Author: staceymeeker

  • Tragedy and Christianity: Minimal and Maximal Faith

    The Girardian theory of tragedy considers the tragic form as expressing a delusion concerning the heroic stature of its protagonist. His personal qualities, the fatality of his agon and its usually fatal consequences, in a word, what distinguishes Oedipus from you and me, is a mythic element designed to prettify the ugly reality that the tragic hero is no more or less than a garden variety scapegoat, chosen “arbitrarily”–say, for his swollen feet–and retrospectively accused of all sorts of horrors as a pretext for our having done away with him. The greatness of tragedy, if greatness there be, lies in the ability of its greatest masters to see through the arbitrariness of its form, so that the spectator experiences a partial revelation of the emissary mechanism that underlies all cultural phenomena. Maybe Oedipus didn’t “really” sleep with his mother; maybe he was just the victim of a familiar twelve-letter accusation. Maybe not Oedipus but a plurality of bandits really killed Laios, as Sandy Goodhart suggested in a celebrated article (“Lestas Efaske: Oedipus and Laius’ Many Murderers”; Diacritics 8, 1, Spring 1978). In his agons with Tireisias and Creon, it becomes ever clearer that, feet aside, Oedipus is not predestined for tragedy; a small deviation in the course of the agon, as in that of the chaos-theory butterfly, would have made one of his rivals the victim in his place.

    This is a fascinating way to read tragedy, but once the rush of superiority has passed, one wonders why the deindividualizing agon bears tragedy’s sole truth while its noble, individualizing elements are demystified; one may even suspect that the debunking procedure is no less an arbitrary ritual of sacrifice than tragedy itself. It may be a vulgar insult to accuse Oedipus of sexual relations with his mother, but it is certainly more humiliating still to accuse the myth of making it all up. Is the ultimate anthropological truth that all human difference is arbitrary, or as they say nowadays, socially constructed?


    For Girard, the originary mechanism embodies the arbitrary difference of which tragedy is made, based as it is on the violent méconnaissance that culminates in the lynching of a fellow human, whose exclusion is the foundation of the nascent community. But the originary event does not require the centrality of an arbitrarily chosen human scapegoat. It is more parsimonious, on the contrary, to hypothesize that the human occupation of the sacrificial center was a later development; the myths Girard used to corroborate his human-scapegoat theory reflect the Big-Man stage of social evolution rather than its equalitarian inception. But in the absence of such a figure, the universal human reciprocity of the originary scene, having dissolved all prior differences, lacks a basis for tragic narrative. If culture begins with all humans acting in harmony, then anything tragic in the human condition can be explained only by a falling-away from originary perfection.

    It might be alleged that it is resentment occasioned by the originary difference between the sacred referent and the sign by which we designate it that is the prior source of our resentment against our fellow human beings. My resentment of firstness on a human scale is but the shadow of my originary resentment of the central object whose sacrality survives its physical dissolution through the persistence of the sign. The “tragedy” of the human condition is sometimes described in terms of the tension between body and soul, the worldly mortality of the human being and the immortality of the signs by which he communicates. But in order for this originary tension to give rise to the human agon of tragedy, there must exist a human analogue to the absolute difference of the central object.

    Adam Katz’s suggestion that firstness is present in the originary scene provides the originary hypothesis with the basis of a minimal theory of tragedy. Katz observed that in the most parsimonious description of the event in which the participants exchange the “aborted gesture of appropriation” that becomes the sign, someone goes first. The originary reciprocal exchange of signs that creates the human by deferring the conflict attendant on shared mimetic desire plausibly begins with some individual taking the initiative and subsequently being imitated by his fellows. The importance of Katz’s emendation of the hypothesis is not simply in helping us better to visualize the hypothetical originary event. It gives ontological status to the fact that mimetic phenomena, however dedifferentiating, are characterized by differences, and that rather than of effacement we should rather speak of the deferral of such differences. Even if at the outset the initiative of the “first” user of the sign confers no advantage and presumably goes unrecognized by the participants who imitate his action, as human culture evolves, the extension of the deferral of conflict that the act of signification brings about will plausibly lead to a growing awareness of these differences. Whereas in Girard’s formulation, the only difference created by the originary human act–stipulating for the moment that the “emissary mechanism” can be conceived of as having a punctual beginning–is that between the many and the one, the mob and the victim, the originary hypothesis entails without the necessity for further presuppositions a differentiation within the group supplementary to the “absolute” difference between the sign and its object. Without this secondary category of difference, not merely the future usurpation of the center by the Big Man but the deferred alternation of the Maussian exchange-system that structures premodern society would require a supplementary hypothesis. For one clan to hold the totem feast this month while the neighboring clan awaits its turn requires confidence that firstness is not asymmetric superiority but merely deferral of reciprocity, and the basis for this confidence can most parsimoniously be found in the originary event.

    The presumption that originary firstness precedes and is absorbed by the reciprocal exchange that defers mimetic violence helps to explain the familiar intuition that tragedy is the supreme narrative expression of the “human condition.” The firstness of the tragic hero is not the passive consequence of his selection by the mob. Although the divinity originates in the (presumably animal) victim of the originary feast, the human complement to the victim’s passive uniqueness is the active assumption of firstness, which is the originary source of the Big Man’s and eventually the king’s assumption of central power. Tragedy derives its narrative energy from the resentment aroused by the usurpation of the center, but this usurpation has its roots in the “egalitarian” moment of origin.

    Suppose firstness were not a human necessity; suppose all the participants in the originary event emitted the sign simultaneously. The tension between human mortality and semiotic immortality would still exist. Even if I never dreamt of resenting my fellow man, I would resent the sacred object whose being I could never possess. But how could this emotion be confined to the sacred? Even if the difference between me and the sacred is “absolute” and that between me and an Other only relative, how could the resentment of ontological injustice not spread by analogy to the real or fancied injustices of daily life? To construct the originary hypothesis without the category of firstness is to make inessential the differential temporality of human action, with its potential for opacity and suspicion, and consequently to foreclose the possibility of understanding what configuration permits the extension of originary resentment of the sacred into resentment of our fellow humans.


    The rehabilitation of the tragic is not a refutation of the anthropological revelation contained in Christianity. What it puts into question is the linear vision of history that makes Christianity the bearer of the entire anthropological truth latent in tragedy. Christianity entails an ethically higher level of human organization than tragedy, the creation of a society whose labor was performed by slaves. But had Christian Europe’s advance in social organization, which would eventually generate modern bourgeois society, simply “transcended” classical culture, Christianity would not have struggled over the past half-millennium to defend itself against secularization. That the traditional story of the Renaissance that links the emergence of bourgeois society to the rebirth of classical culture, if not of the political and economic organization that accompanied it, errs in denigrating the Christian component of its origins, is no justification for denying the tension between Christian faith and what our analysis allows us to understand as the individual assumption of the tragic necessity of firstness that characterizes classical culture.

    The tension is not between faith and its absence but between minimal and maximal degrees of faith, to which correspond the converse degrees of the personal assumption of firstness. All human existence is founded on faith in the shared transcendence of representation–minimally, of language–and consequently on originary sacred difference and the resentment of this difference. Tragedy depends on this minimal faith; we are all bearers of difference, on the model of sacred difference but incompatible with it, provoking resentment that no sacred ritual can contain. In contrast, Christian faith maximally conflates sacred difference with human firstness, thereby transforming our resentment of firstness into worship. In Science and Faith (1989), I proposed that the key event of Christian revelation occurs on the road to Damascus: when Jesus appears to Saul as the one he persecutes, he makes him realize that the very fact of persecution is equivalent to worship, that hostile obsession with the Other is the sign of the divinity of that Other. Saul’s conviction of the necessary connection between persecution and worship, as embodied in his vision of Jesus, reflects his awareness of the movement that Jesus had led and the experience of its troubling persistence after his crucifixion. One persecutes what one resents, and what Saul resented in Jesus was no doubt the posthumous persistence of his firstness in the face of this humiliating punishment–a personal exemplification of the curse of the “chosen people” of which Saul was well aware.

    By accepting to make this one human being responsible–as would later be said, as a “person of the Trinity”–for transcendence itself, by accepting the divinity of human firstness, Saul freed himself from the burden of resentment. The mystery of the cross is the conflation of the firstness of the human whose aborted gesture first expressed renunciation of the central object with the sacrificial status of that object itself. The two modes of difference that together constitute the originary scene, that of the object whose appetitive attractiveness is converted into sacred significance and that of the individual who inaugurates this significance by signaling his withdrawal from the symmetry of potential mimetic conflict, are brought together in the person of the crucified Jesus.

    This suggests the originary analysis of Christian faith as the assertion of the identity of these two modes of difference, that of the human utterer of the sign and that of its sacred referent, as expressed most succinctly in John’s “In the beginning was the logos.” With this analysis in mind, we can understand the phenomenon of monotheism prior to Christianity as a more austere form of this conflation in which the unique God is identical to the sacred, to transcendence itself, and is consequently the model of human firstness, without however being identical to it. Christian faith in this identity is maximal, or as in Tertullian’s famous credo, absurd. It includes and transcends tragedy in the sense that Jesus’ agon is the model for all firstness; but it abolishes it at the same time through the faith that the mortal incarnation of transcendence is for all humans the abolition of mortality itself. By identifying our resentment of the Other with our fundamental resentment of the divinity, Saul’s revelation makes of our resentment the sign of our transcendence of death. Man and God are revealed to have the same fundamental ontology.

    The Christian is expected to turn all his resentment of human firstness toward Christ and abolish it in contemplating the agony of the crucifixion. Throughout the Middle Ages this remained the principle of a ritual-based society, one full of violence and sin but within which violence and sin could be contained. What the Renaissance discovered, and that returned tragedy to the stage, was the social necessity of firstness in human relations–not the anointed king’s divinely sanctioned firstness but that of Hobbes’ Leviathan and more generally of the bourgeois “freed slave,” whose activity would henceforth increasingly be structured by human desire, the “private vice” that, as Mandeville would note, produced market society’s “public benefits.” The functioning of the social order would be increasingly less compatible with directing all resentment to the divinity as its universal mediator.

    The resuscitation of tragedy by the bourgeois exchange system was not a negation of but a supplement to the Pauline revelation. Since the coming of Christ, to enter on the tragic stage was no longer the universal human fate, but the Renaissance hero returns to it nevertheless, caught in a mechanism of firstness and resentment that he understands from without but with which his society’s surviving ritual order obliges or tempts him to engage. Hamlet is even less than Oedipus an arbitrarily chosen victim; he relishes his victimary role and would prolong it indefinitely in the familiar posture of the man of resentment who defines firstness as disaffection from the scene. The Girard who best understood Hamlet is not the author of “Hamlet’s Dull Revenge,” which makes him like Oedipus a scapegoat for our bloodlust, but that of the Dostoevskian analyses of Mensonge romantique.


  • Right and Left

    Ever since the French Revolution, we have been in the habit of describing politics as a battle between the Right and the Left, as though this were an anthropological truism. The fact that this division originates with the Revolution, that is, with the Left, should lead us to suspect the “even-handed” symmetry of the figure. If we take as our point of departure the most obvious, if not necessarily the most valid characterization of this opposition as that between stability and change, or for the philosophically minded, Being and Becoming, then it is odd that the two should be given equal status. In most aspects of our lives, the functioning order is what matters, and in all but exceptional, not to say revolutionary circumstances, change is incremental, if it occurs at all.

    In everyday life, we may complain about living conditions, or traffic, or taxes, but our submission to the reality of the social order is the reality of what we do, our complaint, a mere epiphenomenon. (If, however, our resentment unearths some illegality, our complaint becomes a means of enforcing the social order.) That the political faction whose vocation is to implement such complaints is nonetheless one of the two symmetrical political forces in liberal democracy confirms (1) that it is the Left that is the origin of this symmetry, and (2) that the Right, in defending Being against the Left’s Becoming, is also an instrument of “complaint,” seeking to limit or undo the changes wrought by the Left. The Left is indeed the “party of resentment,” but because resentment is contagious, the Right is resentful as well; it is the party of those who resent the resenters. Hobbes was the first man of the Right in this sense; his use of the scenic imagination to conceive the origin of monarchy out of the “state of nature” is the anthropological foundation of what we call the Enlightenment. Hobbes’ originality reflects his new, post-Revolutionary status as the secular defender of what had previously been accepted by all, including its opponents, as a divinely instituted ritual order, but that had henceforth to be defended by political means.

    All politics, in a word, is about Becoming. If the human is revolutionary, politics is evolutionary; its existence presupposes the symmetry and therefore the negotiability of resentments that would otherwise risk breaking out in violence. It is the tension between the universal reciprocity of the moral model and the necessarily opaque ethical reality of a given society that furnishes the political sphere with its energy, but only the dynamic of the market system gives rise to the symmetry that allows for politics in the modern sense of the term. Although the factions in the classical republics of Athens and Rome were not without resemblance to the modern Left and Right, there can be no true Left in a slave economy. The ancient “proletarians” sought to increase their own privileges rather than to abolish privilege as such; even prior to universal male suffrage, the bourgeois economic hierarchy had no such cushion below it. Hannah Arendt’s well-known exaltation of political “action,” which takes place entirely among humans, above the “work” and “labor” that manipulate the natural world, has its roots in the German-romantic identification with Greece, whose noble “Aryan” nature Nietzsche contrasted with the Judeo-Christian ressentiment that is the root of modern politics. Politics is distinguished from Arendt’s “action” in that it is only a secondary preoccupation of the bourgeois, whose primary focus on the economy reflects his historical position as what Kojève called in Hegelian terms a “freed slave.”

    Politics is the anthropological laboratory where we learn the respective limits of goal-oriented activity and the resentful reaction against it. The agon of resentments is what distinguishes politics from economics, and from the perspective of Sirius makes politics so much more ugly and irrational than economics. But because we do not live on Sirius, no theory of politics can situate itself “objectively” outside the political realm. “Political science” is a horizon rather than a reality, and even as a horizon it must defer to anthropology to define the integrity of its object. Conversely, the questions anthropology cannot answer are left to be dealt with by means of politics.

    One might call the Left-Right opposition “class-based,” but class conflict is not politics but revolution; a true party of the proletariat or of the bourgeoisie would not be a political party but a faction. The weakness of politics in Iraq as (formerly?) in Northern Ireland reflects the confessional and/or ethnic base of its political parties. Politics exists only when one has a choice of party, not merely formally but “psychologically,” when individual voters have access to the mindsets of both Right and Left and must consciously choose which they prefer. Self-interest of course plays a role, but not necessarily in a directly material sense. Our choice of one of the various nuances of a Left or Right mindset is a bet on the future of the social order, not simply an attempt to modify it to our material advantage. Opposing one’s own selfish interest is often an attractive position even from a material standpoint; a white male academic will probably achieve more by championing groups whose interests diverge from his own. In such cases the sacrifice of his immediate interests operates as a moral potlatch within a Maussian exchange system partly if not wholly independent of the market. Such parallel systems can take on a quasi-religious force, as is currently occurring with the global-warming phenomenon to which I will turn below.

    Adam Katz invokes originary analysis in the hope of transcending the tiresome Left-Right dichotomy. Katz suggests that the most fundamental political division opposes not Right and Left but originary and generative. The first is “radical” in bringing all questions back to the (moral-communal) center, the second, “liberal” (in the European sense of the term) in its focus on the creation of new (individual-economic) degrees of freedom. Katz’ opposition of positives–the “negative” side of which is the disappearance of the Left as such–is antithetical in spirit, if not entirely in rhetoric, to the standard modern pattern of opposed Left-Right resentments.

    The “originary” perspective derives its power exclusively from the moral model; it is not so much resentful of the historically existing order as aware of its derivative status with regard to the origin. Similarly, the “generative” outlook is concerned not with the reactive defense of a contested order but with exploiting the freedom provided by the originary event to act independently of the group in its (deferred) interest by participating in economic exchange. The question that concerns us here is whether these categories can ever replace Right and Left as the primary poles of political debate.

    The idea of a politics not driven by the need to negotiate the resentments of different groups strikes me as utopian. In Left-Right politics, economic creativity is associated with the conservative desire to maintain the exchange system rather than the liberal one (in the American sense) to impose “moral” restrictions on it, but the more important point is that the generation of new degrees of freedom is an economic rather than political operation. This suggests that the Left-Right opposition belongs not to the moment of the emission of the sign but to its embodiment in the newly formed exchange system; it reflects the potential conflict between those who resent the “equal” distribution after the sparagmos and those who resent the thought of revisiting this distribution. The Left expresses the eternal grievance over the inevitable falling-off of transparent reciprocity between the exchange of signs and the exchange of things, but it exists as a Left only once a Right emerges to express the resentment inherent in the specifically modern obligation to defend as ethical an order of exchange that had previously been held sacred.

    The politics of the originary-generative opposition remains within the “placeless” realm of the sign, where problems of distribution are in principle always already deferred, rather than in the world of material exchange, which is not so much the realm of “scarcity” as that of opacity. The opposition between originary and generative reflects the constitutive tension of the originary context where the community must be affirmed around the center, but only to the extent that the participants can subsequently leave the center to engage in economic activity. This is a tension that belongs to the scene as a whole rather than becoming personalized in conflict. It is akin to the tension that arises at the end of a dinner party between the centripetal force that keeps the group together and the centrifugal force that sends them to their cars. The mimesis inherent in such phenomena virtually never leads to open conflict, because there is no privilege to fight over other than the trivial one of leaving early, which makes leaving easier rather than harder for the others. It is not coincidental that the participants in this configuration have already partaken, presumably to their satisfaction, of the products of the communal sparagmos. Politics, on the contrary, finds its energy in the resentment that the distribution of these products inspires, with the Left condemning the social order’s inequitable distance from the originary moral model and the Right defending its legitimacy as historically continuous with this model.


    Does the recent debate over global warming provide grounds for claiming that the “Western” political debate of Right and Left is approaching the limits of liberal democracy? The Left considers the threat to human survival from the result of human disequilibrium with the natural world far more serious than that posed by Islamic extremism. Yet except in unambiguous emergencies, throughout human history human threats have taken precedence over natural ones. If the sea level were to rise precipitously or if an asteroid were to be nearing the earth, there would be no need to argue about the relative importance of human and natural dangers. Now, even in the absence of clear and present danger, the Left claims that the threat is a scientific “fact.” In this extension of the postmodern victimary critique beyond the human sphere, presumably only the transcendental judgment of “science,” rather than the usual political bargaining, can confirm the Left’s apprehensions or the Right’s sanguinity.

    But what this means is precisely that, like the purely human problem of Islamic terrorism, the human-natural global warming issue is indeed an object of political bargaining. The transcendental appeal to scientific truth does not stray from politics as usual; political rhetoric always appeals beyond naked self-interest to a transcendent universal rooted in the originary event, even if it is usually described in more cosmological terms. The predicted catastrophic consequences of global warming, however distant, are no more or less hypothetical than those of an Iranian nuclear device. Politics exists to adjudicate the respective degree of gravity of such dangers, which cannot be determined in the formal rationality of a judicial procedure but only through the negotiation of personal and collective resentments. What is both fascinating and frustrating about such debates is the impossibility of maintaining the “objective” basis of the issue, that is, the projected significance of global warming for humanity in general, outside the sphere of political debate. The real question at stake is not whether the Earth is getting warmer or even whether human activity is the cause, but how much industrial productivity should be sacrificed for how much reduction in “greenhouse effect.” The Left sees global warming as a weapon in its critique of the market system and its values; the Right sees its opponents as mere resenters of a system they consider fully capable of dealing with environmental issues in its normal course of operations. If tomorrow it is discovered that the production of CO2 actually reduces global warming, within a few days all the positions will have switched around, but all the underlying resentments will remain the same.

    Although the coming and passing of the postmodern era has posed challenges to the market system, it has not put an end to the modern political dichotomy of Left and Right. On the contrary, the recent evolution of virtually all the major European countries, which were dominated during the Cold War by shapeless “center-right” coalitions as bulwarks against communism, suggests that if anything this opposition has been sharpened–as witness the just-concluded French election. If “politics” is an indispensable feature of the market system, it is because it has proved effective at releasing energy from the deferral of violence into the economy at large. Today, as the modern world confronts its Other in what appears to be their “final conflict,” it is easy to grow impatient with a political debate that seems so irresolute in the face of the fanaticism of transcendentally guaranteed resentment. And the critique of this lack of resolution is an important element of the debate itself. But whether its outcome be reason or folly, the only alternative to the uncertainty of politics is not the certitude of “science,” whether of climatology or of Generative Anthropology, but the dogmatic truth of our enemies.


  • Why Do We Believe in GA?

    The other day my and Anthropoetics’ old friend Andrew McKenna was sufficiently irritated by a piece in the March 4 New York Times magazine to send it to me as material for a Chronicle. The article in question, by Robin Marantz Henig, is listed in the table of contents as “Darwin’s God,” but on the cover of the magazine it is entitled “Why Do We Believe?” Its frame story is the intellectual odyssey of one Scott Atran, currently an anthropologist with the CNRS, who “entered Columbia as a precocious 17-year-old” in 1968 or so (I can’t resist pointing out that I entered Columbia as a not-so-precocious 16-year-old in 1957). The discussion, which cites a number of authorities (Daniel Dennett, Pascal Boyer, Justin Barrett, David Sloan Wilson…) in the field of what might be called “evolutionary religion (not ‘religious’) studies,” gives no definitive explanation for why “we” believe in God, but everyone seems to agree on the propositions that (1) belief in God is “hard-wired” into our brains, and (2) it is “irrational” and as such probably not directly adaptive but a “spandrel” (Stephen Jay Gould’s term) or accidental by-product of the genuinely adaptive human penchant for shared, reassuring ideas and our related inability to “conceive of ourselves as not existing.” This trait has a number of adaptive advantages, both in making the thought of death less painful and in reinforcing what Durkheim (unmentioned here, even by our CNRS anthropologist) called “solidarity.” For most of the authorities consulted, these advantages suffice to make the side-effect belief in God a necessary evil, although Richard Dawkins, whose Voltairean tract The God Delusion has been on the best-seller list for months, thinks it almost wholly pernicious, as does another best-selling atheist, Sam Harris, author of Letter to a Christian Nation. The article concludes, portentously:

    No matter how much science can explain, it seems, the real gap that God fills is an emptiness that our big-brained mental architecture interprets as a yearning for the supernatural. The drive to satisfy that yearning, according to both adaptationists and byproduct theorists, might be an inevitable and eternal part of what Atran calls the tragedy of human cognition.

    If I sometimes find it discouraging to observe that in twenty-five years, the new way of thinking that I call Generative Anthropology has been adopted only by a tiny handful of adventurous thinkers, pieces such as this one fill me with a sense of beatitude. On the subject of “why we believe,” if on no other, I am obliged to conclude that my “way of thinking” is not merely superior to but in a wholly different league than discussions like the one in the Times. No doubt Andrew sent it to me as a way of boosting my morale.

    There is no point in attempting to refute the article’s tentative explanations for our “belief.” Anyone who begins from the same unexamined premises will quite reasonably arrive at similarly tentative conclusions. Nor is it altogether futile to examine the nature of religious beliefs from a “zero-based” standpoint that permits us to discover, for example, that they tend to be what Boyer calls “minimally counterintuitive.” But anyone with a sense of intellectual elegance will be skeptical of an a posteriori explanation that cannot retrodict from a huge mass of data more than a set of vaguely plausible assertions. Formulating the problem in this way guarantees that, given what we intuitively consider to be the fundamental human traits, we will find belief in God a very odd thing indeed. If we begin from the standpoint that knowledge of the world requires that we think logically, explaining the persistence of the God-spandrel requires all kinds of intellectual contortions. For even if shared irrational belief is a good thing (for instance, because by raising the price of entry to a given society it helps solve the “freeloader” problem), why exactly does God have “anthropomorphic” traits? Why wouldn’t a belief in alien abductions do the trick? And why must this “anthropomorphic” god be all-powerful and immortal? Why is the “minimally counterintuitive” not satisfied with green elephants or flying trees? Thus we must offer a different explanation for each trait: immortal and all-powerful to console us for mortality, irrational to promote “solidarity,” anthropomorphic because we tend to associate causality with human-like agency. . .

    It never seems to strike these explorers of “the tragedy of human cognition” that their unexamined anthropological intuition may not be the ideal place from which to begin their journey. Perhaps instead of starting with the idea that the thoughts and actions connected with religion are regions of opacity in an otherwise transparent existence, we should extend our wonder at the human proclivity toward “belief” to the uniquely human ability to use language and other forms of representation. These cutting-edge researchers never get as far as Roy Rappaport, the late anthropologist of religion who postulated in the 1990s that religion and language were “coeval,” or Max Müller, who remarked somewhat less rigorously on the same coincidence in the 1870s–or Giambattista Vico, who noted it more imaginatively, albeit still less rigorously, in the 1740s.

    Only once we come to see religion, art, and language as manifestations of a single as yet unexplained faculty of representation can we seek a unitary explanation for this faculty itself rather than beginning with Aristotle’s “rational animal” zoon logon exon and then expressing consternation at his or her perverse tendency to burden him- or herself with “irrational” beliefs.

    Rather than expounding the originary hypothesis for the nth time, I will merely note that, contrary to what may still be the majority view of specialists of the problem (Terrence Deacon is the main exception here), “symbolic” human language is not an extension of animal signal systems but a radically new mode of communication. I would go still farther: language brings into being an entirely new kind of entity, the category or type–as in the type-token distinction fundamental to language–that is nowhere to be found in the real, material world.

    No doubt one can cite analogies to this kind of entity in nature: the “natural kinds,” such as living species or chemical elements, each member or portion of which can be considered under certain constraints as equivalent incarnations of what Aristotle called a “form” (eidos), a dynamic variant of what his master Plato had called an Idea. But these analogies will take us only so far. Plato may have believed that the Idea of, say, a tree was more “real” than a living tree itself, but the “Idea” of a tree is inconceivable without the signified “tree” in human language. No doubt members of a species share a genotype that manifests itself in individuals much as a semiotic type is instantiated in its tokens, just as any batch of silicon is an instantiation indistinguishable from any other in a given chemical reaction. But all we find in the real world are members of various species, batches of various chemicals; there are in the world no types of human or tree or silicon existing independently of these individual instances. Even if, overlooking the fact that it would be impossible to trace all the beings we call “trees” to a common taxonomic root without including many plants we wouldn’t call trees (palm and banana trees are closer to onions than to oaks), we posit the existence of an Urbaum, the formal genetic pattern of this plant would exist only as incarnate within individual Urbaumen in the chains of its DNA, not in an Idea or word such as only human communities can create.

    No doubt language could not exist in human minds without a neuronal substrate; ideas do not grow in thin air. But the existence of neurons, even “mirror neurons,” does not explain the existence of language. On the contrary, it is the existence of language that explains the neuronal evolution of the species that uses it. It is a serious category error to affirm that the secrets of language or religion can be discovered by examining the structure and functioning of neurons. Language involves virtual beings of a new kind that “exist” nowhere but in the communal domain of language itself. Once we realize that the ontology of words and meanings, which must be “believed in” by a speech community to exist at all, is altogether different from that of worldly objects of any kind, we will find belief in God–who shares many characteristics of this ontology–less of a mystery. If there is a mystery to explore, it is rather the controversial nature of religious belief both in its particulars (in the often violently asserted incompatibility of different religions) and in general (in the atheistic critique of religion per se).


    The nonbeliever claims that man created God, the believer that God created man. The apparent symmetry of these claims suggests that the truth is to be found in the center, in the simultaneous emergence of both. Yet this mutual creation is in fact radically asymmetrical. For the believer, real things are created; for his adversary, God is a fiction no more problematic than Hamlet or Superman. But just as the Times article asks “why we believe” in God without remarking that the language we use to ask the question is just as transcendental as the being of which it is skeptical, so the atheist calls God a “fiction” without remarking that our capacity for creating fictions is no more self-explanatory than that for using language.

    Why is it less remarkable that we create “characters” we know never existed and attribute to them actions we know never took place than that we “believe in God”? The obvious answer is that in creating or following a story, we make no assertions about reality, whereas belief is precisely such an assertion. But even if we stipulate that the function of language is to provide manipulable models of reality, it follows only that religious discourse, which makes unprovable and apparently implausible assertions about reality, is more dysfunctional than fictional discourse that asserts nothing at all; we still have not explained the function of the latter. We should not confuse stories with thought experiments, elaborations of hypotheses about reality. Hamlet is not a thought experiment about medieval Denmark.

    The simplest distinctions are often the most insightful. Fictions normally concern mortal beings like ourselves. Religious discourse, including what we call “myth,” is about “immortals,” and although these two categories interpenetrate in interesting ways–for example, in “demi-gods” and “dying gods”–their fundamental distinction remains. Gods, and all the more so, the monotheistic God, have the attributes of signs as opposed to things. They are not subject to mortal decay; they inhabit “another world” and from this transcendental vantage point preside over our own. The notion of divine omnipotence reflects the all-powerfulness of the sign in the originary event, where the participants’ unanimous designation of the object of desire by means of the sign defers the violence attendant on attempting its appropriation. The projection of this omnipotence onto the natural world provides a cultural explanation for the events of nature. God is praised for good weather and blamed for earthquakes because he is in the first place understood as the arbiter of chaos or peace in the internal conflicts of the human world.

    The anteriority of myth to fiction, of stories of gods to stories of humans, indicates that the total separation of the ontology of language from that of reality that permits us to use the former to create maps of the latter evolved from an earlier stage during which the beings that exist in language were presumed to share its ontology, the invulnerability of signs to the entropy of the material world that, when attributed to living beings, we call “immortality.” This is an immediate corollary of the originary hypothesis, according to which it was by surviving the scene of its first enunciation that the ostensive sign came to be understood as a linguistic type independent of its tokens. As the center of the scene remains after its occupant has been dismembered in the sparagmos, so the sign remains that refers to it. On this hypothesis, the being we call “God” is the permanently subsisting signified of the originary sign, the being whose permanence corresponds to the permanence of the sign itself.

    Every human possesses the means of “immortalizing” his or her experience by representing it. It is this capacity that associates with our grief at death a sense of scandal that is more than a mere animal reaction to non-presence. The death of our representational capacity is the death we really care about; few things are sadder than a human being who can no longer use language. For the believer, this scandal is expressed and transcended in the contrast between the soul and its embodiment; our grief at the mortality of the one must be tempered by our faith in the immortality of the other. But the model for the immortal soul is nothing other than the immortal signs of language. Conversely, it is only once we have come to understand that this spiritual immortality belongs to us as well as the gods that we can conceive of fictions in which the creatures we create with our signs share in their spiritual but not their material being the sign’s transcendental status.


    The outcome of arguing over such things as whether God created the world in six days is not merely failure to reach agreement but the most dismal intellectual stagnation. We need to reason about the human rather than recycle formulas ad nauseam in the service of preset existential positions.

    If atheists and believers, instead of facing off against each other to defend their turf, sought to find their common point of reference in the human self-consciousness that alone permits them to debate in the first place, they would find themselves obliged, not to put away their various beliefs, but to bracket all those that interfere with this new conversation. As a result, they would move to the boundaries of their respective belief-systems, to the one common point on which all humans can stand: the hypothesis of our descent from a single originary event of representation.

    Only having reached that singular point would they be able to express in mutually communicable terms how much they do and do not share. It is through this conversation that we will learn the possibilities and limits of ecumenism–which anthropological truths all humans can accept, and conversely, about which the necessities of social order require them provisionally to disagree.

    Before this can happen, however, not just the happy few of generative anthropology but the actual participants in the debate will have to become aware that there is indeed an alternative to their way of conducting it. I hope that, if not my mortal incarnation, then at least my immortal soul will hold out long enough to witness this moment of revelation.


  • The Crisis of Firstness (Guest Chronicler: Adam Katz)

    I take Eric Gans’ latest Chronicle (#341, “Victimary Extinction or Religious Survival”) to initiate a displacement of White Guilt from the center of our discussion, insofar as contending diagnoses of the phenomena must ultimately be tested by the respective treatments they propose and by what the debate itself can reveal regarding the fundamentals of our “discipline.” If our disagreements can be shown to reside in different ways of articulating historical specificity and fundamental anthropological reflection, on the one hand, and GA as a mode of self-reflection capable of assisting in the identification and amelioration of rivalries and resentments as well as a mode of disinterested inquiry, on the other hand, it will have been a productive disagreement indeed.

    I can begin by endorsing and minimally taking issue with the following representation of my positions: “As the mode of postmodern critique, deconstruction is fully ‘Katzian’; it attributes no power to the Other and all power to the hegemonic national/cultural Self.” Insofar as the Other is he who does not occupy the same scene as I do, the “Katzian” position seems to me axiomatic: none of us gives a second thought as to whether we are presently offending the Mongolians or Aleutians, and if we do worry about offending the Muslims, it is because we now share a common object with them, which is to say to that extent they are now no longer “Others” but rather “other” participants on the same scene. Maybe to that extent deconstruction is itself “Katzian,” but the purpose of deconstruction is to preserve and heighten that ambiguous state between other and Other, where we are perpetually dealing with specters of our own creation (“Others”) which nevertheless possess sufficient agency to disrupt our projections (“others”). The ethical stance in this case would be, as Gans suggests, one that understands that it is not only the power to physically control and exclude the Other, but to construct and define her, regarding which the “Same” must be ever vigilant.

    If the “Other” is he who does not share our object and participate in constructing our scene, the term covers a wide range of relationships: from the kind of irrelevant Others I mentioned in the previous paragraph, to enormously powerful Others who could easily destroy us, to, perhaps most importantly, those upon whom I project the fears and desires that would properly, but only with very uncertain results, be directed toward my others (this would probably have been the more accurate critique of “Orientalism” than the one Said actually issued: projections of the “East” enabled classes and nations within Europe to avoid making too explicit accusations of tyranny and backwardness against each other). So, I am not simply referring to those we need not concern ourselves with, merely those who raise no fundamental moral questions for us. It follows that moral boundaries will be blurred and internal modes of deferral disrupted when Others start to become others (and hence to modify and disturb our relations with our “others”). Whereas in our relation to others, we seek to maintain norms of reciprocity and indeed, to constantly repair and when possible strengthen those norms, in relation to Others, we aim for a less lofty symmetry, ensuring at least some minimal predictability in our transactions. White Guilt emerges in response to the crisis induced by the massive boundary confusion of the 20th century and is therefore a sign of the collapse of this distinction between reciprocity and symmetry, and the significant damage to each taken separately: this collapse is the problem to which White Guilt represents an attempted solution, and White Guilt has now become part of the problem preventing the attempt to construct solutions, albeit provisional and difficult ones.

    So, if I have been saying “that the bearer of WG is in the first place afraid of his own potential power over the Other” it is in the sense that the fear generated here is fear of the others instigated by a new and problematic relation to the Other. In this sense I can see why Eric would situate my reflections at a less fundamental stage of anthropological inquiry—on the originary scene the distinction I am making between others and Others does not seem to exist. First of all, let me explain my own thesis. I am recommending that we take literally the claim, on the part of the typical white guilty leftist (American or European), that he fears George Bush more than Osama Bin Laden. For those who don’t actually experience that fear, it must be very hard to take it literally—it seems like an obvious dramatization, and it makes sense to assume that what is “really” meant is that one fears that “George Bush” will incite the resentment of “Osama” leading to the violent resentment one “really” fears. Not so, I insist: the fear is that the American public, conceived in the white guilty imagination to be a veritable lynch mob only barely held in check by the various obstacles to action put in place over the decades by the liberal media, academy and judiciary, once roused to settle accounts with “Osama” once and for all, will not stop there. I don’t say that the fear is as specific as that “George McGovern” will be the next target, but rather, that unleashing the American mob will lead to uncontrollable and unpredictable consequences that will engulf us all, one way or another (and wouldn’t that be the most specific that one’s fear on the originary scene itself would be?—one wouldn’t fear, in particular, some designated other). Buffer zones, crucial to the existence of the islands of the enlightened in a “normalized” sea of zombies, will be swept away. For the left, in other words, it is an article of faith that for “middle (red) America,” “coastal (blue) America” is always about to become a monstrous Other.


    This brings us back to the originary scene, which is itself in fact characterized by an intensification of the ambiguity between other and Other: the more the other occupies the same scene as I do, the more likely it is that he is an Other who wants to usurp my place and destroy me. In that case, if “Adam is right to analyze European-style ‘pacifism’ and all that it entails as a reaction to the horrors of WWII’s paroxysm of firstness gone wrong–gone wrong precisely because it was hallucinated as itself a reaction by the ‘victims’ of the Jews’ betrayal in WWI (der Dolchstoss), Bolshevism-plutocracy, corruption of the ‘Aryan race,’ etc.,” we need to pay closer attention to Eric’s claim that “In the originary event, the ‘first’ user of the sign was driven by the fear that his gesture of appropriation might arouse a violent reaction in his fellows. Behind the postmodern fear of one’s own power over others is the more anthropologically primitive fear of the potential ability of these others to reverse the hierarchy that sustains this power.” There seem to be two different dimensions of firstness here: firstness as a fear of the violence of the Other and fear of firstness as a potential mode of violence or “Othering” in its own right. And it would make sense to think of firstness as itself fearful insofar as, in the moment before others became others by imitating the gesture (rather than Others by ignoring it), the distinction between firstness and “firstness gone wrong” would be impossible to make in any reliable way.

    That is, without its completion by the others, the initial gesture is radically indeterminate: it could incite and intensify just as easily as it could interrupt the gathering crisis. In this case, rather deep memories of the originary scene would be involved in White Guilt. Even more, it seems likely that not only would firstness be necessary for the originary scene, but so would its forgetting: firstness would be a vivid reminder of that moment when the convulsion of violence seemed at least as likely as any other possibility; remembering, which is to say iterating and ritualizing the scene as one in which everyone signed simultaneously would be much more assuring. Firstness would only be remembered in times of crisis, and since it would, by definition be “remembered” by someone “first,” it would be, for the others, at least in part a sign of that crisis as well. Firstness, then, in these later rememberings, would always involve a willingness to risk scapegoating and its success would be world-historical precisely because that possibility was transcended.

    So European colonialism would be a form of firstness as well as firstness gone wrong: what other form of relationship between Europe and Africa and Asia could have avoided the need, on the part of Europeans, to take on some kind of civilizing role, even given their own barbarities and general ill-suitedness to take on such a role? The Nazi Holocaust, insofar as it can be seen primarily as continuous with this history (as it is, perhaps most famously, by Aime Césaire, in his Discourse on Colonialism, arguing that the only reason Europeans were so horrified by the genocide of the Jews was that for the first time the victims of colonialism were white), would then lead to a conflation of firstness with firstness gone wrong, repeating, finally, the originary forgetting of firstness (by representing the Jews as simply another victim, chosen for easily explicable historical, sociological, economic, etc., reasons). All claims to civilizing the Other aim at nothing more than possessing the Other—but this very desire to possess the Other (his resources, territories, labor, etc.) is what drove the West into a thirty years long civil war that, had Hitler’s scientists been a bit cleverer or luckier (and that won’t be the case next time, since the means are already available), we would not have survived.

    In this case, White Guilt is a spectacular example of firstness gone wrong: what else could account for the belief that one’s own cultural suicide will save the world? But this brings us back to the bearer of White Guilt’s fear of the violence of the Other. Eric’s claim is that “Behind the postmodern fear of one’s own power over others is the more anthropologically primitive fear of the potential ability of these others to reverse the hierarchy that sustains this power.” But what “hierarchy” is there to be reversed on the originary scene? If the originary scene is set in motion precisely through the collapse of pre-human, animal hierarchies, this formulation would seem to concede the “lateness” of White Guilt. The same seems to me to be the case with the following: “Nor is this fear permanently absent in the postmodern configuration. No doubt if the Europeans chose to fight with guns they would not have to fear those with knives. But once one ceases to affirm firstness by displaying a credible threat of violence, the resentful Other will fill the vacuum with violence of his own. The history of ‘liberation movements’ reflects this, as well as the current jihadi struggle. Terrorism only works–is only even tried–when the dominant power begins to take the resentment of its subalterns into account.”

    The question of the decision no longer to affirm firstness cannot, it seems to me, be located, strictly speaking, on the originary scene: this would have to refer to what I have hypothesized as the periodic need to remember and recover firstness, which can always be allowed to “lapse.” The same goes for the credible threat of violence, which we might consider a part of the originary scene, but a dispensable part: we can imagine the need to use force against those rejecting the sign; but we can also imagine a unanimous renunciation. It seems most economical to take this new attitude toward the subaltern as part of the broader crisis of firstness. Once a deformation of firstness has become accepted as a mode of deferral (White Guilt, in its various institutions—an anti-American UN, the EU, post-Auschwitz forms of international law which have increasingly encroached upon national sovereignty, almost to the point of rendering it illegitimate—has, from the standpoint of the Europeans and American Europhiles, kept the peace in Europe and, it is plausible to imagine, prevented nuclear war between the superpowers and contains the only hope for First World/Third World reconciliation. At the very least, how could one disprove any of this?), only another, matching mode of deferral can replace it. This is my understanding of the need to de-center White Guilt, which means to return to the task of historicizing “Auschwitz” by retrieving firstness.


    I have nothing to add to Eric’s remarks on the need for “a circumstantial narrative that allows us to trace our heritage back to a model of originary exchange,” so I will focus on some of the political preconditions of a recovery of the required minimal faith. If “every religion claims for its community the ancestry of the first human to convert his appropriative gesture into a sign,” the same must be true, more contentiously, with every national community. If we are to resist the imperial and utopian ambitions of the “transnational progressives” (the political party of White Guilt) as well as the renewed tribalism of which the jihad is merely the most prominent and dangerous component, we can only do so in terms of the prerogatives of the nation state. But so far that would merely be a call to return to the traditional nationalism of (or at least conceived and idealized in) the nineteenth century.

    Through the nineteenth century a genuinely “pluralistic” world could be tolerated: an increasingly democratic and free West could co-exist with the ancient tyrannies of the East and the Muslim world. Much of the resentment directed toward the Bush Doctrine by conservatives rests upon a belief that such a pluralism is inevitable since we have no reason to assume that liberty is desired (or more desired than other things) by Others. But this configuration collapsed precisely because the desire to possess the Others infiltrated the modes of reciprocity carefully constructed over centuries of Western history—in particular, rules of warfare and respect for national sovereignty. The widespread availability of nuclear weapons makes it even more absurd to think of returning to the previous pluralism. We have no choice but to turn the Others into others, which doesn’t mean transforming the world into a single community; rather, it means shared rules of engagement based upon a general conformity of domestic institutions. This is already happening rather rapidly: our relations with China and India, to take the two most prominent examples, have already moved well beyond the colonial, asymmetric, model. In fact, we could see the intensification of both White Guilt and its complement, the totalitarian jihad, in recent years, as resulting from the fear that their entire mode of deferral and civilization (respectively) is becoming extinct.

    But the outcome is uncertain—backsliding in Europe and the U.S. is very real, and without the U.S. maintaining its centrality, its firstness, at least a while longer, there will be no shared center capable of sustaining the world market system. As necessary as religious faith may be, we must also be able to look for the highest political forms of the West, in particular constitutional government, as well as those “amendments” added in the 20th century in response to both abuses of firstness and totalitarian attempts to exterminate it, such as civil disobedience, the “dissident,” the “witness,” and to support them whenever we find them. Perhaps we will, in an interesting twist, find them more and more often in the Christian “martyr” in Islamic and Communist societies (i.e., China); and, of all places, in the heart of Western Europe itself, where before long not only “Islamophobia” but global warming “denial” might be deemed thought crimes. We must, in short, support, learn to recognize, and hypothesize new modes of freedom, which is to say gestures which are indispensable for and yet dependent upon their completion by other actions beyond our control; or new modes of firstness, which we will inevitably not be completely ready for until we find ourselves converted to the scene they present to us for our continuation. In the name of such political forms and alliances we can recover a sense of limited but necessary use of force and hence “restore our deterrent”; and in the process go a long way toward restoring reality as a process of trial and error.

    This is perhaps the most serious effect of White Guilt—it aims at suspending reality because reality is nothing other than the contagion set in motion by the breaking of the originary symmetry Eric has described as the peculiar deformation of the originary scene constitutive of White Guilt. Our capacities for dealing with reality from any other standpoint than that of the special prosecutor looking for Watergate-style conspiracies in every nook and cranny of existence have significantly atrophied. A fully human reality is based upon mutual promises and covenants and upon keeping faith with them. This means we are obliged to follow ‘Abraham, the man from Ur, whose whole story, as the Bible tells it, shows such a passionate drive toward making covenants that it is as though he departed from his country for no other reason than to try out the power of mutual promise in the wilderness of the world, until eventually God himself agreed to make a covenant with him’ (Hannah Arendt). The retrieval and extension of firstness is the exercise of this power; it is all that can be holy for all of us today, and all that we need.


  • Victimary Extenction or Religious Survival

    For some time I’ve been having a little discussion with Adam Katz about the roots of White Guilt that I thought I would share with the reader. I have been claiming that WG is rooted in real physical fear of the Other whose resentment threatens us with violence. On the contrary, Adam insists that the bearer of WG is in the first place afraid of his own potential power over the Other and that it is this fear that explains, for example, why Europeans are so ready to give in to pressure from radical Muslims and so unwilling to engage in combat even (say, in Afghanistan) under the auspices of NATO. When I pointed out that Europeans have good reason to physically fear the Muslim populations in their midst, Adam made the following reply:

    With regard to the Europeans, I have no doubt the physical fear is real–if I have decided that I will only fight barehanded, someone with a knife will genuinely terrify me; the question is, why did I so decide? Something else must frighten them even more–so the fact that they are willing to face this more direct fear must say something about how terrifying that must be.The “something else” here, as our earlier discussion makes clear, is the Auschwitz paradigm of evil persecutor and powerless victim that I consider the point of departure for the postmodern and the victimary attitudes that lie at its core. I can’t very well disagree with my own formulation.

    The solution to this dilemma lies in the fact that we are dealing with different historical layers of the phenomenon under discussion. From the standpoint of WG’s historical specificity, Adam is right to analyze European-style “pacifism” and all that it entails as a reaction to the horrors of WWII’s paroxysm of firstness gone wrong–gone wrong precisely because it was hallucinated as itself a reaction by the “victims” of the Jews’ betrayal in WWI (der Dolchstoss), Bolshevism-plutocracy, corruption of the “Aryan race,” etc. Fearful of what European violence once wrought, Europe has abandoned the means of violence, making it vulnerable to those who “fight with knives.”

    It is only with respect to a more fundamental, less historically specific anthropological paradigm that this behavior can be thought of as motivated by the physical fear of exacerbating the Other’s resentment. In the originary event, the “first” user of the sign was driven by the fear that his gesture of appropriation might arouse a violent reaction in his fellows. Behind the postmodern fear of one’s own power over others is the more anthropologically primitive fear of the potential ability of these others to reverse the hierarchy that sustains this power. Nor is this fear permanently absent in the postmodern configuration. No doubt if the Europeans chose to fight with guns they would not have to fear those with knives. But once one ceases to affirm firstness by displaying a credible threat of violence, the resentful Other will fill the vacuum with violence of his own. The history of “liberation movements” reflects this, as well as the current jihadi struggle. Terrorism only works–is only even tried–when the dominant power begins to take the resentment of its subalterns into account.


    One implication of this discussion is that we should understand victimary pacifism not simply as a desire to defer the force previously exercised in the defense of firstness, but as the expression of a romantic desire to return from the enforced difference of hierarchy, with its Auschwitzian potential, to a utopian deformation of the originary event where the equal potential force of Self and Other enforces not so much reciprocity as mutual inaction–as though the emission of the sign were a permanent state rather than a moment of deferral. WG’s favoring of the “dominated” through various forms of “affirmative action” has a deeper purpose than to produce equality of results in the present; its ultimate aim is to abolish not merely the effects of history but history itself, to return to the mythical innocence of the originary model. Since this state can never be reached, affirmative action must go on forever, not merely for the cynical reason that it demonstrates to its supporters the inferiority of those who receive it, but because the model of equality of outcome implicit in their special treatment points to the originary horizon that would otherwise risk being forgotten. Thus it is true both that the guilty wants to retain the Other’s otherness so that he can pursue his demonstration of dissociation (Shelby Steele) and that this very configuration gestures toward a hypostatized originary equality.

    The aim of WG is not to abolish firstness but to delegitimize it, or to use a familiar term, to deconstruct it. As the mode of postmodern critique, deconstruction is fully “Katzian”; it attributes no power to the Other and all power to the hegemonic national/cultural Self. But to the extent that it occurs, the real deconstruction of institutions is the work not of the intelligentsia but of those whom these institutions disfavor. Postmodern politics, as made visible in the paroxysm of 1968, is in the first place anarchistic, but it acquires and indeed, generates allies of a more sinister and potentially destructive nature.

    Arguments against WG from a universal anthropological standpoint always fail to convince its partisans because WG is itself conceived from such a standpoint. Thus the response to the claim that a given institution is the historical realization of an originary human potentiality is that the institution is illegitimate because it has strayed from the moral model. In this perspective the institution’s function, economic in the broadest sense of embodying a mode of social exchange, is subordinated to the originary function of all social institutions: the deferral of violence through representation, the moral end that trumps all practical ends. It is implicit in WG that the study of institutions be critical, not merely adjectivally but substantively; the sole legitimate discourse about institutions is the deconstruction of the discourses that function to hide their immorality. Despite the obscurity that characteristically attends such analyses, there is nothing inherently complex about this procedure. Indeed, the most effective implementation of deconstruction has been in the radically simplified–because overtly political–form of Edward Said’s epoch-making Orientalism, which denies the objectivity of “orientalist” discourses a priori on the basis of their provenance in the hegemonic West.

    By bringing everything back to an originary moral utopia–whose utopian nature reflects the refusal to see it as an origin– postmodern victimary thought gives itself what it fancies to be an unimpeachable anthropological basis, albeit at the price of assimilating the entire course of human history to its “fulfillment” in the Holocaust. Yet it would be a mistake to characterize WG as impractical. The absolute nature of its view of historical firstness as a falling-away from a timeless moment of perfect symmetry guarantees that its negotiating position cannot be compromised by any action within the political marketplace. The sole cure for WG is to be, as they say, mugged by reality.


    GA’s understanding of the functionality of religion cannot be implemented as a practical scheme. Insofar as it remains committed to the scientific credo of minimalism, theoretical anthropology cannot become a religion; there is no parsimonious myth of origin. For GA to be a substitute for religion, it would have to present the originary scene not as a minimal hypothesis but as a fact our descent from which we could celebrate as a community. What GA can affirm is that there is no epistemological justification for rejecting religious belief-systems on the basis of their non-minimalism. The cosmological claims of these systems, even when true, are not meant to establish empirical verities. As Durkheim said a century ago, the object of the affirmations of religion is not the object-world but the human world.

    It is no accident that throughout the West only traditional religious morality, notably as embodied in conservative American Christianity, has been able consistently to stand up against WG. Religious morality interprets the originary deferral of violence for the benefit of a virtual human community that, because it exists in history, must take history into account as something other than a moral catastrophe. This is true for even the most “other-worldly” religions, including virtually all Christian sects. In contrast, the moral minimalism of WG is centered on affirming the subject’s purity in dissociation from the hegemonic forces of his own civilization, irrespective of the moral worth, or lack of same, of the civilization’s “victims,” as witness Western feminism’s remarkable lack of outrage at the grossly unequal status of women in traditional societies. “Subaltern” cultures have a right to their own history that the dominant West must renounce.

    The victimary belief-system relies on the moral model for its critique of reality while ignoring morality’s anthropological function of preserving the human community. In contrast, the religious narratives that supplement our minimal conception of the originary event and its consequences serve to guarantee a given community’s claim to be the sole legitimate heir of the originary deferral of violence by analogy with that of the first user of the sign. When religion links a given community with humanity as the bearer of transcendence, Heidegger’s shepherd of Being, the link goes beyond the human-in-general to affirm the firstness of this community, however its limits be defined. In the West, the Jews’ status as the “chosen people” has attracted the envy of the faithful of the other “Abrahamic” religions, but every religion claims for its community the ancestry of the first human to convert his appropriative gesture into a sign.

    In America Alone (Regnery, 2006), Mark Steyn makes a demographic case for religion by noting that the “post-religious” societies of Europe have birth rates well below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman and are thus condemned to disappear within a few generations. Steyn’s positive assessment of religion’s role in preserving the human community is in the spirit of Durkheim and more recently, of Rodney Stark and various evolutionary psychologists who have noted the adaptive value of religion in maintaining social cohesion. If Steyn’s analysis nevertheless merits particular attention it is because, as he puts it, “It’s the demography, stupid!”: even to state that demographic survival is a society’s most basic indicator of success is to commit a tautology. The death-spiral birth rates found all over Europe, some as low as 1.1 (France is proud of its exceptional near-replacement rate), have never before been observed in societies not traumatized by famine, plague, or war. Or perhaps we should say that these societies have been permanently traumatized by a war that ended sixty years ago.

    This impending horizon of demographic suicide provides a post-Durkheimian insight into the function of the sacred. Against this horizon, the notion of the “immortality of the soul” by analogy to that of the sign, which every religion expresses in one form or another, takes on a very concrete meaning. Whatever I may conceive my personal immortality to be, it can only be realized even in imagination by my fellow humans, whether in my genetic descendants, or more broadly, in my cultural community. Contemporary European history offers a laboratory demonstration that individuals whose horizon is limited to their personal existence will not, when given the choice (via easily obtainable contraceptives and abortions), insure the survival of their society. For the esthetes of the 19th-century vie de bohême, this meant leaving works rather than children; for their descendants today, it means profiting from accumulated social wealth with no more concern for the future of their culture than of their DNA.

    The ultimate lesson of this debacle is that absent identification with firstness, communities cannot survive in the most fundamental, biological sense. The critical test of the claim that a society can live without religion is not simply, as it has traditionally been understood, whether it can remain free of destructive internal conflict, but whether it can provide some goal beyond individual life that motivates its members to reproduce themselves. This question has been occulted in the past–by no means “arbitrarily”–by the subordination of women who bear and rear the children to men whose free exercise of their faculties has traditionally been little hindered by the existence of offspring. Contrary to the standard narrative of secularization, the evidence suggests that as childrearing in modern societies comes to depend on a positive decision by both parents, the explicit affirmation of spiritual transcendence that religion provides becomes not less but more necessary.

    This is not conclusive proof that this expression need take a traditionally religious form. Nonetheless, it strongly corroborates the hypothesis that the archaic “oral” form of the historical narratives and other discourses of traditional religions provides moderns with a necessary link to the traditional, “Maussian” mode of social exchange that has not been abolished so much as submerged by the modern market system. We may not need religion to tell us to respect each other’s desires, but without a circumstantial narrative that allows us to trace our heritage back to a model of originary exchange, we may no longer be able to insert these desires, whose biological satisfaction no longer insures reproduction, into the social context of the exchange of gifts between generations.

    There is no basis in reason for condemning traditional religion as an irrational need from which Enlightenment will one day free us. On the contrary, if our conception of anthropology is correct, the highest truth is that of the survival of the human community, and it is the duty and destiny of the reason of the philosophers to reformulate itself around this truth. Whether we learn it “maximally” from religion or minimally from GA, genuine wisdom requires us to accept, in the face of metaphysics that too many take as a synonym for science, that language and its associated logics exist in the service of the human and not the other way around.


  • Frère Jacques

    Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive thought, despite its often arch presentation (not to speak of the tiresome word-games it has inspired in lesser minds), contains the most profound anthropological intuitions of postmodernism. Generative Anthropology is most simply described as the result of grafting the Derridean notion of deferral or différance onto the stock of Girard’s “fundamental anthropology” to produce its conception of the human as the deferral of violence through representation.

    I regret that I was never able to engage in a dialogue with Derrida. My contacts with him were few and limited. On the last occasion, when he went back on his promise to participate in a special deconstruction issue of Anthropoetics on learning that we were expecting a dialogue rather than an interview, I was surely amiss in not approaching him directly during his annual stay at UC Irvine. Paying court to Great Thinkers has never been my strong suit, even when I am ready to acknowledge their greatness. Thus the opportunity for dialogue was lost, if indeed it ever existed.


    Having paid rather little attention to Derrida’s later writings, including his 1996 essay, “Foi et savoir” (Faith and Knowledge), I was struck by a personal text entitled “Moi, l’Algérien” that appeared in the November 9, 2006 issue of the Nouvel Observateur. Derrida concludes this little essay, which begins by describing his childhood as a Jewish boy in Algeria, with an informal discussion of faith that displays such sureness of anthropological intuition that it can very nearly be read as a contribution to GA:

    I cannot address myself to another, whoever he is, whatever his religion, his language, his culture, without asking him to believe or accredit me (me faire crédit). Relating to another, addressing another, presupposes faith. One can never demonstrate, one can never prove that somebody is or is not lying–this is impossible to prove. One is always able to say: I told a falsehood but I said it sincerely, I was mistaken, but I did not lie. Consequently, when somebody speaks to us, he asks us to believe him. This faith is the condition of the social bond itself. There is no social bond without such a faith. Thus I believe that one can radicalize the secularization of politics (du politique) while maintaining this necessity of faith in the general sense that I have just defined and then, on the basis of this universal faith, this shared faith, this faith without which there is no social bond, one can and one must respect religious affiliations in the normal sense of the term. And I am persuaded that authentic believers, those who are authentically Jewish, Christian, or Muslim, who are not simply dogmatic, are readier than anyone else to understand another person’s religion and to achieve this faith whose universal structure I have just described. Consequently I believe that there is no contradiction between political secularization and the mystery of life, that is, the fact of living together in faith. The act of faith is not a miraculous thing, it is the very air we breathe. As soon as I begin to speak, even if I am lying, I am saying to you: “I tell you the truth, believe me, I promise to tell you the truth.” And this act of faith that is implicit in social relations, in the social bond itself, I am persuaded that authentic believers, those who are not what we call fundamentalist, integrist, dogmatic, ready to transform their belief into a weapon of war, are readier to understand both the other’s religion and this universal faith. Consequently, I believe that far from there being a contradiction, there is a connection between political secularization and what you call the relationship to the mystery of life.
    Here Derrida situates in language itself the primary bond of mutual faith between human beings, a bond that is renewed each time someone speaks. (One wonders how he would have reconciled this model of language as the mediator of mutual presence with his more familiar early critique of linguistic self-presence or logocentrism.) Derrida raises the concern for the distinction between lying and truth only to dismiss it as superficial, for the primary affirmation “I am telling you the truth” implicit in every utterance is prior to the proposition, the declarative sentence that alone can be true or false. Significantly, he uses the term “promise” (“I promise to tell you the truth”), which as I observed in Chronicle 328 is the only one of Austin’s performatives that is accessible to every speaker of language independently of any religious or secular ritual context. (The typical performatives, “I now pronounce you man and wife,” “I dub you Sir Henry,” “The court is now in session,” are statements that “do things with words” only if uttered in their proper context by an authorized officiant.) Derrida is justified in extending the category of the promise to constative propositions. But the promise inherent in the constative is conceivable only on the basis of an originary promise more elementary than that of truth: the promise of mutual non-appetitive attention (which Girard calls in a slightly different context “non-instinctual attention”) to the common central object of desire. To extrapolate from Derrida’s text to the terminology of the originary hypothesis, my assurance of “telling the truth” does not refer in the first place to verifiable information about the world but to my emission of a sign in the place of an appropriative gesture. Verification of the “truth” of the ostensive sign is inherent in the signing act itself; to emit a linguistic or “symbolic” sign is ipso facto not to appropriate its referent, and the sign’s prolongation contains within it an implicit promise of continued non-appropriation. This extrapolation’s only infidelity to Derrida is in presupposing the necessity of a scenic hypothesis of origin, a necessity invisible from within the Western metaphysical or philosophical tradition. Yet in adopting in his later works a religious vocabulary that he did not shrink from applying to the real world of human relations, Derrida implicitly acknowledged a ground of the human more fundamental than metaphysics.

    Derrida’s text twice insists on the opposition between dogmatic and authentic religious belief; the latter grants an understanding of both “the other’s” religion and the universal faith inherent in our common possession of language. The true as opposed to the dogmatic believer is able to understand other faiths than his own because (although this is not explicitly stated) he is able to recognize the anthropological basis of all faiths in this minimal anthropological faith. Whatever else we believe, the “air we breathe” as human beings is that of faith in the viability of human communication mediated by representations. The matter of lying is indeed secondary because the main thing is that we understand each other, with regard both to the content of my discourse and to its form, which in this case is constative. Even if I am lying, both I and my interlocutor are aware of the rules of the language game and communicate to each other this awareness. My potential manipulation of the system through lies–a danger the late Roy Rappaport thought it the primary function of religion to avert–is only a secondary matter, a sin against the system that reaffirms its order, since were lying to become the norm, language would cease to embody the minimal faith lacking which its users would no longer be part of a human community.

    Derrida’s true believer commemorates a particular revelation as definitive but is at the same time aware that his dispute with those who hold to other revelations is less fundamental than the shared universal faith whose origin each of the revelations claims to explain. The practitioners of the different faiths can argue about the quality of their respective revelations but they cannot dispute the common element in all of them: providing a foundation for the human use of language, not simply as a cognitive function, but as the fundamental mode of communication, our shared faith in which is equivalent to being human.


    A point in Derrida’s discourse where his intuition is more difficult to decipher is his reference to la sécularisation du politique. I do not think that this is merely the usual reference to Western and particularly European disaffection from the ritual practices and thoughtways of traditional society, a process Marcel Gauchet calls le désenchantement du monde. We should conceive it rather in originary terms as the separation of the exchange of signs from the originary central referent of these signs. In this context what Derrida calls radicalization suggests the substitution of a “secular” or simply, anthropological theory of origin for the usual religious narratives. Not only do we make the decision to view the human exchange of signs without reference to a revealed originary narrative, but the theory of origin that we espouse affirms the invalidity of any such narrative in the public sphere.

    Yet in his final sentence Derrida emphasizes not merely the compatibility of this secular theory with faith in general, but their intimate connection. Like non-dogmatic religious belief, the non-revelatory theory of origin implied by political secularization helps us to grasp the element of minimal faith common to all religions. Far from a diplomatic concession to religion, this rapprochement between secular and religious modes of thought suggests a position that only Derrida’s scenic skepticism distinguishes from that of the originary hypothesis: openness to the element of transcendental faith in the non-ritual world makes one aware of the anthropological basis of all faith, and thereby allows the “non-dogmatic” believers in each religious revelation to grasp the faith that they have in common.

    What Derrida calls the “mystery of life” is the apparently inexplicable relationship between transcendence and immanence, between the real world and the world of signs, which religious narrative mediates, but which “political secularization” forces us to conceive in anthropological terms. It is ironic that Derrida’s commitment to the “radically secular” postmodern academic context, which dismisses the originary hypothesis as a myth of origin, dissuaded him from exploring what I have shown to be his own rapprochement with GA. Nonetheless, GA is fundamentally indebted to this most lucid and powerful of postmodern thinkers.


  • Benchmarks (Anthropoetics XII, no. 2)

    The articles in this issue, all by prior contributors, deal with a variety of subjects. Andrew Bartlett’s originary analysis of science and memory begins an ambitious three-part sequence whose overall context is a study of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and what it tells us about the problematic role of science in modern culture. Tom Bertonneau, our journal’s most faithful author, returns to the narratives of Henry James, the subject of his article in Anthropoetics‘ inaugural issue in June 1995, with a focus on the idolatrous consequences of the Nietzschean “death of God.” In a follow-up to her article in Anthropoetics XI, 2, Dawn Perlmutter expands on the gory but compelling and timely subject of Mujahideen ritual murder and “desecration.” Finally, Eric Gans‘s article on “White Guilt” elaborates on material that first appeared in the Chronicles of Love and Resentment.

    About Our Contributors

    Andrew Bartlett lives in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. He teaches composition and literary analysis at Kwantlen University College in Surrey (a suburb of Vancouver). Kwantlen has granted him an Educational Leave for the 2006-2007 academic year so that he might work on a book-length manuscript, Playing God: Science Fictions of the Artificial Human, a project in applied GA. He has attended several annual meetings of the Colloquium on Violence and Religion, and participates in Sparagmos! the Vancouver GA Group.

    Thomas F. Bertonneau teaches English at SUNY Oswego.  He is a regular contributor to Modern Age, Intercollegiate Review, and The University Bookman, as well as to Praesidium and Anthropoetics.  His “Karen Blixen and the Apocalypse of Man” will appear in the forthcoming (Spring) number of Modern Age; his article on “Sacrifice and Sainthood: The Short Fiction of Walter M. Miller in Context” is forthcoming in Science Fiction Studies.  Bertonneau has contributed a study of Walter Pater to Adam Katz’s anthology of GA criticism, also forthcoming.  With Kim Paffenroth of Iona College, Bertonneau has written The Truth is Out There: Christian Faith and the Classics of TV Science Fiction, published in June 2006 by Brazos Press and available for purchase at Amazon.com.  New among Bertonneau’s affiliations is his election to the editorial board of Pashuhesh-e Zabanha-ye Khareji (Research in Foreign Languages), a Persian-language quarterly published from the University of Tehran that annually issues an English-language or French-language special number.

    Dawn Perlmutter, Director of the Institute for the Research of Organized & Ritual Violence and SEDGCAT LLC, is the author of Investigating Religious Terrorism & Ritualistic Crimes (CRC Press), Reclaiming the Spiritual in Art (SUNY Press), Graven Images: Creative Acts of Idolatry (UMI dissertation), and numerous publications on ritual violence, image worship / desecration and blood rituals in contemporary culture. Her primary current project is a Symbolic Evidence Database of Gangs Cults and Terrorists (SEDGCAT), a predominantly visual database that supports law enforcement professionals in identifying and analyzing emblems, insignia, sacred objects, rituals, ideologies, etc. of hundreds of organizations. She regularly trains law enforcement agencies throughout the United States, has advised Police Departments and Prosecutors’ offices on numerous cases of ritual homicide, and presented expert witness testimony on ritualistic crimes. As the subject matter expert on ritual murder she has been interviewed for many documentaries, newspapers and newscasts including The O’Reilly Factor, the Fox News Channel, Geraldo at Large, NBC, CBS, The Learning Channel, the CBC and the BBC. She holds a Doctor of Philosophy from New York University and a Masters Degree from The American University, Washington, D.C.

    Eric Gans‘s CV may be found by clicking on his name below.

  • Mujahideen Desecration: Beheadings, Mutilation & Muslim Iconoclasm

    Wartime atrocities are typically attributed to psychological warfare, military strategies or individual acts of brutality. Although infinite varieties of cruelty have transpired in every war throughout history, the intense media coverage of the war on terrorism and the calculated dissemination of information on the internet has made us all witnesses to unimaginable violence. Suicide bombings, beheadings, mutilation, cutting out tongues, cutting off ears, amputations, gouging out eyes, genital mutilation, and dismembering dead bodies is common and widespread. Although our natural inclination is to relegate these horrific acts to another century, when interpreted in the context of religious ideologies, sacred customs, and cultural traditions it is obvious that they are not anachronisms.

    These inexplicable acts need to be understood as sacred violence and comprehended in religious concepts such as sacrifice, blood ritual, iconoclasm and desecration. They are ritualistic acts with distinct functions, meanings, objectives, and justifications. They determine an individual’s status in life, death and the afterlife, relegate punishment of community members and enemies, serve as rites of passage and initiation, and signify fidelity, honor, and courage in a warrior culture. The fact that these chilling acts also serve to terrorize the enemy is a secondary objective, what is commonly referred to as a bonus.

    The primary function of ritual in the community is that of providing the proper rules for action in the realm of the sacred and the secular. For that reason it takes a fully committed true believer to commit such heinous acts; if any aspect of the faith is questioned, than the thin line between holy warrior and barbarian dissolves. Ritualizing violence legitimizes it, allowing the perpetrator to stand on solid moral ground. Mujahideen have the full support of their community in a manner the significance of which Americans cannot fully grasp. American soldiers are court-martialed, imprisoned, and publicly humiliated for unacceptable violent acts, while the Mujahideen are glorified and praised in direct proportion to the amount of blood they have on their hands. From a strategic perspective, publicly dishonoring our own soldiers undermines the war on terrorism, invalidates our military in the eyes of our enemies, negatively affects morale, and makes us tactically vulnerable; from a ritual perspective the sacred status of the holy warrior is debased, sacrificial blood is polluted, communal rituals fail to have meaning and a sacred crisis ensues. Moral ambiguity causes more damage than weapons of mass destruction; it destroys the community from within. Authentic warrior cultures understand that to question their soldiers’ actions in war is sacrilege. The Mujahideen fighter thinks in sacred terms and every act of violence is theologically and communally sanctioned. These Jihadi soldiers are not completing a tour of duty, they are all lifers groomed from birth in a continual recruitment process comprised of a series of ritual initiations whose ultimate fulfillment is to die as a martyr in holy war. Violent mutilations are not arbitrary and capricious barbaric acts; to fully comprehend them, they must be understood in the context of Jihadi blood rituals and Muslim iconoclasm. In this paper I am going to focus on the ritualistic crimes of beheadings, torture, and mutilation. It will be demonstrated that these brutal acts are ritual manifestations of Mujahideen Desecration.

    Desecration in the Media

    Desecration is defined as the defilement of something holy, an act of depriving something of its sacred character. This most often refers to desecration of sacred books, sacred places, or sacred objects, but also encompasses the entire sphere of the holy. The media has frequently and selectively focused on controversies surrounding what Muslims hold sacred, that is, Quran desecration, Mosque desecration, desecration of the bodies of Muslim soldiers and images of Muhammad. These highly publicized incidents have evoked violent and often deadly protests all over the world. This extraordinary response is part of a larger religious world view that separates significant aspects of life into the sacred and the profane. It is also part of a calculated Jihadi campaign that promotes victimhood as a recruitment technique the goal of which is to indoctrinate moderate Muslims into racist and anti-Western ideology and to elicit world sympathy for an ostensibly oppressed population. Holocaust denial is part of this campaign so that Muslims can claim to be the victims of a Jewish conspiracy, self-righteously proclaiming that their land has been occupied, their holy places defiled, their prophet dishonored, and their people violated. The relentless reporting of Muslim desecration has perpetuated these erroneous ideals and has been responsible for recruiting more terrorists than Usama bin Laden. Desecration is so significant in Muslim ideology that there is a terrorist group in Iraq specifically dedicated to the concern called, “The Brigades for the Defense of Holy Shrines.” It is a faction of the Mahdi Army, the Shiite insurgency group led by Moqtada al-Sadr. Most of the damage to Holy shrines is enacted by rival factions who do not have to concern themselves about how they are depicted in the press. These important distinctions are frequently lost in the media that obsessively focuses on supposed Western abuses of Muslims. There were no headlines expressing outrage or claiming desecration when 1,000 churches were burned down across Indonesia by state-sanctioned Muslim mobs. Although the press was out in full force when Pope Benedict XVI quoted a 14thcentury Byzantine ruler who regarded Islam as violent, there were few follow-up articles about the Islamic response, which included among other violent acts bombing churches, the crucifixion of a 14-year-old boy, the murder of a nun, and the beheading of priests. The media also fails to use the word “irreverence” when hundreds of American flags and effigies are burned each year by Muslim protesters, or when a racist cartoon depicts the Secretary of State pregnant with a monkey in her belly, or when Iran holds a Holocaust denial conference and a Holocaust cartoon exhibit that organizers stated was intended to test the West’s tolerance. The West’s response has been a resounding tolerance of Muslim racism, anti-Semitism and anti-Christianity. Liberal newspapers and television stations do not use the words desecration, irreverence, defilement, blasphemy, or violation when Americans are burned, eviscerated, dismembered, mutilated, hung from bridges, and booby trapped. Islamic extremists have been so successful in their public relations campaign that they have successfully manipulated the Western press into perpetuating their victimhood status, contributing to the sense of disrespect that is fueling Muslim extremism. In colloquial terms the media is continually relaying the message that Americans are “dissing” Muslims. Similar to gang violence, the only way for young Muslims to restore honor, save face, maintain territory, and survive is to retaliate with a vengeance. The extensive degree of mutilation enacted by this Mujahideen gang directly correlates to the Muslim perception of desecration. In brief, Jihadis mutilate as a form of sacred retribution for perceived acts of blasphemy, appropriately enforced by Islam’s Holy warriors.

    2

    Beheadings

    One of the Mujahideen’s more popular methods of dealing with the enemies of Islam is decapitation. Beheading, pre- and post-mortem have long historical and theological precedents in Islam and both practices are frequently implemented by Islamic extremist groups. Although they initially appear to be the same act, they perform entirely different ritual functions. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was infamous for his videotaped beheadings of hostages in Iraq, as I described in detail in a companion article titled “Mujahideen Blood Rituals: The Religious and Forensic Symbolism of Al Qaeda Beheading” [Anthropoetics XI, no 2]. In that article I focused on beheadings of live hostages and asserted that they were blood rituals whose primary function is initiation into the al Qaeda network. Sacrifice entails the intentional release of blood from a live victim, hence the decapitation and dismemberment of the dead does not constitute a sacrificial blood ritual; however, it is a ritualistic act whose function is characteristic of desecration. In the war on terrorism hundreds of civilians and soldiers have been decapitated as the direct result of Islamic ideology. In Iraq and Afghanistan dismembered corpses are regularly found in mass graves and headless bodies are frequently found by soldiers. The following charts are selected examples of beheadings perpetrated in the name of Islam. Due to the enormous scope of research and difficulty in ascertaining information on the subject the incidents listed were limited to the year 2006. The following charts are not representative of the hundreds of people killed by suicide bombings and other Mujahideen tactics.

    Mujahideen Beheadings 2006

    Name of Victim (s) Nationality Religion Date Place Details
    Maulana Salahuddin Pakistani Muslim 11-03-06 Waziristan region, Afghanistan Note was attached to body accusing victim of spying for the United States–body was shot after beheading
    Ayad Tariq Iraqi Assyrian Christian 10-21-06 Baquba, Iraq Was beheaded by Muslims after admitting to being Christian
    8 men Afghani Muslim* 10-15-06 Afghanistan Video of beheadings was released in which the victims confessed to spying for the United States and the United Kingdom–statement accompanied video claiming the Mulla Dadullah was executing Christians
    14 men Iraqi Muslim 10-13-06 Balad, Iraq The bodies had all been shot and beheaded–the victims were construction workers who had been kidnapped the previous day
    1 man Myanmar Buddhist* 10-13-06 Thailand Islamic militants shot and beheaded the victim, a migrant farmer, in front of his teenaged daughter–the head was left in Pattani
    7 people Iraqi Muslim* 10-12-06 Baghdad, Iraq Appeared to be sectarian revenge killings
    Father Amer Iskender Iraqi Assyrian Christian 10-11-06 Mosul,Iraq Victim’s Muslim captors had demanded the victim’s church condemn the pope’s words and pay a $350,000 ransom
    2 people British Christian* 10-09-06 Afghanistan* Video was released showing Mulla Dadullah Khan beheading the British soldiers, 2 women, and 27 Afghan soldiers
    2 women Afghani Muslim* 10-09-06 Afghanistan* Video was released showing Mulla Dadullah Khan beheading the women, 2 British soldiers and 27 Afghan soldiers
    27 men Afghani Muslim* 10-09-06 Afghanistan* Video was released showing Mulla Dadullah Khan beheading the soldiers, 2 British soldiers, and 2 women
    Bubak Omadjadi Philippine Muslim 10-04-06 Barangay Bongkaong, Patikul, Sulu Victim was allegedly beheaded and skinned by soldiers – also possible that the assailants were members of the Abu Sayyaf Group
    50 people Iraqi Muslim* 10-02-06 Baghdad, Iraq Many of the victims had been beheaded and showed signs of torture
    7 people Iraqi Muslim* 10-01-06 Suwayrah, Iraq Bodies were turned into the Kut morgue
    Mustafa Asimi Turkish Muslim* 9-21-06 Gereshk District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan Had been kidnapped in August by Taliban. When his company refused to withdraw from the country, he was beheaded.
    Shabir Ahmad Dar Indian Muslim* 9-14-06 Kashmir, India Head and body were found separately
    62 people Iraqi Muslim* 9-13-06 Baghdad, Iraq Bodies were found throughout the city–all were tortured; some were beheaded.
    3 men Iraqi Muslim* 9-13-06 Iraq* Ansar al-Sunna released a video of the beheading of three Iraqi guardsmen–men were beheaded with a knife
    Mohammad Taha Sudanese Muslim 9-07-06 Kalakala District, Sudan Was killed by al-Qaeda in response to an article victim had printed in newspaper. Hands and feet were bound
    2 people Iraqi Muslim* 9-05-06 Bayji, Iraq Severed heads were found without bodies
    3 women Iraqi Muslim* 9-02-06 Baquba, Iraq The bodies of three decapitated women were found
    Fakhrudin Afghani Muslim* 8-31-06 Grishk District, Afghanistan Taliban killed victim for spying for the U.S. and Afghan Forces – body was left on the river bank
    Noor Wali Afghani Muslim 8-30-06 Kati Khel Village in Miran Shah, Pakistan Notes were attached to the bodies accusing victim of spying for America and Afghanistan
    Haq Nawaz Afghani Muslim 8-30-06 Deer Pakhel village in Miran Shah, Pakistan Notes were attached to the bodies accusing victim of spying for America and Afghanistan
    Layth al-Janabi Iraqi Muslim* 8-24-06 Near Baiji, Iraq Beheaded victim was a police officer
    2 men Afghani Muslim* 8-21-06 Nuristan province, Afghanistan Victims were bodyguards–had been kidnapped with their employer, Haji Younus by the Taliban
    5 people Iraqi Muslim* 8-17-06 Tigris River, Suwayra, Iraq Victims were either shot or beheaded–all showed signs of mutilation
    1 person Iraqi Muslim* 8-09-06 Zab river near Atilah, Iraq Body was found in the river, beheaded
    Loi Khan Pakistani Muslim* 8-08-06 Madikhel, Pakistan Note was left on the body accusing victim of spying on Islamic militants
    7 people Iraqi Muslim* 8-04-06 Kut, Iraq All individuals were beheaded
    2 people Iraqi Muslim* 7-29-06 Suwayra, Iraq Bodies were found in the Tigris River without their heads
    1 man Iraqi Muslim* 7-21-06 Kirkuk, Iraq Body was found without the head
    1 person Iraqi Muslim* 7-18-06 Near Tikrit, Iraq Girl’s head was used as booby trap to kill civilian
    1 person Iraqi Muslim* 7-05-06 River Zab, Halwa Wasta, Iraq Body was found but not the head
    4 men Afghani Muslim* 6-22/3-06 Zabul provincial district, Shahjoy, Afghanistan Bodies were found separately–two on Thursday, two on Friday (6/23)–all were accused of spying for Afghan and coalition forces
    Pfc. Kristian Menchaca American
    Houston, Texas
    Christian 6-21-06 Yusufiya
    Near Baghdad, Iraq
    Members of al-Qaeda in Iraq booby trapped with bombs, tortured, cut, burned, dragged, dismembered and beheaded the bodies
    Pfc. Thomas L. Tucker American
    Madras, Oregon
    Christian* 6-21-06 Yusufiya near Baghdad, Iraq Members of al-Qaeda in Iraq booby trapped with bombs, tortured, cut, burned, dragged, dismembered and beheaded the bodies
    Two people Algerian Muslim* 6-17-06 Gouraya, Algeria Beheading was claimed by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
    Hasim Khan Afghani Muslim* 6-14-06 Miranshah, Pakistan Pro-Taliban militants left a note on the body accusing the victim of spying for the United States and Afghan forces
    Fyodor Zaitsev Russian Christian* 6-13-06 Abducted in Baghdad, Iraq–beheading location unknown The Mujahedeen Shura Council beheaded the victim as revenge for deaths caused by the Russian government
    Rinat Agliulin Russian Muslim 6-13-06 Abducted in Baghdad, Iraq–beheading location unknown The Mujahedeen Shura Council beheaded the victim as revenge for deaths caused by the Russian government
    Anatoly Smirnov Russian Christian* 6-13-06 Abducted in Baghdad, Iraq–beheading location unknown The Mujahedeen Shura Council beheaded the victim as revenge for deaths caused by the Russian government
    Oleg Fedoseyev Russian Christian* 6-13-06 Abducted in Baghdad, Iraq–beheading location unknown The Mujahedeen Shura Council beheaded the victim as revenge for deaths caused by the Russian government
    7 people Iraqi Muslim* 6-10-06 Al-Maleh River, near Suwayrah, Iraq Victims had been tortured and beheaded
    2 people Iraqi Muslim* 6-10-06 Khan Bani Saad, Iraq Victims had been brothers–their heads not their bodies were found
    3 men Iraqi Shiite Muslim 6-10-06 Baghdad, Iraq Committed by Ansar al-Sunna in revenge for deaths of Sunni Arabs in March and April
    9 people Iraqi Muslim* 6-06-06 Hadid, Iraq Victims’ heads were found but not their bodies
    3 people Iraqi Muslim 6-03-06 Hadid, Iraq One of the victims had been a sheikh–heads found without bodies
    4 people Iraqi Muslim* 6-01-06 Hibhib, Iraq Several of the men had been detained by the Baghdad police prior to decapitation
    3 people Iraqi Sunni Muslim* 5-31-06 Muqdadiya, near Baghdad, Iraq Was believed to be by Armed gangs in response to the destruction of a Shiite shrine in February – Hands of all bodies were tied
    2 people Iraqi Muslim* 5-26-06 Kut, Iraq Bodies but not heads were found
    Khudayr al-Tamimi Iraqi Muslim* 5-26-06 Near Muqdadiya, Iraq Victim was a bridegroom found with relatives
    4 people Iraqi Muslim* 5-26-06 Near Muqdadiya, Iraq Victims were found with bridegroom
    2 women Iraqi Muslim* 5-21-06 Najaf, Iraq Victims bodies were found
    1 woman Iraqi Muslim 5-18-06 Kirkuk, Iraq Victim had been a labor activist for the Kurdistan Democratic Party
    4 people Iraq Muslim* 5-14-06 Kerbala, Iraq Victims had been brothers working for an aid organization
    1 person Iranian Muslim* 5-13-06 Najaf, Iraq Body was left in cemetery
    1 man Pakistani Muslim* 5-11-06 Khar, Bajur, Pakistan Pro-Taliban militants left a note with the body accusing the victim of spying for the United States
    10 people Iraqi Muslim* 5-09-06 Suwayra, Iraq Bodies were found in Tigris River
    1 child Iraqi Muslim* 5-09-06 Suwayra, Iraq Bodies were found in Tigris River
    1 person Iraqi Muslim* 4-22-06 Baghdad, Iraq Was found with nine other bodies, but was the only one beheaded
    2 people Iraqi Muslim* 4-19-06 Shaab, Baghdad, Iraq Victims were school teachers
    4 people Iraqi Muslim* 4-11-06 Jurf al-Sakhar, Iraq Victims were soldiers and/or Iraqi police officers
    30 people Iraqi Sunni Muslim 3-26-06 Mulla Eid, near Baquba, Iraq Was a possible response to the destruction of a Shiite shrine in February
    14 people Iraqi Muslim* 2-02-06 Baghdad, Iraq Bodies were found blindfolded with hands tied behind back–some were beheaded; some were stabbed
    3 people Iraqi Muslim* 1-26-06 Baghdad, Iraq Bodies were found decapitated
    Malim Abdul Habib Afghani Muslim* 1-03-06 Zabul Province, Afghanistan Victim was a teacher, killed by the Taliban for educating girls
    1 girl Iraqi Muslim* 2006 Iraq Dog’s head replaced the girl’s actual head

    * Information has not been verified

    3

    The numerous examples of decapitated bodies have direct parallels to historical events in Islamic history. The Mujahideen ritually defile in the same manner and for the same reasons as their warrior predecessors, aligning them with Muhammad and providing authenticity to their claim that they are following a pure doctrine of Islam. “The practice of beheading non-Muslim captives extends back to the Prophet himself. Ibn Ishaq (d. 768 C.E.), the earliest biographer of Muhammad, is recorded as saying that the Prophet ordered the execution by decapitation of 700 men of the Jewish Banu Qurayza tribe in Medina for allegedly plotting against him. Islamic leaders from Muhammad’s time until today have followed his model. Examples of decapitation, of both the living and the dead, in Islamic history are myriad. Yusuf b. Tashfin (d. 1106) led the Al-Murabit (Almoravid) Empire to conquer from Western Sahara to central Spain. After the battle of Zallaqa in 1086, he had 24,000 corpses of the defeated Castilians beheaded and piled them up to make a sort of minaret for the muezzins who, standing on the piles of headless cadavers, sang the praises of Allah. He then had the detached heads sent to all the major cities of North Africa and Spain as an example of Christian impotence.”(1) Now the decapitated heads are sent to all the major cities in Europe and America via television and the internet.

    In addition to theological justifications there are significant symbolic and ritual interpretations of the phenomenon of beheadings. In her book titled Losing Our heads, beheadings in literature and culture, Regina Janes distinguishes between five principal types of traditionally severed heads: venerated, trophy, presentation, sacrificial, and judicial, corresponding to five principal types of traditionally authorized beheadings throughout human culture. “The ancestral head, removed after death, not taken by violence; the trophy head, taken in warfare or raid; the sacrificial head taken from a living person by decapitation in the performance of a religious rite; the presentation head, taken in a political struggle to remove a contender or rival; and the public execution, proceeding from a legal decision.”(2) With the exception of the venerated ancestral head, the four remaining types of beheadings are prevalent in contemporary Islamist culture.                                                                                                              The judicial category of severed heads is best exemplified by the current method of public execution in Saudi Arabia; decapitation by sword. Under a strict interpretation of Islam known as Wahhabism people convicted of murder, drug trafficking, rape, armed robbery, witchcraft, and apostasy can be executed. It is important to note that although beheading may seem a barbaric method of formal execution it is not symbolic of desecration. Mujahideen beheadings (post- and pre-mortem) are manifested as sacrificial, presentation and trophy heads.

    Sacrificial heads are best exemplified by the videotaped ritual murders of Nicolas Berg, Kim Sun-il, Jack Hensley, Eugene Armstrong, Kenneth Bigley, and numerous other victims by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s group al Qaeda in Iraq. There are distinct commonalities in all of al Zarqawi’s beheading videos that are indicative of decapitation in the performance of a religious rite. What distinguishes the sacrificial head from other types of severed heads is that the decapitation is a ritualized communal event. With the advent of modern technology the categories of severed heads are not always mutually exclusive. For example, the videotaped beheadings of Abu Musab al Zarqawi originate as sacrificial heads, the result of a communal blood ritual with formal premeditated violence, a Mujahideen symbol of warrior fraternity. When the head is held up by the hair and presented to the cameras, it is no longer a sacrificial head it is now in the category of presented heads.

    “Presented, a head is reduced from a symbol to a sign. No special power inheres in the head or accrues to the taker from it. The taker expects reward or recognition from the person to whom he presents the head.”(3) Al Zarqawi presented ritually severed heads on video to the world and received tremendous recognition from both friends and enemies of Islam. In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda linked militants and pro-Taliban tribal militants behead numerous tribesmen accused of spying for America and Afghanistan. Frequently they place actual notes on the bodies as warning signs to others. One note indicated that the beheaded corpse was a gift for Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai.(4) Severed heads are presented to enemies or to friends; they are used to make new friends and conciliate enemies–or to signify the rupture of an alliance and the opening of hostilities.(5) Presentation heads were also evident in Islamic History and in one well-known example offered to the Prophet himself. In the famous Battle of Badr against the Meccans, Muhammad was overjoyed when Abdullah Ibn Masoud presented him with the severed head of his enemy Abu Jahl.

    The most common form of Mujahideen desecration is the trophy head. “The trophy head–a complex, ancient, enduring, and irrepressible icon of death, emblem of war, sign of the warrior, symbol of life. Exuberant, triumphant violence makes the trophy head at once invigorating (to takers) and horrifying (to their neighbors). A social sign of individual martial prowess, the trophy head is an always ritualized, widely distributed, terror inducing sign of victory. . . . The head is hunted for the sake of a power the head confers and continues to possess even after it is severed, a power that can be appropriated, possessed, and transferred to the taker. Yet the head is also hunted as a sign of the warrior’s success relative to other warriors. Its power is real, not symbolic. The head marks a difference between the dead and the not-dead, the loser and the victor.(6) The Taliban, Abu Sayaff, al Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al Sunnah, Salifist Group for Preaching and Combat, warring tribal, Sunni and Shiite factions, and numerous other insurgent and terrorist groups sever heads as trophies.

    In March 2006 Ummat Studios, the propaganda arm of the Taliban, released a video of alleged criminals who have been beheaded in Waziristan. The images depict crowds smiling and posing with strung up dismembered mutilated bodies. Body parts are posed, rearranged, and played with. Items such as cigarettes are placed in the mouths of decapitated heads and one head is staked high on a tall wooden pike. “The video quotes the Quran and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad to justify the killing of what are allegedly highway robbers and other common criminals. It shows their mutilated bodies being displayed as a warning to crowds of people. The underlying warning is that the same fate awaits those who would cooperate with secular regimes which will not implement harsh Sharia (Islamic) law.”(7) The Fedayeen Saddam publicly beheaded more than 200 women during an alleged anti-prostitution campaign in June 2000 through May 2001. The victims were dragged out of their homes, stretched out on an iron bench, and decapitated with a sword in front of their children, family and the whole population of the district. The victims’ families were forced to display the heads at their homes for several days hanging from fences and doorposts near signs that read, “For the honor of Iraq.”

    A more recent example of the taking of trophy heads occurred on October 29, 2005 in Sulawesi Island, Indonesia. Three Christian High school girls were beheaded with machetes and a fourth girl was severely mutilated but managed to escape. The bodies, dressed in school uniforms, were left by the road near the execution site. The severed heads of the 15 year old girls were dumped in plastic bags in their village along with a handwritten note that read, “Wanted: 100 more Christian heads, teenaged or adult, male or female; blood should be answered with blood, soul with soul, head with head.”(8)In November 2006 three Islamic extremists were tried for the murders. The Javanese trader who planned and directed the murders related how he conceived the idea after a visit with members of the Philippine Islamic terrorist group the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. During the visit he was informed that the organization staged bombings to coincide with Lebaran, the festival that ends the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.” Conscripting several accomplices at a local pesantren, or Islamic school, he directed one of them to seek out “the head of a Christian.” “It would be a great Lebaran trophy if we got a Christian.”(9) Although there was little media attention of the incident in Western news, headlines in Australian and Asian newspapers read, “Beheaded girls were Ramadan ‘trophies’” and “Christians beheaded as Muslim ‘Trophies.’”

    4

    Islamic history is inherently a history of trophy and presentation heads. “The Ottoman Empire was the decapitation state par excellence. Upon the Ottoman victory over Christian Serbs at the battle of Kosovo in 1389, the Muslim army beheaded the Serbian king and scores of Christian prisoners. At the battle of Varna in 1444, the Ottomans beheaded King Ladislaus of Hungary and “put his head at the tip of a long pike . . . and brandished it toward the Poles and Hungarians.” Upon the fall of Constantinople, the Ottomans sent the head of the dead Byzantine emperor on tour to major cities in the sultan’s domains. The Ottomans even beheaded at least one Eastern Orthodox patriarch. In 1456, the sultan allowed the grand mufti of the empire to personally decapitate King Stephen of Bosnia and his sons—even though they had surrendered— and seven decades later, the sultan ordered 2,000 Hungarian prisoners beheaded. In the early nineteenth century, even the British fell victim to the Ottoman scimitar. An 1807 British expedition to Egypt resulted in “a few hundred spiked British heads left rotting in the sun outside Rosetta.”(10)

    Another significant and relevant example of a trophy head occurred earlier in Islamic history in the historical Battle of Karbala between Muhammad’s grandson (the third imam of Shi’a Islam) Husayn ibn Ali and a military detachment from the forces of Yazid I, the Umayyad caliph. This battle is central to Shiite beliefs. Outnumbered by thousands, Husayn was killed between a small group of his followers and the Umayyad Army. Husayn’s head was cut off and raised on a pike for all to see. His body was looted and then trampled by horsemen.(11) The Battle is commemorated each year by Shia Muslims on the holiday of Ashoura. It is a period of expressions of grief and of pilgrimage to Karbala, Iraq. Shi’a Islam communities annually reenact the tragedy by ritual acts of self mutilation. To commemorate the suffering of Husayn many ritually slice their heads with swords. “Some Shi’a observe Ashura with a traditional flagellation ritual called zanjeer zani or zanjeer matam, involving the use of a zanjeer (a chain with a set of curved knives at the end).”(12) As if time stood still, sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims, manifested in mutilation and decapitation in the same place and for the same reasons, continues 1327 years later.

    Mutilation

    Beheading is just one manifestation of the many types of mutilation that are prevalent throughout Islamic countries and justified by Sharia law; the code of law derived from Quranic scripture and from the teachings and example of Mohammed. Mutilation, pre- and post-mortem, also has long historical and theological precedents in Islam, and both practices are frequently implemented by Islamic extremist groups. Pre-mortem mutilation is torture, post-mortem mutilation is desecration; both perform specific symbolic functions. Currently torture as a form of judicial corporal punishment occurs in many countries and includes among other things amputations, floggings, mutilation, stoning to death, crucifixion, and branding; however, Saudi Arabia and Iran are the only two countries that still consider eye gouging a legitimate judicial punishment. Surgically removing one or both eyes is based on the literal interpretation of lex talionis, the law of retaliation or best known from the formulation “an eye for an eye.” The Arabic word for the law of retaliation is Qisas and is found in the Quranic verse of Sura 5:45, “And We ordained therein for them: Life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth and wounds equal for equal. But if anyone remits the retaliation by way of charity, it shall be for him an expiation.”(13) This verse is interpreted to allow for three options: 1) the sentence is enacted and the accused has the appropriate body part(s) removed; 2) the injured party has the option to remit or forego retaliation and take compensation in money, goods or livestock in an agrarian economy; this option is known as diya or more commonly known as blood money since the ‘charity’ or sadaqa actually goes to the injured person; and 3) the option of forgiveness, which means that the injured party forgoes retaliation and monetary compensation. Among recent examples that specifically involved removal of eyes, the Greater Sharia Court of Dammam in Saudi Arabia on December 9, 2005 ordered an Indian citizen to be punished by having his right eye gouged out in retribution for his role in an altercation in April 2003 in which a Saudi citizen was injured. The act was punishment for a brawl in which he was defending himself. He did not have a lawyer at the trial and the only witness was not able to testify during court proceedings because he was Indian and the injured party Saudi.(14) On September 16, 2004 a court in Tabuk ordered the right eye of a Saudi National to be gouged out, but gave him the option of paying compensation within one year. The man had intervened when he saw youths pelting his brother with stones, in response he also threw stones, hitting one youth in the eye and causing him to lose vision in one eye; he helped carry the injured youth to the hospital. Two months before the sentence was to be carried out, he had managed to collect only 550,000 Saudi riyals (US$147,000) of the 1.4 million riyals (US$373,000) demanded by the victim.(15) On June 10, 2005, Iran’s State Supreme Court upheld a sentence for a man to have his eyes gouged out. The original court ordered for acid to be sprayed on the accused man’s face as retribution for his actions, he was also sentenced to 74 lashes and prison time. His lawyer appealed the decision on the grounds that the rest of his face would also be damaged from the acid. A second court rejected the appeal and instead ordered that his eyes be gouged out by a “qualified surgeon, so as not to damage the face itself.” The act was punishment for an accident committed twelve years earlier when he was sixteen. He had not been sentenced when he was sixteen so that the court could sentence him as an adult and hand down a stronger punishment. He was given the option of paying 3 billion Rials ($300,000) in blood-money to forego the punishment; however, that amount of money was beyond the laborer’s reach.(16) Those are just a few examples of state sanctioned mutilation.

    Iraq under Saddam’s regime was notorious for widespread and systematic government sanctioned torture, rape, mutilation and mass murder. Saddam Hussein understood the symbolic and strategic significance of mutilation. Fedayeen Saddam and Republican Guard troops committed torture and executions involving beatings, breaking bones, gouging out eyes, throwing people off of high buildings, chopping off fingers, ears and genitals, cutting out tongues, piercing hands with electric drills, ritualized mutilations, amputations, lashings, and beheadings. In just one of many violent campaigns Saddam Hussein ordered surgeons to remove the ears of army defectors and those who refused to report for military service as a form of judicial punishment. Saddam Hussein’s ear-amputation campaign went on for three days, May 17-19, 1994, in every city in Iraq; an estimated 3,500 men lost their ears. They were not given painkillers and tied down to their gurneys; some lost both ears, other victims only one. Some were even branded with a hot poker with the Arabic word for coward scorched across their foreheads. Afterward they were thrown into prison and tortured on a daily basis in an effort to get them to confess that they were plotting against the regime, which would have meant a death sentence. Many bled to death in prison afterward. The guards taunted them by calling them Abu Thanat Mabtura, Arabic for Abu Earless, or Father Earless.(17) Erving Goffman in his classic text “Stigma, notes on the management of spoiled identity” writes in his opening paragraph, “The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids originated the term stigma to refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor–a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places.”(18) Stigma was both the intent and result of Saddam’s amputation campaign. A general amnesty four years later brought little respite for the victims; mutilated ears signified a red letter D for deserter. None of the earless men were able to find work, since the party controlled employment in most sectors of the economy and women would not marry disfigured men with no job prospects.(19) Saddams’ legacy is a culture of mutilation that resonates across Iraq and is inculcated in the population

    5

    Recent incidents of murder and mutilation go beyond Saddam’s signature strategy of terror and stigma and are indicative of a sacrificial crisis. This is evident by the degree of desecration and the fact that victims include people who are typically the most protected, cherished and revered. Children, women, and priests were all victims of unspeakable acts of violence. An Iraqi priest, Father Paul Alexander, was disemboweled, had his arms and legs severed while he was alive before he was beheaded in one of the more disturbing responses to the Popes statements.(20) CNN correspondent Nic Robertson, in an uncharacteristically neutral news story of sectarian violence in Iraq, reported that “a 15-year-old girl had been beheaded and a dog’s head sewn on her body in its place; and of a young child who had had his hands drilled and bolted together before being killed.(21) Although a woman has never been publicly beheaded on video, they are frequently raped, tortured, and mutilated. “On November 14, 2004, U.S. marines found the body of a Caucasian woman on the street in Fallujah, Iraq. The body had long blonde hair, her legs and arms were cut off, all four appendages were missing, her throat was slit and she had been disemboweled. An AFP photographer embedded with the Marines said the woman was wearing a blue dress and her face was completely disfigured. The victim could only be identified as Western and is presumed to be either Margaret Hassan or Teresa Borcz Khalifa. Both were taken hostage prior to the body’s discovery.(22)

    Mujahideen and Iraqi insurgents expend extra effort in brutalizing Americans and particularly American military personnel. Mutilation entails a specific kind of ritualistic crime; a collective, provocative and incendiary desecration of the enemy. On March 31, 2004 Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah ambushed a convoy containing four American private military contractors providing security for the U.S. Army. The four armed contractors, Scott Helvenston, Jerko Zovko, Wesley Batalona and Michael Richard Teague, were shot, set ablaze, dragged from their cars, beaten, beheaded and dismembered. One body was tied to the back of a car and driven through the city. The car had a poster in its window of Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder of the Palestinian militant group Hamas. Their burned corpses were dragged through the streets before a cheering crowd that dismembered the corpses. Many of those in the crowd were excited young boys who shouted slogans in front of television cameras. One resident displayed what appeared to be dog tags taken from one body. Adults and children celebrated the killings by chanting “Fallujah is the graveyard of Americans” while hacking the bodies to pieces with poles and farm tools.(23) Two blackened and mangled mutilated corpses were lynched from the green, iron trestle bridge that spans the Euphrates River. A local resident was quoted “The people of Fallujah hanged some of the bodies on the old bridge like slaughtered sheep.”(24) “The images of the four civilians killed in Iraq filled television screens worldwide but were largely shunned by American television that deemed them too graphic.”(25) Interestingly, the American media has no problem showing graphic images of injured Palestinians and Iraqi civilians but suddenly acquires principles when the victims are Americans.

    One of the most heinous examples of body desecration occurred in al-Yusufiyah outside of Baghdad, Iraq. On June 20, 2006 the bodies of Pfc. Kristian Menchaca, 23, and Pfc. Thomas L. Tucker, 25, members of the 101st Airborne division, were found mutilated beyond recognition. Not only were the bodies mutilated and booby-trapped, but IED’s lined the road leading to the victims and it took troops 12 hours to clear the area of the bombs.(26) There were varied initial reports of the details of the injuries. The O’Reilly Factor reported that they were hacked to death, their eyes gouged out and their bodies defiled.(27) E.D. Hill in a Fox and Friends video reported that their penises were cut off and shoved into their mouths, their ears and noses were cut off, and then they were finally killed.(28)Afterward, their hearts were cut out. To the consternation of U.S. officials, who are careful to withhold casualty details until the soldiers’ families can be notified, the deaths were first officially reported by an Iraqi defense official Major General Abdul Aziz Muhammed Jassim who said in a news conference that they had been tortured and killed “in a barbaric way.”(29) The Mujahideen Shura Council, an umbrella organization for eight insurgency groups inclusive of al Qaeda in Iraq, immediately claimed credit for the murders on a web site. “We announce the good news to our Islamic nation that we executed God’s will and slaughtered the two crusader animals we had in captivity,” “And God has given our Emir, Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, the good fortune of carrying out the legitimate court’s command in person.” Al-Muhajer is another name for Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian-born terrorist who replaced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as leader of al Qaeda in Iraq.(30) As if mutilating the bodies were not enough of a violation, two videos of the actual desecration subsequently appeared. Both videos were clearly propaganda films which attempted to link the killings of the two American soldiers in Iraq to the murder of a 14 year old Iraqi girl and her family. “The claim that Tucker and Menchaca were killed and desecrated in retaliation for the rape and murder of Abeer Qassim al-Janabi and her family is questionable since the allegations of the murder were not made public until after the two were killed and the videos were not released until three weeks after the incident.(31)

    On July 10, 2006 the Mujahideen Shura Council issued on the Internet a 4:39 minute video that showed the mutilated corpses of the two young American soldiers. “The extremely graphic footage is preceded by an audio clip of a past Usama bin Laden speech, and an audio track from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is heard over the scenes in which the Mujahideen display and prod the corpses. A message introducing the video states that this video is presented as “revenge for our sister who was dishonored by a soldier of the same brigade,” referencing the rape and murder of an Iraqi girl and her family by a group of American soldiers in al-Mahmoudiya.(32) After a brief introduction with an image and the voice of Osama bin Laden, the video shows the two dead soldiers lying on a bridge with obvious multiple wounds. Their bodies are being taunted by the insurgent captors. Thomas Tucker had already been decapitated and his severed head is held up to the cameras as a classic trophy/presentation head. Kristian Menchaca is being stomped on by an insurgent who has his foot deliberately placed on the head of the dead soldier. At one point in the video, an image of the recently deceased leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, is superimposed over the film, throughout the entire video there is a voice over of al Zaraqawi calling Muslims to jihad. A nasheed, Islamic jihad song, can also be heard in the background.(33)

    On September 22, 2006 a second video with a high production value and new footage of the mutilation of the bodies was released by the Mujahideen Shura Council of Iraq. The video shows the bodies bound to the back of a truck being dragged through the streets, beaten and kicked. In one instance Thomas’s head is kicked by an insurgent. At the end of the video, the two U.S. soldiers’ bodies are burned. The video is titled: “In Member of the Sunnah of Our Ancestors in Mutilating the Infidels,” is 9:12 minutes in length, and depicts the attack upon two American soldiers in al-Yusufiyah. According to the Site Institute, “Reciprocation is emphasized throughout the video. An al-Jazeera interview with Mohammed Taha al-Janabi, Abeer’s uncle, begins the illustration of American crimes, followed by narration of an inhabitant of al-Fallujah describing American crimes during the second battle in that city. Also, the Mujahideen Shura Council points to the burning of Taliban Mujahideen in Afghanistan as additional justification for their acts against the two American soldiers in al-Yusufiyah. Stories of Muhammad’s companions and Islamic scholars who acted in kind to crimes committed against them are presented as vertically scrolling text atop an image of one of the American soldiers. A message within the video reads: “The Mujahideen, Allah willing, will stay on the companion’s path, “tit for tat” in being harsh on the apostates and the Crusader infidels and the splitters by dispersing and hurting them, destroying their troops, killing them, and wishing to offer the biggest sacrifices for the God of earth and the skies”.(34) Although the Site Institute relegates the entire incident in the video to revenge killings there are specific expressions of violence that signify significant symbolic acts of desecration when viewed within the larger context of Iraqi culture.

    6

    From a 21st century Western psychological perspective the previously mentioned incidents of murder and mutilation would be categorized as pathological acts of violence. However, justifications for violence are culturally relative and need to be examined from a symbolic anthropological perspective that takes into consideration the symbolism of the culture as it is manifested in religious ritual, customs, practices, and specific acts of violence. If we examine the particular incidents of mutilation it becomes evident they may not be as arbitrary as first assumed. For example, the deliberate stepping on victims heads is a allusion to a prevalent Muslim custom that considers the bottom of shoes as highly offensive. The burnings of bodies are not aberrant acts of collective mob violence, they are a response to Islamic burial customs which strictly prohibit cremation. Dragging the bodies through town on the back of a truck, hacking them to pieces and leaving them exposed to the elements is a reversal of Iraqi funeral rituals in which the body is bathed, shrouded, prayed over, carried through town in a funeral procession and buried in the ground. Punishing the corpse by inflicting society’s worst taboos is a deliberate perversion of sacred funeral rites and an obvious projection of private fears and cultural beliefs onto the enemy.

    In addition, murder and desecration are rampant because they are theologically proscribed in the principle of Lex talionis (Qissas) and customary tribal law. ‘Mutilating bodies in retaliation for the mutilation of Muslims is derived from the case in which pagans mutilated the body of Hamzah ibn Abdul-Muttalib, one of the prophet’s companions, and the Prophet swore to mutilate seventy pagan corpses in retaliation.(35) A number of recent fatwas proscribe mutilating enemies’ bodies. In February 2005 the London based radical Sheikh Hani al-Siba’i justified the mutilation and torture of enemies by the precedent of the Prophet who, as a punishment for stealing sheep, “drove nails and gouged out the eyes of the ‘Urayna tribe . . . cut off their opposite arms and legs and threw them into al-Hrara area to die.” If the mere crime of theft warranted such a punishment, according to the sheikh, the crimes of the occupiers of Iraq certainly do.(36) In specific response to the mutilations of the four contractors in Fallujah, a fatwa was issued by the Saudi Sheikh Omar Abdullah Hassan al-Shihabi that proscribed an even more general dispensation for mutilating the dead. He decreed that the dead can be mutilated not only as a reciprocal act but also when it serves to “terrorize the enemy” or to gladden the heart of a Muslim mujahid.”(37) Theologically, mutilation of the enemies of Islam is justified; politically oppressive regimes are responsible for a legacy of physical abuse that has been inculcated and perpetuated, psychologically, cultural taboos and fears are projected onto others, and symbolically inexplicable forms of habitual desecration are marks of a culture that is devolving into a sphere of magical thinking and primal violence.

    Conclusion: The Failure of Muslim Iconoclasm

    Desecration goes beyond psychological warfare when children are joyfully participating in the dismemberment of a body and posing for pictures in front of mutilated corpses. To fully appreciate the significance of these violent ritualistic acts they have to be understood within the entire context of Muslim desecration. Iconoclasm which is generally defined as the destruction of sacred images, usually for religious or political motives,(38) is synonymous with desecration. The media has reported only one side of the issue of Muslim iconoclasm, disrespect of what Muslims hold sacred, and have not reported on the very significant other side of the issue, Muslim defilement of what non-Muslims hold sacred. Like two sides of the same coin, Muslim indignation and desecration are intrinsically intertwined. What initially appears to be a disproportionate and exceedingly violent response to the Pope’s comments or cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad are examples of Muslim iconoclasm which derive from the Quranic prohibitions against idolatry. Muslims believe that images can give rise to idolatry (idol worship).The fear is that an image, rather than the divine being it symbolizes, can become the object of worship and veneration. Prohibitions vary among Islamic traditions but typically include images of Allah, Muhammad, the representation of gods, divine figures or semi divine figures of other religions and the figurative depiction of living creatures, especially human beings. The prohibition is not specific to images but includes among other things writings, statues, etc, basically anything that could be construed idolatrous even in a relative and provisional manner and particularly any representation that insults the prophet Muhammad. For example Salman Rushdie’s depiction of Muhammad in his 1988 book The Satanic Verses, though literary, caused great anger among Muslims, culminating in an edict from Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, who charged Rushdie with apostasy and issued a fatwa calling for his death. He was understood as disrespectfully breaking the image prohibition, as his writings created non-Sunna images of the prophet in the mind of the reader.(39) More recently in March 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued an edict against un-Islamic graven images, as a result, the Taliban militia went across Afghanistan, including the Kabul museum, destroying all pre-Islamic treasures and ancient sculptures. They used explosives, tanks, and anti-aircraft weapons to blow apart the Buddhas of Bamyan, two monumental statues of standing Buddhas carved into the side of a cliff in the Bamyan valley of central Afghanistan, built during the 6th century.

    More common unrecognized manifestations of Muslim Iconoclasm are the burning of effigies and flags of enemies. Because the secular media does not regard the American flag or for that matter the American President as significant emblems of the United States they fail to recognize that when Muslim protesters are burning the American flag and U.S. President in effigy it is a sacrilegious iconoclastic act. The burning of effigies is a ritualistic act that unifies participants and reinforces their collective hatred for an individual and what he represents. Participants seek to reduce the impact of the person represented by the effigy by destroying his or her likeness. The burning is a symbolic, deliberate attack. Throughout the world and particularly in the Middle East protestors regularly burn effigies of President Bush, other prominent leaders, recently including Pope Benedict XVI.

    Historically one function of mutilating images and statues of people was as a means of formally executing a person in their absence or in some cases after they were already dead. “The whole apparatus of execution could be employed upon images, not only in hanging, but also in pillorying, burning, quartering, and decapitating them. “The instances of the desecration of enemies of the commonweal described by the Roman historians, and the destruction of statues of those posthumously declared by enemies of the state, properly fall under the rubric of iconoclasm. . . . Punish the absent miscreant by punishing his representation in our midst; visit odium upon it by public disfigurement, mutilation, or hanging. In both cases the action of making, displaying, and disfiguring the image may be spontaneous, or it may fall within established and official structures of disapproval and sentencing.”(40) Interestingly there is a significant connection between the mutilation of effigies and the mutilation of corpses. Historically corpses were put on display, dismembered, hanged, drawn and quartered and subjected to a variety of other ‘punishments’ in what technically is referred to asposthumous execution, the ritual execution of an already dead body.(41) Punishing effigies evolved from punishing the actual corpse. “One practice not yet mentioned must be regarded as a significant antecedent of the public execution of images: the execution and burning of corpses of criminals and heretics by civil and ecclesiastical authorities. Although it clearly antedates the full blown executio in effigie, it continues beside the latter well into the eighteenth century and even beyond. . . . The punishment of corpses became widespread in the sixteenth century, received much discussion in criminal treatises, and was frequently employed by the Inquisition.”(42)

    7

    The relationship of the punishment of corpses and effigies is extremely relevant to the subject of Mujahideen desecration. Moderate Muslims mutilate effigies, Jihadists mutilate dead soldiers; both are ritualized acts of iconoclasm and both are manifestations of primal instincts, the very same instincts that the idolatry laws proscribe. There is a thin line between iconoclasm and idolatry which is contingent upon the concept of image magic. The burning of effigies and mutilating corpses is connected to the concept of sympathetic magic which is essentially based on the law of similarity and expressed in the magical principle that “like produces like.” “Perhaps the most familiar application of the principle that like produces like is the attempt which has been made by many peoples in many ages to injure or destroy an enemy by injuring or destroying an image of him, in the belief that, just as the image suffers, so does the man, that when it perishes he must die.”(43) Politically the mutilation of effigies is an act of iconoclasm; religiously it is an act of idolatry. In either case mutilating effigies involves image magic which is inherently related to the fear of images (idols). Muslim iconoclasm evinces two types of fear, one of which is best exemplified by the destruction of the Buddhist statues: the fear of worshipping false idols. The destruction of the statues by the Taliban is an example of classic iconoclasm, to enforce the theological prohibitions against graven images. The function of the prohibition is to avoid idolatry that may lead to the worship of false gods. This is the primary reason for the tradition of aniconism in Islam, which was originally intended to protect the religion from the pagan practice of worshipping statues and currently serves to focus the religion away from the contemporary “idols” prevalent in Western materialism. However, as a result of such strict prohibitions on images, the few designated Muslim sacred objects and spaces such as mosques and the Quran achieve significantly more symbolic meaning. The limited amount of sacred objects and spaces enhances their sanctity and correspondingly enhances the degree of disrespect when they are allegedly defiled. This is one explanation for the disproportionate response to perceived Muslim offenses. Ironically, by attributing sacred characteristics to tangible objects these become the idols that were so vehemently prohibited.

    The second type of fear of images is exemplified by the intense response to cartoons of Muhammad; this is a primal fear that is expressed in magical thinking. The fear is that the image of Muhammad may somehow make Muhammad vulnerable. This semiotic problem provides significant insights into the beheading and mutilation of bodies. The desire to protect Muhammad by prohibiting his image is the same desire behind the destruction of effigies to bring harm to enemies. The mutilation of effigies is serious, the reason images of Muhammad are prohibited is not limited to the fear of conflating sign with signified but also with the primal fear that if the image is mutilated so is the symbol. If effigies of Muhammad were burned in the same fashion as effigies of the Pope the response would unleash a violence more destructive than anything we have ever seen before. Furthermore, the symbolic desire to mutilate effigies can be applied to mutilating bodies; the violent ritual can escalate from images to reality, “Decapitation as symbolic practice precedes decapitation as violence.”(44) The thin line between iconoclasm and idolatry dissolves. Protesters are no longer content to beat, dismember, behead and burn effigies, the participants now require blood, flesh, and bones, and the image is replaced with an actual body, a more authentic signifier. An act of iconoclasm escalates to an act of ritual violence and desecration. The function of the theological prohibition of images is compromised by the overwhelming human desire for symbols and the religious realm becomes primal and sacrificial. This is the failure of Muslim iconoclasm, its devolvement into idolatry.

    By perpetuating the cult of Palestinian and Muslim victimhood, the Western media incites a vicious sequence of insult, protest, violence, and mutilation. Widespread reporting of incidents that offend Muslims escalates to protests that entail ritualized acts of symbolic violence (burning effigies), then to acts of actual violence (mutilation and murder) that devolve into primal acts of symbolic violence (desecrating corpses) in a reciprocal cycle of iconoclasm, idolatry, and ritual murder.

    8

    Notes

    1. Timothy Furnish, “Beheading in the name of Islam,” The Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, XII: 2, http://www.meforum.org/article/713 (back)

    2. Regina Janes, Losing Our Heads, Beheadings in Literature and Culture, New York University Press, New York and London, 2005: 14. (back)

    3. Janes, “Beheadings”: 16-17. (back)

    4. MSNBC, “Islamic Cleric, Afghan Refugee Beheaded,” August 30, 2006, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/14579741/#storyContinued . (back)

    5. Janes, “Beheadings”: xii. (back)

    6. Janes, “Beheadings”: 15. (back)

    7. Rusty Shackleford, “Taliban Releases New Beheading Video from Waziristan (Images),” Jawa Report, March 16, 2006 http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/163680.php . (back)

    8. Stephen Fitzpatrick, “Beheaded girls were Ramadan ‘trophies’,” The Australian, November 9, 2006 http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20726085-2703,00.html . (back)

    9. Ibid. (back)

    10. Furnish, “Beheading.” (back)

    11. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Battle of Karbala” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karbala . (back)

    12. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Day of Ashura” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashura . (back)

    13. James M. Arlandson, “Muhammad’s ‘aye’ for an eye: law of retaliation in Islam,” American Thinker, July 24, 2005 http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/07/muhammads_aye_for_an_eye_law_o.html . (back)

    14. Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Court Orders Eyes to Be Gouged Out,” December 9, 2005 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/09/saudia12199.htm. (back)

    15. Ibid. (back)

    16. Iran Focus, “Man Sentenced to Have Eyes Gouged out for Teenage Crime,” June 10, 2005 http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2345 . (back)

    17. Rod Nordland, “The ‘Abu Earless’ Brigade,” MSNBC, April 23, 2006 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3068335/site/newsweek/ . (back)

    18. Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, Simon & Shuster Inc, New York, London, Ontario, 1963:1. (back)

    19. Nordland, “The ‘Abu Earless’ Brigade.” (back)

    20. Tebayn, “Church Calls for Action Over Gruesome Violence Toward Christians in Iraq,” November 2, 2006 http://www.tebayn.com/Tebayn%20English/index.asp?pageID=1&SID=3014&Ln=En . (back)

    21. Lawrence Kaplan, “A Revolting Truth,” The Plank, July 10, 2006 http://www.tnr.com/blog/theplank?pid=24150 . (back)

    22. ABC News Online, “Marines find Caucasian woman’s body in Fallujah,” November 14, 2004 http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200411/s1243242.htm . (back)

    23. Rory McCarthy and Julian Borger, “Americans burned and mutilated by Iraq mob,” Guardian Unlimited, April 1, 2004 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1183365,00.html . (back)

    24. BBC News, “Bodies mutilated in Iraq attack,” March 31, 2004 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3585765.stm . (back)

    25. Fox News, “Violence Strikes Iraq’s Sunni Triangle,” March 31, 2004 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,115703,00.html . (back)

    26. Barbara Starr, Cal Perry, and Ed Lavandera, “US soldiers’ bodies mutilated, booby-trapped,” CNN, June 21, 2006 http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/06/20/soldiers.missing/ . (back)

    27. Bill O’Reilly, “The Murders and Mutilations of Two American Soldiers in Iraq,” Fox News, June 21, 2006 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,200407,00.html . (back)

    28. YouTube, “Where Is the Outrage?” June 21, 2006 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k3vspqmjIVI&eurl . (back)

    29. Jonathan Finer and Joshua Partlow, “Missing Soldiers Found Dead In Iraq,” Washington Post, June 21, 2006 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/20/AR2006062000242.html .(back)

    30. Starr, Perry, and Lavandera, “US soldiers’ bodies mutilated.” (back)

    9

    31. Rusty Shackleford, “New Tucker and Menchaca Video: Bodies Desecrated by Terrorists,” Jawa Report, September 23, 2006 http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/184744.php . (back)

    32. SITE Institute, “The Mujahideen Shur Council in Iraq Issues a Video of the Mutilated Corpses of the Two Captured American Soldiers in al-Ysefiya,” July 10, 2006 http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications193306&Category=publications&Subcategory=0 . (back)

    33. Rusty Shackleford, “Beheading Desecration Video of Dead U.S. Soldiers Released on Internet by al Qaeda (Video/Images),” Jawa Report, July 10, 2006 http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/183865.php . (back)

    34. SITE Institute, “’In Member of the Sunnah of Our Ancestors in Mutiliating the Infidels’ – A Video from the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq Featuring the Revenge Attack Upon Two Captured American Soldiers in al-Yusufiyah,” September 22, 2006 http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications213306&Category=publications&Subcategory=0 . (back)

    35. Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad, Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford, 2006: 69. (back)

    36. Middle East Media Research Institute, “London Islamist Dr. Hani Al-Sibaai Justifies Slaughters in Iraq: The Prophet Muhammad Used to Slaughter As Well,” February 22, 2005 http://www.memritv.org/Transcript.asp?P1=576; Bar, Fatwas: 69-70. (back)

    37. FaithFreedom.org, “The examples of Muhammad,” Ali Sina http://www.faithfreedom.org/Articles/sinaawa40621.htm; Bar, Fatwas: 69. (back)

    38. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Iconoclasm” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iconoclasm . (back)

    39. Encyclopedia of the Orient, Muslim Iconoclasm” http://lexicorient.com/e.o/mus_iconoclasm.htm . (back)

    40. David Freedberg, The Power of Images, Studies in the History and Theory of Response, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1989: 257, 247. (back)

    41. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Posthumous Execution” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posthumous_execution . (back)

    42. Freedberg, “Power of Images“: 259-260. (back)

    43. Freedberg, “Power of Images“: 272. (back)

    44. Janes, “Beheadings”: 3. (back)

     

  • Originary Science, Originary Memory, Frankenstein and the Problem of Modern Science (Part 1 of 3)

    I. Frankenstein as Modern Myth and the Need for an Idea of “Originary Science”

    1 In Originary Thinking: Elements of Generative Anthropology (1993),(1) Eric Gans proposes that the minimal judgment concerning any cultural artifact, a judgment that may be conferred only by the “verdict of history,” is that the artifact counts–as the referent of the first sign on the originary scene did–as significant in the long run (OT 130). That the verdict of history has testified to the significance of Frankenstein (1818) is undeniable. Mary Shelley’s first novel contains the set of kernels for a basic “story”(2) that almost every cultural consumer in the Western world sooner or later learns. The story tells of a hubristic modern scientist, atheist and materialist, who attempts to create human beings, therefore playing God and bringing upon himself, upon the not-quite-human creature, and upon unsuspecting human bystanders, disastrous violent conflict and irredeemable suffering. From this primary model there descends an impressive line of imitations: enduring modernist specimens such as H. G. Wells’ The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896) and Karel Capek’s R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots) (1922); acclaimed postmodern fictions such as Craig Nova’s Wetware (2002) and Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003); contemporary pop fiction such as Tom Hyman’s Jupiter’s Daughter (1994), John Darnton’s The Experiment (1999), and F. Paul Wilson’s Sims (2003);Hollywood blockbusters such as Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), Steven Spielberg’s AI: Artificial Intelligence (2001) and Michael Bay’s cloning-horror thriller, The Island (2005). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any narrative of the human robot, android, cyborg, or clone in which scientist and “product” confront each other that would not be doomed to create its differential effects in the long shadow of Mary Shelley’s founding model.

    2 The founding model conveys in parabolic form the difference between an action’s intended results and its unintended consequences, a difference significant to any cultural agent whose project involves unavoidable risk to the uninvolved public. It suggests the ethical risk entailed in many a technological innovation or commercial venture or thesis proposal in market society. It is no accident that the “Frankenstein” accusation is deployed in public discourse concerning nuclear bombs, human genetic engineering, and ecological disaster-making of all sorts (Mulkay; Turney). The core story, as we all know, has become, more significantly, a lasting modern myth.(3) It is revealing to classify Mary Shelley’s first novel not only with its descendants, the literary imitations of it, but also with other modern works that have similarly proven themselves to possess the peculiar power to inspire numerous variable re-tellings, to generate cultural icons people use without knowing their “original” historical sources. The canon of modern myths would include the Faust story (as told in Marlowe’s play), Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Bram Stoker’s Dracula. It might include others; my aim here is only to assert the curious presence among us of the category of modern myth and to make the uncontroversial move to include Frankenstein in it. The modern myth constitutes, on its face, a paradoxical class of cultural productions. Why do we have them? The expression “modern myth” cannot be a self-abolishing contradiction in terms, because we do in fact have them; but given that the enlightenment project aims at the expulsion of delusional, superstitious “myth” and the enthronement instead of verifiable, “scientific” truth, why does myth persist as modern myth? Is it not the goal of modernity to shake off the illegitimate authority of legend, fancy, religion–and to put in its place the scientifically creditable? Of our four examples, only the sober Robinson Crusoe seems less than hostile to the scientific cast of modernity: Faust, Frankenstein, and Dracula remain dream-soaked and suspicious of the authority of reason, addicted to the closed satisfactions of ritual violence. Nor is it accidental that Robinson Crusoe alone in the set shows no open hostility to what Gans has illuminated as the minimal model of market society, and that the other myths (by contrast) exude a nostalgia for the good shows made possible by the staging of a fantasized decadent aristocracy that refuses to learn the pragmatic wisdom to be gained from witnessing the revolutionary purifications of the American and French revolutions.(4)

    3 This curious persistence of the anti-scientific, anti-democratic and anti-modern in modern myth itself may be the sign of modernity’s failure to get science to appropriate the authority to be derived from its anthropological roots in religious practice.(5) Modern myth, in its turning away from enlightenment directives, creates a high-stakes market of esthetic traditions (“modern tradition,” another oxymoron) not only to supplant “Religion” but also to save us from an allegedly anesthetic, amoral “Science.” The Frankenstein myth takes pride of place here, more resonant than Faust or Dracula in its power to crystallize popular resentment of real-world science.(6) Roslynn Haynes’ authoritative From Faust to Strangelove: Representations of the Scientist in Western Literature (1994) demonstrates beyond any doubt that throughout modern Western history, the scientist both in high literary art and in popular culture almost always gets cast in a “negative” role. She also documents the way this deep resentment of the scientist figure has grown especially acute in the wake of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.(7) And the deluded scientist who aspires to playing God the creator of the human cuts the most disturbing figure. What anthropological truth about science and modern culture, in the minimal terms of originary analysis, is revealed and preserved in the Frankenstein myth?

    4 Once we begin to ask these questions, we are forced to confront some interestingly blurry lines in generative anthropology itself. For when we turn to the key texts of originary thinking, we find that “originary science” has not yet been explicitly thematized, although the materials for such a thematization seem to be scattered here and there. This study, the first in a three-part originary analysis of the problem of modern science as it is revealed by Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, will take up the challenge of inquiring into “science” in the discourse of generative anthropology, of attempting to formulate a notion of “originary science.”

    II. First Step Toward Finding “Originary Science”: Uniqueness of the Human

    5 Anyone acquainted with the oeuvre of Eric Gans will have noticed the range of fundamental components of the human for which he has found a place in the originary event. With a searching rigor, Gans has elaborated a fascinating, but deliberately selective, inventory of anthropological categories fundamental to an understanding of the human. The inventory includes mimetic paradox, symbolic language, representation, originary linguistic exchange; originary mimesis, rivalry, resentment, desire, guilt; the experience of the communal sacred, originary significance, the minimal esthetic effect; the minimal model of sacrificial ritual in the originary sparagmos; the inauguration of economic value in exchange of the first personal property in the sparagmos; originary irony, narrative, personhood; the anthropological idea of God in the originary signified that subsists in the absence of the consumed sacrificial object; the establishment of the rhythms of ethical social life (“independent” productivity) as opposed to moral communal life (ritual duty).

    6 We might ask about one more feature: technology and science as fundamental components of the human. The most cursory examination of the differences between our species and others surely must include the wonders wrought by the technological implementation of the discoveries of natural science, especially in the last two hundred years. In response to skeptics who discount or deny the uniqueness of the human by pointing out the existence of so-called animal languages or animal culture, Gans often points to the fact that no animal species has anything like human religion. If we do remain open to noticing the close identity between the universality of human religion and the massive evidence pointing toward the origins of language in communal experiences of the sacred, he suggests, our openness might inspire us to shed some of our false humility in the name of intellectual self-respect. Yet in a gesture the intended objects of which are far more spectacular, one could direct the attention of the deniers of human uniqueness to the differences of scale between the sticks that chimpanzees use to fetch insect foods and the technological achievements of humans: fire, the axe, the plough, the wheel, the boat, the flying kite, pyramids, cathedrals, skyscrapers, bicycles, tractors, planes, heart transplants and brain surgery, books and movies and electronic journals. The root of the technological achievements of our species, results of knowledge systematized by those forms of symbolic representation known as “science,” may well be felt to deserve inclusion in the originary event. Indeed, science separates us from the animals more decisively and spectacularly than does religion. Where would we locate science in the originary event?

    7 If one begins to restudy Gans’s oeuvre with an eye to the question, one notices an intriguing pattern: phrases such as “natural science” and “empirical science” and “scientific method” appear most frequently in the context of discursively self-reflexive moments where the scope and object of generative anthropology itself are being delimited. For example, we read: “But the scope of generative anthropology is not all-inclusive. Only the categories of human culture may usefully be subjected to originary analysis, not those [categories] by means of which we seek to understand the natural universe” (OT 10). One of the fundamental distinctions in originary thinking, in fact, is the thick line drawn between anthropology and cosmology. Generative anthropology takes “the human” as its object of knowledge; “natural science” or cosmology takes the laws and regularities of the natural world out there as its object. Inasmuch as anthropology is not “hard” natural science, then, the universe of natural objects and the categories used to acquire knowledge about them fall outside of the scope of generative anthropology. It would be absurd to speak of originary gravity, originary salinity, originary genetic mutation. Gravity, salinity, genetic mutation are categories proper to physics, chemistry and biology; they have no relevance to intellectual operations studying the human. Gravity and salinity and genetic mutation preceded the emergence of the human and will outlast the extinction of the human, however much that fact might offend our resentful desire for cosmological centrality.(8) (In this case, a truly absurd resentment. “No fair!” said the people to the rocks, to the spiders.) Anthropological categories will not help us understand these purely natural phenomena. By the same token, however, those of us who wish to pursue the anthropological must combat the imperious attempts of the “hard sciences” to reduce the human to the physical, chemical, or biological. If one does not grasp Gans’s unwavering attentiveness both to the uniqueness, specificity and irreducibility of the human as an object of knowledge, and to the autonomy of anthropological thought as the intellectual domain in which that knowledge is organized, one will have difficulty grasping generative anthropology itself. In any case, my point now is that “science” may still be waiting to be located on the originary scene partly as a consequence of this need to keep the materialist bulldogs at bay and to insist on the relative autonomy of the human.

    8 The biological perhaps deserves some special treatment here because it is, in the triad of hard natural sciences, closest to the anthropological. Especially inasmuch as Darwinian evolutionary theory impinges on the major question of human origins, there is an interface between generative anthropology and human biology. Gans is unique among scholars whose intellectual operations have their roots in the humanities’ traditional practice of text-based reflection. Generative anthropology is unusual in the way that it pays due respect to developments in evolutionary neurobiology, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, cognitive science and related disciplines. One thinks, for example, of Gans’s marked interest in Terence Deacon’s work on the origins of symbolic reference in human evolution. Meanwhile, inasmuch as biology moves in a materialist direction and seeks an understanding of the human through models that were created simply to explain the animate as opposed to the inanimate, Gans takes a step away from its methods: “The emergence of the human cannot be explained by the theory of biological evolution alone, not because Darwinism isn’t good science, but because the defining human trait of symbolic representation is not a biological phenomenon” (“Science and Faith in Kansas”).(9) Generative anthropology is a way of thinking that permits us to theorize our intuitive sense of the obvious inadequacy of such notions as the “selfish gene” and the impossibility of reducing the human mental experience of (self-) representation to “just” neurological functions of the brain or “just” computational models beloved of the cyberneticists.(10) It is not that Gans rejects the hypothesis that all of nature is in some final ultimate sense material, that he waxes mystical about the mind and injects “soul” into it somewhere, as did Descartes with his speculations about the lodging of invisible spirit in the pineal gland.(11) On the great ontological question of what is, cosmologically, as we have seen, generative anthropology picks no schoolyard quarrel with that big fellow, physics. However, generative anthropology does have a fight with those who believe human representation can be understood by way of the models of explanation constructed to explain the physical, chemical, sociobiological or neurological: “The interventions of the transcendent in the immanent, whether as freedom or as divinity, are ungraspable by physical models that cannot account for the effect of our knowledge of the model on the behavior we are studying” (“Free Will” [emphasis added]). A model must be sufficient to explain its object (Baier 390).(12) The unorthodox claim of generative anthropology is only that a minimal hypothesis of the origin of human representation in terrestrial history can explain human representation. Otherwise, one must shrug and say “language . . . just evolved, didn’t it?“, an evasive query which is certainly not an explanation, let alone an hypothesis. Our study of the human is inefficient at best and self-defeating at worst as long as it refuses to propose and to test one or another hypothetical model of human language origin. Gans’s core thesis about the origin of human representation itself as opposed to the mere necessity of proposing one, is, perhaps surprisingly, detachable from all his descriptions of the originary event. That core thesis is: “the sign can not arise unconsciously, since its use implies consciousness”; “we could not have begun to use language unawares” (“Is GA Falsifiable?”). We notice in passing that the ascetic biologism which refuses to make room for the originary status of ostensive language in any fundamental reflection on human origin marks the precise point where Eric Gans, wearing his philosopher-of-language hat (only one of many hats he may anytime put on), parts company with Jacques Derrida.(13)

    9 It follows perhaps as no surprise, given these remarks on the originary hypothesis’ position with respect to cosmology and the “hard sciences,” that generative anthropology has consistently distanced itself from the “social sciences,” as well. But it distances itself only inasmuch as those “social” sciences aspire, as biology sometimes does–in a rather perversely self-defeating downward direction, limiting their explanatory models to ones borrowed from the “harder” sciences–to the search for quantifiable, predictable, law-like structures in the various forms of human behavior (mental, familial, social, political, economic). The prestige alone of physics is no reason to mimic its models when they will not do to explain the object of one’s study. In the pursuit of knowledge of the human, generative anthropology suggests that the endless sorting and storing of data, the accumulation of case studies, statistical inquiries, diagnostic tests, content analyses and the like, will never substitute for a minimal hypothesis of the human itself, what it is and how it emerged from its evolutionary forbears.(14) Nor are the humanities free of this tendency toward a mystical faith in the cumulative results of interpretations piled up without an organizing hypothesis or set of competing hypothetical models. The humanities, we expect, will take the human for their object. Yet on the whole, the very question what is the human? has become in most literary critical circles an embarrassing one to ask (let alone dare to “answer”). The prohibition against asking the question is probably the result of the domination system in the soft-sciences academy of victimary thinkers who believe that its merely being asked will inevitably “exclude” and therefore victimize certain parties. Ironically, the victimary prophecy fulfills itself in that when all of us refuse to theorize the human even in the most minimal fashion, all of us indeed are universally self-excluded from knowing who we are, where we came from, what our creaturely status is. (We note in passing that we agree such victimization should be avoided: but witness the ethical motive which accompanies the scientific in Gans’s prioritizing of minimality in the originary hypothesis. The more minimal the hypothesis of human origin, the more maximal is its openness to historical human diversity.) It is not the case that Gans despises or dismisses the testing of falsifiable hypotheses and the collection and sharing of empirical data in the human sciences. On the contrary, as with his attention to work in the neurobiology of language and the paleontology of human origins, and with his respect for Marvin Harris’ program (along with similar examples of respect for empirically verifiable information), Gans believes in the “scientific method” under certain flexible qualifications as the best way to get at the truth about the human. But if generative anthropology therefore positions itself as a way of thinking that leads to “scientific truth” (and I think it does), then we seem to have reached a quandary. We are now contradicting its self-differentiation from “cosmology,” its taking the human as its exclusive object. There, as we noted above, generative anthropology seemed to reject “science” for another way of thinking. So if we are to locate “originary science” in the originary event, we need to detail a little more thoroughly generative anthropology’s interaction with the hard sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

    10 Audaciously but not arrogantly, generative anthropology does not reject the findings of these research domains so much as accept them under the sign of a minimal inclusive containment–as forms of human representation which, although directed sometimes even at non-human objects, are objects of anthropology itself insofar as they depend upon forms of human representation itself. Gans writes: ” . . .only a self-knowing creature could have created natural science. The objective scene of scientific knowledge is in the first place not the scene of nature but the scene of human origin” (OT 12); “It is human origin that provides the model for the origin of natural phenomena, which are understood to arise as if already existing in the context of human culture” (OT 5). Scientific representation must remain human representation, not in the objects it takes up but in the practices it enacts. However strange it might seem, even the hard sciences that take the cosmological as their object, the hard sciences that deal with what the philosopher of science Ian Hacking calls “indifferent kinds,” categories of natural phenomena that are not affected by our knowledge of them (Hacking 103-108), come in this way into contact with some fundamental notions in originary thinking. The cautious move I am making here is (again) to assert that scientific representation of the natural world is still a form of human representation; the origins of scientific representation, therefore, are one with the origins of human language generally. This should give us courage to begin to delimit “originary science.”

    III. Scientific Representation is Human Representation: Implications

    11 I have made the claim that we do well to remember that scientific representation is, in terms of the originary hypothesis, a form of human language. Two comments on this claim need spelling out. The first: it does not follow that cosmological thinking permits our intellectual operations thus to indulge in the acrobatics proposed by the advocates of Intelligent Design theory. Gans has rejected Intelligent Design and the more mystical but related “anthropic principle” as category errors.(15) He has rejected even more forcefully the bibliolatry of the oxymoronic “creation science” inasmuch as it demeans the foundations of modern biology in Darwin’s evolutionary model, and does this demeaning while failing to recognize the pertinent valuable notion Biblical tradition does have to offer: the necessity of thinking of human origin as an event (“Science and Faith in Kansas”). Gans’s maxim, “theology is often good anthropology but it is nearly always bad cosmology,” often appears in this context of the revisited cosmological-anthropological divide.(16)

    12 A mystery does enter our scene of attention here in the aspirations of the “argument from design,” however, and I have no wish to expel it in blind subservience to the doctrines of scientific naturalism, which can match, in their obstinate self-confidence, the obstinacy of fundamentalist bibliolatry. Reflection on this mystery will meanwhile permit us to further our delimitation of originary science. Originary science: the scientific knowledge that would be externalized by scientific representation must be knowledge of the object itself, the “object” that for generative anthropology first appears on the originary scene that generated the human being itself as a cosmological phenomenon: “The miracle of the concept, like that of the loaves and fishes, is its embodiment of the trace of the originary scene, where the shared ostensive sign defers mimetic violence. The sign does not create the physical thing, but it creates the meaningful things that can be represented by a sign” (“Programming”). The quest for “objective” knowledge is one with the quest for the object of the first sign, the object transfigured at the origin of the human by our ancestors’ abortive gestures of appropriation. But we do not want the sign in itself, the sign simply as that which is exchanged on the periphery (we are not postmodern solipsists meditating on the text indifferent to the world of objects, deluded by under-thought notions of language as an independent force).(17) We want the sign as that which intends the object, meaning we want the appropriation and consumption and knowledge of the object. I will expand on these starting remarks later. For now, my point is that the great drama of human history includes the great drama of the expansion and partitioning of that minimal object to include all the objects in the whole universe, and the “universe” itself as object. It is human desire as a function of paradoxical representation that has given us human knowledge of the object-world “out there”: “In the original scene, desire is pure paradox: appropriation of the central object is precisely what is prevented by the significance accorded it in the scene itself” (EC 159). Just as our first ancestors desired to know that object, modern humans with a scientific education want to know about all of nature, from its most microscopically minute incarnations to its most cosmologically expansive. The historical drama which shows human desire (human desire, although in originary terms always prior to cognition, impels and sustains cognition), shows us ourselves moving in curious hunger and hungry curiosity from the abortive gesture of appropriation toward the one minimal food object on the originary scene, moving toward, today, our abortive gestures of appropriation that aim to know and to touch upon all of the planet earth and the vast reaches of (think Star Trek) space. Certainly this drama of the pluralization into infinite multiplicity of the objects of knowledge is awe-inspiring. Only a boor would deny its inherent mysteriousness.

    13 However, it does not follow that our mindful intuition of this awe-inspiring collective achievement of all human minds co-operating (notice that “communal achievement” would not have been accurate) is in any way confirmatory or corroborative evidence of the mind of a great Designer, a mind other than ours. Perhaps our minds are met somewhere and some way by the mind of God; generative anthropology remains in the long run skeptical rather than dogmatically atheistic at this juncture, preferring to limit its hypotheses to a firm foundation in the minds we certainly know we do have (our own) and choosing to set aside the unverifiable existence of the mind of an independent-of-the-human cosmic Designer (not our own). If such skepticism commits us to “materialism” (and it is not clear that it does),(18) then generative anthropology must be characterized as “materialist.” Meanwhile there persists a difference between scientism itself, and faith in the scientific method as linked to a respect for human being; generative anthropology takes up that latter faith and respect, while it explicitly rejects both the epistemology and the ontology of scientism.(19)

    14 The second implication of the claim in question (that is, we ought always to recall that scientific representation descends from ostensive, originary language) takes us into the ethical. The results of reflection here become somewhat paradoxical. Gans has made the assertion: “Natural science has advanced by expelling ethical considerations from its intellectual operations” (“Ethical Mission”). The phrase “ethical considerations” is, I believe, an echo of remarks in certain chapters in Bernard Williams’ Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985).(20) What this remark entails, I suspect, is that the hard natural sciences learned at a certain point in their history that the cosmological world was indeed ontologically separate from the human, precisely in the sense that text-based systems of representation limited our powers of understanding and explanation. Religious reverence for the sacred myths and texts provides only limited openings into the truths of physics, chemistry, and biology. That limitedness of religion as a mode of inquiry should be self-evident to the modern person, believer or non-believer. We have collectively realized from time to time that we needed new languages, new sets of presuppositions, new modes of calculation, and new models of prediction. Thanks to the offerings of scientific innovators, we tried some and found them working, and a new human fearlessness respecting the phenomena studied by physics, chemistry, and biology liberated inquiry from magical thinking and superstitious prohibitions that had until then restricted the free flourishing of the movement toward explanatory models not rooted in religious ritual and myth. Therefore, in noting that natural science makes progress by “expelling” the ethical, Gans is making a descriptive claim about the epistemological efficiency of the hard sciences rather than a moral claim absolving them of any and all ethical responsibility to the human community.

    15 This suggestion that the expulsion of ethical considerations from natural science is a descriptive operation, rather than an endorsement of the idea that the pursuit of scientific truth can turn its back without penalty on the human, returns us to Gans’s neat formula, theology is often good anthropology, but nearly always bad cosmology. I will focus this time on the first clause, theology is good anthropology, but I will also venture to suggest the reason for the nearly always at the limit. Theology as the philosophical guardian of religious intuition ought to have a restraining influence not on our questions about the cosmos as object, not even on scientific representation as the human praxis that attempts to discover and organize knowledge about that object, but on the technological implementations of such material possession and appropriation as science makes possible in the real world. Our fear of the mad scientist to this extent is not irrational, but itself scientific and ethical at once. New knowledge of a weapon or a medicine or a technique necessarily entails new ethical consequences disturbing to established moral traditions. Theology is good anthropology in another way: the goal of religion conceived in its minimal form is, we recall, the goal of binding human beings together to remember the originary experience of the communal peace that was made possible by the sign. A minimally “religious” way of thinking respects the moment of transcendence that allowed us to represent and defer our violence not only towards each other but also toward the immanent “object” itself at the origin of the human (our origin). The hard sciences (physics, chemistry, biology) take the natural world as their object of study; cosmology, even though it may take as its object one of “indifferent kind” other than the human and thus not do anthropology, nonetheless ought, as human praxis, to preserve a minimal link to the communal responsibility at the origin of the human if it is to remain “human” in the ethical sense. This obligation to preserve a knowing link to the event of a unique human origin identifies the debt that science, as expressed by and embodied in technology, must forever be paying to religion.(21) But the same debt also begins to mark out the originary ground for the historicity of the seeming irreconcilability of science and religion: the object as sacred object must remain in principle forbidden to appropriation, but as object of science must be accessible to experimentation, handling, some technological “violence.”

    16 So as to that irreconcilability, the object of sacred experience is not permitted to be known in itself as the object of scientific knowledge is taken to be known. The object of scientific knowledge is ultimately desired in order that it may be appropriated, divided, not only desired but also consumed in satisfaction, completely signified and made into an image in significant memory, and so forth. What follows from this tension between the object of sacred experience and the object of scientific knowledge, however, is a binding of human scientists to the origins of their desire for knowledge in the experience of the sacred. Originary science is the result of signification in the mode of desacralization, but the maximally ethical science is that which minimizes the necessary desacralization. The object must be sacred before it can be grasped by a human being as object; if it is not grasped in a narrative that includes that originary sacred moment, that narrative has excluded the human–it is not quite a human being who is doing the grasping. This formula goes some way toward providing an originary model for the much-celebrated awe that scientists themselves profess to feel when inquiring into the mysteries of nature: that awe is a moral experience generated by the scientist’s experience not of the object as a thing detached from human mimesis, but, on the contrary, the scientist’s sense that he or she is first in the community to experience the difference that scientific signification makes in tension with the originary sacred.(22) But at the same time, the implicit prohibition against mad science or evil science may also now be articulated: “mad science” is the human sign in the mode of maximal desacralization of the object, including the maximal desacralization of the “object” we wish to know as the (secret behind the) human person. Those scientists who take the natural world as their special object of desire and knowledge are humans who risk losing their own human-ness if and when they forget the (religious) truth, a truth paradoxically at once cosmological and anthropological, that humans are unique in the cosmos because only they can best be known by minimal anthropological thinking, which is itself ethical thinking. To respect that risk of losing one’s humanity and to assume that minimal responsibility toward other humans is part of what “human being” means, not only morally but also cosmologically. Our emergence as a species in terrestrial and cosmological history was inseparable from an originary experience of the sacrality of the object; but that object is nothing alone, alone the object is neither sacred nor significant, neither capable of desacralization nor condemned to insignificance. If we are to be human, we ought to remind one another that the cosmos signifies or does not signify only because humans (we) are in competition to appropriate it, and remind one another that it will only signify so long as we agree to attribute to it at least a minimal degree of sacred inaccessibility and resistance to appropriation. This is a form of “nature worship” that does no violence to human being, because it prioritizes mimetic respect for the humans who do the worshiping, themselves the most “interesting thing,” to us, in nature anyway.(23) For originary thinking, the cosmos as an object of human knowledge is inseparable from its being an object intended by the ethical self-restraint inherent in originary paradoxical representation.

    17 Understanding this move should help us grasp the radical human-centrist morality at the root of originary thinking as a discipline. For Gans, the ontological principle of the uniqueness of the human is indistinguishably epistemological and ethical.(24) The principle is epistemological in the ways we have already touched upon: anthropology itself must separate the objects of its knowledge, which do not include gravity or salinity or genetic mutation, but do include the sacred, desire, the esthetic, violence, irony and the like (those features which distinguish humans from all other living and inanimate things). The principle is ethical in the sense that our very being as humans is one, at its originary core, with the deferral of violence through (symbolic) representation. But this means that to the extent that the practitioners of the natural sciences deny the uniqueness of the human by reducing it to an “object” in the cosmological sense (think of the “science” of Auschwitz and Hiroshima), they have already destroyed the human by forgetting their own belonging to the human community. The results of their indifference to the human are not, in this sense, the unintended (“objective”) consequences of an epistemological miscalculation but rather the inevitable, perhaps predictable results–predictable at least in the context of the intellectual operations governed by originary thinking–of the originary error produced by their denial of the originary unity and uniqueness of the human. The preservation of our “human being” as cosmological object of knowledge is ontologically dependent on the preservation of our being human as the ontological subject “free,” via the sign and the deferral of violence through representation, of cosmological necessity. Anthropology here comes to include cosmology, because cosmology becomes impossible without anthropology. Of course the cosmos exists apart from us, but it does not exist as significant to us apart from us. The ontology of generative anthropology–which itself is unique, as its object, the human, is unique(25)–is paradoxical in this sense, that the cosmos is indistinguishably intended by the originary human sign as an object of knowledge and indifferent to the human sign as an object of desire. Originary science both discovers and thematizes that indifference of the sacred or scientific object, and it is therefore always moving in the direction of the desacralization and exchangeability of the object. Culture is one: the cosmological is not the anthropological, but the only cosmos we are free to desire and to know is the cosmos we know by way of paradoxical representation (including scientific representation). That is what “cultural universality” means: not that the universe “out there” does not exist and is not objectively real, but simply that the universe “out there” is available to us as humans only as an object of representation; as humans, we are the only species of life known in the universe to be capable of symbolic representation.(26)

    IV. The Originary Sign as Paradoxical, not Instrumental

    18 At this point in our investigation, it seems timely to give more detail about the operation of the sign in the originary scene. “Symbolic reference” and “language” and “the sign” have worked for us at a certain level of generality so far, but if we return the sign to its paradoxical function in the originary event, we might be able better to delimit the uniqueness of the intellectual operations Gans calls generative anthropology. Generative anthropology, he has asserted more than once, can be named only as a “way of thinking.”(27) It is not a social science.(28) It is not a form of “normal science,” as in Thomas Kuhn’s phrase, which could be institutionalized as a professional discipline. It is not a cultural theory.(29) It is not a form of inquiry belonging exclusively to the “humanities” or given to linguistic fetishism. It is not religion.(30) It does, however, require, as all self-reflective intellectual work requires, a minimal leap of faith(31) in the adequacy of our signs to the ever inaccessible object. It does not eschew the notion of spiritual experience.(32) It is not philosophy.(33) It is a way of thinking that returns over and over again to the question of the minimal components of the human and their emergence on the originary scene. Central to the originary hypothesis is the claim that it explains the origin of human language. But there are different descriptions of human language itself. So we pause here, to ask what the sign does. What the originary sign does is also what scientific representation must do. Generative anthropology celebrates and reveals the paradoxicality of the originary sign. The reason that generative anthropology has had to call itself only a “way of thinking” and none of the other things above is not the result of any perverse self-aggrandizing hubris or sloppy arrogance on Gans’s part. It is, on the contrary, the result of a strangely self-effacing attempt to formulate a genuinely new mode of inquiry that serves the uniqueness of the human rather than remaining servile to other forms of scientific and linguistic representation, which tend inevitably to deny or diminish or downplay or denigrate this uniqueness.

    19 With respect to all the sciences and even philosophy itself, Gans suggests that religion has always gotten right the one thing they have gotten wrong, cut adrift as they were from the beginning by the evacuation of the ostensive in Plato’s formulation of the concept: originary representation is paradoxical, so representation and even truth must be paradoxical. The originary sign does not merely point out the object as an object of appetite. Human language is not merely instrumental, and so “scientific representation” that pretends to a purely instrumental knowledge of the whole truth will never be able to account for the human, whether as the object of anthropology or as the object of cosmology, the “hard” sciences.

    20 Indexical pointing out is instrumental language, motivated by hunger, or by fear of danger, or by sexual appetite or the like. Animals point objects out to each other; animals know things about their environment; they learn and teach one another such things. But just as animal appetite is not human desire, the instrumental indexicality of animal sign systems is not the mimetic paradoxicality of human symbolic reference, not least because it is incapable of generating that level of being we call the human, that level of being defined by our self-awareness as language users. Let us return to the minimal originary event. A group of proto-human animals, equipped with sophisticated perceptual systems and memory systems, with the physical apparatus either to make hand gestures or vocal cries or both, with a capacity for mutual imitation, with an intensity in that capacity such that it is conducive to intraspecific conflict in situations of appropriative competition, converges on an object of appetite, let us say a food object. We can picture these protohumans in a circle around this object, equidistant from it. The circle is about to become the first human community, the object is about to become the first object of symbolic reference and nascent sacralizing attention. Now we hypothesize the event. In reaching for this object, their gestures at first only indexical, the animals recognize one another’s gestures toward it as a threat to one another, indicative of the danger each represents to the other. Each has a “natural” appetite for the object, but each also has a “natural” appetite to stay alive, not to get hurt by the others who are as hungry and as excited, as “worked up,” as they are. Now as they recognize each other’s gestures of appropriation pointing toward and pointing out the object, they pause, they abort these gestures, and they study these gestures, fleetingly, briefly, minimally, as things in themselves, seemingly apart from the object, as what we now call signs; but of course the gestures are not apart from the object, they are all about the object, and the protohumans return to focus on the object, which now appears different, appears itself transfigured, more desirable, somehow different than before because it has been pointed out in a new way by the abortive gestures of each, my own, the other’s, the other’s, my own. (I describe this in slow motion; it must have happened very quickly the first time.) This pointing out, this singling out, reinforced by the proto-humans’ mimetic rivalry and their mutually reinforcing imitation each of the other, makes the object itself seem to exude a repellent force (a force which in reality is the result of the paradoxical increased tension and decreased competition occasioned by the pause that the abortive gesture of appropriation brings into existence); the object now seems to have a life of its own. It does: it has the “life” of the transfigured object of the first human sign.

    21 At last the animals converge on this object, divide it, consume it (this is the sparagmos), with great ferocity; but they consume it in a manner more peacefully (and this supplement of peacefulness is minimal too) than that in which they would have consumed it if the pause conferred by the sign had not happened, as an event, had not created a minimal decrease in scenic tension. Now the sign has, yes, we concede, had an “instrumental” function: the sign does not lose its practical indexical function. It was pointing to a real world object all along. But such pointing is not merely an indexical pointing, given the event that has happened. The pointing has–by an “accident” that exceeds natural accident in paradoxically creating originary human purpose–created the first community of specifically human language users. In the context of originary mimetic interaction, the protoparadox of imitation and rivalry, the sign points to the thing in the real world and transfigures that thing into something that exists on a new level of being, the level of being created by its having become an object of human representation, a symbol. The primary characteristic of the paradoxical mimetic symbol, this special sign, is that it creates a new level of being; and the being on that level is human being. After the consumption, something remains in the minimally emergent human minds: they remember the gestures they made, they remember the object as the pause changed it, and they remember the decrease in tension conferred by this tiny little event. That remaining something is enough: it is the trace of the little bang of language, the birth of the human.

    22 In this scenario, the sign is not generated simply to point out the object. The originary sign is not a tool simply for describing “the thing out there.” It is not instrumental with respect to the external reality of the object. On the contrary, the uniquely human sign points out the object only in the context of the paradox of rivalry and imitation. The uniquely human sign points out that, points it out so that, all humans desire it; but all can not have (“appropriate”) the object if all desire it all to themselves; but because they can not have it, they each want it all the more. The originary sign defers the violence inherent in this pragmatic paradox. Because we are the only species to have experienced, to have endured and to have enjoyed, this event, we are the only species that uses symbolic reference. The sign transfigures the cosmological, material object into a mental and spiritual “object” held in the mind of human beings. The ontological status of this object, as represented by humans, is therefore irreversibly different from what it was before it was represented by humans. What generative anthropology calls “the originary protoparadox of mimesis, the antinomy of imitation and rivalry” (SP 63) consists therefore in the process of that qualitatively unique event, irreducible to any material calculus or deterministic model of quantitative computation or molecular, neurological interaction: the event is that the protohumans who imitate each other in gesturing toward the object become rivals because that very mutuality increases the intensity of movement toward the object. That which binds together and makes the same (originary experience of the sacred: imitation of gestures intending to appropriate the resented inaccessible object) is at the same time that which threatens self-annihilation and thus heightens self-consciousness (originary desire: rivalry between those who make the gestures intending to possess the object, increasing awareness of the object as its own “living” sacred thing). Generative anthropology takes as its object all of human and cosmological reality “out there” in so far as the sign impinges upon such reality. But human being is a paradoxical reality, because it is never able to rest between being the one doing the representing and being the one being represented, between process and substance: human being is neither absolute and objective nor relative and subjective, but paradoxical, restlessly between, dynamically open.

    23 Given all of these considerations, it should be no wonder that Gans quietly affirms his position that “a new ontology must be allowed the chance to generate its own methodology” (OT 7). Philosophy, including natural philosophy, is not yet prepared to believe that such an evenemential model can have any value in producing knowledge about the human. But Gans’s decision to place not just indexical or instrumental representation, but paradoxical representation at the origin of the human, leaves him no choice but to model this level of being in the form of an event, however minimally. Thus his thought is not willful iconoclasm toward worldly objects so much as it is a submissively quizzical interrogation of the scene. Representation is not representation of the object alone. The “object alone” is immaterial, inaccessible to and un-representable by the human subject. Genuinely human representation is representation that, in both its communal and collective modes, oscillates: it oscillates between the cosmological as the “scientific” object of the minimally anthropological, and the minimally anthropological as the “scientific” representation of the cosmological that contains (without reducing) the anthropological. Only the originary hypothesis enables us to describe such a paradoxical mode of representing Being and Being represented.

    24 The material, concrete “object alone” is necessarily not an object for humanity alone until it has become an object represented in and by the minimally transcendent mode of originary symbolic reference. This relocation of everything concrete, sensual, “out there” in the natural universe to the other side of the “invisible barrier” of human scenicity is a new way of thinking.(34) That scenicity places our intraspecific violence as the transformative prerequisite to having “access” to the concrete thing out there. The priority of signifying community to significant object remains the most difficult aspect of generative anthropology to grasp for the relentlessly “objective” or empirical scientist who wants a direct, unmediated line to the real–a line imaginable in the terms of the classical subject/object dichotomy of modern philosophy. But the line needs to be refigured as a paradoxical oscillation.

    25 We have thus far in our pursuit of a notion of originary science begun to define it. The task remains to specify the exact “moment” of its emergence in or close to the originary event and, just as importantly, to distinguish originary science from other forms of cognition that precede but do not constitute it. The aim of such distinguishing will take us through four stages of examination: the experience of the sacred; the experience of the esthetic; the sparagmos; the ritual repetition of the originary event. Our focus will be on the different forms of cognition and thematization that are made possible in each successive stage, as the originary human community comes increasingly closer to the material reality of the central object, and increasingly aware of the tension between the experience of the sacred, which contains the necessary evil of sparagmatic violence, and the pattern of free excursion and ritual return, the rhythms of which provide the way to originary signification in the mode of desacralization and exchangeability.

    V. Experience of the Sacred: “Revelation” without Cognition

    26 The cognitive productivity of the “moral” moment of the originary event, that first moment of sacred experience, must be described as a pure revelation which may not even merit the name of cognition. Something is “learned” in originary revelation, but what is learned about the object is (paradoxically) the prohibition against knowing anything about it other than its omnipotent resistance to being known, its inaccessibility to appropriation. The originary sign governs “science” just as its governs any other form of human signifying practice; but science extends that governance into a mode that permits physical contact with the object, sensual knowledge of it, maximal exchangeability of it, its literal deconstruction and reconstruction. The analogy of taking apart and putting back together a mechanical or electronic device may help here: staring at the engine or the television in desiring contemplation, or commanding it to appear in the mode of the magical imperative, will never be the same as naming it in the mode of taking it apart. According to Gans, knowledge is knowledge of the center, by and in the center. A measure of the distance between scientific experience and the experience of the sacred may be taken when we reflect on this claim: “the originary category of the sacred cannot differentiate between the central object and the being of the locus it occupies; [even] religion proper begins when the feast is over, the object has disappeared, and the sign remains in the memory along with the image of its referent” (SP 140) [emphasis added]. This claim implies that although properly human memory is not yet quite operative in originary sacred experience, even such human memory as will “later” be permitted in ritual repetitions of the sacred event will minimize (as much as possible) the individual accessibility of the central object to the whole community, and thus minimize its knowability under forms of scientific representation. In the experience of the sacred, dominated by the de-individualizing force of communally equalizing resentment, we experience the center as “a locus of dispossession” to such an extreme extent that our awareness of our gestures as themselves signs has not even yet undergone the oscillation of the esthetic; originary desire is drowned out and cut off, so to speak, by originary resentment. And again, the success of the ritual repetition of the originary event as a process re-creating a religious experience depends on the strict prohibition of experiences of the privately imagined desirability of the sacred center as a locus open to my occupation (“imaginary possession” as the sine qua non of esthetic oscillation). Fantasies on the periphery of individual appropriation must be sacrificed to an equalization and homogenization of the mental experiences of those on the periphery: if they desire the center, they must desire it equally, which means they must resent the center equally and not begin resenting each other. (The first one to begin showing such desire will be the first to arouse resentment internal to the periphery and thus to question religious truth by betraying a certain preference for “esthetic” experience.)(35)

    27 Therefore, we may claim that the prohibitive, repellent force of the central object experienced as sacred object appears so powerful as to rule out the public expression of even the mere possibility of the imaginary possession of the object. Noteworthy here is the strange fact that originary sacred experience did not even include (yet) the experience of the name of God, because God had not yet been named in our memories as the Being that occupied the center; that naming would be attached to that memory only after the object had been destroyed in the sparagmos and the subsistent Being of the center been separated from the originary experience of the sacred, the memorability of the image fueled by esthetic experience. The experience of the sacred has a stability impossible in that of the esthetic: in the “stable imaginary structure of resentment” we feel ourselves each as only a “self on the periphery [that] is definitively alienated from the desired object” (OT 119). The “force” of the sacred object is conceived as “independent of representation” (OT 118): “Although the sacrality of the center is coeval with the sign that designates it (as the ‘name of God’), it is experienced (‘revealed’) as ontologically prior to the sign, and is therefore independent of the esthetic effect that operates between the sign and the referent” (OT 124).

    28 Now, I do not wish to downplay the world-creating irreversible power of this experience of originary prohibition-as-revelation: it “effects a radical transformation–in fact, a reversal in attitude toward the object, from appetitivity to reverence” (OT 68). Unless we believe in the apocalyptic history-ending fantasies of the most extreme believers in scientism (whose fantasies not coincidentally resemble in their fanaticism those of the most world-denying millennial prophetic cults and the most utopian political extremists), that originary experience of the sacred object remains with us and keeps us human as we were at the origin: “Since we will never know ‘everything,’ there will always be enough mystery in the world to remind us that the representational freedom with which our species began was dependent on sacred certitude” (Gans, “Intelligent Design?”) [emphasis added]. All human freedom is measured against this originary unfreedom, which was at the same time the freedom to become human in the first place by letting the transfigured object become sacred and (eventually) become the first Person. Scientism, given its contempt for mimetic paradox and its faith restricted to de-contextualized experiment and language removed from any scene which would include the memory of originary sacrality, argues for the possibility and desirability of knowing everything about everything. By contrast, the originary experience of the sacred knows only one thing, which opens the possibility of knowing other things one by one, but never “everything”–as long as humans are mimetic and live in communities (where “sharing” and conflict are the facts of life). The originary experience of the sacred knows nothing but resentment of the object, the object as absolute other, not even open to imaginary appropriation. But that knowledge will entail knowledge of other humans and of the sign and (at last) of the object as it has been transformed by others and the sign, made into an object of human desire and human manipulation.

    29 Because of the minimality of this originary knowledge of the sacred, Gans writes of our difficulty of putting ourselves in the place of our first ancestors in this first moment: “We need to be able in principle to discuss the origin of language with its originators, for if no such dialogue were possible, we would face this origin as a natural rather than a human phenomenon. But when we thematize language and equate the origin of the human with that of the object of this thematization, we find it difficult to speak with those whose only theme is the sacred referent” (OT 16; emphasis added). The sacred referent, however much we might thematize it, is not the referent of a scientific investigation. It is untouchable, unknowable, not even able to be thematized beyond its naming and the ineffable experience that accompanies that naming. There is something fundamentally irrational and fundamentally human, at once, about the sacred object when contrasted to the significance-drained “object alone.” Bring into your memory the image of a sacred place you love: the Manhattan skyline, St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, the ruins of the Parthenon, the Mayan ruins at Chichen Itza, the city of Jerusalem, whatever you please.(36) Viewed from the outside–by another human not attached to the place by religious tradition or communal identification–the place is not worth fighting about, it is nothing but a physical structure, interesting perhaps architecturally (the esthetic) or economically (the tourist), but not to be worshipped or protected by violence. Viewed from the communal “inside,” the objectively neutral place is everything, infinitely valuable and worthy of preservation as it is and worth defending to the death if need be from those who would reduce its sacred value to its esthetic value. On a different scale, it is the private sacred as mediated by the erotic that makes a personal daily diary into a sacred text to be kept under lock and key, transforms a brick-and-mortar house into a home, and changes the body of a cohabiting spouse into the incarnation of a loved one. We are unable to explain these experiences in the same way our first ancestors were unable to explain their originary experience of the sacred. None of these phenomena are rationally explicable under any merely physical, chemical, biological, or neurological model.(37) They are explicable only by an anthropological way of thinking that makes space for the category of the sacred; and generative anthropology offers a minimal scientific formulation of that (irrational) category.

    VI. Originary Cognition in Esthetic Experience: The Object Imagined as Separable

    30 Cognition begins with esthetic experience: “But the central locus is where all cognition takes place, and the esthetic is the sine qua non of originary cognition” (OT 125); “Only through the esthetic experience of the center can the object be known in its specificity. This knowledge is not a return to the practical appetitive awareness of the object prior to the scene; the communal context [enforced by the sacred] is constantly reestablished” (OT 126). As we established above in our discussion of the non-instrumentality and non-indexicality of the originary human sign, its mimetic paradoxicality, the sign does not point to the mere object of appetite; it points to the desirable object, its desirability mediated by a group of humans becoming aware of their signifying gestures and their increased awareness of those gestures in themselves. Esthetic experience permits the human self-consciousness of the desirability of the object to come into extended play. Esthetic experience sets up an oscillation between “imaginary possession” and “recognized inviolability”: we imagine possessing the object, which takes us toward a material knowledge of it–the desire to consume it now for its communally mediated significance and (on top of) its appetitive value, not merely for the latter alone. But we also recognize the inaccessibility of the object, the result of its seemingly autonomous sacred force. The signs we use when designating the object as uniquely central make us want to possess the object, but once we focus exclusively on the object and lose sight of our signifying gestures themselves, the object alone without the gesture signifying it becomes in-significant, and that returns us to the sign, and so the process continues. Nevertheless, the minimal internalization in individual minds of the imagined object, the pole of the oscillation named by “imaginary possession,” permits, promotes, produces, the very thing that the resentment-governed experience of the sacred prohibited: contemplation of the object itself as separate from its central locus on the communal scene. This model of cognition is anthropological without being scientific, in that it reproduces the fundamental human (mental) experience of crisis and deferral.

    31 I must quote Eric Gans at some length here.

    But the knowledge provided by this examination [of the object in esthetic experience] cannot thematize the distinction between locus and object. Esthetic knowledge concerns the object not as a member of a category, to be understood according to the Aristotelian formula of species and difference, but as the knowable reality of the center-as-such. The esthetic object cannot be a model in the scientific sense because it can . . . be known [only] insofar as it is revealed in its individuality as an object of desire; in this [not being a model in the scientific sense], it [the “known” esthetic object] is like the idea of God. . . . The esthetic is an anthropological discovery procedure; it permits us to perceive the fundamental principles of human interaction beneath the empirical trappings of social experience.
    (OT 127) [emphasis added]

    There are many consequences to the principle that “originary cognition” is esthetic cognition, consequences for the ethical question of humanly responsible scientific praxis.(38) What I would stress now is that the esthetic prolongs the originary experience of the sign. It is this prolongation of the sign that makes language itself possible; the sacred alone would not have generated human language. The esthetic experience, because it supplements originary resentment with a desire satisfiable only by imaginary possession, is private, internal, and therefore portable. That portable privacy (now only imaginary) is the minimal form of the knowledge-seeking activity that “later,” when linked in memory to the private consumption of individual portions of the divided object in the sparagmos, will drive individual members of the community out into the profane world seeking new beautiful objects to substitute for the originary object of prohibitively sacred desire. Yes, the esthetic effect may well be supported by the sacred even as it supports the sacralization of the object: “the communal context [of morally equalizing, totally resentful center-periphery difference] is constantly reestablished” (OT 126). But the esthetic will later become detachable from the sacred because of its imaginary separation of object from locus. In market society, the mediating power of the experience of secular artworks, themselves portable and exchangeable in a way that ritual commemorations of the communal sacred obviously can not be, will supplant the mediating power of communal sacred experience. Not being bound to ritual repetition is part of what it means to live in modern society, where the freedom of individuals to produce artworks and the freedom to pursue scientific projects tend to be either permitted or restricted as one.(39) The censorship of art usually accompanies the censorship of “science,” because both are modes primarily of peripheral, free, private exchange rather than modes of ritual re-consolidation of the center’s authority.(40)

    32 In the “distinction between locus and object,” then, we have a move toward scientific knowledge of the object that is, nevertheless, not yet science. What is missing is the self-conscious thematization of the substitutability of a different object, the possibility that another object could do just as well, be just as beautiful or desirable: that substitutability is essential to scientific cognition, but not even permitted in the esthetic. Adorers of literature are therefore scared of criticism. This is the anthropological root of the notion that the scientist is “cold” and “heartless” toward his objects, whereas the artist is “warm” and “overflowing with feelings” by contrast: privileging the individuality of the object increases its victimary (sacred) centrality, whereas insisting on its exchangeability decreases its inviolable, precious significance. In esthetic cognition, the object can be revealed “only in its individuality as an object of desire”–meaning its uniqueness is not exchangeable, reproducible, or reducible to its material or analytically detached components. In scientific experimentation and verifiability, on the contrary, the repeatability of the experience of the (sacred) object is the source of the value of the scientific truth: we know something about the object because it appears sufficiently analogous to other objects, “according to the Aristotelian formula of species and difference.” We can put these other analogous objects in the place of the alleged sacred object, and submit them to tests, to get perhaps the same results and find out perhaps something about the original object itself, apart from those who would have “protected” it from our “profane” hands. When we enjoy a meal cooked by a friend during an evening of dinner and conversation, our esthetic knowledge of the meal’s satisfying quality (whether imagined or real) is entirely different from the knowledge we might get from the friend who gives us the recipe, the information we need to cook “the same” dinner at home. It will probably not be the “same dinner,” even if just as “good,” because of what Gans calls “the institutional refractoriness of the esthetic”–the esthetic, unlike the sacred, is an effect that cannot be coerced. The example, nonetheless, illustrates the intimacy of the scientific and the esthetic: that the scientific can make the esthetic available to everybody through economic exchange. First-time esthetic experience cannot be reproduced just as it cannot be coerced. But as, for example, every individual who has escaped and recovered from the illiberal restrictions of a religious fundamentalist upbringing can attest, personal experience of the sacred certainly may be “coerced” by ritual repetition.(41)

    VII. The Sparagmos: “Immediate” Knowledge and Originary Irresponsibility

    33 It should come as no surprise that Gans’s description of the sparagmos, especially the most fully articulated one in the chapter “Originary Violence,” brings us close to what seems like originary science. We have given originary science the description the sign in the mode of originary desacralization. The violence of the sparagmos, with all its reverberations and echoes of resentment and hatred of the central object, with its violent movement toward dissolution of the tensions between word and thing, sign and object, desire and satisfaction, innocent “contemplation” and guilty “appropriation” of the object, seems to invite description as desacralizing. But to let such a description stand would be a big mistake. The originary sparagmos is not a desacralization of the object. On the contrary, it is the sparagmos alone that makes it possible for the community to grasp the object that was once merely a material thing as now an ideal thing, transcendent. The sparagmos is the site of the originary production of the concrete-thing-as-ideal-object. Why is this so? Because only as an effect of sparagmatic violence does the idea and memory of the object detach itself from the concrete, real-world thing and enter the individual minds of individual participants of the scene as the signified. The originary event as posited by the originary hypothesis generates transcendence from immanence, reverence from appetitivity, paradoxical mind from instrumental matter, the anthropological from the cosmological, the level of ideal being that inheres in representation from the level of material being that necessarily escapes representation. The event is not complete until the object has disappeared; the signified is not the referent, but rather is being born only thanks to the sacrificial death of the referent.

    34 Nevertheless, it is with the sparagmos that things begin to happen “in the real world”; and in its pragmatic, appetitive, getting-hands-dirty aspect, the sparagmos permits a form of cognition quite impossible in either the sacred or the esthetic “moments” of the originary event. We know the sacred center as the one Person at the origin; we imagine possessing such Personhood in the experience of the esthetic. But the sparagmos makes that imaginary possession real; the sparagmos permits the category of originary individual personhood: “The personhood of the center as acknowledged by the sign is mimetically reproduced in those who resentfully destroy it. The sparagmos is in the first place an act among persons, the destruction of the originary person by the collectivity of its imitators” (SP 147). The self-consciousness of the sacred is the self-consciousness of the community as one, without individualization. The self-consciousness of the esthetic is that of the imaginary individual of fantasy in tension with the real formal closure made necessary by a human community uniting in the designation of a significant object of desire, an object the real possession of which remains formally (communally) forbidden. But the human individual “comes into his (her) own” (resonant phrase) in the sparagmos: private space is created; the individual will henceforth always be a human individual, bound to the community; but the self-consciousness of the sparagmos is that of real individual possession, the private person’s imagination testing what it wanted against the real, the pragmatic self at last satisfying its “natural” appetites. This self-consciousness, it must never be forgotten, is self-consciousness made possible only by the human sign. No animal experiences this self-consciousness because no animal can represent it to his or her animal self. Appetitive satisfaction of the human kind is not “animal” satisfaction; it is satisfaction inseparable from religious, esthetic, and economic mediation; the object for the human, whether represented in the religious mode or the scientific, is the object transfigured absolutely. Market-hating utopianism aside, it is only the third of these moments–the economic–that completes an originary event that is able to open up the human historical project. It is no surprise that Gans has repeatedly remarked that the discipline of economics, among the social sciences, is the closest to the “hard” natural sciences. (42)

    35 To say that the economic completes the religious and the esthetic is simply to confess to the corporeal, embodied, concrete, appetitive nature of human beings, their famous “animality,” itself a quality of the human about which we never relax, alternately owning and denying, privileging and despising, assimilating it to and evacuating it from our self-definitions. The acquisition of paradoxical representation did not supernaturally vault us from the sphere of the beastly physical into the sphere of the angelic cerebral. The human is both and neither of these at once, not a contradiction-in-terms but an endless borrowing and re-creating, the angelic infusing the beastly and the beastly refusing the angelic and vice-versa. The animality of the human is essential in the sense that an originary signification that did not return us to the cosmological “real world” of objects better equipped to compete in ecological terms with other species and to flourish among our own would have offered no advantage in evolutionary terms, would not have been “selected” for.

    36 To put the economic in third place and seemingly the conclusive narrative position is not, in any case, to suggest that the human can ever fully leave the religious or esthetic behind: any wished-for evacuation of respect for sacrality and beauty from the quest for “truth” could only be a wish of the scientistic mind at its most detached from human community. When humanity loses all contact with its roots in religion, it is no longer humanity–no matter what the recent polemics of Sam Harris (The End of Faith) and Richard Dawkins (Root of all Evil?), understandably upset by the apparent linkages between religious faith-based fundamentalism, terrorism and war, might wish to lead us to believe. For the good of the human community, an at-least-virtual sacrality of the center must persist even in the most “secular” modes of free market exchange, or the consequences are disastrous. A quick digression on the colloquial sense of “economic” helps here. To imagine the threat of an economic world cut off from its anthropological roots in the religious, we may call to mind images of the anti-economic: the financial apocalypse of stock-markets crashing, the scene of street mobs smashing store windows, the total deregulation of the market as its self-destruction: such a vision is, no less than ecological or nuclear catastrophe, a possibility we are reasonable to fear and to wish to defer. It remains the case, however, that reflection on the concreteness of the “economic” helps us get at the latent form of the not-yet-scientific in the sparagmos. The possession and consumption of the value-laden object may count as knowledge of the object, but they do not yet qualify as desacralization and therefore not quite scientific knowledge.

    37 Many things happen in the sparagmos. For one thing, originary economic exchange of valuable things happens. The category of economic value emerges. Under the regime of the purely sacred and esthetic, we had been exchanging signs alone, looking but not touching; in the sparagmos, we exchange real things, real portions of the object itself: “The [accepted] equivalence of portions extends the equivalence of signs into the real, appetitive world and so transforms it. The establishment of formal equivalence between real objects, as opposed to signs, inaugurates the category of value” (OT 52; emphasis added). For another thing, originary “sacrifice” occurs, a collective action of tremendous violence and fury which almost tears the community apart in the tearing-apart of the object. This originary sacrifice is only minimally different from “red in tooth and claw” animal consumption of the object, in that the human sign is associated in the minds of the participants with the portions of the object distributed: a form of minimal rationality appears: “in the sparagmos, the rational appetitive operation of dividing the object is supplemented by the violent discharge of this tension [between center and periphery] in what is also a defiguration, a destruction of the very formal-esthetic closure that was imitated in the transformation of the appropriate gesture of the sign” (SP 135). For another thing, the separation and absence that is the source of the idea of God (not yet the idea itself) appears: “But, upon its division, the central object loses its unbreakable attachment to the center and becomes in its separate parts subject to valuation. At the same time, the division of the object reveals the independence of the permanent center-as-such from its temporary material occupant . . . this [separation] is the source of the idea of God, as opposed to the undifferentiated concept of the sacred” (OT 53). This opening between centrality-as-such and the material occupant of the center as preserved in “significant memory” will prove crucial in our locating the emergence of originary science. There can be no (eventual) “real”–that is, communally witnessed–desacralization of central Being except as a possibility opened up by this originary “imaginary” separation of Being and beings. We learn in the sparagmos the difference between the Being of the sacred center as such and the mere material occupant of the center: “Being becomes beings in the sparagmos . . . the inextricably appetitive-cum-resentful division of the central object among its participants . . . sends originary humanity back to its worldly concerns from the otherworldly unity obtained during their deferral” (SP 95). I note in passing the link between “worldly concerns” and scientific representation. All of these happenings bring us far closer to knowledge of the object itself than we were with the prohibitively unfree experience of the sacred object or the oscillatory and purely imaginary experience of the esthetic object.

    38 The link between this originary evil violence and the religious myth of the “fall of man,” the separation of Divine from human, is also a step toward originary science. Let me describe these points of contact. The one body of the sacred victim-object is the “literal” model for moral unity, the sacred one Other of the originary human community. Gans explicitly links the fury of the sparagmos to the numberless myths of the “fall” of humankind: “But if the origin of the ethical is only minimally moral, then it is maximally immoral. The violence of the sparagmos makes it the origin of evil; the first collective act is the ‘fall of man’” (SP 142). We have noted the tremendous violence of the sparagmos, the fury of the literal deconstruction of the body of the object-victim, the minimality of the “co-operation” the “distribution” enacts–which would, let us frankly confess, in our violence-sensitive postmodern ethic, look to us from the outside more like chaotic animal savagery than human social order. The minimal “difference” from animal savagery is, we see again, only and no more than the minimal difference made possible by the originary sign.(43) The first material knowledge of the object, although only knowledge of a piece of the object-experienced-as-sacred and esthetic, is a knowledge in which the unified communal sacred resentment is almost totally “forgotten.”

    The sparagmos offers to the violent imaginings of originary resentment a partial but real fulfillment. The individual participates in the de-figuration, the destruction of the formal wholeness of the worshiped object. In so doing, he loses himself in the collectivity, where his violent action is “irresponsible,” not observed and judged by his fellows. But at the same time, while in this “invisible” condition, the participant acquires a portion of the victim, from which he obtains not only appetitive satisfaction but also the originary notion of personal property. The sparagmos creates the private individual by effacing the public visibility of his action and its results, in contrast to that of the original (aborted) gesture of appropriation. (SP 145)

    The sacred moment maximizes the public visibility of each individual’s signifying gesture, but the sign is then without material value; by contrast, the sparagmatic moment minimizes the public visibility of each individual’s signifying gestures, but the “thing” or portion of the object now becomes economically valuable, and its concreteness threatens to substitute altogether for its quality as the thing-sacred-and-significant. Thus the “animality” of the sparagmos is not coincidentally linked to its “evil,” in that the return to immanence of appetite threatens to destroy the verticality of signification achieved by the originary sign. The sparagmos is the act of originary evil; human irresponsibility and evil are linked: “The sparagmos, in which the exercise of violence toward the sacred center is accompanied by the denial of individual responsibility for this violence, is the model for all acts of evil, both collective and individual” (SP 145). I pause to distinguish collective from individual responsibility. The “collective” failure of responsibility consists in the threat of our forgetting the experience of the object as sacred, permitting the whole community to destroy the whole object, one humanity opposed to one Divine Being. The “individual” irresponsibility consists in the threat of one individual person’s forgetting the esthetic experience mediated by others’ and one’s own signifying gestures. The memory of the experience of the object as desirable-but-inaccessible is potentially overwhelmed by the distracting physiological satisfaction of consumption.

    39 Originary resentment, in both its sacralizing the object and its giving rise to the object’s esthetic desirability-in-inaccessibility, allows in the sign “the alienation of his freedom to the center” by means of which the “individual participant begins to become responsible for his act toward the community” (SP 146) [emphasis added]. Our signifying the object-as-sacred creates the possibility of communal moral responsibility, but only begins it: the individual “begins to become responsible.” This beginning with the signification of the object-as-sacred finds its completion only in the sparagmos, with the experience of the object-as-known-in-consumption, the object of economic value. The human signifying of otherworldly absolute Good has become the human production of worldly “good,” relative, exchangeable, measurable. The private experience of the object as economic threatens to obliterate the memory of the communal experience of the object as sacred. The relative loss of the memory of the sacred object, however, is supplemented by the minimal fiction of nascent self-understanding, the little awareness that sacrality is perhaps not inherent in the central object alone: “The alienation of responsibility to the center that gives rise to evil is at the same time a movement toward self-understanding. The evil of originary resentment is the price man pays for a first glimmer of lucidity, for eating of the tree of knowledge” (SP 146) [emphasis added]. The knowledge of the otherworldly “good” object-as-transcendent could not have come about without our this-worldly knowledge of our own “evil” mimetic resentment of it, in its immanent concreteness. The knowledge of the transcendent could not have come about without the self-consciousness of a newly significant, valuable immanence. At the sacred “moment” the object of desire and knowledge is truly “beyond” us. In the context of the event as a whole, which (thank God) includes the economic, we come to know ourselves even if at the “price” of knowing the victimary status of the central Being (because we have torn it apart).

    40 Knowledge of the one whom we later come to call “God” means that we incur eternal guilt. That “price”–our debt to God–is why God seems all “good” and we as wildly distracted humans seem all “evil” at the origin, why the fall is the fall and not the ascension, why an unrestrained dream of human perfection without a memory of God is not “realistic” and must end in despair, why attempting to really be God is a logical, theological, and anthropological perversity. At the same time, any despair we might suffer at the cold truth of our eternally necessary moral imperfection permits hope in that, although it will always be impossible for us to be “good” in the sense of maximally moral and absolutely communal beings (only God can be so, only God is Not us),(44) it will certainly be possible for us to be “good” in the sense of minimally moral and relatively ethical beings. The “beastly” economic world, the real world of everyday human interaction, always undercuts the angelic aspirations of those devoted to the ritually-compact religious world, where an artificial human “sacred” equality can be punctually re-produced.(45) The moral is the realm of the communal, of the center-oriented gathering of public individuals who are determined primarily to defer appropriation of the object, to agree together on respecting that which is already held or known as valuable, elevating its significance by leaving it alone, contemplating it. By contrast, the ethical is the realm of the collective, of the center-forgetting loosely peripheral gathering of private individuals who wish to engage in economic exchange of the already-appropriated object, and who agree on the value not of the object as whole and untouchable but rather on the value of the object as open to consumption, and subject to the “concrete” knowledge that alone makes it consumable: the knowledge of it as not-sacred, not-beyond, not untouchable, but here and now and exchangeable, (minimally) desacralized. (It always hurts to exchange something sacred: taking the sentimentally valued family jewelry to the pawn shop is a small tragedy.)

    41 What follows from this, a fact with important implications for our attempt to locate originary science, is that there is a certain danger to the community in the originary sparagmos. The violent intensity of unleashed resentment, mixing with animal appetite, appears to threaten a return to pre-human appetitive animality: “In ending the deferral initiated by the sign, in lifting the moral inhibition on the aim of the originary appropriative gesture, the sparagmos opens the space of the ethical. In this collective rather than communal action, the symmetrical concern for one’s fellows that characterized the moment of signification has been replaced by a violent concentration on the object in an undifferentiated context of resentment and appetite” (SP 150–51) [emphasis added]. The indifferentiation must meet with a minimal limit, however, or we do in fact return to animality and lose our humanity.

    42 What is that limit? It is the memory of the whole scene, which includes the experiences of the sacred and the esthetic, those experiences which preceded the economic and which the economic almost obliterated. Here we may quote Gans at length on the originary usurper, who must be the model for the originary “scientist”:

    The criminal’s isolation is that of the individual usurper of the center. The origin of social differentiation is the act of such a usurper . . . and this breach of originary equality, socialist utopias to the contrary, can never be healed. The human usurpation of the center–and the “mature” form of resentment that follows it–had already been anticipated in the unconsciously controlled anarchy of the sparagmos.
    (SP 151) [emphasis added]

    I would suggest that the curious phrase “unconsciously controlled anarchy” constitutes a site for some originary thinking about originary thinking. There is first the paradoxical notion that the essential “control” which preserves the human community from a chaos of self-destroying usurpers is unconscious. “Control” presumably connotes an operation that includes deliberation, is not deliberate but “unconscious.” Now given generative anthropology’s faith in science, I do not expect that we can attribute the “control” to the God of the creationists or the God of the proponents of Intelligent design. Who or what is doing the controlling, then, and in what sense this control is “unconscious,” require specification. Further, there is the paradoxical union of “controlled anarchy” as such, regardless of the end characterization as “unconscious.” “Unconsciously controlled anarchy”: is anarchy itself not that which is not controllable? If a form of anarchy can be controlled, does it still qualify as “anarchy”? If control is “unconscious,” is it still “control”? The phrase is loaded, overloaded, but still strangely evocative. I would add in passing that we might think of this “unconsciously controlled anarchy” as the point where Eric Gans gets as close as he ever will to a similar point in Rene Girard’s thought. It is the point at which Girard disavows the priority of the human sign and grounds human significance in gestures toward interventions of a fideistic theological cast.(46) This is the point of maximal “indifferentiation” not expressible in or by human language, sound and fury signifying (almost) nothing, the point out of which “the human” must emerge, or into which it will disappear, consumed by its own significance-abolishing mimetic violence.

    43 For originary thinking, however, what comes to ground significance in general, and the significance of generative anthropology itself, is nothing more mysterious than our mysterious possession of human language on the scene of origin–not the sign alone, not the signified alone, not the referent alone–rather, human language as a paradoxical and scenic phenomenon. I will venture to re-name this “unconscious control” as “originary memory,” that first human memory which we all share with one another as beings capable of using the uniquely human sign. It is the unconsciously held memory of the configuration of the scene, the minimal memory of mimetic interactivity, that functions as an equivalent to the “unconscious control.” Again, this formulation stands on a cliff looking out to the ocean of the theological, but stands there. We know what we know, but may never be certain that God gave this knowledge to us. Gans’s originary hypothesis is there to suggest to us that that the scenicity of human language certainly exists in our minds, so we need not invoke the cosmological correlate of what seemingly exists on the scene–the mind of God–to guarantee for us what we know, with a little introspection and faith in one another’s language, know already to be an infinitely valuable truth. The “materiality” of the central object having now been destroyed in the sparagmos, and the communal effect of religious and esthetic experience having all but disappeared in the violence of originary consumption, what remains is originary memory: it is originary memory that we take out into the “profane” world from which scientific representation will emerge; it is originary memory that survives and recalls the “unconsciously controlled anarchy” of the sparagmos.

    VIII. From Originary Memory to Originary Desacralization

    44 My exposition of all these moments, perhaps more detailed than it needs to be for those intimate with Gans’s oeuvre, has been presented in order to bring out certain tensions between the status of the “object” in the originary event according to which “moment” in the originary event we are reflecting on. Originary science can not have emerged in the originary event itself, although the latent possibility of it was there in the sparagmos most clearly. So far, I have been attempting to draw out, by means of slow-motion distinctions, the way in which the possibility of the scientific representation of the object is impossible in the “sacred” moment’s union of object and central locus, opened up as a possibility in the “esthetic” moment’s imaginary (but only imaginary) separation of object from locus, and all but fulfilled in the richly concrete, properly individualizing, contact-heavy moment of the sparagmos. But I propose that it is only with history, with the ritual re-enactment of the originary event, that we can speak of originary science. “Science” must nourish and sustain the movement outward and away from the restrictive effects of sacred prohibition against object knowledge. “Science” itself can begin only with the community’s return to the scene of ritual, and the concrete replacement of the originary object with another object, and the tensions implicit in that substitution. Perhaps science is not, then, strictly speaking, originary; perhaps the “scientific” as an anthropological category must be contained by the “economic.” What happens to the originary event if, to complete it, we must return to it as if it were incomplete the first time? Our principle of minimality would not then be respected. I defer these questions to the reader, as matters for “future research.” Regardless, another set of elaborations will help us.

    45 There are possibilities for tension in the substitutionary re-incarnation of the sacred object in ritual repetitions of the originary event. But first, I wish to avoid the error of supposing that the object in itself is sacred or significant. It is not, apart from the scene. That mysterious thing which mediates the “unconsciously controlled anarchy” of the sparagmos is not the memory of a particular object alone, or a particular image alone, or a particular signifier or signified alone, but all of these together. It must be the memory of the form of the paradoxical center-periphery oscillation or, in other words, the scene as evoked by the sign in significant memory. What I have called “originary memory” is that which not only mediates the “unconsciously controlled anarchy” of the sparagmos, but alsomediates the passage between the originary event and its first historical repetitions in ritual. “Science” belongs to the realm of our historicity rather than belonging to the necessity of that one cosmological event which made all the difference in creating the possibility of our historicity: it is in the difference between those forms of belonging that the eternal tension between “science” and “religion,” or scientific representations of the scene of origin and religious representations of the scene of origin, uneasily persists, driving us out into the world of indifferent objects and back into the ethical realm of human exchange, out and back, out and back.

    46 Originary memory, in keeping with the individualizing effect of the sparagmos, belongs primarily to the memory of individual participants on the scene. There is no vaporously invisible collective unconscious for generative anthropology, but there is the reality of collective human memory conceived as the sum-total of the mutually respectful memories of individual participants whose recall of the event is mediated by the perceptible human sign: “Attachment to the subsistent center of the scene is reinforced by the collective action of ritual, but the primary locus of this subsistence is the internal scene of representation of the individual participants, where the post-sparagmatic signified remains as the ultimate correlate of the sign” (SP 137). I believe that we remain faithful to this formulation if we name as “originary memory” that remaining of the “post-sparagmatic signified” on the “internal scene of representation” in the interval between the event and its first ritual repetitions. Indeed, let me emphasize again, this memory is the post-event equivalent of that minimal subsisting anarchy-controlling “unconscious” memory which accompanied the “forgetting” during the sparagmos of the sacred force of the object: “The participants who approach and dismember the object act as a community only in the minimal sense that they are bound together by the memory of the sign; this minimum of virtual solidarity, consonant with the parsimony of our hypothesis of origin, is just sufficient to permit them to survive the sparagmos” (SP 142) [emphasis added]. I note in passing the echo of “re-ligio” in “bound together”: collective memory is doing the work of religious ritual in the absence of any individual consciousness, significant thematization or mythic elaboration of the almost-totally-forgotten sacred experience. Another formulation of originary memory reads thus: “The participants in the sparagmos, in seeking to destroy the center itself, attain only its material occupant; their intent is frustrated by the persistence of the sign and the significant memory that guarantees it” (SP 149) [emphasis added]. Note again how–curiously–the sign “persists” as if such persistence were something almost against the will of the consuming selves in the sparagmos. Elsewhere, Gans writes that it is the “crucial function of maintaining in memory the imageless sign” that belongs to religion rather than to the esthetic. The esthetic insists on the image as accompaniment to memory: “religion proper begins when . . . the object has disappeared, and the sign remains in memory along with the image of its referent” (SP 140) [emphasis added]. I would point out in this formulation the distinction implied by detachment of the image from the sign. There is the memory of the signifying gesture as itself an object of attention, the memory of the sign-that-evokes-the-object; then there is the mental image, as that which, contained in “significant memory,” recalls a perceptual trace of the transfigured real-world object (as distinct from the signifying gesture). The remembered mental image recalled by the sign recalls the object-as-referent; the memory of the signifying gesture as itself an object of attention recalls the “whole” scene.

    47 Also during the human community’s long evolution through the generative unfolding of speech acts of increasing complexity and freedom, originary memory plays an essential role. There would be no opening to the imperative, interrogative, or declarative forms of human language were it not for originary memory. The emergence of the imperative as a thematization of the inappropriate ostensive (the presence-in-memory of the object that is absent-in-reality) relies on originary memory. Human memory is paradoxical here again, like the sign: “not merely the presence of the referent, but its perceived absence provokes the sign as an expression of desire” (SP 145). Such an oxymoronic “perceived absence” can only be a function of the originary memory of the sign-provoked image itself, the sign recalling the mental image of the object. The imperative form moves us away from the “real world” in which the object is absent and toward that “fictional world” of the declarative which can make the object endlessly present (as in fictional narrative). More explicitly, in the “paradoxical oscillation between the falsity and the truth of the inappropriate ostensive” there occurs the pragmatic paradox that “forces the thematization of the distinction between absence and presence” (SP 55). That is a thematization which itself must depend on originary memory prior to the emergence of declarative language.

    48 With the emergence of the declarative and the possibilities of predication and conceptualization that accompany the declarative (without which “natural philosophy” and modern science could never have come to be), originary memory can become, so to speak, a world unto itself: the postsparagmatic signified as a subject of predicative sentences can become the Divine Creator God who is the subject of narratives, of mythical elaboration. But the declarative is from another perspective only the full realization of the possibilities implicit in the originary memory of the context. It is only the context of the whole scene as that which contains the sacred object while opening up the possibility of sparagmatic and hence “scientific” knowledge of it, that permits the “virtual” reality of an imagination independent-of-ritual: “The sign can only signify in context; but the taking into memory of the context along with the sign makes the sign potentially independent of the context. Similarly, the originary community to whom the sign is addressed has existed only under these specific circumstances, but it retains its virtual existence in their absence” (OT 17) [emphasis added]. Originary memory is that which permits the “virtual” community to continue to exist after the “specific circumstances” of real-world conditions and physically present objects have vanished. Originary memory sustains us between the originary event and its first historical re-enactments in religious ritual, for which we find new objects to replace the originary object. The “potential” of the sign’s being “potentially independent of the context” is fully liberated only when the declarative permits for the individual minds “out there” in the profane world (out there in an area free of ritual prohibition), the staging of their own fictional worlds: “This potentiality is . . . realized [only] with the emergence of the declarative utterance-form, where language becomes the source of context-free models of reality” (OT 17). In short, I am suggesting that the “taking into memory of the context along with the sign” under the elementary ostensive and imperative forms evolves into the construction of “context-free models of reality” with the declarative’s emergence. With the world-changing declarative utterance, the human being is freed to make hypotheses about reality that may be understood without one’s being required to verify them–the world of meaningful but non-verifiable fictions emerges as the precursor of the world of verifiable scientific truths. This universe-altering liberation from the pressure for immediate confirmation of the presence of the signified or remembered object in the proximate environment, a pressure which must have been a severe constraint on the imagination itself (for us, an almost unthinkable constraint), is a momentous liberation indeed. It was, however, latent in originary memory even under the rule of ostensive and imperative signification.

    49 For we do not have to wait for the declarative to have science. Originary science must be present in, or near, the originary event of ostensive signifying, millennia before “sentences” are formed. In The Origin of Language (1981), Gans described the substitutionary replacement of the originary object under the heading of the “lowering of the threshold of significance.” The chapter “The Origin of Signification” in Signs of Paradox (1997) treated roughly the same process of the opening up of language to lexical diversification and the opening up of the human world to the world of natural objects, to consumption of them and knowledge about them. It would, I admit, be unfair to attribute to Gans himself any explicit description of post-originary signification as desacralization or as an activity the primary function of which is to produce “information” about the real-world object. On the contrary, all the emphasis by Gans is thrown–appropriately–on the power of the ritual context to minimize any destabilizing effects that the bringing of new objects onto the scene of representation might entail. Thus we read this in The Origin of Language, a description, I remind the reader, not of the originary event but of its first historical repetitions in nascent ritual:

    The placing of a new object at the center of attention attributes to it a situational equivalent of the “power” of the [originary] sacred object to compel the attention of the interlocutor. It is this analogous attribution of “power” to the object that differentiates the ostensive from the mere signal expressing instinctual interest. The verifiability of the ostensive covers not only the presence of the object but this power, which is to say, its significance. Because we may assume that instinctive signals have a predetermined physiological threshold of activation, the obvious point of insertion of ostensives is just below this threshold, where the referent is perceived and judged to be potentially significant. Evocation of the presence of the community in the absence of a sufficiently “powerful” object being in effect the equivalent of a return to a state of unreconciled mimetic crisis, with the locutor in the asymmetric and therefore vulnerable role of the victim, we must assume that the instinctual threshold was lowered only very gradually. (OL 77; emphasis added)

    I have italicized “verifiability” and “analogous” to suggest spaces in which there is tension between originary object and new object, tension that will have to be mediated by the space of elasticity or freedom provided by originary memory. Gans has in fact more than hinted at such tension. One space of tension, as we have seen, is that between the originary “usurper” whose proximity to the newpossibly-sacred substitute object and to the object itself risks his being victimized by the community (the usurper as metonym of the new object he introduces). The other space of tension is the yes or no of the “analogy” the members of the community may or may not be prepared to draw–relying on originary memory of the image-of-the-object as I have outlined it above–between the new and the original object. Inasmuch as originary memory reproduces a memory of the whole scene and the whole event, all forces tend toward the community’s peaceful acceptance of the new object: the usurper wishes to minimize the risk of violence to himself, and the community wishes to minimize the risk to itself. An object as close in “image” as possible to the original object must be the most appropriate object, because an object as close in “image” as possible to the original object would risk the least disassociation between originary event and ritual repetition, between the “image” in originary memory and its possible re-presentation in a new object of economic value. What I contend, however, is that the “conservative” minimalization of the difference between objects is not a guarantee of the absolute preservation of the sacrality of the original object, but rather a measure of the minimality of originary desacralization: the minimality of “originary science.” That originary science is the sign in the mode of a minimal desacralization is precisely what we should expect. The other imperative, however, is maximal exchangeability: and the new object, to be exchangeable, must be permitted to be different, to have differential significance. Originary science pays intense, almost total respect to religious imperatives. It is no one other than the originary scientific “usurper” who asks the community to exchange this new, “real” object for the old, remembered, now less “real” object, which risks losing some of its sacred power as the necessary consequence of the differential information being created. The new object will not be the same object; therefore, it must present a minimal threat to communal solidarity. Therefore, when Gans writes of the original sign being “applied to a referent other than the original one” he includes the notion of a “diminution of intensity” in the sign itself. The scientific, I suggest, has there with that “diminution” taken a little bit away from the sacred. Nor should we be surprised that the originary meeting of the sacred and profane occurs with the usurper’s production of differential information: “This first differentiation would create a two-place hierarchy of signs constitutive of the opposition between sacred and profane representations” (79). The first “profane” representation may be considered the first “scientific” representation.

    50 It is well worth comparing these passages from The Origin of Language (1981) to topically related passages from “The Origin of Signification,” a chapter in Signs of Paradox (1997). I repeat that the sacred force of the object is in fact the result of scenic interaction: “The central object is remembered through the image, but the image masks the real source of significance, which is not the object but the total configuration of the scene, held together by mimetic tension between center and periphery” (SP 141) [emphasis added]. Only from the “total configuration of the scene” does the object get its sacred power. I am not proposing a new mysticism of context-free “real objects” that we can smuggle onto the originary scene. What I am attempting to underline is the tension between, at one moment, what is in “conservative” memory the image of the originary sacred central object, and, at the same moment of deliberate repetition, the potentially disturbing and destabilizing differential information conveyed by the non-identical new object presented to the ritual participants by the originary “scientist.” Originary memory must have wrestled with such distinctions. The “mimetic tension” above is not only “holding together” the scene but threatening to push it apart, from the point of view of the usurper bringing something new to the community and from the point of view of the community. It is the priority of desire over cognition, understood as communal desire for stability over individual cognition of potential difference, which makes for the reciprocal vulnerability of center and periphery whenever the usurper imports via scientific representation potentially valuable new knowledge of the natural world onto the sacred scene. The potential difference makes the “religious” community vulnerable to the usurper’s production; but equally, it makes the “scientific” usurper vulnerable to the reprisals of the image-attached religious community.

    51 In this formulation, then, we must acknowledge that religion and the esthetic remain in different ways bound to the figure and the image as pre-established and cognitively conservative forces. It is one thing to emphasize the indispensable power of religion to restore an awareness of our spiritual interdependence with other human beings and our universalizing communal “duty” to humanity as such. It is another thing to admit, as one must, that religion and the esthetic both are tied to a fixation on the already-established sacred or beautiful object or image. Religion and the esthetic both get in the way of the “scientific” usurper’s legitimate, indeed often quite necessary (especially in times of hardship and economic stasis), desire for knowledge of the new object, the object not-yet-assimilated to the sacred or the beautiful. It is religion in this role as violent defender of the institutional resistance to the “arbitrariness of the sign” and religion in its insistence that the “materiality” of the sign is tied to its “referent” that thinking must struggle against (SP 96; and see just below). As itself a descendant of originary science, generative anthropology conceived as the organized collective results of originary thinking stretches itself to the limit of its tie to merely religious intuition and allies itself with scientific representation inasmuch as it thinks “beyond” sacred and esthetic significations to “Being” on its own,(47) reconstructing and deconstructing Being to beings and back again. Scientific representation in this mode is the thinking that attempts to grasp the paradoxical interactivity of the scene without a pre-ordained allegiance to any one image or figure of sacred, esthetic, or economic value.

    52 Originary thinking, like originary science, itself is willing, like the usurper whose new object produces “differential information,” to leave sacralizing figural representation behind–when necessary–to move toward and to include the minimal hypothetical results of valuable new information. Originary thinking stands strangely outside the scene it hypothesizes, in the role of the first usurper of divine knowledge. Here is Gans in the chapter “Originary Being, Originary Thinking” describing the activity of those who would attempt to practice generative anthropology. The terms of that activity can not readily be translated into an intellectual operation under the model of “cultural” practice, but fit rather better with a model of scientific representation, which offers to the marketplace of ideas an hypothesis that might make a difference on the scene of culture. The scene of culture itself needs to get paradoxically beyond “culture” into a new way of thinking that produces a genuinely new object of knowledge, the human as event:

    Thinking reduces “outward” to “inward” form, visible to invisible; it struggles to maintain the fundamental arbitrariness of the sign in opposition to the cultural institutions, ritual and esthetic, that would take advantage of the sign’s materiality in order to motivate its relationship with its referent. Where the sign minimally re-presents the formal closure of the object, thinking prolongs representation into analysis. Originary signification defers the sparagmos, but thinking is the antisparagmos that reunites the object’s scattered remains, recomposing Being from beings. (SP 96) [emphasis added]

    In its detachment from, nay, struggle against, any tendency to “take advantage of the sign’s materiality” and thereby make of the image, the figure, the referent, the sacred or beautiful already-established thing an obstacle to originary analysis, those who do originary analysis take as their model the first historical and scientific usurper who had the risk-bearing courage to bring a new object onto the scene of representation. Originary thinking knows better than to dream of destroying the scene of representation. It has no desire to usurp the center for itself. On the contrary, the effect of originary thinking is to create and sustain our collective human awareness of the scene of representation. It aims to make the scenic event of human origin infinitely exchangeable as a sign, accessible to everybody as an object of knowledge and desire.(48) Inasmuch as the purpose of originary “science” here converges with the purpose of originary “religion”–the human acquisition of secular differential knowledge making its peace with the sacred necessity of the human deferral of violence through representation–the scene contains its own self-generation.

    53 It is possible for us to grasp originary science now, only because science in the postmodern era has become the detested object of such near-universal resentment. Auschwitz and Hiroshima made us aware as never before of the power of scientific representation to destroy human significance on two fronts. The “medicine” of Auschwitz presents the model of what happens when, for the scientist, human beings bearing their own bodies are submitted to a sacrificial violence which attempts to exceed itself by being not sacrificial at all, exceeding the scenic commemoration that had inhered in all sacrifices prior to it: “the horror of the camps is their scenelessness. . . . This destruction was not intended to be exemplary, to play out a sacrificial drama in which the executioner is in complicity with his victim, but simply to be effective, to remove a certain figure from the scene” (SP 164). Hiroshima and Nagasaki, their human victims no less to be mourned, present the model of what happens when, for the scientist, the forces of the natural world may be turned perversely against that world in a mode of ecological annihilation that entails greatly increased risks of human self-annihilation: “Its intent [evil’s intent] is to destroy the scene of culture . . .. [evil] depends on what it seeks to annihilate, but its failure in reality is the result not of internal logic but of insufficient means. The postmodern era begins at the moment in which we realize that the means are indeed available” (SP 163 [emphasis added]). Following up on these remarks, we may notice that it is only because we have become aware of modern science in its fearsome mode of a maximal desacralization and minimal exchangeability (“mad” science),(49) that we can now venture the hypothetical model of a “good” originary science as the sign in the mode of a minimal desacralization and a maximal exchangeability.(50) To sacrifice science altogether to the apprehensions of our postmodern “sense” of its terrifying dangerousness would be, however, to waste it–to waste the very knowledge these horrors of Auschwitz and Hiroshima have produced. Just as the denunciation of violence is not its overcoming, the resentment of science is not its overcoming. That we know how in-human science may become should inspire us only to be more vigilant about making scientific practice remain human, making it remain respectful of our shared ethical unity in the scientifically-knowable originary event. Any return to irrational fundamentalism, whether of the neo-primitive environmentalist, bibliolatry-inclined religious, or doctrinaire scientistic variety, would be an unfortunate turning away–a turning away from the minimal faith in that opening to the continuation of omnicentric human history that generative anthropology, itself an originary science, recommends.

    Acknowledgements

    I wish to thank Richard Van Oort, Christopher Morrissey and Pablo Bandera for their collegiality and friendship as members of Sparagmos! The Vancouver GA Group over the last few years. They have, with patience and good nature, helped me with “originary thinking” far more than they will ever know. I thank Adam Katz for questions on my paper “Accusations of Playing God and the Anthropological Idea of God,” forthcoming in a collection of essays he has edited, The Originary Hypothesis: A Minimal Proposal for Humanistic Inquiry (Davies Group Publishing 2007). I am indebted to Adam Katz especially for the invaluable direction that I should try to think of “science as a kind of sign” and for seconding my intuition that it would be located somewhere near the sparagmos. I am grateful to Andrew McKenna and Ian Dennis for encouragement and questions regarding earlier stages of my research into Frankenstein prepared for the COV&R 2005 conference in Koblenz, Germany.

    Notes

    1. See Originary Thinking (1993), 130. I will be referring to Gans’s major works usually with the following parenthetical abbreviations: OL for The Origin of Language (1981); EC for The End of Culture(1985); SF for Science and Faith (1990); OT for Originary Thinking (1993); SP for Signs of Paradox (1997). Chron. will be used as the abbreviation for Chronicles of Love and Resentment. (back)

    2. In Seymour Chatman’s narratological sense of “story” as opposed to “discourse.” See Chatman (1978). (back)

    3. In this context, I am using the word “myth” as Chris Baldick does: “In myths, the essential ‘story’–corresponding to Aristotle’s mythos, or basic action–is a more economical and malleable thing that the elaborately plotted and sub-plotted narrative which we expect to find in a novel. Most myths, in literate societies at least, prolong their lives not by being retold at great length, but by being alluded to, thereby finding fresh contexts and applications” (3). It will eventually become obvious that I concur with Baldick’s claim that the Frankenstein myth “explores the godless world of specifically modern freedoms and responsibilities. The myth . . . turns repeatedly upon [the] new problems of an age in which humanity seizes responsibility for re-creating the world, for violently reshaping its natural environment and its inherited social and political forms, for remaking itself” (5). I disagree, however, with Baldick’s decision to follow the herd in arguing that “The relationship between Frankenstein and his monster is modelled ultimately upon that between parent and child” (8). George Levine’s use of “myth” (1979) is also close to the use of the term here. (back)

    4. For the anthropological opposition between market exchange and “good shows,” between the omnicentric pragmatism of market exchange itself and the more limited pragmatic value of the esthetic catharsis in “good shows,” see the Chronicle of Love and Resentment titled “Culture against the Market.” (back)

    5. I make the assumption here that cultural stability in modern societies depends on a general respect for the scientific method and its revelatory institutions. (back)

    6. In the words of Roslynn Haynes: “Frankenstein has become an archetype in his own right, universally referred to and providing the dominant image of the scientist in twentieth-century fiction and film . . . his name . . . synonymous with any experiment out of control” (From Faust to Strangelove 92) [emphasis added]. (back)

    7. “After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it became increasingly difficult to portray scientists as necessarily having both the power and the morality to become world saviors and lead humanity to a glorious future. In America, moreover, there was the morally awkward fact that former German scientists, some of whom had been prominent Nazis, were welcomed into the national pantheon of missiles-research scientists to boost the U.S. cold war effort” (Haynes 176). (back)

    8. Richard Van Oort: “The object existed before and continues to exist after the sign has been created. Language originates as the transcendence of material reality, but it does not abolish it. The symbolic representation of the appetitive object leads to the reality of its eventual material distribution.” From “Science and Culture,” Chron. 45 (1 June 1996). (back)

    9. From “A GA Conversation”: “A sociobiologist might protest that our common values are the result of evolutionary adaptation. This is certainly true; it is even a truism. But what is missing in the biological approach to culture is… culture itself. If we had “instincts” to enforce morality, why would we need language and rules to do so?” (“A GA Conversation [III].”) Thus Richard Van Oort, in the same column: “Since our claim is that the human world is irreducible to the empirical world of biology, the burden of the argument lies with us–indeed with all those in the humanities to agree on a set of minimal principles that defines this anthropological content.” Chron. 76 (18 January 1997). Richard Van Oort again: “Culture–humanity–begins where biology ends. In the moment where the urge for biological satisfaction–the desire to eat–endangers the social configuration of the group, this configuration must itself be represented. Imposed on the biological scene between subject and (appetitive) object is the minimal linguistic triangle between self, other, and world. This is the formal basis of all culture.” From Chron. 45, “Reflections on the Sokal Debate” (1 June 1996). (back)

    10. In The End of Culture, Gans addresses the subject of artificial intelligence as a challenge to the ontological uniqueness of the human, pointing out for A. I. theorists the problem with their side-stepping the question of “what occurs prior to the manipulation [of representations] . . . the creation of the representations themselves”: “Given the metaphysical bias of contemporary science, it is not surprising that discussion of this subject has never . . . taken an anthropological perspective” (EC 59). (back)

    11. “Although natural scientists from Newton to Hawking have referred liberally to God, there is no place in science for the more-than-verbal association of the sacred with the phenomena of nature. It is all very well to affirm that ‘God does not play dice with the universe,’ or that his ‘mind’ may be described in such and such equations, but the subject of these and similar assertions is merely the metaphysical Cartesian idea of God as a guarantee of the correspondence in kind between man’s general understanding of the world and its reality” (OT 13). We shall see below that for generative anthropology there is a “guarantee” but it subsists only in human minds collectively working together, in “originary memory.” Once God dies to give us this memory, we are on our own–never to be separated from our memory of God, but certainly separated from any notion that the discipline of our not forgetting might be replaced by a Divine coercion of such memory (which coercion of memory could in fact only function as a violation of what theologian Ted Peters calls our “future freedom”). (back)

    12. One related passage in Kurt Baier’s vigourously compact exposition of atheistic materialist cosmology reads: “Explaining something to someone is making him understand it. This involves bringing together in his mind two things, a model which is accepted as already simple and clear, and that which is to be explained, the explicandum, which is not so. Understanding the explicandum is seeing that it belongs to a range of things which could legitimately have been expected by anyone familiar with the model and with certain facts” (Baier 390). (back)

    13. “Yet Derrida can conceive of no act that could institute language because he denies the essential difference between human language and the ‘language of life,’ the genetic code as the (truly originary) institution of the trace. [ . . ..] For the sign of language to constitute itself as a trace of a different (or differant) kind from those of previous life-forms, including their ‘language,’ the recuperation of the ‘trace’ by unconscious mimesis must be revealed to be inadequate. This revelation, the matter of the originary hypothesis, is entirely lacking in Derrida’s ontology. What is missing from this philosophical exposition is the very notion of the human. This is the ultimate demonstration of metaphysics’ incapacity to generate an anthropology” (SP 149). At a certain point, Derrida’s skepticism forces him to take refuge in biologistic mysticism, seeming to deny the manifest reality that between Francois Jacob’s “language of life” and human language there is a difference in kind. The language that lets ants build anthills and birds build nests is different in kind from the language that lets humans build pyramids, cathedrals and skyscrapers. (back)

    14. “Why, in order to study cultural phenomena ‘objectively,’ do we need a ‘theory’ at all beyond the basic principles of scientific method? Hypothesis, in this [resistant- to- generative- anthropology] view, should be local, formulated only after the study of a particular set of data. Whether we call it ‘mimetic theory,’ ‘fundamental anthropology,’ or ‘Generative Anthropology,’ [however,] Girardian thinking asks us to accept an a priori understanding of human behavior rather than trust to empirical observation and its extensions in the cautious generalizations of the social sciences.” From “COV&R Story,” Chron. 170 (12 June 1999). (back)

    15. For the rejection of Intelligent Design theory, see the Chronicle titled “Intelligent Design?” (2005). (back)

    16. The maxim, in context, reads: “Theology is often good anthropology, but nearly always bad cosmology. What people say about God in relation to human interaction deserves our most serious attention. What they say about God in relation to natural phenomena may interest anthropologists, but not geologists or biologists” (“Science and Faith in Kansas”). (back)

    17. “Deconstruction, and post-structuralist theory in general, puts language at the center of all things. So does GA, except that for this child of Rene Girard’s deviant, extra-Parisian brand of ‘French theory,’ language is not an independent force but a distinctively human activity” [emphasis added]. From “Postmodern GA,” Chron. 180 (4 Sept. 1999). (back)

    18. I am thinking here of the intriguing openness of the process theology of John F. Haught as formulated in his Is Nature Enough? Meaning and Truth in the Age of Science (2006). Anybody interested in the “common boundaries” shared by generative anthropology and theology will find Haught’s work of interest. Its description of the human condition, especially the irreducibility of the human to the explanatory models of the natural sciences, echoes the formulations of Eric Gans again and again. Furthermore, Haught avoids the philosophical awkwardnesses of “intelligent design” theory, as far as I can tell, completely. (back)

    19. Here is Gans speaking of the scientistic delusion that a description merely of brain activity, merely of “empirical” goings-on in the organic brain, will someday be able to explain the human, human language, or human representation: “But despite the vast scientific progress since the Enlightenment, this scientism suffers from a materialist fallacy that–on the specific point of language origin, and therefore on that of the essence of the human as such–recalls Descartes’ location of the soul’s action on the body in the pineal gland, or Gall’s proposal, mocked by Hegel, to divine our mental abilities from the shape of our skulls” [emphasis added]. From “We are all Generative Anthropologists Now,” Chron. 229 (3 March 2001). (back)

    20. “It might well turn out that there will be a convergence in ethical outlook, at least among human beings. The point of the contrast is that, even if this happens, it will not be correct to think it has come about because convergence has been guided by how things really are, whereas convergence in the sciences might be explained that way if it does happen” (Williams 136). But compare: “The project of giving to ethical life an objective and determinate grounding in considerations about human nature is not, in my view, very likely to succeed. But it is at any rate a comprehensible project, and I believe it represents the only intelligible form to ethical objectivity at the reflective level” (Williams 153). (back)

    21. I am thinking here of the paradox in originary thinking by which its “secular” stance never abandons its faith in a “communal guarantee”: “Since humans may be shown to exist and God or gods cannot, a secular hypothesis of origin might seem ‘more minimal’ than a religious one. But the hypothesis of human origin is not a question that may be posed outside the human experience; and within that experience, the transcendent Being personified in the Judeo-Christian tradition as God is not detachable from the communal guarantee that makes language and other representational forms possible.” From Gans, “We Are All Generative Anthropologists Now,” Chron. 229 (3 March 2001). (back)

    22. My allusion to the “first one” deliberately invokes the valuable, now well-integrated “amendment” to the originary hypothesis proposed by Adam Katz in “Remembering Amalek” (2004-2005). The amendment illuminates the differentiating status of “firstness” among the originary users of the sign, and the concomitant opposition between the “sign of renunciation” and the “sign of contagion.” I will anticipate here certain notions that will become clear only by the end of the essay. On this model of the “first” one to discover valuable scientific knowledge, the connotations are favorable. Danger ensues, as we shall see, when the scientist as “first” is the one to risk peripheral resentment of the “religious” community attached to the originary object-image. (back)

    23. To the ecosophic reader offended by this, I would note that I am making a “cosmological” point. The human uninterested in other humans is not going to last very long in the natural world. It is a “scientific” or “natural” fact that humans are a social species (like bonobos and chimpanzees)–we go mad in isolation. The originary event takes this evolutionary fact about the mimetic sociality of our animality as one of its prerequisites. The level of being that is “generated” by paradoxical symbolic reference, language-as-transcendent, only adds even more “evidence” to support the claim that humans are, because they must be in order to survive, the most religiously, esthetically, and economically “interesting” thing in nature to other humans. It is perverse to disown this truth, at once anthropological and cosmological, in self-punishing victimary obeisance to a cosmos that would (we delude ourselves) be “hurt” by our relative lack of “interest.” This obeisance may be in fashion because of the pervasiveness of apocalyptic discourse pointing to our global ecological crisis, but it should, in my opinion, be resisted nevertheless. A house is not a home; the cosmos alone is only a house; it becomes a “home” to us only when we are sufficiently interested in each other as humans to transfigure that cosmos into something significant. That transfiguration begins with the revelation of the sacred human-divine scene in the originary event. (back)

    24. From “Is GA Impossible?”: “GA, in contrast with those modes [religion and the ethics of the foxhole], proposes no ethic other than the end of crisis, the deferral of violence. Its aim is to express the objective truth of the human, but by an analogy to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, objective truth and ethical functioning are mutually limiting: like the position and momentum of a particle, beyond a certain point the truth and ethical value of an idea become inversely dependent on each other.” Chron. 44 (25 May 1996). Consider as well this passage from Signs of Paradox, in which a certain cosmological imagination entails a certain ethical attitude: “Only when the human is [mistakenly] accepted as a given of nature rather than a cultural self-production can the forces of good and evil be seen as symmetrical. Manicheism is oblivious to the initial triumph of good over evil without which humanity could never have come into being. The Manichean . . . exemplifies . . . the structure of resentment” (136). (back)

    25. From Originary Thinking: “But there are many in the scientific camp who refuse to entertain an originary hypothesis, not because human origin is in principle beyond comprehension, but because such a ‘speculative’ hypothesis cannot be falsified by the evidence. This is a methodological objection grounded on the principle that, for the scientific method, ontology has no reality independent of methodology. But to take this position is to forget that every methodology is founded, implicitly or explicitly, on an ontology. A new ontology must be allowed the chance to generate its own methodology” (7) [emphasis added]. (back)

    26. Human representation of the human being as situated in the cosmos is paradoxical because the cosmos must both exclude and include us (the representers) at the same time: the human condition must include something of our cosmological status, setting, belonging, and the like. But ” . . . all models of the human condition are paradoxical because they both must and cannot include themselves within the system they model” (“George Soros,” [Chron. 82]). Or to put it more elegantly, here is Gans describing “the radical form of fictionality we call paradox”: “The deferral of empirical verification risks being usurped by a form that transforms the fictional hesitation between truth and falsity into an oscillation in which understanding itself, made to depend on this verification, is indefinitely deferred” (63). (back)

    27. “The difference between anthropology as I understand it and natural science is that at its core [anthropology] depends on a mentalistic intuition of the human as understanding and creating meaning. Its faithfulness to this intuition makes GA not a new doctrine of positive anthropology, but a new way of thinking, neither social science nor humanistic interpretation, [a way] grounded on the minimal defining condition of humanity, the use of representations.” From “Is GA Falsifiable?” Chron. 36 (30 March 1996). And again: “GA is not a Popperian-falsifiable theory, but a Kuhnian paradigm, a way of thinking about the human.” From “A GA Conversation (III),” Chron. 76 (18 Jan. 1997). (back)

    28. “Fetishizing language as a function independent of such [human mimetic] interaction, for example as a ‘tool for knowing the natural world,’ gives us instrumental analyses of human thought that deny the paradoxical generation of the transcendent realm–that is, [deny] precisely what uniquely characterizes humanity. This is a social-science deformation, pedestrian but ‘objectively’ reasonable.” From “The Problem of the Subject,” Chron. 117 (15 Nov. 1997). (back)

    29. “But GA is not a ‘cultural’ theory any more than it is a theory of natural science. Originary thinking is irreducible to the subject-object dichotomy of classical metaphysics, either in its positive mode as the basis of the natural and human sciences or in its paradoxical mode as the unthinkable foundation of cultural self-analysis; it offers an explanation for the emergence of both.” From “The Origin of Language II: Scientific Perspectives,” Chron. 167 (1 May 1999). (back)

    30. “The tension inherent in the dual conception of the central locus, spatio-temporally particular but ontologically concrete, is not resolvable within religion itself. It is reproduced in our era in the tension between physical anthropologists’ search for concrete paleontological evidence of human origin and the deconstructors’ insistence that the representational phenomena that define the species have ‘always already’ existed: two antithetical evacuations of the originary event” (SP 141) [emphasis added]. (back)

    31. “Once the originary hypothesis is considered, however minimally, as the potential object of such a contract [an esthetic contract], it becomes easy to explain its lack of wide acceptance. Its very minimality makes it incapable of competing esthetically with either the historical particularity of religious discourse or the textual mystique of deconstruction, yet it nonetheless requires a contract of participation that the hypotheses of social science do not.” From “Postmodern GA,” Chron. 180 (4. Sept 1999). (back)

    32. One among many examples: “On the contrary, to dare to think the fundamental question of the human as already solved, and as solvable only under the condition of believing it thus, with a faith limited to this proposition alone, is to express a credo that one can neither simply advise others to reproduce nor claim as a unique ‘artistic’ gesture. The steadfastness of this conviction makes me spiritually ready for death yet prepared to pursue indefinitely the cognitive task of elucidating the implications of this minimalist conception of the human” [emphasis added]. From “Anthropology and Mortality,” Chron. 264 (29 June 2002). (back)

    33. Gans, drawing one of many distinctions between originary thinking and “philosophy” in its primal propositional form, metaphysics: “thought is metaphysical when it denies the anthropological historicity of the scene of representation, whether it accepts (nominalism) or denies (realism) that [historicity] of the representations that appear on it” (EC 68). (back)

    34. This “invisible barrier” is closely related to the obstacle generative anthropology faces because Popperians, stuck on the demand for empirical falsifiability, can never get beyond their obsession with it so as to begin to grasp what originary thinking might have to offer in the way of “scientific” intellectual operations. One might say that the falsifiability that Popperians demand makes a certain fetish of empirical visibility. Gans writes: “Theories of the human that take representation into account not simply as a ‘behavior’ but as a fundamental constituent of desire cannot be falsified in the normal sense of the term. To say, when A desires B, that A’s desire is mediated by representation of B, is not testable in any simple manner. There is no way to remove all representation of B in order to test the hypothesis, since precisely representation is not limited to some formal procedure of designation but can be accompanied by any sigh that the desiring subject encounters on his scene of representation.” From “Is GA Empirical?” Chron. 164 (3 April 1999). (back)

    35. I am thinking again of the Katz amendment concerning “firstness” in “Remembering Amalek.” The paradox demanding further reflection is that the originary violence of the scientist seems to dis-respect the originary sacred object by substituting for it a different one and destabilizing sacred value, thus performing a “sign of contagion.” But from another perspective, we might say that the scientist is performing a “sign of renunciation” in that he or she risks his or her own self-destruction (communal resentment) in the very gesture of seeming to de-value the originary object. One’s “firstness” as scientist, inasmuch as it is grounded in a disregard for individual self-preservation, sacrifices any guarantee of self-centralizing usurpatory privilege to a much more probable self-endangering significant (secondary) difference. Scientific innovation that appears to be violence against the sacred object is actually violence against the security of the individual scientific self. One might even begin to wonder whether the originary Christian sacrifice, Jesus’ willingness to give up desire (he loved life here) to the cause of knowledge or “revelation” (knowledge he already possessed, but we others certainly did not) does not–paradoxically, for Jesus’ abyssal self-giving figures as the very opposite of sparagmatic violence–follow this model. (back)

    36. “The religious remains bound to a specific locus, just as the esthetic is bound to an image; the religious locus is a place of sacrifice, just as the esthetic image is the figure of a victim” (SP 141).(back)

    37. “The nature of human action is distorted by any perspective that seeks to reduce [human action] to a set of predictable models–within which the model-maker’s own activity both must and cannot escape accounting.” From “Beyond ‘Generative Anthropology’ 2: Resistance to Mimetic Theory.” Chron. 145 (25 July 1998). (back)

    38. Beauty may have something to do with goodness after all. The beautiful has contact with the morally good, in that the (material, concrete) economic category of value mediates between sacred equality and esthetic pleasure. That which is utterly ugly and undesirable will be without economic value; the valueless is the unexchangeable; and the person with nothing to exchange will be subject to involuntary economic deprivation, a victim of human evil. This truth is revealed by Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein: the ineradicable “ugliness” of the Monster externalizes the amorality of the “pure” science that his physiological being re-presents as technological product. (More on this is parts 2 and 3 of this study.) It also explains our freedom not to feel guilt when we kill off hideously ugly alien species in science fiction horror movies such as Independence Day, The Terminator, and Alien. (back)

    39. Richard Van Oort: “Throughout this dialogue, the suggestion has been that minimal thinking is not simply a reflection of an unquestioned faith in a scientific principle, but at once also a reflection of a certain historical narrative, namely, the rise of the international exchange system. Anthropologically speaking, minimality also means decentralization of the exchange process. It is the movement away from ‘maximal’ ritual acts of exchange to ‘minimal’ secular acts of exchange. This is an ethical development. It designates the point where ethical control becomes truly self-regulating, where the social order is seen as anthropologically motivated, not as somehow imposed from without the process of exchange in which the community is created.” From “A GA Conversation (III),” Chron. 76 (18 Jan. 1997). (back)

    40. “No doubt such [dogmatic] belief [in the infallibility] of the market is unfounded; but it should be made clear that the dogmatism of the market is not merely more benign but on a different plane than the dogmatism that rejects the market. Where the latter [rejection] poses the infallibility of a doctrine, which is really that of its omnipotent interpreters, market-worship emphasizes precisely the fallibility of human self-knowledge that Popper makes the foundation of the open society: since no once can know a priori the best allocation of resources, we must rely on the market to provide it.” From “George Soros and the Open Society,” Chron. 82 (1 March 1997). (back)

    41. It may even be the case that experience of the sacred must be coerced, which would entail the notion that we are free really to believe in God only on the condition that we understand we are freenot to believe in God; but such latter understanding, under this paradox, would require that God be always in some sense an object not merely known by means of sacred communal “revelation” but also by way of esthetic experience. Perhaps one must desire to “possess” knowledge of God all to oneself–and be disappointed (into disbelief) by the impossibility of satisfying that desire of “imaginary possession”–before one can learn to share knowledge of him with others. The sharing presupposes a minimal faith in the exchangeability of the human sign as something that guarantees the real, including the reality of God. Shareable knowledge of God–as opposed to wholly private “mystical” experience, by definition inexpressible--would, according to this description, have to be post-sparagmatic knowledge of God. Likewise for the Christian (in particular), to know Jesus as “the Christ,” as Gans suggests in Science and Faith, is to know that one has persecuted him–participated in the sparagmos that “destroyed” his worldly body. One who owns such knowledge can only be grateful for the wholly originary memory the living Christ inspires. (back)

    42. See, for example, “Postmodern GA” (Chron. 180). (back)

    43. “Hence although the sparagmos, like the emission of the sign, concentrates all difference in the center, it carries out in the most literal sense the deconstruction of the moral model” (SP 50). (back)

    44. Compare these remarks on the philosophical equivalent: “Our reading of Heidegger’s question in anthropological terms rather than cosmological terms should not induce us to interpret ‘Being’ as ‘human being.’ The Being that the philosopher seeks is external to the human and can be exemplified by humanity only at the horizon of [humanity’s] historical trajectory” (SP 96). (back)

    45. “The market presupposes an accumulation of property and consequent differences of wealth, just as the political process presupposes the accumulation of influence and consequent differences of power.” From “On Political Economy,” Chron. 123 (24 Jan 1998). (back)

    46. The gesture would be one made toward the Mind of God that pre-exists the human mind, a Mind in which we must have “faith” in the sense that we will never be able to explain (indeed, “faith” need not explain) its origin in cosmological-evolutionary history: God simply always Was (and is and will be) before and outside the human. This gesture absolves us of the “secular” requirement to propose a “scientific” hypothetical model of the origin of human language. Somehow, human language “just evolved” as a “gradual” effect of human scapegoating in a manner that nobody (Girard included) has yet ventured to describe in detail. Meanwhile, the kinship of originary thinking and “Girardian thinking” is undeniable; and the possibilities for more active dialogue are far from being exhausted–indeed, unfortunately in my opinion, they have hardly begun. I would not wish to foreclose the much-to-be-desired possibility that from within “Girardian” circles alternative or competing hypotheses of the origin of human language, or amendments to the originary hypothesis made in the spirit of Girard and formulated in explicit dialogue with generative anthropology, might appear.(back)

    47. Both the sacred and the esthetic are “bound” in a way that originary thinking itself strives not to be: “The religious remains bound to a specific locus, just as the esthetic is bound to an image; the religious locus is a place of sacrifice, just as the esthetic image is the figure of a victim” (SP 141). (back)

    48. From “The ‘Jewish Question’”: “In a world that has drawn back from the esthetic politics of modernism, that is beginning at last to understand that the socialist and fascist utopias are cut from the same poisoned cloth, no millennial image of the good society can have any but harmful effects. The only figure we need is the figure of the origin, the only scene absolutely necessary for the constitution of a single human race. This scene is not utopian; it is the locus of an interminable agon” (SP 167). (back)

    49. I allude to the familiar acronym “MAD,” which designates Mutually Assured Destruction as the indistinguishably sacred-and-secular limit regulating exchangeability of the “means” for species self-annihilation now made available by modern science. “Minimal exchangeability” is intended to carry the not insignificant connotation of the minimal exchangeability of nuclear weapons. See Bartlett (2004) for more on that question, specifically in regard to movies exploring the threat of nuclear warfare. (back)

    50. The interplay between the maximal exchangeability/minimal desacralization of originary science, and its dangerous, dehumanizing inversion in the worst applications of modern science–in the minimal exchangeability/maximal desacralization of modern science–will be explored at length in parts 2 and 3 of this study, scheduled to appear in the next and following issues of Anthropoetics.(back)

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    Baldick, Chris. In Frankenstein’s Shadow: Myth, Monstrosity, and Nineteenth-Century Writing. Oxford: Clarendon, 1987.

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  • White Guilt, Past and Future

    The politics of the past few years, dominated by the reality and threat of Islamic terrorism, seem designed to persuade us of the primacy of resentment in human affairs. The existence of people willing not merely to risk death but to court it in the hope of killing as many of the enemy as possible would seem to offer incontrovertible proof that not love but resentment conquers all. But ever since Nietzsche first theorized le ressentiment, it has been clear that the scene of resentment and the power it generates are dependent on a complementary phenomenon that allows the marginal man of resentment to triumph over the forces that control the scenic configuration—a phenomenon for which Nietzsche provides no real explanation. I call this phenomenon white guilt.

    The original use of this term refers to the guilt experienced by whites over the unfair advantages they owe to racism. Two books published in 1997 contain the phrase in their—curiously similar—titles: Race Card: White Guilt, Black Resentment, and the Assault on Truth and Justice, ed. Peter Collier and David Horowitz, and Black Anxiety, White Guilt, and the Politics of Status Frustration by T. Alexander Smith and Lenahan O’Connell; in 2006 Shelby Steele put it on the title side of the colon in White Guilt: How Blacks and Whites Together Destroyed the Promise of the Civil Rights Era. But since in our intuitive semiotic system white is not, as the optics treatises tell us, a combination of all the colors, but the absence of color—the state of unmarkedness—I feel justified in defining white guilt by metaphysical rather than mere physical whiteness. No doubt the notion of white guilt in Western culture depends on a coincidence of the metaphysical and the physical, but it is the first that is primary: white guilt is the guilt of the unmarked toward the marked.

    As a point of reference, in the December 12, 2004 issue of the Los Angeles Times, Michael Kinsley half congratulates and half commiserates with himself over the speed with which gay marriage has come close to general acceptance, and in some circles has come to be looked upon as a right. Kinsley ends his piece thus:

    [The acceleration of the process of recognizing injustice] means that all of us who consider ourselves good-hearted, well-meaning, empathetic Americans—but don’t claim to be great visionaries—are probably staring right now at an injustice that will soon seem obvious, and we just don’t see it. Somewhere in this country a gay black woman, grateful beneficiary of past and present perceptual transformations, has said something today in all innocence that will strike her just a few years from now as unbelievably callous, cruel and wrong.

    Kinsley’s black lesbian will soon realize she is oppressing someone whose victimary stigma we have not yet learned to be guilty about. What better illustration could be given of the power of white guilt than this anticipatory certitude of new victims to discover?

    Originary Thinking about White Guilt

    To engage in originary thinking is to conceive the origin of the human—language, ritual, the aesthetic—as an event:

    Whereas animal experience is motivated primarily by appetite—animal cognition reflecting the fundamental difference between a perceiving consciousness and appetitive objects—human experience remains mediated by a common scene—language—which is nothing other than the institution of a barrier of representation, dividing the (prehuman) appetitively motivated subjectivity from the desirable object. [T]he first moment of specifically human experience occurs when protohominid society reaches a critical level of intraspecific violence and its existing social structure (based on a complex and strict pecking order decided by one-on-one contests of dominance and submission) no longer provides the community with unifying power. Thus, violence typically breaks out over objects attractive to instinctual appetite. The originary hypothesis proposes that the salient feature of human society—language—must have originated as a mechanism for deferring violence. Thus, the first sign is an “aborted gesture of appropriation” which defers animal appetite through the institution of communal representation. This gesture takes place on a communal scene where the participants surround an object attractive to animal appetite which all seek to appropriate but, for fear of mutual reprisal, are forced instead merely to equally designate. This moment of suspension opens up a linguistic space between the designating individuals and the attractive central object, thus providing the characteristic centre-and-periphery configuration which will be reflected in all recreations of the scene. The “aborted gesture” becomes the first sign and instigates a mechanism for communal interaction far more efficient than the genetically programmed forms of communication inherited from the animal past.
    In the scene of origin, the first sign—the aborted gesture of appropriation—is an ostensive. This minimal definition of language is all that is needed to institute the scene of representation. In designating the central object, all the participants reveal their desire for the object, but at the same time they prohibit any one individual from fulfilling that desire through the appropriation of the appetitive object. In thus deferring their desire, they transform the perception of the object from being merely attractive to animal appetite, to a transcendental plane where it is represented as universally significant to all the individuals on the periphery. This creation of a shared scene of universal significance is nothing other than the collective scene of linguistic presence upon which all representational (i.e., cultural) productions are subsequently dependent. (Richard van Oort, “Epistemology and Generative Theory: Derrida, Gans, and the Anthropological Subtext of Deconstruction,” Anthropoetics 1, 1 (June 1995) https://anthropoetics.org/journal/ap-vol-1/ap0101/vano/

    In the hypothetical originary event, the formation of the community drives out all internal conflicts; but this process is not instantaneous. We owe to Adam Katz the observation that firstness is a necessary element of the minimal originary scene (see “Remembering Amalek: 9/11 and Generative Thinking,” Anthropoetics 10, 2 (Fall/Winter 2004-05) https://anthropoetics.org/journal/ap-vol-10/ap1002/amalek/) That the emission of the sign occurs spontaneously to all the members of the group is a less parsimonious assumption than that a “first” member of the group, by aborting his appropriative gesture toward the central object, provides a model of proto-signing behavior for the others to imitate. This priority, once we include it in our model, contains the latent potentiality not merely for differentiation but for hierarchy, and for the resentments that hierarchy arouses in both those on top and those below.

    2

    The overall category of xenophobia is anticipated by the latent possibility of two very different resentments toward (and discriminations against) either the early or late users of the sign, either of whom is viewed as closer to the center than the “unmarked” self; the first, because they discover its sacrality, the last, because they persist in their claim on its appetitive reality. The crucial historical reenactment of the firstness of the originary scene in a world of plural societies is the Hebrews’ invention/discovery of monotheism, the redefinition of the scene as an explicitly global phenomenon with the One God as its unique center. Although the monotheistic God is claimed to stand equally above everyone, the fact that the Hebrews were the first to make this claim for “their” god gives rise to the persistent phenomenon of antisemitism. Similarly, the originary roots of ordinary xenophobia (racism, ethnocentrism) lie in the discrimination of the “early” users of the sign against the “late.”

    White guilt is much farther than racism or antisemitism from its originary model; in the strong form in which we know it today, it scarcely predates the fall of the Berlin wall, and even in its broadest sense as guilt for the exclusion of the collective Other, it does not appear to antedate the French Revolution. A footnote of Chateaubriand’s Essai sur les revolutions (1797) describing the author’s purported encounter near Niagara Falls with one of a group of American Indians, contains the extraordinary sentence, “How thankful was I to him for not liking me!” (Comme je lui savais gré de ne pas m’aimer!) This early expression of white guilt is far from today’s terrorized expressions of PC, if only because at the time its idiosyncratic pose of self-hatred would have appeared—was meant to appear—paradoxical. Like all mimetic phenomena, the guilt adopted by a “unique” romantic ego is not the same as that of an entire class whose enlightened members teach it to be ashamed of its pretensions to universality, holding up those who persist in these pretensions as foils to their own virtue.

    White guilt is the obverse of the unconscious discrimination that Kinsley dreads; it internalizes within the unmarked group the real or potential accusation of the marked that they have been excluded from its conception of universal humanity. White guilt’s open-ended anxiety takes the place of guilt for formerly legal privileges.

    Resentment in the Modern Era

    The resentment specific to modernity, as exemplified by a line running from Hamlet through Molière’s Misanthrope to Rousseau and the Romantics, is impotently dependent on the scene from which the subject prefers to claim expulsion rather than acting either to rejoin or to destroy it. Hegel’s schöne Seele is a variant of this line in which resentment is “sublimated” into an overwhelming sense of the evil of the world, an evil that contaminates us from without and that we combat, or at least denounce, in vain. Modern resentment is not yet white guilt because the resentful subject does not admit to complicity in the expulsion of which he sees himself the victim. Its dynamic is situated within a society for which the self-styled exclusion of the romantic victim, by personalizing the anonymity of urban society by a vision of persecution, is secretly a mode of integration. No doubt the romantic intelligentsia, once their attachment to the Restoration had worn off, became champions of the peuple and imputers of guilt to the bourgeoisie—although the latter was more violently scorned for its philistinism than for its oppression of the proletariat. But the nineteenth-century radical intelligentsia did not conceive the provocation of white guilt as its primary mission, which would in effect have been an admission of defeat. The true revolutionary wants to win, not just make his opponent feel guilty. The revolutionary bourgeois intellectual gave up his guilt when he went over to the proletarian cause and fought for his own class’s annihilation.

    The successful liberations that followed WWII could not have been obtained without white guilt. But the early conquests of the postwar era were predicated on a restricted form of this guilt to which they could promise a closure devoid of Kinsleyan anxieties. Guilt for segregation or colonialism ends with the phenomenon itself, just as guilt for depriving women of the vote ends when the vote is granted. To end de jure privileges is to create a society of equals, a meritocracy. The Roosevelt liberals for whom meritocracy was the ultimate state of the market system have today for the most part joined the neoconservative camp in disillusion. The meritocratic ideal is vulnerable to the resentment inevitably generated in those whose merit is declared inferior, and our political system dictates that if these individuals are members of ascriptive groups that can with any credibility claim to be stigmatized, movements will arise to promote their interests by appealing to the white guilt of the rest of society.

    The heyday of unrestricted white guilt began with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR. With market society no longer menaced by a rival socioeconomic system, the only serious opposition to it would henceforth be internal to the market system, for which it could offer no credible replacement. At this point the revolutionary intelligentsia was forced to recognize the essential identity of what had previously appeared as two ontologically distinct and opposed entities: the class of oppressors and the class of their denouncers. The intelligentsia is only sporadically the voice of the (now largely third-world) proletariat who stand outside the power structure by their non-possession of the means of production; its chief function is to act as the conscience of the universal bourgeoisie, from which it distinguishes itself—but that difference is everything—by its awareness of guilt, which it undertakes to spread to those who continue to ignore it. Conversely, the resentment of those who see themselves as victims can achieve results only by allying itself with the far greater force of white guilt.

    Let us call victimary liberalism the ideology of those who devote their political energy to the cultivation of white guilt—first their own, then everyone else’s. Rather than an expression of resentment at failure, white guilt is cultivated as a compensation for success. White guilt is not left to individual or even group psychology; it is administered by a network of institutions that channel its energy into expiatory gestures, which these institutions seek to impose on the rest of the “unmarked” population. Groups of “activists” conceive it as their mission to defend the interests not just of other humans but of animals, trees, water, and so on, presumably in preference to those of their generally affluent membership. The “blue” institutions of the media, entertainment, and the university are the most visible components of this network, which was perturbed by 9/11 but has since more than fully recovered. Even Kinsley is disturbed by the increasing banalization of institutionalized white guilt; with the exception of a small vocal faction of conservatives poorly represented in prestigious universities and media venues, the intelligentsia takes for granted that unrestricted white guilt is the unique touchstone of ethical judgment.

    3

    Conversely, the intense contempt in which the intellectual class holds the “red” electorate has its source in the latter’s apparent indifference to white guilt. By despising the “neocon” establishment, the victimary liberal admits and simultaneously rejects his own complicity in the oppression he denounces. In this regard, Islamic terrorism is a source of genuine fear but also of moral relief, enabling the intellectual to hold the Administration responsible for having made us a target and to forget that the Islamists’ resentment is directed not at specific American policies but at the entire market system of which the United States is the most powerful component. The relationship between the intellectual left and the terrorists is symbiotic precisely because it is not symmetrical. (If there is symmetry, it is between the terrorists and the “hawks,” neither of whom is appreciably influenced by white guilt.) The left condemns Western society for oppressing its Other while the Islamists denounce their own rulers’ softness toward “otherness.” The terrorists carry out in reality the same actions that our local revolutionaries perform symbolically; how many times had the World Trade Center and the Pentagon been burned in effigy by antiglobal protesters at international trade conferences? That Western intellectuals and Islamists share a common enemy explains why the former tend to express less hostility to the latter than to the representatives of global market society.

    The Structure of White Guilt

    It would be a mistake to characterize white guilt as simply a binary relationship between the guilty individual and the center that he has emptied of its victimary referent. Like every scenic interaction, white guilt is ternary; it is both shared with the other participants and mediated by them, like a tax owed to the center that other taxpayers make sure one pays. Even when one faces a direct victimary claim, it is the condemnation of one’s fellow guilt-bearers that one principally fears, psychologically and above all institutionally. In the United States, but increasingly in other Western countries, compensation of “victims,” as the ominous term “political correctness” implies, is enforced through the judicial process and/or bureaucratic grievance mechanisms. The hyperbole characteristic of victimary discourse functions to remind the larger community of this. It is a common, if tacit, understanding that victimary rhetoric need not meet normal standards of truth—witness the prestige of Al Sharpton after the Tawana Brawley hoax—since its function is less to point to a specific injustice than to remind the “white” majority of its guilty status. White guilt is distinct from the more general phenomenon of originary guilt as it appears in Freud’s or Girard’s model or in Nietzsche’s analysis of ressentiment. Freud and Girard speak of guilt only in reference to a specific victim, father or “emissary”; guilt for the originary collective sacrifice, because it is not mediated by the being/signified of the originary sign, is assimilated to the guilt experienced by an individual murderer.

    The classical victim of injustice was an individual even when he was a member of a stigmatized group. The Dreyfus case may have provoked cries of “mort aux Juifs!” and given birth to Zionism, but it was entirely focused on the guilt or innocence of Dreyfus himself (and secondarily on other individuals in the army, the Jewish community, the liberal and reactionary press, etc.). In contrast, the specific character of postmodern white guilt is the collective nature of the victimary figure. The Tailhook scandal and the Rodney King beating, to cite a couple of examples from the 90s, were not about King or Paula Coughlin but about women and blacks, even minorities in general (most of the looting during the King riots was done by Latinos). Neither King nor even Coughlin was either innocent or guilty; they were victims. The acquittal of O. J. Simpson despite his obvious guilt reflected a similar assimilation of the individual to his racial group. The mostly black jurors who voted for acquittal and their supporters in the black community (where an estimated 70% affirmed Simpson’s innocence) were not judging Simpson’s guilt so much as “sending a message” to the white majority. In this case, the application of victimary rhetoric to a privileged individual failed to persuade the general/white public, but this rhetoric was learned and reinforced by people who were used to using it successfully.

    One can regret a loss, but one can feel guilt only toward a subsisting being. The collective guilt for sacrifice is not directed toward the central victim as such but toward the divinity, the signified of the sacred sign that the sacrificers have denuded of its referent. The Christian intuition of the ultimate identity of the victim and the divinity in the incarnate logos is incompatible with a mode of thinking in which the individual victim is a representative not of the divinity but of an ascriptive group. Victimary rhetoric is an extension of Nietzsche’s Sklavenmoral by which the weak dominate the strong, but it adds a collective component that Nietzsche never anticipated. Nietzsche’s ressentiment subordinates the “strong” to the Judeo-Christian priests on the basis of an abstract Moral condemning the exercise of worldly power rather than out of guilt toward those over whom the power is exercised. The Christian slaves’ weapon against their masters is their faith in Christ’s promise to them despite their lowly status, not an accusation of slavophobia. The Martin Luther King phase of the civil rights movement explicitly took its example from this vision of Christianity; the general reverence felt toward King reflects his enunciation of an egalitarian, color-blind vision. It is not fortuitous that today those most strongly identified as Christians are those who are arrayed against white guilt. White guilt may depend on the Christian association of the sacred with the victim, but it rejects the Christian’s fundamental mediation through God. Postmodern victimary thinking is fundamentally atheistic; it understands human interaction as a zero-sum game played on a scene with no central mediator, which is why it is so vulnerable to paradoxes of cooperation on the Prisoners’ Dilemma model.

    Before 9/11 one could imagine that on the domestic front the nihilism of white guilt was working itself out by analogy with the PC/anti-PC dialogue playing out in the universities. The early to mid-90s saw many books devoted to the PC question—Dinesh D’Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (1992); Jung Min Choi and John W. Murphy, Politics and Philosophy of Political Correctness (1992); Ward Parks, Political Correctness and the Assault on Individuality (1993); Edith Kurzweil and William Phillips, eds., Our Country, Our Culture: The Politics of Political Correctness (1994); Sarah Dunant, ed. War of the Words: The Political Correctness Debate (1994); Marilyn Friedman and Jan Narveson, Political Correctness: For and Against (1995); and so on. Conservatives provide PC horror stories; liberals deny the seriousness of these and point to the persistence of sexism and racism; moderates condemn the excesses of both sides and remind us that the university—and the society as a whole—is really functioning pretty well. There are many flavors of PC, but the movement that has driven it most forcefully in Western society is feminism, dominated by upper-middle-class professional women whose aims are incremental rather than nihilistic. Whatever the fantasies of extremists who equate sex with rape and the “patriarchy” with tyranny, men and women in first-world societies are continuing to find ways to get along while adapting to the increasing but never total convergence of their life trajectories.

    Post 9/11, however, we are reminded that we do not have the luxury of working out cultural integration among “ourselves,” that there are people willing to kill and die to destroy the liberal-democratic system, or in any case to disrupt it as much as possible. It is increasingly evident that radical Islam, which conflates antisemitism with anti-Americanism in its opposition to both historical and synchronic firstness, puts into question the victimary ethic that demands the expiation rather than the affirmation of this firstness.

    4

    Auschwitz and Hiroshima

    The Second World War was almost certainly the last total war humanity will be able to tolerate. The necessity for restraining maximal violence henceforth links the world in a global community; all wars since WWII are so to speak civil wars. The most urgent problem of the new millennium is how to deal with those who deny their membership in this community to the point of being willing to wreak “mass destruction” on it if given the means.

    Prior to 9/11, the consequences of WWII were, and residually still are, worked through ethically, politically, and aesthetically in what we call postmodernism. The hobbling of the postmodern(ist) subject, which occurs in a number of superficially distinct modes, is the interpersonal equivalent of the hobbling of the national “subjects” on the global stage. The deconstruction of central authority, however liberating it may be to those who define themselves as its victims, is an act of ideology, or in other words, of resentment, complicit yet denying its complicity with this authority. The confused nature of this gesture reflects postmodernism’s failure to articulate the double lesson of the war epitomized in Auschwitz, the ultimate act of asymmetric violence, and Hiroshima, the ultimate act of reciprocal violence. In one case, a group of non-combatants was singled out for annihilation; in the other, great violence was inflicted upon the adversary’s population in order to force surrender. Although their simultaneity is not altogether coincidental, the two phenomena have very different moral valences. Yet in their mutual implication the role of each has not been easy to sort out. On 9/11, history performed the task for us.

    For a number of years I considered “Auschwitz” to be the sole point of origin of postmodern ethics, aesthetics, and politics. This is not unreasonable as a first approximation, but the characteristic postmodern attitude of white guilt can be understood only by introducing “Hiroshima” as a second, partially independent variable.

    I therefore propose the following model:

      • Auschwitz makes illegitimate all de jure forms of asymmetry: colonialism, segregation, apartheid; we may call this political egalitarianism.
      • Hiroshima has two consequences.
      • Since it makes total war henceforth impossible, it gives rise to strategies of proxy wars, containment, MAD, and the removal of the chief focus of competition from the military to the commercial sphere; we may call this political realism. This strategic phase comes to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-91.
      • It provokes a sense of guilt toward its victims, despite the fact that Japan was the original aggressor in the war. This is the beginning of the characteristically postmodern phenomenon of white guilt, which becomes the basis of a political movement only when the opposition to the war in Vietnam conflates Auschwitz with Hiroshima, “excess” power with asymmetry.

    That Hiroshima rather than Auschwitz is white guilt’s critical point of departure may not be obvious. Until the end of the Cold War, the “realist” heritage of Hiroshima remained dominant; only after Vietnam did its “guilty” legacy began the inexorable conquest of its present strongholds: academia, the “helping organizations,” the entertainment world, the media. By the time white guilt truly came into its own in the post-USSR world, its link to the end of WWII had been obscured by time.

    This model makes clearer the split between the two modes of political atonement that emerged from the war. Both egalitarianism and white guilt challenge the legitimacy of asymmetrical relations: the former, the de jure relations encountered in colonialism and racial segregation, the latter, the de facto differences that inspire the more recent trends of affirmative action and political correctness. The differences between the finite, objectivist attitude of political egalitarianism and the open-ended subjectivism of white guilt are traceable to their different historical sources.

    “Auschwitz” supplies the necessary historical condition for the collective focus of white guilt. Hitler had contempt for all “non-Aryan” races, but he defined his mission on earth as protecting it from the Jews (“In standing guard against the Jew I am defending the handiwork of the Lord.” Mein Kampf, Ch. 2). Antisemitism became after 1933 the central means for affirming through exclusion the solidarity of the “Aryan” community. Stigmatization of the Jews was the exemplary model for the Nazis’ other racial laws; if one could justify the expulsion, spoliation, and eventual extermination of the Jews with the claim that their existence was incompatible with the health of “Aryan” Germany, then other groups (Gypsies, homosexuals, the mentally ill…) could be condemned under the same criteria.

    The Jews are not the simple “Others” of Western society imagined by Sartre in his notorious Réflexions sur la question juive (1946); they are those who refuse Christ in the name of the Torah, the “Old Testament” guarantee of their firstness as the elected and electors of the One God. The Nazi persecution of the Jews was not carried out as a sadistic domination of the weak—although the opening to this sentiment was indulged in by many of “Hitler’s willing executioners”—but as the defensive reaction of a subject that feels itself excluded from sacred Being by those with a prior claim. Because the forces of the market system are globalizing by nature, their association with the “nomadic,” “tribal” Jews whose fabled power over money, beyond its historical exemplifications, ultimately derives from their priority in sacred exchange, allows the antisemite to promote elimination of the Jews as the means to eradicate modern anomie and restore communal solidarity.

    Postmodernity ignores the Hebrew priority in monotheism that reflects the paradoxical human structure of firstness-in-equality. Just as one participant must have been first to discover/invent the sign in the originary scene, so one people must have been first to discover/invent the One God. In the originary configuration, the “Jew” is the first member of the group to transform his appropriative gesture into a sign designating the object whose appropriation is (temporarily) renounced; to persecute the “Jew” is to reject this originary gesture and with it, humanity itself. The rejecter fails to see that the firstness of the “Jew” is that of renunciation rather than appropriation. The Hebrews forgo the opportunity to invoke the sacred center directly; in Exodus, God gives his name to Moses as a declarative sentence (see my Science & Faith, 1991).

    5

    Antisemitism, itself a victimary claim, is the paradigm for what is condemned by the victimary thought that comes to dominate the postmodern era. But although antisemitism is very different from garden-variety racism—that, for example, of the segregated South—postwar victimary rhetoric refuses to distinguish between the denunciation of the Jews’ sacred priority and the subordination of groups judged inferior. Since murdering the mentally ill, Gypsies, Russians, political opponents, and homosexuals is “just as evil” as killing the Jews—and many Jews and non-Jews, suffering from Holocaust fatigue, insist on this equivalence to the point of reproach—the horrors of Nazism (and of the less salient but almost equally vicious Japanese racism) provoked a reaction against the subordination of groups who aroused no envy of firstness in their dominators beyond a Rousseauian nostalgia for the “natural.” The colonial powers didn’t envy their foreign subjects; they simply considered them to be at a lower stage of human development, whether (unjustifiably) in terms of their humanity itself or (justifiably) in terms of their social organization. After WWII, what was condemned in either case was a dominant group oppressing a less powerful one, irrespective of the ideology that justified the oppression.

    The conflation of antisemitism with garden-variety racism not only treats the “first” as the “last”; it also raises the “last” to the status of the “first.” Because the persecution of the Jews is founded on resentment of attributed superiority, their relegation to an inferior status is not justified by a claim of lesser competence. And since the Nazi-Jew distinction is the paradigmatic model of differential status, it has been implicitly taken to invalidate any claim of lesser competence even when grounded on objective evidence. The envy that is an essential component of antisemitism is reproduced ex post facto by the granting of preferences to victim groups; compensatory firstness replaces historical firstness.

    Rejecting firstness inspires no guilt; it is “lastness” that is synonymous with victimage. Thus there is no anti-antisemitic white guilt to complement the anti-racist variety; where the racist openly despises his victim’s “lastness,” the antisemite can never admit his envy of Jewish firstness and so, even if repentant, does not convert his envy to guilt. Only during the immediate postwar years, before Israel gave evidence of having the most powerful army in the Middle East, did the Jews, viewed as the hapless victims of the Holocaust, benefit substantially from white guilt. The Jews have had the curious experience of going in the space of a single generation from Untermenschen to “Whitey,” from being discriminated against because of who they are to being discriminated against—admittedly in a far more benign fashion—for who they are not.

    In this misunderstanding of its causes, half the lesson of the Holocaust has remained unlearned. On the one hand, status privileges must be abolished to include all humans in an emerging global humanity, but on the other—and this tends to be forgotten—historical firstness must be preserved from guilty attempts to deny its validity, lest all be swallowed up in murderous resentment. Precisely because humans are the most mimetic creatures, they advance by imitating each other rather than by each discovering each truth independently; human historicity depends on someone going first. Refusal of the firstness without which the human is inconceivable is tantamount to nihilism, the hatred of Being.

    Hiroshima mon amour

    That the Holocaust would inspire a postwar sense of guilt in Germans and their willing and unwilling WWII allies is understandable enough; the connection of white guilt to Hiroshima requires further explanation. The most prescient and insightful demonstration of this connection is no doubt the 1959 Duras-Resnais film Hiroshima mon amour, one of the masterpieces of the New Wave. After making his reputation in 1955 with Nuit et brouillard, the first commercial documentary of the concentration camps—in which the word “Jew” is never mentioned, although yellow stars are visible in one or two shots—Alain Resnais became a consecrated artist with a film in which the only representatives of the Axis powers are powerless, innocent victims. Yet Hiroshima mon amour‘s aesthetic power attests to its ethical power as well; this is the beginning of a postwar sense of guilt whose object is not any specific national violence, German or Japanese, but that of the human species—our own. Conceived a little over a decade after the end of WWII, this film poses the aesthetic and ethical necessity of attributing victimary status to the war’s aggressors simply because they were also its losers.

    Hiroshima depicts the last day of a French actress’ transitory affair with a Japanese businessman in Hiroshima, where she is making a pacifist film. It begins (after its famous opening shots of the lovers’ bodies in the shower) with a lengthy documentary sequence in both Hiroshima’s hospital and its museum, where we witness, presumably through the actress’ eyes, both surviving victims and evidence of the bombing, including a filmed Japanese reenactment. As the actress recounts her visit in voice over, she insists that she has “seen everything” in Hiroshima; her lover replies that she has “seen nothing,” implying that only the victims themselves could “see” the bombing and its effects. Neither in this sequence nor elsewhere in the film is there any indication that the bombing ended a war between the US and Japan, let alone that this war began with a sneak attack by the Japanese.

    The film not only portrays the Japanese as victims of the bomb; the sole representative of Germany too is a victim. We learn in the course of the day that as an adolescent living with her family during the Occupation in the central French city of Nevers (the resemblance to “never” is surely not coincidental), the actress had had a love affair with a German soldier with whom she hoped to return to Germany after the war. But the soldier is killed by French partisans; the girl finds him dying on arriving at a rendezvous. After Liberation, her hair is shorn and she is confined in a cellar for several months by her parents as punishment for consorting with the enemy. On her release from the cellar, she leaves Nevers for Paris; since then, she has never returned to Nevers nor told her love story to anyone but the Japanese man, who expresses pride in being the only person to have heard it. Earlier in the film we were given, in a quick flashback, a glimpse of the soldier’s hand lying on the earth, a memory inspired by (and matched to) her sleeping Japanese lover’s hand in the same position on the bed. Although the actress is now married, we learn nothing about her (presumably French) husband. The German is the one man she has truly loved; the Japanese is so to speak his reincarnation.

    Hiroshima mon amour portrays the conversion of the losers of the war into its victims through the eyes of a citizen of a defeated nation that ended up on the winning side. On a number of occasions, lifeless Nevers is contrasted with lively postwar Hiroshima. In the couple’s long nocturnal walk that is the climactic sequence of the film, shots of the actress walking through Hiroshima’s streets are intercut with shots of Nevers that display the city as a ghost town populated only by dark, empty, sinister buildings. If victorious France has lost its soul, through the sacrifice of Hiroshima defeated Japan has been reborn. In the film’s final sequence the lovers meet for the last time in the actress’ hotel room the night before her departure from Japan. In the exchange that concludes the film, she tells him “You are Hiroshima” and he answers, “And you are Nevers, in France.” The characters have no other names. But whereas he takes the name of an injured but reborn city, she continues to bear the name of her native town abandoned long ago, a name chosen for its temporal emptiness.

    6

    The implicit moral message of Hiroshima is that identification with the defeated adversary-as-victim is the only true road to peace; now that humanity has demonstrated its potential for self-destruction, the self’s own violence is the chief danger that must be controlled. Omitting the enemy’s violence from Hiroshima mon amour is not tantamount to claiming that it did not exist, but simply that it is absent henceforth from the life of the (victorious) subject. If we permit ourselves to think beyond the film’s historical amnesia to the war itself, the impression we are left with is that irrespective of who began the fighting or what would have happened had the starters been the winners, the final, victorious act of violence was the only one that was not part of a reciprocal exchange and must consequently be the unique focus of our guilt. The violence we must avoid above all is the unanswered “excess” that defines (real or symbolic) victory, whether in the A-bombed Japanese cities or in firebombed Dresden, scene of Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five (1969). The bearer of white guilt must identify with the defeated adversary as a means of denying complicity with the violence exercised by his own society on his behalf.

    However uncomfortable one may be with its effacement of the crimes of the Axis, Hiroshima mon amour does not blame the Allies and takes no cheap shots at the Americans who made and carried out the decision to drop the bomb. White guilt is focused more on pitying the adversary-victim than on condemning one’s own side. Even where such condemnation can be implied, notably in the sequence devoted to the heroine’s confinement, it is never given a political dimension beyond its historical moment and suggests no program other than generalized pacifism. The anthropological value of this historical amnesia is that it permits us to focus on the asymmetry of victory without taking sides. The bomb’s asymmetry that ended the war also ended “total war”; even in its primitive state it provided a first vision of our self-extermination. This lyric, apolitical moment of victimary thinking was suitable for the genius of Marguerite Duras, the author of the Hiroshima screenplay and the most important French novelist since Proust. Duras’ fiction, most strikingly in her masterpiece, Le ravissement de Lol V. Stein (1964), reveals better than any other the latent power of the passive, feminine position of the “loser” in love’s triangle, and by extension of all losers, as if debunking in advance the victimary era she would anticipate.

    Although white guilt as a motivation to political action derives from both Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Hiroshima mon amour suggests the primacy of the latter over the former. No word of allusion to the fate of the Jews could be permitted, lest the German soldier-lover and by extension his Japanese counterpart be implicated in it. Hiroshima mon amour gave narrative form to the legacy of Hiroshima: the divorce of the condemnation of violence from the question of ends, and consequently from history.

    Is man’s inhumanity to man worse than the annihilation of mankind? One can recover from the first, but not the second. Whatever depths of evil may motivate “the will to power,” it is less likely to eliminate the human altogether than a nihilism that makes suicide the guarantee of the purity of its intentions. Does the slaughter in Rwanda inspire as much fear as a suicide terrorist with an atomic weapon? The first is scarcely unprecedented; the second, definitely so. And whereas ethical progress is glacial, perhaps even chimerical, technological progress is continually accelerating. Where would we be if all war and organized violence had evolved out of existence but the means of destroying the entire planet were at the disposal of the average person?

    Yet to abandon the priority of Auschwitz is to put an end to human dignity. If extermination as an end in itself fails to horrify us more than even the most terrible destruction conceived, even erroneously, as a lesser evil, then what humanity have we left to save? Thus the Auschwitz-Hiroshima debate is one best avoided; we can devote the time we save to meditating on the significance of the temporal coincidence of the project of genocide with the creation of weaponry that could wipe out our entire species. But the more immediate task is to understand the specific contribution of each to the victimary paradigm that defines the postmodern era.

    Vietnam

    The crisis of the Vietnam War, reinforced by the student unrest in France, made the year 1968 the historic moment when the asymmetrical force of Hiroshima met the moral dichotomy of Auschwitz in the first genuine political movement of white guilt. The youth of the educated class, spurred by the military draft that threatened it with active participation and possible death, condemned the American war effort not merely because we were employing “excessive” means of violence as at Hiroshima, but above all because “we” who were “bombing Vietnam back into the stone age” had become the Nazis. (Remember “Hey, hey, LBJ, how many children did you kill today?”) I well recall the revelatory force of this new perspective. Its power did not come from a simple sense of guilt. On the contrary, it was driven by the necessity of disculpating ourselves, in particular for avoiding military service in Vietnam: if we were the Nazis, then refusing to fight was a courageous act. This catalyst, which affected some more directly than others, inspired the doctrine that although “We” as representatives of American power were Nazis everywhere, most definitely including at home, “we” as university radicals were domestic victims of the Establishment fighting back on a par with the admired “Vietcong.” Characteristically, a brochure made the rounds in 1968 entitled “The Student as Nigger” (cf. the Québécois Nègres blancs d’Amérique).

    The adolescent form of white guilt that was born at this historical moment had as its midwife the divergence of interests, more apparent than real, between university-based radicals and the Establishment upon whom the guilt was heaped. As in all social movements, but particularly in the symbol-driven variety—a category that 1960s New Leftists shared with 1830s Romantics—a temporary dichotomy of interests was used to define a “class” distinction that masked the more fundamental identity of the rebellious group with its opponents. By finding Nazism everywhere, 60s radicals could justify prolonging their adolescence in study as a form of revolt rather than as passive acquiescence in the “system.” The projection of guilt onto the Establishment created a dichotomy between good guys and bad guys that masked the significance of the attribution of guilt to one’s own country, to one’s own social class, and ultimately to oneself. Nor should we dwell overmuch on the desire for self-preservation that motivated the student radicals; if this had been the source rather than merely the catalyst of white guilt, it would have died out with the end of the Vietnam war, and certainly with the end of the draft. The subsequent expansion of white guilt, so strongly with us today, belies this narrow interpretation.

    In contrast with conflicts typified by the “class conflict” beloved of Marx, which arguably oppose representatives of lifelong structural roles in the community, the conflict that interests us here reflects in its inception the mobile “Oedipal” dichotomy of youth vs age. Although this temporary difference contrasts with “ascriptive” differences such as race, gender, and sexual orientation, it can nevertheless serve as a model for all victimary stances; just as the “oppressed” youth becomes an adult, so the victim of racial or sexual discrimination comes to receive the protection of the laws and even some preferential treatment. And just as the youth wishes to remain in adolescence yet be treated as an adult, so the minority practitioner of victimary rhetoric wants to retain his or her victimary status yet be judged against the temporal horizon of full equality. The self-perpetuation of “temporary” affirmative action programs reflects this paradoxical temporality.

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    The 1960s middle-class radical who regarded his elders with contempt had no social praxis other than theirs to which he could refer. To “drop out” of society à la Timothy Leary was to condemn oneself to marginality, as only a few of that generation actually did. The typical 60s radical—who had once sung Phil Ochs’ derisive “Love me, love me, love me, I’m a liberal!”—became a liberal Democrat; a smaller number, including (to practice full disclosure) myself, disillusioned with the New Left rather than simply outgrowing it, adopted some version of (neo)conservatism. In either case, they were absorbed into what Marcuse in 1964 rather illogically called the “one-dimensionality” of the “system,” reduced to fighting their battles in the predefined political arena, or occasionally (as at WTO meetings) demonstrating noisily outside it.

    This evolution of the erstwhile radicals is not a return to an earlier stage of political opposition. The major parties’ political positions themselves, formerly rough approximations to roles in “class conflict,” remain infused by the new opposition opened up in the 1968 era between the “guilty” and their denouncers. On whichever side one finds oneself, it is impossible to deny that white guilt, for or against, has become the central issue of Western politics, yet more critically in Europe than in the US. Whether the West should admit its “imperialism” and accommodate Islamic sensitivities or whether it should offer the superiority of its system as an example is an issue that far transcends any specific instance of conflict.

    White Guilt as Faith

    When we discover that subjects such as white guilt do not lend themselves to rational discussion, we habitually call our differences “political,” implying that it is the self-interest of the disputants that poses an obstacle to disinterested debate. A better description of these difficulties is that they are religious. It is not facetious to point out the sacred component of postmodern white guilt; although this attribution does not suffice to explain the phenomenon, it makes clear what kind of resistance to change it sets up. Victimary rhetoric’s constant reference to the Nazi-Jew model is in the first place a denunciation of a false sacred that affirms the ontological truth of human difference. What the Auschwitz demonstration founds is not simply a new stage of moral history, although this aspect is not to be ignored; it is a new paradigm of sacrality, or in other terms, a new mode of explicit confrontation of the empirical with the transcendent. Throughout the history of the great Prisoners’ Dilemma that is human society, it is sacred representation in its various forms that holds in check the temptation of defection by preserving the memory of violence averted and redirected.

    But to take Auschwitz as demonstrating that all asymmetry is evil is to reject out of hand the problematic necessity of firstness, and thereby to fall into the very discriminatory mode against which the postmodern originally defined itself. The characteristic postmodern hostility to Israel—”anti-Zionism”—expresses indignation that the Jews, whose status as absolute victims was the point of departure for postmodernism, have returned to their old ways of self-assertion. As its promoters claim, this attitude is not identical to classical antisemitism. But what is painfully naïve about those who make this claim is their ignorance that this anti-Zionist indignation repeats trait for trait the old antisemitism; calling the Israeli Jews “Nazis” is really just a way of calling them… Jews.

    Religion characteristically extrapolates from the power of the sacred to regulate human society by attributing the violence of nature to “acts of God,” that is, of our God, whose severity and benevolence alike are responses to our actions or at any rate means of provoking us to virtue. Removing the divinity merely short-circuits the causal chain by eliminating all wills but our own. Thus, whereas considered from the standpoint of its “diverse” cult objects, white guilt is a kind of pantheism, its focus is not on these objects but on the guilty subject, who is less interested in celebrating the glory of the not-self than in preempting the accusation that he is victimizing it. That the white guilt paradigm is less about helping the victims than about denouncing the victimizing Other in ourselves—and in those less morally sensitive than we—is clear from its vast expansion in the post-Vietnam era, beyond non-ethnic human categories to animals, plants, and the planet in general. The environmentalism of the past decade—acid rain, ozone layer, global warming—ignores well-attested natural climatic cycles in its desire to blame climate change on “unnatural” human activity. A whole new set of Pharisees has arisen whose lives are focused on denouncing, and sometimes violently aggressing, what they judge to be the inadmissibly non-reciprocal treatment of humans, animals, and things.

    Traditional wisdom warned of the dangers of hubris, but this hostility to human pride is no mere humility. It demonstrates that in the absence of a commonly recognized God, guilt alone becomes the mark of the sacred. White guilt is the ultimate secular religion. God reveals himself to Saul on the road to Damascus as the person whom he persecutes. In the post-Christian version of this revelation, God is revealed through the guilt that accompanies the self-affirmation of one’s being as firstness, as (temporary) non-reciprocity. The sacred guarantees of firstness, which Christianity had traditionally sidestepped rather than challenged (“Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s”), have disappeared; the bearer of privilege is ipso facto a victimizer.

    A generation after Vietnam, although the faith of white guilt remains secure, its works have not been impervious to the lessons of history. On the domestic front, the Clinton-era welfare reform, highly successful as these things go, is a sign of a new flexibility. Similarly, it is no longer unthinkable to express resistance to affirmative action programs. Today, especially since 9/11, the real battles of white guilt are fought on the international stage, focused on two families of victims, passive and active.

    The first family is what can still be called the “third world”: poor, highly stratified societies with a negligible impact on the global economy. We have no clear guidelines for dealing with such enormous differences in wealth and economic opportunity once they come into play in the global context. Since the end of the colonial era, during which the great powers, with varying mixes of hypocrisy, rapacity, and genuine concern, had taken their cultural-economic superiority as an explicit justification for political dominance, many third-world countries have been governed by kleptocracies to which the first world provides aid with little guarantee that it will be well employed—a formula for economic and political stagnation demonstrably inferior to all but the worst forms of colonialism. Our contact and commerce with these populations is minimal; we know them only abstractly as “victims.” When, as in Rwanda a few years ago or in Darfur today, we see real victims being slaughtered, we never seem to be able to do very much about it.

    Far different is the case of the second family, the Islamic Middle East. Unlike the rest of the once-colonized world, Islam retains old memories of political dominance over the West; its post-colonial resentment has increasingly taken the form of jihadist terrorism in a mythical return to the era of Muslim conquest that ended in the fifteenth century.

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    Both families of victims are indispensable components of the white-guilt universe. White guilt is primarily a posture of compassion, not fear, yet as our relative indifference to Africa demonstrates, without the fear, there is little stimulus to implement the compassion. If the third world’s unthreatening despair provides Western white guilt’s moral guarantee, fear of the Islamic threat supplies its urgency. What explains the extraordinary indulgence afforded the Palestinians is that they combine both factors, arrayed as they are against the West’s perennial exemplars—and scapegoats—of scandalous firstness.

    Conclusion

    To trace the genealogy of white guilt is not to put an end to the dilemma it reflects. Human morality demands reciprocity; postmodern white guilt is a reaction to history’s most atrocious failure of reciprocity—Auschwitz—which coincided with the discovery of the most extreme technical means of imposing non-reciprocity—Hiroshima. Today’s globalizing world is built on these foundations. The traditional Christianity that justified the acceptance of life’s inequities by contrasting the limited possibilities of this earth to the transcendent kingdom of God could not survive the Holocaust intact. Antisemitism has always been the ultimate test of Christianity, and the ultimate triumph of antisemitism in Europe put an end to the role of European Christianity as an important social force. Even the papacy, its most vigorous institution, maintains its influence more through the celebrity-sacred of the papal “event” than the liturgy and rituals of the Church. In the United States, where the shrinking mainline Protestant churches are dominated by white guilt to the point of undertaking divestment-from-Israel campaigns, the principal religious response to the challenge of Auschwitz has been an evangelical Christianity that emphasizes both the individual’s relationship to Jesus (rather than to the Other) and the exceptional role of the United States as an example to the world. It is only apparently paradoxical that red-state evangelicals are closer to the implicit politics and even the intellectual values of generative anthropology than the bicoastal secular intelligentsia, whose professional and educational status would seem to make them the natural audience for the minimal theology of originary thinking. Secularist denial of the sacred and its relevance to moral issues is less, not more parsimonious than religious belief. Conversely, the compatibility of the originary hypothesis with religious belief demonstrates its own parsimony. It is a corollary of the hypothesis that the becoming-arbitrary of the linguistic sign (formal representation) be accompanied by the reaffirmation through religion and art of the experiential substance of the originary event (institutional representation).

    No one disagrees on the basic principle of morality: reciprocity is implicit in the human use of representation. Yet, unlike a mathematical function—or a market transaction—reciprocity does not operate instantaneously; it cannot function without firstness. Someone must initiate the exchange, even when saying hello. The genius of Marcel Mauss’ little book Essai sur le don (The Gift) is that it describes what we all do every day in our personal lives without realizing that we are participating in a “tribal” rather than a bourgeois economy. When we give a gift, we don’t expect an immediate gift in return, let alone a cash payment. The delay in returning the gift exists for its own sake as an element of the deferred exchange that maintains the social order. It is this mode of exchange that explains the anomalous inclusion of the promise among Austin’s performatives. I can’t dub, marry, or induct, or even in most circumstances declare, but I can always promise, because this is one institutional act that must be performable by every speaker of human language in order to affirm his allegiance to humankind.

    White guilt rejects this moral configuration of firstness and deferral for fear of the non-reciprocity to which it always threatens to lead. It is a fallacy to think that when we dispense with the anthropomorphic representation of the sacred center (“God is dead”) we have done away with the necessity of a sacred guarantee of difference. White guilt is the pessimistic version of this fallacy. In God’s absence the guilty subject makes himself the guarantee of the ultimate reciprocity into which difference must dissolve, suffering within the temporal limitations of human life the tension between real and ideal that had hitherto been the responsibility of immortals. This is far from the optimism of Enlightenment and even from that of Nietzschean liberation from ressentiment; white guilt cannot forget the Nazi perversion of this Nietzschean optimism. The ontological affirmation of human non-reciprocity is evil and must be denounced, but to denounce non-reciprocity not merely transcendentally but empirically is to define the human condition by resentment rather than transcendence.

    The Enlightenment saw the sacred as superstitious, a residue of the past (the sense of the Latin word) that the intellectual elite, at least, could cast aside. Originary thinking, although non-theistic, makes no such claim. The originary hypothesis is a “minimal sacred” that provides a point of comparison for other supposedly minimal models of morality that hide their sacred roots rather than displaying them. The state of world affairs makes increasingly clear that by endorsing the Other’s resentment, the religion of white guilt has incited the return of the sacred in its most crudely sacrificial forms. When one inhabits a moral environment where only losers are considered virtuous, one had better reevaluate one’s criterion of virtue before being forced to face the consequences of its realization.