Author: staceymeeker

  • On Realism

    We customarily recognize a transhistorical polarity between realistic and symbolic or “idealistic” modes of representation, according to the respective primacy of the referent or the sign. At the symbolic pole, the esthetic object is grasped by the audience as transparent to its meaning within its cultural context; conversely, a realistic representation presents its object as a contingent source of new information presumably independent of this context. Ernst Gombrich has described the gradual and by no means linear advance of representational realism throughout the history of Western art, much as Erich Auerbach has done in the literary realm.

    The fact that the symbolic object is already the embodiment of the sign whereas the “realistic” object is still being examined for its appetitive qualities might be taken to suggest that realism precedes symbolism. But although there are celebrated examples of realism in early cave art (along with a much greater number of highly schematic representations), both our intuition and the historical evidence suggest rather that realism is a late mode, that far from reflecting a preliminary examination of the appetitive qualities of the object, it derives from a second look that follows its sacralization by the sign and is a part of the movement by which the object, once its inaccessibility has been thus established, is freely reinvested with appetitive value in anticipation of the sparagmos that follows. The phenomenon of pornography, which thrives on “lifelike” detail, confirms this interpretation. Or if we take as our example the realism of a portrait, the more precise its details, the more “consumable” it is, the more it provokes a visceral reaction, whether of desire or of repulsion, in contrast with a more idealized portrait to which our reaction is largely determined by our cultural knowledge of its subject. Whereas the first look at the object, which leads to the aborted gesture of appropriation that subsequently becomes the sign, is one of prehuman appetite, the second look is an appetitive evaluation liberated from the danger of mere appetite by the sign. The realist attitude is one of an attentive but superior will, able to see the object “objectively,” without falling under its spell.

    But because realism is concerned with evaluation, not appetitive satisfaction, it tends to turn the sacrificial nature of the scene into a critique of the society that exacts the sacrifice. Realism has a faintly revolutionary taint, as reflected in the slogan of “socialist realism”: to display the real is to refuse its absorption by the symbolic-ritual framework of society, and consequently to contest this framework as incapable of absorbing it. The rise of realism as an esthetic movement occurs at a time when the ritual framework of society has been undermined by the secularizing force of the market system. That the framework of ritual laws could be replaced by the voluntary exchanges of the market in what we call consumer society is hinted at in the first great realist novel, Madame Bovary—and caricatured in prescient fashion in that great misunderstood satire, Huysmans’ A rebours.

    Realism must be distinguished from the category of popular art, which, in contrast to high art focused on the moment in which the central object is renounced and obliges us to identify with the central figure as victim, belongs to the moment of appetitive satisfaction that coincides with the sacrificial violence of the sparagmos.


    The literary term realism originated in France in the wake of the secular disillusionment that followed the failure of the 1848 revolution and the establishment of the Second Empire. What was particularly galling to the liberal bourgeoisie after 1851 was that in destroying the Republic Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte had been defending their own class interests. In contrast with the Second Republic’s unsustainable attempts at inter-class harmony, as exemplified by the Ateliers nationaux that were supposed to provide work for the unemployed, the Emperor’s electoral semi-despotism provided the necessary framework for France’s transformation into a modern industrial society. The political emasculation of the bourgeoisie was prerequisite to its economic success.

    The failure of romantic politics exposed the illusion of romantic art, the seamless communion of artist and audience exemplified by Victor Hugo’s cry in the Preface of Les contemplations: “Insensé qui crois que je ne suis pas toi!” [“Foolish one who thinks that I am not you!”] The literary forms that corresponded to this historical irony were the ironic “Satanism” of Baudelaire’s poetry and the equally ironic nihilism of Flaubert’s prose. The choice to place on the scene of representation an object that bore its contingency on its face reflected the postromantic emphasis on the arbitrariness of the will of the esthetic creator who could no longer depend on the Hugolian communion of souls. At the same time, contingency invested the central object with a value as an object of consumption.

    Duranty’s journal Le réalisme panned Madame Bovary on its appearance in 1857—and had it still been around in 1869, it would probably have treated L’éducation sentimentale even worse. Flaubert never considered himself a realist; his fascination was not with the realists’ mediocre reality but with the revelatory aspect of the real that he referred to as la bêtise, embodied in objects of egregious contingency, including the bizarre historical products of the human imagination, whose “reality” for us is guaranteed by the fact that we could never have conceived them ourselves. The gargoyles and other grotesqueries of the middle ages do not carry the message of raw contingency that we find in Flaubert’s realism; they are figures of the devil whose antithetical reality Victor Hugo fancied he could synthesize with that of God, whereas there is no conceivable synthesis between la bêtise and an authorial consciousness external to the text—which Flaubert claimed to inhabit like God in his creation. The effet de réel described in Barthes’ famous essay is not so much a metonymic detail as a detail irreducible to any figure—except that of the non-figurality of the “fetishistic” object of consumption. The ironic presence of this contingent real that reaches its paroxysm in the en-soi of Sartre’s 1938 La nausée begins as an analogy to the contingency of the industrial capitalism of the Second Empire.

    It was inevitable that one day Flaubert would be credited despite himself as the chief “realist” novelist. The underlying attitude toward reality expressed in every aspect of his writing from his stylistic innovations (free indirect discourse, narration in the imperfect tense, anti-dramatic sentence patterns such as ending with a long adverb…) to his alternative fondness for “orientalist” excess and ironically underplayed contemporaneity—the twin modalities of bêtise—is the foregrounding of the contingency of the real. Lesser writers such as Zola—who always acknowledged his Flaubertian ancestry—and the Goncourts—who did not—would subsequently associate this contingency with a class-based social critique, whether or not they endorsed a historical eschatology—”socialism”—predicated on this critique.

    What for Flaubert is an ontological offense that we can escape only through art, the lesser realists saw as a social problem resolvable by politics—or by religion. It was the Empire’s decline and fall in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 that inspired Zola to interpret its economic salvation of the bourgeoisie as its political (and moral) damnation. Zola built his twenty-volume Rougon-Macquart series around the historical conceit that the Second Empire, whose necessity Flaubert accepted (and to which he quietly expressed his loyalty—Sartre dedicated nearly an entire volume of L’idiot de la famille to the analysis of Flaubert’s decision to accept the Emperor’s award of the Légion d’honneur), was the carrier of the “disease” of capitalist greed and that the defeat of 1870 was not merely a punishment but a purgation. The Flaubertian ontology of post-1848 French literary realism opposed the radical contingency of the real to a transcendental source of meaning that becomes increasingly explicit in Flaubert’s own work, moving from the abstract locus of the authorial position in Madame Bovary through Frédéric Moreau’s pre-novelistic “C’est là ce que nous avons eu de meilleur!” [“That was our best moment!”] in L’éducation sentimentale to the Christian themes of the Trois contes and La tentation de Saint-Antoine and finally the authorial copying of Bouvard et Pécuchet. The figures of transcendence that appear in all Flaubert’s works after 1870 are ascetic in the extreme: a wormy stuffed parrot, a leper, the head of John the Baptist. What Flaubert’s career tells us about realism is that its focus on contingency hides an appeal to transcendence, one realized in Zola’s post-Rougon-Macquart-Second-Empire utopias, Maupassant’s evolution toward “spirituality,” and Huysmans’ toward a strongly anti-material—and antisemitic—Catholicism. Barbey’s quip that the author of A rebours would have to choose between la bouche d’un pistolet et les pieds de la Croix [the barrel of a pistol and the feet of the Cross] could be applied to the entire realist movement, and to quite a few symbolist poets as well. The obsession with the contingent real as a sign of disenchantment can best be overcome by a return to the old ritual values, which in the late nineteenth century offered an increasingly institutional—and political—respite from the market. Flaubert’s final religion of copying looks forward to Proust rather than to Huysmans or Léon Bloy.


    André Bazin among others pointed out that the cinema was less a product of technological advance than its goal. Recording and reproducing reality, with mechanical fidelity whenever possible, was a 19th-century passion, and cinema would become the ultimate expression of this passion. The public film spectacle was an extension of a trend begun with the romantic theater of putting the entire world on stage, including by the end of the century sea battles in water tanks, false mountains, and teams of horses and camels. Lumière’s publicly shown 50-second vignettes were for the most part documentaries of everyday reality, in contrast with Edison’s peepshows, filmed in his “Black Maria” studio, which showed “private” acts, including sexual ones, as befitted their private mode of presentation.

    Not long after the invention of cinema, the emergence of the one- to two-hour cinematic narrative that we have come to call a film demonstrated that the temporality of the moving picture makes it an intrinsically narrative mode and consequently, like theater, an appropriate vehicle for a public spectacle. What concerns us here is how this form of spectacle comes to be associated with realism, particularly in the French tendency of the late 1930s known as poetic realism, the first of only two well-known filmic movements (the other is postwar Italian “neo-realism”) to be designated by this charged word.

    More akin to Zola than to Flaubert, Marcel Carné presents his fallen world with dead seriousness. (For simplicity’s sake, I refer to Carné as the auteur of his films, although they also bear the mark of screenwriter Jacques Prévert.) Le jour se lève (1939), generally acknowledged as the last and greatest poetic-realist film, begins with Gabin/François’ murder of the sinister Valentin, the corrupter of the ingénue Françoise. The action remains confined within the room in which François locks himself for the duration of the film, preparing the end by recalling his story in a series of three flashbacks, after which, as the police close in, he shoots himself through the heart. As in the earlier Le quai des brumes (1938), the source of the fictional world’s corruption is defined as a vaguely Semitic figure of evil, but the revelation embodied in this definition has now become the plot of the film. In Le quai, Gabin-Jean kills Zabel to liberate his beloved, Zabel’s ward Nelly, from her tutor’s increasingly explicit sexual advances; the murder has no causal connection with the hero’s death at the hand of a young gangster in the concluding scene that follows. In contrast, the fact that Le jour begins with the murder proclaims its lack of purgative effect. Valentin’s death not only prefigures François’ own, it does nothing to liberate Françoise, who in her final appearance in the film, while declaring her futile love for François, cries that she is unable to move.

    Le jour, with its circular structure and despairingly ironic conclusion–the sun rises through the vapor of tear-gas on François’ body lying among the debris of his room, as we hear the ringing of his alarm clock–seems designed to demonstrate that the ordinary desires of ordinary people are incapable of founding a praxis, even a “tragic” one. The only meaningful temporal progression–the only possible plot–is then the discovery of this fact. François has no dreams of transcending his own sphere; all he wants from life is to marry Françoise, who is emphatically designated as his female equivalent–not only do they share this archetypal French name and its “name-day,” they are both foundlings raised in a public orphanage. François’ desires are not the illusions of Emma Bovary or even Frédéric Moreau; they are the fundamental tropisms that make human existence possible, rendered impotent by the corrupting effect of Valentin.

    Realism after Flaubert–that of Zola and the Goncourts, and later of Huysmans (not to speak of “decadent” writers such as Pierre Louys or Octave Mirbeau)–is full of perverse sexuality. One could make the case that the genre that begins with Germinie Lacerteux and Thérèse Raquin is modeled on perverse sexuality. Our interest in these novels is neither one of straightforward identification nor of mere curiosity; to the extent that we become attached to their characters, we are attracted to their very degradation. In Le jour, more explicitly than in Le quai, the Gabin persona is perversely attracted to the figure of sexual evil. Several times François tells Valentin to go away, but he never does; in the scene in the bar (where Valentin falsely claims to be Françoise’s father), it is rather François who leaves. In the final flashback sequence, when Valentin invades the hitherto private space of François’ room–he is the only person in the film to do so–the latter, unable to shake off his corrupting presence, shoots him in a rage, half-realizing that by killing him he is also killing himself.

    Yet in contrast to novels’ complicity with their hypocrite lecteur, the images of sexual desire that Carné offers the spectator are devoid of perversity. We first see Françoise at the sand-blasting plant carrying a bouquet of flowers, and share François’ pleasure at this virginal sight. We later hear from Clara that Françoise has been intimate with Valentin, but in their only brief contact in the film, Valentin cancels their scheduled meeting. Here as elsewhere, Le jour concentrates and intensifies the themes of Le quai. Already Nelly’s image in that film, although scarcely virginal–we know she has been the voyou Lucien’s mistress–is far more respectable than in the Mac Orlan novel from which the film is adapted, where Nelly was the queen of the prostitutes of Montmartre. Whereas Nelly and Jean spend a night together, in Le jour, we see François in bed with Clara, but never with Françoise; there is no suggestion that they have been sexually intimate.

    Finding the virgin bride already soiled puts an end to the temporality of romance. But whereas the narratives of literary realism offered us desires we could share only perversely, Carné shows us as real the images of sexual beauty that for Emma and Frédéric are illusory (although Emma’s own sexual beauty is taken seriously enough), for Zola’s characters, sinful, and that the reader of Germinie is unlikely to conjure up at all. Because poetic realism takes as its theme the impossibility of “normal” desire, it insistently shows us the image of this desire; what is contingent is its non-fulfillment. The iconic immediacy of the image guarantees the normality of François’ original desire and makes plausible the externalization of perversity in the character of Valentin.


    Whereas 19th-century realism is understood as the narrative embodiment of the failure of romanticism in both literature and politics, we are accustomed to view poetic realism from a narrower historical perspective: the failure of the Popular Front, the growing threat of Nazism and war are reflected in a cinema of demoralization. Because film is a popular art dependent on appeal to a mass public, the explanation of poetic realism abstracts from esthetic history, implying a direct transference of “attitude” from the political conjuncture to the artwork, with Valentin as a scapegoat for the audience’s resentments.

    Modernism is the ultimate statement of the notion that the artist’s vision, rooted in desires more fundamental than language–and consequently than mimesis–is the sole source of authenticity. Unlike his romantic counterpart, the artist no longer desires or anticipates the adherence of the “bourgeois” spectator. What separates modernism from the post-romanticism of which literary realism is a part is that for the latter, the only transcendence of the bourgeois exchange system requires a return, whether ascetically anthropological, sentimentally “pre-industrial,” or traditionally religious, to the origin of this very society, whereas the modernist’s faith in the natural/primitive/Volkisch/ proletarian utopia built on the expulsion of bourgeois exchange permits him to give free rein to the expression of desires that the post-Romantic either repressed or experienced as “decadent”: Mallarmé gives way to Apollinaire.

    The demonization of Valentin does not merely reflect a popular or mass esthetic; it is a popular inflection of the “socialist” scenic structure of modernism. Carné shares both modernism’s valorization of “instinctive” desire and its contempt for the bourgeoisie; the difference is that he is a popular artist. Thus the object of our “instinct,” which modernism characteristically expresses in elite terms to avoid pleasing the bourgeois audience, takes the form of commonplace romantic imagery (a pretty girl with a bouquet of flowers), whereas the bourgeois is a bogey-man rather than a philistine. In both Le quai and Le jour only the two monsters, Zabel and Valentin, dress and speak as members of the bourgeoisie. The futility of their expulsion, made explicit in the latter film, reflects the simple fact that the bourgeois is indispensable to bourgeois society. The bourgeois is always already present as the father and seducer, and in the time of Nazism it is hard not to see him as the demonized Jew as well, the predecessor of the Christian who defiles his women and his culture before he can get there to protect them. François’ is the story of the modern ego destroyed by its inability to liberate its “proletarian” desires without incurring “bourgeois” corruption. If modernist optimism celebrates the liberation of desire from the constraints of the market and the discontents of “civilization,” its pessimistic mode shows this liberation as impossible, yet without denying its necessity.

    The conclusion we are led to concerning the unity of “realism” is that whereas 19th-century realism is founded on Flaubert’s fascinated denunciation of the bêtise of contingency while under the protection of a purely formal esthetic transcendence, the poetic realism of the 30s denounces not bourgeois reality’s contingency but its corruption. What is insisted on as real in the first case is the petit fait vrai, the silly little object that is the typical product of the exchange system. The emphasis in the second is on the power of that very object to reduce transcendent values to venality–thus the little brooch that Françoise gives to François as a unique gift of love he later learns is merely one of dozens offered by Valentin to his conquests. Emma’s consumerism eventually kills her, but the objects she buys are not pernicious in themselves; in Carné’s world, the exchange system pollutes everything that it touches.

    Postromantic reality is susceptible to being transfigured in an esthetic, and ultimately a religious gesture of transcendence; modernist reality is not, because both its desirability and its corruption preexist the self. The ironic sunrise that illuminates François’ corpse in his demolished room is the polar opposite of the one that offered Saint Anthony a parting vision of Christ. The source of modernist transcendence lies in a communal energy prior to the self, which the self must be destroyed in order to liberate. We could only have learned the key to our origin by observing the horror of the 20th century attempts to renew the originary event in the political sphere.


  • Questioning Generative Anthropology

    Chris Fleming of the University of Western Sydney, author of René Girard: Violence and Mimesis (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004) and co-author of three articles in Anthropoetics (most recently, Romanticism), was in California this month on an all too short study leave. During his trip, Chris brought up a few challenging questions. I have put these in my own words, so Chris should not be held responsible for the formulations that follow.

    1. From the beginning, GA has taken for granted that the minimality or parsimony of originary thinking is a sign of its validity. But what justifies making Ockham’s razor the ultimate criterion of an anthropological hypothesis? However simple it may be to speak of a single originary event during which all the essential categories of the human emerged, if some day we discover that these categories emerged over time, or in different places, should theoretical elegance trump correspondence with the facts? And even if there are no “facts” available to disturb our hypothesis, doesn’t taking minimality as an a priori reintroduce metaphysics at the heart of our minimally metaphysical anthropology?

    In its normal sense of requiring the postulation of the fewest parameters or “imaginary entities” necessary to account for a given phenomenon, Ockham’s razor applies to natural phenomena and to human phenomena considered in the same light as these. But the phenomena of human culture are not “empirical” but (in phenomenological terms) intentional. To utter a word is to perform a physical act, but we understand this act as the willed production of a token of a sign-type that in principle communicates a meaning, which is also a significance, to others who share the speaker’s sense of what is significant.

    Because the features of human representation are not arbitrary parameters, instrumental nominalism cannot be applied to a set of intentional categories that define the place of their object in human culture. The minimality of the originary hypothesis applies not to the parameters of the scenario it proposes but to the postulation of a single event in which human representation in both its formal/linguistic and institutional/ritual modes emerges as a transcendental phenomenon irreducible to worldly relations of substitution, which are in Peirce’s terms indexical rather than symbolic. The originary hypothesis is situated on the cusp between the world of “nature” and the human one of representational culture; its empirical plausibility is subordinate to and in fact dependent on its value as a heuristic or “paradigm” that offers a plausible explanation of the human-cultural phenomena it addresses. In a heuristic, as opposed to a quantitative model, the advantage of parsimony is intuitively obvious; it is for those who would deny the common origin of (sacred) significance and (symbolic) signification to explain what advantage their separation offers to the historical analysis of their divergence.


    2. Why, in contrast to postmodern “theory,” does GA lack drama, providing the reader with no narrative role, no imperative with which to identify?

    Minimalist anthropology shares the common task of all culture, which is to de-dramatize the world’s dramas before their bloody dénouement, but its mode of operation is cognitive rather than esthetic; it is minimally dramatic. The postmodern Western intelligentsia remains dominated by the political “drama” of identifying with the victimary forces in their revolt against authority, as if expiating the moral horrors revealed by WWII. All postmodern thinkers act out the same revolt: the center exercises an illegitimate hegemony that victimizes the periphery and must therefore be “deconstructed.” Author, Subject, Father, King, Phallus, God… are subjected to the same process of delegitimization. In the language of traditional ontology, it is Being itself that is delegitimized. One recalls the line from Anaximander that Heidegger discusses in Holzwege:

    Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away according to necessity; for they must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.Now that the injustice of “things” is so great that the penalty owed cannot possibly be paid, the loan of Being must be foreclosed.

    The “drama” or political agenda of postmodernism is opposed by that generally qualified as neoconservative, defined grosso modo as the affirmation of market society and of the human social order in general. A number of these Chronicles have taken neoconservative positions, including an exhortation to choose Bush over Kerry in the last US Presidential election. Yet in contrast with the intimate connection between postmodern victimary thought and the left-liberalism of the Western academy, no similar relationship holds between GA and neoconservative politics. The resurgence of conservative thought over the past 30-odd years is unconcerned with originary anthropology except insofar as it is implicit in conservative respect for religion. Perhaps in reaction to the insistent secularism of the left, neoconservative writings often fall back on religious conceptions of the human and even flirt with the “theory” of Intelligent Design. Whereas victimary thinking is founded on an originary model, however crude, of human interaction, neoconservatism is a practical movement with little patience for theoretical models not conducive to political action. Another way to put this is that victimary thinking appeals to systematic thinkers (like the philosophes or Marx), whose raison-d’être is the superiority of intellect over reality, whereas neoconservatism appeals to pragmatic thinkers (like Burke or Hayek) who subordinate intellectual parsimony to the common sense learned from history. The idea, fundamental to originary thinking, that historically grounded common sense is itself founded on intellectual parsimony consequently appeals to neither group.

    The principle of political philosophy implicit in the originary hypothesis is the primacy of reciprocal exchange. What then does originary thinking reject in victimary thinking’s universal application of the Auschwitz paradigm? Certainly we cannot object to the abolition of de jure social distinctions that was the accomplishment of the first phase of the postwar era. If morality is reciprocity, then the only excuse for hierarchy is to facilitate reciprocity, on the model of the apprenticeship of children to adults. Whatever the intention behind it, maintaining similar tutelage over adults of other cultures cannot be defended without denying the ultimate unity of the human. But every structure of reciprocity is built upon firstness. From the originary scene on, someone must always go first; and the advantage gained thereby is not immoral if it contributes to greater reciprocity in the long run. Because the radical form of victimary thinking that I call white guilt sees firstness as in principle illegitimate, it often proposes remedies–such as “affirmative action”–that generate more resentment than they allay.


    3. Given my frequent espousal of (neo)conservative positions, do I consider these to be deducible from GA? Does the presence of firstness in the generative model of reciprocal morality put GA “on the Right”?

    Only to the extent that today the attack upon the firstness of Western society from the “liberal” left poses a more urgent problem that the attack on its egalitarianism from the “paleoconservative” right. Although I respect John Rawls’s attempt to construct a model of the just society (see Chronicle 322), this model ignores both the fundamental danger to the social order from the resentment it generates and the dynamic nature of the exchange system by means of which this resentment is “recycled.” Rawls’s model of justice is entirely distributional; both one’s original endowment of “primary goods” and one’s opportunity for fulfilling one’s “plan of life” belong to the members of society as individuals rather than as participants in a system. Rawls’s references to community (a word not in his index) refer to “shared final ends” rather than to a genuinely interactive process. In Rawls’s vision of the just society, each person’s career is determined by his capital on entry and the realization of the opportunities it permits, as though society were an aggregate of people with varying fortunes each playing a slot machine with a personalized set of odds.

    Given the imperative of promoting reciprocal exchange, the goal of political decisions is to determine the optimal degree of firstness conducive to the maximization of reciprocity over a term dependent on the human life-span. (It is much easier to accept the advantages of others when you have reason to hope that you or at any rate your children have some likelihood of equaling them.) The failure of socialism, not merely in tyrannical, inefficient Soviet-bloc communism but even in the benign communal environment of the Israeli kibbutz, where the absence of salary differentials generates widespread resentment among the more productive, illustrates the necessity of incentives. The left-right political alternation of modern market societies reflects their need to recalibrate these incentives at regular intervals. Today Western Europe finally appears to be realizing that its systems are excessively socialistic, but we should not forget that the social-welfare orientation of these systems was itself a reaction, beginning in the Bismarckian era, to the excesses of inequality under early capitalism. Nor should these “excesses” be understood in a retroactively moralistic manner; to kick off modern industrial society, 19th-century misery was no doubt inevitable; to this misery, welfare-state social democracy was among the least disastrous 20th-century reactions. If the model of moral reciprocity obliges us to condemn the inequalities of past times, we should not forget that it is the accomplishment of those times to have made possible a functioning society that dispenses with their inequalities.

    There are points in time, however, when political judgments acquire the status of moral imperatives and create historical watersheds. “Auschwitz” is one such moment, with vast consequences for political systems everywhere; September 11 is another. It is easier to see such watersheds in retrospect, but just as Nazi gas chambers cannot be defended in any ethical context, neither can Islamist suicide bombings–even if more than a few people on “our” side like to think of September 11 as a justified consequence of our own policies.

    Today the extreme form of white guilt that thinks we have to “understand” even the vilest forms of hatred is but a stone’s throw from the mainstream of the American left. What originary thinking adds to the visceral conviction that we must defend our own way of life both for our own and for everyone’s sake is its emphasis on the fundamental necessity of exchange. Although there is room for differences of opinion as to what inequalities in wealth and income must be borne in order to maintain the market exchange system, those on the left in a democratic polity cannot afford to lose sight of the prior need to defend the system itself from its enemies.

    To sum up my answer to Chris’s final query, I think the scenic model of the originary hypothesis gives Generative Anthropology more than any other mode of thinking a justified claim to call itself a philosophy not of the right but of the center. Although this center is well to the right of today’s intellectual class, if the rightward trend of American politics continues, there may well be a time when GA will fall to the left of public opinion–perhaps even of the next generation of academic intellectuals.

    A moral rule of thumb is to make it one’s priority to combat the most virulent forms of hostility to the firstness that contributes to exchange: antisemitism and anti-Americanism, today so often tellingly combined. Today Jewish and American firstness are attacked for conferring political and economic privilege; not long ago, Jews were accused of “mongrelizing” natural hierarchy and Americans for spreading egalitarian vulgarity. The mature political view suggested by the originary hypothesis is one that learns to value the promise of future reciprocity over vengeance for present difference.


  • After Postmodernism: Performatism in Literature

    Consider the following case. We are introduced to a hero who was the sole survivor of a serious accident and had to fight for his life afterwards under adverse conditions. The hero describes his ordeal at great length to a second character. At first, his brave, uplifting story seems consistent and true. At the end, however, a host of clues make clear that parts of the tale must either be a fantasy or lie. There is no doubt that certain details contradict well-founded scientific knowledge of our physical world. After the hero has finished, the second character, who is professionally responsible for checking the story’s truth, declares that it must be false. The hero denies this but says he will offer a second story. This one is short, brutal and to the point. It repeats the basic content of the first story, but in a way not contradicting science and all known evidence. When asked about the discrepancy between the two stories, the hero answers by saying essentially this: “I am the sole witness to an accident in which I have lost everything dear to me. I have two stories that tell about it. One is beautiful and one is ugly. You have no way of knowing for sure which one is true. Which story would you prefer?” In the end, the second character’s report on the case is inconclusive. Based on the facts at hand, he says, he cannot determine how the accident happened. In wrapping up his report, however, he chooses to cite a detail from the hero’s first, false story rather than the second, more plausible one.

    Let’s look at how this stripped-down story (the full version was first published in 2002) corresponds to narrative strategies usually associated with postmodernism. As in many postmodernist narratives, it first causes us to identify with a central character and then abruptly undercuts the terms of that identification. However, one thing about it is odd. Rather than leaving us in an attitude of skeptical undecidability regarding the hero, as postmodernist texts tend to do, it encourages us to revise our skepticism and identify with his story even though we know it to be false. Our response is evidently supposed to follow that of the second character, who, though unable to reach a final conclusion regarding the facts, decides to cite the beautiful, untrue story. And, if we flesh out the story with more detail, things get odder still. For the hero is himself not just a witness to an accident, but also an ardent practitioner of Hinduism, Christianity and Islam (in later years he also studies the Cabbala to boot). When confronted with the contradiction involved in this kind of multiple allegiance, he says simply, “I just want to love God.” The point of the book is evidently to make us identify with and believe in a hero who wants to worship a central, unified deity at all costs.

    By now many readers will have identified my trimmed-down tale as Yann Martel’s Life of Pi (Martel 2002).(1) As my summary suggests, this popular and critically acclaimed book presents something of a logical challenge to postmodernism. Where postmodernism revels in skepticism, Life of Pi encourages belief; where postmodernism offers competing, equally plausible worlds, Life of Pi gives us a choice between what is false and what is most likely true; and where postmodernism favors decentered, deceptive states of knowing, Life of Pi focuses on unity, willpower and love. While it’s certainly possible to deconstruct the latter position, it really isn’t much of a challenge to do so. The book itself makes clear that Pi’s belief is based on willful self-deceit, and it makes sure that knowledge of the true facts behind the accident will remain deferred forever. From a critical postmodern or poststructuralist point of view, the book seems to be pointless or trite. Why, after all, write a book making us identify with a metaphysical attitude that we know is demonstrably false to begin with?

    If Life of Pi were an anomaly within current literature, we might be able to write off its unpostmodern features as a kind of quirk, a personal whim of the author deserving no further critical notice. The problem is that in many current works of literature, this odd preference for positive metaphysical illusions, for narrative authoritativeness and for forced identification with central characters has become generic. If this trend continues–and there are very good signs that it will–it would mean a turn away from postmodernism towards a new, as yet uncharted type of aesthetic sensibility.

    As I have suggested above, this sort of sensibility is not accessible to the set of critical practices associated with poststructuralism. The problem is not so much that Life of Piresolutely resists deconstruction; it’s that Pi deconstructs its own metaphysical conceit so completely that there is hardly anything left for the canny poststructuralist reader to do. This happens because Life of Pi shifts the framework of its argumentation from an epistemological plane to an aesthetic one. The book says, in effect: “given that we can never know for sure what is true, isn’t it better to enjoy what is beautiful, good and uplifting rather than dwell on what is ugly, evil and disillusioning?” The book doesn’t however just pose this question as an abstract postulate. Instead, it forces it on us in terms of a concrete choice: we are given a long, beautiful story and a short, brutish one and asked to decide for one or the other. And this choice, of course, is part of a larger aesthetic set-up or trap. Readers opting for the more plausible, ugly tale will tire of it quickly and let the whole thing drop. Readers choosing the beautiful, untrue tale, by contrast, will continue to reflect on it while treating its precepts as something thatmight be true. This type of novel elicits a specific, aesthetically mediated performancefrom readers by forcing them to believe in a character or event within the frame of the fictional text. Indulging in this doubled suspension of belief might at first seem incautious or naive. However, it is a necessary precondition for all future acts of interpretation, which in themselves may be ironic, intricate and subtle.

    Because I’ve found this performative pattern recurring in so many recent works of literature (as well as in the cinema and architecture, too) I’ve decided to call the type of sensibility associated with it performatism. Since the original formulation has been around for a while now, I won’t go into it again in full detail.(2) However, because its premises are still alien to most critics and readers, I’d like to recall its most basic features before going on to discuss some specific works of literature.

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    At the core of performative narratives is an inner frame, which is often presented in the form of an originary scene. These scenes work by reducing human experience to a few simple givens that seem to bring us closer to the very beginnings of humanness itself. In the case of Pi, the originary scene is, of course, the lifeboat which he shares with a Bengal tiger (or a murderous cook, depending on how you look at it). Please note that these originary scenes are in no way authentic; they are neither entirely natural nor are they prior to semiosis. Rather, they expose characters to a radical, restrictive presence which they must transcend in some way (Pi, for example, must overcome the presence of the hungry tiger). Within the text, the originary scene or inner frame causes readers to identify in a certain set way with a character who is locked into a situation at the center of our attention. Because of their radical fencing-in of presence, originary scenes tend to be marked by the use of what Eric Gans calls ostensive signs.(3) These are simple, name-like signs that are used to designate present objects or states; in Gans’s version of the originary scene the first ostensive sign creates belief and beauty by wondrously deferring mimetic violence.(4) In this particular instance, the ostensive sign is a whistle sound which Pi uses to train the tiger not to attack him (the whistle is made to stand for the rocking of the boat, which makes the tiger seasick). In general, there has to be a lock or fit between the inner frame and the text whole (or outer frame) for the performatist plot to work. In the case of Pi, the immanent, ostensively mediated act of training the tiger (the inner frame) allows Pi not just to survive, but also to confirm his love of a transcendent God–the beautiful story which, taken as a whole, we have almost no choice but to believe (the outer frame). If, on the other hand, we accept the validity of a sober, disillusioned interpretation (the more plausible story about the cook), it would destroy the fit between the frames and lead to a deconstructive, though not very satisfying reading of the text as a whole. Once more, though, the choices we have here are very limited. This is not least because the ostensive way Pi that trains the tiger–by confronting him with something sickening every time he tries to attack–is transferred directly to the terms of reader response. The skeptic “attacking” the belief structure of the book gets an ugly story, the believer accepting it a beautiful one. Our doubts about believing something that is beautiful but probably not true are never eliminated; however, this self-doubt is now enclosed within the structure of belief itself. Although there is still a considerable irony involved in the way we are made to believe Pi’s story, this irony doesn’t vitiate the way we identify with him and his tale.(5) The ultimate frame of reference is performative, and not epistemological: it applies only within the confines of the particular text at hand. The point of the text is not to have us grasp a trace of truth by relating something in the text to something outside of it, but rather to make us believe and experience beauty within its own closed space. This is the common goal of all performatist fiction: it forces us, at least for the time being, to take the beautiful attitude of a believer rather than the skeptical attitude of a continually frustrated seeker of truth.(6) Hence our willingness to believe in Pi’s way of believing in God applies only within the peculiar world of the text. Outside its boundaries we can go back to being our old secular, skeptical selves again–if we so choose. The act of reading, however, has been turned toward an aesthetically mediated, closed act of believing rather than one of open-ended knowing.(7)

    The kind of framing or forced identification described above doesn’t rule out intertextual citations or critical reflection. These external factors must however always be subordinated to the unbending outer frame of the text. The frame, in other words, fences the text off from the truth conditions of discourse in general–that endlessly shifting, infinitely open realm in which seemingly singular, unequivocal arguments can always turn into their exact opposites.(8) While it may indeed be possible to be very skeptical about certain aspects of what is going on in the story, we nonetheless accept it because we have been made to find it beautiful. This makes the aesthetic mode–something that has traditionally always been roped off from the conditions of practical everyday judgment–the privileged place of argumentation. The difference between this performatist type of aesthetic and the traditional Kantian one is, however, that this one works by coercion: instead of adhering to formal, presumably transcendental attributes of beauty, the text forces us to decide for beauty in terms of a relative, very narrowly defined scene or frame. Performatist aesthetics are in a certain sense “Kant with a club”: they bring back beauty, good, wholeness and a whole slew of other metaphysical propositions, but only under very special, singular conditions that a text forces us to accept on its own terms.(9) The ironies and tensions growing out of this quid pro quoare incidentally more than enough to keep performatist reader responses alive and kicking. Readers are always well aware that their not-quite voluntary experiencing of beauty is part of a trade-off, and indeed one of the main aims of performatist literature is to encourage reflection on just what this trade-off entails. As the name “Pi” itself suggests, the problems raised by the hero’s story are not reducible to a whole, finite answer: the initially closed-off text raises a whole bundle of theological, ethical, and ideological issues whose discussion would exceed the scope of this essay. The point is not that Life of Pi resists being drawn into broader, uncontrollable contexts; it’s that the book enters into those contexts under its own terms and in a different way than was the case in postmodernism. Most notably, Life of Pi demands (and in a certain sense creates) a new type of reader who is willing to enter into the closed frame of the text and, at least for the time being, identify with its artificially rigged center before going off on his or her own. It would be going to far to say that performatist texts restitute subjectivity in the grand style that humanist critics of postmodernism have always been longing for. However, they do provide readers with a limited experience of identity-building under controlled, rather coercive conditions.

    This basic device of performatist narrative–framing the reader so as to force him or her to assume a posture of belief vis-à-vis a dubious fictional center–can be found in so much contemporary writing that a comprehensive survey is hardly possible within the confines of a single article. To underline the ubiquity of this turn away from postmodernism, I’ve singled out four further texts differing greatly in theme, genre and narrative style: Ingo Schulze’s Simple Stories (an episodic novel about German reunification with a distinctly American subtext); Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things (a classic of postcolonial literature); Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader (an erotically tinged treatment of post-Holocaust generational conflicts in Germany); and Olga Tokarczuk’s “The Wardrobe” (a programmatic short story by the most popular Polish writer of the postcommunist era).

    Sad Sacks vs. Smiles: Ingo Schulze’s Simple Stories

    One way of highlighting the difference between performatism and postmodernism is to take up a clear-cut case of intertextuality, which is to say one in which a narrative text deliberately cites–and modifies–a postmodern one in a way that runs counter to postmodern norms. Because in the logic of postmodernism any attempt to break out of its force field is already implicated in that field from the very beginning as a trace or quote, an explicit case of intertextuality should be a good litmus test of whether postmodernism can be cited and simultaneously turned in a direction that can’t be assimilated to postmodernism’s own self-fulfilling prophecies about how texts work.

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    A good example of this kind of intertextual turn is the chapter “Lächeln” (“Smiles”) from Ingo Schulze’s Simple Stories,(10) which transplants the plot of Raymond Carver’s short story “Sacks”(11) from Sacramento to Munich, Germany. In both stories, a son meets a father who has broken with his family some time before; the father makes an elaborate confession to the son detailing why he left, and he gives the son a trivial gift–in Carver’s story a sack of candy (which the son forgets to take with him) and in Schulze’s a pair of handmade potholders.

    Carver is sometimes considered no longer postmodern because of his “dirty realism” with its seedy milieus and lower-middle-class characters. However, many of his stories still use the basic postmodern strategy of first fostering, and then undermining, reader identification with central figures.(12) These shifts in sympathy are in turn a direct outgrowth of his characters’ radical dualism. The folksy, engaging characteristics we observe superficially or hear in his characters’ familiar Middle American diction form a kind of outer shell which effectively obscures the powerful, sinister forces roiling within them. Hence when evil, or brutality, or some strong emotion breaks out of Carver’s characters, it often seems to have no immediate cause (a good example of this is the story “Tell the Women We’re Going” in the collection What We Talk About When We Talk About Love). Inasmuch as they resort to violence, Carver’s protagonists seem more like alien monsters than like the K-Mart patrons they outwardly resemble. If we identify with them at all, it’s because we enjoy the sublime thrill of uncovering some malevolent force lurking beneath the banality of lower middle-class American existence.(13)

    In the case of “Sacks,” the father’s story, which is presumably meant to foster understanding in his son, reveals only the man’s thoroughgoing lasciviousness. His confession in fact resembles a traveling-salesman joke, with the father and his mistress being caught in bed by the cuckolded husband and the father jumping half-naked through the front window. Although in the process he seems to have experienced some sort of epiphany, as often happens in Carver, we never find out exactly what it is: the story breaks off before we learn how it affected the teller.(14) Similarly, the father’s gifts–jellybeans and luscious chocolates–are hardly more than tokens of his own petty lustfulness. The son–aptly named Les–comes away from this reunion diminished rather than enhanced. A traveling salesman himself, his own marriage is also on the rocks, for reasons he doesn’t choose to mention. At the beginning, though, Les says he “wants to pass along” (Carver 1989, 37) his father’s story to us–a story that turns out to be as empty and stale as a bad joke. In the end, the son does exactly to us what his father has done to him: he leaves us with his own story, which is no less desolate than that of his father’s. Having been thrust into the role of the narrator’s ersatz sons, we as readers might expect some sort of positive identification to arise from this. Yet our relationship with Les remains uncannily empty: we get even less out of his own story than he got out of his father’s, just as we are haunted by our inability to get a handle on exactly what he is talking about. In spite of its “realism,” Carver’s story works more on an epistemological level than a semantic one. Signifiers aren’t there to transmit inner meaning from a storyteller to someone else; they simply pass their intrinsic emptiness on down the line. And what’s even worse: once we’ve got them, we can’t get rid of them, just as Les can’t “forget” the sack of candy he has left behind at the airport bar. Communication appears not just as a process of endless deferral and endless diminution of meaning, but also as the accumulation of this emptiness in involuntary acts of recollection and narration–something well in keeping with the epistemological skepticism and metaphysical pessimism peculiar to postmodernism.

    At first, Schulze’s father-son reunion in Simple Stories seems to repeat Carver’s fictional setup under even less auspicious conditions. The father left his family not two, but twenty-four years ago; the son isn’t just having marital problems, but lost his wife in a traffic accident and has never recovered from it emotionally. To compound things there is also a typically German East-West divide. The father left his family to defect to the West, where he remarried and became a successful doctor. His contact with his son has been limited and condescending: first a card with a 100 mark bill congratulating him on the birth of his son, then a condolence card, also with a 100 mark bill, upon the death of his wife. The son, by contrast, is one of the losers in German reunification: a former student of art history, he was thrown of out the university and is now reduced to doing odd jobs–among other things, he works as a traveling salesman (as recounted in Chapter 4, “Panic”). The son isn’t even too sure about why he wanted to look up his long-lost father in the first place. Maybe he was curious, he says, maybe he was expecting to get some money (Schulze 86/102).

    At first glance, his father’s story hardly seems designed to bring the two closer. As in “Sacks,” the father has experienced an epiphany that he wants to pass along to the son. After suffering a sudden stroke (“just a lightning bolt, and you’re left paralyzed” [89/104]) he becomes a fervent believer in Christ and the bearer of a comforting, self-serving message: “There’s a purpose behind it all […]” intones the father regarding his condition, “even if we can’t see the purpose, or at least not right off” (90/105). The son, for his part, is hardly convinced of his father’s sincerity: he has the feeling that “he had planned each sentence, had prepared himself for our meeting as if for a lecture” (90/105). The father’s conversion, however, has an intertextual twist to it, for at its core is a scrambled version of the traveling-salesman story out of “Sacks.” After the father’s stroke, he and his wife are visited regularly by what he in the German original calls a “Holy Angel”–a Bible-thumping preacher from an unnamed Christian sect. The preacher uses the opportunity to secretly court the wife; both then run off together to Portugal. In this case, though, the joke is on the two adulterers, as the father gets religion precisely because he has been betrayed:(15)

    “So that’s what they’re like, I thought. That’s what’s behind all the sanctimony. The world’s that simple. I was an enthusiastic masochist. But,” my father said, squinting again as if laughing ahead of time at some joke, “do you know what, my boy? My life was only beginning. All alone? Anything but! Jesus Christ was never so close to me as in that moment! Who are we to be offended by those who bring us the message?” (93/109)

    The father’s experience, it might be added, is social as well as mystical. After his wife leaves him, the “brother and sisters” of the sect help him regain his self-dependence and make the two potholders (embroidered with an eight-pointed star) which he gives to the son. The son, in turn, hangs them right next to his stove, “so that I just have to put out an arm whenever I need them” (95/111).

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    Like Carver, Schulze uses a kind of deadpan prose that makes it difficult to separate the banal from the sublime, the ironic from the heartfelt. When Martin, the son, says he realizes his father’s story is a real “Saul-to-Paul tale,” he’s using a common German figure of speech. Similarly, when patrons of the café smile at the son helping the lame father out of the restaurant to his taxi, it’s not clear whether this occurs out of embarrassed politeness or as a spontaneous expression of true sympathy. As in Carver, we have to carefully parse all minor details to find out how they work together as a whole. And the sum of these details suggests that, unlike in “Sacks,” the father’s story does make a positive difference.

    This difference isn’t a semantic one–the son doesn’t convert to Christianity or take his father’s homilies to heart literally. What does happen, though, is that he himself goes through a kind of “Saul-to-Paul” conversion in his attitude towards the father. As he discovers later, the father had always sought contact to his family and assumed they would follow him to the West; it was his mother’s second husband, a Party functionary, who made her send back all letters and packages from the father (201/220). The son notes this changed attitude in the introduction to his narrative, although–once more in the starkly elliptical fashion typical of Carver–he doesn’t tell us why:

    It’s hard for me to talk about meeting my father, about how it felt at the time, I mean, to give an account of the impression he and his story made on me. Not because my memory’s poor–it was barely a year ago–but because I know more now. I might even say I’ve become a different person. (86/101)

    This insight is not acquired entirely after the fact. After the father has told his Saul-to-Paul story, the son begins to tell how his wife was killed in a bicycle accident. Suddenly, he is moved to confess his own irrational complicity in her fate: “I wanted Andrea to die, and then it happened” (Schulze 91/106). Thereupon the father absolves him of his guilt (“You probably never really loved her, or at least not long enough” [91/106]) and, to make the ritual complete, passes him a cookie–a communion wafer of sorts, which the son places in his mouth and swallows. Once more, the situation in “Sacks” is reversed: instead of a string of self-perpetuating empty confessions, we have two “true confessions” that in spite of their trivial trappings allow a positive, symmetrical relationship between father and son to develop. The ostensive insignia of this relation–the bracket holding together the inner and outer frame–is provided by the two potholders Martin hangs up next to his sink. They stand not only for the human presence of the absent father, but also the transcendent presence of the absent Father, as embodied in the eight-pointed star. Whether we or the hero take advantage of the one or the other–as in Life of Pi–is a question of free choice. The posture of believing, however, has once more been thrust on us through the imposition of an exterior, authorially determined frame. The posture of disbelief–of thinking that all Martin has gotten out of the reunion are a pair of lousy potholders–turns into a trap that makes it well nigh impossible to read this part of Simple Stories in a satisfying or productive way.

    Beautiful Otherness: Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things

    At this point, the critically minded reader might be moved to ask whether the experience of being trapped by an author in beautiful, comforting frames of belief is not some insidious plot designed to keep us from interrogating the exploitative mechanisms of global capitalism. Pi, although hailing from India, is not exactly your voiceless, subaltern victim: articulate and precocious in the extreme, he leaves a cozy middle-class existence in the Third World for an even cozier one in the First. And, while Simple Stories doesn’t exactly present a rosy picture of life after reunification, it tends to reconcile differences between the ex-communist East and the capitalist West by imprinting Christian symbolism and attitudes on the fabric of everyday life. Given these examples, you might conclude that performatism is best suited to preserving liberal bourgeois norms and values.

    Performatism, however, works equally well when embedded in a radical critique of ideology and power politics. The most prominent example of this that I’ve been able to find is Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things (Roy 1997). Roy’s credentials as a critic of global capitalism are beyond dispute: since writing her acclaimed novel, she has turned out a whole slew of polemical broadsides against such rewarding targets as the Indian Bomb, post-9/11 American foreign policy, and environmentally destructive development projects.(16) Like many postcolonial writers, Roy is, at least in theory, resolutely anti-essentialist: she has, for example, no patience with those of her countrymen who would separate an “authentic” India from a “corrupted” West. This steadfast rejection of all originary sources leads to a well-known problem of self-definition: if there is no essential, ultimate, or originary truth, how can you define your own critical position in an affirmative way? Unless you happen to be a convinced Marxist (which Roy isn’t) the standard postmodern answer to this question up to now was usually this: you don’t have to justify a single position because you have continually changing positions. By taking the essentialist conceits of a hegemonic Center at face value–and continually exposing their untenability as you move along–you leave behind a dynamic trail of discursive otherness that more than compensates for the loss of a hard-and-fast ideological credo. In theory, this sounds good, but in practice almost no one actually wants to live and write in this Nietzschean, peripatetic mode of endless epistemological interrogation. The result has been a repolitization of critical discourse, with explicit ideological agendas (often Marxist) existing uneasily alongside stinging critiques of essentialist truth and master narratives. Gayatri Spivak’s term “strategic essentialism,”(17) which was originally supposed to make this sort of thing seem forceful and circumspect, inadvertently exposed the double standard lurking within it: the term sounds like a carte blanche allowing a discrete subject with a hidden agenda (a “strategist”) to get away with doing something that he or she would deny to everyone else.(18)

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    At first, Roy’s own solution to this problem follows a rigorously post-ideological pattern. In her essays as well as in her novel, she portrays not only India and the West, but also capitalism and Marxism as equivalent in terms of arrogance, despotic hubris and destructiveness. A salient case is that of the Indian bomb. By building its own bomb, India has in Roy’s view “enter[ed] into a contract with the very people we claim to despise,” which is to say the Western societies whose histories are “spongy with the blood of others,” and who “virtually invented […] colonialism, apartheid, slavery, ethnic cleansing, germ warfare, [and] chemical weapons” (Roy 1999, 144). But just because they’re runners-up in the race to acquire weapons of mutual mass destruction doesn’t make the Indians any better: “All in all, I think it is fair to say that we’re the hypocrites. We’re the ones who’ve abandoned what was arguably a moral position–i.e. we have the technology, we can make bombs if we want to, but we won’t” (Roy 1999, 145). This sort of hypocrisy is no less obtrusive on a personal level. In The God of Small Thingsthe skirt-chasing Anglophile capitalist Chacko with his Marxist ideology and the wife-abusing Communist nationalist Pillai with his vested interest in a chutney factory represent two sides of the same dismal coin. And, as Roy’s novel shows, when confronted by a threat to its hidden interests this sort of categorical thinking can even become lethal–as when Velutha is murdered for transgressing against the tacit “Love Laws” proscribing sexual relations between higher-caste members and untouchables.

    Roy’s reaction to the falseness of ideology is, however, radically different from those current in postmodernism and postcolonial studies. Although her positive program is not broadly formulated or very rigorous, it suggests that she regards love and beauty as the basic givens of human interaction:

    Railing against the past will not heal us. History has happened. It’s over and done with. All we can do is to change its course by encouraging what we love instead of destroying what we don’t. There is beauty yet in this brutal, damaged world of ours. Hidden, fierce, immense. Beauty that is uniquely ours and beauty that we have received with grace from others, enhanced, re-invented and made our own. We have to seek it out, nurture it, love it. Making bombs will only destroy us. It doesn’t matter whether we use them or not. They will destroy us either way. (Roy 1999, 159)

    Roy, in other words, treats mutually shared affection and pleasure in matters of taste–two utterly traditional metaphysical precepts–as an irreducible point of departure and a last defense against the encroachments of a “brutal, damaged world.” The result is an intersubjective free space, a minimal scene of love and beauty amidst what is otherwise an oppressive, violent, class-ridden, sexist, and generally threatening outer realm. It goes without saying that this free space can no longer be reconciled with postmodernism. For at its center–hidden, fierce, and immense–stand two metaphysical imperatives which, at least in terms of the novel, cannot be assimilated either to ideology or its never-ending critique. This is, as it were, “Kant with a sari”–Roy has transplanted the basic premises of Kantian aesthetics to the Indian subcontinent and made its focus a supple, ebony-skinned untouchable and a lambent, wide-hipped divorcée.(19)

    I can’t emphasize enough that Roy’s originary scene of love and beauty is not entirely natural or prior to culture. In its most radical form, it is situated on the very cusp between nature and culture, at that place where distinctions between the two seem to blend most: in incest. When the emotionally ravaged dizygotic twins Rahel and Estha make love at the end of the book after a long, involuntary separation they are doing nothing more than reaffirming the possibility of productive undifferentiation, of returning to an unregulated, discrete unity enabling them, at least in principle, to cancel out the oppressive world of Ideology, Law, and History. Their own private, sorrowful scene is not just a union of doubles but is trinitarian: Rahel is sister and mother in one, a genetic and psychological stand-in for the lost, martyred mother (“She moves her mouth. Their beautiful mother’s mouth.” [Roy 1997, 327]). The incestuous threesome holds forth the possibility of a transcendence which is however not realized in the book: what the twins share “is not happiness, but hideous grief” (Roy 1997, 328).

    Roy could easily have ended her story on this depressing note. As any deconstructionist would be happy to tell you, Rahel and Estha’s reinscription of gender relations, although an understandable reaction to the hypocrisy of an overdifferentiated, “ideological” society, can’t bring back the mother physically and can’t make the twins’ psyches whole. And that is why Roy, rather than tarrying in a victimary stance,(20)chooses to place an affirmative performance at the book’s end upholding the possibility of a love that is not just beautiful but also productive and sublime.

    This love is at its very inception revelatory and transcendent. When Velutha first catches Ammu’s gaze “centuries telescoped into one evanescent moment. History was wrong-footed, caught off guard” (Roy 1997, 176). Love is a presence, a scene transpiring between two humans in a singular, personal moment of mutually shared beauty and affection. This scenic conception of love is repeated at the very end of the book in an affirmative way, as a beautiful and sublime unity transcending Law and History:

    As he rose from the dark river and walked up the stone steps, she saw that the world they stood in was his. That he belonged to it. That it belonged to him. The water. The mud. The trees. The fish. The stars. He moved so easily through it. As she watched him she understood the quality of his beauty. How his labor had shaped him. How the wood he fashioned had fashioned him. Each plank he planed, each nail he drove, each thing he made, had moulded him. Had left its stamp on him. Had given him his strength, his supple grace. (Roy 1997, 333-334)

    There is even something here that might, at least for a time, reconcile Marxists and Kantians. Unalienated beauty, it would seem, arises on the borderline between nature and human work upon that nature, just as the Kathakali Man–the ritual dancer of Kerala–is “the most beautiful of men” because “his body is his soul”: it has been “polished and pared down, harnessed wholly to the task of story-telling” (Roy 1997, 230). Something similar occurs with words, which both the narrator and her child heroes agglutinate so as to dissolve standard grammatical boundaries in a rhythmic, sensual way (“sourmetal smell,” “sariflapping,” “Orangedrink Lemondrink Man” etc.). Love, language-play, carpentry and Kathakali are all performances erasing the secondary boundary lines of culture, class, and caste and replacing them with a beautiful presence which, under the right conditions, can transcend its world of “small things” and reach up to the stars.(21) The deferral of this dream in “tomorrow,” the tragic last word of the book, isn’t meant as an ironic put-down, but as a promise: it marks the possibility of projecting love’s presentness into the future. The novel’s storyshows that this projection doesn’t work (it ends with the act of grievous incest); the novel’s plot that it does (it ends with an act of sublime love). As always in performatist works, we are given a clear choice as to what direction our attitude can take. If we opt for chronology and the belatedness of the story, we will be left with grief and desolation; if we choose the aesthetically mediated presence of the plot, we have the inspiration of love and a future which we can act on in an affirmative way.(22)

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    The End of Posthistory: Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader

    The problem of how to make history present and the future palpable is something that fictional works are now also starting to recast in performatist terms. Normally, the postmodern, posthistorical argument about writing history goes something like this: any attempt to construct a unified history will prove illusory, since the historical construct, inasmuch as it pretends to closed totality, will never quite achieve identity with itself. There will always remain what Jean-Luc Nancy (1990, 105) calls an “excess” of meaning that isn’t reducible to the original, central scheme. Rather than shrugging this off as an insoluble hermeneutic bind, postmodernism turns it into a positive program. Historical writing becomes a double strategy, combining critiques of traditional historiography with the representation of marginalized otherness. Instead of the neat furrow of a master narrative, history becomes a sprawling field of overlapping incisions whose goal is to unearth and empower the peripheral sources of historical experience–that of the everyday, the subaltern, the victimary.

    Nowhere is the problem of representing victimary experience more acute than in discourse on the Holocaust. As Eric Gans has pointed out, the mass murder of the Jews in World War II (and, to a lesser extent, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) shifted the focus of political thinking from the utopian center to the peripheral victim, whose fatal experience of exclusion from society became the point of departure for progressive political thought and action.(23) The goal of politics, in other words, is no longer to adhere to the right kind of ideology but to continually position yourself anew in opposition to a hegemonic center–in effect, to take on the role of a virtual victim. In the case of Nazi genocide, the lethal relation between center and periphery leaves no room for ambivalence. Between victim and perpetrator there can be no real reciprocity and no underlying, humanizing unity: you’re either One or the Other. The Holocaust experience, in short, has a double potency in postmodernist thought. It not only identifies Western culture as the center and source of unmitigated terror,(24) but also supplies a moral perspective that can be defined spatially and fluidly, as a position vis-à-vis that center, rather than as a rigid set of counter-rules and prescriptions. The result is a kind of soft-hearted Nietzscheanism, with the victim, rather than the Übermensch,acting as the jumping-off point for a peripatetic critique of bourgeois mores.(25)

    The term “the Holocaust,” which came into currency in the 1960’s, is itself a belated, postmodern one; it grew out of the need to make victimary experience memorable in cultural, rather than in personal, terms. In recent years, though, an ever widening gap has opened up between these two kinds of experience. Little new has been added to the vast Holocaust literature in terms of personal documentation, and the visual and literary depictions of concentration-camp horrors are so well known that they have either become clichés or diminished greatly in their power to disturb us. In late postmodernism, this exhaustion of original victimary experience has given rise to works whose means of arguing are ultimately more aesthetic than didactic or documentary. Peter Eisenman’s Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, for example, has visitors wander through a maze of huge dark gravestone-like steles reminding them forcefully of the disorientation and vulnerability of the victim, though without any specific thematic reference to the Holocaust;(26) the slashed, jagged architecture and gaping spaces of Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in Berlin do essentially the same thing.(27) In literature, a Swiss gentile named Bruno Grosjean (aka Binjamin Wilkomirski) identified with the victimary plight of Polish Jews so strongly that he in effect became one and wrote a critically well-received survivor’s memoir. The point is not so much that Wilkomirski/Grosjean was a deliberate fraud–he seems to have serious mental problems–but that a reading public accustomed to horrific descriptions of camp life was readily willing to accept a poetically embellished memoir which, to use Baudrillard’s phrase, was “more real than real.” In film, there have been attempts to stray from the well-trodden paths of victimary discourse by depicting concentration camp victims as life-affirming, comic characters (Roberto Benigni’s Life is Beautiful) or by emphasizing fragmentary, present-day acts of remembrance over a coherent documentary exposition (Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah). All these examples, although in their own ways successful works of art, take victimary discourse to extremes which are at the same time beginning to exhaust it. The fraudulent effectivity of Wilkomirski’s hyperreal memoir, the thematic emptiness of Eisenman’s Holocaust Memorial, Benigni’s “inappropriate” use of a comic genre, and Lanzmann’s staged recollections of history all suggest a basic need to inflate, exaggerate and embellish the customary postmodern way of presenting the Holocaust, that is, as the non-reciprocal otherness experienced by victims of a relentlessly cruel, monolithic center. The simulatory effort required to renew that victimary experience has begun to compete with the very thing that it seeks to enhance; we are increasingly being confronted with modes of aesthetic excess that distract from the victimary paradigm at least as much as they renew it. In view of the rapidly fading sources of real experience, this increasingly excessive relation between art and victimhood is becoming an unavoidable fixture of all discourse on the Holocaust.

    Given this reassertion of aesthetics, it’s justified to ask whether there might be an alternative to victimary discourse that would open up a perspective towards the future without rewriting history to the detriment of its victims. Although the terrain is difficult and dangerous to tread, there are signs that books and movies are now beginning to focus on perpetrators, the ethical choices involved in their actions and, above all, on the possibility of atonement and reconciliation that these choices imply. Of these works, the most prominent English-language examples coming to mind are, in film, Spielberg’sSchindler’s List and, in fiction, Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated and Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow; in German, these include such novels as Marcel Beyer’sFlughunde [Flight dogs] and Ulla Berkéwicz’s Engel sind schwarz und weiß [Angels are black and white]. While I can’t go into all the implications of this shift to a perpetrator perspective here, I would like to focus in on an example which treats these questions in a way that is eminently typical of literary performatism. The book I have in mind is Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser [The Reader](28)–one of the few recent German novels to become a bestseller in America and unusual because of its sympathetic treatment of a former SS prison camp guard.

    Although well received by the reading public and many critics both in and out of Germany, The Reader was met with icy reserve by those writers who noticed its deviations from the unwritten norms of victimary discourse (the book was often lumped together with Wilkomirski’s as an example of “disturbing” Holocaust literature).(29)There is, however, a considerable aesthetic difference between the two works. Whereas Wilkomirski’s book simply carries virtual identification with the victimary to its logical extreme, The Reader breaks with postmodernist norms by framing or artificially uniting victims and a perpetrator in closed, ritualistic scenes.

    7

    The first frame, in a Nazi work camp in Poland, is perverse and cruel. In what seems to be an act of childish narcissism, an all-powerful illiterate–Hanna–forces doomed Jewish bearers of written culture to make that culture present by reading to her out loud. Hanna seems to crave Bildung but can acquire it only through the application of brute force; in doing so she aids and abets a genocidal system.(30) (You might call this Kant with a cattle prod: a natural disposition towards enlightenment is coupled with pure, murderous power over scapegoated victims.) In the second frame, Hanna repeats the reading relationship, but now replaces physical power (Macht) with a mixture of sexual power (Kraft) and maternal solicitude: she becomes a lover and ersatz mother for the underage hero Michael. Unlike the first frame, however, this ritualistic relationship, though still unequal, contains an element of reciprocity. The ritual enables Michael to continually reenact an ideal, incestuous initiation into manhood;(31) Hanna’s sexual contact with an innocent allows her to repeat the camp ritual in a purified way (in symbolic terms, this is why the protagonists bathe before having sex and reading: they are both trying to preserve and renew what is for them a self-fashioning sacral scene). Although consensual, the affair nonetheless eventually deforms Michael; after Hanna’s departure he is unable to enter into long-term relationships with other women. In the third frame, in prison, the ritual relationship is played out again in a desexualized and depersonalized way. Hanna becomes, at least outwardly, a morally autonomous, enlightened individual: she not only learns to read on her own, but also demonstrates civil courage (she engages in a sit-down protest when funds for the prison library are to be cut off). Eventually, she levies the severest possible judgment on herself by committing suicide at the very moment where she would have been allowed to reenter society in a well-organized and comfortable way. In effect, she resists resocialization by entering into a symbolic frame of a higher order–that of the dead victims, who, as she says, are the only ones who really understand her (Schlink 1997, 196/1997a, 187). Michael, by contrast, manages to rid himself of the frame in a symbolic act of reduction and restitution. Although the Jewish survivor of the church incident is unwilling to accept the money Hanna has saved up, she does take the tin it was kept in (replacing a similar one stolen from her in the camps and suggesting the symbolic undoing of a past injustice). This ending suggests that two autonomous subjects–a victim and a stand-in for a perpetrator–are larger than the frames that seem to enclose them. The frame, however, remains a real, indispensable means of symbolic communication between the two: even if they can’t agree on the content of the frame–the survivor rejects the money inside it–they can tacitly agree on its mediating and consolatory power. This transaction, though without intrinsic value, confirms the originary mechanism of the ostensive and hence the possibility of a future, as yet deferred rapprochement.

    Reviewing The Reader‘s main features we can discern without difficulty two major fault lines running between it and the usual postmodern treatment of the Holocaust. The first such fault line is marked by the book’s metaphysical optimism. Schlink appears to see the world, or, more precisely, the frame at hand, as something that is always open to betterment, albeit in an incremental or incomplete way. The Reader doesn’t necessarily present us with a less damning picture of German complicity in genocide than postmodernism did–the book makes no attempt to excuse Hanna’s crime or deny the suffering of her victims. The Reader does however suggest that people–and in particular perpetrators–are enclosed in ritualized frames at least partially of their own making, and that these frames can change (or be changed) for the better over time. This contrasts starkly with the metaphysical pessimism of postmodernism, which would condemn us to simulate endlessly a victimary condition now lying three full generations behind us. Using a fictional scenario, The Reader demonstrates the possibility of framed, individually constructed historical change rather than the Eternal Return of the Slightly Different.

    The second radical break with postmodern norms is The Reader’s insistence on framed identification with a perpetrator as well as on the common origin (not the common moral status) of perpetrator and victim. The Reader‘s postmodern and/or psychoanalytic critics were quick to point out that the book maneuvers us into identifying with a perpetrator and her lover, who is in a sense both her accomplice and victim.(32) From a postmodernist perspective, which allows no commonality or reciprocity between victim and perpetrator, this forced identification with a perpetrator is accompanied by a fatal quid pro quo. According to this view, Schlink causes Michael to usurp the victimary position usually occupied by the Jews, but only at the cost of encasing him in an obsessive, sexually charged shell that effectively shuts out all moral reflection.(33) In this interpretation, Michael is burdened by the “inability to mourn,” which is to say by the inability to rid himself of his obsession with his narcissistic love-object Hanna. Michael, it would seem, is condemned to repeat the experience of the entire German people, who, in the sweeping vision of the psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, redirected their libidinal energy after the war into “derealizing” or repressing the memory of Nazi crimes and their own self-serving love of Hitler.(34)The cure recommended by the Mitscherlichs in 1967 was, incidentally, precisely that drastic confrontation with images of heaped-up corpses that has since grown into a visual cliché.(35) This remedy is repeated in one form or another by The Reader‘s postmodern critics, who urge us to reflect once more on “the incommensurability of the victimary perspective and the experience of the perpetrator collective” (Schmitz 2002, 311) or, in a more resolute Nietzschean mode, to grapple with the possibility that the defining feature of humanity is its ability to inflict an infinite amount of pain on others for no particular reason.(36)

    As such, it is no surprise that postmodern and psychoanalytically minded critics reject out of hand a book that shows how a perpetrator develops morally in terms of closed, ritualized frames. In themselves, these frames–the work camp, the secret affair with a minor, the prison–are at worst cruel and at best ambivalent. However, they help create inner scenes of self-fashioning which, though flawed and constricted, allow Hanna to transcend the previous frame that she happened to be caught up in. This sort of ritualized, spatially staggered individuation fits in well with the sociological concept of framing developed by Erving Goffman in the tradition of Emile Durkheim.(37) Goffman sees patterns of everyday behavior as transpiring within social frames or codes which enable individuals to maintain a modicum of dignity and selfhood under trying or embarrassing circumstances (these frames are in turn thought to represent the secularized remnants of what was once a universally binding religious experience(38)). This closed, face-to-face mode of individuation stands directly opposed to the Nietzschean-Freudian one, which demands that subjects forthrightly bare their psyches in a virtual, open-ended confrontation with the overwhelming terror of the Holocaust–a confrontation in which the subject can by definition never win. The Reader, it would seem, argues implicitly against the kind of over-intellectualized, self-accusatory type of discourse that has long characterized the Holocaust discussion in Germany.

    8

    The ultimate scandal associated with The Reader is, however, its “confusion” of victimary and perpetrator roles. Once more, The Reader never conflates these issues in a moral or legal sense: there is never any doubt about Hanna’s guilt, and in spite of Michael’s identification with her (which we share in a vicarious but guarded way) she never becomes the object of false, unmediated sentiment.(39) The true scandal from a postmodern perspective is that the illiterate Hanna’s actions are motivated by a fear of being socially stigmatized and scapegoated–precisely that fate that is visited upon the Jewish victims of Nazi genocide. Hanna is subject along with the Jews to what René Girard would call the victimage mechanism, an originary event in which societies seek to distract from the mimetic rivalry within them by lynching innocent victims.(40) The crimes perpetrated by Hanna (whose Germanic name is homonymous with the Hebrew Hannah) arise from her own private fear of that potential victimage; in fact, that fear is so powerful that it later causes her to incriminate herself in court in a wholly irrational, self-defeating way. In the same way, Hanna’s grotesque misuse of Jewish prisoners to acquire Bildung suggests that she is has no fear whatsoever of being contaminated by their racially defined otherness. Hanna’s ritualized, narcissistic framing of her own self makes her immune to pressure from the victimizing community, but also to abstract legal reasoning and racist ideology. In the end, as Bill Niven has pointed out, Hanna doesn’t even really become a morally autonomous individual, in spite of her immersion in Holocaust literature and the classics of bourgeois culture.(41) Rather, by sacrificing herself through suicide, she remains true to the victimage mechanism. In a final act of sacrificial hubris she expels herself from society, in effect preferring to deify herself as a victim rather than reenter society as an autonomous, morally responsible individual.

    The Reader doesn’t try to justify Hanna’s obvious moral deficits or her complicity in mass murder. It does, however, recast the problem of reckoning with the Holocaust in terms of frames in which a combination of love, enlightenment and coercion enable the slow, albeit incomplete restitution of an autonomous moral conscience. The book encourages us, along with Michael, to believe in Hanna’s step-by-step redemption; although this belief is only partially fulfilled, it also enables us, along with Michael, to break with a cycle of endless mourning over a traumatic past. In spite of Schlink’s metaphysical optimism–marked by his implanting an unquenchable desire for culture in an unlikely heroine–The Reader doesn’t enthrone that desire as the linear, progressive accumulation of sweetness and light. This is because the frame is both a haven and a burden. While creating a ritualized free space in which a subject may develop more or less on his or her own terms, the frame at the same times cuts the subject off from the public domain in which that development could achieve general acceptance. In the long run it is neither the frame itself nor its content taken alone that are essential for progress, but rather a positive performance that transcends both. This performance is, I think, embodied in the symbolic transaction between Michael and the Jewish survivor. The frame–the tin–isn’t discarded or denied, but instead becomes a concrete, unified (ostensive) sign of a perpetrator’s desire for redemption and a victim’s desire to undo the horrific experience of the victimary past. Projected onto a common object, these two mutually exclusive perspectives allow us to believe that we can transcend the past, for without this belief we are condemned to repeat it endlessly. The deconstruction of this double projection–which is once more not terribly hard to do–throws us back into a cycle of virtual mourning; its acceptance creates a framed, minimal moment of presence that would allow us to move forward into the future. The danger is not so much that we are going to succumb uncritically to old illusions, as the posthistorical critique insinuates,(42) but that we are going to miss out on the future by endlessly simulating an increasingly hazy, emotionally distant past. The performatist projection doesn’t seek to blot out that past and plunge blindly into the future; instead, it offers a frame grounded in presence that mediates between the two. Given the rapid waning of real historical experience and the aesthetic excesses that inevitably accompany the simulation of that experience, the performatist projection offers a very real perspective for moving, frame by frame, out of the seemingly endless expanse of posthistory.

    A Closet Kantian: Olga Tokarczuk’s The Wardrobe

    One of the more dramatic historical developments in the last few years has been the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid assimilation of it and its former client states into the global culture of what has been an increasingly robust-looking “late” capitalism. Contrary to what an outside observer might assume, this opening of the Soviet bloc countries did not suddenly set them awash in an alien, postmodern culture imported from the West. All Eastern European literatures I am the least bit familiar with–those of Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the former Yugoslavia–had indigenous, thriving postmodern literatures well before 1990. Most of this was underground or in samizdat, as might be expected, but some was published with official approval, most notably in the culturally more liberal countries like Yugoslavia and Poland.(43) The advent of democracy simply legalized and popularized an aesthetic mode that was already well known to sophisticated readers; at the same time, it caused the book market to be flooded by middle- and low-brow works laying no particular claim to literary innovation. As in the West, serious, risk-taking literature in these countries tends to be postmodern and the academic discussions about it poststructuralist.

    In the former Eastern bloc countries there are, however, several important younger authors who have been taking the basic devices of postmodernism and giving them a performatist twist. Of these authors, who include Viktor Pelevin in Russia and Miloš Urban in the Czech Republic,(44) I’d like to focus in briefly on Olga Tokarczuk, who is one of Poland’s most popular and critically acclaimed writers of the post-Communist period.(45)

    The work I wish to touch on here is Tokarczuk’s signature story “The Wardrobe” (Tokarczuk 1998, see Appendix for English translation), which provokes postmodernist norms with its “impossible” decontextualization of time, space and gender and its forced identification with a higher, unified consciousness within a closed space.

    The plot of the story is simple: a woman narrator and her male companion buy an ornate old wardrobe, kill off its woodworms with turpentine and place it in their bedroom. As they soon discover, the Wardrobe–it is spelled that way in the story–has the power to eliminate all differences–between man and woman, self and world, inside and out. The attraction exerted by the Wardrobe is so great that both characters eventually abandon their worldly lives to spend all their time inside it. At the end, only the faint sounds from a miners’ band are heard as their unused apartment sinks into dust and darkness.

    9

    The story is narrated by a female alter ego of the author in an everyday, matter-of-fact tone (readers familiar with Tokarczuk’s well-publicized home life on a remote farm near the Polish-Czech border will have no trouble associating her husband Roman with the character “R.” or recognizing the Silesian local color). The narrator herself shows no signs of intoxication or incipient mental illness, and there is no ironic denouement revealing that we have been hoodwinked by a peripatetic, unreliable author-narrator. The story does, however, offer us a clear quid pro quo: by retreating into the ideality of a unified, closed space the characters make their life unlivable in practical terms. Read as an epistemological allegory, the story simply confirms the fact–obvious even to non-deconstructionists–that you can’t completely cut yourself off from the world and be a part of that world at the same time, even under ideal, rather preternatural conditions. From a postmodern perspective, the story may seem crude or simply slightly addled–why, after all, bother demonstrating something in fictional terms that is pointless or obvious anyway?

    Before turning to the story, it’s helpful to know that Tokarczuk is an ardent admirer of C. G. Jung–and consequently also a closet Kantian.(46) This reveals itself more fully in Tokarczuk’s notions of literature and reader response outlined in Lalka i perła [The doll and the pearl] (Tokarczuk 2000), her book-length treatise on Bolesław Prus’s classic 1889 novel The Doll.

    In her essay Tokarczuk presents what might be called a psychologized or Jungian version of Kantian aesthetics. She begins by describing the text as a “neutral space” enabling the psychological projection of an author and that of a reader to meet in a “mysterious exchange relationship” (Tokarczuk 2000, 13-14)–a personalized, but otherwise faithful reformulation of Kant’s “disinterested” aesthetic, which operates above and beyond the realm of mere norms or concepts. The reader remains superior to this “virtual world,” is aware of its conventional character and can maintain a distance to it, but is nonetheless led to identify with certain characters that allow him or her to experience extreme–you could also say sublime–states ranging from catharsis to pure transcendence: overcoming death, conversing with the gods, ignoring time, transgressing any kind of boundary, and so on. (Tokarczuk 2000, 14). As Tokarczuk notes–with a tip of the hat to Kant and Jung’s idealism–“the book […] demonstrates that all reality is located in the human psyche” (2000, 14). Furthermore, this dream-like exchange of projections between author and reader results in a “new type of reality” which leads to a novel or text becoming a “psychological fact” for the reader (2000, 14); this state is said to resemble a hotel room or tavern which you frequent from time to time as a guest (a spatial metaphor realized literally in Tokarczuk’s story “Hotel Capital”(47)). Finally, Tokarczuk suggests that the author is him- or herself a projection of a larger entity that she calls the “observer” (obserwator)–a kind of transcendental, tutelary self that she links to Jung’s notion of the archetype as well as to traditional notions of the guardian angel, demon, muse and genius (2000, 18). The author is in this sense merely “a sensitive and delicate tool of the observer,” which for its part “cannot be pinned down”; because the observer is “interested only in last things, to the point of tedium” (2000, 18) it presumably remains an unrewarding object of analysis. In philosophical terms, Tokarczuk returns to the Kantian concept of “I think” (which accompanies all our personal judgments as an originary, unifying principle) its archaic or originary personifications as guardian angel, muse, genius, … (48) In short, we have once more arrived, by way of Silesia, at an indigenous variant of originary Kantianism.

    Viewed in these terms, “The Wardrobe” is a living embodiment of the “neutral space” of the text in which an author’s and a reader’s projections converge in a guided, but not entirely compulsory way. The story makes us identify with the possibility of the radical interiorization of experience, of a retreat into a pre-semiotic, archetypal space in which even the contours of the archetypal are dissolved. The Wardrobe is in fact presented as a kind of an archetypal archetype, an originary space which also includes the exteriorobservator in the guise of a guardian angel: “When thought is alone by itself it starts to pray. That’s the very nature of thought” (Tokarczuk 1998, 7). Reflexivity, in other words, is next to godliness, even as communication is reduced to non-semantic, sensual perceptions shared with others living in enclosed, dark spaces (the miners). You could, I suppose, argue that “The Wardrobe” is simply presenting us with a virtual tour of an impossible interior state, a kind of weird exercise in narcissistic self-delusion that we are supposed to deconstruct as quickly as possible after we’ve been exposed to it. Here as elsewhere, though, this superior attitude towards the story’s epistemological insufficiency is bound up with a massive loss of aesthetic appreciation and affect. Even if we don’t accept the story’s literal message–that spending the rest of your life in a wardrobe with your mate is a desirable life-goal–we can accept on some level itsperformative one–that experiencing interiority and unity in an especially intensive way is a beautiful thing (even though it is by its nature “strange” and unviable in practical terms). And this is where the epochal divide asserts itself with a vengeance. Where deconstruction and the flip-flopping narrative strategies of postmodernism try to show that the performative and the literal are interchangeable functions of a larger discursive context over which we have no control, performatism makes the performative mode into a present, more or less compulsory aesthetic fact in the mind of the beholder. By coupling an incredible literal message with a beautiful performance, “The Wardrobe” and texts like it practically force you to imitate the attitude of a believer. If you staunchly reject this posture you’ll remain postmodern; if you accept it you’re a performatist by default.

    The choice is up to you–almost.

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    Notes

    1. The citation quoted immediately above is from p. 69. (back)

    2. Interested readers may refer to Eshelman 2000/2001, Eshelman 2001/20002 and Eshelman 2002/2003. (back)

    3. Gans coined the term in The Origin of Language (Gans 1981); for his most recent definition of the term see Gans 1993. (back)

    4. Cf. Gans 1993, 53: “The truth of the originary sign is the birth of the human. The sign is what protects the human community against its potential self-annihilation in mimetic conflict. In the face of this danger, its truth as a gesture of representation rather than a gesture of appropriation is not a foregone conclusion. It is only because the members of the originary community accepted this truth as the revelation of central Being that we are here to speculate about it. They drew back from conflict because they were able to interpret their own acts not as spontaneous movements toward the center but as ostensive signs designating the agent that prevented this movement.”(back)

    5. The book leaves the question of whether there really is a God open by resorting to the Cabbalistic doctrine of Tsimtsum, in which God creates the world and retracts back into Himself (the Japanese ship carrying Pi and his family is named “Tsimtsum” and Pi himself studies the Cabbala). The doctrine suggests that there is a single origin but that we simply have no way of corroborating it anymore. (back)

    6. In this sense performatism reverses the basic procedure of the phenomenologicalepoché: a situation is bracketed off to experience beauty and not to acquire knowledge.(back)

    7. While performatism is an epochal, and not a general theory of literature, it is in keeping with the growing relevance of theories concerned with aesthetics, ethics and positive reader response rather than with linguistic or epistemological misrecognition. For more on this turn in literary theory see Fluck 2003. (back)

    8. In other words, it does the opposite of the Derridian frame, which mediates in an undecidable way between inside and out. For a comparison of this closed notion of frame with the Derridian one, see Eshelman 2002/2003. (back)

    9. As Eric Gans has pointed out, Kant one-sidedly valorizes the cognitive aspects of aesthetics and ignores its physical and communal aspects: “The ultimate source of our pleasure in the ‘formal finality’ of aesthetic representation is not our ‘cognitive faculties’ but our intuition that the community’s shared participation in this finality or representational intentionality will protect us from mimetic violence. The aesthetic performs a function analogous to that attributed by Durkheim to religious ritual: it reinforces our solidarity with the sacred center and, through its mediation, with our fellow members of the human community” (Gans 2003, 344). Gans also suggests that “the pleasure in the moment of sharing exists only against a constantly renewed background of ‘painful’ desire that Kant does not mention”; hence the aesthetic experience “can best be conceived in Kantian terms as an oscillation between the pleasure of beauty and the pain of sublimity” (2003, 343). Performative texts in effect guarantee this oscillation by placing around a beautiful center coercive, “painful” frames that remind the reader of the limits of beauty while at the same time making the experience of beauty possible in the first place. (back)

    10. Quotes refer first to the English translation (Schulze 1999), then to the German original (Schulze 1998). (back)

    11. First published in 1974; cited according to Carver 1989. (back)

    12. This applies above all to stories written before the collection Cathedral, which is widely thought to mark a turn towards optimism in Carver’s work. (back)

    13. This apprehension of menace is in fact often mentioned in connection with reader reactions to Carver’s fiction, and it would seem to account for a good deal of its success with upscale readers; see in this regard Meyer 1995, 22-23. (back)

    14. Presumably, Schulze was aware that “Sacks” is a heavily trimmed-down version of Carver’s story “The Fling,” which uses the same plot but supplies much more detail. In “The Fling,” for example, we learn that the cuckolded husband committed suicide in a particular painful way. (back)

    15. In Carver’s story, it is the adulterous wife who gets religion at an expedient moment: “She got down on her knees and she prayed to God, good and loud so the man would hear” (Carver 1989, 45); in “The Fling,” the cuckolded husband goes so far as to commit suicide. (back)

    16. See such polemical non-fiction works as The Cost of Living (Roy 1999), Power Politics (Cambridge, Mass. 2001) and War Talk (Cambridge, Mass. 2003). (back)

    17. Spivak first used the concept in Spivak 1996 (orig. 1984), 214-215. (back)

    18. Spivak, who mixes Marxism and deconstruction, eventually stopped using the term herself, which she said “simply became the union ticket for essentialism” (Spivak 1993, 35). As Boris Groys points out in his witty essay Unter Verdacht [Under suspicion] (Groys 2000) this poststructuralist obfuscation of subjectivity eventually leads to its restitution: the less we have a handle on what the agent or subject is up to, the greater is our suspicion that he or she is really there–and pulling off something devious behind our backs. (back)

    11

    19. The two characters, in other words, combine appealing physical qualities with the status of social otherness. For an incisive reinterpretation of Kant’s concept of beauty as one of otherness see Siebers 1998. According to Siebers, this focus on beauty-as-otherness need not be unpolitical: “Admittedly, beauty provokes otherness on a small scale–a human scale in fact–but perhaps this is where otherness has the greatest political value, since the small scale forces individuals to confront otherness within their world rather than referring it to an external reality” (1998, 37). Roy takes this a step further: at some point, her beauty-as-otherness turns into sameness by allowing an identification across all boundaries of culture and ideology. The “God of small things”–the God of sublimity and beauty–is a global One. (back)

    20. As Eric Gans has pointed out repeatedly in his internet Chronicles of Love and Resentment, postmodernism’s focus on decentered otherness (as opposed to utopian master narratives) leads to an ethical mindset privileging peripheral victims. From Gans’s neoconservative point of view, this attitude is productive in its rejection of centralized authoritarianism but unproductive in its reliance on resentment. Roy certainly wouldn’t agree with Gans’s notion that we should all warmly embrace global capitalism and bourgeois democracy, but her position is consistent with Gans’s in that it stresses reconciliation, love and beauty–and a break with the guilt-producing mode of victimary discourse. See also the discussion of The Reader further below. (back)

    21. This universalist pretension has been noted by numerous authors. For those still obligated to postmodern norms this can only appear as a sellout: Marta Dvorak, for example, criticizes Roy for addressing not her “own community but an allogenous one” and for engaging in a “dynamics of domestication and familiarisation” (Dvorak 2002, 61) rather than playing up the non-reciprocal otherness of her own cultural experience.(back)

    22. In terms of reader response, performatism leads to a reaffirmation of contingency, since we are left with an ending suggesting open choice rather than belated, know-it-all-after-the-fact irony. Unfortunately, one of the few critics interested in reestablishing contingency as a positive aesthetic category–Gary Saul Morson–has made his own criteria so restrictive that they would appear to apply nowhere outside of a small subset of 19th-century serial novels (see Morson 1998 and Morson 2003). Morson’s crucial demand is that novels mimic real-world, open time literally. Hence the stipulation that “processual” novels, as he calls them, should make us sense a “more or less regular heuristic” and not “an overall structure” (1998, 305); that they be “properly interpreted without imposing a design” or being reread (1998, 306), and that they incorporate real-life events and reader reaction into them as they are being written (1998, 305). Performatist works, by contrast, impose openness on us through their explicitly felt constructedness and artificiality. This paradox is in turn only possible in the autonomous aesthetic realm, which Morson is trying to open up to what he grandly and perhaps also rather prematurely calls “life.” (back)

    23. Gans (2002) describes this postideological scenario in the following way: “Where modernist politics is cruel, postmodern politics is victimary. Its scenic imagination, haunted by the image of victimization, conceives an ideal scene without a sacred center, where all is periphery. […] Postmodern politics has an infinity of tasks; it sees every form of human relation as at least potentially victimary. Where the postmodern esthetic shies from constructing a center, postmodern politics finds in every mode of human interaction a center to deconstruct, construed as the locus, not of sacrifice, but of power.” (back)

    24. As Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe (1987, 63) puts it, the Holocaust is, regarding the West, the “terrible revelation of its essence” (“L’Extermination est à l’égard de l’Occident la terrible révélation de son essence.”). (back)

    25. For more on this see Gans 1997a. (back)

    26. Eisenman’s plan was widely criticized in Germany for being too abstract. Eventually, the German government made him include an information center in the concept so as to provide at least some form of historical documentation. For a full account of the debates regarding the Memorial see Niven 2002, 194-232. (back)

    27. The museum, which was open to visitors while it was still empty, proved to be a popular attraction solely on the basis of its architectonic effects. (back)

    28. Citations are provided according to the English translation (Schlink 1997), then the German original (Schlink 1997a [orig. 1995]). (back)

    29. See in particular Schlant 1999, Bartov 2000, Long 2000, and Schmitz 2002. (back)

    30. Schlink, whose is a professor of law and a practicing judge, “frames” his heroine in a very exacting way. Hanna’s guilt is made explicit by confronting her with an extraordinary situation requiring an easily made act of free choice; the crime is however mitigated somewhat because it is unpremeditated and passive. Also, it remains unclear whether Hanna was simply doing her duty or whether she was “cruel and uncontrolled” like another guard called “the Mare” (Schlink 1997, 118-119/1997a, 115). The weak circumstantial evidence of Hanna’s brutality is evidently meant to make us decide in dubio pro reo. (back)

    31. This initiation is symbolically sanctioned by his mother, who sends him to “Frau Schmitz” so that he may thank her for helping him after he was sick in public. (back)

    32. See in particular Long 2000, 55: “By accepting the proffered identification with Hanna, the reader can abdicate responsibility for engaging with the vexed moral questions that any serious discussion of the Holocaust necessarily raises.” (back)

    12

    33. See Bartov 2000, 34: “[…] metaphorically, Michael becomes the Jewish victim, both by virtue with his association with Hanna as the reader, and thanks to the grace of his late birth, which prevented him from becoming a perpetrator. Yet, even as he tilts toward the category of victim, Schlink contextualizes his tale within a framework of emotional numbness and sexual obsession, both of which are above or below morality, since the former is a blank and a void, and the latter is involuntary and uncontrollable. Thus numbness and obsession are a means to avoid responsibility and reject all ethical categories.” (back)

    34. Both Schmitz and Bartov diagnose Michael as suffering from the syndrome defined by the Mitscherlichs. (back)

    35. See Mitscherlich 1988 [orig. 1967], 82: “[…] we must broaden the insight into ourselves so that we recognize ourselves in those horrifying scenes […] in which 100, 500 or 1,000 corpses lie before us–corpses of those we have killed. That would mean an insightful, empathetic acceptance of victims long after the time of terror has passed.” (back)

    36. See Bartov 2000, 40. If I understand Bartov’s use of a Primo Levi quote correctly, this direct experience of Holocaust terror–akin to looking at the Gorgon’s head and turning to stone–is impossible anyway; all we can do is belatedly cobble together our ravaged post-Holocaust identity in a quasi-fictional, simulatory way. Hence Wilkomirski’s fraudulent memoirs, which mourn virtually, are more acceptable to Bartov than Schlink’s inability to mourn at all in the postmodern mode. (back)

    37. For more on Goffman’s concept of framing and performatism see Eshelman 2002/2003. (back)

    38. See in particular Goffman’s essay “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” in Goffman 1967, 47-96, esp. p. 95. (back)

    39. Even The Reader‘s harshest critics, such as Bartov and Long, agree that Michael’s representation of Hanna cannot be taken at face value; both suggest however that Schlink has not distanced himself enough from Michael’s perspective. (back)

    40. For a full discussion see Girard 1987, 3-30. Bill Niven (2003), in a similar argument, has linked Hanna’s behavior with a “culture of shame” (as opposed to a “culture of guilt”). (back)

    41. See Niven 2003, 395: “It is as if she [Hanna] had hoped to slip back into the role of passive recipient. Realizing that this will not be possible, she escapes, in carefully stage-managed style, into suicide.” (back)

    42. Typical of this is the line taken by Nancy (1990). According to this way of thinking, any “humanist” or “democratic” attempt to project a feeling of social community or hope is an unconscious repetition of the fascist project (1990, 115). The only tenable alternative to this kind of self-delusion is the critical act of “taking history to its limit”–with that limit being marked, apparently endlessly, by our attitude toward events now lying three generations in the past. (back)

    43. For example, a celebrated work of postmodern literature, Milorad Pavić’s Dictionary of the Khazars, appeared in Belgrade in 1984; in Poland there seems to be a general consensus that postmodern literature began in the 1970’s (cf. Galant 1998). (back)

    44. For more on this see Eshelman 2004. (back)

    45. Only one novel, House of Day, House of Night (Evanston 2003), has appeared in English. (back)

    46. Jung, among other instances, follows in the Kantian tradition when he assumes that archetypes are a transcendental given embedded in the human psyche. (back)

    47. Originally published as “Numery” [Room numbers] in Tokarczuk 1998; available in English in Granta 72 (2000), pp. 35-54. For an in-depth analysis see Eshelman 2004.(back)

    48. See Kant’s explication of this in the Critique of Pure Reason, Book 1, Section 2, § 16. In his voluminous cultural history of intimate inner space, the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (2000, 422-423) has noted the use of the word “observator” in conjunction with the Roman notion of the genius or tutelary god as well as the derivation of Kantian and Jungian concepts of self from the notion of tutelary doubles in general (2000, 426 and 454). (back)

    13

    Literature

    Bartov, Omer. 2000. “Germany as Victim.” New German Critique 80, pp. 29-40.

    Carver, Raymond. 1981. What We Talk About When We Talk About Love. New York.

    Dvorak, Marta. 2002. “Translating the Foreign into the Familiar: Arundhati Roy’s Postmodern Sleights of Hand.” In: Reading Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things. Ed. by Carol and Jean-Pierre Durix. Dijon, pp. 41-61.

    Erving Goffman. 1967. Interaction Ritual. Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior. New York.

    Eshelman, Raoul. 2000/2001. “Performatism, or the End of Postmodernism.”Anthropoetics 2. (anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0602/perform.htm)

    Eshelman Raoul. 2001/2002. “Performatism in Architecture. On Framing and the Spatial Realization of Ostensivity.” Anthropoetics 2 (anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0702 /arch2.htm)

    Eshelman, Raoul. 2002/2003. “Performatism in the Movies (1997-2003).” Anthropoetics2 (anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0802/movies.htm).

    Eshelman, Raoul. 2004. “Aus der Epoche auschecken: Die Spätpostmoderne in Ali Smiths Hotel World und deren performatistische Überwindung in Olga TokarczuksNumery (Zimmernummern) und Miloš Urbans Sedmikostelí (Die Rache der Baumeister).” [Checking out of the epoch: late postmodernism in Ali Smith’s Hotel World and the turn to performatism in Olga Tokarczuk’s “Hotel Capital” und Miloš Urbans Sedmikostelí {Sevenchurches}]; Poetica 1-2 (2004), pp. 193-219; English version: “Checking out of the Epoch: Performatism in Olga Tokarczuk’s Hotel Capital vs. Postmodernism in Ali Smith’s Hotel World“, Anthropoetics 2 (2004/2005). (2004).

    Fluck, Winfried. 2003. “Fiction and Justice.” New Literary History 34, pp. 19-42.

    Galant, Jan. 1998. “Polska proza postmodernistyczna lat siedemdziesiątych” [Polish postmodern prose of the 1970’s]. In: Postmodernizm po polsku? [Postmodernism in Polish?]. Ed. by Agnieszka Izdebskiej. Łódz, pp. 53-68.

    Gans, Eric. 1981. The Origin of Language. Stanford.

    Gans, Eric. 1997. Signs of Paradox. Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures. Stanford.

    Gans, Eric. 1997a. Chronicles of Love and Resentment No. 120, “Victimage and Virtual Inclusion” (anthropoetics.ucla.edu/views/vw120.htm)

    Gans, Eric. 2002. “On Esthetic Periodization.” Chronicles of Love and Resentment No. 258, March 23 (anthropoetics.ucla.edu/views/vw258.htm)

    Gans, Eric. 2003. “Originary and/or Kantian Aesthetics.” Poetica 3/4, pp. 335-353.

    Girard, René. 1987. Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. Stanford.

    Groys, Boris. 2000. Unter Verdacht. [Under suspicion] Munich.

    Lacoue-Labarthe, Phillipe. 1987. La Fiction du Politique. Heidegger, L’art et la politique. Paris 1987.

    Long, J.J. 2000. “Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser and Binjamin Wilkomirski’sBruchstücke: Best-Selling Responses to the Holocaust.” In: German Language and Literature Today: International and Popular. Ed. by Arthur Williams, Stuart Parkes and Julian Preece. Oxford, pp. 49-66.

    Martel, Yann. 2002. The Life of Pi. Edinburgh.

    Meyer, Adam. 1995. Raymond Carver. New York.

    Mitscherlich, Alexander and Margarete. 1988. Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. [The inability to mourn]. Munich.

    Morson, Gary Saul. 1998. “Contingency and Poetics.” Philosophy and Literature 22, 286-308.

    Morson, Gary Saul. 2003. “Narrativeness.” New Literary History 34, 49-73.

    Nancy, Jean-Luc. 1990. “Our History.” diacritics 20:3 (1990), pp. 97-115.

    14

    Niven, Bill. 2002. Facing the Nazi Past. United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich. London & New York.

    Niven, Bill. 2003. “Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser and the Problem of Shame.” Modern Language Review 2, pp. 381-396.

    Roy Arundhati. 1999. The Cost of Living. London.

    Roy, Arundhati. 1997. The God of Small Things. London.

    Schlant, Ernestine. 1999. The Language of Silence. West German Literature and the Holocaust. New York & London.

    Schlink, Bernhard. 1997. The Reader. London.

    Schlink, Bernhard. 1997a. Der Vorleser. Zurich.

    Schmitz, Helmut. 2002. “Malen nach Zahlen? Bernhard Schlinks Der Vorleser und die Unfähigkeit zu trauern,” German Life and Letters 3, pp. 296-311.

    Schulze, Ingo. 1998. Simple Storys. Berlin.

    Schulze, Ingo. 1999. Simple Stories. New York.

    Siebers, Tobin. 1998.”Kant and the Politics of Beauty,” Philosophy and Literature 1, pp. 31-50.

    Sloterdijk, Peter. 2000. Sphären I. Blasen. Frankfurt am Main.

    Spivak, Gayatri. 1993. Interview. Boundary 2, 20:2, pp. 24-50.

    Spivak, Gayatri. 1996. “Deconstructing Historiography.” In: The Spivak Reader. Ed. by Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean. New York, pp. 203-235.

    Tokarczuk, Olga. 1998. Szafa [The wardrobe]. Wałbrzych.

    Tokarczuk, Olga. 2000. Lalka i perła [The doll and the pearl]. Cracow.

    15

    Appendix: “The Wardrobe” (Olga Tokarczuk, trans. Raoul Eshelman)

    When we moved in here we bought the Wardrobe. It was dark and old and cost more than the transport from the store to our house. It had two doors decorated with a floral ornament. The third door was made of glass, and when we drove it home in a rental truck the whole town was reflected in its pane. We had to tie a cord around the Wardrobe so that the doors didn’t open during the drive. Back then, as I stood in front of it for the first time, I for the first time had a feeling of just how senseless my existence was. “It’ll fit in well with the rest of our furniture,” said R. He stroked its body tenderly, just as if it were a cow that had been bought for a new farm.

    At first we put the Wardrobe in the hall–it had to be quarantined before entering the world of our bedroom. I squirted turpentine into the barely visible holes, a reliable inoculation against the ravages of time. During the night the Wardrobe creaked and groaned in its new site. The dying woodworms were lamenting their fate.

    In the course of the next few days we put our old apartment to order. In a crack in the floor I found a fork with a swastika engraved in it. Out of the wooden siding protruded remnants of an old yellowed newspaper. The only legible word on it was “proletariat.” R. opened the window wide open to hang up the curtains, and the sound of a miners’ brass band marching through town in the evening intruded into the room. The first night, in which the Wardrobe shared our dreams with us, we couldn’t sleep for a long time. R.’s hand, unable to rest, wandered back and forth over my stomach. And then we dreamed. From that time on we always dreamed together. We dreamed of an absolute quiet in which everything was hanging there like the decoration in a shop window, and that we were happy in that quiet, because we were everywhere and nowhere. The next morning we didn’t even have to tell one another about the dream–all we needed was a single word. After that we never spoke to one another about our dreams.

    One day it happened that there was nothing left to do in our apartment. Everything was in its place, orderly and clean. I warmed my back by the stove and gazed at my cloth napkins. There was no order in their woven patterns. Someone had made holes with a crochet needle in the dense material. Through those holes I looked at the Wardrobe and remembered the dream. It was from the Wardrobe that the quiet came. We stood opposite one another. I was the one that was fragile, unstable and mortal. The Wardrobe was simply its own self. In a perfect way, it was exactly that which it was. I touched its smooth handles with my fingers and the Wardrobe opened before me. I saw the shadows of my clothes and R.’s two tattered suits–in the dark everything had the same color. In the Wardrobe there was no difference between my femininity and R.’s masculinity. It didn’t matter whether something was smooth or rough, round or square, far away or close, alien or one’s own. The Wardrobe smelled of other places and another time that was strange to me. But, my God, it reminded me all the same of something familiar, something so near to me that there were no words to describe it (words always need a certain remoteness in order to designate things). My form entered into the space reflected by the mirror on the inside of the door. I was reflected as a dark outline, hardly distinguishable from a dress hanging on a clothes hanger. There was no difference between the living and the dead. That was me, in the single mirror eye of the Wardrobe. Now I had only to lift my leg and enter into the Wardrobe’s midst. And that I did. I sat down on plastic bags filled with wool and listened to the sound of my own breathing, amplified by the closed space of the Wardrobe.

    When thought is alone by itself it starts to pray. That’s the very nature of thought. “Angel of mercy, my guardian”–I saw my angel before with a face so beautiful that it must be dead, “may you always be with me…”–its waxen wings lovingly embrace the space around me. “In the morning”–the smell of coffee and the bright windows hurting your sleepy eyes, “in the evening”–when time slows down as the sun sets, “in the daytime”–being becomes the same as experience, noise, movement, millions of meaningless actions; “in the night”–the powerless, lonesome body in the dark; “always come to my aid”–the angel guarding children walking along the abyss. “Guard me, protect my soul and my body”–cardboard boxes with the legend “FRAGILE: HANDLE WITH CARE”; “and lead me into eternal life, amen”–the clothes hanging in the half-darkened Wardrobe.

    From that time on the Wardrobe drew me into itself, it was like a gigantic funnel in our bedroom. At first I only spent late afternoons sitting there when R. wasn’t at home. After that I did only the most necessary things–shopping, turning on the washing machine, calling someone up. Then I would go into the Wardrobe, quietly closing the door behind me. Inside it didn’t make any difference what day it was, what season, what year. Everything was velvety. I fed on my own breath.

    One night I woke up from a dream heavy as a humid storm and yearned for the Wardrobe as if it were a man. I had to wind my arms and legs around R.’s body and hold tightly to him in order to stay in bed. R. spoke in his sleep but his words made no sense. Finally, one night I woke him. He didn’t want to leave the warm bed. I pulled him after me and we both stood before the Wardrobe. It was unchanging, mighty and tempting. I touched the smooth handle with my fingers and the Wardrobe opened before us. In it there was enough room for the whole world. Inside the mirror reflected us both, freeing our forms from the surrounding darkness. Our breathing, at first uneven and halting, found a single rhythm. There was no difference between us. The hanging clothes covered our faces. The Wardrobe closed the door behind us. And that’s how we began to live there.

    At first R. went out sometimes to buy something, to go to work, that sort of thing. But after a while that effort became onerous. The days grew longer. From the streets the dampened music of the miners’ bands could sometimes be heard. The sun rises and disappears, and the windows try to draw it inside, without success. The furniture, napkins and dishes are covered now by a thick layer of dust, and our apartment sinks more and more into darkness.

  • Wordsworthian Songcatching in America

    For the handsome two-volume edition of his collected Poems that appeared in 1815, William Wordsworth wrote a preface and an “essay, supplementary to the preface” which, taken together, constitute the last major statement of his literary principles.(1)Much of what Wordsworth wrote in these essays echoes or extends what he called the “systematic defence” of his poetic theory and practice he first propounded about a decade and a half earlier in the preface to Lyrical Ballads. But in the 1815 supplementary essay the poet goes into detail about a subject he treated only sketchily in the earlier preface: identifying his poetic precursors and cherished influences by name. In light of the poetic project Wordsworth laid out in the preface to Lyrical Balladsto depict “situations from common life . . . in a selection of language really used by men” (Works, 791), we would expect him to have something laudatory to say about one of the 18th century’s most popular collections of English common-language poems, Thomas Percy’s Reliques of Ancient English Poetry. And Wordsworth fulfills this expectation, saying “I do not think that there is an able writer in verse of the present day who would not be proud to acknowledge his obligations to the Reliques” (Gill, 656). But he doesn’t stop there. To drive his point home, Wordsworth contrasts the authenticity and dignity of the Reliques with another celebrated 18th-century example of a reputedly ancient and native-grown poetic tradition, James Macpherson’s Ossianpoems. Percy’s Reliques, Wordsworth writes, reflect “true simplicity and genuine pathos” (Gill, 654). But Macpherson’s purported “translations” of the epic songs of a third-century Celtic bard named Ossian, in Wordsworth’s view, amount to nothing but unnatural forgeries, as “audacious as [they are] worthless” (Gill, 656).

    Nearly two centuries later, Wordsworth’s preference for Percy over Macpherson seems easy enough to explain: faced with a choice between genuine and manufactured folk traditions, Wordsworth, a common-language poet dedicated to tracing in his verses “the primary laws of our nature” and the “essential passions of the heart,” gravitated toward authentic, and away from artificial primitives. The choice that Wordsworth made, coupled with his success in creating the taste by which his poems were to be enjoyed, spelled the end of the brief 18th-century vogue of foisting on the public bogus “found” epics. After Ossian and the specious “Rowley” poems of Macpherson’s imitator Thomas Chatterton were exposed as frauds(2), Wordsworth suggests, we won’t be fooled again, both because we’ve gotten more skilled at spotting forgeries, and because there’s little need for manufactured primeval grandeur when so many spontaneous expressions of essential human nature lie ready to hand, waiting to be collected and distilled from the ballads and folk songs with which “humble and rustic life” abounds.

    By opposing Percy and Macpherson, Wordsworth showed that the primitivist strain in English romanticism might have gone in two very different directions. It could have followed Macpherson’s lead in recapturing the primal through style and rhetoric–combine the names of actual places with a few made-up ones, throw in a few 18th-century archaisms, and tie it all together with inverted, Homeric-sounding syntax, as in this, the opening of a poem called “Oina-Morul” from Ossian:

    As flies the inconstant sun over Larmon’s grassy hill so pass the tales of old along my soul by night! When bards are removed to their place, when harps are hung in Selma’s hall, then comes a voice to Ossian, and awakes his soul! It is the voice of years that are gone! they roll before me with all their deeds! I seize the tales as they pass, and pour them forth in song.

    Or English Romanticism could have followed Percy in evoking the primal through the suggestiveness and understated eloquence of the traditional ballad, as in the stanza from “Babes in the Wood” that Wordsworth reproduced in the 1800 preface to Lyrical Ballads to illustrate the power of common-language verse:

    These pretty Babes with hand in hand
    Went wandering up and down;
    But never more they saw the Man
    Approaching from the town.

    For all the bardism that talented poets like Blake and Shelley contributed to English romanticism, there’s the fine counterbalance of Wordsworth’s demonstration, both in his critical writings and in his poetry, of the profundity lying beneath the uncluttered surfaces of the naïve arts. To the long list of Wordsworth’s groundbreaking poetic pronouncements and accomplishments, we need to add one more item. In addition to persuading English-language poets who came after him to think of poetry as the “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” and to eschew the floridity of “poetic diction,” Wordsworth also encouraged us to trust our love for the simple rhymes and lyrics on which we cut our aesthetic teeth, and to view popular culture not as the vulgar alternative to high literary culture, but as a deep well of living human truth from which the finest and most philosophically serious poetry could draw “renovating virtue.” Under Wordsworth’s influence, the poet was not only “a man speaking to men,” but also a songcatcher. And what is a songcatcher? For a start, a songcatcher is animated by an entirely different attitude toward the old stories than Ossian has, who in the final sentence of the passage above portrays himself as cut from the warrior mold he celebrates: he’s a poet who lies in wait, seizes the heroic tales as they pass, presumably knocking them on the head before stealing their glory and arrogating it to himself as he sings “his” songs. A songcatcher, by contrast, admires and respects the land and the stories it holds, and loves the people whose everyday lives are passed under nature’s watchful care. Part rural poet, part itinerant folklorist, and part amateur anthropologist, the songcatcher is a peripatetic gatherer and interpreter of the rawest data of humanity’s ongoing project of self-understanding.

    2

    The influence that traditional balladry had on Wordsworth’s writings is well understood.(3) Less extensively covered, though, is the influence that Wordsworth had on how subsequent artists and scholars viewed traditional balladry. This essay will chart that influence, particularly with regards to how the bridge that Wordsworth built between folk and high literary culture in both his critical writings and his poetry changed the way that the traditional arts were viewed in the 19th and 20th centuries. The story of Wordsworth’s songcatching and the subsequent history of Wordsworthian songcatching in America will point to the pivotal role that this nineteenth-century poet played in shaping the contours of contemporary life, particularly in the United States, where a number of geographical, demographic, and cultural factors have combined to spread his influence way beyond poetry and even literature, and into American culture at large.

    This journey spans more than two centuries and crosses the Atlantic at least a couple of times, but it starts in Britain with the humble ballad. And what is a ballad? Simply stated, a ballad is a song that tells a story–or, it’s a story told in song. In the early years of the last century, George Lyman Kittredge identified five characteristics that distinguish the ballad from other literary forms: a ballad is “a short narrative poem, adapted for singing, simple in plot and metrical structure, divided into stanzas, and characterized by complete impersonality so far as the author or singer is concerned” (Child, xi). Poets of Wordsworth’s day seeking to re-create the feel of traditional balladry frequently employed the ballad stanza: alternating four beat and three beat lines rhyming ab ab, as in this, the opening of Percy’s version of “Barbara Allen’s Cruelty”:

    In Scarlet towne, where I was borne,
    There was a fair made dwellin,
    Made every youth crye, wel-awaye!
    Her name was Barbara Allen
    (Wordsworth and Coleridge, 246)

    Of Kittredge’s five characteristics of ballads, the last–the “impersonality” of the author or singer–is the one that really distinguishes the ballad from other types of poetry. In many respects, this requirement is counterintuitive, for it contradicts the commonly-held notion that lyric arises within and represents a specific and identifiable individual consciousness. Ballads, by contrast, are verses that have become detached from whoever originally composed them, and therefore have passed into collective ownership. Though ballads originated in a single mind–every ballad, presumably, had a first singer–through time they become the common property of successive generations, who might alter them with each iteration, but also keep them alive, either as old songs passed from parent to child, or as cheap printed broadsides, sold for a half penny in the streets of cities large and small.(4)

    Broadside ballads can be very old, since the broadside ballad industry emerged simultaneously with the invention of the printing press. And though an old, anonymous story or song could go from a broadside into the oral folk tradition, only to be collected later and printed again, more often the process moved in the opposite direction, making broadsides–at least potentially–a source of ethnographic data. While a handful of ballad anthologies were published in England prior to 1760(5), the literary tastemakers of the Restoration and 18th century tended to view a love for ballads as a quaint holdover of one’s childhood tastes, or, at best, a gentleman’s hobby, indulged privately. The diarist Samuel Pepys had a collection of some 1700 broadside ballads, and in a diary entry of January 2, 1666, wrote of his “perfect pleasure” in hearing an actress sing “her little Scotch song of Barbary Ellen” (quoted in Wilentz, 9). InSpectator 85, Joseph Addison, risking the scorn of his Augustan Age readers, praised “the old Ballad of the Two Children of the Wood” as “a plain simple Copy of Nature, destitute of the Helps and Ornaments of Art” (Addison). What is recognized today as the English ballad revival that reached into Wordsworth’s lifetime begins in 1760, when Percy’s Reliques and Macpherson’s Fragments of Ancient Poetry, the first volume of the Ossian poems, both appeared. The wide popularity of both books spawned a literary fad that picked up speed as Wordsworth matured from boy to man. In 1769, David Herd’s The Ancient and Modern Scots Songs, Heroic Ballads, etc. appeared; a second edition, with the slightly altered title of Ancient and Modern Scottish Songs, came out in 1776. We know that sometime before 1800 Wordsworth had seen this collection, because he copied four verses of a Herd ballad titled The Cruel Mother into his commonplace book, verses which seem to have influenced The Thorn, a gloomy ballad of insanity and child murder that appeared in Lyrical Ballads. Joseph Ritson brought out several anthologies of songs and ballads in the 1780s, and by the beginning of the all-important decade of the 1790s, ballad collecting and imitating emerged as something approaching a full-blown craze. Joanna Baillie’s Poems; Wherein It Is Attempted to Describe Certain Views of Nature appeared in 1790; it featured “The Storm-Beat Maid,” with its Percyesque subtitle, “Somewhat after the style of our old English Ballads” (Wordsworth and Coleridge, 248). And the ballad fad was by no means limited to Britain: in 1796, William Taylor, Wordsworth’s teacher at Hawkshead Grammar School, published a translation of Gottfried Burger’s Lenora, originally written in German but based on the Percy ballad “Sweet William’s Ghost.” Walter Scott also translated Lenorafor magazine publication in 1796, and later identified this as the work that made him want to become a poet.

    The old ballads being resurrected and imitated in the 1790s held for Wordsworth the nostalgic appeal carried by all songs of childhood. But there was an added attraction: under the influence of both Percy and McPherson, British ballad collection around the turn of the century focused on the border counties of northern England and southern Scotland, the cherished haunts of Wordsworth’s native district. One reason for this was that Percy saw the relatively uncivilized state of life on the border as the source of the traditional ballads’ emotional intensity and authenticity. Though, wrote Percy in his “Essay on the Ancient Minstrels,” “the old Minstrel-ballads. . . are extremely incorrect, and run into the utmost licence of metre,” they also display “romantic wildness, and. . .[the] true spirit of chivalry.” The long-disputed border between the two kingdoms, Percy goes on to say, has proved an excellent impetus for imaginative flight and aid to poetic composition:

    There is scarce an old historical song or Ballad wherein a Minstrel or Harper appears, but he is characterized by way of eminence to have been “of the North Countreye”: and indeed the prevalence of the Northern dialect in such compositions, shews that this representation is real. On the other hand the scene of the finest Scottish Ballads is laid in the South of Scotland; which should have been particularly the nursery of Scottish Minstrels. In the old song of Maggy Lawder, a Piper is asked, by way of distinction, Come ye frae the Border?– The Martial spirit constantly kept up and exercised near the frontier of the two kingdoms, as it furnished continual subjects for their Songs, so it inspired the inhabitants of the adjacent counties on both sides with the powers of poetry. Besides, as our Southern Metropolis must have ever been the scene of novelty and refinement, the northern countries, as being most distant, would preserve their ancient manners longest, and of course the old poetry, in which those manners are peculiarly described (qtd. in Stewart, 140).

    3

    It would be difficult to overstate how powerfully Percy’s equation of the harshness and violence of life on the northern border with poetic genuineness influenced first-generation English Romantics. It contributed greatly to the appeal of Robert Burns, whose Scottish dialect poetry evoked the romantic wildness of northern life for London literati in the 1780s and 90s. Walter Scott prefaced The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, his 1802 collection of traditional ballads and original poetic compositions on balladic themes, with a fifty-page chronicle of the intrigues, feuds, vendettas, plundering raids, and outbursts of remorseless savagery on both sides of the border, stretching from the Roman occupation to the last Jacobite rebellion of Bonnie Prince Charlie in 1745. For Percy and his intellectual and poetic progeny, life lived close to the land–and, especially, life lived close to the land on the border–laid human nature bare, amplifying alike humankind’s innate goodness and its depravity.

    In his own way, Wordsworth subscribed to this view, though his poems tended to emphasize the goodness, seeing selfishness and violence as moral aberrations capable of being ameliorated, as he put it in the subtitle of Book 8 of the Prelude, by the love of nature. The common-language poetry project he first outlined in the 1800 preface toLyrical Ballads rests, however, on a Percyesque equation of ancient or traditional manners with essential human nature. Wordsworth’s poems depict situations from “low and rustic life,” he tells his readers, because in these circumstances “the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which they can attain their maturity, are less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more emphatic language.” But beneath his assertions in the preface that the poet is a “rock of defence of human nature” (Gill 606) and that the language of poetry should closely resemble “that of life and nature” (Gill 612) do more than merely justify Wordsworth’s decision to adopt an unadorned style in his poems. The preface also makes the most powerful argument that the English-speaking world had yet seen for the deep psychological and philosophical significance of the naïve arts, especially traditional balladry, the naïve art form closest to Wordsworth’s heart since childhood. As I’ve mentioned, he used four lines from the Percy ballad of “the Babes in the wood” in the 1800 preface to illustrate the intrinsic elegance and dignity of common-language poetry. The important role played by balladry in the development of Wordsworth’s ideas about poetry was registered in other ways as well. In his Alfoxden notebook of 1797, Wordsworth wrote of his love for the “Scotch songs. . .Scotch poetry, old Ballads & old tales” he had known as a boy, and in 1808 he told Francis Wrangham that he had once thought of circulating some “songs, poems, and little histories” as cheap street ballads, printed on halfpenny sheets (Parrish 85).

    Wordsworth’s most extensive explanation of how balladry influenced his poetry appeared in the “Essay, Supplementary to the Preface” he wrote as a sort of epilogue to volume two of his collected poems of 1815. After naming Spenser, Shakespeare and Milton as his major influences from the neo-classical era (and dismissing Pope and Dryden), Wordsworth identified James Thomson and Percy as his most important and most immediate poetic influences. Thomson’s The Seasons, Wordsworth wrote, was “a work of inspiration” (Gill, 650); and the ballads Percy “collected, new-modelled, and in many instances (if such a contradiction in terms may be used) composed,” had “absolutely redeemed” English poetry (Gill, 653). Wordsworth’s kind words for Percy bracket his scornful–and much longer–disquisition on Macpherson and the Ossianic phenomenon, which begins with a sarcastic apostrophe: “All hail Macpherson! Hail to thee, Sire of Ossian! The phantom was begotten by the snug embrace of an impudent Highlander upon a cloud of tradition–it traveled southward where it was greeted with acclamation, and the thin Consistence took its course through Europe, upon the breath of popular applause” (Gill, 654). But while England and the continent rejoiced in Macpherson’s apparent discovery both of a previously unknown epic and a native-grown Homer to sing that epic, Wordsworth wasn’t buying it:

    Having had the good fortune to be born and reared in a mountainous Country, from my very childhood I have felt the falsehood that pervades the volumes imposed upon the World under the name of Ossian. From what I saw with my own eyes, I knew that the imagery was spurious. In nature every thing is distinct, yet nothing defined into absolute independent singleness. In Macpherson’s work it is exactly the reverse; every thing (that is not stolen) is in this manner defined, insulated, dislocated, deadened–yet nothing distinct. It will always be so when words are substituted for things (Gill, 655).(6)

    This is a marvelously dense extract from the essay, and manages to express in only five sentences many of the essential elements of Wordsworth’s worldview–from it one can abstract his theories of cognitive process, the way that nature imprints itself upon human consciousness, and how poetic language reflects reality. It also reveals what Wordsworth saw as the basis of traditional balladry’s lasting value. If Macpherson is the opposite of Percy, and in Ossian everything is “insulated, dislocated, [and] deadened,” it follows that in Percy’s ballads things are immediate, connected, and vivid. Can there be a better example of a spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling than an ancient ballad, conceived in the throes of an elemental passion, and carried into the present by its power to confront us with timeless human truth?

    But for all Wordsworth did to make the case for the aesthetic and philosophic validity of balladry, he generally did not–unlike some of his contemporaries–write imitations or re-enactments of ballads, as Coleridge had in “Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” “The Three Graves,” and the “Ballad of the Dark Ladie.” Though Wordsworth employed the clippity-clop ballad meter in many of the lyrics composed between 1797 and 1804, including some of the Lucy poems, “Expostulation and Reply, “Tables Turned,” “We Are Seven,” and “Anecdote for Fathers,” the element of traditional balladry that found its way most frequently into his verse was the melancholic indeterminacy of the stories the ballads told. Like myths, ballads start out as orally transmitted records of some actual (usually violent) event, acquiring the features that enable them to serve as exculpatory or scapegoating narratives as they pass from hand to hand. A ballad is a recital of some tragedy, societal or domestic, in which one or more people suffered. Some ballads–especially those that spring from public catastrophes, like train wrecks, ship wrecks, and gruesome multiple murders–can go on at great length in detailing this suffering, with each new singer adding a stanza or two to a song about the wreck of the old ’97 or the loss of the Titanic. Ballads about domestic murders, betrayals, and loss, though, tend to be shorter, and sometimes elide most of their identifying details in order to heighten their poignancy, as in “Bonny George Campbell,” an old Scottish ballad as it was performed by North Carolina native Bascom Lamar Lunsford in 1949:

    4

    High upon highlands, low upon Tay,
    Bonny George Campbell rode out one day.
    All saddled, all bridled, and booted rode he
    And home came the saddle, but never came he.
    My barn is to build, my baby’s unborn,
    My Bonny George Campbell will never return.
    Well, high upon highlands, low upon Tay,
    Bonny George Campbell rode out one day.
    All saddled, all bridled, and booted rode he,
    But home came the saddle and never came he.
    Home came the saddle all bloody to see
    And home came the good horse, but never came he.(7)

    The earliest printed version of “Bonny George Campbell” didn’t appear until after Wordsworth published Lyrical Ballads, so we can’t know for certain whether he was influenced by this specific ballad. It’s pretty typical, though, of the Scottish border ballads with which Wordsworth grew up in its concentration on the suffering of those left behind, with their sorrows figured by the humble quotidian tasks of rural life. A ballad like this raises more questions than it answers: who is Bonny George Campbell, and what happened to him? Is he alive or dead? What other hopes of the unidentified speaker have been dashed by his disappearance? The same sorts of questions arise from Wordsworth’s “Lucy” poems, such as “She Dwelt Among the Untrodden Ways” and “A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal”:

    She dwelt among the untrodden ways
    Beside the springs of Dove,
    A Maid whom there were none to praise
    And very few to love:

    A violet by a mossy stone
    Half hidden from the eye!
    –Fair as a star, when only one
    Is shining in the sky.

    She lived unknown, and few could know
    When Lucy ceased to be;
    But she is in her grave, and, oh,
    The difference to me!(Works, ed Sheats, 112)

    A slumber did my spirit seal;
    I had no human fears:
    She seemed a thing that could not feel
    The touch of earthly years.

    No motion has she now, no force;
    She neither hears nor sees;
    Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course
    With rocks, and stones, and trees.(Works, ed Sheats, 111)

    Poems like this evoke the speaker’s peculiarly mingled feelings of grief and awe by leaving out the narrative details one would expect to encounter in conventional elegies and laments. Who is Lucy? Why did she die? What does it mean when the speaker of “She Dwelt Among the Untrodden Ways” focuses his attention in the middle stanza on a “violet by a mossy stone / Half hidden from the eye?” And in “A Slumber,” the pronoun “she” appears in both stanzas–but with no clear antecedent. Is the antecedent the “spirit,” or the unnamed female who’s rolling around with rocks and stones and trees? Much of the power of these two justly admired lyrics may be traced to the way that they, like “Bonny George Campbell,” employ a gestural aesthetics that produces a poignancy all the more powerful for its having been muted. They point at, but do not dare to name, their originating events. Like the old ballads, the Lucy poems appear to have come down to the present from a long time ago, and in the process of that transmission have been stripped of all but their most essential elements. What theydon’t say invites readers to supply from their own store of feelings something approaching the emotional impact of the ballads’ precipitating events.

    This spare and delicate gestural style was one of Wordsworth’s most important legacies to the poets who came after him. Standing midway between the antiquarian ballad collectors of the middle 18th century and the common-language poets (Browning, Tennyson, Whitman, et. al.) of the middle of the 19th century, Wordsworth both benefited from and perpetuated the ballad revival. But by the time of Wordsworth’s death in 1850 the old northern British ballads had all been collected from the Scottish highlanders and dalesmen of England’s border counties, and were being continuously recycled into historical romances, nursery rhymes and tales, and expendable rustic poetry by Sir Walter Scott, James Hogg, Robert Southey, and others. By 1825 or so, there was little untouched folk culture to be found, even in the remotest corners of Britain. Much of that culture had been overrun by industrialization (particularly in the form of lead and coal mining) or dispersed by enclosure of pasturelands. In the 19thcentury, searchers for Percy’s genuine “North Countreye” singers began to look westward across the Atlantic, where a treasure trove of unspoiled British folk culture flourished after one of the largest and rapidest mass migrations in recorded history: the movement of a quarter- to a half-million people from the border regions of England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland to the backcountry of the United States between 1717 and 1775.

    5

    All American schoolchildren know that the first successful British colony in North America was founded by the Puritan Pilgrims, who came from East Anglia to Massachusetts in 1620. The next wave of British immigration brought “distressed cavaliers” (and their indentured servants) from the losing side of the English Civil War to the tidewater and Chesapeake Bay regions of what is today Virginia, Delaware, and Maryland. The third wave brought societies of “Friends,” religious dissenters of various sects–Quakers, Shakers, Mennonites, Anabaptists–from England’s north midlands to settle in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Delaware River Valley. Almost all of these first three waves were completed by about 1715, and altogether brought about 90,000 British people to North America. But this total amounted to less than half of even the most conservative estimate of the number of Anglo-Scots-Irish immigrants who arrived in the 18th century.

    Like most immigrants to the new world, the British borderers sought space, freedom from governmental regulation of their traditional ways of life, and economic opportunity. In North America, they settled in the landscape that most closely resembled that which they had left: the mountainous trans-Appalachian region that runs from the middle of Georgia in a roughly northeasterly direction across western South and North Carolina, western Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky, eventually merging with the Alleghany Mountains in Pennsylvania. By the end of the 18th century, there were Anglo-Scots-Irish settlements scattered throughout what is today the American south–an area roughly the size of Western Europe, and today the most populous of the United States Census Bureau’s four national regions, with a current population of about 106 million, more than a third of the total population of the U.S.

    Contemporary American southern culture still bears many signs of its having originated in the British borderlands. Many of the speech ways and regionalisms of the American south–like using the verb “reckon” as “to think” or “to consider”–can be traced to northern English dialects. The best evidence of the northern British provenance of southern American culture, though, comes from Appalachian place names. After he sings “Bonny George Campbell,” Bascom Lamar Lunsford says that the American title of the fiddle tune derived from “Bonny George Campbell” is “Cumberland Gap.” Cumberland was far and away the favorite place name bestowed by the British borderers on their new world homes. There are Cumberland Mountains in eastern Tennessee, a Cumberland Knob in North Carolina, the Cumberland river, which rises on the western slopes of the Appalachians in North Carolina, and waters the fertile Bluegrass region of southern Kentucky and northern Tennessee, and the Cumberland Gap, a mountain pass that connects the American backcountry with the southern port cities of Savannah, Georgia and Charleston, South Carolina. There are Cumberland counties in Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and southern Pennsylvania, and too many towns and cities named Cumberland, both in the United States and in eastern Canada, to list.

    The mountainous topography of the southern backcountry, combined with the clannish tendencies the borderers brought from their homelands, kept the Appalachians pretty isolated well into the 20th century. Electricity and indoor plumbing didn’t come to much of the region until the late 1930s. While this isolation kept Appalachia a couple of generations behind urban America in economic development, it also protected the old British folksongs, ballads, and stories the borderers brought with them to the new world from being diluted or altered by encounters with other folk traditions. This meant that well into the 20th-century, one could still find in the cricks and hollers of the Southern mountains pristine examples of northern British ballads as they had sung in the old world two or three centuries ago.

    The first and most influential Wordsworthian songcatcher in America was Harvard English professor Francis James Child (1825-1896). Two factors combined to interest Child in traditional balladry: the first was his exposure, at Berlin and Göttingen in the late 1840s, to Germanic philology’s effort to transform the “romantic dilettantism” of literary criticism into something approaching a “well-organized and strenuous scientific discipline” (Child, vol. I, p. xxv). The second factor arose from his work as general editor of a series of volumes titled the “British Poets,” published in Boston between the late 1840s and the 1870s. In the course of overseeing the publication of this series (which eventually ran to more than 150 volumes), Child repeatedly ran across examples of British balladry, and resolved in the late 1850s to edit a definitive collection of all extant variants of English and Scottish ballads. This monumental task occupied Child for the rest of his life, and culminated in the publication of the English and Scottish Popular Ballads in five volumes between 1882 and 1898.

    The Child canon consists of more than 5000 variants of 305 ballads. Variants were arranged chronologically, earliest to latest, and reproduced exactly as they appeared in their independent sources. This degree of meticulousness, Child hoped, would introduce much-needed scientific precision into ballad study, and would correct the misleading editorial practices of earlier collectors like Percy and Scott, who sometimes omitted a ballad’s rustic indecencies or furnished incomplete ballads with their own “improvements.” Child’s editorial apparatus in English and Scottish Popular Ballads was designed to eliminate opportunities for such silent emendations. As a result, Child’s collection remains an enormously useful research tool, and contemporary ballad scholarship still refers to ballads and their variants with Child’s numbers.

    At first glance, it might seem that nothing could be farther from Wordsworth’s love of traditional balladry’s delicate fragmentariness than Child’s patently Victorian attempt to catalogue exhaustively the products of an everyday activity carried on over several millennia. In at least one respect, though, Child was a Wordsworthian songcatcher. Child shared with Wordsworth an all-important anthropological assumption about traditional balladry: the older and more rural the ballad, the more truly the ballad is presumed to reveal the essential characteristics of humanity. Ironically, this is shown by the strange fate suffered in English and Scottish Popular Ballads of the “Babes in the Wood,” the ballad that Wordsworth that quoted so lovingly in the preface to Lyrical Ballads. Percy’s version of “The Babes in the Wood” appeared in volume III of Child’s first collection of ballads that appeared in 8 volumes in 1857-58. During the process of expanding these volumes for the definitive edition, however, Child grew increasingly committed to excluding from the collection any ballads that did not show evidence of having circulated orally before being transcribed either by collectors or broadside printers. After he was granted access to Percy’s manuscripts in the late 1860s, Child discovered that Percy’s version appeared to have been taken verbatim from a seventeenth-century black-letter broadside. Calling “Babes in the Wood” “popular” rather than “genuine,” Child omitted the ballad from the definitive collection–despite the fact that the title of his life’s work was English and Scottish Popular Ballads. Like Wordsworth, who in the 1815 “Essay, Supplementary to the Preface” had excoriated Macpherson and equated poetic popularity with sensationalism, extravagance, and superficiality, Child deeply distrusted the ability of manufactured primitivism to represent essential human nature.

    6

    Curious omissions like this notwithstanding, Child’s collection carried Wordsworthian songcatching into the next century, and sent scores of professors, amateur musicologists, and nostalgic searchers for the beloved songs of their childhoods into the cricks and hollers of Appalachia, hoping to find a previously uncollected variant of an old ballad. The last of the great transatlantic Wordsworthian songcatchers was Cecil Sharp, who was renowned in England for having revived interest in traditional Morris dancing around the turn of the 20th century. Sharp spent nine weeks of the summers of 1915 and 1916 walking through Appalachia collecting old British folk songs, which he published in English Folk Songs from the Southern Appalachians (1917). After Sharp, though, Wordsworthian songcatching in America was increasingly pursued by the mountain folk themselves, who by the late 1920s had a new, economic incentive for learning and preserving the old ballads. Thanks to gradually rising standards of living in America’s rural areas, more country folk had radios and phonographs, which created the need for recordings of the ballads and social music that had been sung and played on cabin porches and at Saturday night barn dances for generations. In August of 1927, an enterprising record executive from New York named Ralph Peer opened the last chapter of the story of Wordsworthian songcatching in America. Peer placed an advertisement in the Bristol, Tennessee News Bulletin inviting musicians who could perform the “songs of the mountains” to audition for a contract with Victor records. The ad found its way to Maces Springs, Virginia–only 26 miles from Bristol as the crow flies, but an all-day journey in those days, owing to the primitive condition of the roads–where Alvin Pleasant Carter, his wife Sara, and their sister-in-law Maybelle Carter decided to take up Peer’s offer. Calling themselves the Carter Family, the trio recorded three songs for Peer, who released two of them, “The Storms are On the Ocean” and “Single Girl, Married Girl” in early 1928. The record started selling all over the south, and the American country music industry was born, with the Carters as its first family. Between 1928 and 1930, the Carters sold 700,000 records.

    Through A. P. Carter, Wordsworthian songcatching passed from professor-antiquarians like Percy, Child, and Sharp back into the hands of people who, like Burns, Wordsworth, and Scott, lived close to a land still brimming with vital folk traditions. During his lifetime A. P. Carter would claim credit for having composed some 300 songs recorded by the Carter Family, including many–like “Will the Circle Be Unbroken,” “Keep on the Sunny Side,” and “Wildwood Flower”–that have become standards of American folk and country music. But A. P. created out of whole cloth only a handful of songs; like Burns and Scott, he was first and foremost a collector, who adapted everything he found–from genuine Anglo-Scots-Irish ballads that had come over with the borderers to maudlin Victorian parlor-piano songs–to the raw, stripped-to-the-bone Carter Family style, as in, “Single Girl, Married Girl,” their first hit record:

    Single girl, single girl
    She goes to the store and buys
    Oh, she goes to the store and buys
    Married girl, married girl
    She rocks the cradle and cries
    Oh, rocks the cradle and cries
    Single girl, single girl
    She’s going where she please
    Oh, she’s going where she please
    Married girl, married girl
    Baby on her knee
    Oh, baby on her knee.(8)

    A. P. Carter said that he learned this song from his mother and taught it to his wife Sara, who sings it on this recording, accompanied by herself on a percussive autoharp, and with Maybelle on guitar, playing the melody on the base strings in between strummed chords(9) (Zwonitzer 25). Sara could have heard “Single Girl, Married Girl,” though, from her mother, grandmother, or great-grandmother. No specific old-world source for this song has been identified; but it belongs to a class of Anglo-Scots-Irish ballad, the woman’s lament, of which there are several examples in Child’s ballads, such as number 79, “The Wife of Usher’s Well,” or 295, “The Brown Girl.” For our purposes, though, less important than the song’s provenance is the spare way it evokes the young wife’s realization that marriage has irrevocably ended her childhood, even while she still calls herself a girl. The most poignant image of the brutal finality of her transformation from child to adult is the song’s second stanza, in which the teenaged girl “rocks the cradle and cries,” comforting the baby, but unable to comfort herself. Like Wordsworth’s “Lucy” poems and “Bonny George Campbell,” “Single Girl, Married Girl” depicts a welter of commingled emotions–self-pity, regret, grief, anger, frustration–as economically as possible, with the same gestural aesthetics that structures both the old Scottish ballad and Wordsworth’s balladic lyrics. It’s as if the poet posits an inverse proportion between the number of words and the depth of the feelings: the fewer words, the more profound the emotion. Or, to put it in another way, the fewer words, the more universal the feeling, since the feelings can therefore be attributed less to the accumulated (and conventional) meanings of the words and more to something that pre-exists language. In Wordsworthian romanticism–and Wordsworthian romanticism is the defining romanticism of the English-speaking world–gestures come before concepts and names. This is what Wordsworth is talking about when he criticizes Macpherson in the 1815 preface for substituting words for things in the Ossian poems. Words constitute one of the most important mediums for expressing and evoking feelings; but words are notthe feelings they evoke. When words are fetishized as things, they become obstacles, rather than avenues, to the feelings that remain constant despite differences in language, culture, time, or whether the Atlantic ocean is to the west or to the east of your home.

    There were, of course, some obvious and significant differences between these two songcatchers, Wordsworth and A. P. Carter. Though Wordsworth lived almost all of his long life in the country, he still had a university education, and he lived, and comported himself, as an English gentleman. A. P. Carter had, at most, three years of formal schooling; and though the financial success of the Carter Family would have enabled him to live grandly in a southern metropolis like Nashville or Atlanta, he never left what he called his “Clinch Mountain home” in Maces Springs, Virginia. But though Carter couldn’t have been Wordsworth, A. P. could have been created by Wordsworth: in The Excursion, the long narrative poem of 1814 that gave Wordsworth a broad English readership, the narrator is a man like A. P. Carter, a “Pedlar” who walks the hills and valleys selling humble rustic goods as means of supporting himself while he pursued his avocation of collecting stories and lore that illustrate humanity’s essential characteristics. Before he made his fortune in music, A. P. Carter was an itinerant peddler, selling fruit trees, seeds, and simple farm implements to his neighbors in the mountains of western Virginia. Both were restless, peripatetic poets. Wordsworth usually composed his verses while walking; indeed, a path he built for this very purpose on the steep hillside behind Dove Cottage in Grasmere, England, can still be seen today. A. P. Carter’s daughter Janette remembers her father as a restless, thoughtful man, always walking “up and down the railroad tracks, his hands behind his back” as he composed or arranged his songs (Carter 32).

    7

    And in addition to sharing these temperamental similarities, both created the taste by which they were to be enjoyed–Wordsworth as the poet of common language and ordinary life, Carter as the creator of the raw, elemental, and genuine style of popular music. In the course of creating these new tastes, both expanded the canons of the genres in which they worked, Wordsworth by bringing the simple dignity of folk songs and ballads into literary poetry, Carter by demonstrating the universalizing appeal of spare orchestration and heartfelt, unadorned performance. Both served as tutelary figures and inspirations for those who came after them. As Percy and Burns were to Wordsworth, Wordsworth was to later British and American poets–a solid ground from which Matthew Arnold and Walt Whitman could embark on their own explorations of humanity’s essential characteristics. A. P. Carter has played that same role for several generations of songwriter-poets, from Woody Guthrie to Joan Baez and Bob Dylan. Carter’s songs serve as a seemingly inexhaustible well of authentic human truth, capable of restoring lost vigor to artistic forms that have been enervated by over-cultivation. When the overuse of conventions makes art grow stale, go back to the roots, and reinvigorate your art with raw folk energy. This is the logic of Romantic revivalism, for it tells us that when the way forward grows hazy or dim, we can always go back to our roots, as Wordsworth, casting about in Book I of The Prelude to find an original theme for his modern epic, “some work / of glory . . . forthwith to be begun” (79-80), goes back to his own roots, his childhood, and finds an epic waiting there for him.

    After Romanticism, artistic culture can go in two directions: it can strive for ever-greater degrees of originality, which usually incorporate the “transgressive” acts so beloved by pop culture scholars in academia today; or it can seek roots, by scraping away the accretions of culture and civilization to reveal a pristine, and therefore true, originary scene. Both directions have their pitfalls: transgressors risk invoking disgust and scorn in their spectators; root-seekers risk ridicule if what they present as the simply authentic is received as mere corniness. There’s an old joke about country music that reveals how quickly and easily simple truths can morph into hokey conventions. What happens when you play a country song backwards? You get your woman back, you get your pick-up truck back, you get your dog back. . . In their day, the rustic poetry of Burns, Wordsworth, and Scott occasionally aroused the same kind of ridicule. In an 1814 review of The Excursion, Francis Jeffrey tartly declared “This will never do!” and went on to task Wordsworth for trying to evince eloquent simplicity “by sprinkling up and down his interminable declamations a few descriptions of baby-houses, and of old hats with wet brims” (Perkins, 463, 467). In light of this, calling Wordsworth the great-grandfather of country music could be the lowest insult or the highest praise, but I’ll leave it to my readers to make that determination on their own. Suffice it to say that for all the ridicule that country music generates in blue-state America, the lives of tens of millions of red-state Americans play out against the background of what Nashville songwriter Harlan Howard identified as the essential ingredients of a country song: three chords and the truth. If it tells us nothing else, the story of Wordsworthian songcatching in America demonstrates that at least two Romanticism’s most bracing innovations–the breaking down of the wall separating high and popular culture and the dedication to seeing the timeless truths of humanity wherever they can be found–have been so universally accepted that we’ve forgotten there was a time when people didn’t believe in what David Bromwich has called Wordsworth’s “sense of radical humanity” (7). Contrary to what’s taught in chronological surveys of English literature, Romanticism wasn’t swept under the richly embroidered rug of Victorianism. Romanticism found a permanent home in popular culture, where it continues to shape the contours of everyday life.

    Works Cited

    Addison, Joseph. Spectator 85 (June 7, 1711). http://tabula.rutgers.edu/spectator/text/
    june1711/no85.html

    Bromwich, David. Disowned by Memory: Wordsworth’s Poetry of the 1790s. Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1998.

    Carter, Janette. Living with Memories. Maces Spring, Virginia: Carter Family Memorial Music Center, 1983.

    Child, Francis James. The English and Scottish Popular Ballads. Five vols. New York: Cooper Square, 1962.

    Fischer, David Hackett. Albion’s Seed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

    Parrish, Stephen Maxfield. The Art of the Lyrical Ballads. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973.

    Perkins, David. British Romantic Writers. 2nd ed. Harcourt, 1995.

    Sharp, Cecil J. English Folk Songs from the Southern Appalachians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932.

    Stewart, Susan. “Scandals of the Ballad,” Representations, No. 32 (Autumn, 1990), 134-156.

    Wilentz, Sean, and Greil Marcus. The Rose and the Briar. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005.

    Wordsworth, William, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads. Ed. William Richey and Daniel Robinson. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 2002.

    ———-. The Poetical Works of Wordsworth. Ed. Paul Sheats. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982.

    ———-. William Wordsworth. Ed. Stephen Gill. Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1982.

    Zwonitzer, Mark and Charles Hirschberg. Will You Miss Me When I’m Gone? The Carter Family and Their Legacy in American Music. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.

    8

    Notes

    1. For Yarrow Revisited, and Other Poems in 1835, Wordsworth wrote a postscript in which he laid out his views on poverty relief, trade unionism, and the state of English religion. See Poetical Works, ed. Sheats, 817-825. (back)

    2. Between 1768 and 1769, Thomas Chatterton (1752-1770) published a series of purportedly antique manuscripts written by a 15th-century English monk named Thomas Rowley. The Rowley materials, which included contrived historical chronicles, lyric poems, and dramas, earned Chatterton a brief renown, and he resolved to make a living as a professional writer. But his plans for a literary career foundered on the realities of the London publishing world of the late 1760s, and on August 25, 1770 Chatterton was found dead in a garret, surrounded by scraps of paper and an empty arsenic bottle. Though his death may have been accidental (arsenic was sometimes used to cure gonorrhea), Chatterton served as a powerful symbol of the self-sacrificing artist for later English romantic poets. Coleridge wrote a “Monody on the Death of Chatterton”; Wordsworth called him “the marvelous boy” in “Resolution and Independence”; and Chatterton appears in “Adonais,” Shelley’s elegy for Keats. It was Keats himself, though, who fell most under the spell of Chatterton’s image as an untutored genius: Keats dedicated Endymion, the long narrative poem he wrote in 1815-16 as a “trial of my powers,” to Chatterton. (back)

    3. See Robert Mayo, “The Contemporaneity of Lyrical Ballads,” PMLA, Vol. 69, No. 3 (June, 1954), 486-522; Mary Jacobus, Tradition and Experiment in Lyrical Ballads (Oxford, 1976); Nicholas Roe, Wordsworth and Coleridge: The Radical Years (Oxford, 1988). For a more focused discussion of the stylistic similarities between Wordsworth’s poetry and traditional ballads, see Stephen Parrish, The Art of the Lyrical Ballads (Harvard, 1973), especially 121-125 and 173-177, and Paul Sheats, The Making of Wordsworth’s Poetry(Harvard, 1973), 184-187. For the history and evolution of high-cultural ballad imitations by canonical poets, see Malcolm G. Laws, Jr., The English Literary Ballad (Carbondale, 1971). (back)

    4. Greil and Marcus (p. 7) reproduce an early 19th-century broadside of “Barbara Allen’s Cruelty.” For the history of broadside ballad publication in England, see Hyder Rollins, “The Black-Letter Broadside Ballad,”PMLA, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1919), 258-339. (back)

    5. Ambrose Philips’ A Collection of Old Ballads came out between 1723 and 1725 and Allen Ramsay’s The Ever Green and The Tea-Table Miscellany both appeared in 1724. (back)

    6. I am grateful to Jonathan Wordsworth for pointing out that Wordsworth was middle-aged when he made this statement, but there is little reason to doubt that as an adolescent, he was as caught up in the Ossianic craze as any of his contemporaries. (back)

    7. Lunsford (1882-1973), who called himself “The Minstrel of the Appalachians,” was born and lived in South Turkey Creek, near Leicester, North Carolina. The composer of the hillbilly standard “Old Mountain Dew,” Lunsford also collected Anglo-American ballads, and claimed that he knew more than 3000 folk songs. In 1949, Lunsford spent a month in Washington D.C., recording some 325 songs for the Library of Congress. This text of “Bonny George Campbell” is transcribed from Lunsford’s recording on Smithsonian/Folkways SF 40082 (1996). (back)

    8. The Carters recorded “Single Girl, Married Girl” several times between 1928 and 1943. The original Victor recording can be heard on The Anthology of American Folk Music , ed. Harry Smith (Smithsonian Folkways 40090 / A 28750, 1997). (back)

    9. This was Maybelle Carter’s signature style, and is still known in country music as the “Carter Scratch.” The crisp electric-guitar base notes on Johnny Cash’s recordings of the 1960s–especially in “Folsom Prison Blues,” “I Walk the Line,” and “Orange Blossom Special”–were derived from the Carter Scratch. Cash met Maybelle Carter shortly after breaking into the music business in the 1950s, and in 1968 became her son-in-law when he married Maybelle’s daughter June. (back)

  • Of Which We May Speak: Meditations on Irony, Eccentricity, and Faith

    “The time has come,” the Walrus said,
    “To talk of many things:
    Of shoes–and ships–and sealing-wax–
    Of cabbages–and kings–
    And why the sea is boiling hot–
    And whether pigs have wings.”
    (Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass)

    The standpoint of irony as such is nil admirari, but when it kills itself irony has, with humor, scorned everything including itself.
    (Søren Kierkegaard, Papirer)

    I

    Intellectuals profess an admiration for irony. They watched Seinfeld in first-run and they buy the program on DVD because they take it, as they took it, for ironic. The same intellectuals usually also identify themselves as ironists, of a rarer variety even than the redoubtable television comedian, on the supposition that they stand askew to the prevailing social consensus, such that their perspective yields them an insight into matters opaque to hoi polloi. “I have baffled them,” the late Joseph N. Riddell once said within earshot while emerging from the Haines Hall lecture auditorium at UCLA. The remark partook more in the self-congratulatory than in the ironic, but it was symptomatic of a certain enduring intellectual conceit in which the sense of a privilege of irony, or a satisfaction in superiority, is also rooted. The intellectual pretends to hover above the settled and the established, to gaze down upon the “culturescape,” as though from a height; even while he declares himself “against Platonism” and works “to subvert metaphysics,” he cannot help but to take, in the mode of “as if,” a transcendentally guaranteed view of life, the world, and everything.

    Yet for a hundred years and more, intellectual discourse has meant institutionaldiscourse, because, in the modern context, no such creature as a non-institutionalized intellectual exists. The history of Western intellectualism indeed conforms to the pattern that its adherents have never actively resisted their own institutionalization; society has put them away into established Bedlams where they have tended happily to remain under the comforting delusion of their tenure. The grunting and squinting of deconstruction and the Brave New Worlds of Feminism and Multiculturalism have all taken place, thanks to the largesse of the taxpaying middle class, within the walls,where the Neveu de Rameau-like commotion will least bother ordinary people on their way to and from productive work. By axiom, the non-resistance of the intellectuals to their institutionalization amounts tacitly to agreement with the consensus. This would be the consensus with which the intellectual claims heartily–as it were, in principle–to disagree. The non-resister postures and fulminates, thus emphasizing his (or her) technical disagreement; but his (or her) consent to immurement, with a salary,adequately guarantees his (or her) essential docility. He (or she) hardly hovers high above the world. No: he (or she) lives under lockdown, each in his appointed cell. Women and minorities request and receive double immurement in their own set-aside programs. Regular ritual occasions in the quadrangle advertise the courage of it all and give the inmate an opportunity to exercise.

    As Søren Kierkegaard once put it in an earlier stage of modernity than our own, so soon as a people has relinquished spiritual conviction, “the ‘Professor’ appears:

    Through many arguments he is able to prove, to substantiate, and to comprehend. That glorious one, together with his life, is scientifically arranged in paragraphs. Graduate students are examined in what kinds of arguments, and how many, are needed to comprehend it. Then, if they know the arguments are good, they are appointed or “called” to a pleasant little living, with prospects of promotion, to lecture on the arguments to the congregation.

    The “Professor” of course flatters himself and the respective graduate students and undergraduates and all their intended with the idea that the “Professor” is Evolution’s finest and richest flower.

    Here, in a journal entry from 1851, Kierkegaard indulges his own rich irony: a hunchbacked social misfit, he jilted a beautiful girl who could see past his physical misshapenness; he then spent his life writing philosophical treatises and peculiar novels that few or none read and conducting debates in Copenhagen newspapers on arcane issues of state-sanctioned theology and the established church. Kierkegaard referred to himself in his private Papers as a “martyr of laughter,” meaning that, because of his awkward physique and because men of patented authority designated him as an intellectually incompetent provocateur, he served as a perennial butt of finger-pointing jokes in public. Kierkegaard, who rarely turned down an opportunity to get into the fray, anticipates the “pre-humiliated personality” invoked by Douglas Collins; the philosopher-theologian’s lot constituted the opposite of what in the contemporary setting bears the designation of “celebrity” even while he enjoyed a similar conspicuousness. One newspaper, The Corsair, famously and regularly pilloried Kierkegaard, selling many copies by doing so; the journal’s cartoonist brutally caricatured his object’s physical deformities, intensifying public ridicule. Contemporary objects of cartoon satire and editorial lampoon occupy a lower rung on the ladder of self-development than did Kierkegaard, and yet contemporary journalism, circulating the coin of popular culture, consists of little else than sarcastic mockery. Undergraduates can define neither irony nor satire, but they know what sarcasm is–operationally, anyway. Philologically, sarcasm has to do with mocking a corpse, who can neither make objections against nor resist his ill treatment.

    2

    Kierkegaard had once naively seen for himself a career either as a holder of academic office in the state-funded university or a clergyman in the Danish Lutheran Church, likewise established; his dissertation, The Concept of Irony (1841), nestles itself in the prevailing accepted language of Hegelianism, as it was then, and cites a bibliography of approved Young Hegelian authorities, such as Friedrich Christian Baur (1792-1860), a radical and a skeptic who extolled various Late Antique heretics. This gesture still generated a suspicion of excitement at the time. In the same way, a twenty-something doctoral candidate of the 1980s would have written in the jargonized style then regnant and would have cited the stellar poststructuralists, such as Michel Foucault or Jacques Derrida, or in the 1990s, the prominent feminists and multiculturalists. The craze, nowadays, as it has been for two decades, is for so-called transgressive discourse. One pursues one’s career in the perfervid language of adolescent contrariness, championing the trivial against the serious and assuming the mien of an iconoclast. In the selfsame moment, however, when Kierkegaard seemingly accommodates himself to intellectual orthodoxy, he begins to undermine it. His dissertation is not merely a study of irony; it is practice in irony. It suggests the articulation, not of a professor, but of an anti-professor. Indeed, The Concept of Irony qualifies itself with the subtitle, With Constant Reference to Socrates, the man above whom, for Kierkegaard, none save Jesus ranks higher in the anti-professorial hierarchy.

    More than one feature of Kierkegaard’s discussion of irony will strike cognoscenti of Generative Anthropology as familiar. The mere fact of Kierkegaard’s insistent and by-no-means-unmotivated linkage of irony to the person of Socrates, especially in light of the Athenian’s quasi-sacrificial demise, suggests the participation of things ironic in things sacred. Irony, according to the Dane, always but indirectly constitutes an attempt to address the mob, which wants to hear nothing contrary to its motile will. The prominence of Socrates’ “sign” or daimon in The Concept hints further at a relation binding irony to signification. Irony, says Kierkegaard, always points to something about which the rules forbid one directly to speak. The Kierkegaardian irony is related to the stubborn persistence, in societies that see themselves as the acme of sophistication, of primitive injunctions. The Kierkegaardian irony finally concerns the grammar of the “indicative.” It will be useful, therefore, before expounding the pertinent features of Kierkegaard’s investigation, to review briefly the “originary analysis” of irony found in Eric Gans’s Signs of Paradox (1997). Apropos of irony as quasi-object of desire, as a thing or quality that one would possess, Gans remarks that the ironic perspective–or pose, or whatever it might be–is “always gifted with prestige” and that it supposes the “knowing superiority” of the subject “to the ironies of fate that await us in the real world.” Here irony means reversal, as in an Athenian tragedy. While “irony is,” as Gans sees it, “central to all thought” and while it indeed forms an element in the “historical human sign-system of language,” mastery of irony, if irony is to function as a recognizable, differentiated aspect of that system, must be rare rather than universal.

    Exactly this rarity of command over irony endows irony with its prestige and makes it, not only a focus of desire, but also and necessarily an occasion for resentment; Jews and Christians would say that irony occasions covetousness, a transgression explicitly enjoined in the Decalogue. Even those in the Athenian Boulé who vote to condemn Socrates, especially his trio of accusers, envy him his dialectical wit and wish they could slay as easily with the sword of repartee their own forensic opponents; once they have done away with him, he can no longer lord it over them as the living proof of their mental obtuseness. Real ironists annoy us, biting at our tail ends like gadflies, yet everyone in a modern context wants to wear the badge of irony. (That is to say, everyone wants to bite at his opponent’s tail end–a perfect index of the prevailing psychology.) Given that possession of irony imbues the possessor with charisma, it would hardly surprise us to discover that some people believe themselves to be ironists who, objectively, are not. The possibility exists that the Seinfeld audience consisted (or consists) mainly of non-ironists who nevertheless feel like ironists when they are watching the episodes; moreover, as Seinfeld concerns the constituency of popular entertainment, this must be the case. It could even happen that groups of pretenders, organizing themselves, might lay claim falsely to the qualification of ironist and establish safeguards for protecting their domain. In an institutional setting, for example, where presumptive command of irony played a role in upholding status, outsider-investigators could perhaps find in place prohibitions of questions or topics that have the potential of drawing nigh embarrassing revelations.

    Eric Voegelin (1901-1985) writes in The New Science of Politics (1952) of the stereotypical way in which institutions, when they fall into the rigidity of doctrine, seek the means for “preventing embarrassing criticism” and for quashing “theoretical debate concerning issues that involve the truth of human existence.” Voegelin refers to Cromwell’s Puritan Revolution and to the ideological empires of the Twentieth Century, but it is ever so. “In the university today,” writes William Irwin Thompson in his essay on “Mythic Narratives about Human Origins” (1996), “there is definitely such a thing as forbidden knowledge.” Should one “make a mistake”–which is to say, should one ask a prohibited question or invoke unofficial authorities and so “disturb the academic clergy”–then the promise of tenure can swiftly vanish; or, should one already have tenure, the administration can probably dig up a quality of moral turpitude sufficient to the punitive cause. Thompson takes more interest in paranoia, however, than he does in irony, which receives no entry in the index of Coming into Being, where “Mythic Narratives” appears.

    But the discussion has taken us prematurely beyond the important analysis of irony inSigns of Paradox, or just maybe it has taken us to the heart of that analysis. According to Gans, irony being “inherent in the sign-system,” we should remark that:

    The primary characteristic of the sign is that is that it occupies a different level of being from the reality it designates. This vertical difference, the basis of the opposition within the sign-system between signifier and signified, can only be thought concretely from an originary perspective. The sign as an abortive gesture of appropriation is on a different level from its referent because although it remains a physical gesture, it renounces the physical assimilation of this referent in becoming a representation of it. . . . In the phenomenological usage, the sign “intends” its referent precisely in the sense that the referent remains outside the immediate sphere of action of the intender.

    3

    The notion of “levels of difference” functions essentially in Gans’s discussion by reminding us that signification never expurgates its kernel of resentment, and that jealousy never proceeds de haut en bas but always vice versa. The contemporary established world characteristically employs a vocabulary, afflicted by the French disease, that attacks the putative complacency of received theories of the sign and ofsignification. In Signs, Gans mentions Jean-Marie Benoist’s Tyrannie du logos (1975) as both contributory and exemplary. Under this attack on our supposed naïveté, the taken-for-granted phenomenological intention and the equally taken-for-granted hermeneutic meaning are mere delusions, nominated compulsorily for deconstruction. But if irony inhabited and shaped signification from the beginning, as Gans argues, then the attempt to leave people in bafflement about language would also be an attempt to deprive them of irony and of its benefits. The attempt to ball up language, so as to corrupt communications in the public square, would be the attempt to ball up irony itself, so as to deprive an independent criticism of one of the main weapons in its armory. When Gans invokes “the concrete,” he must be using that term, with its politically radical connotations, in a somewhat ironic manner. The irony of the materialist view of existence lies in its inability to accept the intangible as effective; hence it cannot understand renunciation, which it classes with religious phenomena such as asceticism that it regards as delusory and ergo as anti-progressive. The program of progress aims at appropriation of the concrete object so as to fulfill appetite, but the (ironic) program of culture, as Gans sees it, aims at reconciling the community to an inevitable frustration of mere appetite. Such reconciliation depends on the ability of a community to take a paradoxically satisfactory partial satisfaction, not in the object, but in the representation of it.

    In culture, of course, the principle of reciprocity eventually generates the market, whose economic tide lifts all boats and increasingly satisfies most appetites, but one must never forget the relation of the market to the intangibility of the sign in its context of the originary human scene.

    For Gans, irony articulates that “fragility of the absolute, or ‘vertical’ formal difference, inaugurated by the sign with reference to its source,” which he denominates as “the relative or ‘horizontal’ difference in the real world between subject and object.” In originary analysis, irony echoes the mutation of the ostensive into the imperative. The ostensive, we recall, emerges in the existential dilemma of the originary scene, where the convergent individuals of the pack cross the threshold from bestiality into humanity by recoiling from the item of appetite that has drawn them into dangerous centripetal confrontation. Through the ostensive, the incipient community designates the item whose appropriation each individual has renounced and that the crowd has renounced collectively: the ostensive refers to the object as an inaccessible presence, but as apresence nevertheless. The imperative refers to the absence of the object, for whose conciliatory power the community suddenly yearns in a renewal of crisis: the imperative “is [thus] uttered in the absence of [the] referent to make it appear. . . . Pronouncing the word . . . is expected to produce the object.” In originary analysis, the object that the community calls on to appear will still be beyond accessibility, for it is not really an object, but a sign of social cohesion. Recalling the object through the pronouncement of the imperative reinforces social cohesion, but it does nothing to diminish–rather, it intensifies–the frustration intrinsic to a turning-away from some tasty morsel. Irony must please the subject because the sign pleases, but “the pleasure of irony” will therefore qualify as an “esthetic pleasure” only, one that oscillates “between ascetic form and seductive content,” never reaching the latter. Pleasure must always remain within the horizon of the esthetic because the utopia of repletion would mean the neutralization of culture and a relapse into animal existence.

    For Kierkegaard, writing in The Concept, irony emerges in the Socratic commitment to conversation or dialectic, as opposed to oratory. The sophists practice oratory, and while not all of them behave so nakedly as do Thrasymachus in The Polity or Callicles inGorgias, their overriding egotism, their desire to command, can hardly slip past even the most casual perusal. The sophists are utopians in the sense that they want to reorder the body politic for their exclusive convenience, although they are likely to invoke natural precedence or some other justification when they do so. It will really be best for everyone, they implicitly say. Thus Callicles focuses in his discourse on themes of strength and repletion, nominating them as indices of a primordial dispensation that modern ideas have illegitimately displaced. “Nature . . . demonstrates that it is right that the better man should prevail over the worse and the stronger over the weaker,” he says, thereby conflating “better” with “stronger”; and “a man should encourage his appetites to be as strong as possible instead of repressing them.” Callicles defines “the happy life” as “having all the . . . appetites and being able to satisfy them with enjoyment.” When Socrates questions Callicles ironically to show the contradiction in the latter’s theory, Callicles, like an undergraduate, misunderstands the irony and accuses Socrates of being “sarcastic.”

    Kierkegaard says that with regard to the egomaniacs and proto-tyrants, Socrates’ ironic comments have the effect of dispersing pretense–and so of annulling the coercive aggression of the speeches–while avoiding direct contradiction. Kierkegaard’s general formulation about the relation of Socratic irony to power requires sensitive interpretation: “What [Socrates] desires to censure by contrasting discoursing with conversing is the egotistical quality in eloquence that longs for what might be called abstract beauty, versus inopes rerum nugaequae canorae, and which sees in the expression itself, torn loose from its relation to an Idea, an object for pious veneration.”

    One might be excused for thinking of all that postmodern prose in all those journals for thirty-five or forty years. In its context, Kierkegaard’s observation conforms to, as it forecasts, the explanation in Signs of Paradox that irony binds together the “vertical” and the “horizontal” by commemorating both simultaneously through its “oscillating” type of double-awareness; the tendency of oratory, by contrast, is to forget the “vertical,” and to lurch along the plane of existence toward the indignity, which the orator foresees as a triumph, of mere appetitive consummation. The orator, like the dictator, doesn’t give a damn for conversation or for definitions or for questions. The orator has no theory–he is not a theorizing type–but if he did have one it would undoubtedly resemble the postmodern view that the vertical dimension, which irony acknowledges, corresponds to a superstitious figment and that irony thus stands in the way of all things pragmatic, especially the immediate agenda of the orator. In a television documentary about religion, for example, the biologist Gerald Dawkins casually refers to the New Testament as “Saint Paul’s nasty, sadomasochistic doctrine of atonement for original sin” and equates religious education with child abuse. InGorgias, Plato’s study of a purely secular type of fanaticism, Callicles warns his interrogator that, in confounding people as he does, Socrates is likely “to be dragged into court, possibly by some scoundrel of the vilest character,” and dispensed with by a vote. Thus did Leonid Brezhnev speak to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and thus has power always spoken to dissent.

    4

    An “essential connection” exists, writes Voegelin in Science, Politics and Gnosticism(1959), “between the libido dominandi, the system, and the prohibition of questions.” Kierkegaard’s Concept distinguishes, in just this Voegelin-like way, between Plato’s open dialectical project and Hegel’s hermetic system: “With Hegel it is not necessary to question thought from without, for it questions and answers itself in itself. With Plato, on the other hand, thought answers only insofar as it is questioned . . .” The phrase, “is not necessary,” really means is regarded as superfluous or is regarded as a presumption against the completeness of the system. Kierkegaard writes that irony concerns both questioning and the relation of a subject to an object. When, under irony, “I ask a question,” it follows that “I know nothing and dispose myself receptively toward the object.”

    Thus the Kierkegaardian irony is indicative and subjunctive at the same time; like the originary irony in Signs of Paradox, it oscillates between two noncompossible cases. In a casual remark committed to a journal around the time that Kierkegaard was writingThe Concept, he noted: “The grammar of the indicative and subjunctive really contains the most aesthetic concepts, and occasions just about the highest form of aesthetic enjoyment (it borders on the musical, which is the highest).” The indicative, like the ostensive, calls attention to something in and for itself; the subjunctive declares that the case is what it is, despite any doctrinal or institutional object. Kierkegaard also wrote on the same occasion that the ironist necessarily takes up a stance against systematic authority, with its tendency to declare against what intuitively is, because, whereas the ironist admits, “I know nothing,” by contrast “the systematizer believes he can say everything, and that whatever cannot be said is wrong and unimportant.”

    The ironist is a prophet, necessarily alienated from the people but observing the scene, so to speak, on their behalf. He stands guard on the openness of existence, as it has emerged in the freedom of consciousness–and in freedom of conscience–on the human scene. Socrates’ daimon listens to suasory speeches, to the orators, whispering“no” to its protégé whenever he feels the temptation to be persuaded by their seductive schemes. If only the oysters in Lewis Carroll’s poem could have accessed the demonic! They might, as First Lady Nancy Reagan once recommended, have “just said no” to the Walrus. Irony, embodied in the Socratic ethos, will assume a form, as Kierkegaard puts it, entirely negative, but never nihilistic or fanatical. A fanatical ironist would be a contradiction in the adjective, while a fanatical connoisseur of oysters would not. Hence the professors, with their commitment to the isms, disqualify themselves as ironists. We note, however, that envy of the ironist need obey no such limit; that, as in every case of resentment, it can grow into a monstrosity. To profess, after all, is to orate; to orate, like an emperor, is to command. Yet once the sense of irony has been unleashed in a society, or in a cultural continuum like that of the West, the resentful non-ironist, seeking to command, will have a motive for arrogating the title of ironist to himself. He will obey the formula of seeming to be authentically knowledgeable, through the withholding of explanations, about pretentious false knowledge, to the putative pretentiousness of which he will constantly but non-specifically draw attention. He will verbally abjure power while lavishly exercising it; he will verbally champion victims while inveterately expelling those who remain insufficiently vociferous on the topic of championing victims.

    It is not for no reason that Gans closes his chapter on irony by alluding to Francis Fukuyama and warning his readers against “the chimera of ‘the end of history.’” Gans urges us to behave in a manner “structurante” rather than “structurée.” It is not so much the long-standing and patiently developed institutions of a society that threaten us, but their derailment into ideologically self-justifying nodes of command, places of opportunity for opportunists. Pace the vehement Dawkins, God never threatens us, especially under the hypothesis of his non-existence, but the programmatic denial of him for the sake of some agenda, as in Stalinism, well might. Notice how in Dawkins’ indictment God becomes a victimizer–indeed the very Arch-Victimizer, “vindictive, unjust, unforgiving, racist.” Says Dawkins, “Religion may not be the root of all evil, but it is a serious contender.” The evolutionist leaves the conclusion of his syllogism unstated but we can legitimately claim no doubt as to what it is. “May God,” writes Gans, “or the ironic contemplation of his absence, save us from the utopian search for final solutions.”

    II

    No doubt the institutions have always already grown ponderous, coercive, parochial in their outlook, and not a little bit dictatorial in their dispositions. Culture itself, as Richard Weaver writes in Visions of Order (1957), has something of the dictatorial in its constitution: “At [the] center [of any cultural dispensation] there lies a ‘tyrannizing image,’ which draws everything toward itself. . . . Such centripetalism is the essence of every culture’s power to cohere and endure.” The ironist does not say “nay” against this“center” or “image,” concerning the metaphysical reality of which, as of Gans’s paradoxically absent God, he might indeed have his suspicions; rather the ironist, as in Kierkegaard’s journal discussion, always addresses the “actual” from the perspective of the “thinkable.” Should he say “nay” to something, he will say it to the actual, as to a lapse from the thinkable; the ironist implies, in his nay-saying, that the thinkable is identical with the preferable, morally considered.

    One might remember Socrates’ conversation with Callicles in Gorgias in this regard. Callicles and the other sophists are as they are. Only the collision with reality, the mutual slaughter of their power-contests, will convince them (too late) of the vanity of their ambition. Part of what makes the sophists what they are–proto-tyrants who want to seize the city and arrange a life maximally convenient to themselves–is their refusal to think through their basic assumptions; often this refusal takes the form of a bitter contempt for received wisdom, which they denigrate as the equivalent in their terms of slave morality. They flail and they fulminate, forming committees and initiating litigation in the courts. Or better yet, in the same regard, one might remember the confrontation, not itself ironic but illustrative of that in which the ironist places his faith, between Antigone and Creon in Sophocles’ tragedy. No one orates or professes with the aplomb that Creon brings to his kingly task in long suffering Thebes. As comedian Jon Stewart has said apropos of someone else, Creon is the type of self-righteous strongman who really puts the dic in dictator.

    5

    Creon upholds an explicit theory of politics (he lectures the Thebans on it), according to which Eteocles will receive a state funeral while Polyneices, his brother and foe in the lately settled civil war, will remain unburied, food for jackals and vultures. Antigone clashes with Creon by carrying out the rites for Polyneices anyway on the argument that while Creon’s word might be law actually, an immemorial “unwritten law” nevertheless demands that all the dead receive proper treatment. Writes Weaver: “That cultures [or a polity] should be allowed to develop independently and exclusively not only is right, but is essential; there is a point, however, at which a culture encounters something comparable to ‘natural law.’” Such natural law, functioning as a limit,“derives sanction from a universal consideration of justice.” Weaver’s observation accords perfectly with the discussion of reciprocity in originary analysis, just as Antigone’s sense of justice in the tragedy accords perfectly, quite while it anticipates, the Socratic anamnesis, as represented by Plato. Justice, as reciprocity, finds its matrix in the originary scene, which imbues the means of defusing the crisis–language–with the wisdom of the occasion and makes the insight available thereafter in the conversational, as opposed to the oratorical, model of speech.

    It is true that Weaver uses the character of Antigone to illustrate what he calls the rhetorical or emotional tendencies, rooted in history and intuition, as opposed to the dialectical or analytical tendencies, which are destructive of history and intuition, and that he gives favor to the former. But Antigone never makes any speeches; unlike Creon she has no theory, only an inherited conviction about propriety. Haemon says to Creon that the people are talking among themselves about Antigone’s advocacy of the unburied brother.

    So, in Sophocles’ tragic scheme, it is the peripheral phenomenon of conversation that articulates justice against the tyrannical center, which the play shows to have been usurped by an egomaniac, who intolerably flouts the unwritten law. Antigone relates to irony because, while its protagonist hardly qualifies an ironist (far from it), the drama turns, as tragedy must, on an ironic reversal that casts Creon down and makes for a brand of bitter justice after all. Irony, as Kierkegaard asserts, concerns the relation of the individual to his polity. Regarding Socrates again, Kierkegaard writes in The Concept:

    When one considers that even in our modern states where, precisely because it has undergone a far deeper mediation, the state allows quite a different liberty of action to subjectivity than the Greek state was able to do, when one considers, I say, that even in our modern states the particular individual still always remains a rather ambiguous person, then one can surmise from this with what eyes the Greek state must have looked upon Socrates’ attempt to go his own way and live as a private person.

    The tension between the emergent “private person” and the state, by no means resolved in l’affaire Socrate, would become increasingly dire in the Ecumenic Age, to borrow Voegelin’s term, that followed the dissolution of Athenian independence, taking the form of the succession of mundane empires beginning with that of Philip of Macedon and culminating with the Pax Romana, both in its first or Pagan and then again in its second or Christian phases. One puts it so notwithstanding the fact that a “Christian Empire” is another contradiction in the adjective.

    What is the “ecumene”? A definition is needed because irony has a relation to the phenomenon. In the fourth volume (1974) of his Order and History (begun 1957),entitled The Ecumenic Age, Voegelin adduces a definition that one remembers for its poignancy but that eludes later relocation in his text. Voegelin says that whereas a polisis a subject that governs itself, an ecumene is a parcel of geopolitical existence–consisting possibly of hundreds or even thousands of poleis–over the possession and control of which contending concupiscent aggressors destructively battle. Says Voegelin in a passage that this author has providentially succeeded in locating: “The ecumene is not a subject of order but an object of conquest.” It is also “a graveyard of civilizations.” Thus the vast swath of earth subdued by Alexander the Great immediately becomes a desire-object for the contentious successors, who carve it up duodecimally; they run into Parthian and Hindu limits in the East, where the locals respond mimetically to the pattern. The Pax eventually reconciles competing Hellenic claims by swallowing Hellas whole. The individual becomes more, not less, “ambiguous” than previously he was.

    At the historical noonday of the Pax comes Lucian of Samosata (125-200), an almost exact contemporary of the “Philosopher King” Marcus Aurelius (121-180) who, like Hegel many centuries later, conversed mainly with himself, as in his Meditations. Talking to oneself is “cud-chewing,” says Kierkegaard in an aside on the Prussian illuminatus inThe Concept. Talking to oneself is also inalterably derivative, in a defective sense, of the norm of talking with other people, in the same way that atheism is inalterably derivative of the norm of belief. Dialogue falls existentially prior to monologue just as belief falls existentially prior to denial. Lucian, a Syrian by birth and a Greek by education, scandalously but predictably did not receive a network television contract nor has his work appeared on DVD, although his repartee entails greater ironic subtlety by far than one-time matriculating SUNY Oswego undergraduate Jerry Seinfeld’s. Trained in Athens in rhetoric, the acknowledged royal road to power and riches of the time, Lucian experienced something like conversion, after which he scorned oratory and its pretenses; he wrote dialogues filling the Platonic form with the content of the New Comedy. He became, as far as historians can discern, the producer, writer, and stellar performer in a satirical road show that took him from Attica all the way to Gaul, during the course of which, as one says, he consistently packed the houses and brought down the rafters. Think of Saturday Night Live thirty years ago when the sketches were funny. Commentary takes Lucian’s Two Charges of Literary Assault, written around his fortieth year, for autobiographical. In Plato’s Apology, three orators bring the charges against Socrates; in Two Charges, Oratory herself, or rather Rhetoric, brings indictment against Lucian, but then so does Dialogue, in a case adjudicated by none other than Justice, ably assisted by Hermes, both examining the case at the behest of Zeus.

    Before the gathered crowd (it more resembles a rabble), addressing herself to the jury and the two judges, Rhetoric complains: “It was I . . . who came upon this man, still wandering around Ionia not knowing what to do with himself. . . . He was pretty young, still spoke a barbarian language and was a hair’s breadth from going native and wearing an Assyrian-style kaftan“; after she made him both eloquent and rich, “he fell passionately in love with that bearded fellow, Dialogue . . . who clams to be the son of Philosophy.” Where previously the Syrian spoke with the ennobled “free flow of my language,” Rhetoric says, he now merely “weaves a few brief arguments together and speaks them in a conversational tone”; instead of adhering to the topics, he deploys “novelty.” Rhetoric asks Hermes to force the Syrian to reply in dialogue, but Hermes points out that, as “there’s only one of him,” he will need to defend himself in a speech. The Syrian says that while he was grateful for having been married to Rhetoric: “There came a time when I saw that she was not behaving sensibly any longer, nor retaining the seemly dress which she wore when the famous demesman of Paeania [Demosthenes] took her as his bride. Instead, she was wearing jewelry, had coiffured hair, had rubbed rouge all over her cheeks, and had a black line drawn under each of her eyes.” (Take my wife–please!) The jury votes; the Syrian wins with only one vote against, after which Dialogue steps up to the dock to present his case. Dialogue lays it against the Syrian that: “He took off my sensible mask and put on another, comic, satyr-like and almost ridiculous. Then he shut me up in the same room with joking, iambus, cynicism, Eupolis and Aristophanes–men terribly clever at criticizing serious things and pouring scorn on what is right and proper.”

    6

    Lucian imbues Dialogue’s remarks with a measure of irony, as the satyr-mask, far from debasing dialogue, restores it to its Socratic origins. In The Drinking Party, Alcibiades describes Socrates as resembling a satyr. In Two Charges, the Syrian responds to Dialogue by telling how, when he first took up Dialogue, the latter had lapsed into misanthropy; he had grown “sullen-looking and withered with continuous question and answer sessions,” whereupon “the first thing I did was to get him used to walking on the ground like normal people.” Rhetoric having become meretricious, Dialogue seems to have inflated itself–in typical Late-Antique Theosophical fashion–into an arcane system that scorns existence. Kierkegaard remarks in The Concept how irony functions in response to “a foolishly inflated wisdom, which knows about everything.” In this way, irony is more appropriate because more necessary to the Late Antique setting, distorted by its Second Religiosity, than it was in the Attic setting in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian Wars.

    In Signs, Gans writes that irony signifies a recognition on the ironist’s part that human wishes–the spells and requests and imprecations that people couch in language against some prevailing condition–are “impotent”; leaping beyond the ineffectuality of language as a technique for rearranging the cosmos physically, irony likewise aims its ire at “the Being who gave us language.” Irony thus presupposes the withdrawal of God and the deflation of theology, or at least the withdrawal of a god and the deflation of a particular theology. Irony thus also presupposes the opposite of what the withdrawal of God and the deflation of theology are typically taken to signify by those who strive to bring them about and subsequently celebrate them: namely the ascendancy of Man and his technical excellence as deity in place of the evicted deity. It might be the excellence of Man’s machines or the brilliance of His political syllogisms. As religion wanes, or so the theory has always insisted, institutions and techniques shall come at last into their full effectiveness and people will be liberated from the weight of ages into the happiness of repletion. The emergence of the ecumene indeed corresponds with widespread skepticism and the death of god; it also coincides with the apotheosis of institutions and techniques, including magical substitutes for religion such as theurgy and formulas for the transformation of man into the Man-God.

    Voegelin reminds us in The Ecumenic Age that apparent religious innovations actually partake in the anti-spiritual instrumentalist tenor of the times. Rulers of empire characteristically “support [and justify] their ecumenic conquest by the sanction of high-gods judiciously selected from the old gods or newly created for the purpose.” Temporarily, “magic pneumatism gives its addicts a sense of superiority over the reality which does not conform.” Such hocus-pocus, like the modern syncretistic piety of multiculturalism, is profoundly hostile to irony; it asserts its dogma fiercely and never tolerates the slightest hint of dissent from its literal-mindedness. Irony’s annotation of the non-conformance of cosmic reality to wishes is tactical, not strategic; irony merely grimaces at tribulation–it then shrugs its shoulders and accepts tribulation, insofar as that tribulation is, in fact, cosmic, and not an injustice. In response to injustice, ironynotices, and it may become subversive while yet wanting to keep its head. This is the difference between irony and sainthood. Shakespeare’s Fool is a case in point. Features of Two Charges strongly suggest that Lucian has understood this pattern of deformation even while being immersed in it.

    The comedy, culminating in the Syrian’s acquittal, begins high on Olympus, where Lucian reveals Zeus as a deity whose troubles keep piling up: “Oh, to hell with the philosophers who say that happiness exists only among the gods!” All the gods are harried and fatigued, Zeus laments. Apollo, for example, has been “virtually deafened by people bothering him for prophecies.” The Moon gets no sleep because she has to shine until late at night for carefree revelers. Says the King of the Gods, “I wish I could ask the philosophers, who think only the gods are happy, when the hell they think folks with so many problems to deal with have any time to drink nectar and eat ambrosia!” For one thing, the Arbiter of Cosmic Justice has to report “an enormous backlog of old lawsuits not dealt with.”

    Hermes tells Zeus that what people most fiercely hold against Olympus, hence against Zeus, is “the time-lag” implied by that “backlog.” The Olympus of Two Charges is not heaven, of course; it is the Imperium. Zeus is not the old familiar Homeric god, effective against injustice in The Odyssey; he is the human, all-too-human sovereign ofthis world. Since Alexander the Great, rulers of the world had enjoyed deification: Caesar was deified and so was his nephew-successor Augustus, by a vote of the Senate. The Antonine Emperors, beginning with Antoninus Pius (86-161), identified themselves with Sol Invictus, “The Unconquered Sun,” and found ideological justification for this divine conceit, which the coinage illustrated to the plebes, in the professorial discourses of Neoplatonist doctrine and Ptolemaic astronomy. The order on earth reflected the order in heaven, so the theory would have it. As the Platonic God rules serenely in heaven, so does his counterpart on earth. Whether anyone believed the theory is an open question. No doubt bad faith abounded. What is not in dispute is that the theory formed the basis of mandatory practice. Celsus, for example, who lived during the reign of Aurelius, holds it against the Christians in his notorious pamphlet that they slighted the official cult and maligned the image of the inviolate god; he recommends that the authorities punish the offense severely. The real crime of the Christians, of course, was to have noticed that they did not live in utopia and that many important human needs went unanswered in the kingdom. The Epicureans, who resemble the Christians in startling ways, also noticed this and, in fact, lived in some tension with the establishment when they congregated in communities. Even Constantine (280-337), who made careful rapprochement with the new religion, identified himself with Sol Invictus; his famous sign, seen by him at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge, is not the cross but rather the sun, which gave him victory. Thus–“in hoc signo vinces!” It is the pseudo-transcendental claim of what Voegelin would call a concupiscent aggressor.

    The more routine such deifications became (Commodus and Caligula proclaimed themselves gods in their lifetimes), the more obvious it also became that the self-styledSoter or “Savior” was simply a man, often a rather nasty one, and that his subjects were not in fact subjects in the autonomous sense but rather elements of a conquest. The “time-lag” is Lucian’s equivalent of what Gans observes when he writes how irony “both points out and repairs the inadequacy of the deferral of violence through representation that is the essence of human culture.” Before one can set aboutrepairing injustice one must notice it, but noticing injustice can entail a risk for the enunciator, as every prophet discovers, and irony lets him articulate the problem indirectly. Gans notes that irony only rarely corresponds to “saying the opposite” of what a subject in fact means, primarily because not every enunciation has an “opposite.” Irony entails saying other than what a subject means, often by obliquity. Lucian’s “time-lag” is, by way of illustration, the irony of litotes, addressing enormity through a figure of the innocuously small and merely irritating.

    7

    In The Concept, Kierkegaard asserts that irony is “incompatible with the state” and that the ironist is necessarily other than “a good citizen.” In his private papers, Kierkegaard confided that he thought of irony as beginning with the sense “that the world is in some way ridiculing one.” Kierkegaard was addressing Socrates, but the insight applies as well, or perhaps even better, to Lucian, who distinguished himself by being an ironist who survived. In Two Charges, before the Syrian’s case comes up, the Stoa, in allegorical get-up representing the philosophical school of that name, accuses Pleasure, also in allegorical get-up, of having seduced away her lover Dionysius. Stoicism, like Platonism, and in weird combinations with it, informed the official discourse of the emperors and was interwoven in the syncretism of the establishment’s ritual. Stoa makes her case for alimony, roundly chastising Pleasure along the way. Pleasure “doesn’t even spare the gods,” Stoa complains: “In fact, she flatly questions their providential role. So if you’re wise, you’ll lay a charge of impiety against her as well.” Impiety provided the focus in the case against Socrates, as brought by Lykos, Anytos, and Meletos, who argued that the object of their litigiousness both denied the existence of the gods and worshipped a new and heterodox god, namely his daimon. Socrates remarks the contradictory idiocy of it in his address.

    Unlike Socrates before the Boulé, Dionysius prefers not to serve as his own lawyer; he asks Epicurus–wrongly although popularly reviled as an advocate of hedonism–to state the defense on his behalf. Epicurus argues that had it been a case of Pleasure ensnaring Dionysius by “spells or drugs,” the jury would have to convict: “But this is a case of a free man, in a city which claims to be free, with no legal impediment [to the defendant’s] finding distasteful the unpleasantness preached by [Stoa] and judging [as] nonsense the happiness she tells him is the reward for his painful labours.” When Stoa attempts cross-examination, trying to trip up Epicurus over “the third figure of indemonstrables,” the jurors complain that they “don’t understand these polysyllabic questions,” and they immediately vote to acquit.

    On its surface, the Dionysius-interlude of Two Charges amounts to little more than comic-satiric high jinks–it seems, at first blanch, rather more sarcastic than ironic. Lucian grasps that in his time philosophy has morphed into theosophy and that theosophy has become an instrumentality of the Imperium. Epicurus points out in the defense that Pleasure has not used “drugs or spells.” Insofar as Dionysius has escaped from Stoa (from the Stoic System) into freedom (eleuthereia), the previous negation(no drugs or spells) indeed implies that it is Dionysius’ former relation to Stoa that might well have had the nature of magical enthrallment. To complete the indirect assertion, however, readers of the sketch must recall the opening, where Lucian reveals the obsolescence of the old gods through the Zeus’ incompetence and the resultant “time-lag.” Lucian may safely reduce the Olympians to figures of New Comic ridicule because no one any longer believes in them. Yet not believing in one set of gods–or in some particular theological idea–does not mean that one believes in nothing, religiously speaking.

    On the contrary: into the vacuum left by the vanishing gods the Systems have expanded. The people, constituting the jury, find the Systems so much polysyllabic babble, but the members of the intelligentsia, entranced by them, respond through doctrinal adherence to their promise of immanent justification and even a kind of immanent redemption. Ironists are few, and they have prestige. Professors are many by comparison and they want prestige. The jurists want to go back to work so as to make a living. They participate in the market. One way of faking irony so as to garner prestige is to invent verbal-magical discourses that appear to elevate the user abovethe everyday world of ordinary conversation. The adherents of this discourse can then impress others by talking their secret language together, squinting in unison, and harrumphing on a pre-established cue. Kierkegaard speaks of “an inferior form of irony” that “seeks to realize itself in conventicles.” To see the phenomenon in its actuality, one could attend a meeting of either the MLA or the ALSC executive committee, or simply visit the conference-sessions, as the author of Signs of Paradox and I once did, in a locale in Manhattan that is now a large deep hole in the ground. Against the idols represented by the Systems, Lucian poses, putting the words into Epicurus’ mouth,freedom. Why does Lucian choose Epicurus rather than Menippus or Diogenes the Cynic to be his spokesman in this context?

    Lucian calls on Menippus elsewhere in his oeuvre, as in the Icaromenippus, which lofts a gadfly up to Olympus. As for Diogenes–no one forecasts Lucian’s rhetorical insouciance better than the Cynic. The most plausible reason is that Epicurus articulates his atomism primarily as a weapon against superstition and so tries to neutralize numinous awe as a tool of social manipulation used by power-seekers and power-wielders. Epicureanism figures centrally in another work by Lucian, his biography of the religious swindler Alexander of Abonoteichus. Alexander or the False Oracle and Two Charges illuminate one another.

    According to Lucian’s account, Alexander (Second Century) had learned the magical arts–prestidigitation and illusion making–from a lover and master who had in his turn studied with Apollonius of Tyana (born 4 B.C.), the miracle worker and prophet publicized by the writer Philostratus (early Third Century) in a biography commissioned by Lady Julia, wife of Emperor Septimus Severus (reigned 193-211). With a partner, Cocconas, Alexander established a notorious oracle in Abonoteichus in Cappadocia. He had discovered, Lucian writes, that “human life is ruled by a pair of tyrants called Hope and Fear, and if you treat them right you can make a lot of money out of them.” The oracle succeeds at first beyond Alexander’s dreams. As his fame mounts he travels to Rome, where the emperor receives him at court; in a move to create a charismatic religious organization with him at its head, Lucian says, Alexander later “sent missionaries all over the Roman Empire.” But the fakir’s own extravagance soon betrayed him, for “the more intelligent members of the community began to turn against him.” Among these perspicacious segments of the populace, Lucian names the Epicureans, who, in good scientific fashion, revealed the stagecraft behind Alexander’s miracles. The confidence man was, as Lucian says, “permanently at war with Epicurus–for what more suitable opponent could be found for a professional liar than the one person who [has] really understood the truth about things.” Alexander tries to parry the exposure with an oracular message to the effect that the Imperium throngs with “atheists and Christians who had most viciously blasphemed against him.” On the other hand, Alexander “was quite friendly towards the Stoics, the Platonics, and the Pythagoreans, with whom he pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence.” Alexander died, writes Lucian, of delirium tremens. The biography ends with an encomium to Epicurus, “a really great man who perceived . . . the beauty of truth, and by passing that insight on to his followers, has given them a wonderful sense of freedom.”

    8

    Linking the Systems–Stoicism, Platonism, and Pythagoreanism–with the religious swindler, whose ambition is “ecumenical” precisely in Voegelin’s sense, allows Lucian to comment on the ideological aspect of Imperium. Alexander fears two segments of the universal community, the Epicureans and the Christians, the latter being lumped with the Epicureans into the false prophet’s defensive accusation after his tricks come to light. Unmoved by verbal chicanery, these two groups bring clarity and skepticism to inflated claims. Lucian makes one of the earliest mentions of the Christians in Pagan literature; and the acknowledgment of them is remarkable in being positive, at least by association. This was the time when official tracts with titles such as “Against the Christians” began to appear. By an ironic coincidence, Lucian dedicated Alexander or the False Oracle to a certain Celsus, his friend, but this is not the same Celsus of anti-Christian and pro-Solar notoriety; he seems to have been an Epicurean rather than a Platonist.

    Returning to Two Charges, one can now say that, without committing himself to Epicureanism, in stating his own case in relation to Rhetoric and Dialogue, Lucian announces himself as free with respect to doctrinaire claims, for Rhetoric and Dialogue stand in parallel with Stoicism and Platonism, which have collapsed from the level of authentic insight into verbal-magical parodies of philosophy. Putting the pieces together–the parts of Two Charges and then Two Charges with The False Oracle–we can now also say that Lucian commits himself to truth, which, in the Venn Diagram that we might draw of these things, must coincide largely with freedom. Lucian says none of this directly; he says it all by complicated indirection. He also says it in a superficially unserious way, inserting every potentially dangerous comment into the farrago of vaudeville and slapstick. Another characteristic of irony, then, is that it may conceal itself underneath satire, which is not quite the same thing as irony, or even under clowning, which is another thing again. We might also recur to Gans’s statement about irony requiring us to behave à la manière structurante. We note that, to arrive at Lucian’s meaning, we deconstruct nothing; rather, we must work hard to construct. Lucian fulfills Kierkegaard’s remark in The Concept that irony “is a state of true freedom.” But insofar as Lucian carries the imperative of nil admirari to an extreme (he exempts explicitly from his skepticism only the Epicureans), he fulfills another Kierkegaardian observation at the same time, namely that the ironist “achieves his satisfaction in solitude.”

    This feature of Lucian’s irony becomes obvious when he ceases merely to lambaste falsehood and fatuousness and tries to create positive examples of a justified life, as we shall see in turning to his Demonax. Solitude is an ethical limit of irony.

    III

    Irony constitutes a species of internal emigration. It is a tactic for living, for survival, put into effect in times of enormity and troubles by spiritually sensitive types. In his discussion in The Ecumenic Age of the new type of post-Alexandrian empires that dominate the Mediterranean world in Late Antiquity, Voegelin describes, as we have seen, “an object of organization rather than a subject.” Drawing on Polybius (202-120 B.C.), Voegelin characterizes the Iranian, Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and finally the Roman empires as spiritually nihilistic: “Above the ecumene there rises no cosmological symbolism as from the Near Eastern empires, no symbolism of world history as from Israel’s present under God, no philosopher’s theory of the polis as from the Athens of Plato.” The ecumene is defectively “a power field into which peoples [are] drawn through pragmatic events,” but it does not correspond to “an entity given once and for all as an object of exploration,” and which might therefore be shown to have a rational, an understandable, structure, like a cosmos; the ecumene “rather was something that increased or decreased correlative with the expansion or contraction of imperial power.” The ecumene “furthermore had degrees of intensity correlative with the degrees of direct jurisdiction or indirect political control maintained from the ruling center.”

    Because the prevailing ecumenic polity at any time is a vast distortion of order, it cannot satisfy a basic demand for order built into consciousness, no doubt at the basic level of the sign, as originary analysis maintains. The imperial dispensation casts every sensitive person in the role of Antigone versus Creon. In pre-ecumenic situations, such as that of the Hebrews in Egypt, a logistics of exodus was in place; the dissatisfied or outraged parties could physically vacate the jurisdiction of the offending sovereign and his government. During Socrates’ imprisonment in the days before his death, his friends made it clear that the way was open for a jailbreak and for quite comfortable exile elsewhere in Greece.

    In the Pax under the Antonines, however, the route of geographical exodus closes itself off, for where might one go when the Imperium coincides with the known world? Fleeing to the Persian Empire in the east would be like having fled from Albania to Cuba during the Communist regimes. Hopping Hadrian’s Wall to live among the blue-faced Picts would be equally absurd, although they say that the mead packed a wallop. Lucian himself speculated in a fantasy, True Histories, about islands beyond the Pillars of Hercules–and into space all the way to the moon–but Greco-Roman explorers never ventured into the Atlantic Main, which thus functioned symbolically as a boundary to conquerable reality. Voegelin writes: “If reality is understood in the comprehensive sense of Anaximander’s dictum [everything comes from the Apeiron and everything returns to it under the law of justice (Bertonneau’s paraphrase)], obviously [then] man can nether conquer reality nor walk out of it. . . . No imperial expansion can reach the receding horizon; no exodus from bondage is an exodus from the condicio humana; no turning away from the Apeiron can prevent a return to it through death.” Should exodus occur under these circumstances it will necessarily occur by what Voegelin calls “pneumatic differentiation,” a turning-within of the afflicted soul.

    Insofar as contemporary scholarship sees Epicurus and his followers through the prism of Marxist doctrine, it fails to see that Epicureanism, far from being the rejection of religion for which base materialists take it, is itself not only a highly differentiated religious idea but a textbook case of internal emigration from a distorted existence. Epicureanism is not ironic but it can help us to understand irony as internal emigration and it can therefore help us to understand how irony must at last give way to faith,which it presages. It might be that eccentricity is the term midway between irony and faith.

    9

    In the didactic poem On the Nature of Things by Epicurus’ first century B.C. Latin follower Lucretius, for example, in Book IV, we find a developed comparison between republics and empires. Lucretius takes empire as a ponderous given. In the aftermath of the Trojan War, which Lucretius reads as an attempt by Agamemnon to establish a Greek empire in Asia, much disorder ensued, with “each man struggling to win dominance and supremacy for himself.” Out of this disorderliness–think of the suitors in Odysseus’ palace in Ithaca–came a renewed demand for order, acting on which, “some men showed how to appoint state officials, to establish civil rights and duties so that men would want to obey the laws” and “mankind, worn out by a life of violence and enfeebled by feuds, was the more ready to submit of its own free will to the bondage of laws and institutions.” Lucretius understands, as does Voegelin, that a polis, be it Athens in the time of Theseus or Rome in the time of Numa, is a subject that governs itself. Lucretius traces empire back generically to a particular legendary-historical event: “Remember how at Aulis the altar of the virgin goddess was foully stained with the blood of Iphigenia by the leaders of the Greeks, the patterns of chivalry. . . . It was her fate in the very hour of marriage to fall a sinless victim to a sinful rite, so that a fleet might sail under happy auspices.” Empire is thus victimary from its degree zero. The troubled present, stemming from Agamemnon’s lust to punish Troy by conquest, Lucretius calls “this brutal business of war by sea and land.” The civil wars then raging for control of what already possessed the form, if not yet the name, of Imperium,Lucretius calls “this evil hour of my country’s history.” Epicurus (331-247 B.C.) himself figures in the Prologue to On the Nature of Things, as a secular savior-martyr, which distinguishes him from a savior-monarch or dictator. It is worth recording that the generative event in Epicurus’ life was his family’s being forced to participate in a colonial enterprise by the Macedonian ruler of his native island of Samos. The ship taking citizen-colonists to their new rationally planned city foundered, orphaning the young Epicurus and predisposing him to view the so-called philosophical justification of political expediency with a jaundiced eye. Stop invoking the geometric Forms to justify telling us where to live, he might have said, addressing the regime.

    Many must have shared his resentment because his school grew rapidly and soon counted adherents all over the Hellenistic world. Under Roman hegemony the popularity of Epicureanism grew. Like the early Christians, whose tactics theirs forecast, the Epicureans argued for withdrawal from the larger world into small, autonomous communities, the paradigm of which was the master’s Garden in Athens, where he settled as an adult.

    Kierkegaard writes that Hellenism qualified as ironic even “without needing the railleries of a Lucian,” yet Lucian repeatedly measures up to the Kierkegaardian canon of irony and presages what Kierkegaard sees as the next phase of spiritual differentiation beyond Hellenistic irony, namely Christianity. Not meaning to do so, Kierkegaard nevertheless describes Lucian perfectly when he remarks in The Concept that irony “in the eminent sense directs itself not against this or that particular existence but against the whole actuality of a certain time and situation.” Lucian’s irony makes itself evident in the things and persons that Lucian admires, these being few. Now historians and scholars know of Demonax, whom Lucian claims for his teacher, only through Lucian’s encomium of him, but this is not to say that Demonax never existed. Supposing him to be non-fictitious, Demonax’s dates would correspond to the late first through the middle second Centuries. His name hearkens back to the distinguishing feature of the Socratic ethos–the daimon, that mark of negativity, which is also a declaration of subjectivity and freedom–and so puts us squarely back in the topos of irony. Lucian begins Demonax the Philosopher with this mordant formulation, which assumes the banality, hence the deficiency, of the prevailing scene: “Apparently it was the will of the gods that life even in our day should not be utterly bereft of memorable and noteworthy men.” One could say that this condition of reality is apparently also true in the incipient twenty-first century–for irony is inextricably bound up in appearances. But back to Lucian. . .

    Two men existed in his day that Lucian regarded as deserving of commemoration. Sostratus, a giant whom the Boeotians mistook for Heracles, was one, and Demonax was the other. Mistaking men for gods constitutes a vice of the time, as does attunement, also implied by the mistake, to physical rather than spiritual qualities. Sostratus, like Superman, excelled at “removing robbers” from the region and “crossing crevasses” in a single bound. Demonax, by contrast, who stemmed from a Cypriote family “not undistinguished for nobility and wealth,” nevertheless “overcame this obstacle” and “turned to philosophy.”

    In a rather Kierkegaardian moment Leo Strauss once observed that when the prose of a competent writer-thinker seems to suffer a lapse into solecism this usually constitutes a deliberate attempt to throw off heresy hunters. It is once again this matter of appearances. We stumble across such a gaffe in Demonax. Lucian at first assures us that “there was no Socratic irony about him” only later to explore the parallelism, point by point, between the behavior and demeanor of Demonax and those of Plato’s master. Demonax “seems to have modeled himself most closely on Socrates,” epistemologically speaking, in that “he mixed many philosophical systems together” or rather took such truth as he could find from whatever source offered it. In contrast with Dialogue in Two Charges, Demonax always “went on foot”; he touched and was no doubt profaned by the vulgar earth. Lucian writes, “he joined in the work of the city with everyone else.” Despite “the enormous respect for him among the Athenian people,” however, Demonax’s “independent spirit together with his habit of saying exactly what he thought had won him among the people exactly the sort of hatred they had once accorded Socrates.” In asserting that Demonax always said what he thought, Lucian is again not quite saying what he means, for his quotations of the philosopher’s witticisms suggest the subtle indirection of the ironist.

    Kierkegaard insists in The Concept that irony never proposes a thesis external to itself. The ironist’s purpose “is merely to feel free, and this he is through irony.” Kierkegaard also insists that irony belongs essentially to epochal moments, in which “the given actuality has completely lost its validity.” The ironist, who never loses contact with the “metaphysical,” senses the collapse of every existing institution into an “imperfect form” although he “does not possess the new,” which might replace the old. The Boulé once accused Demonax of failing to sacrifice to Athena and of having suspiciously excused himself from initiation in the Eleusinian Mysteries, participation in which had evidently become socially mandatory. Demonax responded that he “did not suppose that [Athena] needed any offerings from me” and that, as for the Mysteries, if they lacked merit “he would not hold his peace, but would try to dissuade non-initiates from the rites” and if they proved themselves valuable “his love of humanity would force him to reveal them to everyone.” That would be profanation either way. Both remarks conceal doubt about sacred doctrine while invoking an apparent concern with safeguarding the very sacrality they tend to dissolve. Athena’s not needing Demonax’s offerings might well derive from her non-existence, after all; and his disinclination to be initiated might well derive from his regarding the Mysteries as a form of rank superstition. Demonax’s response has meanwhile had its intended effect of disarming a crowd “that had been holding stones in their hands, ready to use them.”

    10

    The Athens of Lucian’s Demonax both is and is not the Athens of Plato’s Apology. The same fundamental anthropology remains in effect, signified by the crowd’s readiness to lapidate the dissident. The Athens that condemned Socrates, however, was the polis,although in the throes of its dissolution, of the independent, the pre-ecumenic age; what occurred there signified only to Athenians or at most to a still restricted Hellenism. The polity ready to condemn Demonax has long since lost its independence to be absorbed, along with the rest of Greece, first into the Macedonian Kingdom and then into the Roman Empire. It now signifies for the ecumene as a whole, because the ecumene conforms elsewhere precisely to what it is either here or there. The “given actuality” that for the ironist has “completely lost its validity” extends itself conterminously with the Pax so that from it no exit any longer exists except by spiritual withdrawal. Even withdrawal entails danger. As in Demonax’s refusal to participate in civic sacrifices or mystic initiation, the public, always ready to reassert community at the expense of a victim, shows a proneness to interpret nonconformity as offensive to its norms. The ironist knows this. He can sometimes deflect hostility through a well-wrought fillip or he can turn attention from himself at the non-lethal expense of someone so ripe for deflation that the crowd will content itself with the sideshow.

    When the sophist Maximus of Tyre (125-185) visited Athens, he extolled himself and made an ornate gesture of waiting to be summoned by one or the other of the Athenian schools. In his speech, according to Lucian, Maximus said:

    If Aristotle summons me to the Lyceum, I shall go with him. If Plato invites me to the Academy, I will be there. If Zeno asks me, I shall spend my time in the painted Stoa. If Pythagoras calls me, I shall seal my lips in silence.

    Demonax arose from his seat, identified himself loudly, and shouted out, “Hey, Pythagoras is calling.” Demonax dismisses with equanimity the worn-out institutions of the old sacred as well as the attempts to revive the old sacred in putatively new metaphysical doctrines such as those of Maximus, one of the early Neoplatonists, hence a contributor to the stultifying official theosophy of the later Roman Empire. Maximus’ open invitation to the schools strongly suggests a mercenary inner nullity, as though a modern candidate for an assistant professorship were to say during his on-campus interview, “If Andrea Dworkin calls me, if Edward Said calls me . . . etc.” We would think to ourselves, this geisha is really powdering his cheeks with rouge, just as the Syrian says of Rhetoric in Two Charges. If only Pythagoras would call them all! Insofar as Demonax stands for Lucian, Lucian stands for the carte-blanche contrariness that Kierkegaard establishes as the sine qua non of irony.

    Lucian, in praising Demonax, never restricts himself to targets, like visiting senators and the idle rich, of whom our contemporary professoriate would approve. Demonax beards Favorinus of Arles, a sophist whose testicular underdevelopment rendered him physically effeminate; he makes punning jokes at the expense of a “pretty boy” whom he takes for a passive homosexual. Of another swishing male, this one the son of a Roman official, Demonax says, “he’s a fine lad, worthy of you and the spitting image of his mother.” A whole series of Lucian’s dialogues, the courtesan dialogues, presuppose the meretricious character of the female sex. The usual situation in a courtesan dialogue concerns a mother’s advice to her daughter to employ her secondary sexual characteristics in order to manipulate men for access to their bank accounts. In the motto of Marx (Groucho), whatever it is, Demonax is against it, or rather irony is against it. One cannot permit irony and then arbitrarily limit it. The notion of permitting irony roundly contradicts itself, for irony never, under any circumstance, permits itself tobe permitted. To do so would mean that irony had annulled itself. So irony remains transcendentally unconfined by the politesse of a speech code as duly instated by a majority vote of the academic assembly or any other body.

    But something else is happening in the example of Demonax, inseparable from unconstrained freedom of speech. Everywhere in Lucian’s homage to his teacher the deflation of hubris goes hand in hand with the oblique annotation of an underlying coercive violence in the deep structures of the world-community. We have encountered the incipient lapidation in the Boulé. On another occasion, having been attacked and bloodied in the street, Demonax refuses the crowd’s urgency that he should invoke the proconsul and demand punishment for his attacker. On yet another occasion: “The Athenians were considering the setting up of gladiatorial contests in competition with the Corinthians. Demonax came forward and said, ‘Don’t vote this measure through until you’ve removed the Altar of Pity.’” The sensitivity to sacrificial and quasi-sacrificial violence that one encounters in Lucian, whether he speaks for himself directly or cites the remarks of his teachers and friends, belongs with his doubts about received religion and therefore belongs with his irony. Kierkegaard writes in The Concept that irony would illuminate the real; irony would “mystify the surrounding world not so much to conceal itself as to induce others to reveal themselves.” Like the Hebrew prophets, like the Epicureans, like the Christians, Lucian’s detachment from the intracosmic gods and their cults brings to light a purely human, immanent causality. In the remark to the Athenians about the Altar of Piety, Demonax affirms, without directly mentioning it, the humanity of the victims in gladiatorial spectacle. Lucian’s indirect judgments apply not merely to Athens, a debt-ridden provincial city in the ecumenic scheme of the Roman Empire, but to the whole of the inhabited and politically abject world.

    The image of Demonax, Lucian would also apply to the whole of this worn-out and de-valued world, offering it as an exemplum for imitation. But because, in true ironic fashion, Demonax had no positive creed to recommend in place of the false creeds that he incessantly mocked, his example could ultimately only be that of withdrawal. He took withdrawal seriously, never marrying, living frugally and alone, and finally starving himself to death when felt that he had usefully lived out his life. Christians and their post-Christian brethren no doubt find Demonax attractive for his stubborn loneliness and acerbity, traits that Medieval Christianity taught us to admire. The same might be said of Lucian–modern people are almost bound to admire him because they reflexively (although quite uncritically) admire a sharp tongue directed at a pompous fall guy. Medieval Christianity in the West, but not in Byzantium, scorned Lucian. The Enlightenment resurrected him. Cyrano de Bergerac imitated The True Histories in hisEmpires et royaumes de la lune et du soleil; Voltaire lavished praise on him and imitated the mocking aspect of his prose. Only Jonathan Swift really succeeded him.

    11

    One must admit, however, that the earnestness of the martyrs, not the acerbity of the ironist as such, is what ultimately disseminated the post-sacrificial dispensation of the Hebrew prophets and the Gospel evangelists. In a spirit of generosity we might say that an ironist like Lucian makes straight the road for those who surpass all criticism of the institutions by actually facing the beasts in the arena. In Signs, Gans writes:

    We do not ironize when faced with the real power of the sacred center to defer human conflict. But whatever the flourishes of the cosmological imagination, this power is not transferable to the natural world; God lets it rain on the just as on the unjust, which is really to say he can do nothing for or against either. By our irony we reject ad maiorem Dei gloriam this attribution of impotence to God, implicitly reproaching him with deliberately choosing to not to grant our wish for sunny skies.

    Demonax–or rather Lucian–seems to have recognized the principle, for Lucian records that his teacher’s favorite quotation from Homer was, “The wretch and the hero find their prize the same.” The Justice of Zeus has evaporated, if it ever existed. Despite proliferating claims of Hermetic or Apollonian epiphany, the divine essence no longer reaches down into the pragmatic sphere. The corollary of the principle is that people must organize their own lives, but they can do this only with difficulty in the inhuman largeness of the ecumenic setting, with its endemic wars and civil wars, its ethos of betrayal, and its bloody mass entertainments.

    As the Imperium disintegrates in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries, devolving into the Gothic kingdoms in the West and ossifying into Byzantium in the East, irony temporarily loses its role in social criticism and, as it were, drops out of the vocabulary. Kierkegaard argues that antique irony forecast the dissolution of the old without prescribing the form of the new. Once the new arrives, whatever its form, the Socratic-Lucianic irony will have outlived its “zeal in the service of the world spirit,” as The Concept would put it. Irony revives during the religious wars as the folk-hero and provocateur, either Thylor Simplicius, one of whose better-known Twentieth Century avatars is Jaroslav Hašek’sGood Soldier Schweik. Gans reserves nineteenth-century literary irony to the late or second-generation phase of Romanticism, that of the 1840s. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is not ironic, Gans argues persuasively in Signs, as he does elsewhere; Rousseau merely instantiates the usual Romantic case of a self-proclaimed “hapless victim” certain of bearing within himself “a divine self-consciousness for which the worldly separation between form and content, sign and thing is an illusion.” The acuity of this delusion makes it original and productive in Rousseau’s Rêveries, but as commoditized in the contemporary humanities it is irritating and corrupting. Not only is Rousseau’s “not yet an ironic position,” but its egomania suggests the total incompatibility of irony with two phenomena: narcissism on the one hand and Gnosticism (what I have been calling “theosophy”) on the other. The nineteenth-century ironist, whether Baudelaire or Kierkegaard, “knows that his extraworldly stance makes him complicit in the worldly iniquities he denounces.”

    IV

    If irony has a relation to the ecumene in Voegelin’s sense (and such is the case) then it necessarily has a relation to Gnosticism, the characteristic intellectual derailment of the Ecumenic Age, against the inflation of which Lucianic, if not Socratic, irony articulates its tactical negativity. As counterintuitive as it sounds, the suppression of the heresies, as un-ironic as that process was, also contributed to obviating the antique irony. The heresies typically show a Gnostic cast, which is not to say that no Gnosticism whatever managed to serpentine its way into the Christianity of the Nicene Creed. Nevertheless, melding with Plato’s thought, particularly with his political science, as in Augustine, Christianity better reconciled itself to what Lucian calls the time-lag inherent in the world-situation than did the sub-Platonic, bric-à-brac Systems that also in their crude fashion constitute a kind of criticism of the angst of existence. Christianity could reconcile itself, for example, to the indefinite postponement of the Second Coming. Only Saint John of Patmos strains with impatience; Paul, while living in hope, remains calm.

    All of Gnosticism in its textual aspect is like Revelation on steroids. In Order and History, Volume IV, Voegelin indeed denies that Gnosticism can be grasped as stemmingfrom Christianity, as scholarship frequently claims, and he discusses the phenomenon in these terms: “Syncretistic spiritualism . . . must be recognized as a symbolic form sui generis. In the multicivilizational empire it arises from the cultural area of less-differentiated consciousness as a means of coping with the problem of universal humanity in resistance to an unsatisfactory ecumenic order.” A twenty-first-century academic publisher would probably have refused Voegelin’s manuscript outright for that one phrase, “the cultural area of less-differentiated consciousness.” It is amusing to imagine the boiling off of ideological steam and the archly phrased but entirely predictable letter of rejection to the author. But the author of The Ecumenic Age never subscribed to cultural relativism, only to the latitudinarianism required by the search for truth.

    Then again, twenty-first-century academic publishers are part of the unsatisfactoriness of our ecumenic order. In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the East Coast, William Irwin Thompson immediately joined with the chorus of righteousness denouncing the United States for having invited the offense through the offense of its existence, castigating George W. Bush, and assuring his readers that Islam is a religion of peace. Thompson’s statement of his bona fides in this regard takes the title of “We Become What We Hate: Reflections on 9/11 for Planetary Culture and the Global War on Terrorism.” Curious parties will find it in Thompson’s Self and Society: Studies in the Evolution of Culture (2004). Eight years earlier, however, in the essay on “Mythic Narratives” in Coming into Being, Thompson had asserted the following:

    Every society has a cognitive structure of permissible knowledge that is managed by an elite and forbidden knowledge that is distributed in black or shadow markets by cognitive outlaws, heretics, revolutionaries, or just plain crazies . . . In 1971, when I first described some weird things that were hanging out “at the edge of history,” I was accepted and praised by the normal world of Time, Harpers, and the New York Times, but as soon as I moved a toe over the edge from journalism about the evolutionary news to intellectual commitment to spiritual communities such as Findhorn, Auroville, and Lindisfarne, I was ostracized from the world of official notice and literary reviews. For the critics, I had fallen off the edge of history to dwell in outer darkness.

    12

    Thompson’s case qualifies as interesting because it illustrates the Gnostic problem of the professor, as we might specify it. One can read Thompson’s books, even Self and Society, with its ideologically predictable chapters, with pleasure and in expectation of real information and insight. I recommend particularly Travels about Earth (1975) andThe Time Falling Bodies Take to Light (1981). Thompson, sensitive to deformations of culture and the doctrinal parochialism of institutions, especially of academic ones, has striven to find livable non-institutional niches in which he might teach and write without restricting himself to the narrowly defined range of “permissible knowledge.” When the literary establishment spurned him in the mid-1970s for his un-vetted intellectual interests and unapproved spiritual affiliations, he could see the machinery of correctness falling into place against him. He understood the phenomenon. Yet in the moment of genuine crisis a generation later, perhaps through having become an institution of his own, and a kind of guru for a certain sector of academia, he automatically sided with the crudest strains of anti-Americanism. Who has noticed that reflexive anti-Americanism–or anti-Christianism, as in the recent elite attempt to substitute a neutral “holiday” for the more specific occasion of Christmas–is part of a contemporary “syncretistic spirituality,” to recur to Voegelin’s term? But it is. And Thompson is a specimen syncretist. As with all Gnosticizing syncretists, we can even sympathize with his plight.

    Voegelin, in The Ecumenic Age, links Gnosticism with “the contraction of divine order into personal existence.” As the inherited forms of symbolic order in a large-scale society increasingly shaped by libido dominandi become incapable of bearing the idea of order, when, as Voegelin puts it, “the symbols have separated from the function they had in the cultural context of their origin,” then a type of person aware of his need for a viable vocabulary of existence, will select, as from a smörgåsbord, an eclectic mass of cast-off deities, demons, and monsters from the “graveyard of civilizations” to form a “pre-creational psychodrama.” The aim of the “psychodrama” is to demote existence in favor of a fantasy in which the urgency of the believer or believers will soon radically transform the cosmos by the abolition of the existing order, seen by the dramaturge as an illegitimate interruption of a pre-existent and eternal cosmic dispensation. In the Second Century A.D., in Valentine’s Gospel of Truth, for example, the bricolage amasses “Egyptian Ogdoads and Pythagorean Tetrads, Iranian, Babylonian, Israelite, and Christian symbols,” and does so with an insouciance concerning provenance shared by Maximus of Tyre’s intellectual willingness to embrace whatever philosophical school was willing to embrace him, including presumably all of them, if they all called. In Thompson’s case, the bricolage includes: Plato’s Theory of Ages from The Laws (in a literalized form), Marija Gimbutas’ theory of Balkan Prehistory in the Neolithic Age, George Steiner’s Anthroposophy, Feminism, New Age Spirituality, Catastrophe Theory, and Environmentalism.

    Steiner’s Anthroposophy is itself already an eclectic revival of Neoplatonic and Gnostic symbols from Late Antiquity, while Feminism and Environmentalism are modern forms of apocalyptic. “Global pollution and global catastrophes are having an implosive effect,” Thompson writes, “as disasters such [as] the greenhouse effect and the ozone hole are bringing all of humanity together in the new planetary cultural phase-space.” Voegelin reminds us that Gnosticism, while it is a spiritual “dead end,” is also nevertheless a response to the perception that “pragmatic reality” has become “devoid of meaning.” Gnosticism “tends to nourish its righteousness by pointing to the evil in the world,” but it simultaneously “rejects the life of spirit and reason under the conditions of the cosmos in which reality becomes luminous in pneumatic and noetic consciousness.” In other words, Gnosticism cannot abide the notion that God lets it rain on the just as on the unjust; indeed, Gnosticism does not want to admit that it is Godwho establishes the dichotomy of just and unjust, whence the deconstructive mandate that all the left-to-right prescriptions of logocentric oppression be reversed. Voegelin calls Gnosticism “a dead end” because

    There is no alternative to an eschatological extravaganza but to accept the mystery of the cosmos. Man’s existence is participation in reality. It imposes the duty of noetically exploring the structure of reality as far as it is intelligible and spiritually coping with the insight into its movement from the divine Beginning to the divine Beyond of its structure.

    The Gnostic occupies the mere geometrical position of the ironist, askew to the world, without any of the consolation afforded by irony. The ironist knows what the Gnostic refuses to admit–that one cannot exit the cosmos to judge it from the outside, as the cosmos possesses no outside except insofar as such an outside takes the form of an agency–call it God–who, having established the cosmos and furnished consciousness with its luminosity, has now withdrawn to let free will sort out those things that pertain to it in a community. Gnosticism knows what it knows vehemently. Irony suspects that it only knows a little, but that the name for all that it does not yet know is not“falsehood.” The Gnostic invariably orates. The ironist is not unwilling to converse, to let his feet touch the earth, as Lucian says. Augustine, who wanted to have a conversation with the Manichaean bishop Faustus, found that Faustus could only orate and that in a colloquy he came across as insipid and not at all knowledgeable. Faustus remained serene, however, in his conviction that in abstaining from beans he was preparing the abolition of this world and the restoration of Divine Light.

    Is it so then that faith is a further differentiation of consciousness that grows in the soil prepared by irony? Kierkegaard thought so. “Irony as a mastered moment,” he writes inThe Concept, “exhibits itself in its truth precisely by the fact that it teaches us to actualize actuality, by the fact that it places due emphasis on actuality.” Irony, says Kierkegaard, entails a “longing for a higher and more perfect” type of being, “but this longing must not hollow out actuality.” Under the sign of irony, “actuality will therefore not be rejected and longing shall be a healthy love, not a cowardly, effeminate ruse for sneaking oneself out of the world.”

    Voegelin read Kierkegaard sympathetically, so it comes as no surprise that Voegelin’s analysis of Gnosticism resembles Kierkegaard’s discussion of Teutonic Idealism in the Systems of Fichte and Hegel. Rather, Kierkegaard foreshadows Voegelin. The Kierkegaard of the late Papers, just before his death in 1855, offers an even more startling remark about irony and language, one that will return us to both Voegelin’s “noetic” idea of consciousness and Gans’s scenic idea of the sign, and that will permit a concluding reconciliation of Voegelin’s history and Gans’s anthropology. Under the heading “MAN,” Kierkegaard writes that, “through language everyone participates in the highest–but participating in the highest through language in the sense of merely talking about the highest is just as ironical as being a spectator of the royal dinner-table from the gallery.” Under the heading “LANGUAGE,” Kierkegaard writes that: “language is an ideality which every person has free. What an ideality! That God can use it to express his thoughts, so that through language man has fellowship with God.” Language partakes of “spirit,” says Kierkegaard, “and in the sphere of spirit, irony is always present.” Let us bring into conjunction with Kierkegaard’s formulation two sentences from the chapter on “Originary Being, Originary Thinking” in Gans’s Signs:“Thought in the universe of language begins not with appetite but with human desire, which already contains its own obstacle. Instead of finding pleasure, as does the esthetic, in the formal perfection of the inaccessible figure, thought deconstructs the figural relation that maintains the obstacle in order to seek a way around it.” Language as noesis assumes in advance a cosmos at once inconvenient and fundamentally inalterable, but not unlivable, so that people, in a reasonable conversation about existence, can ultimately find their way around the obstacles of scarcity and convergence. The most inconvenient and inalterable thing about reality as every individual finds it, already constituted, is the presence in it of other human beings. Thought and language emerge to defuse the crisis of convergence in the incipiently human community at its moment of transition to consciousness; thus does morality, as an idea, emerge at the same time, and with it the notion of a Being who posits morality.

    13

    Judaism and Christianity refine morality by repudiating sacrifice, but they cannot liberate human beings from a scene on which the “vertical” world of language and ideas intersects with the “horizontal” world of desire-objects; neither Judaism nor Christianity, in their shared wisdom, tries to do this impossible thing. “The Trinity,” writes Gans in Signs, “is the closest theology has come to grasping the paradoxical structure of the scene of representation.” Thus

    The subsistent but invisible being of the Father engenders the worldly incarnation of the esthetically visible and vulnerable Son; the Christian God is both present at the origin and historically contemporary. The Holy Spirit, as the agent of the sign-system that links the originary and the contemporary, the being of the subsistent locus and the victim that temporarily occupies it, presides over the unity of trinitary theology . . . God is subsistent, yet he is also worldly.

    Following in the steps of the Hebrew Prophets, Christianity illuminates the underlying sacrificial organization of the existing society. “The establishment in the ultimate clarity of the Spirit of the oscillatory identity of Father and Son, deity and victim, is intended to abolish the resentment of the human periphery.” Christianity, like Judaism, is a religion of discussion between equal participants who recognize their equality rather than a religion of awesome mandatory regulations emitted from a sacred center. It is a religion of dialogue rather than of oratory. Kierkegaard’s private confidences contain a prickly Lucianic statement that Gans’s “trinitary” distinction between the sacrality of the center and the dignity of the periphery can help us to understand: “In early antiquity the philosopher was a power, an ethical power, a character–the Empire protected itself bypaying them, making them ‘professors.’” Then Constantine converted on his deathbed and the Imperium began to style itself Christian, necessitating Kierkegaard’s little addendum, “Likewise Christianity,” a comment on the perpetual pagan antiquity of even the newest, self-consciously postmodern and post-religious institutions.

    In The Ecumenic Age, Voegelin remarks on the unbroken continuity from the “I am”who speaks out of le buisson ardent to Moses in Midian to the reiterated ego eimi of Christ in the Gospels.

    The “I am” that speaks in Jesus . . . is the same “I am” that has formed the humanity of man in the past by evoking the response of faith. But the faith of Jesus does not have the compact mode of Abraham’s faith. In the epiphany of Christ, the formation of humanity in history has become transparent for its meaning as the process of transformation. In Jesus, the participation of this humanity in the divine word has reached the intensity of his absorption into the word.

    Voegelin’s observation that humanity has been formed through the evocation of faith implied by the use of language ties his idea of history as humanity’s more or less witting participation in a world that the logos illuminates but does not create to Gans’s discussion of the implied linguistics in Christian theology. Faith is a mode of self-conscious existence that rises above that pragmatic plane where a restricted operational knowledge is adequate to the task at hand. Faith waits in expectation without mixing expectation with demand, but faith never exactly specifies what it expects, as this might diverge too much from what actuality grants. We must not suppose that faith wants nothing. Faith is a desire like other desires, after all. Faith might well expect the worst, and it knows what that is–death. But faith has learned to defuse the tension of waiting for it-knows-not-what by passing the time in conversation with its fellows. Faith can always revise its short-term goals, shrugging its shoulders at disappointment. Faith, for both Voegelin and Gans, as for Kierkegaard, is simply openness to the world as a continuous revelation of truths that may be taken up in language. Faith is thus not institutional, for institutions exist by projecting extremely specific images of both near-term and far-term goals, in the non-realization of which they tend to wax irate and point the fingers of blame.

    Many years ago, in the utterly faithless milieu of a humanities graduate program at UCLA, I providentially stumbled into a seminar devoted to the French Symbolist poets, then much under discussion for their supposed anticipation of the great deconstructive project. Stéphane Mallarmé was supposed, in that vehement climate, to have anticipated the “grammatology” of Derrida–either that or Mallarmé had been fulfilled, as it were, by Derrida. My passage through the UCLA of the 1980s and my experience generally of the academic world has perhaps prejudiced me against institutions, but the institutional world seems to have followed the academic world in embracing the strictures and pieties of what one can only regard as Gnostic doctrines. Another way of saying the same thing is to remark that twenty years or so of experience has left me extremely suspicious of any milieu in which irony seems lacking. The proctor of the seminar on the Symbolists was none other than the author of Signs and the conceiver of generative anthropology. There was always something of the incorrect about Eric’s courses. Although smoking in the classroom had not yet been officially banned in the early 1980s, North America was already in its anti-smoking spasm. The fact that the Symbolism seminar or, later, the first Generative Anthropology seminar, took place in an atmosphere so charged with the second-hand reek of serially consumed Gauloises was, if I may say so, curiously refreshing. Not all of those cigarettes were burnt away into nothingness by the seminar-leader either; many of the students–the French ones–also smoked like factories. Gnostics deplore the fog of worldly existence. That is why they instigate anti-smoking campaigns. The faithful say if it is foggy, let us devise together an esthetics of the fog, as in the painterly or musical schools of Impressionism.

    14

    The Generative Anthropology seminar stood in stark contrast to the English Department seminars on “critical theory” where the smoke was thick, verbal, and asphyxiating. No vivifying admixture of tobacco tainted it. Certain “texts,” one was told, were “unreadable.” We nevertheless had to “read” them and then discuss their “unreadability” ad nauseam. We had to do so, moreover, without any irony, and a low-irony diet is bad for health. Derrida is always-already an obtuse literalist, but the graduate students labored in Hercules-fashion to literalize even further his literalism. Without irony, a seminar participant who was devoted to the now deservedly forgotten work of Gregory Ulmer, wrote down on a sheet of paper two noncompossible statements and then solemnly explained to us how, in writing them down, he had shown the “logocentric” prejudice against the “excluded middle” to have no secure basis in reality. Or maybe it was “reality.” Tell that to your banker. That particular inestimably silly demonstration strikes me as the perfect example of what Voegelin means when he defines Gnosticism as suicidal flight from the world, as a fantasy of power over the cosmos.

    I am painfully aware of having posed no thesis in the foregoing, of having reached no conclusion, two counts against me somewhat ameliorated, I hope, by my insistence that these are “meditations” and not a rigorous or scholarly essay. I have loved Lucian of Samosata since I was a teenager and have relished the opportunity to write about him in a public way. I have tried to restrict my references–to one book by Voegelin (although I cheated and quoted from Science, Politics and Gnosticism as well as fromThe Ecumenic Age), to one by Gans, and to one by Kierkegaard. Annotations seemed superfluous in the circumstance, so I omitted them. I guess that I shall have to serve time in one of the circles of Hell for having done so, but I expect to go there anyway. For Lucian I consulted the new Penguin anthology of his work, translated by Keith Sidwell and the old Penguin anthology, translated by Paul Turner, which I have owned since I was sixteen years old in 1970.

    Oswego, New York, 23 January 2006

  • Mujahideen Blood Rituals: The Religious and Forensic Symbolism of Al Qaeda Beheading

    Beheadings, suicide bombings, and ritual mutilation are not just strategies of war but time-honored warrior traditions that are theologically sanctioned. To relegate these acts to mere terrorist tactics is not only strategically unwise but diminishes the true nature of the threat. Similarly, to designate enemies as religious fanatics, Islamic extremists, insurgents, or radical militants who have corrupted the peaceful religion of Islam is a politically correct fallacy that is undermining every aspect of the war on terrorism and resulting in the death of American soldiers. In this paper, apparently inexplicable violent acts committed during the Iraq war will be presented as the sacred blood rituals of Mujahideen warriors. It will be established that ritual beheadings have been prevalent throughout Islamic history and are theologically prescribed and communally sanctioned. As I have argued throughout my research into new religions and ritualistic crimes, it is my contention that the most reliable method of understanding ritual violence is found in the symbolism, aesthetics, and blood rituals of the participating community. Consequently, in this paper I present a detailed symbolic analysis of numerous ritual beheadings that reveal “beheading signatures” specific to the al-Qaeda network. Finally, I will argue that continuing to analyze the violence from a Western perspective, sugarcoating by the media of violent aspects of the Islamic religion, and failing to recognize that we are in the midst of a century-old Holy war will only serve to perpetuate a never-ending cycle of reciprocal violence.

    Mujahideen

    Mujahideen (Arabic: مجاهدين, also transliterated as mujāhidīn, mujahedeen, mujahedin, mujahidin, mujaheddin, etc.) is a plural form of mujahid (مجاهد), which literally means “struggler”, someone who engages in jihad, or “struggle,” but is often translated as “holy warrior.” The root of mujahedeen is J-H-D (ج-ه-د), meaning “effort”; this is the same root as jihad, which means “struggle” as in holy war. In the late twentieth century, the term “mujahideen” became popular in the media to describe various armed fighters who subscribe to Islamist ideologies.(1) Several groups on the U.S. Department of State list of foreign terrorist organizations and other terrorist groups (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm and http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31759.htm) have the name Mujahideen in their title such as: Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) , Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badhr), Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM), Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM), and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). Today, the term Mujahideen is more commonly used to refer in general terms to guerrillas fighting the Coalition Forces in Iraq. Even in Arabic, the term has taken on meanings that are specifically religious, specifically military, or both. Mujahideen is essentially a military force of Muslim guerilla warriors engaged in holy war, frequently referred to as Soldiers of God. Insights into the contemporary and religious nature of Mujahideen from an Islamist perspective can be found on an active internet site titled Jihad Unspun (http://www.jihadunspun.com/home.php). The publisher, Khadija Abdul Qahaar, is openly promoting Iraqi resistance and a global jihad. An article in Jihad Unspun by Zafir Jamaal titled “Soldiers of God, Fighting In The Name of Allah” describes the Mujahideen warrior:

    In theatre against US & coalition forces in the mountainous caves, rural towns and cities in Afghanistan are mostly Mujahideen – Holy Warriors or Soldiers of God who fight in the name of Allâh in His war against unbelievers. Mujahideen number in the hundreds of thousands worldwide and to understand them, one must first understand the Islamic principle of Jihad. . . . To participate in Jihad is an honor and a duty that is welcomed by the true Muslim. The Qur’ân, the law of Allâh handed down to Mohammed, his final Prophet, states that a man killed in a Jihad becomes a Shaheed or a martyr and a special place in Paradise is assured. The Mujahideen’s willingness to die in battle stems from the promise by Allâh that Shaheeds go immediately to Paradise. No matter how many sins they have committed in this life, to die as a Soldier of God ensures complete forgiveness. Shaheeds are buried as they fall, in the clothes that they died in, bodies bloodied and unwashed, and without coffins. They go to Allâh exactly as they died for their faith. There is no greater glory for the Muslim warrior.

    Courage, physical courage, is central to the Mujahideen character. He demonstrates a special facet of bravery – the ability to suffer pain stoically, without fuss, and silently. To be without courage is abhorrent; such a person is despised. . . . The combination of courage, and their fervent commitment to Allah, the cause for which they fight, make the Mujahideen formidable warriors to defeat. As devout Muslims they know and follow the teachings of the Qur’ân literally. Once religious leaders declare a Jihad, it is the obligation of all Muslim men to fight, to defend their faith, their honor, to protect their independence, and to guard their land and families. . . . It is not only the man who dies in a Jihad that is venerated. There is reward also for those who fight and live. Such a person is called a Ghazi, and Islam promises him rich rewards in Paradise. According to the Prophet (peace be upon him) the Mujahid who spends one night on guard duty has performed equally with the ordinary man who prays for a thousand nights.

    The battle cry of the Mujahideen is ‘Allâh o Akbar’ or God is Great. They shout this as they attack, as they fire their weapons, when they see a target hit, even on training when no enemy is in sight. It is a cry that has been heard down the centuries.

    Add to the Mujahid’s hardy physique, his ability to endure privations, his great resilience, and you have the makings of a first-class guerrilla soldier. From the military point of view the Mujahid starts with substantial advantages. Physically he is better able to withstand the extremes of the terrain and climate than his often much softer enemy. He is fighting for his faith, his freedom, and for his family, which gives him an enormous moral ascendancy but most importantly, he is fighting for Allâh, his God. (2)

    2

    Significantly the concept of mujahideen is a unifying ideal, a lifelong fraternity of soldiers, who when called upon by a charismatic religious leader such as Usama bin Laden or Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi will not only fight to the death but commit suicide for their ideals. In almost every statement made by various terrorist groups, they proudly identify themselves as mujahideen. They are viewed as more than just ideal soldiers; their actions are not only respected by family, community, and country but more significantly, deemed sacred. Their religious devotion is what makes them such dangerous and committed enemies. For this reason it is extremely important strategically and tactically that we begin to understand the beliefs and rituals of these Mujahideen warriors.

    Religious Symbolism

    Because it is difficult to fully comprehend suicide bombings, beheadings, and ritual mutilations from a Western perspective, they are generally reduced to acts of barbarism and psychological warfare. In any type of ritualistic crime every aspect of the act has symbolic meaning to the perpetrator, particularly when the violence is perpetrated in the cause of a religious ideology. Ritualizing violence is what makes it sacred, hence justifiable. With the exception of suicide bombings, the most obvious and prevalent examples of religiously sanctioned Islamist murders are beheadings. The symbolism of contemporary beheading is both political and religious; the political aspects are to instill fear, the religious aspects morally sanction murder. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s group Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers) filmed the beheadings of Americans Nicolas Berg, Kim Sun-il, Jack Hensley, Eugene Armstrong, Kenneth Bigley and numerous other victims. Zarqawi is Iraq’s most-wanted man and his group has repeatedly posted such videos showing what it calls “the implementation of God’s ruling against Iraqi ‘apostates’ or foreign hostages.” Other groups that have videotaped beheadings include Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Hasan bin Mahmud’s group Army of Ansar al-Sunna (Defenders of the Tradition), Abdulaziz al-Muqrin’s group the al-Qaeda Organization in the Arab Penninsula, Harkat ul-Mujahedeena, the Taliban, and The Salafist Brigades of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq.

    Videos of beheadings are easily accessible free of charge on the internet and can be viewed at sites such as Orgrish.com, which not inappropriately before the war on terrorism was predominantly a violent pornographic site. The political aspects include the sophisticated use of film to arouse panic and the clever use of technology to disseminate the footage. Arabic satellite stations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar and Islamist web sites such as Muntadiyat al-Mahid display the murders for the entire world to see. In his book Islam in the Digital Age, Gary Bunt focuses on religious uses that Muslims make of the internet in what he refers to as “online fatwas” and “e-jihad.” In an article titled “Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications,” Ronald H. Jones describes how these multimedia techniques are used,

    Since 9/11, jihadists have been very successful in leveraging the Internet to amplify or broadcast their message. The beheading videos are a small part of a larger, sophisticated media campaign which has grown and evolved in a complex way. Early videos included “last will and testament” films of suicide bombers, recording their motivations and enshrining them as martyrs. The videos were played after the attack to claim credit and recruit more martyrs. One beheading video included footage of the surveillance and actual kidnapping of the victim, followed by his confinement, questioning, and murder, and thus served as a “how to” or documentary film. In addition to videos, jihadists are producing and distributing computer art productions, songs, and prayers designed to motivate anti-U.S. mujahedeen. Posters or montages of photos glorify al-Qaeda operations and encourage anti-U.S. violence. The images are usually embedded in bulletin boards or stored in digital archives, allowing them to be copied and spread quickly across the Internet. The songs, called anashid, vary widely in content and origin but typically consist of chanting combined with military sound effects. They encourage suicide operations by calling to mind Islamic conquests of the past or the prestige of Islamic culture. Short audio clips are embedded in threads in jihadist bulletin boards, while high-quality ones form the audio background of multimedia productions like recruitment and beheading videos.(3)

    The religious messages and commemoration of Islamic conquests perpetuated in e-jihad, particularly the ideal of the holy warrior wielding his sword, has inspired a new generation of mujahideen to ritual violence.

    Although the terrorizing impact of sawing off someone’s head with a knife, than holding the decapitated head for the cameras is obviously a powerful form of psychological warfare, these ritual beheadings hold a much more significant meaning to Mujahideen and have a long precedent in Islamic theology. The beheading ritual is full of symbolism that places the militants closer to Islam’s roots when the sole way of fighting was the sword. These rituals authenticate the ideal that they are in the same war that the prophet and the first Muslims were fighting. In addition the videos have recruitment appeal to young Muslims who see evidence that the insurgency is strong and pure.(4)

    Terrorist groups justify the decapitation of prisoners with Qur’anic scripture. Sura (chapter) 47 contains the ayah (verse): “When you encounter the unbelievers on the battlefield, strike off their heads until you have crushed them completely; then bind the prisoners tightly.” The Qur’anic Arabic terms are generally straightforward: kafarumeans “those who blaspheme/are irreligious,” although Darb ar-riqab is less clear. Darbcan mean “striking or hitting” while ar-riqab translates to “necks, slaves, persons.” With little variation, scholars have translated the verse as, “When you meet the unbelievers, smite their necks.” For centuries, leading Islamic scholars have interpreted this verse literally. The famous Iranian historian and Qur’an commentator Muhammad b. Jarir at-Tabari (d. 923 C.E.) wrote that “striking at the necks” is simply God’s sanction of ferocious opposition to non-Muslims. Mahmud b. Umar az-Zamakhshari (d. 1143 C.E.), in a major commentary studied for centuries by Sunni religious scholars, suggested that any prescription to “strike at the necks” commands to avoid striking elsewhere so as to confirm death and not simply wound.(5)

    Another, albeit less-frequently, cited Qur’anic passage also sanctions beheadings of non-Muslims. Sura 8:12 reads: “I will cast dread into the hearts of the unbelievers. Strike off their heads, then, and strike off all of their fingertips.” In the original text, the relevant phrase is adrabu fawq al-‘anaq, “strike over their necks.” This verse is, then, a corollary to Sura 47:3. Yusuf ‘Ali is one of the few modern commentators who address this passage, interpreting it as utilitarian: the neck is among the only areas not protected by armor, and mutilating an opponent’s hands prevents him from again wielding his sword or spear. The point of this opening phrase–to “cast dread” or, as some translations have it, “instill terror”–has now been adopted by Islamist terrorists to justify decapitation of hostages.(6)

    3

    Timothy Furnish in an article titled “Beheading in the name of Islam” clarifies the religious significance of beheadings.

    Islam is the only major world religion today that is cited by both state and non-state actors to legitimize beheadings. And two major aspects of decapitation in an Islamic context should be noted: first, the practice has both Qur’anic and historical sanction. It is not the product of a fabricated tradition. Second, in contradiction to the assertions of apologists, both Muslim and non-Muslim, these beheadings are not simply a brutal method of drawing attention to the Islamist political agenda and weakening opponents’ will to fight. Zarqawi and other Islamists who practice decapitation believe that God has ordained them to obliterate their enemies in this manner. Islam is, for this determined minority of Muslims, anything but a “religion of peace.” It is, rather, a religion of the sword with the blade forever at the throat of the unbeliever(7)

    There are numerous examples throughout this article that link beheadings and other acts of ritual mutilation to Islamic theology. The most obvious example is the group chanting “Allahu akbar,” the traditional mujahideen battle cry, as they are slowly decapitating a hostage. This cry that has been heard down the centuries clearly demonstrates the religious nature of these violent rituals.

    Al-Qaeda Network Beheadings

    Al-Qaeda (Arabic: القاعدة, al-Qā’idah; “the foundation” or “the base”), is a radical Sunni Muslim organization led by Usama bin Laden. In addition to its own members, al-Qaeda’s network includes groups operating in as many as 65 countries throughout the world. The principal stated aims of al-Qaeda are to overthrow nearly all Muslim governments, which are viewed as corrupt, to drive Western influence from those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries and establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world. Al-Qaeda’s ideology, often referred to as jihadism,seeks to rid Muslim countries of what it sees as the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes. In 1998 bin Laden organized an alliance of terrorist organizations called the “International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders,” and declared war in an edict that called for attacks on all Americans. It is significant to note that this was not just a political declaration but a religious decree (fatwa), a call to arms quoting the Quran as justification for violence, specifically proclaiming that it is the duty of Muslims around the world to wage holy war on the United States, American citizens, Christians and Jews. (A transcript of bin Laden’s fatwa may be found at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.)

    In the 1980’s Usama bin Laden recruited thousands of Muslims from mosques around the Middle East to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They were referred to as the Afghan Mujahideen. Many of these holy warriors had returned to their respective countries and had later been recruited again by Usama bin Laden for a war against their former ally, the United States. They already were initiated into the mujahideen tradition, had received specialist training, and had established links with each other during the war; it just took someone like bin Laden to bring them back together and reignite their fervor against a new enemy.(8) Mujahideen fighting the coalition forces in Iraq have revived a long tradition of blood rituals, particularly Quranic verses that beckon holy warriors to smite the necks of unbelievers. The modern version of this mujahideen blood ritual is choreographed and videotaped. These videotaped beheadings are not just a form of psychological warfare but a method of validating the ideal that they are in the same war that the prophet and the first Muslims were fighting.

    Most readers are familiar with the beheadings of Daniel Pearl and Nick Berg but may be surprised to discover that there have been dozens of beheadings since. More than 200 foreigners have been kidnapped in Iraq. Mujahideen from several terrorist groups have demanded the release of Iraqi prisoners, the withdrawal of troops, and ransoms for the hostages’ release. Some have been released, but about one-third of them have been killed. Others are believed to be still held hostage in Iraq.

    When the Iraq war began the primary victims were Iraqi citizens abducted by Iraqi criminals and ransomed for financial reasons. In April 2004, as U.S. forces simultaneously attacked insurgents in Falluja and Najaf, two groups, the Islamic Army in Iraq and groups linked to al-Zarqawi, began kidnapping foreigners in order to prevent those countries from sending troops or assisting with Iraq’s reconstruction. These two groups were the main producers of the videos of executions or victims pleading for their lives. After the interim Iraqi government took over on June 28, 2004, there was an increase of kidnapping attacks on foreigners, which seemed to have the desired effect of causing several companies to remove workers and several countries to withdraw troops and to cease helping with the country’s reconstruction. Then in Fall 2004, the focus of the attacks shifted away from foreigners to include the Iraqis themselves, such as police officers, national guardsmen, election commission members, political candidates, and prominent government officials. Partisan targets included Shiite and Kurdish citizens and Christian churches. Violence was directed at the Iraqis to lessen support for the interim government, disrupt elections, and continue the chaotic conditions that favored the militants. The militants labeled these Iraqis as traitors, more accurately as apostates.(9)

    Of the numerous hostages killed it is difficult to determine the exact number who have been beheaded. Although this article contains a list of over 50 individual beheadings it does not include decapitated bodies found in mass graves or headless bodies frequently found by soldiers. There have been several news reports of decapitated bodies found in Iraq. For example, on September 15, 2004, United States soldiers discovered three heads and decapitated bodies thought to be of Iraqi civilians on a roadside north of Baghdad. On October 5, 2004, five decapitated bodies of Iraqis were found dumped separately in Mosul and Kirkuk. On November 3, 2004, three beheaded bodies were found under a suspension bridge in Central Baghdad. On November 18, 2004, four beheaded bodies were found in Mosul. On December 12 2004, four decapitated bodies in civilian clothes were found in Haswa. On October 3 2005, south of Baghdad in Latifiya, Iraqi troops found 15 headless bodies in a building inside an abandoned former army base; the bodies included ten men, three women, and two children. The following charts are examples of Al Qaeda network beheadings from the years 2000-2005. It is important to note that the charts do not include the previously mentioned unidentified bodies, hostages kidnapped and later released, or hostages executed by gunfire or other methods. Because of the enormous scope of research and difficulty in ascertaining information on the subject of contemporary Islamist beheadings, there are numerous other instances that have not been included in this article. The following charts are also not representative of the hundreds of people killed by suicide bombings and other Mujahideen tactics.

    4

    Al Qaeda Network Beheadings 2000-2005

    Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    Nick Berg American Jewish May 11, 2004 Iraq
    Kim Sun-il South Korean Christian June 22, 2004 Iraq
    Georgi Lazov Bulgarian Christian July 13, 2004 Iraq
    Ivailo Kepov Bulgarian *Christian July 14, 2004 Iraq
    Mohammed Mutawalli Egyptian Muslim August 8, 2004 Iraq
    Durmus Kumdereli Turkish *Muslim September 13, 2004 Iraq
    Jack Hensley American Christian September 20, 2004 Iraq
    Eugene Armstrong American Christian September 21, 2004 Iraq
    Kenneth Bigley Britain Christian October 7, 2004 Iraq
    Unidentified Truck Driver Turkish *Muslim October 14, 2004 Iraq
    **11 Iraqi Police & National Guardsmen Iraqi Muslim October 17, 2004 Iraq
    Shosei Koda Japanese Christian October 31, 2004 Iraq
    Ali Hussein Jassem Mohammad al-Zubaidi Iraqi Shiite Muslim January 21, 2005 Iraq
    Ahmad Alwan Hussein al-Mahmadawi Iraqi Shiite Muslim January 21, 2005 Iraq
    Jassim Mohammed Hussein Mahdi Iraqi Muslim April 5, 2005 Iraq
    Badr Brigades Member Iraqi Shiite Muslim October 22, 2005 Iraq

    Islamic Army in Iraq

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    Raja Azad Khan Pakistani Muslim July 28, 2004 Iraq
    Sajad Naeem Pakistani Muslim July 28, 2004 Iraq
    Zoran Naskovski Macedonian *Christian October 18, 2004 Iraq
    Dalibor Lazarevski Macedonian *Christian October 18, 2004 Iraq
    **Dragan Markovic Macedonian *Christian October 18, 2004 Iraq

    5

    Army of Ansar al-Sunna

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    ***Unidentified Man (CIA) Western unidentified August 11, 2004 Iraq
    Khaled Abdul Messih American *Muslim August 25, 2004 Iraq
    Nepalese worker (1 of 12) Nepalese *Hindu August 31, 2004 Iraq
    Iraqi Kurd Iraqi Kurd Muslim September 19, 2004 Iraq
    Iraqi Kurd Iraqi Kurd Muslim September 19, 2004 Iraq
    Iraqi Kurd Iraqi Kurd Muslim September 19, 2004 Iraq
    Barea Nafea Dawou Ibrahim Iraqi Muslim October 2, 2004 Iraq
    Maher Kemal Turkish *Muslim October 11, 2004 Iraq
    Luqman Hussein Iraqi *Muslim October 11, 2004 Iraq
    Al-Sayed Alaa al-Malki Iraqi Shiite Muslim October 12, 2004 Iraq
    Ramazan Elbu Turkish *Muslim October 14, 2004 Iraq
    Seif Adnan Kanaan Iraqi Muslim October 22, 2004 Iraq
    Iraqi Soldier (1of 11) Iraqi Muslim October 28, 2004 Iraq
    Major Hussein Shanun Iraqi Muslim November 3, 2004 Iraq
    Unidentified Iraqi Iraqi Muslim September 12, 2005 Iraq
    Unidentified Iraqi Iraqi Muslim September 12, 2005 Iraq

    Ansar al-Islam (aka Jund al-Islam)

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    25 PUK prisoners Iraqi Kurds Muslim September 23, 2001 Iraq

    Harkat ul-Mujahedeena

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    Daniel Pearl American Jewish January 29, 2002 Iraq

    6

    The Salafist Brigades of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    Fadhel Ibrahim Iraqi Muslim October 13, 2004 Iraq
    Firas Imeil Iraqi Muslim October 13, 2004 Iraq

    Taliban

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    Malim Abdul Habib Afghan *Muslim January 3, 2006 Afghanistan
    Unidentified Afghan man Afghan *Muslim December 9, 2005 Afghanistan

    Al Qaeda Organization in the Arab Peninsula

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    Paul Marshall Johnson, Jr. American *Christian June 18, 2004 Saudi Arabia

    ***al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    Hossam Armanious American Coptic Christian January 14, 2005 United States
    Amal Armanious American Coptic Christian January 14, 2005 United States
    Sylvia Armanious American Coptic Christian January 14, 2005 United States
    Monica Armanious American Coptic Christian January 14, 2005 United States

    ****Fedayeen Saddam

    Name of Victim Nationality Religion Date of Beheading Place of Beheading
    250 women Iraqi Muslim June 2000-May 2001 Iraq
    prisoners Iraqi Muslim 1995-2003 Iraq

    *Presumed religion – unable to verify

    ** Presumed beheaded – unable to verify at this time

    ***Presumed group – unable to verify at this time

    ****there is a debate as to whether the Fedayeen Saddam is part of the Al Qaeda network

    7

    Beheading Videos (warning: these videos depict graphic violence!)

    Date Name of Victim Video of Beheading
    10-22-05 Badr Brigades Member http://www.ogrish.com/archives/al_qaeda_in_iraq_beheads_badr_brigades_member_Oct_22_2005.html
    09-12-05 2 Unidentified Iraqi’s http://www.ogrish.com/archives/two_beheaded_in_iraq_by_ansar_al_sunnay_army_Oct_05_2005.html
    04-05-05 Jassim Mohammed Hussein Mahdi http://www.ogrish.com/archives/zarqawis_group_al_qaeda_in_iraq_
    beheads_iraqi_national_guard_on_video_Apr_04_2005.html
    01-21-05 Ali Hussein Jassem Mohammad al-Zubaidi http://www.ogrish.com/archives/2nd_iraqi_worker_beheaded_on_the_streets_of_iraq_Jan_21_2005.html
    01-21-05 Ahmad Alwan Hussein al-Mahmadawi http://www.ogrish.com/archives/iraqi_worker_beheaded_on_the_streets_Jan_21_2005.html
    12-09-05 Unidentified Afghan Man http://www.ogrish.com/archives/video_shows_beheading_by_taliban_in_afghanistan_Dec_24_2005.html
    11-03-04 Major Hussein Shanun http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=135500
    10-31-04 Shosei Koda http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=133500
    10-28-04 12 Iraqi Soldiers http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=129500
    10-22-04 Seif Adnan Kanaan http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=127500
    10-14-04 Ramazan Elbu http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=124500
    10-14-04 Unidentified Turkish Truck Driver http://www.ogrish.com/archives/turkish_truck_driver_beheading_video_execution_performed
    _by_qaqa_brigade_tawhid_and_jihad_group_Oct_14_2004.html
    10-13-04 Firas Imeil http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=120500
    10-13-04 Fadhel Ibrahim http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=120500
    10-12-04 Al-Sayed Alaa al-Malki http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=117500
    10-11-04 Luqman Hussein http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=116500
    10-11-04 Maher Kemal http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=116500
    10-07-04 Kenneth Bigley http://www.ogrish.com/archives/ken_bigley_video_kenneth_bigley_beheading_video_Oct_10_2004.html
    10-02-04 Barea Nafea Dawoud Ibrahim http://www.ogrish.com/archives/iraqi_national_barea_nafea_dawoud_ibrahim_
    beheaded_by_ansar_alsunna_Oct_03_2004.html
    09-21-04 Eugene Armstrong http://www.ogrish.com/archives/american_hostage_eugene_armstrong_
    beheading_video_killed_by_zarqawi_militant_group_Sep_21_2004.html
    09-20-04 Jack Hensley http://www.ogrish.com/archives/american_hostage_jack_hensley_beheading_video_Sep_22_2004.html
    09-13-04 Durmus Kumdereli http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=93500
    08-31-04 12 Nepalese Workers http://www.ogrish.com/archives/nepalese_hostages_execution_video_and_beheading_images_Aug_31_2004.html
    08-25-04 Khaled Abdul Messih http://www.ogrish.com/archives/khaled_abdul_messih_beheading_video_Aug_25_2004.html
    08-11-04 Unidentified Western Man (alleged CIA Agent) http://www.ogrish.com/archives/cia_agent_beheading_video_Aug_11_2004.html
    08-08-04 Mohammed Mutawalli http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=87500
    07-13-04 Georgi Lazov http://www.ogrish.com/archives/bulgarian_beheading_video_in_iraq_possibly_georgi_lazov_Aug_09_2004.html
    06-22-04 Kim Sun-il http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=75500
    06-18-04 Paul Marshall Johnson, Jr. http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=71500
    05-11-04 Nick Berg http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/decapitation_video.htm
    01-29-02 Daniel Pearl http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=54800
    1995-2003 Fedayeen beheading / Torture http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/6086
    1995-2003 Iraqis tortured by Fedayeen http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=83500

    8

    Forensic and Symbolic Analysis of Beheading

    Beheadings in the Al Qaeda network videos meet all the criteria to be designated ritualistic crimes, more specifically ritual murder in the category of holy war. Ritualistic crime is defined as any act of violence characterized by a series of repeated physical, sexual, and/or psychological actions/assaults combined with a systematic use of symbols, ceremonies, and/or machinations. The need to repeat such acts can be cultural, sexual, economic, psychological, and/or spiritual.(10) Some reporters have claimed that the beheadings are a form of human sacrifice, hence the terrorists committing these crimes are not true Muslims but have returned to pagan pre-Islamic practices that are prohibited in the Quran (editorial in USA Today, “Nothing Islamic about human sacrifice,” http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2004-11-16-peters-edit_x.htm). The practice of human sacrifice is a form of idolatry that is prohibited in all the monotheistic religions, specifically in reference to the worship of other gods; however, referring to these beheadings as human sacrifice is inaccurate. There are subtle and important distinctions between ritual murder and sacrifice. In its simplest terms, human sacrifice is ritually murdering someone as an offering to a god; ritual murder is ritually killing someone for other reasons. The mujahideen are not beheading victims as offerings to Allah; they are ritually murdering the enemies and apostates of Allah to preserve Islam as theologically proscribed in the Quran. The Mujahideen are not creating a cult of human sacrifice; they are returning to a pure form of Islam, as they consistently claim. These subtle but important distinctions are what prompted me to propose a ritualistic homicide typology in my book Investigating Religious Terrorism and Ritualistic Crimes.

    The Ritual Homicide typology proposes five categories of ritual homicide based on religious concepts; sacrifice, ritual murder, millennial murder, holy war, and iconoclasm. Each category posits common forensic findings, victimology, crime scene indicators, method of operation, motives of perpetrators, and the symbolic significance of various ritual homicides. All categories consist of premeditated crimes and are not mutually exclusive. Interestingly Mujahideen beheadings constitute the perfect combination of ritualistic crime and religious terrorism, and according to the typology would be classified as ritual homicide in the category of Holy War.

    In the ritual homicide typology, Holy War is described as

    a sacred (holy) category of group or group sanctioned ritual conduct. Holy War is always committed by a true believer, a religious soldier who commits acts of terrorism because of his or her fervent devotion to a system of beliefs based on orthodox religious conventions. There are several types of victims targeted in Holy War, predominantly the victim represents the antithesis of the offenders’ beliefs, therefore victimology depends on this doctrine. If multiple victims are involved there will be similarities of race, religion, political beliefs, social status, or economic status. Victimology also includes the victims who come into conflict with the group’s objectives; this includes the informant, ex-member or any member who poses a threat to either the leaders control or the groups integrity. A paramilitary method of operation will be employed and could include the wearing of uniforms, the use of training compounds, and the highly organized use of military tactics. There will often be multiple crime scenes: confrontation site, death scene and body disposal burial site. The calling card / signature of the group may be left at the scene. The forensics will often reveal the calling card or signature aspect of the group and can include bombings, firearms, and weapons of mass destruction or blunt force trauma from personal weapons. The purpose of this type of ritual homicide is to overthrow the existing religious / political order to achieve political and religious goals.(11)

    Al-Qaeda network beheadings meet all of these criteria. The following is an analysis of some of the major crime scene indicators in the beheading videos.

    Ritual / Signature

    There are distinct commonalities in all the beheading videos that are obviously indicative of repetitive ritualistic behavior, referred to as the signature aspect of the crime. The most prevalent recurrent pattern includes some or all of the following: reading of offenses (transgressions), confession, judgment, last words, execution, praising of the deity, written or verbal statement of demands. Dependant upon the group, symbolic patterns include; the space is decorated with banners that identify the name and emblem of the group, the participants are dressed alike in military type uniforms consisting of black clothing, including ski masks or head scarves covering their faces, weapons are displayed, the victim (hostage) typically has his hands tied behind his back, his feet bound, and is placed on the floor in front of the group. American and some other victims are dressed in the orange jumpsuits of the type worn by detainees in U.S. prisons, including the detention center at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The ritual pattern begins with a statement from the executioner reciting the reason for the death sentence, which usually alludes to current political events, is teeming with religious language justifying the violence and praise for Allah, and often contains future threats. The victim then has the opportunity for last words; sometimes he confesses to being a spy or whatever the group has coerced him into confessing, or pleads with the audience to acquiesce to the kidnappers’ demands and secure his release. At this point the head is cut off with a small knife by the leader, sometimes while other participants hold the victim down; the head is then held in the air by the hair and placed on the victim’s back to shouts of Allahu Akbar, the battle cry of the mujahideen. Mutilated bodies are later found in various outdoor public areas, sometimes together with the head and occasionally in a separate location from the head.

    The function of ritual is very diverse; but one of the more common purposes of ritual, particularly in warrior traditions, is initiation. The male initiation rite is a rite of passage to transform boys into strong, fierce warriors. Analysis of the dates of the beheadings shows that they escalate and cluster at certain times. The obvious interpretation of the dates of executions is that the beheadings are a response to specific attacks by U.S. forces and to political events such as the interim Iraqi government taking over. However, another interpretation of the quantity and timing of the beheadings is that they constitute initiation into the al-Qaeda organization. Initiation and endurance rituals in warrior cultures are often violent and always involve blood. Killing an enemy warrior is a very common method of initiation. Cutting someone’s head off or even witnessing the violence without recoiling requires a certain form of discipline, and would constitute a method of pledging allegiance to a fraternal organization. Another aspect of the ritual is that when everyone participates, it creates a bond sealed in blood that makes the unit that much more united. The video and subsequent media attention bonds the individual terrorist groups to the larger al-Qaeda network, and a rivalry begins over who can behead the most enemies as a method of acquiring status within the organization. Interestingly, al-Zarqawi formally merged with Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaeda in October 2004, soon after several highly publicized beheadings. On the day that Al-Zarqawi announced his alliance, an Islamist website posted a message in which al-Zarqawi took credit for decapitating 11 Iraqi Police and National Guardsmen. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was successfully initiated and earned his status in the Al-Qaeda network with the heads of hostages and a high body count from suicide bombings.

    9

    Victimology

    For the Mujahideen warrior victimology is obvious: because the victim represents the antithesis of the offender’s beliefs, victimology corresponds directly with Islamist doctrine. It became evident from a review of statements made by the perpetrators in the videos, on terrorist web sites, and by former hostages that the nationality and religion of the victim is one of the most significant factors in influencing the degree and method of violence. Nationality and religion determined whether the hostages would be released, negotiated for, executed by gunshot, beheaded, or beheaded on video. Hostages from countries that are part of the Coalition Forces are executed as Crusader enemies of Islam; Americans are deemed valuable hostages that will attract the most attention and are typically beheaded and videotaped. Many of the hostages that have been released were from countries that were either not part of the coalition forces, whose government paid the terrorist ransom, or who eventually withdrew their troops from Iraq. The religion of the victim is also a crucial factor in the selection of who is beheaded. The justification for killing Jewish and Christian hostages is obvious, given their status as the original enemies of Islam; this is what Usama bin Laden is referring to when he called upon the Mujahideen to fight the “Crusader-Zionist alliance” in hisfatwa titled “Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.” Muslim victims are persons viewed as collaborating with the Americans; the justification is that they are apostates and blasphemers. Apostates (Murtad) are Muslims who abandon their religious faith, which is one of the most serious transgressions under Islamic law. Blasphemy (Kufr) is defined as a denial of any of the essential principles of Islam. For Islamists a Muslim convicted of blasphemy or who is deemed an apostate is sentenced to death.

    The beheading videos and terrorist statements make consistent references to Muslims who support the coalition forces in any manner, particularly those who belong to the new Iraqi Police or National Guard. A typical example is a statement posted on the web site of the Al Qaeda-linked Army of Ansar al-Sunna on November 3, 2004, showing the beheading of what they called “a senior Iraqi army officer” in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. “Your mujahedeen brothers in Mosul managed to capture a senior officer in the Iraqi army, the apostate Major Hussein Shanun.” The statement was posted along with the video and photos showing the victim after he was decapitated with his head placed on his back. “At the behest of his American masters (Shanun) took part, along with his soldiers, in several operations against the mujahedeen in Mosul.” The statement said the “despicable officer confessed to his actions” and warned that anyone who “dares back the crusader occupation forces” would meet the same fate.(12)

    The beheading videos and terrorist statements have also made specific references to the religion of the victims. Al-Zarqawi’s group posted a message on its Web site that suggested the killing of South Korean national Kim Sun-il was linked to Kim’s religion. “We have killed an infidel who tried to propagate Christianity in Iraq,” the message read. “This infidel studied theology and was preparing to become a missionary in the Islamic world.” In the message, the terrorist group also accused Kim’s employer, Cana General Trading Co., of Christian affiliations, attacking its policy of donating 10 percent of its profits to missionary work.(13) The victim’s religion is also referenced in the title of the videotape of the murder of American Daniel Pearl. The title reads “The Slaughter of the Spy-Journalist, the Jew Daniel Pearl.” Judaism, Christianity, and Western democracy historically and ideologically have constituted a serious threat to fundamental Islamic beliefs, hence the significance of the nationality and religion of the beheading victims. Formally declaring the victims as infidels, apostates, and pagan enemies of Islam during the beheading ceremony is theologically required to justify the ritual murder.

    Weapon

    In most of the videos, the captives are decapitated with an 8-10 inch serrated knife. The person is held down while the knife is used in a slicing fashion, cutting the front of the victim’s neck first, followed by a combination of circular and sawing motions. A ceremonial knife is the weapon of choice for ritual murder; it is symbolically significant for the leader to draw blood from the victim. Across cultures, the role of the sacrificer is an honored and privileged position and maintains status within the group. In this case the sacrificer is an enforcer, a holy warrior implementing Allah’s law. The terrorists are ritually required to cut the necks of their enemies as proscribed in the Quran, thus transforming the execution into a holy rite.

    The use of the knife is also symbolic of the sword which is a prominent symbol of warrior cultures in general and of Islam in particular. “The sword was originally the primary symbol of an Arab fighter until the introduction of the rifle. Khalid ibn Walid, the great general of the Muslim armies in the Prophet Muhammad’s era, was called the Sword of God (Sayfullah) just as tribes often referred to themselves as the “sword” of their leader.”(14)The sword is also a prominent symbol in the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad is quoted as saying, “The sword is the key of heaven and hell; a drop of blood shed in the cause of Allah, a night spent in arms, is of more avail than two months of fasting or prayer: whosoever falls in battle, his sins are forgiven, and at the day of judgment his limbs shall be supplied by the wings of angels and cherubim.”(15)The Prophet Muhammad also had a collection of swords each with their own name and history. (Chart of the Prophet Muhammad’s Swords:http://www.usna.edu/Users/humss/bwheeler/swords/index_of_swords.html) In addition, “To commemorate their warrior heritage, the Omani and Saudi flags feature two curved swords.”(16) Swords appear in some of the emblems of Islamic terrorist groups including Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC).

    Most significantly, Quranic verses of war that sanction fighting against persecution are called the “Sword verses.” The Sword Verses command Muslims to slay pagans, hostile Jews, Christians, and Arab polytheists who fought against Muhammad. The Sword verses are frequently used by religious terrorists to legitimate unconditional warfare against unbelievers, which is referred to as Jihad-e-asghar or Jihad of the sword. The symbolism of reciting offenses that declare the victim to be an infidel or apostate followed by group participation in the ritual cutting off of the head with a knife is the contemporary manifestation of Jihad of the Sword.

    10

    Body Disposition / Mutilation

    The most obvious signature of the al-Qaeda network beheadings is found in the mutilation and disposition of the body. This article does not include decapitations that occurred postmortem–for example, in July 2005 Taliban gunmen ambushed an Afghani border patrol, killing ten soldiers and afterward beheading their bodies. That is also indicative of a ritual signature but a different type. The focus of this paper is the ritual act of beheading, hence in all case studies the direct cause of death is from injuries resulting from decapitation. There are distinct commonalities in all of the Al-Qaeda beheading rituals with mutilations specific to certain groups. I have identified three distinct group signatures. Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn, Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and Fedayeen Saddam. There are many other Islamist groups in Iraq and other countries who perform beheadings, as evidenced in the above charts; however, the length of this article and the scope of investigations into these crimes does not allow for an in-depth description of each group. Hopefully, the forensic and religious observations in this paper will inspire much needed further research into this subject.

    What I have identified and refer to as the classic al-Qaeda forensic beheading signature is found in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group and entails the following: binding the victim, a ritual performance with perpetrators in uniforms, recitation by both victim and perpetrators, execution with group participation where members hold the victim down while his neck is slowly sawed off with a relatively small knife, holding the severed head up by the hair. Body positioning involves staging; after the head is severed from the body the torso is placed on its stomach and the head is placed in the center of the back. This is also evident in other Iraqi insurgent groups, particularly groups that have splintered off from al-Zarqawi’s or who share members. The al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya beheading signature entails: binding the victim, slitting the throat with a knife, and mutilation involving the removal of Coptic cross tattoos from victims. The Fedayeen Saddam beheading signature is much more traditional and consists of group participation in a public ritual performance, perpetrators in uniforms, recitation of offenses by the perpetrator, execution by a designated individual who is skilled with a sword; the victim is bound, placed on his knees, and propped over some kind of support where the neck is exposed, the head is hacked off with one cut of the sword, the severed head is held by the hair and publicly displayed. Body positioning involves staging with the head being placed on the victim’s back. Female victims were beheaded in a similar manner; however, their heads were hung outside their homes for several days. The following are more detailed descriptions of the three groups’ activities, citing specific cases of torture, mutilation, and ritual murder.

    Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn Beheading Signature

    The classic Al-Qaeda beheading signature is most evident in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers) also known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Arabic: القاعدة في بلاد الرافدي, Al-Qaa’eda fi Bilaad’ir-Raafidee, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia) and the al-Zarqawi Network. “Before September, 2004 the group was called Jama’at at-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Arabic: جماعة التوحيد والجهاد, Monotheism and Holy War Movement) more commonly referred to as Unity and Jihad group. The group’s name, which is usually abbreviated as JTJ, purposefully contrasts the strict monotheism of Islam with what it sees as the polytheism of the Christian Trinity. The name change is significant as it uses the archaic name of Iraq used in the Islamic Caliphate era.”(17) The group adopted its current name after an important formal merger with Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Al-Zarqawi announced the merger in October 2004, and in December, bin Laden endorsed al-Zarqawi as his official emissary in Iraq. In a statement posted to an Islamic forum website on October 17, 2004, the militant group said: “We deliver to the nation the news that both Jama’at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad’s Amir [al-Zarqawi] and soldiers have pledged allegiance to the sheikh of the mujahideen, Usama bin Laden, and that they will follow his orders in jihad for the sake of God so there will be no more tumult or oppression, and justice and faith in God will prevail.” The statement called on the “youth of this nation” to join al-Zarqawi’s followers under the banner of Al-Qaeda. Jama’at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad later released a statement claiming it has officially joined the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, and Al-Arabiyah television broadcast a statement by the group identifying itself as Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers). Iraq is commonly known as the land of the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates.” (18)

    The Jordanian Palestinian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah, a.k.a. Abu Ahmad, Abu Azraq) established cells in Iraq soon after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, formalizing his group in April 2004 to bring together jihadists and other insurgents in Iraq fighting against US and Coalition forces. Al-Zarqawi and his group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Iraqi resistance. The immediate goal of Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn is to expel the Coalition through a campaign of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and intimidation, and establish an Islamic state in Iraq. Their long-term goal is to proliferate jihad from Iraq into “Greater Syria,” that is, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.(19)

    Al-Zarqawi’s group claimed credit for a number of attacks targeting Coalition and Iraqi forces, as well as civilians. Activities that are relevant to this paper include kidnapping, beheadings, and targeted assassinations to intimidate Iraqis and third-country nationals working in Iraq as civilian contractors. Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn is responsible for numerous beheadings and releasing videotapes of the violence. In April, an American civilian, Nick Berg, was kidnapped and later beheaded. One month later, a video of his beheading was posted on an al-Qaeda-associated website. Analysts believe that al-Zarqawi himself killed the American as well as a Korean hostage, Kim Sun-il, kidnapped in June. Al-Zarqawi took direct credit for the September kidnapping and murder of two American civilians, Jack Hensley and Eugene Armstrong, and later their British engineer co-worker, Kenneth Bigley, and the October murder of Japanese citizen Shoshei Koda.(20) There have been numerous subsequent beheadings by al-Zarqawi’s group and other Islamist insurgent groups in Iraq.

    11

    The Nick Berg beheading video was the first highly publicized ritual murder and had the desired shocking effect on the American public. At present most people are either unaware of the large number of beheadings that followed Berg’s, or as with other forms of violence, have simply become desensitized to them. The Nick Berg video begins with a written title, and than Berg is seen sitting in a chair wearing an orange jumpsuit. He identifies himself, “My name is Nick Berg, my father’s name is Michael, my mother’s name is Susan. I have a brother and sister, David and Sarah. I live in West Chester, Pennsylvania, near Philadelphia.” The next scene depicts Berg with hands bound behind his back and feet bound sitting on the floor in front of five men wearing ski masks and head scarves. A lengthy statement is read aloud from white sheets of paper by the man in the center (al- Zarqawi), standing directly behind Berg. After the statement is read al-Zarqawi removes a knife appearing to have an eight to ten inch blade from under his garments in his chest area with his right hand and swiftly places his left hand on top of Berg’s head, grabbing his hair. Nick Berg is pushed onto his left side by al-Zarqawi, assisted by the unidentified individual wearing a white hood/mask combination. Pushed onto his left side, Berg has his legs bent at the knees and raised toward his chest with his arms still tied behind his back. At this point, the video goes out of focus; as it comes back into focus, al-Zarqawi uses the knife to cut the throat of Nick Berg, beginning at the area near his left carotid artery. Almost immediately, blood is seen pouring onto the floor from the wound caused by the incision. The sound of Nick Berg screaming in pain and agony goes on for a few seconds. Al-Zarqawi is shown using the knife in a slicing fashion, cutting the front of the neck first, followed by a combination of circular and sawing motions with the knife around his neck while still holding Berg by the hair. While al-Zarqawi sawed off Berg’s head, the other men shouted: Allahu Akbar! The tape appears to stop at an edit point or video stoppage where the individual wearing the white hood and previously standing on the right side of al-Zarqawi is now using the knife in a saw-like manner, holding the knife in his right hand while holding Nick Berg’s hair with his left hand. The individual wearing the white hood ultimately detaches the head from his body and holds the head outward in his left hand, still holding the knife in his right. Following this series of frames, the video appears to jump frames (possibly due to uploading the video to a computer), at which time Nick Berg’s head is shown completely detached and the primary object on the screen.(21) The last image in the video, depending on which version you obtain, depicts Nick Berg’s head placed on the middle of his back.

    In addition to the obvious political symbolism of the masked men in recognizable terrorist uniforms, the primary motive for this ritual murder is revealed in the declaration read in the video. News reports summarized and Westernized significant aspects of the wording and the religious language was literally lost in the translation. A transcript of the statement read by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on the video includes the following language; “Praise to Allah who honored Islam with His support, humiliated the infidels with His power, controlled everything with His Command, and tricked the infidels. Prayers and peace be upon the one that raised the banner of Islam with his sword. . . . Has the time not come for you to lift the sword, which the master of the Messengers was sent with? . . . The Prophet, the master of the merciful has ordered to cut off the heads of some of the prisoners of Badr in patience. He is our example and a good role model.”(22) This was not simply a political speech or terrorist threat, it was a religious decree. It is written in the same language as Usama bin Laden’s fatwa, using expressions that religiously justify the violence and align the participants with the original mujahideeen. The result of the suppression of the sacred language in the media is a secularization of the most dangerous aspect of the war on terrorism, the religious imperative to kill us. An excellent example of the difference between the press reports and the actual language can be viewed at TrackingTerrorism.com news (http://www.trackingterrorism.com/news/print.asp?artid=458).

    One of the most significant aspects in the Nicolas Berg video, besides the actual violence, is that al-Zarqawi himself wielded the knife; this not only sent a message to the American public but also sent a message to Jihadists around the world. In warrior cultures the leader of the group would never ask his men to do anything he was not prepared to do himself, particularly a violent and dangerous act. Any soldier who aspired to the title of a great fighter and leader always led his men into battle. Performing the execution himself was a method of gaining respect and admiration while simultaneously pledging his allegiance to al-Qaeda. It was of such importance that the audience be aware of the fact that al-Zarqawi personally performed the execution that it was not only stated in the title of the video “Sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi slaughters an American infidel with his own hands” but emphasized again at the end of the read statement, which was signed Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Prince of Al Tawhid group and jihad, Iraq, 22 Rabi I 1425 (May 11, 2004). There was initially some question of whether al-Zarqawi actually participated in the execution, but the video was immediately authenticated by the intelligence community after they conducted a technical analysis of the tape. Culturally there was no doubt that al-Zarqawi’s participation was symbolically required; it would have been dishonorable to take credit for another warrior’s kill. Through this televised ritual murder, al-Zarqawi firmly established his leadership and broadcast a rallying call that established beheading as the latest tactic of war. Unfortunately, his strategy was very successful, as evidenced by the dozens of beheadings that followed. That is why the forensic signature in al-Zarqawi’s beheadings appears in so many subsequent groups; they are emulating their leader. It is also the reason for designating his group’s pattern of ritual murder as the classic al Qaeda beheading signature. Although Daniel Pearl had been beheaded two years earlier, it was not publicized, hence had no strategic value. Nick Berg’s beheading and its subsequent publicity was a successful method of aligning the entire jihadist movement with the Prophet Muhammad and the original mujahideen.

    The symbolism and staging were more prominent in subsequent beheading videos after the Mujahideen had had time to perfect their rituals. The next video by al-Zarqawi’s group depicted the beheading of South Korean Kim Sun-il; in this ritual the group has now hung a banner with their name in the background. Kim Sun-il is blindfolded; unlike Berg, Kim Sun-il is fluent in Arabic and understands the true nature of the situation, so he pleads for mercy and repeatedly begs for his life. Another terrorist participant reads the religious justification for the execution which is basically that Kim Sun-il is a Christian missionary. In the video Al-Zarqawi, who now wears his ritual knife prominently on his belt, proudly wields it before it is used to cut off Kim Sun-ill’s head. After he is decapitated in the same manner as Berg, Kim’s head is held by his hair, blood dripping onto his now severed and mutilated body. One of the terrorists chants “Allah Akbar” as the men holding Kim’s head return the chanting “Allah Akbar,” swinging Kim’s decapitated head before them. They shout “Allah Akbar” another fourteen times. The video ends with music softly playing an Islamic prayer.

    12

    The next highly publicized beheadings by al-Zarqawi’s group were Americans Jack Hensley and Eugene Armstrong, and Briton Kenneth Bigley. By this time the Al-Qaeda in Iraq signature is now firmly established; a ritual performance with perpetrators in uniforms, recitation by both victim and perpetrators, execution with group participation where members hold the victim down while his neck is slowly sawed off, holding the severed head up by the hair, praising Allah, and placing the severed head on the center of the back. Subsequent beheadings have elements that occasionally differ, for example, victims may not wear the orange jumpsuit, some are blindfolded while others are not, and the beheading of Japanese hostage Shosei Koda in Iraq occurred while he was lying on top of a U.S. flag.

    The religious justification is evident in every beheading. The very fact that these executions are ritualized and that the executioners praise Allah throughout is what distinguishes them from common acts of barbarism. There would be no honor in simply cutting off someone’s head for the sake of terrorizing your enemies; the ritual characteristics have to be present to be theologically and communally sanctioned. To situate this in the realm of the sacred as opposed to a mob killing it is ritually required that each person participate in the religious ritual, hence, the communal chanting of Allah Akbar while the victim is being beheaded. Finally, all of the participants in the beheading ritual have to be authentic true believers, who will kill and die for their religion; this is the very reason they identify themselves as soldiers of God. These beheadings are nothing less than the sacred blood rituals of the Mujahideen.

    al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya Beheading Signature

    On January 14, 2005 in Jersey City, New Jersey, police discovered the bodies of Hossam Armanious, his wife Amal Garas, and their daughters, fifteen year old Sylvia and eight year old Monica, murdered in their home in a crime that has been dubbed “Jihad in Jersey City.” “The family was bound, gagged and tortured, before their throats were slit in accord with the instructions for executing nonbelievers, as detailed in the Quran: (47:4) ‘Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers, smite at their necks; At length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly [on them].’”(23) The victims were Coptic Christians, an Egyptian sect of Christianity despised by fundamentalist Muslims for their refusal to convert to Islam. The Coptic Church, whose presence in Egypt goes back nearly 2,000 years, has experienced persecution off and on over the centuries, intensifying in the last ten years. The Coptic Church is an independent church that broke away from the Byzantine Orthodox in the 6th century. Coptic Christianity was the majority religion in Egypt until at least the 9th century, when it was overtaken by Islam brought by Arab conquerors. Today Coptic Christians are Egypt’s largest religious minority, constituting at least ten percent of the population. Exposed to continuous and subtle pressures, their numbers are dwindling due to severe religious discrimination. There is a web site that keeps track of their struggle titled Copts.com, Home of the persecuted Copts in Egypt, on which the Armanious family is listed under the section on Coptic Martyrs (http://www.copts.net/links.asp).

    Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Arabic: ألجماعه الاسلاميه ) (Arabic for “the Islamic Group”; also transliterated Gamaat Islamiya, Jamaat al Islamiya, al-Jamā’ah al-Islāmiyah, etc.) is Egypt’s largest terrorist group dedicated to the overthrow of the Egyptian government and replacing it with an Islamic state. It is also one of the original members of the al-Qaeda network and has been responsible for targeting and murdering Coptic Christians in Egypt. The group conducted a number of attacks on Egyptian security forces, government officials in Egypt, Coptic Christians, and other perceived Egyptian “opponents of Islam” in an insurgency that has killed 1,200 people since the early 1990s. To escape Islamic persecution many Coptic Christians emigrated to the United States where several hundred thousand now live, mostly in New Jersey, New York, and California. Jersey City has a population of both Copts and Muslims, and a significant connection to al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Prior to this incident, Jersey City had already gained “the nickname ‘Terror City’ because of its history of Islamic extremist activity. Jersey City gained this reputation after the first bombing of the World Trade Center, on February 26, 1993, which was carried out by a local terrorist cell. The van used in the attack was rented in Jersey City, the bomb was built in several Jersey City apartments, and the perpetrators frequented the Jersey City mosque presided over by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.”(24) Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the spiritual leader of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, is currently serving a life sentence for seditious conspiracy for planning to blow up New York landmarks. It was suggested that one motive for the Armanious killings was that a relative of the victims had helped prosecutors in their case against lawyer Lynne Stewart, currently on trial in Manhattan for allegedly smuggling outfatwas written by her imprisoned client, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, to his followers in al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Some of the fatwas resulted in attacks in Egypt.

    However, the motive that was cited in most media reports was the fact that Armanious was active in Internet chat rooms and was well known for expressing his Coptic beliefs and engaging in heated debates with Muslims on the Web site PalTalk.com. Pal Talk is an internet chat service that attracts up to three million users a month; some Arabic-speaking users of Pal Talk have reported that contentious debates between Christians and Muslims are common in certain chat rooms. Armanious had a reputation for being one of the most outspoken Egyptian Christians. “According to several reports, Armanious boldly proclaimed his faith on Internet chat rooms and invited Muslims to believe in Christ, and had been doing so for about five years. His intrepid declarations drew numerous threats via the website. When one Muslim told him to “shut up,” Armanious allegedly replied, “I can say whatever I want. I live in America.”(25) Shortly before the murders one of the internet messages read, “You’d better stop this bullshit or we are going to track you down like a chicken and kill you,”(26) a Middle Eastern reference to slitting the throat. In an important New York Sun article, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross uncovered that the Armanious family was just one of a number of Christians systematically tracked by a radical Islamic website because they debate Muslims on PalTalk.com. “The password-protected Arabic Web site, at the address www.barsomyat.com, features pictures and information about Christians who have been particularly active in debating Muslims on Pal Talk. . . . Barsomyat.com features not only photographs of the targeted Christians, but also attempts to track down their addresses. . . . One user posted a photograph of Hossam Armanious and wrote, “This is a picture of the filthy dog, curser of Muhammad, and a photo of his filthy wife, curser of Muhammad. They got what they deserved for their actions in America.”(27) Fittingly, the Islamic website’s banner displays a lamb with its throat being slit and a crucifix crossed out by a violent red “X.” The main heading, in Arabic, says “Christians: Revealing the Truth Behind Our Belief.” The significance of this crime in reference to this article is that detailed reports of the mutilations suggest a beheading signature specific to al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. The wounds are based on the same Quranic scriptures as other al-Qaeda beheadings and refer to the Islamic legal imperative to kill those who are deemed blasphemers. The considerable amount of time the perpetrators spent in the house, the extent of mutilation and torture, multiple stab wounds in all of the bodies, the cutting of all of their throats, and the symbolism of the injuries is distinctly indicative of ritual murder. The family was bound and silenced with duct tape that may or may not have been found inside the house. “Each of the parents had their throats slit, with three ‘drilled’ or ‘twisted’ holes about the size of a thumb below the slit. The daughters had two similar holes inflicted below the slits in their throats.”(28)Sylvia, who would have turned 16 the next day, was especially brutalized. The girl’s throat was not only slit, but she was stabbed repeatedly in the chest and wrist where she had a tattoo of a Coptic cross. Cross tattoos on other family members were not defaced but Monica’s wrists were cut. Sylvia, a young, outspoken devout Christian, may have been subjected to the worst torture for not representing the values of an appropriately modest Muslim young woman practicing Hijab (dressing modestly).

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    Although the authorities tried to relegate this crime to a savage isolated incident, the forensic evidence is characteristic of ritual murders of Coptic Christians in Egypt perpetrated by al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. After viewing the bodies at the funeral home, relatives said that “the way the four family members were bound and gagged and the way their throats were slit with holes carved is similar to executions that are shown on al-Jazeera. The American public is not aware of this because the details of the executions are not often described in news accounts.”(29) Another report read, “Family members are loath to blame Muslim extremists for the murders,” but point out “the details of the killings are similar to murders perpetrated by extremists in Egypt, where Coptic Christians have been bound, gagged and had their throats slit.”(30)

    Throughout the investigation, authorities claimed that they thought the primary motive for the murders was robbery. The Coptic community continuously argued that due to political pressure the religious aspect was not thoroughly pursued. Although there was some evidence of robbery, there were many inconsistencies, such as large amounts of jewelry that remained untouched. Nevertheless, on March 4, 2004, two former convicts were charged with binding, gagging and cutting the throats of the Armanious family, one of whom had previously rented an upstairs apartment from the family. Hudson County Prosecutor Edward De Fazio emphasized that the motive for the murders was robbery and provided an incredibly detailed account of the crime. In December 2005, both men were formerly arraigned on murder charges; prosecutors have decided to request the death penalty, and as of this writing no date has been set for the trial. The case is being described as a botched robbery gone wrong. Another way of interpreting the crime is to consider that the primary motive was ritual murder as proscribed by Quranic law and that the murders were staged to look like a robbery. It is not known if this was investigated as a contract killing. It is certainly plausible that authorities would not want the general public to know that an entire family was beheaded in their home by Islamic terrorists in an American city for fear of widespread panic. Yet this does not negate the fact that Coptic Christians have been previously mutilated in this manner in Egypt by the Islamist terrorist group Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Regardless of the motive of this particular case, it is significant to note that the community of Coptic Christians that fled Egypt to avoid violent persecution immediately recognized the characteristics of Islamist ritual murder.

    Fedayeen Saddam Beheading Signature

    Fedayeen (from Arabic fidā’ī, plural fidā’īyīn فدائيون, “one who is ready to sacrifice his life for the cause”) describes several distinct, primarily Arab groups at different times in history. Fedayeen originally referred to an Islamic group active from the 8th to the 14th century known as the Hashshashin or Assassins.(31) They were a religious sect of Ismaili Muslims from the Nizari sub-sect with a militant basis, thought to be active as a mystic secret society.(32) In modern times Fedayeen are more commonly associated with Armed Palestinian militias that were based in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, consisting of refugees of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In the 1960s the armed wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization was known as the Fedayeen and continued to lead violent raids into Israeli territory. In Iran the Fedayeen refers to a Marxist-Islamist radical guerrilla group operating between 1971 and 1983, based in Tehran, that carried out a number of political assassinations in the struggle that culminated in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.(33) The Fedayeen that are relevant to this article are a paramilitary militia founded by Saddam Husein’s son Uday that was directed against perceived domestic agitators and opponents of the Al-Baath regime and that fought against the Coalition Forces in Iraq after Saddam’s overthrow in 2003. Referred to as Fedayeen Saddam (also known as Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice, Saddam’s Martyrs, Fidayi Saddam, Fedayeen Saddam Militia, and Iraqi Fedayeen), the name was chosen to imply a connection to their Palestinian predecessors.

    Fedayeen Saddam’s ideology is primarily paramilitary rather than religious; however, their violence, although secular, has ritual characteristics and is evocative of Islamist symbolism. The most obvious allusion to ritual violence is that Fedayeen Saddam loosely translates as Saddam’s “Men of Sacrifice,” alluding to the original religious sect. The Fedayeen Saddam included a special unit known as the death squadron, whose masked members committed torture and executions. There were numerous news reports attempting to link Saddam’s Fedayeen to al-Qaeda, which would have significant repercussions on the debate over the justification for the Iraq War. Prior to the war in Iraq, the Fedayeen’s ideology was primarily a form of secular nationalism or more accurately a forced “cult of Saddam”; however, in their shared objective to purge the country of Americans, their goals coincided with the Mujahideen. “The ideology of many of the fighters is described as ‘post-Saddam’ and is a simple combination of Islamism and nationalism, covering a wide spectrum of Muslims’ viewpoints that converge on the common goal of ending U.S. military rule inside the country. The U.S. occupation is an assault on both Islam and the entire Arab World, and is therefore viewed as something that must be resisted. . . . A number of the former Saddam Fedayeen were reportedly to have converted quickly to the Islamic agenda, becoming members of active Islamic resistance groups.”(34)

    Several videotapes found in Iraq demonstrated the brutality of the former Iraqi regime and the torture administered by the Fedayeen Saddam. In 2004 the Defense Department made available an edited version of several different torture videos discovered after the regime’s collapse. The tape contained graphic depictions of Fedayeen Saddam members and Republican Guard troops breaking arms and wrists with heavy sticks, throwing people off a high building, chopping off fingers, cutting out tongues, ritualized mutilations, amputations, lashings, and a beheading. (For a complete report on the violence perpetrated under Saddam’s reign, view the U.S. Department of State Report Iraq: A Population Silenced, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, December 2002,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/15996.htm)

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    An article published in The National Review Online by Nick Schulz entitled “Seeing, and Believing: The torture tapes the media are ignoring” provides graphic descriptions of the ritual violence perpetrated by the Fedayeen Saddam:

    The clip opens amid Saddam Fedayeen chanting loudly: “With blood and spirit we will redeem you Saddam.” The Fedayeen stand barking and clapping in a courtyard. A blindfolded prisoner, forced to his knees and held in position has his arm outstretched before him along a low concrete wall. A masked member of the Fedayeen raises high a three-foot-long blade and ferociously slams down on the man’s hand, slicing through his fingertips. The victim is wailing, howling, screaming in agony. The swordsman-torturer, not sufficiently satisfied with his first effort, raises the sword again and drives down once more on the man’s immobile hand. This time he severs the fingers closer to the knuckles . . . The camera then turns to the assembled Fedayeen as they continue rhythmically chanting. . . .

    “In the name of Allah the merciful,” intones the beret-topped loyalist to Saddam’s [supposed] “secular” regime in the next segment. He introduces to the viewer and the assembled butcher squad to another prisoner. The loyalist-narrator reads from the Koran, Sura 2:179: “And there is a saving of life for you in the Law of Equality in punishment. O men of understanding, that you may become the pious.” “The Fedayeen, Saddin Ezzedin al-Arousi,” he goes on, “was charged with a special mission in which he betrayed his duty in the mission. The head of the Fedayeen has ordered the following: He is expelled from Fedayeen work and his arms are to be broken in front of his unit. Tarik Juman will personally undertake the breaking of his arms. Thank you.” The camera jumps to al-Arousi sitting with one arm tied behind him as his right arm is extended out to his side. His right elbow rests on a cinderblock and his right fist is supported by another cinderblock. Nothing supports his forearm in between. While a Fedayeen holds the prisoner’s elbow in place, Tarik Juman crashes a three-inch-thick pipe down on his old compatriot’s forearm, bending the forearm in a ‘V’ shape and shattering the bones within. This procedure is repeated for his left arm as well.

    In another clip a hooded and blindfolded prisoner is led to a room where he is forced to kneel, hands tied behind his back. Another man sits before the prisoner with thick metal tweezers and a scalpel. With his left hand he grabs the tip of the prisoner’s tongue with the tweezers and pulls it forward from his head. With the scalpel in his other hand he slices through the prisoner’s tongue, cutting it out of his mouth and then dropping it on the floor. This ritual is repeated for more prisoners who are lined up, squatting in a row like parts on an assembly line waiting for processing.

    In the final clip we see a blindfolded prisoner being led to his fate as the assembled men around him sing “Happy Birthday, long live the leader, eternal gift to the people.” Again with arms tied behind his back he is shoved to the ground, bent over stuffed burlap sacks. A black-clad Fedayeen loosens the prisoner’s shirt exposing his back and neck, while another stands two feet from him holding a long silver blade at its curved handle. He raises his arms and strikes, hacking the prisoner’s head from his body, tumbling it to the ground. He picks up the severed head by the hair and places it ceremoniously on the dead man’s back as the camera pans in closer and closer and you can make out the victim’s now lifeless and bloodied face.(35)

    The ritualized aspects of the video include the Fedayeen rhythmically chanting their loyalty to Saddam and clapping throughout the torture, the Fedayeen wearing their characteristic ninja-like black uniforms, and group participation in the violence. The religious aspect is evident in the praising of Allah and the recitation of the Quran during the torture of a supposed Fedayeen traitor. Finally the beheading entails ritualized singing and praising of Saddam while the head is cut off with a sword, held up, and then placed on the prisoner’s back. Placing the head on the back of the decapitated body is similar to the body disposition of the classic al-Qaeda signature.

    Nevertheless, a forensic signature specific to the Fedayeen Saddam emerged during an alleged anti-prostitution campaign in which more than 200 women were publicly beheaded from approximately June 2000 through May 2001. Many of the victims were actually political opponents rather than prostitutes.

    Saddam’s Fidayi conducted the beheading operations, which took place in two stages. Accompanied by the leaders of the Ba’th party, the Fidayi made a night raid on the district. The latter was gone through with a fine toothcomb to eliminate any hints of revolt and in order to discover any weapons. The population was summoned for the next day at prayer time. They arrived at the stated hour at the home of the victim, who was dragged out in the clothes she is wearing. She was then stretched out on an iron bench, her head hanging down, in front of her children, her family and the whole population of the district. The executioner and his assistants were dressed in brown bearing the logo ‘Saddam’s Fidayi’ and usually did not come from the district or the region. The Feddayi detailed to carry out the beheading took his sword held out by an assistant and cut’s the victim’s head off. According to the scenes described, the head was exhibited or the body and the head are thrown into black boxes and taken away.(36)

    In another report witnesses stated that after the executions, the victims’ families are forced to display the heads at their homes for several days. “Many families have been required to display the victim’s head on their outside fences for several days. These barbaric acts were carried out in the total absence of any proper judicial procedures and many of the victims were not engaged in prostitution, but were targeted for political reasons.”(37)

    Even under Saddam’s secular reign the Fedayeen beheadings were ritualized and resonated with the historical symbolism of Islam’s holy warriors, particularly the use of the sword to decapitate and the public display of the severed head. Already experienced in ritual violence, it is quite possible that former Fedayeen members passed on their considerable knowledge and skills in the public ceremonies of ritual mutilation and beheading when they joined al-Qaeda-linked Iraqi insurgent groups.

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    Conclusion: 21st-Century Holy War: A Return to the 7th Century

    Typically when investigating a ritual murder you only have remnants of the ritual, generally, the body, symbols, sacred objects, etc., which constitutes the crime scene. With enough evidence, experience, and knowledge you are able to analyze the symbolism and identify a corresponding ritual, religion, group, or person. As disturbing as the beheading and torture videos are, they provide an enormous amount of information and constitute documented records of contemporary ritual murders. More significantly, they prove that ritual murder in the name of religion persists in the 21stcentury. The contemporary existence of ritual murder and human sacrifice has been the subject of many scholarly debates. The argument against the existence of ritual murder is based on a behavioral science theoretical perspective which claims that perpetrators of these crimes are suffering from some form of psychopathology. The argument that attempts to prove that ritual murder occurs is based on a religious cultural perspective that claims that the perpetrators are making rational choices to engage in a violent ritual that is religiously required of that group. I am the leading proponent of the latter argument, and throughout my career have witnessed a pervasive denial of the existence of premeditated group sanctioned ritual murder. That denial was also prevalent when the first beheading video became public.

    There were an abundance of conspiracy theories claiming that Nick Berg was not beheaded by Islamic Fundamentalists, that the beheading was forensically inaccurate, and that it was a hoax perpetrated by the CIA to cushion the blow from the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. There has always been an extreme denial of ritual murder in the United States, particularly when it is in the context of New Religious Movements, Fundamental Extremists, or Contemporary Satanism. Ironically, the public has no problem accepting the fact that secular ritual murders are enacted by individual serial killers, in fact there is a fascination with them. This is because serial killers are viewed as aberrations and it is plausible to regard one individual as a psychopath. It is much more difficult to comprehend ritual murder committed by several offenders who are respected by their communities and whose violence is theologically proscribed by their religious leaders. There has always been a movement to deny the existence of satanic ritual murders by attributing heinous homicides to individual psychopaths and claiming that “satanic panics” were perpetrated by the media. The same denial is taking place by designating these beheadings as a form of psychological warfare. We do not want to acknowledge that in the civilized 21st century people are ritually murdered in the name of God or Satan.

    It is difficult to remain in denial when there is actual proof of ritual murders and not just remnants of the crime scene. The American public is all too familiar with images of violent murder. What the public cannot accept is the fact that these beheadings are communally sanctioned and religiously justified. These are not violent crimes committed by psychopaths or a form of group hysteria; beheading, suicide bombing, and ritual mutilation are the sacred blood rituals of the Holy warriors of Islam. This is a highly organized community that consistently and proudly professes their ideology, values, and goals and persistently identifies themselves as Mujahideen. They do not hide the fact that they are fighting a holy war and that they have a religious imperative to kill Christians, Jews, and unbelievers. All we have to do is listen to what they are telling us.

    Zarqawi’s group, in an Internet video, November 2, 2004, showed the beheading of Japanese hostage Shosei Koda as he lay on a U.S. flag. The group warned Tokyo to withdraw its forces from Iraq or “drown in the hell of the mujahideen” along with “crusader forces.”(38) “Let the whole world know that Al Qaeda Organization of Holy War is firm in its jihad.”(39) As if the internet and video statements were not enough to communicate their goals, al-Zarqawi’s group al-Qaeda in Iraq described its ideology in a manifesto published on line in August 2005. “We vow by the name of God that we are determined to destroy the American empire,” it says. The e-book includes numerous sections totaling dozens of pages, covering such topics as how the Quran justifies beheadings and why democracy is wrong. Repeatedly, the book calls on Muslims to launch attacks against foreign forces in Iraq and people who cooperate with them. The document calls on Iraqi troops and police to turn their backs on the new elected government. “You who betrayed Muslims and in humiliation became one of many collaborators, a servant under the command of the cross, we ask you to return to your Islamic instinct or cutting your neck will be your only punishment for your treason against your religion and your people.” It adds this warning: “Repent or else.” The group says its “doctrine and mission are clear and they can be summarized as our agreement to believe in and fight for the religion of God. We believe that those who follow these beliefs and the provisions of faith are true Muslims and anyone who denounces any of these beliefs and conditions is an infidel even if he still claims to be a Muslim.” The document warns there will be no end to the insurgency. “The call for jihad goes on until doomsday, whether there is an imam calling for it or not.”(40) The language of this war is religious. There are constant references in the secular media to the Quran, religious holidays such as Ramadan, the Prophet Muhammad, the Holy land, Ulema, Madrassas, Sharia, Fatwas, and Jihads.

    The media is fond of using the word “desecration,” particularly in reference to Islamic beliefs. Desecration is a sacred concept, and although we are supposedly not fighting a holy war, the word “desecration” has made headlines quite frequently; desecration of the Quran, desecration of enemies’ bodies, and desecration of mosques. We are hypersensitive to what Muslims hold sacred even when it jeopardizes our national security and puts soldiers’ lives at risk. We are not going to be defeated by terrorism but we will be defeated by political correctness unless we stop sugarcoating the sacred nature of this war. There are many people who recognize the implications of this religious threat; however, not one politician will acknowledge that we are involved in a holy war. It would be political suicide to announce that this is not a war on terrorism but a war on Islam.

    The Mujahideen’s frequent reference to Crusaders and crosses refers to the Crusades, a series of wars undertaken by European Christians between the 11th and 14th century to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims who took it by force in the 7th century. Richard D. Connerney foreshadowed the problem in an insightful article written one month after 9/11:

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    Unlike Christianity or Judaism, Islam’s religious history is inseparable from its conquests. . . . The unfortunate truth of the matter is that Muslim violence against the civilian populations of other religions goes right back to the origin of Islam in the 7th century A.D. . . . And Islam is the only religion that has spawned a wandering group of holy warriors, traveling from conflict to conflict fighting the enemies of Islam wherever they see them–in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan . . . In Islam, it is not the religious message that promotes the faith into the halls of political power as in Judaism and Christianity, it is an original state of political and military strength that promotes the religious message. Looked at this way, jihad is not a secondary concept in the development of Islam–something grafted onto the original religious message–rather it is the very origin of Islam, the sine qua non of the faith. This furthermore explains the inability of Islamic culture to adapt and accept ideas of modernity and secular government. It is no secret that representative democracy does not take well in the Muslim world. Liberal democracy of the American variety requires the embrace of tolerance over truth, the relinquishment of any binding central religious truth or ideology in government. . . . Islam has never existed without the Islamic state, the Caliphate, and it would be hard-pressed to do so now. To accomplish a true secularization of the Muslim world would be to ignore the meaning of the Quran at the core–or at least as it is now interpreted by the most passionate believers.(41)

    Jihadists consistently claim that they are traditionalists who restrict themselves to literal and traditional interpretations of their sacred texts. The media have perpetuated an erroneous idea that Islamic terrorists have corrupted the peaceful religion of Islam, when in fact it is moderate Muslims who have altered the religion and actually practice a Westernized, watered-down version of Islam. Acknowledging the documented history of the Islamic religion should not be viewed as an insult to Modern Muslims or deemed slanderous of contemporary Islam. Every major religion has evolved and adapted to new technologies and cultural changes. The danger occurs when revisionist history promotes a fallacy that denies the violent origins of the Islamic faith and undermines the public’s perception of the seriousness of the threat. The Mujahideen are nothing if not consistent; they practice what they preach, they have retained Islam’s original tenets for centuries and their children are raised as true believers. An example of how deeply the violent ideology is inculcated in traditional Islamic culture is a video that appeared on June 26, 2004, showing four Muslim children staging a mock beheading. A website dedicated to Islamic law featured a video presentation of four children acting out a beheading similar to beheadings in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In a scene that appears to mimic the murder of Nicholas Berg, one young boy kneels in front of three other children, in the same manner as the condemned man; the three children who are armed with toy weapons stand behind him in the same fashion that the terrorists stood over the men prior to their beheading. The middle child takes the role of Berg’s executioner, Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, appearing to read a list of demands. The footage culminates with the mock beheading of the child hostage.(42) The video appeared on a site operated by Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri, a defender of the 9/11 attacks who is on trial in London charged with 16 crimes, including encouraging the murder of non-Muslims and intent to stir up racial hatred. The video demonstrates that the children had detailed knowledge of the ritual and encourages them to take their place as the next generation of Mujahideen. (Children’s beheading video http://inhonor.net/videos/uped/fl_video.php?f_num=74500).

    True believers are the most dangerous enemies. You may be able to get a soldier to fight and die for his country in battle, but you would be hard pressed to find one willing to strap on C-4 attached to a vest full of nails and ball bearings and commit suicide as a walking claymore mine. Mujahideen are lining up for this duty. These holy warriors are willingly blowing themselves up because they have faith. As a consequence of our Western view of the world and standard behavioral science analysis of crime, we fail to see the nature of these true believers. Al-Qaeda has already won the most important strategic battle; they know their enemy, but we are in denial of their religious imperative to annihilate us. Our worst opponent is not the Mujahideen, it is our refusal to acknowledge that we are fighting soldiers of God in a centuries-old holy war.

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    Notes

    1. “Mujahideen.” From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahideen (back)

    2. An article in Jihad Unspun by Zafir Jamaal titled “Soldiers of God, Fighting In The Name of Allah” http://www.jihadunspun.com/thePlayers/bio/mujhaideen.html (back)

    3. Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications, by Ronald H. Jones, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle Papers in Security strategy Series June 2005, p. 8. http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jones1.pdf (back)

    4. CBS news “Beheadings Merge Ancient, Modern,” New York, Sept. 23, 2004 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/23/iraq/main645311.shtml (back)

    5. “Beheading in the name of Islam,” Timothy Furnish The Middleeast Quarterly, Spring 2005, Volume XII number 2 http://www.meforum.org/article/713 (back)

    6. Ibid. (back)

    7. Ibid. (back)

    8. Center for Media and Democracy, Source watch, Mujahideen http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Mujahideen (back)

    9. Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications, by Ronald H. Jones, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle Papers in Security strategy Series June 2005, page http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jones1.pdf (back)

    10. State of California Office of Criminal Justice, Occult Crime: A Law Enforcement Primer. Sacramento, California definition of ritualism. p.25. (back)

    11. Investigating Religious Terrorism and Ritualistic Crime, Dawn Perlmutter, CRC Press, 2004. pages 382-384 (back)

    12. ABC news online “Iraqi army officer beheaded”: video, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200411/s1234249.htm (back)

    13. The Korea Times, 7-15-2004 “Church Leaders Condemn ‘Religious Killing’ of Kim Sun-il,” By Reuben Staines, http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200407/kt2004071516240810160.htm (back)

    14. Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications, by Ronald H. Jones, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle Papers in Security strategy Series June 2005, p. 5. http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jones1.pdf (back)

    15. Jewish Virtual Library, Interpreting Jihad, James A. Beverley http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/jihad1.html (back)

    16. Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications, by Ronald H. Jones, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle Papers in Security strategy Series June 2005, p. 5. http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jones1.pdf (back)

    17. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanzim_Qa’idat_al-Jihad_fi_Bilad_al-Rafidayn (back)

    18. GlobalSecurity.org, Military, Jamaat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad / Unity and Jihad Group http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/zarqawi.htm (back)

    19. Naval Postgraduate School, Dudley Knox Library, Terrorism Profiles Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/qjbr.htm (back)

    20. U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism April 27, 2005, Chapter 5B – Country Reports, Iraq http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45392.htm (back)

    21. Northeast Intelligence Network: “Bloodstain Analysis from Nick Berg Beheading Video – Forensic Irregularities Cast Doubt on Events” Excerpted from issue 9 of the HQ INTEL-ALERT: http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/bloodstainanalysis.asp This article on the Northeast Intelligence network site provides a detailed account of the Nick Berg video. This was cited for forensic details of the beheading only and the authenticity of the video is not the subject of this article. (back)

    22. Athena: Commentary on the War on Terror, Terrorism Unveiled, Zarqawi Statement: Berg Beheading, May 28, 2004 http://athena.blogs.com/athena/2004/05/zarqawi_stateme.html (back)

    18

    23. Chron Watch, “Jihad in New Jersey,” by Judson Cox, January 18, 2005 http://www.chronwatch.com/content/contentDisplay.asp?aid=12431 (back)

    24. The Weekly Standard, “Jihad in Jersey City? The murder of a Coptic family raises disturbing questions,” by Olivier Guitta 01/31/2005, Volume 010, Issue 19. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=5170&R=C433A35A (back)

    25. Assist News Service (ANS), February 8, 2005, “Brutal Murder of Coptic Christian Family in New Jersey Raises Specter of Islamic Violence in USA,” John M. Lindner http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/s05020044.htm (back)

    26. Jihad Watch; January 16, 2005, “New Jersey: an Islamic murder of Coptic Christians?” Originally published as “‘Islamic Hate’ Eyed in Slays,” from the New York Post, http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/004660.php (back)

    27. The New York Sun, “Christians on Pal Talk Chat Service Tracked by Radical Islamic Web Site,” by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, January 31, 2005 http://www.nysun.com/article/8455 (back)

    28. Assist News Service (ANS), February 8, 2005, “Brutal Murder of Coptic Christian Family in New Jersey Raises Specter of Islamic Violence in USA,” John M. Lindner http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/s05020044.htm (back)

    29. Jihad Watch January 31, 2005, “New details on the New Jersey murders,” http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/2005/01/004883print.html (back)

    30. Assist News Service (ANS), February 8, 2005, “Brutal Murder of Coptic Christian Family in New Jersey Raises Specter of Islamic Violence in USA,” John M. Lindner http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/s05020044.htm (back)

    31. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Fedayeen” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fedayeen(back)

    32. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Hashshashin,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hashshashin (back)

    33. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Fedayeen” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fedayeen(back)

    34. Jihad Unspun, “An Insider’s Look at the Iraqi Resistance,” http://www.jihadunspun.com/articles/18122003-Iraqi-Resistence/ir/ailatir01.html (back)

    35. The National Review Online June 17, 2004, “Seeing, and Believing: The torture tapes the media are ignoring” by Nick Schulz http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/schulz200406170846.asp (back)

    36. Global Security.org – Saddam’s Martyrs [“Men of Sacrifice”] Fedayeen Saddam http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/fedayeen.htm (back)

    37. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet March 20, 2003, “Iraqi Women Under Saddam’s Regime: A Population Silenced” http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/18877.htm(back)

    38. Outside the Beltway, November 2, 2004, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/7874 (back)

    39. The Jawa report November 2, 2004 http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/052905.php(back)

    40. CNN.com, “Al Qaeda in Iraq issues virulent manifesto,” August 26, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/08/26/alqaeda.book/ (back)

    41. “Islam: Religion of the sword?” By Richard D. Connerney, October 11, 2001 http://gathman.org/apologos/connerney.html (back)

    42. World Net Daily, Global Jihad, “Muslim kids stage mock beheading,” June 26, 2004http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=39145. Muslim children in video, play make believe beheading, posted by Muaddib, June 25, 2004: http://www.atsnn.com/story/61748.html (back)

  • Benchmarks (Anthropoetics XI, no. 2)

    This issue brings together a couple of our original and most stalwart collaborators, Tom Bertonneau and Matt Schneider, veterans of the original 1987 GA seminar and founding editors of Anthropoetics, and two of our most faithful more recent contributors, Raoul Eshelman and Dawn Perlmutter. All four deal with intellectual landscapes close to their heart. Tom’s leisurely meditation on irony touches on late Antiquity in the person of Lucian of Samosata; Matt deals with the Wordsworthian origins of the American popular ballad; Raoul pursues his elaboration of the performatist esthetic in the literature of Eastern Europe; and Dawn explores once again the intersection of the criminal and the sacred, this time in the all-too-timely world of Islamic terrorism. The reader is warned that her article contains some graphic descriptions, and above all that the links to decapitation videos should not be investigated by the faint-hearted.

    About Our Contributors

    Thomas F. Bertonneau, teaches at SUNY Oswego.  He is a regular contributor toModern Age, Intercollegiate Review, and The University Bookman, as well as toPraesidium and Anthropoetics.  His “Threading the Labyrinth” appears in the currentIntercollegiate Review; his study of Ayn Rand appeared in Modern Age in Fall 2004 under the title “From Romantic Fallacy to Holocaustic Imagination.”  With Kim Paffenroth of Iona College, Bertonneau has written The Truth is Out There: Christian Faith and the Classics of TV Science Fiction, forthcoming from Brazos Press and available for prepublication purchase at Amazon.com.

    Raoul Eshelman (Ph.D. University of Constance 1988, Habilitation Hamburg 1995) is a Slavist and Comparatist specializing in modern and postmodern literature. He is presently teaching at the Dept. of Slavic Literatures at the University of Munich, and is working on a book on performatism.

    Dawn Perlmutter, Director of the Institute for the Research of Organized and Ritual Violence, is the author of Investigating Religious Terrorism & Ritualistic Crimes (CRC Press), Reclaiming the Spiritual in Art (SUNY Press), Graven Images: Creative Acts of Idolatry (UMI dissertation), and numerous publications on ritual violence in contemporary culture. She regularly trains law enforcement agencies throughout the United States, has advised Police Departments and Prosecutors’ offices on numerous cases of ritual homicide, and presented expert witness testimony on ritualistic crimes. As the subject matter expert on ritual murder she has been interviewed for many documentaries, newspapers and newscasts including The O’Reilly Factor, the Fox News Channel, NBC, CBS, The Learning Channel and the BBC. She is currently working on another book for CRC Press titled Blood Rituals (forthcoming 2007). She holds a Doctor of Philosophy from New York University and a Masters Degree from The American University, Washington, DC.

    Matthew Schneider, a founding member of the GA seminar (who has managed to attend some portion of the seminar every year it has been given), holds an MA from Chicago and received his PhD in English from UCLA in 1991. The author of Original Ambivalence: Violence and Autobiography in Thomas De Quincey (Peter Lang, 1995), Schneider has also published essays on Jane Austen, Charles Dickens, William Blake, critical theory, and Biblical exegesis. He is associate professor of English and Comparative Literature at Chapman University (Orange, California).


  • White Guilt VI — From Vietnam to Today

    When we discover that subjects such as white guilt** do not lend themselves to rational discussion, we habitually call our differences “political,” implying that it is the self-interest of the disputants that poses an obstacle to disinterested debate. A better description of these difficulties is that they are religious. It is not facetious to point out the sacred component of postmodern white guilt; although this attribution does not suffice to explain the phenomenon, it makes clear what kind of resistance to change it sets up. Victimary rhetoric’s constant reference to the Nazi-Jew model is in the first place a denunciation of the false sacred that affirms the ontological truth of human difference. What the Auschwitz demonstration founds is not simply a new stage of moral history, although this aspect is not to be ignored; it is a new paradigm of sacrality, or in other terms, a new mode of explicit confrontation of the empirical with the transcendent. Throughout the history of the great prisoners’ dilemma that is human society, it is sacred representation in its various forms that holds in check the temptation of defection by preserving the memory of violence averted and redirected.

    **For those who may not have been following this series, the white in white guilt is defined not by skin color but by unmarkedness: white guilt is the guilt of the unmarked toward the marked, the mark as at the origin designating the victim.

    But to take Auschwitz as demonstrating that all asymmetry is evil is to reject out of hand the problematic necessity of firstness, and thereby to fall into the very discriminatory mode against which the postmodern defines itself. The characteristic postmodern hostility to Israel–”anti-Zionism”–expresses indignation that the Jews, whose status as ideal, absolute victims was the point of departure for postmodernism, have returned to their old ways of self-assertion. As claimed, this attitude is not identical to classical anti-Semitism. But what is painfully naïve about those who make this claim is their ignorance that this anti-Zionist indignation repeats trait for trait the old antisemitism; calling the Israeli Jews “Nazis” is really just a way of calling them… Jews.


    As I recall the events of thirty-odd years ago, the notion of affirmative action was originally limited to outreach activities such as Head Start that gave encouragement to persons who had suffered from discrimination and/or who had had reason to anticipate it. The out-and-out racial preferences that emerged in the seventies came as a surprise; Martin Luther King’s dream that touched the nation had been about integration, not special treatment. Whatever the morality or the long-term value of these programs, the impotent shock they originally occasioned reflects the major shift in attitude that inaugurated a new, endemic stage of white guilt. Instead of creating a de jure “level playing field” by the finite action of eliminating discriminatory practices, the new task was the potentially unending one of compensating for a residual victimary status whose disappearance could only be attested by equality of outcome. Conversely, inequality of outcome came to be considered ipso facto proof of victimage; as the lawyers say, res ipsa loquitur. In other terms, all firstness had to be eliminated. This paradigm was soon extended to asymmetries whose moral status was far less obvious than racial discrimination.

    Religion characteristically extrapolates from the power of the sacred to regulate human society in attributing the violence of nature to “acts of God,” that is, of our God, whose severity and benevolence alike are responses to our actions or at any rate means of provoking us to virtue. Eliminating the divinity merely short-circuits the causal chain by eliminating all wills but our own. Thus, whereas considered from the standpoint of its cult objects, white guilt is a kind of pantheism, its focus is not on these objects but on the guilty subject, who is less interested in celebrating the glory of the not-self than in preempting the accusation that he is victimizing it. That the white guilt paradigm is less about helping the victims than about denouncing the victimizing Other in ourselves–and in those less morally sensitive than we–is clear from its vast expansion in the post-Vietnam era beyond non-ethnic human categories to animals, plants, and the planet in general. The environmentalism of the past decade–acid rain, ozone layer, global warming–ignores well-attested natural cycles of temperature and hurricanes in its desire to blame climate change on “unnatural” human activity. A whole new set of Pharisees has arisen whose lives are focused on denouncing, and sometimes violently aggressing, what they judge to be the inadmissibly non-reciprocal treatment of humans, animals, and things.

    Traditional wisdom warned of the dangers of hubris, but this is no mere humility. It demonstrates that in the absence of a commonly recognized God, guilt alone becomes the mark of the sacred. White guilt is the ultimate secular religion. God reveals himself to Saul on the road to Damascus as the person whom he persecutes. In the post-Christian version of this revelation, God is revealed through the guilt that accompanies the self-affirmation of one’s being as firstness, as (temporary) non-reciprocity. The sacred guarantees of firstness, which Christianity had traditionally sidestepped rather than challenged (“Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s”), have disappeared; the bearer of privilege is ipso facto a victimizer.


    A generation later, the faith of white guilt remains secure, although its works have not been impervious to the lessons of history. On the domestic front, the Clinton-era welfare reform, highly successful as these things go, is a sign of a new flexibility. Similarly, it is no longer unthinkable to express resistance to affirmative action programs. Today, especially since 9/11, the real passion of white guilt is played out on the international stage, focused on two families of victims, passive and active. The first family is what can still be called the “third world”: poor, highly stratified societies with a negligible impact on the global economy. (It is too soon to know how much of this passion the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina will refocus on our own “third world.”) We have no clear guidelines for dealing with such enormous differences in wealth and economic opportunity once they come into play in the global context. Since the end of the colonial era, during which the great powers, with varying mixes of hypocrisy, rapacity, and genuine concern, took their cultural-economic superiority as an explicit justification for political dominance, many third-world countries are governed by kleptocracies to which the first world provides aid with little guarantee that it will be well employed–a formula for economic and political stagnation demonstrably inferior to all but the worst forms of colonialism. Our contact and commerce with these populations is minimal; we know them only abstractly as “victims.”

    Far different is the case of the second family, the Islamic Middle East. Unlike the rest of the once-colonized world, Islam retains old memories of political dominance over the West; its post-colonial resentment has increasingly taken the form of Islamist terrorism, in a mythical return to the era of Muslim conquest that ended in the fifteenth century. Both families of victims are indispensable components of the white-guilt universe. White guilt is primarily a posture of compassion, not fear, yet as our relative indifference to Africa demonstrates, without the fear, there is little stimulus to implement the compassion. If the third world’s unthreatening despair provides Western white guilt’s moral guarantee, fear of the Islamic threat supplies its urgency. What explains the extraordinary indulgence afforded the Palestinians is that they combine both factors, arrayed as they are against the West’s perennial exemplars–and scapegoats–of scandalous firstness.

    In the United States, white guilt increasingly comports with intense hostility toward the half of the population who reject it as a motivation. The American Left has reached a level of disaffection not seen since the 1960s, but whereas the all too concrete fear of being sent to Vietnam motivated an often violent student radicalism, today’s fear, more diffuse, has permeated the mainstream of the Democratic Party. When people whose parents voted for Roosevelt and Truman lionize “pacifists” such as Michael Moore and now, Cindy Sheehan, this is the sign of the breakdown of a set of political norms. The stridency of political rhetoric becomes a substitute for action on the world stage, somewhat in the same way as the virulent anti-Americanism and antisemitism of the Arab countries substitutes for local politics. As the incoherence of the Democratic stance during the last presidential campaign shows, white guilt cannot provide a constructive basis for foreign policy; its energy is not directed against our enemies but at “ourselves.”


    To trace the genealogy of white guilt is not to put an end to the dilemma it reflects. Human morality demands reciprocity; postmodern white guilt is a reaction to history’s most atrocious failure of reciprocity–Auschwitz–which coincided with the discovery of the most extreme technical means of imposing non-reciprocity–Hiroshima. Today’s globalizing world is built on these foundations. The traditional Christianity that justified the acceptance of the world’s inequities by contrasting its limited possibilities to the transcendent kingdom of God could not survive the Holocaust. Antisemitism has always been the ultimate test of Christianity, and the ultimate triumph of antisemitism in Europe put an end to the role of European Christianity as an important social force. Even the papacy, its most vigorous institution, maintains its influence through the celebrity-sacred of the papal “event” rather than the liturgy and rituals of the Church. In the United States, where the shrinking “mainline” Protestant churches are dominated by white guilt even to the extent of inspiring divestment-from-Israel campaigns, the principal religious response to the challenge of Auschwitz has been an evangelical Christianity that emphasizes both the individual’s relationship to Jesus (rather than to the Other) and the exceptional role of the United States as an example to the world.

    The 2004 presidential election opposed not only two political parties but two religions, evangelical Christianity and “secular” white guilt. The professional and educational status of the intellectual elite would seem to make it the natural audience for the minimal theology of originary thinking. Yet it is only apparently paradoxical that red-state evangelicals are closer than bicoastal secular intellectuals not merely to the politics implicit in GA but to its intellectual values. The secular denial of the sacred and its relevance to moral issues is less, not more parsimonious than religious belief; even the popular “belief” in celebrity is a more frank avowal of the basis of humanity in sacred representation. Conversely, the compatibility of GA with religious belief demonstrates its own minimality as a belief system. Parsimony reflects the becoming-arbitrary of the (linguistic) sign whose substance must be reaffirmed by religion and art.

    No one disagrees on the basic principle of morality: reciprocity is implicit in the human use of representation. Yet, unlike a mathematical function–or a market transaction–reciprocity does not operate instantaneously; it cannot function without firstness. Someone must initiate the exchange, even when saying hello. The genius of Marcel Mauss’ little book Essai sur le don (The Gift) is that it describes what we all do every day in our personal lives without realizing that we are participating in a “primitive” rather than a bourgeois economy. When we give gifts, we don’t expect payment, or even an immediate gift in return; when we invite someone to dinner, we don’t expect him to pay, or to invite us tomorrow. Our guest may bring a bottle of wine as a sign of reciprocity, but not–unless he is unambiguously of superior status–a gift worth as much as the dinner itself. The delay in returning the gift exists for its own sake, as an element of the deferred exchange that maintains the social order. It is this mode of exchange that explains the otherwise inexplicable inclusion of the promise among Austin’s performatives. I can’t dub, marry, or induct, or even in most circumstances declare, but I can always promise, because this is one ceremony that must be performable by every speaker of human language in order to affirm his allegiance to humankind.

    It is this necessity of firstness and deferral that white guilt rejects for fear of the non-reciprocity to which it always threatens to lead. It is a fallacy to think that when we dispense with the anthropomorphic representation of the sacred center (“God is dead”), we have done away with the necessity of a sacred guarantee of difference. White guilt is the pessimistic version of this fallacy. In God’s absence the guilty subject makes himself the guarantee of the ultimate reciprocity into which difference must dissolve, suffering within the temporal limitations of human life the tension between real and ideal that had hitherto been the responsibility of immortals. This is far from the optimism of Enlightenment and even Nietzschean liberation from the tyranny of the theistic; the Nazi evil to which white guilt is a reaction is not unjustly perceived as a perversion of Nietzschean optimism. The ontological affirmation of human non-reciprocity is evil and must be denounced, but to denounce non-reciprocity not merely transcendentally but empirically is to define the human condition by resentment rather than by its transcendence.

    The Enlightenment saw the sacred as superstitious, a residue of the past (the sense of the Latin word) that the intellectual elite, at least, could cast aside. Originary thinking, although non-theistic, makes no such claim. The originary hypothesis is a “minimal sacred” that provides a point of comparison for other supposedly minimal models of morality that hide their sacred roots rather than displaying them. The state of world politics makes increasingly clear that judging the success of societies by the secular utopia of white guilt is a recipe for social suicide, and as we have seen, an incitement to the return of the sacred in its most crudely sacrificial forms. When one inhabits a moral environment where only losers are considered virtuous, one had better reevaluate one’s criteria of virtue before being forced to face the consequences of their realization.


  • John Rawls’s Originary Theory of Justice

    Rather than a template for the “good society,” originary thinking provides a touchstone for ethical progress: act so as to diminish the overall resentment in the world, in particular by increasing opportunities for the recycling of resentment into beneficial productive activity. This ethical precept reflects the thesis that the principal concern of human culture is and has always been to check the potential violence of mimetic desire. Constructing a model of the good society is unfaithful to the human exchange-system, whose operations have been from the beginning beyond the grasp of any individual mind within the society, and in which since the rise of the market system we participate largely unmediated by ritual.

    This ethical precept notwithstanding, the “moral model” of reciprocal exchange first exemplified in the originary event provides the basis for a recurrent temptation to create good-society utopias. The theoretical gesture of measuring a given social order against a moral ideal seems to us an extension of the moral intuition we apply in judging our own actions; whatever our degree of resignation, we cannot help but resent any evidence–even if it is “objectively” false–that we have been victims of a failure of reciprocity. It is only from the standpoint of the originary hypothesis that we can recognize the inadequacy of such extrapolations. Both the moral theory and the personal intuition are direct descendants of the originary exchange of representations. The first moral “theories” are explicitly sacred. Abstract moral theorizing must ultimately appeal to either transcendence or intuition, and the appeal to the former differs only in its rhetoric from appeal to the latter.

    These ideas too are situated in history. Determining the proper relationship between morality and ethics poses a particularly acute problem in the postmodern era. The question that has remained with us since the end of WWII is how to overcome the paralysis of Auschwitz; how to acknowledge the necessity of non-reciprocity without condoning genocide. If we hold history’s institutions to the touchstone of the moral model, they will all be found wanting, yet this historical experience tells us that we must do so nonetheless, for if we do not, anything is possible. That accusations of Nazism (or “fascism”) are still current today–and against Israel itself–is a sign that the moral dilemma has not yet been resolved. But unlike metaphysical thought, originary thinking takes the Holocaust as a sign not of the need to resolve this dilemma, but of the necessity of leaving it aside. Making the world a better place does not require–is in fact incompatible with–a prior image of the world made good.


    The most serious attempt to grapple with this postmodern quandary is that of John Rawls, whose A Theory of Justice (1971) remains the era’s most important work of moral philosophy. To sum up Rawls’s basic idea: if we imagine humanity in an “original position” when society is just coming into existence, so that the participants’ (future) place in it is hidden from us by a “veil of ignorance,” then they will agree on the criteria of a good society, since their uncertainty will inspire all of them to create a set of safeguards that would protect them from unfairness in the event they are assigned one of society’s less desirable roles. We can accept this agreement, unbiased by the participants’ knowledge of their social role, as universal humanity’s best judgment. Rawls considers that under these conditions, the least fortunate will be assured that they will reap a positive benefit from any inequality in the overall distribution of social goods; any such inequality can be justified only by demonstrating that eliminating it would make the least well off still less well off than if it remained. (This is an economically-oriented version of Sartre’s “existentialist” notion that the measure of freedom in a society is that of its least free member.) This conclusion has many ramifications that Rawls examines at great length, both within the book and subsequent to its publication, as part of his laudable effort to enter into dialogue with any number of other points of view.

    Rawls’s original position in which all human difference has disappeared behind the “veil of ignorance” has much in common with the anthropological originary scene; what it lacks is scenicity. This Enlightenment-style thought-experiment is more a parable than the model of a hypothetical event. If–against its creator’s intention–we attempt to situate the original position in a narrative, it could only be a theistic one; only a transcendent power could throw the “veil of ignorance” over these “original” humans. The closest thing to it in the secular utopias of the recent past is the dream of an agency that regulates both production and consumption in such a way as to fulfill the preexisting desires and exploit the preexisting talents of each individual. This is the conception that presides over the Fourierist phalanstère, or Marx’s half-serious portrait of the socialist man who is able to hunt in the morning and fish in the afternoon because the distribution of goods and services is handled by “society” (see Chronicle 278).

    Nevertheless, Rawls’s construction has not only been widely influential, it has held the field virtually to itself. Although it has inspired volumes of critique, none of Rawls’s critics have constructed a rival model that allows us to mediate as his does between the condemnation of inequality and its resigned acceptance. The models, for example, of “rational choice” theory are based more in economics than ethics; their creators share GA’s skepticism about moral theorizing, without however being able to account for the universality of our moral intuition–save perhaps as a biological adaptation.

    If we leave aside for the moment the question of agency, Rawls’s scenario resembles our hypothetical originary event, in which any previous hierarchy of distribution breaks down under mimetic pressure, so that the participants, whose future social roles may truly be said to be undetermined, require and receive assurance–through the mediation of a transcendental agent revealed/invented at this moment–that the distribution of the central object be as equal as possible. Such rough equality is typical, as we know, of hunter-gatherer societies to this day. By forcing ourselves to see Rawls’ original position in this manner we gain from it an appreciation for the intuition of equality that lends plausibility to his construction of morality–or Kant’s–even in its ahistorical form. For it is only because there is indeed a historical basis for our intuition that all humans are fundamentally equal that metaphysical moral theories such as those of Kant and Rawls are plausible; they are in fact exercises of the scenic imagination that cannot be explained in the absence of an originary event. This does not mean that we have in the depths of our brains some Jungian archetype of an originary scene, but that the very thing that makes us human, the exchange of representations with ourselves and others, presupposes this fundamental reciprocity; no language can maintain a distinction between its speakers and its listeners.

    Yet another feature of Rawls’ model seems incompatible with any conceivable originary context; it presupposes, without actually thematizing it, that the society to be constituted will involve highly differentiated roles, some of which are very much more desirable than others. I emphasize the “very much” because the just society Rawls sketches contains significant inequalities that are patent to all concerned and which necessarily generate resentment. The burden of Rawls’ quasi-scene is to provide a criterion for judging–in the light, I would insist, of the maximal injustice of the Holocaust–such radically unequal societies. And given the abstract nature of the transcendent agent that will ultimately distribute the roles, Rawls’ model applies just as well to the entire human world as to any particular community. Abstraction permits Rawls to ignore the articulation of the social order and, as his conservative critics emphasize, to consider the distribution of roles independently of the organic connection of individuals within the society. In his attempt to resolve the moral dilemma of postmodernity, Rawls has invented an ingenious means of superimposing the undifferentiated moral model on an intricately differentiated modern society.

    What should make us suspicious of Rawls’s model is that the behavior of these hypothetical beings whose individuality is hidden behind the veil of ignorance cannot really be intuited. They are being asked to choose among hypothetical social models on the basis of an existential fear imported from the originary scene, where fear of inequality and of violence leads to the establishment of equality here and now. Rawls assumes that the veil of ignorance entails the coincidence of our self-interest with that of justice, and that this self-interest is clear enough for us to be able to reason about it. But it is by no means obvious that the fear of occupying the worst role would be determinant; indeed, the “rational” choice would be a society with the highest average, or at least median, complement of human values: to maximize overall expectation rather than being assured of a higher minimum. A society of millionaires with a 1% population of homeless would be preferred by most over a society where everyone makes $1000 per year.  The only superiority of Rawls’s system over the old utilitarian calculus comes from his borrowing of the existential angst of the originary confrontation. The original position is a guarantee of morality only to the extent to which it embodies fear–whose object, as the originary hypothesis suggests, is more violence than poverty.

    Unlike Rawls’s theory, originary thinking, by referring to an explicit scene situated in time, does not attempt to dissolve the tension between the originary moral model of absolute reciprocity and the ethics of the historically existing social order. Although Rawls writes as though it goes without saying that we must apply the moral model not merely to specific interactions but to broad categories of social existence, this use of the “original position” as a moral touchstone for the national or global social order is a development conceivable only in the postmodern era. An ancient Greek or Roman, a medieval monk, a 19th century colonialist–even an early Christian awaiting the Second Coming–would have found such an enterprise incomprehensible. Yet to situate Rawls’s model itself in history is not to “relativize” moral values; on the contrary, it is only by so doing that we can discover the mediations between originary morality and the ethical principles of our own society.


    The central tenet of generative anthropology is that human order is a response to the threat of violence inherent in mimetic desire. Yet the term “violence” does not appear in Rawls’s index, and the danger posed by the breakdown of social order is never considered. On the contrary, Rawls entertains the option of civil disobedience as a means of protest against “injustice,” but as for the danger that such protest might lead to disorder, we have only the near-tautological assertion, “Yet if justified civil disobedience seems to threaten civic concord, the responsibility falls not upon those who protest but upon those whose abuse of authority and power justifies such opposition” (390-91). In other words, if those in power are unjust, then they are responsible for the disorder they provoke, even if this disorder leads to total chaos–but chaos is never a serious consideration in Rawls’s civilized Anglo-Saxon world. As for how we are to decide what is just or unjust in such circumstances, Rawls’s epistemology presupposes that however difficult this may be in practice, there is always a correct answer, one that can in most cases be obtained by following the chains of reasoning in his book.

    The concept that in Rawls’s universe stands for the potential violence of mimetic desire is envy. In the course of his introductory exposition of the original position (section 25), Rawls excludes envy ex hypothesi as a motivation, leaving until later the question of “whether the conception arrived at is feasible in view of the circumstances of human life” (144). Yet when in section 81 Rawls finally comes to deal with this subject, after explaining that in a society with adequate opportunity for self-improvement, envy does not pose a threat (the feature of market society I call the “recycling of resentment”), he takes to task “conservative writers” who “have contended that the tendency to equality in modern social movements is the expression of envy” (538):

    Yet to insist upon equality as the two principles of justice [roughly, equal rights and equal opportunity] define it is not to give voice to envy. This is shown by the content of these principles and the characterization of envy. It is also evident from the nature of the parties in the original position: the conception of justice is chosen under conditions where by hypothesis no one is moved by rancor and spite. (sec. 25) Thus the claims to equality supported by the two principles do not spring from these feelings. The claims of those affirming the principles may sometimes express resentment, but this as we have seen is another matter. (emphasis mine)This is a surprisingly egregious example of petitio principi. Having decided to hypothesize the absence of envy in the construction of his just society, Rawls has no right to appeal to this exclusion in answer to the empirical question of whether egalitarianism is motivated by envy. Rawls’ difficulty is that he wants to build a society without considering the fundamental reason why society exists, which is to prevent “envy” from destroying the socio-economic order. But if we transform the “original position” into an originary scene in which individual envy becomes the origin of collective morality, we can show both that the desire for equality conforms to the moral model that is the basis of Rawls’ intuition of justice and that this desire is motivated by resentment/envy. When we feel we are unequally treated, it is true both that we are envious of those better off and that we are not merely envious: our sense of justice is offended. Rawls thinks he has to choose between the envious motivation of our reaction and its moral justification, whereas it is precisely this conjunction that is the core of the human.


    What lends Rawls’ system its plausibility despite its underestimation of the power of “envy” is its tacit reliance on the broad equality of opportunity that exists only in the market system. His book appeared in 1971, after 25 years of Cold War, and its ahistorical abstraction notwithstanding, its vision of the just society is clearly modeled on a mildly left-wing, “Labour” version of Western market society. Whatever its inadequacies, Rawls’ constructive ethical model is worthy of admiration in an era of deconstruction and postmodernist nihilism. But a system of justice that ignores the potential violence of mimetic desire cannot meet the “post-millennial” challenge of defending our social order against the virulent resentment that finds its current expression in radical Islam. The implication of the originary hypothesis is that justice, like love–like all of culture–cannot be understood as a fixed set of ideal relations, but only as the unending transcendence of resentment.


  • Famous for Being Famous

    Back in 1997, on the occasion of the untimely death of Princess Diana, I explained the role of celebrities as what Girard calls “external mediators” who assuage our resentment of real or potential internal mediators (see Chronicle 108). However much one may be envious of the life-style of the rich and famous, it is too removed from our everyday lives to be really irksome; in contrast, our neighbor’s ostentatious good fortune really gets under the skin. But when we fantasize about the princess’s glamorous existence, our neighbor’s seems tawdry in comparison. If I am obliged to compare myself unfavorably with you, I will be unhappy. But rather than comparing myself with you, I can compare you with Princess Di as potential centers of my interest and desire, in which case you will clearly be found wanting. No doubt on the cultural scene it is you and I who occupy similar peripheral positions, whereas the princess is a representative of the center: we are watching her; she is not watching us. But that is precisely the point: focusing my attention on the transcendental being in the center rather than on my rivals on the periphery is the very function of the originary scene, and of human culture in general.

    A number of recent events have reminded me of the importance of celebrity, most recently, the Michael Jackson trial and its aftermath. On August 8, about two months after the acquittal, a couple of jurors declared that they thought Jackson was guilty but were intimidated by their fellow jurors. (We also learned that both of them had signed book contracts–as it turns out, using the same ghost writer. I will leave my reflections on the judicial system as reality show for another time.) Celebrity trials and tribulations reveal a curious phenomenon: whereas celebrity white-collar criminals such as Martha Stewart tend to be made examples of, and major corporate criminals often receive more severe sentences than murderers (John Rigas, the 80-year-old former CEO of Adelphia, recently got 15 years; Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom got 25), celebrities accused of really serious crimes are inevitably acquitted. O.J. Simpson remains the most egregious case in recent history, although the racial composition of the jury, the incompetence of the prosecution (and judge), and the proximity to the King riots could be cited as particular circumstances. But Robert Blake is not a member of a minority group, and the Jackson trial, held in idyllic Santa Maria, did not make an issue of race, no doubt in part because of Jackson’s pathological doctoring of his appearance.

    I admit I never watched the Simpson circus on TV, nor the special coverage of the other trials, mercifully (and rightly) untelevised. (The popularity of celebrity-watching during the Jackson trial put an end to the only decent all-news programming on television, that of CNN Headline News, whose ratings apparently shot up after round-the-clock news programming was replaced by talking-head celebrity coverage.) But it is pretty obvious in all three cases that the defendants were guilty. Who else but Simpson had means, motive, and opportunity to slaughter his ex-wife and her friend? Who else but Blake had means, motive, and opportunity to off his obnoxious wife? And what was Jackson doing in bed with all those boys? Imagine yourself a woman whose husband spends nights in bed at home and in hotels with adolescent boys; how would you react to his protestations of innocence? Or to his $20+M settlement of a civil suit by a previous claimant?

    To judge from supermarket check-out stands, perusers of People– type magazines enjoy reading about celebrities’ sufferings: abortions, break-ups, unfaithful spouses, weight gains and losses, illnesses, secret operations–and Martha’s jail term. Yet when a group of average citizens–weeks in the jury room have taught me that people not perceived as “average” are seldom allowed on juries–has the opportunity to punish a celebrity for a murder or sexual offense that he almost certainly committed, not only do they refuse to do so, but if our after-the-fact dissenters are to be believed, the starry-eyed majority reacts quite violently against those few who demur. In these “average” minds the notion of “reasonable doubt” is stretched so far that even a videotape of the crime would have difficulty dispelling it.

    Why? In our culture celebrities play the structural role of sacred figures, with all the ambivalence that attends that status. When they engage in peccadilloes that we ourselves can imagine ourselves committing, we take pleasure in the spectacle of their suffering in our place. When they commit unspeakable crimes–like the pharaohs of old who married their sisters–they enjoy a virtual immunity. If instead of making an obscure misstatement about her financial dealings, Martha Stewart had slashed her ex-husband to death with one of the kitchen knives she recommends in her magazine, she probably wouldn’t be wearing that ankle monitor today. Try as I may, I cannot think of a single first-order celebrity who has been convicted of a major crime.

    Although greater media density provides us with vastly increased quantities of celebrity news, I am not at all sure that anything profound has changed in this regard since the Hollywood/celebrity phenomenon began in earnest after WWI. Whatever differences we can find between celebrity today and in Hollywood’s “Golden Age” pale before what they have in common. No doubt the criteria for ending entertainment careers have loosened up quite a bit since the Fatty Arbuckle scandal and the murder of William Desmond Taylor in 1921, but when it comes to criminal convictions, we should recall that after two hung juries, Arbuckle–accused of having contributed to the death by peritonitis of one Virginia Rappe during an orgy in a San Francisco hotel suite–was finally acquitted. The “aura” that surrounded figures like Garbo or Gable seems quaint today, when stars tend to emphasize how much they are like everyone else (now that “everyone else” has enough disposable income to be “like” the star), but the only significant parameter is that the celebrity is universally known and the rest of us are not. A million or so times more people knew Charlie Chaplin than my grandfather; how important is that zero or two more between Britney Spears and me? And in both eras, there have been means of having one’s “fifteen minutes” (appear on Groucho Marx! become the next American Idol!), but they change nothing essential. Semi-celebrity is great at cocktail parties (“That’s right, I’m the fellow who…”) but its very possibility depends on the primary difference between the known and the unknown, the center and the periphery.


    Democracies lack full-fledged external mediators in the sense of persons to whom one attributes a superior essence. Even the domains in which children take their parents as models constantly diminish, and the Harry Potter phenomenon, not to speak of all those inane comic-book movies, demonstrates that on the cultural plane, the opposite has become the case: the parents copy the tastes of their kids because they, at least, are untroubled by the mimetic origin of their desires (see Chronicle 211). As opposed to the great man, the celebrity, as Doug Collins used to say, is “pre-humiliated”: he or she may play a role in our fantasies, but does not serve as a model in the serious aspects of our life—unless our aim is to become celebrities ourselves. There has been some evolution in the direction of greater “pre-humiliation.” Since the advent of TV we commonly sneer at celebrities as being “famous for being famous”–which only makes their difference from us seem more mysterious. Garbo and Gable looked famous; today’s stars just look like… celebrities.

    The hypothesis that celebrities are lightning rods for the resentments generated by everyday internal mediation has the advantage of requiring no unconscious: the passage from envy of my neighbor to the consolation provided by the persona of the celebrity is accessible to my consciousness, whether I pay attention to it or not. More importantly, this passage illustrates an essential point about human comparisons: that the ultimate criterion is provided by the center. This is true even when there is no hypostasis of the center-as-God. Whether the celebrity is famous for X or merely for being famous, the real point behind this cynical qualification is that someone has to be famous, that is, central. Someone has to be perceived as standing to me in the relationship of singular to plural, and it is this singularity that protects us against our anonymous but irksome neighbors.

    The central figure occupies the same structural position as Hobbes’ Leviathan, but it need not acquire sovereign power over us, nor any power at all except that of being asymmetrically known and therefore significant. This asymmetry is inherent in the structure of the scene. Why indeed does the fundamental configuration of human culture oppose a singular center to a multiple periphery? The answer is simply that if we could have limited ourselves to the one-on-one (or few-on-few) interactions of our ape cousins, we would have done so. The greater intensity of human mimesis makes our desires converge on a center, and in the crisis thus engendered, we discover that none of us can any longer be the “alpha” animal and possess this center for himself. (When “alpha” humans emerge at a later stage of human history, it will be through the mediation of this new configuration.) The central position is that of sacred transcendence; it is not a place that can be occupied by one of the peripheral neo-humans. Yet for this very reason it is the place we all desire to occupy, the place toward which all violence tends and from which all power flows. The source of this power is transcendent, “eternal”; no mortal can claim to be the center, although the powerful often claim to be its earthly incarnation, either in a religious setting or simply as the unique leader of the anonymous mass. Despite the horrors of the twentieth century, the Führerprinzip survives in quite a few places.

    But in liberal democratic society, no one makes claims of absolute power. Our leaders are elected for a few years, and if the American presidency is any indication, they tend to arouse in their enemies hatreds stronger than the love they inspire in their followers. At the center of our fantasy life we find not the political leader but the celebrity. “Famous for being famous” is simply another way of saying that the celebrity is transfigured by the simple fact of occupying the center, just as the originary central object was transfigured when it became the object of the first sign (whose permanent signified is the subsistent Being of the center rather than its mortal, presumably edible, representative). As a celebrity, an attractive man or woman who would otherwise attract some fleeting attention is the possessor of a transcendent significance, focusing our desires away from other mortals and allaying our resentments toward them. In our relationship to celebrity, we see in its purest form the scenic configuration of human culture, with the significant object in the center and the “rest of us” on the periphery. If the collective wisdom of our juries occasionally sacrifices the lives of spouses or the sexual innocence of adolescent boys to preserve this configuration, this only goes to show how important it is for the functioning of our society.