experiencer but exists in itself, Parisi’s assertion is that computer algorithms give rise to so-called “soft thought” that should not be limited to the idea that “data become embodied in a structure (a neural net, a brain, or any other material implementation). . . . On the contrary, soft thought is an actuality: a thought event. . . . Modes of thought are, indeed, as real as any object of feeling” (255). The main thrust of Parisi’s argument is to counter the model of controlled calculation that is dominating today’s digital culture as being promoted by the capitalist paradigm of interactivity and control. Not only does she claim that our view of algorithms as sequences of simple instructions that produce predictable results is wrong, but even the more subtle, next-level view of computation that has gained popularity in recent years is inaccurate, namely the view of algorithms as dynamically evolving, biological, and biophysical models of order emerging out of deterministic chaos. Deterministic chaos defines the evolution of systems where each element behaves unpredictably, but the whole behaves according to predictable statistical probabilities. These kinds of algorithms apply to modeling biological forms, mathematical models of reproduction, biophysical interaction, and other second-order cybernetic systems with statistically predictable behavior. However, according to Parisi, algorithmic thought assumes the next order of uncertainty, the uncertainty of incomputability. On this level, incomputable algorithms are infected and reprogrammed by random data that is generated by random probabilities. Parisi appropriates the idea of prehension to describe the relationship between algorithms and data they are fed, explaining that “as actual occasions, algorithms prehend the formal system into which they are scripted, and also the external data inputs that they retrieve. Nevertheless, this activity of prehension does not simply amount to a reproduction of what is prehended. On the contrary, it can be described as a contagion. This is because to prehend data is to undergo an irreversible transformation defined by the way in which rules are immanent to the infinite varieties of quantities that they attempt to synthesize” (xiii). As uncomfortable as the idea of infinite, incomputable data sounds, it and its ability to infect algorithmic objects with new instructions and axioms is a source of novelty and unpredictability. One of Parisi’s goals is to break free from the anthropocentric perspective and theorize thought as existing and evolving independently from human reason following its own logic of computational aesthetics that makes increasing ingression into culture. Unlike the other theorists among those already mentioned who consider the non-anthropocentric, posthuman perspective an unqualified improvement, Parisi makes a discrimination between the biological/autopoietic model of complexity (which she also identifies with second order cybernetics) and the digital one, cautioning that only the latter incomputable paradigm is capable of producing novelty while systems based on second order cybernetics can evolve and change but only within given parameters: “prediction of the future would remain a repetition of the past” (13).

    Dave Eggers’ 2013 novel The Circle reflects Parisi’s ambivalence about self-organizing systems as templates for digital architecture. The novel, which is set in the near future, tells a dystopian tale of a company that is on the brink of taking over the world. The company, which is called The Circle, could be a thinly disguised version of either Microsoft or Google. In either case, the story’s referentiality is not essential to its impact; it is merely a literary tool used to evoke the reader’s familiarity with a situation, namely a type of company, a recent giant of technological innovation founded by young and hip new-economy wizards that is rapidly expanding to a point of becoming too big and powerful to be challenged by any government. What brings The Circle its first success is a universal login product, TruYou. TruYou is tied to a person’s real identity, created for the purpose of integrating all passwords and user identities on various commercial and media sites, its creators reasoning that having one real identity would save internet users the inconvenience of memorizing multiple identities and passwords. “Overnight, all comment boards became civil, all posters held accountable. The trolls who had more or less overtaken the internet, were driven back into the darkness” (22). More than a convenience to customers, TruYou turns out to be a great boon to marketers: “the actual buying habits of actual people were now eminently mappable and measurable, and the marketing to those actual people could be done with surgical precision” (22). And in a sinister but not unexpected development at the end of the book, the company is hatching plans to join with the government in creating one unified system that will make a TruYou account the only way to pay taxes, vote, register a vehicle, and perform other social and civic services. Customers and citizens will thus merge into one entity.

    Another Orwellian product that is launched by this company is a small surveillance camera with very high resolution, called SeaChange. These cameras are inexpensive and easy to hide and attach to surfaces. The company hails it as an innovation that is heralding the coming age of global openness, accountability, and democracy—an empowering tool for influencing global events and building grassroots international communities. It is predicted that people will reach out to each other on an unprecedented scale in a bid to recruit each other for various consciousness-raising activities—and this is, in fact, what happens, as the workers of the Circle start being deluged by requests to join their professional networks and sign political petitions by their customers and old contacts. Another important social change will occur in connection with crime and policing because having an extensive network of ubiquitous and communicating cameras would make it much easier to both prevent crime as well as identify and apprehend fugitives on wanted lists. Thus, one of the characters designs a universal child-tracking system, which would greatly reduce or even eliminate kidnapping. In another example, during a trial run of the SeaChange system, a criminal is located and arrested by fellow citizens only six minutes and thirty-three seconds after she is randomly picked from a wanted list and her picture is broadcast world-wide. Not only is law enforcement made infinitely more efficient, it can also be made more fair, as one employee suggests, proposing a system which would make racial profiling redundant because image-recognition software would be able to pick out individuals with a criminal record and highlight them on video-feed monitors. In addition to these pragmatic concerns, around-the-world cameras will affect the quality-of-life intangibles, as people who cannot travel, for example, would be able to experience places they cannot visit physically, such as the summit of Machu Picchu or the dunes of Sahara.

    The novel reminds us that new technologies have a revolutionary, radically transformative effect on all aspects of life. To be human in the near future will be a new, unfamiliar experience. One character likens this process to theosis: “Now we’re all God. Every one of us will soon be able to see, and cast judgment upon, every other. We’ll see what He sees” (395). The all-seeing collective camera eye will make the world and everyone in it transparent, transparency being one of the central themes in The Circle. The company tries to convince humanity that transparency is a force for progress because it brings knowledge, and knowledge is an unqualified good. Having necessary information at one’s fingertips “would eliminate a lot of doubt and stress” (341), and being visible to everyone would endow one with “layers of self-awareness and a distinct sense of . . . power” (243). Eamon Bailey, one of the company’s grounders, asks Mae Holland, the company’s employee and the novel’s protagonist, who gets caught by two SeaChange cameras when she takes a kayak for a paddle from a renting station illegally: “Do you behave better or worse when you’re being watched?” “Better. Without a doubt,” she answers (296). Transparency is also an important source of knowledge. As Bailey tells The Circle audience: “When you deprive . . . someone . . . of experience . . . you are basically stealing from them. You are depriving them of something they have a right to. Knowledge is a basic human right” (301). The slogan company adopts is “Privacy is theft” (303). This is because “You don’t own the news, even if it happens to you” (236). This is doubtlessly a not so covert allusion to Sergey Brin, the founder of Google, who, according to Wikipedia, said that “knowledge is always good, and certainly always better than ignorance,” a philosophy that is summed up by Google’s mission statement “Organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”

    Mae’s misdeed serves as an excuse to coerce her to go “fully transparent,” a newspeak for a person who wears a camera and microphone all the time and whose movements can be tracked by an audience worldwide. Not surprisingly, she notices about herself that “Since she’d gone transparent, she’d become more noble”—even about trivial things like making food choices or skipping meals: “Every day she’d gone without things she didn’t want to want” (329). This is in addition to wearing a publicly readable health bracelet, which allows others to see her vital data, such as pulse, temperature, blood pressure, and so on, which leads to her doctor’s admonition that she should stop eating salami. Becoming more accountable to herself, she becomes more accountable to her audience because “So many of her watchers . . . saw her as a role model and inspiration” (328).

    Another, related, theme is a forced participation in social media circles. Mae is enjoined by her employer to participate actively in internal and external social media. Whatever social event she attends (and she is increasingly pressured to attend events exclusively on campus, as they call company premises—an allusion to Microsoft), she is required to take pictures and make comments in her several social media accounts as well as read, comment, and send “likes” to other people’s accounts. In addition to strengthening the communitarian aspects of being a company employee, with the word “community” being another corporate buzzword, active social participation has a more nefarious, commercial implication. Employees are ranked on their social media participation, their PartiRank, and this, in turn, leads to two more scores, their Conversion Rate and Retail Raw, which show how many purchases they have inspired in their internet followers and how much revenue these purchases have generated. Mae’s ex-boyfriend, Mercer, who expresses the authorial perspective and the novel’s conscience, warns her: “your company is scanning all of our messages for information they can monetize. Don’t you think this is insane?” (134). But Mae remains oblivious to manipulation and gradual loss of privacy and dismisses Mercer’s concerns, ridiculing his position: “Mercer, the Circle is a group of people like me. Are you saying that somehow we’re all in a room somewhere, watching you, planning world domination?” (259).

    With Mae standing for Everyman and given her perception of reality, the novel cannot have a happy ending. Towards the end of the book, the cameras become so commonplace that every corner of the earth is observable and audible. In connection with this, more and more people feel obligated to become transparent: “the pressure on those who hadn’t gone transparent went from polite to oppressive” (239). Mae is gradually brainwashed into the corporate way of seeing things, and even though she is in a unique position to instigate a reversal of the Circle’s policies, being egged on and aided by one of the company´s original founders who has since had a change of heart, she decides not to help him. It is suggested in the epilogue that The Circle takes over the world, fulfilling their slogan of “closing the circle.” This devastating outcome is aesthetically punctuated by juxtaposing the metaphor of the octopus-like Circle closing its stranglehold on the world with the image of a “tear” (rupture) opening up in Mae psyche, which she sees “clearer” and “louder” (375) as the novel progresses. This symbolic abyss, which she intuits but is incapable of fully grasping, is meant to emphasize for the reader the uncompromising bleakness of the projected future developments conjured up by Eggers’ pessimistic extrapolation of current trends.

    Even though I agree with a number of reviewers who have criticized the novel’s manifesto-like flatness as a consequence of its agenda-driven conception, it is hard to deny that its dark vision of surveillance society and human relations hollowed out by social media has a ring of truth to it, even more so now in 2015 than in 2013, the year of book’s publication. What I want to focus on, however, is not how accurate the novel is in diagnosing the problems of our modern technological society or how prescient it is in outlining our near future, but the anthropological explanation of the type of paranoia to which the novel gives voice. Gilles Deleuze’s name for this dystopia is the Society of Control. Building on Michel Foucault’s theories in Discipline and Punish, Deleuze, in his article, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” extrapolates the idea of Foucault’s disciplinary society to the present, claiming that the disciplinary societies of the industrial revolution gave way to the new type of society that we observe today. Even though the remnants of the disciplinary society, which produces “the environment of enclosure” in the form of the prison, school, hospital, family, and factory are still alive, “these institutions are finished, whatever the length of their expiration periods” (4). According to Deleuze, disciplinary societies are analogical, while control societies are digital because “enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other” (4). It is logical that “disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving energy, . . . [while] the societies of control operate with . . . computers,” given that old-style capitalism owned the means of production, while the new capitalism is “no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which is to say, for being sold and marketed”; “what it wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy is stocks.” Thus “the family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge toward an owner . . . but coded figures—deformable and transformable—of a single corporation that now has only stockholders” (6).

    Deleuze’s analysis has captured something essential about our technological present and the vision of the near future painted by Dave Eggers in The Circle. What is particularly interesting to me, as someone engaged in the project of Generative Anthropology, is the way both Foucault in his analysis of biopower as technologies of subjugation and Deleuze in his dissection of the basic features of control societies use metaphors of mastery. Thus, Deleuze states that “The operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our masters” (6). Language like this suggests to me that there might be some unexamined mimetic assumptions that are operative in the logic of the text that I would like to bring to light. By using The Circle to uncover them, I assume that Eggers’ novel reflects a political perspective on mechanisms of social control that is compatible with Deleuze’s and other contemporary critics’ and philosophers’ cautionary projections about the totalitarian future that is awaiting us (and may already be here).

    The issue of control is thematized explicitly in The Circle. Mercer delivers the diagnosis of this modern condition under the guise of a “cult taking over the world” by explaining to Mae: “like everything you guys are pushing, it sounds perfect, sounds progressive, but it carries with it more control, more central tracking of everything we do” (258-259). In what way then would the society of control be a more threatening model of social organization than that of discipline? Presumably because manipulation within the former would be more insidious and offensive to human dignity and thus violate the inherent symmetry of the originary scene. And symmetry is ostensibly preserved within The Circle, as a company. Nothing signals social distance and class struggle. When Mae is hired, she is told that company’s ethos emphasizes community-building: “We want this to be a workplace, sure, but it should also be a human place. And that means the fostering of community. In fact, it must be a community. This is one of our slogans” (47). Love of sloganeering as a ubiquitous feature of contemporary business culture meant to obscure a self-serving pursuit of profit by an appearance of socially conscious concerns is one of the targets of the novel’s satire. Slogans are constantly spouted by enthusiastic employees: “community and communication come from the same root word, communis“; “If you care about your fellow human beings, you share what you know with them”; “Privacy is theft”; “Secrets are lies”; etc… (95, 302-303). Moreover, solidarity and democratic atmosphere are signaled by the fact that the management of The Circle are young, hip, and energetic people, who not only look and sound the same as their subordinates but seem to share their political engagement and social concerns. The employees, for example, are encouraged, even pressured, to sign an unending flood of consciousness-raising petitions on such topics as environment and human rights and participate in various political and artistic events that take place on campus (the latter involving poetry slams, rock concerts, and stand-up comedy), provided that they take photos and post them in social media. Not only is the company trend-conscious, not only does it care about social and political issues, but is also presents a caring image of community-building, being concerned, for example, by the employees’ physical well-being and thus giving them and their families (even elderly parents, as in Mae’s case) free medical care. In addition to health, the company promotes an aesthetic education of its employees by organizing art events and performances and supporting artists in residence.

    In what way would this model be control-driven and not democratic and/or voluntaristic? It would seem that the development and expansion of the company are not brought about by fiat but happen naturally, as if obeying some higher laws of self-organization. If everything is transparent, if openness is absolute, if information is complete and fully accessible, could we not see human beings that make up this kind of a fully transparent society as cells in one organism, acting in concert, cooperating harmoniously, making everything run smoothly and without wastage? As each cell loses its agentivity and individuality, would it make more sense to “zoom out” and declare an emergence of a higher level of description that deals with collective aggregates? In this sense, the posthuman analysis of nonanthropocentric and non-agential thought, affect, and materiality that follow their own logic of expansion and propagation seems applicable here. It is easy to see (and indeed happens in the novel) that each control-tightening turn of the screw takes place by itself, as if it were the next logical step, often proposed by the employees. And indeed, who can object to labor-saving implementations, such as the universal TruYou identity, which make life so much easier?

    Would the real problem with such an arrangement be the existence of true puppeteers, who will stay behind the scenes and pull the strings of control in order to “monetize information”? Or would there arise some other problems, inherent in this new beehive-type of social organization? For people will certainly embrace these developments voluntarily, seeing them as welcome changes that promote convenience and that are aligned with natural human desires. What drives the innovation is an understandable human desire for instant gratification that aims to make the navigation of the world more seamless, fluid, and immediate, to bring it closer to one’s fingertips. Heidegger associated this desire with the existential human condition of being in the world, Dasein. To be in the world means to be in the state of caring about our worldly projects in a spatial and temporal way, which, in turn, implies a need to be surrounded by useful things, such as tools, with the help of which we achieve our objectives. Our kinesthetic awareness and orientation within a spatial region where useful things may or may not be handy, although implicit, forms the basis of the referential totality that underlies our goal-directed understanding of being-in-the-world. If useful things are far or not handy, we must bring them into our region. Heidegger uses the term de-distancing (in the sense of removing the distance between where I am and where I want to be). De-distancing is something we are constantly doing automatically without thinking about it. “Dasein [or being in the world],” he says, “is essentially de-distancing” (97). This is a useful way of understanding what technological development is all about: human civilization becoming increasingly more efficient and advanced at its essential mode of being, that of de-distancing.

    In the computer age of algorithmic design, de-distancing takes the character of calculation. Instead of physical tools, we base our actions on automated expert systems and feedback-based interactive architecture as well as use calculation in the opposite direction by predicting and forestalling what Hans Blumenberg calls the “episodic tremenda of recurring world events” (26) and catastrophes. Both the action and counteraction of computational thinking are doing de-distancing with previously unseen facility, speed, and competence. The question of whether it is in principle possible to predict and calculate outcomes is at the heart of the branch of knowledge that deals with algorithms. According to Roger Penrose, instances of algorithmic thinking have been known to man since the ancient Greeks, for example Euclid’s algorithm for finding the common factor of two numbers. To find the highest common factor we divide one of the two numbers by the other and take the remainder, and then repeat the step for the number we divided by and the remainder. If the final remainder is zero then the last number we divided by is the highest common factor. In other words, an algorithm is a systematic procedure that could be written as a sequence of steps. Can all problems be coded and solved by algorithms and is all human thinking algorithmizable? Alan Turing conceived of a thought experiment, an imaginary apparatus, later called the Turing machine, to answer this question. The Turing machine is represented by an infinite tape, which will be running back and forth through his hypothetical device as long as calculations need to be performed. When the calculation is completed, the tape will come to a stop with a final output. Turing asked whether we can determine in advance for any general case whether the tape would stop. The answer is that a general solution is impossible.

    This does not mean, however, that we do not successfully solve many difficult computational problems with sophisticated, interactive, self-adapting digital architecture of increasing complexity, performing new, previously unimaginable tasks. How far will these developments go? Will computer systems escape our control and become our masters? Eggers’ novel gives voice to our shared fear of runaway technology, although it is not clear whether his dystopian vision concerns evil people who intentionally dupe the simple-minded majority into submitting to a totalitarian system by distracting them with technological toys or whether expansion and transformation come as a result of collective de-distancing by the posthuman, larger-than-human man-machine aggregate, and then enterprising and unscrupulous people see an opening and take control. What then does this fear of control stem from? I would like to connect it to what Klaus Krippendorf in Communication and Control in Society calls the double bind between determinism and freedom (20). De-distancing successfully is to have the most accurate algorithm for calculating and predicting the behavior of the system of which we are a part. Everything in the system must be logical, law-abiding, and programmable in order for us to calculate what steps we need to take to reach our goals—except for ourselves, who are teleological, goal-articulating beings. But that cannot be, as this reasoning goes, because, by the same token, we must also be calculable and predictable within the constraints of the algorithmizable system. Either we have to accept that we only think ourselves free but are, in reality, programmed and controlled or we have to give up on the paradigm of autopoiesis, self-organization, and second order cybernetics, which is so popular today and to which Parisi provides a corrective by saying that algorithmic (and, by extension, human) thought is incomputable and contagious.

    Even though Parisi looks at contagion as an unforeseen and unavoidable side-effect of computation that infects virus-like the original algorithm, her choice of terminology might reflect an unacknowledged anthropological intuition—something that fears and fantasies of being controlled and manipulated lack. Modeling human behavior within the parameters of choice vs. deterministic calculation does not take into consideration the scenic structure of representation, where the differential relationship of the periphery to the sacred center stages various strategies of sublimating resentment. As Eric Gans explains in Signs of Paradox, “The problem of freedom versus determinism is . . . anthropological rather than cosmic, ‘cultural’ rather than ‘natural.’ To say that the future movement of a particle is ‘determined’ is to conceive a mind potentially aware of this determination. The simple anthropological test of determinism is the following: if after calculating the future state of a system, I can inform the system of my calculations without leading it to deviate from them, that system may be called determined. If, on the contrary, I must hide my calculations to avoid such deviation, then the system is free; for someone within the system could eventually perform the same calculations as I have” (26). In other words, framing the human condition as a dilemma between freedom and determinism disregards that “freedom is born with the sign” (24). Without factoring in language, without taking into the consideration the triangular, mimetic nature of communication, Deleuzian and Foucauldian analysis conceives of social organization as constraining, unchanging, and hopeless. Without explicitly recognizing the center-periphery structure of the scene, such resentful imagination perceives the center as closed (to use Gans’s terminology in Science and Faith), permanently usurped by invisible controlling forces, and thus misses an opportunity to see the scene’s adaptability, its creative power to change and open up in various ways. So far I have not seen evidence that posthuman theories that have shifted focus from the subject or human agent to broader perspectives of reified abstractions or from being to becoming, partly in order, I believe, to avoid the pitfall of resentful closure, have been more successful.

    This is not to deny that the free will vs. determinism conundrum contains a powerful albeit unacknowledged kernel of anthropological truth. I believe it to be a restatement of the pragmatic paradox sans the scenic configuration of triangular desire. Gans defines the pragmatic or mimetic paradox in Signs of Paradox as the “incompatibility of the two roles of subject and other in the mimetic process” (19). In other words, “the sign originates as the solution to the ‘paradoxical state’ or ‘pragmatic paradox’ engendered when the mimetic relation to the other-mediator requires the impossible task of maintaining the latter as model while imitating his appropriative action toward a unique object. Put in geometric terms, the parallel lines of imitation must converge toward a single point” (20). Similarly, freedom vs determinism conundrum arises from the same contradiction. As I quoted earlier, to say that the future is either determined or free is to conceive of another mind who either knows or does not know what I know. I must occupy two peripheral consciousness positions at the same time, with both of these positions attempting to de-distance the same appetitive object, which is an impossible situation. The symmetry of the questions of “do I control?” and “am I controlled?” can only be contemplated from within the mimetic representational paradigm. Even though I do believe that the novel by Dave Eggers touches upon some truly worrying technological and social developments, I also think that the powerful analytical tools of Generative Anthropology will help us achieve deeper insights into these problems.

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    Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: The Free Press, 1985. Print.

    —. Science and the Modern World. The Free Press, 1967. Print.

    Zourzani, Mary. Interview with Brian Massumi. Web. 19 Aug. 2015. <http://www.assembly-international.net/Interviews/html/brian%20massumi.html>.

  • Desire in The Great Gatsby

    In The Great Gatsby, F. Scott Fitzgerald depicts the attitudes and character of the upper class in 1920s America. The residents of Long Island are drifting, with a feeling of having been uprooted. Both Nick, the narrator, and Gatsby, the protagonist, have been in World War I; Nick even confesses that he enjoyed the experience. War has made men restless and Nick claims that it has, at least temporarily, made him unfit to join the family business. Restlessness and a feeling of alienation have caused him to move East, to sell bonds instead of hardware. The feelings of restlessness and rootlessness, combined with a dream of new opportunities, have inspired the whole set—Gatsby, Nick, Daisy, Tom, and Jordan—to move from the Mid-West and West to the East. The East is the America of desire; of adventure, excitement and freedom. Society is on the brink of great upheavals as the result of desire, although the West is still rather entrenched in its regularity and established patterns. Thus, in contrast to the East, the West represents a traditional society, where desire is kept under control.

    World War I transformed the USA into a global political and financial power, and marked the end of its isolationist policies and its sense of inferiority vis-a-vis Europe. By 1920, it is in a position of dominance, the most powerful nation in the world.(1) It had the capacity to impose its will on other nations. Given its position, America also became a leading cultural nation, creating what has come, partly through Fitzgerald’s writings, to be called the Jazz Age. The 1920s in America was a time of great contrasts, as well as of changes; for example, on the one hand, there was a breakdown of traditional moral values, and, on the other, a puritan revival that attempted to control this development by banning alcohol. This was also a time of great violence. Lynching reached a peak in the early 20th century and immigrant-dominated gangs roamed the big American cities.(2) Soldiers had returned from World War I, tired and confused after their nightmarish experiences, only to discover that there were no jobs. In this context of rootlessness, the dream of a new life seemed to flourish, creating the perfect setting to investigate how desire works.

    René Girard’s Theory of Desire

    In this article I will consider French philosopher and literary critic René Girard’s theory of desire, and apply it to The Great Gatsby. Girard considers that desire is evoked by other people’s desires. The common denominator in the European novelistic tradition is, according to Girard, the revelation of metaphysical desire. Metaphysical desire is contrasted with spontaneous desire and arises when the protagonist desires an object via a mediator/model. Usually, desire is considered object-related. However, if that is the case, it is possible to desire freely and attain the object of one’s desire. Girard views desire as less straightforward, postulating a triangular structure that includes a mediator. As long as there is a mediator present, there cannot, initially, be any freedom or autonomy in desire. The mediator can both receive and hinder desire so that one’s desires are transformed into secondary and rival desires. Thus, by imitating through a mediator instead of experiencing direct, object-related desire, the subject becomes entangled in the mediator’s desire. Desire may then work both ways and pave the way for intense rivalry between the subject and the mediator. As long as they desire through each other, their desires will become more and more symmetrical.

    The romantic understanding of desire is that this phenomenon is original and individual. If desire were based on the object alone, it would be based on a spontaneous attraction towards different objects, such as money, houses, and cars. In contrast to these views, Girard claims that desire is not spontaneous, individual, or primarily generated by objects, but is mediated through what other people desire. He maintains that there is no such thing as original desire, only mediated desire. Thus, desire “is always reaching past its ostensible objects and finds little or no real satisfaction in them.”(3) Desire in mimetic theory is not static and therefore cannot be fixed except in stages. The stages of desire as described by Girard are stages of decline, developing from a fascination with the rival to the final stage of being possessed by the same rival; and they can be explained in terms of the increasing intensity of the imitation of the other, which gradually becomes more and more conflictual. There is a development from fascination to rivalry, to conflict, and hate, and eventually to madness/murder/suicide.(4) If there is a stage where desire is most poignant, it is clearly in the later stages, characterized by serious conflict, violence and illness. Thus, desire must be linked to and defined in relation to these negative phenomena.

    Desire in this sense has no substance. At the same time, however, desire is the force that has the greatest impact on shaping individuals—and society as a whole. The deeper one penetrates into the process of desire, the more symbolic, blurred, and sterile the desired objects become in the mind of the subject. Moreover, the references to reality become more and more blurred. The process associated with the ongoing desire for pleasure results in pain, again and again. This is the process by which acting on one’s attraction leads to wounding.(5) The process of desiring through desirous models leads eventually to nothingness.

    Ultimately, desire leaves people barren inside, leading to a nothingness that resembles death. This does not primarily refer to physical death but to spiritual death, where all that really exists in the mind of the subject is the conflictual presence of the other. Within the logic of desire, the problem is the mediator or the model, but the model will, if the rivalry is heated, seldom respond to the other’s wishes. In this gradual development towards a death-ridden existence, the desiring person does not understand that the problem is desire itself. When desire has the upper hand in human relations, it is always the desired and despised model which is the problem.

    Romanticism, Modernism, Mimeticism, and the Breaking down of Boundaries

    According to Girard, both the illusion of autonomy and the process of becoming possessed by the other are phenomena which have been addressed by great novelists. Fitzgerald has produced some of the greatest descriptions of desire in the 20th century. Typically, the characters in The Great Gatsby want to live with the illusion of spontaneous desire and they believe that they are doing so. Fitzgerald is, as will become evident in the following discussion, one of the great explorers of metaphysical desire. He hardly ever describes healthy and natural erotic relations. The joy of sex is not evident in his work and sensuous desire hardly seems to exist; everything is about rejection, social climbing, and a desire to be accepted

    The difference between the romantic novelist and the realist novelist is based upon their different perceptions of the mediator.(6) The romantic writer reveals and propagates the mediator’s presence, often as a rival, but does not reveal his role in mediating desire. The romantic writer believes in the autonomy of the characters and, according to Girard, is himself governed by a desire for autonomy. The romantic lie consists in seeing desire as spontaneous and linear. In contrast, the realist novelist both presents and reveals the decisive role of the mediator in relation to the protagonist’s desire.

    In The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald seems to shift between a romantic and a novelistic understanding of desire. The enchantment lies initially in the romantic dream and its remoteness from reality. (7) Gatsby is clearly a romantic hero who tries to live his life on the basis of a single romantic longing. His dream is what James E. Miller Jr. calls immature romanticism(8) as it belongs not to the present but to a past transfigured by imagined memory.

    This examination of how desire works in The Great Gatsby begins with the objects described initially in order to attract the reader. Desire in The Great Gatsby is enhanced by references to technical innovations such as phones, cars, and airplanes. For example, the name Jordan Baker is constructed from two brands of car,(9) emphasizing Jordan’s machine-like character. Desirable objects are in the hands of people with desires who live outside conventional morality, having loosened their sexual and marital constraints.

    In The Great Gatsby, everything is speeding up, and even the natural world is called into question as people’s vision of what is real and unreal in nature becomes blurred. Leaves on summer trees, for example, are growing the same way things grow in fast-forwarded movies.(10) People look perfect but slightly dehumanized, and their identities overlap. However, desire, which outwardly creates difference and individuality, is slowly turning everyone into clones, and even male and female are less distinguishable. For example, at the end of the novel, Nick is mistaken for Gatsby (Fitzgerald, 158). People are often described in fragments or gestures; a butler is reduced to a nose, Wolfsheim to nose and cufflinks.(11) The descriptions of Daisy and Jordan emphasize fashion, luxury, and leisure; for example, Jordan looks like an illustration in a (sports) magazine. Gatsby is likened to a machine which registers distant earthquakes (Fitzgerald, 8), thereby highlighting his sensitivity and indicating that he will be present wherever some sort of frenzy for the new is aroused. Gatsby is in control of that which is new and he owns everything which is desirable. On the other hand, everything he owns and controls has a single purpose: to win back Daisy Buchanan.

    Desire and the Narrator

    Fitzgerald’s literary style combines Romanticism with Modernism. His prose is both poetic and psychological. Images and rhythms derived and developed from 19th-century poetry are combined with the precision, consciousness, and topical references that were, at the time, becoming the hallmark of Modernist writing in both poetry and prose. Fitzgerald updates Romanticism for the 20th century to meet the Modernist demand for high-impact language; every sentence is packed with both poetry and meaning. At the same time, he challenges the conventional Romantic opposition between technology and art, between machine and imagination.(12)

    In The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald writes from a distance that enables him to discover a more refined literary structure. There is no longer any “authorial” author or narrator with full access to the characters. In his two previous novels, This Side of Paradise (1920) and The Beautiful and Damned (1922), Fitzgerald was playing out his own life, letting his protagonists wrestle with his own conflicting ideas regarding such philosophical perspectives as Nietzscheism, Naturalism, Romanticism, and Catholicism. The omniscient narrators in these novels are therefore constantly shifting perspectives in order to explore the author’s ideological frustrations. In contrast, the story in The Great Gatsby is narrated by a character with limited access to the other characters. By making Nick Carraway the storyteller, Fitzgerald established the needed distance, especially between himself as the author and the protagonist. Nick dreams of absolute knowledge, but he is more and more inclined to see things from Gatsby’s point of view. He vacillates between his father’s bourgeois morality and Gatsby’s romantic perspective. According to Gary J. Scrimgeour, Fitzgerald’s first two novels reveal a fault that is common in the work of romantic writers, which is the inability to understand the true nature of the characters created.(13) In his early career as a novelist, Fitzgerald clearly had difficulty in distinguishing himself from his characters. One reason for the success of The Great Gatsby is precisely the fact that he managed to create characters who were not his alter egos.(14)

    Nick’s reflections are always tainted by his snobbish and bourgeois background. Even though he comes from a privileged background, his attitude toward the wealthy elite is characterized by a certain aggression, as expressed in relation to Daisy, Tom, and Jordan. This aggression seems to be moral. At the same time, his descriptions of people of the working class (Myrtle and Mr. Wilson) reveal an attitude of mild disdain. Nor are the people from the lower middle-class, such as the McKees, exempt from his disdain, and his reflections on Gatsby are never completely free from this attitude.

    While not a neutral observer, Nick is a relatively reliable observer. He is the only character in the novel who is low-key, observant, and perceptive enough to tell the story. The other characters are all prisoners of their own drives, uninterested in people other than those who can stir desire. Nick refers to himself as “slow-thinking and full of interior rules that act as brakes of my desires” (Fitzgerald, 58). His curiosity, nearing voyeurism, and his inability to act upon his desires make him a perfect narrator. Although his moral principles seem to be basically unchanged throughout the book, his perspective gradually changes; he finds Gatsby acceptable after experiencing the violent lives of the very rich—even though he represents all that Nick had previously despised.

    The novels and short stories that Fitzgerald wrote in the early 1920s tend to chronicle events that extend over several years. This lengthy timespan was necessary in order to elaborate on the nature of desire. In contrast, the main story of The Great Gatsby is more condensed and takes place between early June and September 1922. However, these intense months are viewed against the backdrop of what happened five years earlier, in 1917, when Gatsby fell in love with Daisy. These two timelines come together when Gatsby arranges a surprise meeting with Daisy at Nick’s humble and run-down cottage. In this extremely awkward, nervous, and initially uncomfortable meeting, the lovers are reunited after five years, and this inspires Gatsby to fulfill his great desire of recapturing the past as if nothing major has happened during the intervening years.

    However, already at this reunion the impression is created that Gatsby is starting to lose his faith in his quest; doubts are surfacing (Fitzgerald, 82-85). It could hardly be attributed to suspense alone that he almost changes his mind and wishes he could cancel the tea party where he will finally meet Daisy again. This is one of the very few scenes in which the narrator actually enters into Gatsby’s head, revealing Nick’s growing identification with Gatsby.

    Nick as a Go-Between

    The first person narrator, Nick, is constantly trying to become an omniscient narrator, understanding everything that is happening. In order to achieve this, he acts as a go-between. His initial reaction to the notion of infidelity is extremely puritan; when he hears that Tom has a lover, his instinctive impulse is to call the police. However, he soon moderates his moralism and becomes Gatsby’s aid in the process of winning Daisy back. Nick is moral in a traditional sense, but he clearly does not consider the fact that Gatsby’s liaison is not very different from Tom’s.

    The word pander is used in the closing chapter of the novel (Fitzgerald, 171) to describe the settler’s optimism. However, the word also sums up Nick’s role in the affair between Daisy and Gatsby.Pander is derived from Pandarus, a character in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, who acts as a go-between to foster the love affair between Criseyde and Troilus. Just like Pandarus, who advises Troilus in the wooing of Criseyde, Nick enables Gatsby to fulfill his love. Pander means to gratify or indulge an immoral or distasteful desire or habit.(15) In the original context in The Great Gatsby, “pander” is used in a lyrical description of America’s past.(16) Thus, the fresh green breast of the new world appeals to various desires such as nostalgia for the past and optimism upon arrival in the new world. However, it also hints at a decadent modern America by evoking the crime-scene where Myrtle’s left breast swings lose like a flap, incapable of giving sexual pleasure.

    Snobbery, Class, and Money

    The concept of class is a more important theme in Fitzgerald’s novels than in the works of any other writer in the American tradition. Whereas American writers such as Dos Passos, Faulkner, and Hemingway focus on World War I from a soldier’s perspective, Fitzgerald records the preparation for war in The Beautiful and Damned; and although the aftermath of war is evident in The Great Gatsby, it is seen from the perspective of Nick and Gatsby, as something distanced, from the past.

    Fitzgerald’s postwar darkness is merged with class distinctions. According to Robert Emmet Long, class and success are issues that Fitzgerald both delights in and at the same time perceives as darkly apocalyptic due to the upheaval of the traditional social order.(17) The young Fitzgerald combines Romanticism with Nietzschean cynicism, gradually moving away from his Catholic roots. However, in the midst of his ideological struggle, there is a more acute struggle for prestige, and a desperate desire for acceptance. For Fitzgerald, this meant being accepted by the elite, meaning the rich and beautiful. It seems correct to say that the young Fitzgerald was a romantic caught in his own trap.(18) While Proust and Waugh were spellbound by the aristocracy, Fitzgerald is spellbound by the very rich. Hemingway had once said that the only difference between us and the rich is that the rich have more money; Fitzgerald, perhaps due to his family’s mild slide from riches to rags, felt there was something rare, seductive, and mysterious about those who have great wealth.

    In The Great Gatsby class consciousness is evident throughout the entire novel. Fitzgerald’s marriage to Zelda Sayre, who belonged to a wealthy southern family, was only possible due to the great success, especially financially, of This Side of Paradise. Before his marriage to Zelda, Fitzgerald was denied the opportunity of marrying Ginevra King because her family was very wealthy.(19) Ginevra, like Daisy, embodied refined elegance rooted in wealth. Le Vot claims that Ginevra did not love any man; she was in love with love. Only recurrent crisis, dramatic quarrels, betrayals, and reconciliations could keep her restless heart ensnared. Against any man who thought he had won her over, she used jealousy artfully as a weapon, never losing control, maneuvering him into indefensible positions until his dignity was lost. Each of her affairs was a campaign in which she played at being conquered, giving a little to take a lot.(20) Ginevra later became the archetypal model in Fitzgerald’s work for the unattainable and reckless woman men fall in love with.

    Fitzgerald’s father had told his young and ambitious son that “poor boys shouldn’t think of marrying rich girls“.(21) In much the same way as Fitzgerald, Gatsby longed to be loved by a wealthy and beautiful girl; and like Fitzgerald, Gatsby had great difficulty in establishing a permanent relationship with a girl from the upper classes.

    In The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald explores what money can do to a person without a wealthy background. In earlier novels, Fitzgerald had also been acutely aware of the themes of class and money, but he considered them from a different perspective, that of the seriously rich. In his two previous novels both protagonists (Amory Blaine in This Side of Paradise and Anthony Patch in The Beautiful and Damned) come from extremely wealthy backgrounds. In The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald shifts the focus and places a man from a poor background in the central role. His protagonist vacillates, therefore, between being the one who sacrifices others in order to fulfill his dreams and the one who himself becomes the sacrificed victim, cast upon a desirous altarpiece built by the super-rich to preserve their class from anybody who threatens to destroy their unquenched desire for more wealth and success.

    While both Amory and Anthony are initially super-rich, spoilt, sensitive, well-spoken, naturally charming (and at the same time despicable), and capable of making the most unattainable girl fall in love with them, Jay Gatsby has had to make enormous emotional and moral sacrifices in order to arrive where he is. However, Gatsby’s background enhances the drama and makes the character more multidimensional and mysterious.

    The theme of being rejected by the rich appears with great force repeatedly in Fitzgerald’s works in the period 1920-26. In this period, Fitzgerald is constantly depicting scenes in which desire is at its hottest. This seems to be Fitzgerald’s most fertile literary period. In several short stories, the theme revolves around the unattainable woman. In this respect, “Absolution,” “Winter Dream,” “The Sensible Thing,” and “The Rich Boy” are short stories that are closely related to The Great Gatsby. Like Dexter Green in “Winter Dreams” (1923), Gatsby is a moneymaker and a romantic. The handicap both must overcome is their background. Dexter starts a laundry business that gradually makes him enormously wealthy, while Gatsby is initially able to cross the class border by becoming a soldier. As a soldier Gatsby is accepted into Daisy’s upper-class society. The uniform becomes a shield against his humble background and allows him both to be someone else and to mingle with the rich.

    Gatsby and Dexter, due to their modest backgrounds, are spellbound by wealth and money. For Gatsby, love becomes more important than the object of the love, revealing an advanced stage of delusion. Gatsby is in love with love, or the idea of love, which he thinks can bring some order into his confused and disordered life. There is scarcely a hint of real sensual love, either in Gatsby’s relation to Daisy or Dexter’s to Judy. In “Winter Dreams,” Judy Jones is exciting and desirable, capable of making any man fall in love with her. She has understood that in order to always be the winner in mimetic desire, she has to be in a situation of continuous flirtation and give each man only a faint hope of success, never really giving in to anyone. However, her endless flirtations corrupt her, and in the end make her incapable of love. According to Roger Lewis, the wealth that surrounds her destroys at the same time as it creates.(22) The girls in Fitzgerald’s world frequently reject the men, making them feel like they are constantly being denied what they most desire, and this creates in them a world-view of the absurd.

    Dexter’s love, however, involves a simpler desire than Gatsby’s, since it is devoid of any idea of recapturing the past, and this makes it easier for him to move on and accept the inevitable decay. Nevertheless, Dexter does have a certain yearning for the past. Neither he nor Gatsby is able to perceive the illusions of the intense love game which has crippled them into yearning for the past.

    In “The Sensible Thing,” George O’Kelly, like Gatsby, wants to recapture the past. However, he is less of a hero initially. O’Kelly is madly in love with Jonquil, a girl from a wealthy background who gradually comes to question whether George, because of his lack of wealth, is the right man for her.(23) In contrast to Gatsby and Dexter, George is desperate and oversensitive in the act of lovemaking. George suddenly becomes hugely rich and is able to win Jonquil and recapture his intense love for her. However, at the critical moment when he knows she is his, the magic has gone.

    The common theme in these short stories is the nothingness of desire. These love affairs are reminiscent of a cherry tree in bloom. The flowers on the trees look intensely beautiful, then suddenly the blossoms fall. Similarly, the characters seem only to be really alive in the few years when they are young, vital, and physically attractive, before desire overcomes them. In The Great Gatsby, the name Daisy must also be understood in this context as having a short life span. This “Spenglerian” cycle of springing to life and waning into a dull and meaningless existence where only nostalgia is left is a theme which Fitzgerald returns to numerous times, although never with the same intensity as in the 1920’s.

    These motifs of rejection, loveless love, and impossible relationships all come together in The Great Gatsby. In this novel Fitzgerald further heightens the tension by creating a hero who tries to enhance his social status by means of criminal activities and lies, thereby slightly changing Fitzgerald’s cherished scene where the poor, handsome, honest, and vulnerable men are being rejected by wealthy women. Gatsby, in contrast to the typical honest protagonist, tells Nick that he belongs to an old family with old money. By claiming to be an Oxford man and the heir of a San Francisco family, he tries to elevate his past to the level of Tom and Daisy’s which, if possible, would grant him a similar social status.(24)

    Gatsby’s deficiency lies partly in his belief that one can create an earthly paradise. However, this belief is naïve, stupid, and defenseless when juxtaposed with the world of Tom and Daisy. Tom and Daisy are incapable of not showing their contempt for members of a lower class. Daisy despises West Egg, the home of the nouveau riche where Gatsby lives, which is described as “this unprecedented ‘place’ that Broadway had begotten upon a Long Island fishing village—appalled by its raw vigor (…)” (Fitzgerald, 103). This contempt, as well as the bond between her and Tom, is a matter of similar upbringing and education. The fact that Daisy, who represents old money, is appalled by West Egg foreshadows that her affair with Gatsby will be short lived. Her reaction to what she sees as a vulgar place and a rather vulgar party indicates that Gatsby will never succeed in his attempt to win her back and recapture the situation of five years earlier.

    Although Gatsby is living a delusion, he perceives, in a flash, that Daisy’s charm and sentiments are founded purely on money. “Her voice is full of money,” he said suddenly. That was it. I’d never understood before. It was full of money—that was the inexhaustible charm that rose and fell on it, the jingle of it, the cymbal’s song of it. . . . High in a white palace the king’s daughter, the golden girl  (Fitzgerald, 115). Gatsby is so spellbound by money, luxury and snobbism that the insight is merely an observation without any consequence, either in relation to Daisy or his own lifestyle. However, this voice full of money has been modulated by good breeding, confidence, and good schooling, as well as by always having been loved,(25) things Gatsby has been deprived of and still yearns for. Not only is Daisy’s voice full of money, the very language in which Gatsby seduces Daisy the second time is also commercial.(26)

    When Tom reveals Gatsby’s background and criminal activity in the scene at the Plaza suite, fright and revulsion are reflected in Daisy’s expression, which Gatsby, blinded by his narcissism and gnostic vision of life, is unable to see as a consequence of his exposure as a fraud. In this scene (Fitzgerald, 120-129), Nick is initially impressed by Gatsby’s cleverness. Simultaneously he is baffled by the enormity of Gatsby’s vision. Even after having been exposed, Gatsby clearly believes that he will still be able to change the past so that he and Daisy can start anew. Gatsby’s rivalry is now so intense that the objects of both his love and his rivalry are totally blurred, and he seems to have reached the stage of madness at which there are no longer any objects present. Behind his gnostic canopy, his self-understanding, his sense of being a Son of God, lies the most intense desire to be among the elect, with the same status as the super-rich. At the end of the Plaza scene, everything is desire. The reader clearly sees that Gatsby’s chances of realizing his dream are waning minute by minute, leaving only a pathetic shell that Tom does not consider a threat; he allows Gatsby to drive off with his wife, knowing that she will never leave him for a bootlegger and criminal.

    After the car accident, when Gatsby is watching over Daisy outside Tom and Daisy’s mansion, it is evident that desire has destroyed everything. Gatsby’s vision seems weak and pathetic. As he leaves Gatsby to himself, Nick’s thought is that Gatsby is waiting for nothing (Fitzgerald, 139). Daisy has gone back to Tom, Myrtle is dead, and, some hours later, Mr. Wilson will kill Gatsby and then himself. Desire for love, success, and acceptance has been growing and maturing, and ultimately culminates in murderous acts, leaving the reader to unravel the puzzle of how class-consciousness, rejection of the lower classes, infidelity, and the yearning for success could end so tragically.

    Despite his privileged background, Nick becomes gradually aware that although Tom and Daisy are not typical criminals, they are worse than Gatsby. In the course of the novel, readers come to see how little they value other people’s lives. Nick concludes that they “were careless people . . . they smashed up things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness or whatever it was that kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess they had made” (Fitzgerald, 170). This critique of the careless attitude of the upper class is an indirect critique of the American culture depicted in The Great Gatsby, a culture which is surprisingly class-ridden. The American dream, as it appears in this novel, can never be fully attained because the people who have old money will never really accept the nouveau riche. In “The Rich Boy,” Fitzgerald claims that the rich “are different from you and me. They possess and enjoy early and it does something to them.”(27) However, Fitzgerald also highlights the fact that, when people of different classes mix, despite their outward differences, their desires are similar.

    Gatsby cannot win Daisy with his money, but without it he would not stand a chance of taking her away from Tom. However, this chance is not real; despite his fantastic ability to hope and no matter how hard he tries, he cannot change his past and he cannot change other people’s pasts. Gatsby dreams of restoring order amidst chaos, but his actions only create even more chaos.

    In the novel, Gatsby is depicted as a superman based on his outward performance; he is the master of water, earth, and air, represented by boat, car, and plane; however, fire, the fourth element, symbolized by love, cannot be conquered.(28) As mentioned, this rejection by the rich is something Fitzgerald himself had experienced, although in a milder and less violent manner. Before his breakdown around 1934, Fitzgerald believed life was something that you dominated if you were any good.(29) Afterwards, in his later years, he came to see that life dominates you. Gatsby, on the other hand, like so many great romantics, dies young and does not experience this gradual downfall.

    Gatsby: Hero and Criminal

    There is a certain mystery about how Fitzgerald has been able to make Gatsby into a hero. Gatsby is depicted as being boorish; he has no friends, only hangers-on. He is a roughneck, a fraud, and a criminal. He is frightening in his own lack of morals and his lawless aestheticism is rather despicable. His taste is vulgar, his behavior ostentatious, his love adolescent, and his business dealings ruthless; and he is clearly dishonest on a personal level. He is interested in people only when he needs them to achieve his goals. His nice gestures stem from the fact that he does not want any trouble.(30) Most of what Gatsby is involved in is tinged with the most intense danger and desire; for example, bootlegging, fixing results in sporting events, and dealing with stolen bonds.

    However, Fitzgerald does not describe in detail the shady and criminal sides of Gatsby’s life; instead he hints, thereby holding the reader in suspense. The initial gossip is about his wealth, his parties, and his criminal past. When first introduced, Gatsby is described as a tanned, smartly dressed man of around 30, with short hair, exceedingly charming and discreet, and bearing an aura of mystery.

    According to André le Vot, Fitzgerald at the age of nine noted in his diary his suspicion that he was not his parents’ son, but a foundling of more exalted origins.(31) This theme is taken up in The Great Gatsby when Gatsby disowns his poor and very ordinary background and denies that his parents are his parents. Instead he looked upon himself as a Son of God (Fitzgerald, 95).

    Nick thinks that Gatsby turned out all right in the end because, in contrast to the Buchanans and Jordan, he had a goal in life beyond personal satisfaction. However, a closer examination of Gatsby’s Neo-Platonic self-understanding and his urge to recapture past experiences reveals little beyond self-satisfaction. In a way, Gatsby represents the American dream. However, he is also dishonest and passive in relation to religion, and therefore fundamentally estranged from the ideals of the founding fathers.(32) The references to the founding fathers are more nostalgic than real; their religious aims and ethos are inverted.

    In The Great Gatsby religion or religious hope has evaporated. Nevertheless, Gatsby himself is enormously hopeful. His ability to hope makes Nick admire him. But because there is such a gap between Gatsby’s hope and the reality of his life, the novel is devoid of hope at the end; there is no fundamental change or breakthrough in any of the characters’ lives or world-views. Desire in this illuminating novel has thoroughly released the characters from conventional Christian morals, and in so doing, exposed them to violence and death.

    The Workings of Desire

    Desire is initially a weakness; it consists of an urge to acquire something which one thinks others have. However, the core of desire lies in the notion that if one has what the other person seems to have, one will be fulfilled. In the act of desiring, the other person’s weakness is not taken into consideration, since desire makes people blind to the underlying causes of desire. Therefore, the desiring subjects always have the feeling of being hindered in reaching their goal. They do not consider the fact that the other either desires the same object (and the last thing they will do is let the subject have it) or will begin desiring the object of the subject’s desire and compete with the subject for it. In both cases, rivalry will have the upper hand, and the chances of the subject achieving the desired object is minimal. Thus, the main weakness of desire is the fact that humans are not only unable to fulfil the goals set out by desire, their goals often end up the opposite of what one expected:

    Modern people imagine that their discomfort and unease is a product of religious taboos, cultural prohibitions, even the legal forms of protection. They think that once this confinement is over, desire will be able to blossom forth. (René Girard. Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, 285.)

    All the main characters in The Great Gatsby are liberal in the sense that they are willing to break the puritan code.(33) Tom and Daisy find the American dream in a dreamless, visionless complacency of mere matter. They represent substance without form.(34) Fitzgerald’s early novels contained a breathless adoration of flapper heroines whose passionate kisses are tinged with frigidity and whose daring freedom masks an adolescent desire for reputation rather than the reality of experience.

    When viewed from a romantic perspective, only the negative sides of prohibitions are evident. Seen from the point of view of desire, prohibitions only exist to hurt or modify the life of individuals. Desire creates an anthropology of freedom, a freedom that is premised on the notion that if everyone pursues their heart’s desire, everyone will be happy. In deep contrast, Fitzgerald seems to indicate in this novel that desire threatens human relationships to such a degree that there is a need for prohibitions. Desire leads to conflict; it undermines relationships and, in extreme cases such as in The Great Gatsby, leads to murder, suicide, and madness.

    Gatsby is incapable of compromising in relation to his inner vision. He is a Son of God, therefore he controls time.(35) At the end of the novel, the level of Gatsby’s desire has reached such a pitch that he seems to have lost sight of his object (Daisy). In the scene where he is waiting around Tom’s estate, there are indications of a development towards madness; his delusion that he can repeat the past seems to have lost contact with any rational, worldly reality.

    Gatsby creates his own rules and his own private morality which ultimately prove futile. Nick, however, affirms the value of Gatsby’s failed dream. Since Nick is attracted to Gatsby, he is not able to lead the reader to the Promised Land, where desire is explored and revealed. At the end of the novel, he is still biased, although he has become less priggish and more broadminded.

    In The Great Gatsby emptiness and moral indifference eventually lead to violence and death. Already in Chapter I, the brutality in Tom’s behavior foreshadows death as a result of desire. At the same time, despite her wealth and beauty, Daisy makes the American dream look somewhat shallow and hollow. Her lack of contact with reality is exposed at one of Gatsby’s parties when she describes a woman as gorgeous, while Nick describes the same woman as an orchid, scarcely human (Fitzgerald, 101). In the beginning of the novel, she suddenly suggests that a bird outside of the house is an owl, in order to hide the fact that Myrtle has been on the phone to Tom.(36) This is a reference to Keats’ “Ode to a Nightingale,” a poem about beauty, desire, and death, which in the novel is a symbol that echoes the hollow notes of Tom and Daisy’s lost love.(37) Tom’s infidelity makes her frivolity sterile and her sentimentality hollow.

    The characters’ sense of uprootedness is partly a topological problem. Gatsby, Nick, Daisy, Tom, and Jordan are all from the West. One of the issues addressed in The Great Gatsby is the conflict between the surviving Puritan morality of the West and the post-war hedonism of the East. In a way, all of the main characters have become slightly decadent as a result of this move. Nick, however, can return to the West since he has not suffered the same moral degeneration as Tom, Daisy and Jordan.(38)

    Girardian Interpretations of The Great Gatsby

    Two scholars have published articles on The Great Gatsby from a Girardian point of view. Both emphasize the scapegoat dimension in the novel. In “The Great Gatsby: Romance or Holocaust,” Thomas J. Cousineau sees Gatsby as a classic scapegoat who, by his death, enables the other characters to continue living their violent and sacrificial lives. However, my main objection to Cousineau is the fact that he blames Nick for being the main scapegoater,(39) a reading that focuses on deceptive self-understanding instead of the desires that stem from violent action. Stephen L. Gardner, in “Democracy and Desire in The Great Gatsby,” sees democracy basically being born by a heightened degree of mimetic desire, and thus seems to want to defend the old aristocratic world, the world of those born into old money, against the upcoming romantic heroes who are about to rise from their poor backgrounds and threaten their privileges.(40) This kind of interpretation probably exposes a weakness in Girardian theory where negative social upheaval is seen to be one-sidedly caused by the romantic lie. This leads to a naïve understanding of a sensualistic and naturalistic-oriented desire. Destructive acts such as the violent workings of Tom Buchanan are, therefore, less exposed. Tom is, in both Gardner’s and Cousineau’s articles, treated incredibly mildly. It is telling that both tone down the episodes concerning the affair between Myrtle and Tom, and the episode at The Plaza Hotel where Tom’s vulgar and dark social Darwinism is exposed Thus the reader avoids seeing the close symmetry between romantic and naturalistic desire, where Tom, in the words of Richard Lehan, seems to represent the naturalistic, physical force of the new America— “the America in which force is embodied in corporations and in money institutions, embodied in the new urban process, and controlled by finance and the power of information.(41) My aim is to show how desire among the characters only varies in degree, not in essence, thus paving the way towards an understanding of desire as wholly based on the other’s desire.

    From Class and Ideology to Pure Desire

    Tom Buchanan represents the old social elite, characterized as brutal, class-conscious, irresponsible, undisciplined, racist, idle, and philandering. The smug conceit of “The Rich Boy” has hardened into Tom’s arrogant cruelty. This is reflected in Fitzgerald’s prose, which in this novel treats racial prejudices as real prejudices to be taken seriously. In The Beautiful and Damned, this issue is addressed in relation to the character Gloria, who displays a mixture of playful romanticism and cynical Nietzscheanism. In contrast, the cynicism in The Great Gatsby is less admirable and less attractive, as evident in Daisy’s willingness to sacrifice everyone and everything that stands in the way of her pleasures.

    In Fitzgerald’s work, there is often a connection between snobbery and racism. Fitzgerald’s ambivalence is evident in Maury Noble’s reflections on inferior races in The Beautiful and Damned.(42) However, such reflections appear to be less smart, and more violent and despicable, when Tom Buchanan claims “it’s up to us, who are the dominant race, to watch out or these others will have the control of things” (Fitzgerald, 18).(43) Tom tries to defend his position by referring to science or, more correctly, pseudo-science. Nick, however, seems to view Tom’s racist remarks as an example of his limited intelligence and outmoded ideas rather than outright racism.(44) Even though Nick is the most considerate character in the novel and never directly scapegoats anyone, his attitude towards Jews and blacks is condescending and he does not incorporate them in his American dream.

    Gatsby’s urge to rise in society leads to naïve imitation, sometimes making him look ridiculous. His house is modelled on a typically European style. It looks like a Hôtel de Ville from Normandy. It has a Gothic library, a Marie Antoinette music room, and a study which imitates the design of 18th century Scottish architects Robert and James Adam. Similarly, Myrtle’s apartment in New York reflects her social ambitions; the dining room is vulgar and its décor resembles French rococo paintings such as Fragonard’s “The Swing,” alluding to the frivolity going on in the apartment.(45) Both Myrtle and Gatsby, despite the fact that they represent populist vitality, are romantics who lack taste and refinement. In contrast, Tom and Daisy have the taste that old money can buy, although Tom reveals a lack of taste by imitating the old colonizers’ style in his choice of his riding clothes. He is actually a parody of an English country gentleman. Daisy is hollow and lacks integrity. The split in her is marked by an inconsistency of her looks. Sometimes her hair is blonde, sometimes dark.(46)

    Lewis’ comment that one cannot buy integrity or taste seems generally valid. However, taste is relative. Tom and Daisy’s taste is a quality that is associated with their money and their backgrounds. The link between taste and integrity is no longer evident in either of them. Within a short time span, Gatsby has acquired the taste of the nouveau riche, and he is as lacking in integrity as Tom and Daisy, Jordan, Mr. Wilson, and Myrtle. Nick is the only person with any moral integrity, so despite their different backgrounds, he is able to like Gatsby. Otherwise, the lack of likeable characters in The Great Gatsby is remarkable. Only Michaelis, a young Greek who runs an all-night restaurant, is characterized in a really positive way.

    The Victimizing Process

    In The Great Gatsby, the seriously rich are both winners and villains. Nicolas Tredell, from a class perspective, sees Myrtle as the sacrificial victim whose dramatic death restores the equilibrium between Daisy and Tom. However, the victimizing game can be greatly expanded. Gatsby also becomes a victim of their thwarted desire, as does Pammy, Tom and Daisy’s daughter. Tom also turns Mr. Wilson into a victim, thereby provoking him to victimize Gatsby. Gatsby’s disruption of the Buchanan family, as if Daisy’s marriage and child count for nothing, mean that he is not an innocent victim. Jordan does not actively victimize anyone, as she is wrapped in an impenetrable narcissism. However, her haughtiness and arrogance reflect a softer form of victimizing.

    The victimization process may be viewed as the pulse that drives the plot in this novel. In most of the victimization scenes, the outcome is to Tom and Daisy’s benefit. They are the novel’s primary victimizers, sacrificing anyone in their vicinity who threatens their hollow and wasteful lives, even each other. The novel actually culminates in the car crash, where all previous desires suddenly come together in one event and constitute what may be considered a typical modern sacrificial scene in which violence is engendered indirectly and at random.

    According to Tredell, romanticism in early 20th century America is bound up with capitalism, materialism, brutality, waste, selfishness, and infidelity.(47) He goes on to claim that romantic desire is insatiable and the desirability of the goal depends on its separation from the desiring subject. Once satiated, it ceases to be romantic desire.(48) Harold Bloom actually attributes Gatsby’s greatness to the fact that there is no authentic object for his desire.(49) Gatsby, Bloom, claims, “is both subject and object of his own quest.(50)

    Gatsby thinks he can realize his dreams by breaking a moral code. He clearly does not distinguish between money obtained by crime and money obtained by legal means. Tom and Daisy are also continually trespassing on moral ground, while Jordan lives her professional life by cheating.

    Nick’s attraction for Jordan is superficial throughout the novel. In their first encounter, she acts as if she is totally indifferent. She is boyish, fresh, and arrogant, which attracts Nick. She reminds him of a good illustration. Their affair seems half-hearted and lacks sensuality—a typical trait in Fitzgerald’s work. However, Gary J. Scrimgeour claims that Jordan’s unconcern for any other standards beyond those of frank self-indulgence is evidence enough that the two became lovers.(51) Nick accuses Jordan of being a careless driver,(52) and she surprisingly responds with hedonistic honesty, saying that is why she chooses to associate with people who are not careless. In their last conversation, Jordan accuses Nick of the same carelessness that he has accused Tom and Daisy of; and at the end of the novel, Nick has come to the conclusion that Jordan has created her personality out of a series of successful gestures. Other than that her life is purposeless and empty.

    Scrimgeour points out that the characters in The Great Gatsby are all weak characters, indicating that the novel lacks depth. Viewed from this perspective, Jordan may not seem to be a very significant character. However, she is a character of utmost interest when the novel is read as a depiction of the attitudes that prevailed in the 1920’s and the role desire played in people’s lives at the time. Scrimgeour does not succeed in distinguishing, therefore, between the characters’ morals and the moral of the novel. A novel is not weak because the characters are weak.(53) It is also a gross exaggeration when he claims that there is no difference between Nick throwing Jordan over and the brutality of Tom.(54)

    Although Nick is not a detached observer, he is the only character able to tell a story from a perspective that is not totally dominated by his or her own subjectivity. While Nick’s moral insight is sometimes faulty, such as when he claims he never passes judgment on others while he does it all the time, he is, nevertheless, the least desiring of the characters and the one who sees the events most clearly. Nick’s ability to imitate, his openness to outside influences, brings him closer to Gatsby than he realizes. They both dream of a new and enchanted life in the East. Gatsby’s schedule for self-improvement is in essence not very different from Nick’s plans when purchasing books on banking.(55) They are both in search of the American dream, one by legal methods and the other by criminal means. Gatsby would probably not have been such a fascinating and mythological character if he had not been seen through Nick’s eyes.

    Nick is a reliable narrator insofar as he discards what is false, exploits wild rumors and clears away misconceptions. His role resembles that of a detective. However, he is better at deciphering other people’s motives than his own. He is clearly vulnerable to the luxury of the Buchanans’ or Gatsby’s charm and attractive gestures. His relation to Jordan is, despite the physical attraction, tinged with irritation. Her arrogance, moral relativism, and carefree approach to life seem both to attract and repel Nick. However, due to the intensity of his desire, the reader never learns much about what really happens between the two.

    A Novel of Idolatry

    Read as a novel about idolatry, about how people become gods in one another’s eyes, the Christian symbolism which runs through the chapters takes on new meaning. The biblically inspired prose indicates that, perhaps unconsciously, Fitzgerald is exploring a society in which idolatry has replaced Christian values. Thus, The Great Gatsby can be read allegorically as a story about the consequences of replacing a transcendent God with worldly gods. Gatsby is, one must remember, working in “his Father’s business, the service of a vast, vulgar and meretricious beauty” (Fitzgerald, 95), alluding to Jesus as a twelve-year-old in the temple telling his parents “Wist ye not that I must be about my Father’s business?”(56) The replacement of a transcendent God with a penetrating but non-caring god in the form of the enormous billboard of a staring occultist, Doctor T.J. Eckleburg, creates a waste land where agape gives way to Eros. Desire for money, success, infidelity, and moderate violence has replaced traditional Christian virtues such as humility, patience, fidelity, and love of one’s neighbor.

    The religious overtones imply that Gatsby becomes a Son of God and Daisy his Virgin Mary. Unlike Jesus in the Gospels, his conception is a matter of vulgar and meretricious beauty. His church is a fake, in the shape of an absurd mansion, an imitation of a Hôtel de Ville in Normandy; and in this place of worship, instead of pilgrims praying, there is a constant flow of lonely, uprooted people chattering indecently late into the night, sipping cocktails and drinking champagne.

    Gatsby is a Platonist insofar as he holds an image of himself as a Son of God. However, I would refine this perspective by claiming that he is actually a modern gnostic; he is thrown into this meaningless existence, and has to fight his way through the emptiness clinging to a dream of recapturing the spark that was ignited five years earlier in Louisville when he experienced a sacramental unity with his goddess. The kiss is compared to an incarnation, a blossoming (Fitzgerald, 107). Gatsby’s dream of being able to stop time and nostalgically repeat certain moments of the past can be viewed as replacing the Christian hope and longing for heaven. Moreover, the aesthetic scene in which Gatsby shows Daisy his piles of beautiful shirts (Fitzgerald, 89), a sight which causes her to weep, is reminiscent of a religious sacrament.(57)

    Gatsby is working his way free of the material life, renouncing his parents because they are lost in the mire of matter, while he is saved by the exertion of great willpower, which enables him to recapture and prolong these moments of bliss. The madness of the whole project lies not in the attempt to repeat the past but in the attempt to repeat the past as if the circumstances have not changed. Such attempts are, in practice, impossible when one does not consider the changes. This seems, in the case of Gatsby, absolutely impossible. The fact that he keeps looking at Tom and Daisy’s daughter with surprise, without having really believed in her existence,(58) reveals the madness of his plan. Gatsby is incapable of considering the five years which have passed To Gatsby, the fact that Daisy has married and given birth to a daughter is only a preliminary hindrance. The urge to wipe out these five years is Gatsby’s madness, revealing an advanced stage of narcissism.

    Gatsby’s modern version of Gnosticism is reminiscent of the classic gnostic worldview in which the development is from the material to the psychic. However, the psychic in The Great Gatsby is a development towards a form of sterility in which desire creates various forms of psychic prisons.

    Even though Gatsby has been able to acquire all the material goods that people usually dream of, these give him no real pleasure. Gatsby’s sole pleasure lies in trying to win back Daisy in order to fulfill his dream of evoking the same deep feelings he had experienced five years earlier. Clearly, this sacred moment was, for Gatsby, a religious epiphany. At the moment when he kissed Daisy for the first time, he sees, out of the corner of his eye, that the blocks of the sidewalk form a ladder which climbs to “a secret place above the trees” (Fitzgerald, 106). The ladder alludes to Jacob’s dream (Genesis 28.10-19) in which angels are revealed going up and down a ladder, and the Lord is standing beside him in a place named Beth-El (“House of God”).

    Being a Son of God, Gatsby is linked to Gnostics such as Simon Magus and to later Gnostics who, according to Irenaeus, think they are spiritual by nature and do not have to live a moral life in order to be saved. As it is impossible for the earthly element to partake in salvation, spiritual man can “intemperately serve the lusts of the flesh and say that one renders flesh to the flesh and spirit to the spirit.(59)

    While the romantics extolled the glories of nature, the world represented in The Great Gatsby gradually changes into a ghostly world in which nature becomes something grotesque.(60) Nick speaks metaphorically of the earth lurching away from the sun (Fitzgerald, 42). The earth is described as stumbling inelegantly and erratically away from the sun, which indicates that the earth no longer has any real life source on which to grow. At the end of chapter VIII, Nick tries to enter into Gatsby’s haunted mind the day after the car accident; he tries to imagine how unreal Gatsby must find the new world into which he has been thrown so brutally. Nick describes the sunlight as raw, a rose as grotesque, and leaves as frightening,(61) as if experiencing a world that is material without being real.

    The depreciation of nature, which Hans Jonas claims is a common trait in both Gnosticism and Existentialism,(62) can, in The Great Gatsby, be the consequence of desire run wild. The last sentence in the novel, “so we beat on, boats against the current, born back ceaselessly into the past,” indicates that it is impossible for those who give in to desire to fulfill their dream.

    The theme of idolatry is further emphasized in the scene in which Nick stares for half an hour at Gatsby’s mansion in much the same way as Kant stares at the church steeples (Fitzgerald, 85). Nick is no philosopher but there is a certain existential curiosity in his attempt to discover some kind of meaning in the increasingly dramatic events of that summer. However, this meaning is so limited that it can be summed up in Gatsby’s incredible ability to hope, against all odds.

    In The Great Gatsby, God has absconded, just like the gnostic God of the Spirit. Wilson is the only person in the novel who calls on God, but his God is strange and estranged. Wilson does not belong to any church or know any church.(63) His is a new god, symbolically linked to a billboard. Wilson is transfixed by the material god, the god who sees everything and cannot be fooled, but does not care, like the eyes of Doctor T.J. Eckleburg. He is depicted as lifeless and grey, as someone who has been killed by desire before he kills himself. In the enormous advertisement of Doctor T.J. Eckleburg, a change in religious outlook is evident. The Christian God has been replaced by a new and inactive God, who sees everything. This God, devoid of desire and compassion, broods over the godless valley of ashes with his blue eyes, his yellow glasses and non-existent nose, illustrating the nothingness which concludes the novel.

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    __________. Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World. London: Athlone Press. 1987.

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    Notes

    1. Nicolas Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, NY: Continuum, 2009, 10. 2. James C. Howell, “History of Street Gangs in the United States 4,” National Gang Center Bulletin, May 2010, 6. 3. Eugene Webb, Philosophy of Consciousness. Polanyi, Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard, Kierkegaard, London and Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988, 184. 4. “The dynamism of mimetic desire has always been oriented towards death and madness.” (See René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, London: Athlone Press. 1987, 414.) “Mimetic desire thinks that it always chooses the most life-affirming path, whereas in actuality it turns increasingly towards the obstacle—toward sterility and death.” (ibid, 415.) 5. See René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, 162, 322, 416-31; The Girard Reader (ed James Williams), NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996, 161, 198-99, 215-16; René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2001, 16. 6. The difference between romantic and realist literature is not a difference according to epoch. The difference is based on an approach towards desire. There is, however, in Girard’s work, a preference for novels written in the realist tradition. 7. Robert Ornstein, “Scott Fitzgerald’s Fable of East and West,” in Ernest H. Lockridge (ed). Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 55. 8. James E. Miller Jr, “Boats against the Current” in Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 53. 9. Gunhild Enmo, “Borne back ceaselessly into the past. En lesning av F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, Master Degree; Trondheim, NTNU, vår, 2006, 32. 10. F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, London: Penguin Modern Classics, 2000, 9. 11. Lockridge (ed). Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 10. 12. Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 19. 13. Gary J. Scrimgeour. “Against The Great Gatsby,” in Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 73. 14. Ibid, 80. 15. Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 2009, 40-41. 16. Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, 171. 17. Robert Emmet Long, The Achieving of The Great Gatsby. F. Scott Fitzgerald, 1920-1925, London: Associated University Presses, 1979, 180-181. 18. Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 75. 19. André le Vot, F. Scott Fitzgerald. A Biography, NY: Warner Books, 1983, 48-51. 20. Ibid., 48-49. 21. Scott Donaldson (ed), Critical Essays on F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, Boston Massachusetts: G.K. Hall & Co, 1984) 18. 22. Roger Lewis, “Money, Love, and Aspiration in The Great Gatsby, in Matthew Bruccoli (ed), New Essays on The Great Gatsby, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985, 43. See also Roger Lathbury, “Money, Love, and Aspiration in The Great Gatsby,” in Harold Bloom (ed), Jay Gatsby, NY: Chelsea House, 2004, 71. 23. Fitzgerald admitted “The Sensible thing” was based on him and Zelda, on Zelda breaking up with him and, later, the marriage issue. The Letters of F. Scott Fitzgerald, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1963, 189. 24. See Warner, W Lloyd; Meeker, Marcha; & Eells, Kenneth, “What Social Class Is in America,” in Rhonda F. Levine (ed), Social Class and Stratification—Classic Statements and Theoretical Debates, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 74. 25. F.H. Langham, “Style and Shape in The Great Gatsby,” in Scott Donaldson (ed), Critical Essays on F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, Boston: G.K. Hall & Co, 1984, 47. 26. Roger Lathbury, “Money, Love, and Aspiration in The Great Gatsby,” in Harold Bloom (ed), Jay Gatsby, NY: Chelsea House, 2004, 73. 27. F. Scott Fitzgerald, “The Rich Boy,” in The Collected Short Stories of F. Scott Fitzgerald, 110. 28. Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 13. 29. Ibid., 3. 30. Scrimgeour, “Against The Great Gatsby,” in H. Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 73. 31. Le Vot, F. Scott Fitzgerald. A Biography, 13. <32. Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 81-82. 33. James E. Miller Jr, “Boats against the Current” in Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 48. 34. Ibid., 52. 35. Giles Mitchell, “Gatsby is a Pathological Narcissist,” in Readings on The Great Gatsby, San Diego: Greenham Press, 1998, 62. 36. Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, 20. 37. Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 35. 38. Thomas A. Hanzo, “The Theme and the Narrator of The Great Gatsby,” in H. Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 66-68. 39. Thomas J. Cousineau, “The Great Gatsby: Romance or Holocaust?” Contagion 8 (Spring 2001), 22-28. 40. Stephen L. Gardner, “Democracy and Desire in The Great Gatsby,” in Palaver & Steinmar-Pösel (eds), Passions in Economy, Politics and the Media, Band 17, Wien: Lit Verlag, 2005, 281-83. 41. Richard Lehan, “Inventing Gatsby,” in Harold Bloom (ed), Jay Gatsby, NY: Chelsea House, 2004, 89-90. 42. F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Beautiful and Damned, NY: Scribner’s, 1950, 255. 43. James E. Miller Jr, “Boats against the Current,” in Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 1968, 31. 44. Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 44. 45. Ibid., 47. 46. Ibid., 86.47. Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 36. 48. Ibid. 49. Harold Bloom, “Introduction” in Harold Bloom (ed), Jay Gatsby, NY: Chelsea House, 2004, 4. 50. Ibid. 51. Thomas A. Hanzo, “The Theme and the Narrator of The Great Gatsby,” in Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 64. 52. Driving represents a strain of irresponsibility deep in the whole of society. See F.H. Langham, “Style and Shape in The Great Gatsby,” in Scott Donaldson (ed), Critical Essays on Scott F. Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 51. 53. See Scrimgeour, “Against The Great Gatsby,” in Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 79. 54. Ibid., 75. 55. F.H. Langman, “Style and Shape in The Great Gatsby,” in Scott Donaldson (ed), Critical Essays on F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby. 56. Tredell, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 21. 57. James E. Miller Jr, “Boats against the Current” in Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 1968, 39. 58. Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, 111. 59. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses I, 6.2-3, in Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, 270-271. 60. David L. Minter, “Dream, Design and Interpretation in The Great Gatsby,” in Lockridge (ed), Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Great Gatsby. A Collection of Critical Essays, 87. 61. Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, 153. 62. Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, 337. 63. Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, 150.

  • Benchmarks (Anthropoetics XXI, no. 1)

    About Our Contributors

    Per Bjørnar Grande is Docent at Bergen University College, Norway in Religion and Philosophy. His main focus is religious anthropology and literary analysis. Grande has published five books, including Mimesis and Desire. An Analysis of the Religious Nature of Mimesis and Desire in the Work of René Girard (Köln: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2009), as well as a number of articles on religion, art and literature. He is currently writing a book on Meaning in History.

    Marina Ludwigs teaches English Literature at Stockholm University. She has a PhD in Comparative Literature from UC Irvine and has worked with, and presented papers on, both Girardian theory and Generative Anthropology. Her current interest is bringing into dialogue narratology and Generative Anthropology.

    Benjamin Matthews is an Adjunct Fellow in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts at the University of Western Sydney and a freelance consultant in the media industry. He has a PhD in Communication from the University of Newcastle, where he was a Digital Communication Lecturer 2000-2014. His research interests lie in the area of anthropology of representation and the media, and in particular, with texts and textuality provided through digital communication technology.

    Edmond Wright holds degrees in English and philosophy and a doctorate in philosophy. He is a member of the Board of Social Theory of the International Sociological Association, and was sometime a Fellow at the Swedish Collegium for the Advanced Study of the Social Sciences, Uppsala. He has edited The Ironic Discourse (Poetics Today, 4, 1983), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception (Avebury, 1993), Faith and the Real (Paragraph, 24, 2001), and The Case for Qualia (MIT Press, forthcoming, May 2008), and has co-edited with his wife Elizabeth The Zizek Reader, (Blackwell, 1999) and is author of Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith (Macmillan, 2005). Over sixty articles of his have appeared in the philosophical journals. He has also published two volumes of poetry.

  • Post-Fukuyama Reflections

    I have long defended in these Chronicles (e.g., Chronicles 35, 247, 344…) the fundamental point of Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that liberal democracy constitutes the ultimate form of human organization, and that in this narrow sense he was correct in calling the end of the Cold War in 1989 the “end of history.” I won’t go over the point that this “end” should rather be understood as the beginning of a new era with its own problems, but one can say with conviction that despite the occasional yearnings of such as Thomas Friedman for Chinese-style authoritarianism, we have seen nothing since 1989 that gives the slightest hint that there is a more productive social ethic than the one that grew out of the English and American Revolutions. (In contrast, the value of the contribution of the French Revolution will probably always remain ambivalent. The Trotskyite “permanent revolution” idea is too deeply implicit in it for it to be forgotten. Burkean wisdom could only be brought to French governance through a series of oscillations that took up most of the 19th century, and even today, the West’s Revolutionary nostalgia reserves an indulgent smile for Bakunin and Che Guevara while holding the Napoleon IIIs and Pinochets in contempt.)

    I am still guardedly optimistic about the future of the USA and by extension of the West in which it remains, even under the current administration, the leading power and model. But the other side of the argument deserves consideration, and that is the purpose of this Chronicle.


    The liberal-democratic system is founded on an in principle free economic market, “capitalism” if you like, but subject to a legal system controlled by a political “market” where citizens each have one vote, and where the interests, or as I prefer to put it, the resentments, of the different elements of society are negotiated. All such political systems contain “checks and balances,” more elaborate in the US than elsewhere, designed to prevent the tyranny of the majority. But whether the executive be an emanation of the parliament or an elected official in his own right, these systems all function to permit the market to operate as freely as possible, given the inequalities it perpetuates and/or generates.

    Needless to say, this is an extremely schematic description of a liberal-democratic polity. But Fukuyama’s essential point is not that some specific arrangement, that of the US or of another nation, is the final stage of social evolution, but merely that the basic formula of a “free” market coupled with “free” elections cannot be improved upon—and in particular that “planned economies” run by authoritarian rulers with little or no feedback from the citizenry cannot operate as efficiently as democracies. The Hayekian principle that the market, if left to its own resources, is “more intelligent” than its participants has shown itself to be true. China’s recent stock market difficulties provide the latest demonstration that the market can only be truly free in a democratic system. “End of history” or no, Fukuyama surely had a point in seeing the end of the Cold War as a watershed; Soviet communism was the final attempt by an alternative system to outperform “capitalist” economies, and it failed.


    There is great wisdom in Churchill’s famous quip that democracy is the worst political system with the exception of all the others. What this means is that the “others” impose constraints that limit social creativity, whereas democracies go off in all directions. But this is only possible when the participants share a common faith in the overall justness of what has been historically a national system. The negotiation of resentments requires that these resentments be kept under control, that whatever one’s loyalty to a subgroup, ascriptive or otherwise, one is first and foremost a citizen of the nation-state. This is of course a matter of degree, but the current victimary ideology is not only self-perpetuating but tends to link together those whose resentment against the current state of affairs is stronger than their loyalty to the whole. The Black Lives Matter movement’s insistence that persons apologize to it for asserting that “all lives matter” is as good a symbol of this as any.

    The problem is not that blacks or women or Jews, or white males for that matter, feel resentment. Resentment is both humanity’s original sin and its means of perceiving injustice. But the social order must be very careful not to let it be understood that any particular resentment is ipso facto a proof of injustice. That this seems to become increasingly possible—in the universities, certainly—is a sign that the (mostly white) ruling class of American society is running scared. White Guilt, as I affirmed in a discussion with Adam in 2007 (see Chronicles 341 and 342), is less a sign of inner turmoil than a fear that those who share the privilege of Western civilization cannot protect themselves from the resentment of those who claim the status of its victims, whether at home or (in far vaster numbers) in the Third World.

    That the West lacks the will to rid the world of the Islamic State or even Nigeria of Boko Haram is not a good sign. Since WWII, the US has acted as the world’s policeman in reaction to threats to the world order. But now our leaders prefer to be concerned with climate change. For in this, we can imagine that all the world’s people can act as one; all can commune in the White Guilt of despoilers of the environment.


    Perhaps the most fundamental change in international relations since the end of WWII is the end of total war. The recoil from the victimary horrors of Auschwitz is inseparable from the apocalyptic visions conjured up by Hiroshima.

    The postwar vision of economic productivity replacing war as the crucial field of international competition was a great optimistic act of faith in human firstness. Today we can recall Khrushchev’s 1956 “we will bury you” speech—a few days after the Soviets crushed the Hungarian Revolution—as an almost idyllic moment that made clear that, whatever their differences, both systems were competing in the same court. Post-Stalin Communism and Western democracy had similar roots and, without thinking much about it, obeyed similar social norms. We owe at least a glimmer of sympathy to Putin’s declaration that the demise of the Soviet Union was the great tragedy of (the second half of) the 20th century. The great powers understood each other in ways inconceivable between the West and such entities as the Islamic State or Islamic Iran. The turmoil that reigns today throughout the Middle East is more bloody and more hateful than the Cold War. For the leaders of these societies are quite aware that, insofar as the West is concerned, under current “asymmetric” conditions, the very conception of war as a maximal competition between states, as theorized from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, is no longer in force. They too hope to “bury us,” but neither on the battlefield nor on the production line.

    The last real wars we fought, in Korea and Vietnam, ended first in stalemate (nonetheless with a successful outcome in “our” half of the peninsula) and then in defeat. We might perhaps have won the Vietnam war, or at least maintained our commitment to the South, but the public was fed up, and the draft aroused anxiety and anger in those asked to risk their lives when the nation was not under threat. More importantly, it was already clear that the kind of transformation in enemy attitudes that followed WWII could not be brought about in a former colony whose communist insurgency could appeal to nationalist sentiments. Communist Vietnam, after a brutal start, has followed the Chinese hybrid of centralized power and capital market, but neither Vietnam nor China itself seems anywhere near converting to Western-style political pluralism.

    But there was worse to come. The “asymmetric” wars in the Middle East have not only been limited by the propaganda-driven need to avoid civilian casualties; they were never true contests of civilizations in the first place. The economic superiority of the West over states such as Iraq and Syria was never in question. It was in accordance with what appeared at the time the irresistible example of the conversion of the Warsaw Pact states to the Western model that George W. Bush, with what we see in hindsight as naïve over-optimism, invaded Iraq in the belief that once its brutal dictator had been removed, it, and eventually the other states of the region, would likewise turn to liberal democracy. We have now been disabused of this illusion. Had Obama maintained a military presence in Iraq after 2010, we might have learned whether some new mode of liberal democracy had a chance of emerging in this region; that is a chance we are not likely to see again for quite a while.

    As things stand today, international asymmetries in values and access to means of destabilizing violence make it possible for Islamists with no thought of rivaling Western liberal economies to challenge the West in peripheral areas and even to aspire to its eventual destruction in its home territory. 9/11 was in this regard a watershed.

    That IS’s weaponry—as well as its glitz and its means of publicity—are parasitic on the West is the inevitable result of Western firstness. Firstness does not mean “privilege” in the sense in which we are told to check our privilege; firstness is human innovation that will by the nature of humanity be shared with others. But whereas sharing cell phones and Facebook—and plastic explosives—requires very little infrastructure, sharing the means to produce these things, let alone to improve them and invent new ones, is far more difficult. But it is also unnecessary. Whereas China, and even Russia, see themselves vis-à-vis the West as rival industrial powers, the Islamists of Iran and above all of IS are motivated primarily by religio-ethical rather than socioeconomic considerations.

    It is a thought horrible to contemplate, but the integration of Western technology into the tribal society of the Middle East may well be better accomplished by IS than by either ramshackle faux-Western governments such as we find today in Iraq or secular dictatorships like Syria. The Caliphate is so to speak Islam’s natural political form, as the nation-state has been that of Western Christianity. Islamic governance tends to adopt an imperial structure overlaying civil societies of tribal rather than national composition, and as we discovered in the second Iraq war, this underlying tribal configuration is highly resistant to change. The jihadists are unconcerned with providing a higher living standard than Western civilization, so long as their access to oil wealth (not to speak of extortion, the drug trade, etc.) provides general prosperity. Aside from some publicity-oriented massacres, the day-to-day level of tyranny in IS is probably not markedly higher than in Saudi Arabia or Iran (not to speak of China, Cuba, or North Korea), and one can imagine that for the average person who obeys Sharia and stays out of trouble, the level of fairness and governmental honesty is probably greater.

    Thus Fukuyama may well have been right, theoretically and empirically, that measured by any objective standard of human welfare over a reasonable time span, liberal democracy is the “final” social order, and yet wrong to the extent that, now that for the first time the world order is truly global, liberal-democratic nations cannot bring their economic superiority to bear either to convert or to subjugate the polities practicing other systems. It is useless to seek to determine whether the impossibility of total war in the era of nuclear weaponry and terrorist insurgency or the West’s loss of faith in its civilizational superiority is the chicken or the egg. Both go together, and the latter surely feeds on the decay of traditional Western religious and social norms and the concomitant attraction of the far cruder version of these norms enforced by Islamists. Perhaps we should broaden our conception of the “boredom” Fukuyama predicted for the West to refer to the developed world’s citizenry’s increasing disinclination to risk their lives by defending themselves or to insure their civilization’s future by reproducing themselves.


    Yet the practitioners of liberal democracy in the West, along with nations such as Japan that have adapted its values and institutions, nonetheless remain—but for how long?—humanity’s chief exemplars of firstness. And firstness, like the Hebrews’ “election” that made them a “light unto the nations,” is meant to be shared with others as the foundation of human progress.

    It is easy to condemn the colonialist ideal of the “white man’s burden.” But if we call it instead “Europe’s burden,” and refuse to equate its implementation with sinister paternalist caricatures like Leopold’s Belgian Congo, this ideal at its best was an assertion of firstness not as a racial but as a human responsibility. What indeed were the efforts of Médecins sans frontières and the US Army during last year’s Ebola epidemic other than generous examples of Western firstness in action? Not only did these agencies do their best to cure the sick and prevent the spread of the epidemic, but they helped to train and equip local African medical teams to handle future emergencies. Skin color has nothing to do with such activity; it was simply a case of the better organized societies helping the less well organized.

    For Western nations to maintain their liberal-democratic advantage and help spread it to the rest of the world, they must be motivated by generosity, but also by a modest degree of patriotic pride. Firstness operates by example. Where White Guilt promotes resentful parasitism among its “victims,” pride and generosity encourage positive emulation. Whatever his other views on economic matters, I think the Pope as a good Christian would agree with me on this point.


  • Religion and Firstness

    The cognitive content of religious discourse, when it is taken seriously at all in the secular world, is generally limited to the moral domain. If religion gets any credit at all among the intelligentsia, it is for promoting human reciprocity: “all are equal in the eyes of the Lord.” The Ten Commandments largely embody, albeit with some extraneous material, the morality of “do unto others…,” which Hillel famously considered the equivalent of “the Law and the prophets.”

    But this gets religion essentially backward. No special doctrine is required to teach universal equality; it is the closest thing we have to a “moral instinct.” Its formulation as a set of rules, that is, as an ethic, is a reminder that even in hierarchical societies, reciprocity is respected in most human interactions. But the key function of religion is quite the contrary: the affirmation of firstness. The moral reciprocity of humans depends on the firstness of gods, and minimally, of the One God who still rules the West; human firstness is a reflection of divine firstness. If religion is in trouble in the West today, it is that it has largely abandoned the defense of God and firstness, if not the reality of firstness itself, out of impatience with its slowly-yielding dominance in the face of the resentment of what we sometimes still call the “Third World,” the world of the West’s “victims.”


    Religion is a fairly specific social phenomenon; the sacred, in contrast, is coterminous with the human, not as what it is, but as what it is not. As a minimal definition, anything whose appropriation is deferred through representation is, to that extent, sacred. Which is to say that humans live in a world of sacrality. With the exception of a few instinctive gestures and “irresistible impulses” justly considered evidence of insanity, the sane human mind is always mediated by signs.

    In tribal, egalitarian societies, forms of reciprocity always prevail, and any asymmetry is in principle balanced by an equivalent; this is the message of Mauss’ seminal Essai sur le don. Any example of firstness, as exemplified by the gift A gives B, must be compensated by a similar exercise, either a gift from B to A, or more characteristically, from B to C, creating a chain of mutual obligation that never reaches formal equilibrium because new obligations are constantly being created, ideally without ever leading to an accumulation of an excess of gifts or obligations in any one household.

    Originary religion justifies not human but divine firstness; the central object cannot be appropriated, but must be contemplated and celebrated during the period of deferral. If the originary event is to have a successful outcome, that is, to truly be an event, the first to realize this, the first “worshiper”—a point Adam Katz added to GA’s originally symmetrical model of the originary event—cannot be singled out for his role, which must be imitated by all his fellows. And the asymmetry between a group of just-humans and an animal carcass is quite different from that between the first human emitter of the sign and those who come after. But that there is a secret parallel is already implicit in Judaism and explicit in Christianity; the being in the center is potentially human, even essentially human. Humans could not have invented language without attributing its origin to the scenic center, that is, to God.

    The fundamental trait of humanity, as manifested in the originary event, is the capacity to exchange signs in the place of gestures of appropriation whose imitation is conducive to mutual violence. Each offers as a “gift” an act of asymmetrical self-privation that is received by the others who pass it on. The gift itself is a repetition of originary firstness: in the substitution of the sign for the appropriative gesture, my “performance” assures deferral of appropriation but also offers the others a token of the energy that might have led to such appropriation, now repurposed as a linguistic utterance, a little piece of “performance art.”

    My deferral of appropriation is your assurance that the object we both desire remains intact. My appetite for the object itself is supplemented not merely by “mimetic desire” but more specifically by originary resentment. The fact of contemplating, intending, thematizing the object makes its centrality the source of a rage that increases as the fear of mutual violence recedes. It is at this point that the central object becomes the Girardian “scapegoat,” but the rage or menis in question is not dependent on its cospecificity. Aside from the hunger it inspires, its centrality is in itself sufficient to provoke resentment; conversely, the capacity to provoke resentment is also a sign that the center is not permanently inviolable.

    The sparagmos that we hypothesize as the conclusion of the originary event after a certain delay is the fulfillment of this resentment, as well of course as the satisfaction of the hunger. Here again it is the genius of Christianity to point up the primacy of the moral resentment over the physical need. But this discovery depends on the attainment of a level of social organization where hunger is no longer a central concern; freed from slavery to instinct in exchange for his tribute to Caesar, the Christian is able to return to the originary intuition that it is human relations that are paramount, that our relationship with nature depends on the preexistence of a human community that protects its members by deferring potential mimetic violence.


    GA first used the term “firstness” in reference not to the center but to the First to abort his attempt to appropriate the object by intending his gesture as a sign. The first signing gesture is a renunciation of designs on the central object and consequently a source of pacification. In a situation of potential conflict in which all are rivals, the signer renounces appropriating the object in order to designate it as what cannot be appropriated, hence as the source of the group’s resentment. The resulting sparagmos discharges this tension both appetitively and aggressively. By opening up the new “vertical” dimension that creates the human, the First creates an indefinitely imitable gesture that defers resentment, and at the same time inaugurates an interdiction that is not a mere inhibition stimulated by a more powerful member of the same species, but a product, indeed, the very definition, of intentionality, Sartre’s pour-soi.

    Yet the aborted gesture is nonetheless at a second remove a potential source of resentment. Unlike the appropriative gesture it replaces, it demands attention, the joint shared attention unique to our species. We cannot assume that the First was singled out in the originary event, for if he met with any resistance he could not have inaugurated a symmetrical exchange. But if this originary firstness was uniquely successful, it is because it was uniquely able to designate for the first time the central object as a privileged target of the love-and-resentment that is sacred significance. Once the scene of representation exists, the one who reveals it to the others, while transferring his firstness to the center, is also reinserting himself in an already-existing relationship to that center, and effectively proclaiming his own derivative firstness in the human sphere—the prototype of the role of big-man. By designating the central object as alone worthy of attention, the First plays the role of the Hebrews in revealing the One God to the nations. The exemplary case of the Mosaic revelation is the origin of Judaism—and also of antisemitism.

    The originary sign focuses originary resentment on the center and inaugurates an egalitarian community. But we should not picture this community as a utopian société commencée in which the birth of hierarchical society, signaled by Rousseau’s famous Ceci est à moi, figures the Fall of Man. Anthropologists will tell you that egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies are the most violent of all, hence, we may assume, the most resentful. And this stands to reason if we consider that the projection of resentment onto the center alone works only if there is no inter-human inequality to resent, and in order to prevent the latter, members of the society must be constantly vigilant. The giver of Mauss’ gift is very much aware that he is owed something in return, if not by the recipient then by some other member of the group under the obligation to produce it.

    The ritual practices of egalitarian societies maintain the focus of resentment and worship on the central figure in order to allay the constant suspicion that other members of the group are violating the rule of equidistance from the center. The repetition of the sparagmos as sacrifice is the central feature of these rituals. The complex organization that Durkheim describes, where throughout the year the several clans offer feasts each centered on their specific “totem” animal, is both a transition to a truly hierarchical big-man society and a means of deferring it. “Alternate firstness” is the pattern of human life; only in ritual acts like the sparagmos, and even then only “ideally,” can reciprocity be simultaneous.

    In what Voegelin calls the “compact” world of the early kingdoms, the ritual universe was built around the centrality of the monarch, who was often himself worshiped as a deity. The Hebrew Exodus was a liberation from this association of worship with political domination. The Hebrew nation did not deny the necessity of human firstness, but no longer attached it directly to the divinity, which was revealed as the universal One God. Having escaped from the compact world that confuses worldly sovereignty with sacrality, the Hebrews saw themselves as chosen to reveal this truth to the “nations.” Samuel’s famous warning (Samuel I, 8) to the Israelites who demanded a king is a sign of this detachment. The entire society, the people, is the effective agent of enlightenment; its governing agency is of merely instrumental importance.


    Modernity’s rejection of religion coincides with its hostility to firstness. The Enlightenment seeks a utopia of reciprocity without firstness, although the very possibility of reciprocity requires the acceptance of firstness—in the “revolutionary” case, that of the political “vanguard.” We have said enough about the totalitarian socialisms of the 20th century. But the neo-victimary era that began in earnest in 1989 believes it has found the final solution to the problem of firstness in the potentially endless denunciation of ascriptive discrimination (racism, sexism, homophobia…). Firstness will never disappear, and neither will its denunciation; were it not for the reactions it provokes in the West’s undemocratic rivals, victimocracy might continue forever.

    Seeking to “revive religion” would be the most futile of endeavors; religion is of all human activities the most profoundly “its own reward.” But seeing the difficulty American politics and the West as a whole increasingly have in asserting the rights of firstness, the current presidential campaign offers some solace. The pundits still have not understood that the key to Donald Trump’s attraction is not as the embodiment of the voters’ “rage at Washington” or “distrust of politicians,” but as the anti-PC candidate, the anti-victimary candidate, the firstness candidate, even to the point of boorishness. I think the rise of Bernie Sanders similarly reflects a nostalgic affection for a member of an earlier generation brought up before PC.

    As Adam Katz suggests in his most recent GA blogs, a post-victimary trend may be emerging that is not, pace the Democratic Party, a recrudescence of “racism,” but on the contrary an attempt to return to judging human beings not by ascriptive but by performative criteria, by what someone once called “the content of their character.” It is only through such adherence to the principles of liberal democracy that the United States can remain, in defiance of University of California officialdom, a “land of opportunity,” and the model for a world of such lands.


  • Language and Paradox

    The most concrete definition of the word paradox is as a statement that “contradicts itself,” that is, whose truth value cannot be determined because it entails its opposite, the simplest example being This sentence is false, where proposition p is “~p.” Such paradoxes are possible because, given that we experience in time the atemporal world of logic, in the course of processing a proposition we may be forced to pass from one state to a contradictory state.

    This is more easily illustrated by means of the more complex paradox discussed in Chronicle 405. The “Barber Paradox” affirms that there is a barber in a town who shaves only the men in the town who do not shave themselves. This leads to a contradiction when we attempt to determine whether the barber shaves himself; for if so, then he belongs to the class of those he does not shave. I showed in that Chronicle that the statement of the paradox fetishizes into an ontological state what is a temporal contingency; if one simply takes “not shaving oneself” as not (yet) having shaved oneself on a given day, then the paradox vanishes, since the barber shaves himself at a moment when he has not yet shaved himself, after which he has shaved himself and need do so no longer. What this reveals is not sloppy formulation but the contrast between real-time situations and the logical propositions by which we pick out salient properties of these situations.

    No doubt one can easily construct a context—for example, a sociological survey of shaving habits—in which it is reasonable to treat the categories of “shaving oneself” and its contrary as unchanging states. But this categorization produces a model, not a direct translation of reality. Dividing a population into those who shave themselves and those who do not, aside from eliminating those who may not do the same thing every day, passes over the temporal nature of shaving behavior: in order to “always” shave yourself, you have each day to perform the act, which means that you are for part of each day in the state of not-having-shaved-yourself.

    The Barber Paradox is just concrete enough to make clear that it is the detemporalization inherent in the proposition that is the source of logical paradox. The categories that lead to paradox do not do so in the normal case where a proposition is used to understand the world, and this is true of empirical categorizations generally. In describing external reality, we decide what is important according to our needs; if millions of neutrinos are traversing our body every second, that does not mean that we are “distorting reality” to ignore them, nor is it relevant that the cat which is on the mat is a collection of atoms, quarks, dark matter, or for Quine, a collection of “undetached cat parts.” We use classifications for a practical purpose, not to exhaust the meaningfulness of things, which, whether one is a “Kantian” or not, cannot be known “in themselves” but only with respect to our ability and need to know them. (This does not, of course, imply that there is such a thing as a “thing-in-itself”; on the contrary, without human intentionality, “things” are just part of the massive world of Sartre’s en-soi, the “in-itself” without a self. Which is no doubt not all that far from Kant’s own view.)

    What about “This sentence is false”? Just as the barber paradox is paradoxical because an empirical reality that is true or false at time t on day d (“X has/has not shaved himself”) is expressed as a permanent state (“X shaves/does not shave himself”), so the liar paradox is only paradoxical if the enunciation of the sentence is considered to take place instantaneously. Otherwise, when I say, “This sentence,” I am announcing a proposition, not enunciating one, so that there is as yet nothing to which a truth value can be assigned. Similarly in “This sentence is written in English” and “this sentence has five words,” although the empirical qualities (length, language) of the sentence allow for assignment of a truth-value, these grammatical sentences are not propositions in the sense of referring to a “state of affairs” in a reference-world separate from the world of the signs that represent it. Having five words or being in English is not a fact about the sentence until its enunciation has been completed; it cannot be tested against a model of the world that does not (yet) include the sentence. Which is why our first reaction to paradox is that we can avoid it by keeping language separate from what it refers to, and conversely, that self-reference is always paradoxical in that it breaks down the model-relationship between representation and its object, regardless of truth-value: “this sentence is true” is just as paradoxical as “this sentence is false.”


    But to focus on self-reference, one risks forgetting what makes the configuration of linguistic communication originarily and essentially paradoxical. The first object designated by a sign must have been a potential source of a conflict that risked greater danger to the participants than the potential advantage to one who sought to appropriate it. The originary function of representation is to temporarily interdict appropriation of this object by setting it imaginarily on a scene that allows only for contemplation and representation. To exchange the (originary) sign is to accept this interdiction in exchange for the representation, that is, accept to contemplate the scene of representation rather than risk violent conflict by violating it through appropriative action.

    In this case, we may say that significance is conferred on the object by the sign, but the object itself is experienced as the source of this significance. This is the originary paradox in an anthropological, not a logical sense. Here the temporality of paradox is concentrated in an instant: in representing the object, the “first” signer is the first to recognize it as significant, but this worldly significance, although clearly derived from the mimetically enhanced appetitive attractiveness of the object, is not reducible to it; it exists only in the human configuration that has just been created.

    Language is paradoxical from its origin; logical language cannot eliminate paradox but has as its function to defer it. Paradox is not the product of the declarative form that allows sentences to “include” themselves, but just the opposite. The propositional world that allows for occasional anomalies such as “this sentence is false” is a mechanism designed for the deferral of paradox, the paradox that is at the origin of language.

    Indeed, this statement itself appears paradoxical. But precisely, language itself is the greatest paradox of all. To come to designate an object of appetite as the object of representation, the sacred, God, when nothing had ever been “represented” before, to designate the object as always-already sacred/significant, as if discovering this quality in the object, when previous to this moment there was no place in the universe for the category of the sacred/significant or indeed for any category of thought as opposed to appetite, is to perform a gesture whose pragmatic impact is our very existence as a species. The possibility of playing around with self-referential “statements” such as “this sentence is false (or true),” “this sentence has five words—unless I decide to add a few more,” “this sentence has a great beginning but it,” and so on, is nothing but a trivial consequence of this primordial self-reference.

    When I say the cat is on the mat, the priority of the reference world to the proposition is not in question, and yet it is only when I say it that my listener becomes aware of this “prior” shared reality—a phenomenon all the more obvious in the way the phrase is generally used, that is, as a fiction. In the world of esthetic experience, this oscillation between perception and representation is deliberately maintained over time, either itself temporally constructed as a “narration” in language and/or music or other performance, or in plastic art contemplated as a fictive object whose mental construction alternates with the examination of the work-as-representation. “Non-objective” art does not so much eliminate this oscillation as emphasize its paradoxical quality by removing the obvious associations between the constructed referent and real-world experience, making the contemplation of the artwork an anguished search for its “meaning.”

    What we call the originary paradox of signification is nothing more than the fact, which not even the most gradualist anthropologist could deny, that the first word designates, points-to-as significant, a referent that cannot by definition have possessed this status before its designation. To point to God is less to “name” God than to indicate that he deserves to be so designated; yet however important he may be in the lives of the designators, he is only significant as the referent of a linguistic expression. This is not a flaw in the emergence and evolution of language; it is its very essence. Yet in the history of “linguistic philosophy” or “philosophy of language” or indeed of “philosophy” tout court, GA is the first theoretical perspective to recognize this. Which is no doubt why GA is at the center of philosophical and anthropological debate—except that the real purpose of the “debate” is to focus everyone’s attention on subjects of contention that allow them to avoid the center.


    At the origin of language is the creation of a sign-world outside the temporal experience of the life-world. The simplest way to understand why accession to the sign-world defers conflict is that this accession takes place in lived time, in the world of appetite, yet the sign-world itself is outside lived time. Humans are the only creatures who have this second universe in which to dwell, divorced for the moment from the conflicts of the world. That this is true in no way prevents language and representation’s being used, like any deferral of worldly action, to store up energy for the sake of future conflict. Those who think naively that GA’s “deferral of violence through representation” means that language is always on the side of peace sometimes see in “violent language” a refutation of GA. But whether or not “violent language” exacerbates or substitutes for physical violence, the real human problem is that preparations for violence, including the sophisticated representations involved in building nuclear weapons, are also cases of “deferral of violence through representation.” Indeed, without language, there would be no violence in the human sense, only “nature red in tooth and claw”—cats eating birds, but not building gas chambers to exterminate them or bombs to obliterate them.

    What remains indubitably true is that the sign-world emerges as a new, exclusively human phenomenon, and that the necessary naiveté of our expressed wonderment at the sacred interdiction that effects the separation of the sign-world from the life-world should not, as it seems universally to do within the intellectual community, allow us to think that the existence of language is simply one more result of the evolution of life and of the universe in general.

    It seems to me that if one would not believe in God, one owes it to oneself to adopt a theory that allows one to understand, if not the fabulous miracles of the Bible, at least the everyday miracle that occurs when one participates in the human universe of representation. Paradox is one way in which the “miraculous” nature of language impinges on the taking-for-granted of everyday life, and this explains why it remains a thorn in the side of those who, as metaphysicians have always done, take the existence of language for granted in both theory and practice.


  • End of the End of History

    I have always defended Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that liberal democracy is the most stable and efficient form of social organization, and that in consequence it will eventually absorb all others. This emphatically does not mean “the end of history,” but simply that this doubling of the economic market for goods, necessarily “unequal,” by a political market where all votes have the same weight, is maximally productive, although the forms by which it is expressed are bound to evolve. The postwar global international configuration continues to pay homage to this vision, with its “democratic” United Nations and similar agencies (European Parliament, ICC, World Bank…) extending the model of Western national institutions into the sphere of international relations.

    But recent history increasingly makes me less sure of the long-term superiority of the liberal-democratic system. Although nominally democratic forms (“elected” legislative assemblies and presidents) are found even in places such as North Korea, national democracy in its American heartland is not working very well. Meanwhile, autocracy has intensified in Russia and China (where the growth of the market was expected to lead to a liberalized political structure), while Europe continues its demographic decline and shows signs of both centralized authoritarianism and slow disintegration.

    In the US, Obama certainly bears a good share of the blame for the slide toward executive autocracy. All the 2016 Republican hopefuls are promising an executive more responsive at home and more forceful abroad, and it would be difficult to imagine that even Hillary Clinton would be as prone as Obama to presidential overreach. But the more significant question is whether the growth of executive power in the post-millennial era is not a necessary consequence of the victimary radicalization of the civil culture, dominated by the Twittermob and its facilitators in the media, that has dissolved the mutual respect between opposing parties appropriate to liberal democracy into an asymmetrical exchange of contempt and paralyzed incredulity—a phenomenon whose roots lie in the Holocaust, but whose deeper causality in anthropological terms may well be the increasing dependence of economic production on symbolic intelligence that undermines the originary reciprocity of the exchange of signs.

    The victimary passion has reached the level where ordinary citizens accuse the conservative opposition and Christianity itself of racial hatred in scapegoating gestures worthy of medieval mobs accusing the Jews of spreading the plague. For example, this recent Internet meme, accompanying loving family portraits of the Obamas:

    America’s First Family

    First to be scandal free in 30 years
    No drunken children
    Totally wholesome family
    HATED by most white Christians
    because of the color of their skin
    not because of the content of their character

    The challenge posed to Jesus by Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor seems to me child’s play in comparison to this display of victimary pathology.

    No doubt the predominantly racial post-Holocaust victimology of the Obama administration has little in common with Putin’s reliance on Russia’s post-Soviet oligarchs or China’s increased grant of authority to the Communist Party and the military bureaucracy. Yet with a few encouraging exceptions, notably India, the totalitarian mentality seems to be progressing on a broad front at the expense of open political dialectic.


    Since the beginnings of modern society there has been a “Left” and a “Right,” at first defined ethno-religiously in the empirical British fashion as Whigs and Tories, then during the French Revolution on the one-dimensional spectrum that has held up pretty much unchanged until today. The dichotomy is immediately understandable in originary terms: the Left is the party of moral equality, modeled on the originary exchange of signs and the resentment generated by approaching the sacred center; the Right is the party of ethical firstness, of worldly order with its hierarchically differentiated roles. But with the justification provided to victimary rhetoric by the Holocaust model of “inorganic” oppression, the generally unspoken traditions that maintained the social order, and the very notion of firstness, are increasingly called into question. Social hierarchy as such is not denied, but making ascriptive difference a proxy for hierarchical difference permits the assimilation of organic economic relationships to the ascriptive oppression of a caste system.

    Morality and firstness are asymmetrical, and the Left has always (correctly) insisted that morality is the more fundamental of the two. But until WWII, the values that guaranteed the necessary inequalities of the social order had always been taken for granted. In the West, Christianity provided a guarantee of the necessity of the worldly order. From a game-theory perspective, this worldly faith is a way of resolving the prisoner’s dilemma that faces the citizens of a free society; if all cooperate in submitting to the rules, the system will work better than if some defect. Such faith can only be dismissed as “pie in the sky” from a perspective that is indifferent to the social order’s worldly functioning—the perspective of those who see themselves as outside the decision-making process and free to resent its results.

    No doubt the very existence of a Left and a Right reflects the refusal of both sides to fully accept this premise. But if we compare the oppositional attitude that reigned throughout the era of “bourgeois democracy” to the moral arrogance that the post-Cold War Left derives from its victimary perspective, the obvious difference is that in the past, “capital” and “labor,” whatever their mutual hostility, always understood themselves as organically linked in a common enterprise. Negotiations might be difficult because in the small, the two sides are in a zero-sum game: what the bosses keep, the workers don’t get. Marx’s “labor theory of value,” a political rather than an economic principle, gives the workers the right to call giving up anything “exploitation,” the extraction of surplus value. But being “exploited” is not an immoral contingency; it is the way “capitalism” works, and until a revolutionary situation emerges, the workers must be content to seek incremental improvements in their lot. And it goes without saying that the vast majority of American workers who have fought for better wages and working conditions never thought of themselves as socialists.

    As a rule, those of my generation, even old radicals such as Bernie Sanders (a month younger than I), continue to think of the social order in organic rather than ascriptive terms. But in the postwar era, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the Nazi-Jew model of ascriptive oppression has gradually come to be applied to formerly negotiable differences, and has by now begun to eat away at the foundations of the democratic process.

    The postwar reaction to the Holocaust put an end to unequal de jure relationships between ascriptive groups. Its subsequent evolution into victimocracy is paradoxical. Postwar civil rights legislation abolished the inequality of status between blacks and whites. This logically led to the absorption of racial difference, where it still persisted, into the mix of political differences to be negotiated through elections and subsequent deal-making. But the results of this negotiation—affirmative action and the doctrine of “disparate impact”—have paradoxically regenerated de jure differentiation in the inverse image of the racial discrimination of the past. Victimary categories are often guarantees of more favorable treatment than the “white” majority, and above all sources of the moral power to condemn the latter for its “privilege” that presumably maintains the “minority” in permanently inferior status.

    Liberal democracy depends on the existence of a political market parallel to the economic market and concerned with establishing laws to keep resentments under control. Yet as the Left increasingly defines the American political process as a struggle between the “privileged” and those marked as victims, the possibilities of fruitful negotiation have dwindled. The Left increasingly sees its clientele as deserving of a moral consideration that cannot be measured in terms of profit and loss: the victim does not bargain for wages with the oppressor, he demands reparations. But once the opposition between the factions becomes defined in moral rather than politico-economic terms, democratic politics becomes unworkable. If the Republicans often appear baffled it is because they remain committed to political negotiation even as their opponents see political compromise with them as immoral. “Tea Party” extremism has been a (largely ineffective) attempt at a compensatory radicalism. It is notable that despite Obama’s low approval ratings (and 2014’s crushing defeat), the candidates for the 2016 Democratic nomination, notably the wife of the most successful Democratic president since the New Deal, the triangulating New Democrat Bill Clinton, have moved to Obama’s left rather than his right. The last time anyone heard a Democratic candidate talk seriously about bipartisanship was before the 2008 election.


    All other things being equal, democracy is certainly a greater source of creativity than dictatorship. It is hard to believe that China or Russia will be able to hold their own with the West in the domain of scientific and technological innovation in the foreseeable future. But once the balance between firstness and moral reciprocity on which the political and ideological freedoms of the West depend has been perturbed by an increasing emphasis on symbolic manipulation, it is easier to focus on political reparations for ascriptive differences than on making these differences disappear, even assuming such a thing is possible. In conjunction with this development is the broad application of victimary thinking to the natural environment in the name of combating “climate change,” the most disquieting aspect of which is no doubt that victimary obsession with its implications has made any kind of scientific consensus impossible. The use of the term “denial” that couples climate-change skeptics with deniers of the Holocaust is no accident. The Holocaust is the foundation of the victimary; “climate change” is its consecration as henceforth the essence of our relationship to the natural world.

    Will these expansions of the Holocaust model of ascriptive difference render the democratic process progressively more unworkable, leading to ever more government regulation and “green” cronyism, presidential autocracy and Twittermob thought-control? Only the experience of a new administration can tell us. It will be instructive to discover not simply to what extent a Republican—or a “Clintonian” Democratic—president can ease the regulatory overload, energize the sluggish economy, beef up the military… but above all to learn whether a new administration can reestablish a democratic process of debate and negotiation, allowing for real interaction and compromise between the parties. Can the Left, in a word, come to accept being just “the Left” and not the moral center of the society, relegating conservatism and Christianity itself to modes of reactionary hatred and ignorance? Can the Twittermob and the victimary activists be marginalized? We shall have to wait and see.

    Afterword: on political paradox

    Just as the function of all social structures can be summed up as “deferring resentment,” so the distribution of political resentments into Right and Left creates a system of political debate that converts the paradoxical structure of resentment (the resenter depends on the persistence of what he would destroy in imagination; Hamlet is the great revelation of modern resentment, although Racine’s sparer Phèdre is equally powerful) into an exchange of ideas.

    In the pre-democratic era, deferring resentment was, religion aside, indistinguishable from maintaining order; the peasant may have resented the king and the whole feudal structure, but couldn’t do anything about it. This is the vision of resentment one finds in Nietzsche and his disciple Max Scheler, the author of Umsturz der Werte, translated as The Man of Resentment. But resentment is not mere sterile frustration; it is the originary source of creativity and culture (cf. my comments on the Iliad in Chronicle 346 and elsewhere). The genius of the democratic system—which I’m pretty sure is the best we can do, but less sure that the “best” will win out when those “full of passionate intensity” have acquired the nuclear weapons that the “best” invented—is that articulating competing resentments allows for genuine compromise that generates new understanding, analogously to the determination of prices by the market rather than by fiat. But the democratic process remains a mechanism for deferring resentment, which means deferring paradox; and what is deferred is still there.

    As described above, the equilibrium between Left and Right, which is most clearly reflected in the American two-party system, but exhibited by all parliaments, is necessarily asymmetric. One side is Robespierre and the other Edmond Burke. When the system works, which means that the residual resentments are deferred in deference to pressing practical questions, compromises can be reached that contribute to socio-economic dynamism. But when these compromises are not forthcoming, one is forced to recognize that the paradox has reemerged.

    Impatience with parliamentary debate is not a new idea for those who remember the 20thcentury. It is a common feature both of the Left and of the “Radical Right,” which is an oxymoron only for those who understand politics in static, that is, unparadoxical terms. The Nazis were “socialists” unrivaled in their contempt for parliaments. They were not, like the traditional Right, followers of a Burkean ethic, but of a new Nietzschean morality that inverted the traditional Judeo-Christian relationship between morality and ethics—essentially by flatly denying the validity of the originary moral intuition that Judeo-Christianity emphasized, but emphatically did not invent. GA discovers the Sklavenmoral in the originary scene, but the Nazis cared not for such anthropological niceties. Instead, they inverted the Hebrew notion of election—firstness as a “light unto the nations”—into the “morality” that the destiny of humanity was to serve the master race, we know with what result.


    Working like Marx’s old mole beneath the surface of the democratic political order, the scandal of the Holocaust, seventy years after the end of WWII, has broken liberal democracy’s truce between the moral and the ethical, equality and firstness, allowing the originary paradox of their union to reemerge. Girard’s term for such a reemergence of paradox is mimetic crisis. Whether a forthcoming administration can quell the crisis and reestablish democratic legitimacy in the age of robotics and the Islamic State remains an open question.


  • Reality Politics

    [Before the debate]

    Donald Trump’s recent successes demonstrate the limitations but also the reality of the reaction against the victimocracy. To oppose victimary thinking it does not suffice to deplore its excesses, although few dare even that; one must face down its not-so-implicit threat of mob violence. Trump is the one candidate who fears not the Twittermob. God knows what is being tweeted about him, but the point is that he doesn’t care, and if he doesn’t, we shouldn’t.

    It is too easy to reduce the Trump candidacy to the outspokenness of clowns and jesters of the past. Yet the difference is clear. The jester “speaks truth to power” to the king, who could destroy him with a glance, and therefore need not. Rather than the pre-humiliated clown in a beggar’s costume, Trump is the unflappable billionaire in a $5000 suit, facing not up to the king but down to the mob. A number of pundits anticipated that Trump’s churlish words about John McCain’s “war hero” status would take the wind out of his candidacy or end it altogether. Nothing such occurred, because although Trump’s remarks were indeed offensive, they were made in reaction to McCain’s prior insult; Trump was not denigrating the military but disrespecting, however crudely, someone who had first disrespected him. The insight that Trump’s action actualized was that apologizing to McCain would really have been apologizing to the Twittermob. Even Trump’s smear of Mexican immigrants as (largely) drug dealers and rapists hasn’t hurt him at the polls, because his supporters view the over-the-top rhetoric as a sign that Trump can resist the usual victimary arguments in favor of unrestricted immigration.

    The disquieting thing about Trump’s surge is that it points up an apparent incompatibility between political gravitas and the unapologetic affirmativeness that we expect in a political leader in the Reagan-Thatcher mold. Spengler (David P. Goldman) at one point endorsed Ted Cruz as the only candidate arrogant enough to make a good president. But that was pre-Trump, and in recent weeks Cruz’ arrogance has had few occasions to make itself known. If Trump is indeed the sole candidate unfazed by the victimocrats, does this not confirm the Left’s conviction that the victimary model alone provides grounds for serious political activity, to which the only possible responses are niggling qualification or blustery denial—that we live, whether we like it or not, in a victimocracy?

    Let us hope that the strange asymmetry in the two parties’ nominating process does not reflect the decadence of the democratic process in the face of the temptation of authoritarian rule. No doubt Hillary Clinton’s crown-princess status is something of a historical contingency, but it coincides with a rise in presidential arrogance in step with the rise of autocracy around the globe, from Russia to China to the Islamic State, not to speak of North Korea and other communist/socialist survivors. Hillary’s heir-apparent imperiousness, however over-determined, has deep roots in the victimocracy. If her only more than token opposition comes from Bernie Sanders, this is clearly because he is a man of the pre-victimary, “old Left” generation. (So, in a different sense, is Joe Biden.) So long as she remains a minimally viable candidate, no significant creature of the victimocracy will dare come forward to deny Hillary “her turn.”

    The Republican race, in all-too-obvious contrast, now has some seventeen contestants. Is this embarrassing number not comical in itself? What we laugh at is, after all, mimesis disguised as free choice, Bergson’s du mécanique plaqué sur du vivant. In principle, each candidate seeks to offer the most credible embodiment of the presidential. But overpopulation is itself a refutation; if “presidentiality” is indeed so widely distributed, then the quality being sought has not been sharply enough defined. What the candidate oversupply is trying to tell us is that the current mix of incentives and disincentives sets the bar too low, making running for president a profitable source of book contracts and speaking deals with no visible disincentives.

    All seventeen candidates are “well known,” but Trump alone is a TV personality and a man of great wealth (whatever the credibility of his $10b figure—but such claims are what Trump is all about). Trump’s actions thus far appear to demonstrate that only such qualifications provide independence from the Twittermob, and his current prominence gives proof that this independence is a political value in itself, however vague his political platform, provided it be antithetical to the “progressive” policies that the mob—and the current administration—embodies.

    Given the history of lynch mobs in the past, from the KKK to Kristallnacht and beyond, the question that arises (coincidentally with the “discovery” of the first draft of To Kill a Mockingbird), is why at this moment standing up to the mob is perceived as so significant. The old lynch mob was a pretty transparent institution: it defended the interests of a (mildly) privileged group by intimidating a stigmatized population through the false and/or exaggerated accusation and punishment of a “scapegoat.” Today’s generally affluent mob asserts a moral privilege by attacking those who infringe or appear to question the victimary doxa. The Twittermob has achieved inordinate power both over individuals (e.g., the dentist who killed a lion) and over organizations, particularly profit-making ones sensitive to “public relations.” Whence the often-reported dismissals of highly-placed infringers, and the virtual unanimity with which the perpetrators of outed micro-aggressions make cringing apologies to their “victims” (e.g., O’Malley and others fervently denying that “all lives matter”). Someone like Trump, independently wealthy, his own boss and not the employee of a corporation, nor (unlike Donald Sterling) subject to the judgment of NBA fans (and who probably wouldn’t let a girlfriend get away with taping his conversations) is more or less immune to the power of the victimocracy. Even if the IRS coincidentally determines that Trump has committed tax fraud, or the EPA finds fault with one of his construction projects, we may presume that he disposes of sufficient legal firepower to avoid being greatly inconvenienced.

    One might say that we have come to a pretty pass when the ability to disregard the victimary code is the most distinctive qualification in the nation’s prime political race, putting a self-promoting non-politician, more envied than admired, and frequently ridiculed, well in front of a band of governors and senators, a number of whom (Christie, Cruz, Huckabee…) are in fact known for “telling it like it is.” What the Trump phenomenon clearly demonstrates is the widespread malaise engendered by the victimocracy, whose tyrannical nature, apparent to all, can be denounced only by one who is unafraid of accusations of racism and various kinds of “phobia.”

    All the pundits are awaiting the end of the Trump boomlet, and I have no crystal ball to tell me they are wrong. But if all I have been saying about the “decline of the West” is true, then it follows that Trump in his instinctual way, all other things aside, is the one candidate who has grasped the essence of the crisis that we face. Even if the task of dispatching pathetic, “likeable enough” Hillary Clinton will not fall to his lot, his refusal to pay obeisance to the victimary code of conduct will have infused the Republican primary with a rebellious, emperor’s-new-clothes spirit that can hopefully Reaganize and Thatcherize the standard-bearer who emerges.

    Which leads me to a final observation. On completing the first draft of this Chronicle, I was taken aback to observe that two consecutive Chronicles will have described as exemplary two individuals currently best known for their roles on reality television. There is surely no feature of contemporary mainstream culture more alien to me than reality television, the basement venue of the cult of celebrities famous for being famous—to which they have allowed us to add the new category of those, Jenner’s Kardashian in-laws in the forefront, who have become famous for being famous for being famous. Yet it appears that the experience of these unembarrassed self-promoters provides a unique immunity from the victimocracy.

    And here is no doubt the reason. Reality TV stars have a unique opportunity to experience the strange freedom created by a cultural variant of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. The latter affirms that observing subatomic activity renders its measurement in wave-particle terms undecidable. Analogously, the very principle of reality TV is that the presence of TV cameras and crews in a person’s or a family’s everyday “reality” will not and yet will affect this reality, transforming it in undecidable ways. Might living under observation as if unobserved be a privileged means of discovering a new form, Satanic or sublime, of the freedom to be oneself?

    Neither Trump nor even transsexual Jenner is a victimary figure. The latter’s desire to affirm a female self, whatever its psychological motivations, is not the equivalent of a demand for reparations; it is a form of creative self-assertion. And one may understand its exhibitionist element, as I believe many do, as a way of accepting the responsibility for setting a public example that is incumbent on, precisely, a celebrity—and one who, recalling those Wheaties boxes, is not just “famous for being famous.”

    Whatever Jenner’s views on victimary politics, it is notable that s/he did not fear to deeply offend a majority of supporters by coming out as… a Republican. As for Trump, although his political positions have varied and he has befriended Democrats, he is certainly not running for the Democratic nomination today. Notwithstanding their overall pusillanimity, the Republicans are if not the anti- then at least the non– victimary party. And this being the case, Trump alone of the candidates has homed in on the truly paradigmatic plank in the Republican platform. For this act of political astuteness alone, he deserves to be leading the pack. Let us hope that others follow his lead.

    Post-debate: The debates, which benefited Carly Fiorina more than anyone else, didn’t focus on Trump as much as some feared, although you wouldn’t know it to listen to the sensationalistic recaps. Trump is not a careful or well-prepared speaker, and his credibility remained about where it was. But my analysis was borne out when in his very first response he denounced the national obsession with “political correctness,” the only one of the seventeen to do so. Even Cruz, after Trump the most pugnacious, didn’t follow him in going after victimary thinking as such. Carson, Trump’s antithesis yet not a politician either, was the only other candidate to use the term politically correct, in reference to the fashionable squeamishness over “enhanced interrogation techniques.”

  • The Ascriptive Age

    It is curious that in a world increasingly dominated by identity politics, no one appears to reflect on the near-exclusively ascriptive form (i.e., referring to a predetermined and virtually unchangeable identity) taken by victimary identities in the post-postmodern age.

    The Left as always champions moral reciprocity in contrast with the conservative respect for firstness and the structures that preserve it. Now if one thinks about one’s daily experience of hierarchical asymmetry, it is clearly concentrated in the economic arena. One takes and gives orders in an institutional framework that in formal terms not only ignores in fact but, with the exception of compensatory “affirmative action,” is obliged by ever more stringent legal restrictions to ignore every kind of ascriptive difference among its participants.

    In the days when the terms socialism, communism, Marxism described the Left’s ideology, the critique of market society aka capitalism was directed at the hierarchical organization of the production-process, with the wealthy capitalist hiring well-to-do managers to oversee the labor of the poor working population that alone, dixit Marx, created “value.” This exploitative arrangement was for Marx a necessary preliminary to socialism; it embodied a dialectical opposition between capital and labor that would be resolved one day by the expropriation of the expropriators. Whether political activism was required or whether the system would collapse of itself in universal pauperization is unclear and ultimately unimportant; what we retain from the “old Left” is the critique of an economic hierarchy that, a necessary evil for a time, would eventually be defeated by socialism’s greater efficiency. This conviction lent an air of healthy competition to the Cold War, particularly after the death of Stalin; there was something cheerful about Khrushchev’s pacific if deluded “We will bury you!”

    We still hear echoes of class resentment in the half-forgotten Occupy! condemnation of the “1%”—although the representative “class” of that movement was not the industrial proletariat but unemployed BAs with student-loan debt. And the Democratic Party continues to support labor unions and raising the minimum wage. But class-based politics is far from the victimary cutting-edge and often comes into conflict with the more authentically “progressive” environmentalist agenda, e.g., re the Keystone pipeline. And the same can be said for the throwaway criticisms of the “excessive” salaries of CEOs or other beneficiaries (entrepreneurs, entertainers, sports figures…) of the “winner-take-all” age of integrated economies and communications—many of whom contribute heavily to “progressive” causes.

    Yet despite the obligatory lamentations by both parties concerning the stagnation of middle-class wages and the dissolution of the working-class family, the emphasis of the ever-intensifying victimary critique of Western society is almost entirely on ascriptive categories. Increasingly, the “capitalist” economic hierarchy is condemned less as unjust in itself than as “discriminatory” by gender, race, etc. Gender is an endless fount of such critiques, given the biological and traditional cultural differences between the sexes. But under the current administration, especially since the Ferguson protests began just a year ago, the media have focused above all on the traditional American sore spot of race. This is not the place to explore the merits of the grievances involved, but merely to note that race, because unlike gender it is literally, or very nearly, “skin-deep,” is the quintessential ascriptive victimary quality.

    A recent poll sadly but unsurprisingly showed that although just after Obama’s election most people thought racial relations were improving, now most blacks and whites think they are getting worse. My personal interpretation of this is that it reflects media coverage more than personal experience; perhaps the one positive effect of Obama’s presidency, in this or any other domain, is that it has made it easier for blacks and whites to get along in everyday life. But this, if true, only makes my point all the more strongly: victimary thinking in our post-postmodern age is symbolic rather than reality-based, and concerned above all with seeking evidence for situating ascriptive categories in the familiar Nazi-Jew (or master-slave) relationship. Statistics to the contrary about blacks killing blacks or blacks getting along with whites are beside the point.


    The current focus on ascriptive injustice is so intense that it is difficult for persons born after 1960 or so, and virtually impossible for “Millennials,” to conceive that it is an entirely new phenomenon, a product of the postwar era with only the faintest traces in past history, beginning in the Enlightenment. Years ago I discovered a primordial example of White Guilt in Chateaubriand’s Essai sur les révolutions (1797) where, recounting his American travels, he remarks a propos of a sullen young Indian, “how grateful was I to him for not liking me!” (comme je lui savais gré de ne pas m’aimer !) The famously egocentric Chateaubriand wants to demonstrate here the revolt of his uniquely sensitive temperament, less against the settlers’ cruelty or injustice to the Indians than simply their unwelcome intrusion into these “pristine” lands. A less precise primitivism may be found in Rousseau’s vision of a “state of nature” that has been corrupted by les sciences et les arts. But this proto-White Guilt is on an altogether different scale from what we find in the postwar era.

    In furnishing the original Nazi-Jew model for victimary politics, the Holocaust made the Jews the first victimary “minority.” It is difficult to imagine what kind of postwar victimary thinking might have emerged from the critique of apartheid or Jim Crow or sexual oppression. The cruelest slave-drivers and lynch mobs could not have conceived a project to exterminate every black or Indian—nor were Africans or Native Americans known to Western civilization as “the chosen people.” The various postwar civil rights and anti-colonial struggles were willy-nilly shaped or reshaped by the enormity of the Holocaust, which for its part had no relation to any of them.

    These relations of intergroup domination, mild or tyrannical, were in any case “organic,” functional relationships that lay within the mainstream of social interaction, just as did European antisemitism before the advent of Nazism. But the Nazi-Jew relationship was deliberately placed outside normal social relations, nor was it intended as a permanent institution. The point of putting Jews in concentration camps, when they were not immediately taken out in the woods and shot or sent to Vernichtungslagern and gassed, was to extract a bit of labor from them before they died. Only in random local situations were the Jews treated as slaves in the normal sense. Making the Nazi-Jew relationship the model for all unequal social relationships based on ascriptive categories delegitimized all forms of de jure superordination.


    This new model hastened the end of segregation, apartheid, and colonialism. But what was unexpected by those who sought to do away with such ascriptive hierarchies was that as a result of this process, non-race-based hierarchical relationships would themselves become increasingly racialized. When it began, “affirmative action” seemed a justifiable way of repairing the damage wrought by long-term past inequality. But this meant that henceforth the ascriptive category of race became a factor in all institutional relationships.

    In an enlightened reaction to nineteenth-century racialism, anthropologists had told us for several generations that “races” were artificial categories based on superficial characteristics. Today, one of the things that the University of California doesn’t want people to say is that “race doesn’t matter.” Certainly the old “racist” one-drop rule is alive and well. It is rather whites today who seek the victimary prestige of “blackness,” or as in some well-known cases, of “Native American” ancestry. If uttered today, M. L. King’s wish for “a day when people will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character” would be stigmatized as racist. As no doubt it would effectively be, if “racism” be the imposition of any criteria that in fact favor “whites.” But the only meta-criterion that can prevent this is an explicit or implicit quota system that assigns favorable results by race.

    Since the beginnings of affirmative action, in the interest of laying the groundwork for a race-neutral professional landscape, countless aptitude examinations, intelligence tests, and other “meritocratic” criteria have been eliminated because of their “disparate impact” on members of specific races. But in the latest round of victimary thinking, we are told that barring de facto discriminatory practices was just scratching the surface. Today, all kinds of social and professional interactions are examined for evidence of “micro-aggressions” that are said to assert the implicit hegemony of the “aggressor” over his victim. It is in the context of a lifetime’s accumulation of micro-aggressions that ostensibly “objective” criteria have a “disparate impact” on both the privileged and their victims. People have been fired from positions of power for making jokes or offhand remarks, even in private, that can be said to hint at such hegemony. And more recently, the trigger phenomenon offers white students a chance at attaining victimary status by allowing them to claim that their sensibilities have been violated by, for example, having to study a description of rape in Ovid’s Metamorphoses.

    What ultimately justifies all this is the categorical imperative that, despite all evidence to the contrary, all groups are not merely morally equal but have ultimately equal abilities, so that all differences of outcome are the result of accumulated privilege and domination. No doubt this imperative cannot be explicitly articulated, but it is tacitly accepted as an article of faith quia absurdum. Although any system that requires less of one group than another is demeaning on its face, we are required not to look at this face, and must beware of speaking of it in public.

    Since the distributions of abilities among ascriptive groups, whatever their “root causes,” are not likely to change substantially in one or several generations, differences of group outcomes provide an indefinite source of grievances in which the society as a whole, or rather its dominant element, possessors of the “white privilege” of the European founders of the USA, is blamed for the inferior outcomes of victimary groups, even when these outcomes reflect indisputably deviant behavior. The advantage that accrues to the successful group is counterbalanced by the critique of its “privilege.” And in areas such as university appointments and admissions, the “privilege” of whiteness, or that of Asian-ness, is often dearly bought. Affirmative action, victimary resentment, and “White Guilt” are part of a no doubt necessary homage that worldly firstness is obliged to pay to the moral model of reciprocal equality.


    But recently, the most significant ascriptive developments are in the sexual domain. Now that same-sex marriage is sweeping the Western world, we are forced to realize that the affirmation of homosexuality as an ascriptive difference is far more radical, and far more important, than the seemingly revolutionary slogan of the preceding generation: that gender was socially constructed. Homosexuality too, like all sexualities, is in part socially constructed, but it is the opposite affirmation that is consonant with contemporary victimary thinking, even if it undermines the old social-construction argument against conventional sexuality. The radical transformation of the age-old institution of marriage is reinterpreted as its broadening to include all “forms of love” between people, “straight” and “gay,” all of whose sexual interest is considered equally natural.

    This is not the place for me to speculate on the ultimate effect of this change on Western society, but merely to note that the legitimization of homosexuality not simply as a “lifestyle” but as an ascriptive mode of love, understood as monogamous sexual desire, is the real point of same-sex marriage. This ascriptive focus is in sharp contrast to the traditionally rebellious connotation of “gayness” as a stigmatized group’s rejection of traditional social norms, above all that of marriage. The former configuration of marriage-as-normality to which the homosexual opposed his or her sexuality as a choice, relatively unconcerned with the degree to which it was inscribed in his/her DNA, is now rejected precisely because it weakens the claim on ascriptivity. By adopting marriage precisely in its most conventional form, “with all the trappings” (whence the outrage when bakers and flower arrangers refuse to cooperate), the homosexual affirms his/her membership in an ascriptive class, a “race” as objectively real as those determined by skin color.


    But now homosexual identity too has become yesterday’s ascriptive cause célèbre. It has been replaced in the public mind by the current obsession with transgenderism. Whatever the latter’s biological foundation, certain boys/girls demonstrably have a strong sense that they are really girls/boys. Such people, particularly if they have not had surgery to accord their bodies with their sexual identity, doubtless pose a problem to the social order. But to determine whether, for example, traditional women’s colleges, or even ladies’ bathrooms, should be obliged to admit physical males who declare their sexual identity as female, even setting aside the possibility of fraud (which is surely not to be simply dismissed), is not my burden here.

    What I find of interest is rather the degree to which this problem has attracted attention. I think it goes beyond providing one more rope on which to hang the insufficiently progressive, whose sins now include being transphobic and mired in cis-genderism. Here ascriptivism takes a step beyond the “third sex” of homosexuality, one figured whimsically by Facebook’s panoply of 51 gender options. We should take seriously the implication of this proliferation: in principle, every one of these “genders” is both ascriptive, inscribed in “nature,” and at the same time, chosen. Chosen, as are all natural characteristics under the new ascriptivism, but more markedly so—in the same way that the Jews were chosen, and yet chose themselves, as the first people of the One God.

    Here one is tempted to say that postmodern ascriptivism has transcended, or at any rate seeks to transcend, the victimary. Perhaps we may even interpret “Black lives matter,” with its outpouring of righteous resentment at police killings (even when, as in Baltimore, they take place at the hands of largely nonwhite officers, not to speak of the fact that the vast majority of young blacks are killed by other young blacks), as a rear-guard action by America’s most genuinely long-suffering victimary group to wrest public attention from these trendy (and generally white and affluent) upstarts who can affirm their identity with such publicity-savvy flair.

    The transgender phenomenon is exemplary because it offers a model of unique individuality that is wholly ascriptive, involuntary, an effect of “nature,” yet at the same time wholly voluntary, requiring to be assumed by the individual. If I, born a man, not merely feel but know that I am really a woman, then unlike ordinary cis-gendered individuals, I am faced with the fateful decision to assume and reveal my identity. This in turn obliges me to make a whole series of subsidiary decisions concerning surgical operations, changes of name and dress… No doubt such cases are rare. But the model of an ascriptive selfhood that must be courageously assumed rather than merely accepted can be applied more broadly to a general conception of the unique human self whose uniqueness too must be assumed.


    The missing piece of the explanation is the Judeo-Christian notion of election, which for Christians inheres in each immortal soul chosen by Christ. In the new Ascriptive Age, the agony of Christ on the Cross has been iconically transfigured in the image of Jenner on the cover of Vanity Fair, whose sublimely ridiculous effort to look like a young woman instead of an old man has surely involved great pain and enduring discomfort. Those who identify with this image are summoned to practice a kind of imitatio Christi in reflecting on the pain necessarily attendant on assuming one’s “true” identity—one that in this case not only affirms an authentic sexuality but attempts to recapture its “timeless” youthful embodiment.

    No doubt this self-affirmation might uncharitably be seen as fetishizing the Self’s being rather than its doing— becoming a woman is not winning the decathlon. But it is precisely the unique degree to which in Judeo-Christianity the individual’s relation to God’s sacred centrality is personalized, at first through membership in an exemplary “chosen” people, and then, following this intuition to its endpoint, as personally redeemed by the sacrifice of a unique divine victim, that has liberated the Western Self—the Western soul— to discover the laws of nature and create the modern world. At this parlous stage of Western and world history, I think we should welcome whatever symbols of unresentful self-assertion we can muster.


  • The Crisis of Christianity

    The Hebrews were the “first nation,” but Christianity presided over the emergence of the first nation-states, which combined a national government with a universal religion whose “kingdom was not of this world.” The strength of Western Judeo-Christianity came from its rejection of what Eric Voegelin called “compactness,” the sacralization of political structures and the deification of emperors. In the Judeo-Christian universe, the politico-economic order of the world was accepted in its necessity, but all human relations, including political ones, were subject to moral criteria. The genius of Christianity was to separate the egalitarian principle of reciprocal morality from the “tribal” originarity of Judaism as well as from the hierarchical organization necessary in any society beyond the stage of hunting and gathering. René Girard’s notion of emissary victimage as the foundation of human society captures the anthropological monism of the Christian social vision. In Girard’s reading, Jesus’ abandonment by Paul and the disciples was the sign that all humanity outside his immediate family had turned against him at the moment of his agony. What this means is that the differences between slaves and freemen, Romans and Jews, rich and poor, are irrelevant to assigning guilt for the Crucifixion and irrelevant to the redemption that it effects. The Crucifixion resolves a “mimetic crisis” that engulfs the entire society, swallowing up the resentments that separate ranks, classes, races, and genders in a universal rage that can be satisfied only by the sacrifice of a “chosen” victim. Jesus’ divinity is demonstrated by his election for this role; or in purely anthropological terms, by occupying the place of the victim, he becomes divine.

    The redemptive vision of Christianity sees the whole society, and in principle, all humanity, as a great fraternity united by its participation in original sin and in Jesus’ forgiveness, in the context of which the indignities of slavery and other forms of human subordination are transcended. For the Christian, individual human dignity is independent of social status. In this vein, Clarence Thomas recently made the point that slaves even before the Emancipation did not lack human dignity, an idea crucial to the earliest phase of Christianity in an era when slavery was ubiquitous. (Characteristically, Thomas’ assertion was harshly criticized—in crudely racist terms—by a representative of victimary thought.)

    Thus the hierarchies that ruled Christian societies responded to the “Caesarian” necessities of social organization while respecting otherworldly Christian morality in principle. The evolution from agricultural to industrial society unique to the Christian West was dependent on the secondary nature of these necessities. These societies never fundamentally denied the equality of souls before God, although this doctrine was stretched to its limit in slavery and many colonial practices. Indeed, the very excesses of racism are a backhanded tribute to this conviction of the equality of souls; it is easier to claim that Africans or Amerindians are “inferior races” than to accept slavery or dispossession as a practice among ontological equals, such as, we tend to forget, was unproblematically the case in antiquity—or in premodern Africa, which was, as we also prefer to forget, the original source of the “slave trade.” Prosper Mérimée’s1829 novella Tamango is a brilliant literary exposition of the paradox of the African slave-trader.

    It is a tribute to Christianity that although it countenanced these moral compromises it was never wholly comfortable with them. But the Holocaust laid any further compromise open to unqualified condemnation. It is worth reflecting further on why the apocalypse that prepared the crisis of Christianity was precipitated, not by the moral conflicts entailed by such activities as slavery and colonialism, but by the fear of Jewish firstness. That so many in Christian nations could have believed the Jews to have dominated and corrupted the Christian inventions, deeply influenced by Old-Testament models, of the free market and liberal democracy was the beginning of the crisis of the modern West.

    The Holocaust not only provoked the end of colonialism and segregation, and ultimately the rise of feminism and gay liberation, but concomitantly provided the stimulus for the West’s moral dissolution in White Guilt, a guilt that Christ cannot forgive because his own Western “whiteness” makes his forgiveness unavailing. Once the de jure classification of human beings became unacceptable, any difference of outcome among ascriptive groups came to be judged as well by the model of the Nazis and the Jews. The vision of a universal brotherhood of souls that had birthed the success of the West came to be seen as a mask of oppression. Just as the Jews had been the model of the victim-people, the “suffering servant” that became incarnated in Jesus, so they provided the model for the new victimage, which was focused not on social hierarchy per se but on ascriptive difference. There were henceforth nothing but Nazis and Jews—and by a strange yet in retrospect inevitable twist of fate, the latter did not take long to become the “new Nazis.”


    The old antisemitism had found in the Jews convenient scapegoats. But the great Christian insight, restored to its central place by Girard, was that the scapegoat is really God. Those who executed Jews for having murdered Christian children were blind to the fact that to accuse the Jews of creating martyrs was really to make martyrs of the Jews, that the martyred Jew rather than his purported victim was the figure of Christ that Saul saw on the road to Damascus.

    But whereas these ironic miscarriages of justice disfigured but did not yet put in question the Christian drama of sin and redemption, the Jew‘s fancied central position in market society cast doubt upon the entire project of Christian-secular, that is, Western, modernity. Because the Jews formed a community centered like the Christian on a universal God, yet retained toward him a relation of historical firstness, they were fancied capable of constituting a secret compactness within the market that allowed them to transcend the laws of supply and demand. But if the Jewish community could take advantage of the social organization supplied by otherworldly Christian morality to subvert its fraternity of free souls, then the eternal possibility of Jewish defection, by guaranteeing a negative outcome to the market-system’s “prisoners’ dilemma,” fatally undermined modern bourgeois society.

    Bourgeois-era societies—France, Germany, Russia, Austria—boiled over in antisemitic frenzy, leading at last to the Final Solution. “Eliminatory antisemitism” sought to purify Western civilization of Jewish firstness and the Christian envy of it once and for all. Whether or not the Nazis were “really” Christians, when in Mein Kampf, Hitler called combating the Jew “doing God’s work,” he was clearly seeking to cleanse the God he had inherited from Judeo-Christianity of what he understood to be the fatal flaw in the Christian project. No doubt the Nazis rejected the Christian doctrine of the universal equality of souls. But in their eyes, master and slave races would get along just fine as Aristotelian “natural kinds”—once they were rid of the Jews.

    Those who promote White Guilt will be happy to point out that the very horror inspired by the Holocaust benefits from “white privilege,” which makes us focus on this particular genocide (assuming it is not simply denied) while treating as minor matters the decimation of the Congo population by Leopold or the Amerindians by the future Americans. (Noam Chomsky will be happy to supply further references.) Of course, the difference is not the color of the Jews’ skin (although the December 19, 2014 Forward appears to consider it racist to cast Moses as “white”), but that the Jews, descendants of the founders of arguably the more significant half of Western Civilization, were judged by an advanced representative of this civilization to constitute the equivalent of a deadly infection that required them to be systematically exterminated on an industrial scale.


    Hitler was defeated, but can we disagree with Girard’s assessment that postmodern victimary thinking signifies Hitler’s ultimate triumph over the West?

    Hitlerism avenges its defeat by making the concern for victims [le souci des victimes] despairing, caricatural. . . .

    We live in a world . . . that constantly, systematically, ritually reproaches itself with its own violence. We make sure to transpose all our conflicts . . . into the language of innocent victims. . . .

    Although the nihilisms of the far Left are just as fond of Nietzsche as those of the far Right, they are careful not to renew the quintessential deconstruction, that of the concern for victims. Since the failure of Nazism, no deconstructor, no demystifier has attacked that value. (Je vois Satan tomber comme l’éclair [Grasset, 1999]: 271-72; my translation and emphasis)

    In the face of the victimary onslaught, the West seems to have lost the ability to maintain the delicate balance between otherworldly moral values and respect for social norms, or indeed, to hold onto any notion of “normality.” The path from the denial of de jure group discrimination to the suspicion and eventual overturning of criteria that favor traditionally dominant groups requires dismantling not merely objective tests of qualification but ultimately the Judeo-Christian claim of common humanity.

    Christianity has no moral criterion other than the victimary otherness of every human being as bearing the face of Christ. But now we are told to see the Other not as a poor sinner like ourselves, a fellow participant in Adam’s fall redeemed by Jesus’ martyrdom, but as, purely on the basis of ascriptive qualities, either a beneficiary or a victim of a social order unjust in principle, a figure of either irredeemable unworthiness or indelible innocence.

    The idea that Christ’s suffering has redeemed humanity from its sinful state has been transmogrified into the promotion of a set of victimary resentments on the one hand and the proclamation of indelible White Guilt on the other. Those who do not accept this division are increasingly prevented from articulating the original Christian message of human brotherhood, even in its most anodine secular versions. A recent directive from the University of California warns faculty against telling students that “America is the land of opportunity” or using the term “melting-pot.”

    Not everyone espouses victimary values; not everyone has rejected Christianity, even in Europe, and certainly not in the United States. But it is difficult to see what short of the trauma of war can reverse or even slow the “progressive” march of the victimary through all social institutions. Human sin and virtue are henceforth defined in political terms. Yet the fact that political debate concerning these terms is increasingly ruled off limits demonstrates that the victimary movement is unconcerned with the negotiation of diverse views and interests; it is millenarian, apocalyptic. No human interaction is beyond the reach of victimary reasoning, and the process only accelerates as each formerly accepted social norm is discovered to be a disguised form of oppression, each apparently innocent gesture a “micro-aggression.” No Pharisee could have imagined the moral arrogance with which those in power demean, and when possible, degrade, those they accuse of asserting “white privilege”—for such people, after all, are the heirs of the Nazis. Hitler’s quest to deny human fraternity seems not to have failed after all.


    That hostility to the Jews gave birth to and remains in curiously inverted fashion at the center of the victimary process is a point I have made elsewhere. Christianity has become less antisemitic as the West and the world as a whole have become more so, and more anti-Christian as well. It has been largely forgotten that before WWII, Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived together in relative harmony throughout most of the Middle East, even sharing religious shrines. With the creation of Israel, the Jews were driven out of the entire region, with a few marginal communities holding on in such places as Morocco and pre-Khomeini Iran. Now the Christians too are disappearing. In the absence of the Western hegemony that had brought hope of stability and prosperity, the religions of the West cannot resist the force of Islamic exclusivism, which the West itself accepts with surprising ease, perhaps with a nuance of envy. Can we imagine a Western Saudi Arabia that made it illegal to possess a religious book other than the Bible and forbade non-Christians from entering its holy cities? What would we say if “apartheid” Israel engaged in such practices? Yet can what remains of Christendom avoid a touch of regret for the power of the religious faith that pervades the realm of Islam?

    For both historical and practical reasons, Israel is obliged to retain the “dualistic” Jewish understanding of the worldly socio-economic order as a sphere, no doubt less worthy than the kingdom of God, but for whose right conduct God must nonetheless take responsibility. (Israel also, not coincidentally, has the healthiest demography of any “Western” country.) Hence it may well be that, rather than following the current Pope’s redistributive populism, Christianity’s best chance of long-term viability lies in an increasingly intimate partnership with Judaism and Zionism. This would not only permit a counter-offensive against the Islamist persecution of both faiths, but allow Christians to relearn the necessity and dignity of firstness.