Author: staceymeeker

  • A Heroine for Our Time

    Whenever I feel guilty for not having exhaustively researched one of these Chronicles, I remind myself of Georg Lukács’ chapter on the essay in his 1914 Die Seele und die Formen. Lukács calls the essay an ironic genre, in which by writing about some specific subject, one in fact offers a view of a general one. This requires that one have faith in one’s intuition.

    But why else do we have, not just essays, but artworks, if not to exercise and strengthen our intuition of exemplarity? To see a beautiful painting or watch a beautiful film gives satisfaction “in itself,” but this is above all because, as Kant pointed out at great length, the “judgment of taste” (das Geschmacksurteil) is universal—universal not merely in the sense that one assumes that everyone else will share one’s judgment, but in the higher sense that this judgment, although directed at the specifics of a single artistic composition, applies to the human world as a whole. Beauty is not merely a pleasurable sensation; it is one that, mediated by the universal scene of representation, provides an intuitive guarantee that its example is universally meaningful. Exactly how, we cannot tell in advance, but a successful work of art is a model of the self’s harmony with the world. In the case of love-stories in particular, the model requires little effort to apply to our own lives—which explains their popularity. We all need models of love to adapt to our human relationships: imitatio Christi is nothing else.

    Today this sense of esthetic exemplarity is no doubt most powerful in film. Cinema is the one art we all experience as undoubtedly alive. It is no coincidence that even a low-budget indie film is the product of the collaboration of a community of professionally qualified specialists. In a sense this should not make a difference; Shakespeare didn’t need it, nor does the writer with his laptop. Yet the market realities that make a movie the most complex and expensive artwork to produce provide a guarantee of collective authenticity whose importance the spectator cannot deny.

    As a counter-example, lyric poetry, a genre that I have malgré tout practiced fairly extensively, strikes me as irredeemable—essentially because the barriers to entry are so low. Can we really distinguish the cause and the effect between (1) nearly everyone is literate and has access to everyone else through the Internet, and (2) traditional poetic form, not just rhyme but meter and sound harmony, is passé; the poet is “free of constraints”—as though the average amateur could write free verse like T. S. Eliot. Once anyone who wants to “express himself” feels “empowered” to write poetry, the genre itself becomes a vehicle for “self-expression.” As a consequence, poetry comes to be judged by the same criteria as “self,” which today means by those of “identity politics.”

    But there is no point arguing with reality. Artworks must find their audience; and when the dialectic of supply and demand is distorted, the form itself loses its viability. With the result that today, those who still attempt to write and publish “serious” poetry will tell you, sadly, that “no one reads poetry.”

    In contrast, I am heartened by the fact that the cinema shows no sign of decline. Some have indeed written about the “end” of cinema, but unlike similar forebodings about the novel, these prophecies of doom strike me as simply false. In my judgment, the seventh art is as good as it ever was. I can name a dozen or more movies of the past decade or two, in a number of traditions, that I would place as high as any from cinema’s “heroic” age.

    The cinema is indeed a very special genre for the modern era. As I pointed out recently (“The Screenic,” in Mimetic Theory and Film, ed. Bubbio and Fleming, Bloomsbury, 2019), it provided the original model for the “screenic” phenomenon that has by now redefined every aspect of human communications—to the extent that if I wanted these Chronicles to reach a less selective audience, I’d deliver them on YouTube as vlogs. It is a welcome guarantee of the underlying health of our culture that we continue to experience genuine beauty in the cinema—and I mean mainstream cinema, if not the most popular blockbusters.

    This is all the more reassuring because we know that the vast majority of the creators of this culture stand with those who approved of Robert de Niro’s anti-Trump obscenity at the Emmys last year. Thus it is no surprise today that, even aside from out and out political films such as Fahrenheit 9/11 or Vice, Hollywood produces films with a strong victimary flavor, The Shape of Water being among the more obvious. And there are also occasional “anti-PC” films, such as American Sniper or Chappaquiddick. But it is all the more marvelous that movies can be made that avoid fighting political battles and are simply beautiful.

    If our culture can produce such works even in the throes of its victimary obsession, there truly is still hope for our ever-threatened Western civilization. Nor is it merely a matter of ignoring the victimary. The protagonist of the film I am about to discuss is indeed a “victim.” But her case is offered as an example of how we can learn to see ourselves, as religion once made it easier to do, as all both victims and sinners, whose task on earth is to overcome temptations and handicaps and treat our fellows with love.


    I honestly believe that William Sullivan’s Jane Wants a Boyfriend (2015) is the most beautiful love story I have ever seen. Like most of us, I am something of a sucker for romcoms—what else makes Pride and Prejudice so eternal? But when esthetic appreciation reaches a certain level, one must have the confidence in one’s judgment not to dismiss one’s pleasure as mere self-indulgence. It is the privilege of the “popular” arts at their best to transcend the high-low distinction between indulgence of resentment and wish-fulfillment and the high seriousness of great literature. There is sentiment porn as there is violence porn, but Jane is something different.

    In a theater vs cinema reference that should remind film buffs of Carné’s Les enfants du paradis, Bianca, the older of two sisters, is a young Shakespearean actress who is just quitting her bartending job for a glamorous starring role as Titania, queen of the fairies, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Shakespeare’s most fairy-tale play—one particularly beloved of René Girard for its mockery of mimetic desire. Indeed, the one scene we see played out briefly on stage (III, 1) shows Titania, bewitched by a love-potion, in love with the “mechanical” Bottom wearing an ass’s head.

    Jane, Bianca’s younger sister, is turning 25. A sufferer from Asperger’s syndrome, she is able to interact with others and function in the world, but not without problems. Thus she holds down a job in the wardrobe department of her sister’s theater—where she hopes one day to design the costumes and not merely repair them.

    Littérature et folie

    It is no accident that in our era obsessed with victimary difference, a number of films focus on protagonists with mental disorders: Alzheimer’s, autism, schizophrenia. These difficulties provide tacit models for the race-gender differences too fraught today with historical baggage to offer a “level playing field” for the audience. A novel/film such as To Kill a Mockingbird was exemplary in an era when racial segregation was still openly practiced; a similar film today could only be experienced as a piece of well-meaning propaganda. In contrast, the mentally ill are indeed victims, but not of any obvious discrimination or prejudice. Mental illness at Jane’s level allows us to confront an individual’s suffering for her failure to meet the norms of the society without having an oppressor to blame.

    But we can take this theme of marginal mental illness much farther. Once we forget about the DSM, we realize that marginal mental illness is in fact the implicit archetype of all literature—and the overt one for the modern era. The protagonist of any story, whether play, epic, novel, or even lyric poem, is always a bit crazy—or is it the world that’s crazy for not allowing him to fulfill his desire? (To further extend this reflection, think of each new melody, each new image, as just a bit crazy in its difference from all those we have previously seen and heard—or were they insane to have missed it?)

    The novel, after all, begins with Don Quixote. (The affinity between Jane and Arabella, the heroine of Charlotte Lennox’s wonderful 1752 The Female Quixote [see Chronicle 486], will be touched on below.) There is no doubt that Girard’s conversion-narrative analysis corresponds to the “moral” of the story, here and in the other works he discusses. But, as those 18th-century ladies well knew who enjoyed ces romans qu’on ne lit que d’une main, or like Augustine saying “make me chaste, but not yet,” the novel, and art in general, is not summed up in its “moral”; like any true artwork, it provides us with new means of understanding and interacting with the world, both real and transcendental.

    Cervantes shows us that the modern individual, however “mimetic” his desires, enjoys a new freedom in applying them to his experience. Even if windmills aren’t really giants, the unexpected fact that the Don can get away with calling them such for 500+ pages is not merely negative. It is a sign of his, and all of our, ability to remake the world in our own image, even if we risk exaggerating this propensity in the direction of … Asperger’s syndrome. Jane too “hallucinates,” obsessively trying to imagine herself like the modern-day celluloid equivalents of Dulcinea when the real world confronts her with frightening perspectives that the less sensitive of us would not perceive.

    Like Quixote and Arabella, Jane is able to function in the real world by virtue of her “folly,” and like the latter, although not the former, even to reach a “happy ending.” As a counterexample, we may take 15 Park Avenue (2005) by the Indian filmmaker Aparna Sen, who seems to specialize in problematic relationships—her previous film, Mr and Mrs Iyer (2002), depicts a couple of pen-pals in India and Japan who “marry” but never meet. In the later film, a young schizophrenic woman (the victim of a savage gang-rape) has a fantasy of living with her lost fiancé in an Edenic home in Calcutta, but at this iconic New York City address. At the conclusion, after her elder sister’s vain efforts to bring her back to reality, the film displays her as actually finding this mythical address on a street in Calcutta—an “address” that remains invisible to the family members desperately searching for her—and disappearing into it, in an esthetic transcendence despairing at best.

    In contrast, Sullivan’s sensitive and unsentimental treatment makes Jane a female Quixote for our time. As the title indicates, Jane, having reached her 25th birthday, wants—although her desire is, in one of the film’s many brilliant cuts, expressed by another character in a sequence from which Jane is absent—a boyfriend; to enter at last the world of amatory exchange that she knows only from vintage movies. Although not always “reasonable,” Jane is largely aware of her difference from those she herself calls “psychotypical”—displaying the problematic but also privileged marginality of being normal enough to understand that she is not “normal.”

    What makes Jane’s love-story so satisfying is that its every element of desire is bought and paid for by love. Jack, whom we meet early in the film as a denizen of the local milieu and a former college pal of Rob, Bianca’s journalist fiancé, is suffering from Weltschmerz, dissatisfied less with his restaurant job as sous-chef than with his lack of perspective, ten years out of college, on his future in the “adult” world of marriage and family. At Bianca’s engagement party, to which he has invited a young waitress who seems uniquely interested in drinking and sex (although the first eventually obviates the second, and she spends most of the evening in the bathroom throwing up), he runs into Jane, whom he had already met in Bianca’s bar. When she playfully throws him a noir vamp-like gesture, he replies with the Taxi Driver line “Are you looking at me?” upon which, half in panic and half in playfulness, she runs up the stairs and out onto the roof, from where we can see the Empire State Building. Jack follows her, and they begin a desultory conversation, in which she impresses him with both her general knowledge and curiosity (“I read”) and her uniquely weird sense of humor. But Bianca, on discovering them, mistaking Jack for a mere sexual predator, drives him off, angering Jane.

    Yet Jack remains certain that the two of them “had something.” On Rob’s telling him that Jane has Asperger’s, he reads up on the subject, wheedles the family phone number out of Rob, and calls Jane for a date, which is eventually set for the evening of Bianca’s premiere. For dinner, he takes Jane (by subway) to his restaurant, which he has arranged with his boss to open just for her, and specially prepares her (slightly regressive) favorite, grilled cheese sandwiches, for dinner, which they eat by candlelight. He then takes her to the theater.

    I will leave the climax of the plot for later. But I will reveal here the noteworthy fact that, for all the sweetness of its conclusion, Jane refuses to project a future vista. There is no “happily ever after”; Jack is a boyfriend, not a fiancé. Their love is perfect as far as it goes, but we are not invited to speculate on how much farther it might go. One perceptive IMDb viewer pointed out that the film deliberately ends, not on Jane, but on Bianca watching her run off to meet her date, to show us that the film’s real lesson is for her: to let her little sister go and live as an adult, no longer under her protection. And the last gesture of tenderness in the body of the film is the parting embrace of the two sisters, each telling the other that she is her best friend.

    Why is this necessary? Precisely because Jane is not emotional pornography that would let us immerse ourselves vicariously in happiness projected into a fairytale forever-after. As a work of art, it is careful to define its limits, neither hyperbolizing, as in 15 Park Avenue, the capacity of the esthetic to transcend reality, nor conversely, of undercutting its own fictional reality, but simply of reminding us that the lesson is in the work as we see it, not in any future projection of it. More precisely, we are indeed invited to make such a projection, but in our own lives, not in those of the characters, who, as we must always admit when the curtain falls, are only figments of our imagination.


    One can nit-pick about some plot contrivances, in particular, Rob’s getting a coveted overseas assignment just when he and Bianca had rented an apartment in anticipation of moving in together. They had been distraught at the idea of having to take in Jane, since their parents had unexpectedly decided to move from the city to rural New Jersey—the couple is portrayed as blithely unconcerned with the effect of their move on Jane, who could not both live with them and commute to her job in the city. But now that Bianca will be alone for several months, she’ll be happy to have Jane stay with her. The latter insists that this arrangement will only be temporary, but we have no idea where she’ll go afterward, since Jack currently lives with roommates and it’s certainly too soon to presume they will move in together. But these details do nothing to affect the authenticity of Jane and Jack’s love-relationship.

    Jane and Arabella

    Jane, like Arabella, is an exemplary romance heroine: winning her heart requires her lover to overcome exceptional obstacles—perhaps not fighting off five hundred Saracens single-handed, but having to go to a bookstore to read a book on Asperger’s—albeit without paying for it—and above all, to absorb its content.

    But Jane is exemplary in another sense. Her intensely mimetic existence—mouthing the dialogue in old melodramas, like Elizabeth Taylor’s in the 1954 The Last Time I Saw Paris or Coleen Gray’s in the 1952 noir Kansas City Confidential—provides her not only with models of “attitude,” but of creativity. The excessive sensitivity to “stimulation” that defines her condition is at the same time a source of reactions that precisely cannot be predicted from stimuli.

    To clinch my case that Jane is truly the female Quixote of our age, I offer in evidence a revelatory and surely unintentional parallel between these two so different personages: the autistic seamstress and the Quixotic aristocrat both design their own dresses. And in Jane’s case, the revelation produced by the success of her dressmaking provides the climax of the film.

    Indeed, one might ask what other creative activity could unite these inhabitants of different centuries, nations, and social classes? Arabella’s quixotic lunacy, in keeping with her Spanish model, is more comical than Jane’s, and can ultimately be abandoned as a youthful folly. But her desire to design her own clothes surely will not. I cannot imagine that her long-suffering soupirant Glanville, after patiently enduring her Scudéry-ish fantasies, would not have found this particular trait something to cherish—a detail we must be content to imagine, such subjective niceties being foreign to Lennox’s world.

    Dressmaking as an archetype of feminine creativity directly impinges on a woman’s appearance and desirability. Arabella is beautiful already, but she wants to be beautiful in her own terms. Jane, we discover, had already before meeting Jack been designing for herself a beautiful dress, as though knowing in advance that she would find the occasion to wear it.

    In the climactic sequence, after sitting down with Jane in the theater to watch Bianca’s opening, Jack commits the error of “over-stimulation” by trying to take her hand. Jane abruptly rises and runs out of the hall, escaping into the flies of the theater, where we first met her watching her sister’s rehearsal at the very beginning of the film. After Jack follows her, and wins her pardon by acknowledging his error, Jane, instead of returning to watch the play, leads him through a backstage labyrinth to the wardrobe room, her place of employment. After showing him around a bit, she has him wait in one place—and then emerges wearing the lovely dress, which we had briefly seen her working on at an earlier moment, without yet knowing its purpose.

    In a moving revelation, Jane in her dress is truly beautiful, yet still herself—as Mallarmé might have put it, telle qu’en elle-même enfin sa belle robe la change. Through this transformation of herself into her own creation, Jane role as the film’s heroine comes fully into its own. Her skill in creating a beautiful dress out of discarded material is both a sign and a symbol of her ability to piece together the imperfect material of her own persona to make herself desirable both physically and psychically.

    Seeing the evidence of Jack’s genuine admiration, Jane now invites him to come close to her and, for what we understand to be the first time in her life, accepts with enthusiasm his request to kiss her, which he does, chastely, on her lips. In one more beautiful editing touch, this climactic moment coincides with the soundtrack from the applause for the just-concluded Shakespearean performance in the theater below. (A more thorough analysis would reveal numerous examples of both creative editing and parallels/contrasts between cinema and theater that truly merit the comparison suggested above with Carné’s masterpiece.)

    The final lesson of the film is, as we have said, for Bianca, so to speak as the representative of the audience, whose typical member neither suffers from mental illness nor is likely to be the boyfriend of one who does, but may well have a friend or relative of whom he or she risks becoming overprotective. Yet, lest we forget Jane’s salience, the film gives us a wink in the credit sequence—fair game as a kind of epilogue-commentary—where we revisit the key moments of Jane’s and Jack’s romance, concluding, in an endearing, old-fashioned iris, with their kiss.


    No formula can fix the boundary of authentic art from false, tell us what makes it justifiable for one protagonist to succeed while others fail, which handicaps can be esthetically overcome and which are simply pathetic. But to accept the Quixote—or as I would prefer, Lennox’s more charming version—as the model of the novel, and of modern culture as a whole, points to the fact that, in a world liberated from the straitjacket of ritual, we are all  forced to exist somewhere along the “autism spectrum,” taking our values from mimetic models—but adapting them to our own purposes.

    I can clearly picture, in the heavenly circle reserved for illustrious literary heroines, Jane and Arabella sharing tips on dressmaking. Since there would be no ladies’ maids in heaven, Jane would happily show her comrade how to operate a sewing machine.

  • Whatever Happened to Ockham’s Razor?

    I often get the impression that the longstanding principle of not multiplying unknown entities (call them “parameters”) beyond necessity is today considered an obsolete, pre-cybernetic idea. For without computers you can’t handle large numbers of these entities efficiently, but now that we have petaflops and exabytes, the more parameters the better. Could the effect of the computer in the social sciences be similar to that which we have discovered lately when we visit the doctor—to concentrate the professionals’ attention on it instead of the subject, whether humanity in general or the patient in particular, that they are supposed to be examining?

    This Chronicle is inspired by the September 2018 special issue of Scientific American entitled “Humans: Why we’re unlike any other species on the planet.” I must admit that it took me a few months to get to it, knowing that what I would find there would confirm my confidence in generative anthropology, but also my certainty that none of its insights can be assimilated into the current universe of the social/human sciences, given the latter’s systematic refusal to recognize any other than quantitative differences between the human and other animals.


    1. “Two Key Features Created the Human Mind,” by Thomas Suddendorf (p. 42-47); the two features being (1) “nested scenario building,” which reminds us of the double-scope blending of Fauconnier & Turner’s The Way We Think (Gilles, Basic Books, 2002—see Chronicle 528)—one wonders why there is no standard vocabulary to designate such things; and (2) “the urge to connect, the human drive to exchange thoughts with others.”

    Concerning the second, anthropologists should be embarrassed to use this kind of flabby language. What is the “urge to connect” as a term of scientific art? How can it provide a data set? Is the “urge” an emotion like fear, or a psychological need like hunger? How it can be measured? But one thing is certain: characteristically and specifically, humans “connect” through language; animals, although they certainly have their own means of communication, do not.

    No doubt the author feared that claiming that humans have something animals do not would make him guilty of “speciesism.” Yet this is a serious journal for non-scientists, where articles about physics and chemistry and biology give specific names to the objects they are discussing and tell you in lay terms what we have learned about them. It strikes me as one more demonstration of the invasion of our intellectual lives by victimary thinking that one cannot explicitly say that there is a qualitative and not merely quantitative distinction between animal and human communication.

    Here is characteristic passage from the text:

    I . . . found that animals are smarter than widely thought. For instance, chimpanzees can solve problems through insight, console others in distress and maintain social traditions. Nevertheless, there is something profoundly distinct about human language, foresight, intelligence, culture and morality . . . (46)

    It takes nothing away from animal intelligence to point out how inappropriate it is to describe in a scientific publication what separates us from the rest of the animal kingdom as “something profoundly distinct,” and then to include “human language” in a list of five “distinct” human qualities (Dr. Ockham, call your office) without the least suggestion of a dependence hierarchy. Are culture and morality possible without language?

    Let us imagine a similar description of life: “Atoms are more interactive than widely thought. Nevertheless, there is something profoundly distinct about living creatures…”

    How many more decades will we have to wait before the minimalistic clarity of the originary hypothesis outweighs the mutually reinforcing combination of fuzzy-mindedness and PC species-diplomacy that makes this kind of mush standard in the field? Nor is this an effect of dumbing-down for the lay public. If these scientists had hard-edged conclusions, you would hear about them. This is what they think. The Scientific American article only leaves out the data sets you will find in the professional literature. Like Daniel Everett (see Chronicle 567), they are less anxious to explicate the origin of language than to assure us that “language is not that difficult.”

    2. Susan Blackmore’s “Decoding the Puzzle of Human Consciousness” (p. 48-53) begins with the pregnant question: “Might we humans be the only species on this planet to be truly conscious?” (50). She then goes on to cite Thomas Nagel’s famous question What is it like to be a bat?

    It is no doubt interesting to think about what it’s like to be a bat, but the irony implicit in the question comes from the fact that there is no way, even with the most sophisticated measurements of the bat’s nervous system, of putting in words “what it’s like.” We can say with some assurance that in certain circumstances the bat feels cold, or hot, or hungry, but that is not what Nagel is getting at: he wants us to feel the frustration of not being able to get inside the bat’s consciousness to the extent that we can “dialectically” get inside our neighbor’s. But this avoids the essential issue, which is that imagining whatever bats feel won’t help us at all to understand the mystery of human self-consciousness, which is dependent on language.

    Blackmore describes two schools of thought: the “B team,” who “believe” in consciousness, but see it as a kind of side-effect, so that “zombies” may perfectly well exist, who act just like the rest of us but have no “subjective” experience at all, and the “A team,” who see consciousness as an epiphenomenon that may or may not accompany mental activity, presumably in all animals, but has no existence “in itself.” In neither case, the fact that human consciousness is suffused with the language by which we communicate its contents to each other is ever mentioned.

    Hence we should not be surprised that in an article devoted to consciousness, the word “language” is mentioned exactly twice—in the context of the theory of memes, a form of information that, unlike language, apparently has real objective status. Thus we learn that:

    Because humans are capable of widespread generalized imitation [Girardians, take note!], we alone can copy, vary and select among memes, giving rise to language and culture. “Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes,” [Daniel] Dennett wrote in Consciousness Explained, and the self is a “benign user illusion.”

    This illusory self, this complex of memes, is what I call the “selfplex.” An illusion that we are a powerful self that has consciousness and free will—which may not be so benign. Paradoxically, it may be our unique capacity for language, autobiographical memory and the false sense of being a continuing self that serves to increase our suffering. Whereas other species may feel pain, they cannot make it worse by crying, “How long will this pain last? Will it get worse? Why me? Why now? (53)

    The inane pretentiousness of this perhaps needs no comment. We, poor fools, think we have consciousness, but today’s social scientist and neo-philosopher, instead of seeking, as philosophers did not so long ago, to explicate the activities of this consciousness—as in the 900 pages of L’être et le néant—simply tell us it’s all a “benign user illusion.” You never realized, dupe as you are of the Western philosophical tradition, that it’s all just a selfplex, a complex of memes.

    And language—well, this makes me want to take back everything I have said in criticism of Derek Bickerton and the “the food is over the hill” explanation of the origin of language. For Ms. Blackmore, language serves only to “increase our suffering.” Even to conceive that “crying,” as just about any vertebrate can do in its own way, might serve to bring others to succor you a la boy who cried “Wolf” is beyond the comprehension of one who describes our use of language as a means by which we “select among memes.”

    Like the distinguished philosopher I mentioned in last week’s Chronicle, but with an intellectual manque de sérieux that I am sure would shock him more than me, we are expected to find objective language in which to describe human consciousness, if indeed it exists at all, with no particular concern for that consciousness’s own dependence on language. But where the traditional philosophers seriously examine human self-consciousness, the scientists and neo-philosophers deny its very existence. They will presumably begin to take it seriously only if and when they find some kind of neuronic phlogiston that establishes its physical existence.

    In the meantime, we must be content with the answer provided in the last sentence of the article: “We humans are unique because we alone are clever enough to be deluded into believing that there is a conscious ‘I’” (53). Well, that’s helpful. We can send rockets to land on asteroids, but our scientific reflection on ourselves is a poor imitation of Zeno of Elea. And, in case you hadn’t noticed, Zeno was being paradoxical. In Ms. Blackmore we have, in contrast, the sophomore’s earnest desire to surprise us with her new “knowledge.” I bet you weren’t conscious of the fact that consciousness is a delusion!

    3. “What Makes Language Distinctly Human,” by Christine Kenneally (p. 54-59), author of The First Word: The Search for the Origins of Language (Viking, 2007), a review of studies on the subject (not including mine) that reaches no conclusions of its own.

    It has been pretty clearly established that human language is not continuous with animal communication systems; this was the outcome of Terrence Deacon’s researches as summarized in The Symbolic Species (1997), and was negatively confirmed by the failure of all those chimp experiments to teach their subjects more than an advanced signaling system. Yet Ms. Kenneally is ready once more to burst the bubble of the illusion of the “dramatic idea” of an “explosive” origin:

    For a long time we have been in love with the idea of a sudden, explosive transformation that changed mere apes into us. The idea of metamorphosis has gone hand in hand with a list of equally dramatic ideas. For example: that language is a wholly discrete trait that has little in common with other kinds of mental activity; that language is the evolutionary adaptation that changed everything; and that language is wired into humanity’s DNA. . . .

    . . . It [now] looks like language is not a brilliant adaptation. Nor is it encoded in the human genome or the inevitable output of our superior human brains. Instead language grows out of a platform of abilities, some of which are very ancient and shared with other animals and only some of which are more modern. (56-57)

    And a little further down:

    If creatures with different brains and different bodies can learn some humanlike communicative skills, it means that language should not be defined as wholly human and disconnected from the rest of the animal world. (57)

    And in conclusion:

    In the short time since the field of language evolution has been active, researchers may have not reached the holy grail: a definitive event that explains language. But their work makes that quest somewhat beside the point. To be sure, language is probably the most unique biological trait on the planet. But it is much more fragile, fluky and contingent than anyone might have predicted. (59)

    Well, who said language should “be defined as . . . disconnected from the rest of the animal world”? Or that in order to be a “brilliant adaptation,” it cannot “grow out of a platform of abilities . . . ancient and modern”? Why call a “definitive event” in which language originated a “holy grail,” as though the very idea of an evenemential hypothesis is absurd on its face?

    The quasi-religious language used in dismissal is not insignificant. Events, as I understand them, belong to history; otherwise it’s just matter moving around in various ways. The point of the originary hypothesis is not to discover “the” event of the origin of language, but to provide a model of how such an event could inaugurate the world of language and culture.

    Culture intrinsically involves the collective memory of events, so that to claim that our every use of language “bears the imprint” of the originary event of this use is not to invent a myth, nor to point to some specific date on the calendar. It is a model, and its many repetitions need not all have been conscious of one another. But within a given community, barring complete dissolution and reformation, it is indeed meaningful to speak of an originary event. A second event cannot take place without recalling the first—in particular, by the linguistic gesture that marked it. If this idea is uncomfortable for human scientists, that is a shame, because that is how the human works. Other animals evolve; we have a history.

    In contrast, to imagine language as a “biological trait” emerging through genetic evolution is absurd—which does not of course mean that the institutions of language and culture will not have biological foundations as well as consequences on both the body and the brain.  Language is implemented in each individual brain, but its crucial manifestation is on an interpersonal cultural scene. Calling this scene “biological” simply obscures its distinction, along with the other elements of culture, from merely biological life processes. The common-sense difference between nature and culture is not a pre-scientific illusion.

    The “most unique biological trait, . . . fragile, fluky, and contingent”: is that the sum total of what all this research on language has produced? Yet although, in this and the previous article, there is virtually no effort to tell us what consciousness or language are, a good deal of effort goes into telling us that they are not what we thought they were. Rather than proudly proclaim results, like the masters of the hard sciences, these researchers seem above all concerned to destroy our illusions, leaving in their wake only opportunities for new research grants.

    4. John Gribbin’s “Alone in the Milky Way” (p. 94-99) is worthy of note for daring to tell us that there is almost certainly no other intelligent life in our galaxy—although the author insists we can’t be sure about the others, and is also certain that other (non-intelligent) life forms do exist in our galaxy. He alleges the relevant fact that life didn’t take very long to appear on Earth—which still doesn’t explain why we haven’t found any evidence of it elsewhere. Nonetheless, this bit of skepticism makes me wonder whether at least some of the scientists are less gung-ho on extraterrestrial life than they let on, but are afraid to reveal this in public for fear that their budgets might be cut.


    I wish I could invite some observers from Sirius, like Voltaire’s friend Micromégas, to share my amazement that, for lack of a minimal hypothesis of the origin of human language and culture, rather than constructing models of human specificity, our anthropological theorists are consumed with deconstruction. They are anxious to discourage hopes of “holy grails”: sudden transformations, definitive events, “wholly discrete” traits. Rather than seeking to specify what is human, they are impatient to show that every human trait, language included (let’s not talk about religion) is shared in common with the animals, although no doubt “there is something profoundly distinct about us” and “language is probably the most unique biological trait on the planet.”

    The simple truth is that the origin of language and culture as specifically human phenomena cannot be understood in their ontological specificity by either philosophical or natural-science modes of thought so long as both of these ways of thinking depend on the metaphysical fiction that language itself, in the mature propositional form in which we express ourselves, cannot be traced to a human, historical origin.

    For philosophy, this is more a feature than a bug; philosophy in its wisdom has never taken seriously the efforts of such as Condillac and Herder to create hypothetical scenes of language origin. For natural science, the situation is more complex. Science is the child of metaphysics; its own language is necessarily composed of propositions. No doubt this necessity does not apply to language as an object of study. But science is also empirical, based on verifiable observation, and propositional languages are the only ones we know. Linguistics as a science wisely does not deal with speculative questions of origin, only of historically attested derivation. Likewise, the broader domain of anthropology is bound by the realia of empirical research. In Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912), his most important anthropological text, Durkheim explicitly rejected the idea of speculating about forms of religion more primitive than those attested by the researches he presents, and the same would certainly apply to language.

    This leads to an impasse in the study of language origin. It is inconceivable that the first human language consisted of propositions, declarative sentences. Yet in the absence of empirical evidence, anthropologists are highly resistant to the idea of postulating a pre-propositional language as the outcome of an originary hypothesis. Thus their research into language origin, to the extent that it can be so called, treats the idea of originary language in the vaguest manner; it is understood as having a collection of features and performing various functions, but without any attempt to reconstruct a path from what must have been the simplicity of its origin to the “mature” state in which we find all existing human languages.

    Only the originary hypothesis as first enunciated in 1981 in The Origin of Language provides a way out of this impasse. Whence I have called GA a new way of thinking.

    The minimal hypothesis I first drafted 40 years ago never claims that human language is “disconnected” from anything. It treats the realm of representation—language, religion, culture—as a new category of being, not because its material components were unknown in the animal world, but because the proto-human social configuration that led to our “urge to connect,” which Girard, following Aristotle, called mimesis, led to a hypothetical crisis of the old pecking-order system, requiring for its resolution a new social configuration centered on a radically new means of communication.

    But such thinking is too speculative for our social scientists, who cannot deal with anything that is not broken down into separate physical pieces, whether strands of DNA or neurons. If life can be explained in physical terms, how can language be any different? Most of us remember Swift’s portrait of the academicians of Lagado, who had abolished words, and carried sacks on their backs containing the objects they wanted to talk about. But words too are just “physical things,” aren’t they?


    With all due respect for the researches carried out by the authors of these articles and their colleagues, we cannot forbear from pointing out the category error inherent in any attempt at a “biological” understanding of what is by its essence super-biological. Calling the human “profoundly distinct” from other animals is merely a symptom that something is afoot here that is not being explained—that, without recognizing it, a qualitative difference is being disguised as a quantitative one.

    The irony of the age of the Internet, which makes all our writings readily available throughout the world, is that they are a tiny drop in the ocean of other material, much of which has far greater access than ours to the mechanisms of publicity. Yet I retain my hope that the originary hypothesis will one day be recognized as a critical step in the process of self-understanding that has uniquely characterized humanity from the beginning.

  • Releasing the Hedgehog

    Henri Kipod

    Since Adam Katz is running the GASC conference this year, which is focused on the “linguistic turn” directly linked to the postwar victimary developments that led to Girard, deconstruction, and GA, I asked him what he thought I should focus on in my conference talk. His answer was release the hedgehog.

    I came up with the originary hypothesis over 40 years ago, on my 1978 visit to Johns Hopkins, described in detail in The Girardian Origins of GA (available at Amazon.com for $0.99). The hypothesis first appeared in print in the first edition of The Origin of Language, published by UC Press in 1981; a second edition just appeared this year.

    Alas, this was the end of the 60s-70s era of la nouvelle critique, before the academic takeover by the New Left and the clogging of the marketplace with excess PhDs began to impose first mass conformity and then political orthodoxy on humanities departments, where today one must check with the Dean of Diversity before studying white male authors. Had I been able to anticipate this, I might have made more of the extraordinary luck I had of being just old enough to slip in under the wire. I had been hired at UCLA in 1969 without competing candidates, without even having to present a paper or teach a class. They were glad to find me, a promising young PhD, in the days before such persons had become a glut on the market and could redeem themselves only through uncritical devotion to post-colonial or gender-bending studies.

    At any rate, success in the humanities today being what it is, I feel fortunate that I was able to have had a decent career at UCLA, to receive a decent pension on retirement, and above all to have found over the years a group of students and others willing to explore the insights of GA. But my personal destiny is not the point of either our GASC conferences or of these Chronicles—about which I will insist for the record that they are not blogs, a term that scarcely existed when I started them, and that refers to expressions of personal opinion, like diary entries, that require the reader to be interested in their author in order to appreciate them. The Chronicles are intended to be read as essays, a genre whose irony was finely appreciated by Gyorgy Lukács in Die Seele und die Formen (1911), from the days before he converted to Stalinism, as describing an entire domain by means of a small example. Such as, for example, describing all of human culture via a hypothetical scene of originary language.


    Release the hedgehog, as Henri happily confirms, was Adam’s way of saying: let us not be shy about proclaiming GA to be what we have always claimed it to be, a genuine revolution in thought. It is the ONE BIG THING that the hedgehog knows, the proof of whose validity being that all the foxes who write about language and related subjects are unable either to assimilate it or to refute it.

    Let me give an example. I recently participated at a conference along with a distinguished professor of philosophy. After reading my paper (unfortunately he could not stay for my talk), he assured me, with no apparent desire to be insulting, that my thesis was perfectly plausible, and perfectly unoriginal. This from someone who meticulously analyzes the details of self-consciousness without the least concern for the fact that what he and his colleagues call “self-consciousness” is mediated at every instant by language—hence by the structures of the originary scene, my description of which was in his eyes perfectly plausible, unoriginal, and irrelevant.

    What better demonstration of the power of metaphysics—but of the still greater power of the originary hypothesis, so that even when seen, it remains invisible, so vast a sea-change would it require for the practitioners of analytic thought to dare to make it prerequisite to the intentionality that they conceive as nothing more than a refined form of perception. Unless it is explained as the specifically human mental structure of shared representation, of language, the Hegelian-Sartrian pour-soi, along with all its antecedents, is merely an arbitrary psychological construct.


    Which is not to say that philosophers never speak about language. In particular, since the “linguistic turn,” they speak constantly about it, yet without ever stopping to concern themselves with how such a thing as language might have come about. In conjunction with the devastating wars of the 20th century, humanity has learned to think very badly of itself, and it is no accident that virtually all this philosophizing has been done on the Left, which is to say, by thinkers who consider in principle that the human social order in itself is not just in need of adjustment but fundamentally unequal and unjust—a conjunction so familiar that we scarcely realize that it was inconceivable before the French Revolution.

    The Enlightenment’s revolutionary critique of religion was in fact a critique of the human itself, although the critics did not realize this at the time. Religion had always understood the importance of evil, and by this understanding, isolated it as sin from our sacred essence, even if, as in the days of the Flood, and later of Sodom and Gomorrah, only a few humans successfully embodied this essence.

    We were all once considered, in Milton’s words, Sufficient to have stood, but free to fall. The Left may most simply be defined by the rejection of this formula—for although its roots lie in the English Revolution, the term “Left” itself, and the full sense of what it represents, only emerged in the French. The irony that attributes all virtue to the sinister side of the assembly hall is no mere jeu de mots.

    So long as philosophers considered, as many still do, “ideas” independently of language, understood merely as a transparent medium that records them—a truly absurd conception, if looked at critically, yet one that until now has never been radically challenged—they in effect treat language as a gift of God. Or to put this in secular terms, their attitude toward language is founded on an uncritical faith in transcendence, hence in the sacred, although they never think about this, since it is simply taken for granted. Only through anthropological reflection does it become apparent that “taking language for granted” is in fact an enormous act of faith—an anthropomorphic God not being, as is often naively imagined in the West, a requisite of the primary religious faith in the transcendent guarantee of the unity of our collective mental space without which language would be inconceivable.

    Once the philosophers began to question this faith, their reflection on language was indistinguishable from a critique of Western society, understood as the model of society in general. Deconstruction was conceived as a revolutionary activity, intended to undermine the linguistic Potemkin village constructed by the millennia of metaphysicians, who had served their rulers by proclaiming to the masses the myth of presence, retailing the disinformation of écriture as though it were a revelatory, immediate reality.

    If we look beyond its politics, which like all human passions can be a source of revelation, we can see something in this critique of metaphysics that transcends its “socialism”: an intuition of communal unity that precedes all hierarchical division. Yet in the deconstructive universe, this negative Eden is not nostalgia for the paradise lost with the big-man’s usurpation of the center of the communal scene, but the purely conceptual negation of a hierarchy always already inherent in language itself.

    This is the sense of Derrida’s denunciation of the falsely symmetrical dichotomies of white-black, male-female—or for that matter, Right-Left. The notion that “presence” is a myth, that language is toujours déjà écriture, is perversely made to demonstrate the contrary of what it in fact reveals. Presence is deferral; something is only present to us because it appears on a scene, separated by a néant. And its recuperation by divine authority, before it can become a model for earthly usurpation, is mediated by the transcendence without which representation, as the foundation of culture, and thereby of the human itself, is inconceivable.


    Given how simple the originary hypothesis is, it is striking how its very simplicity makes it unintelligible to those in the academy who study the question. This is partly out of professional pride, but above all because the fox-like busyness of academic specialization makes the hedgehog appear a mere amateur, focusing on his little model when there is a world of data to be processed. Unfortunately, without an originary model of the scene of language and culture, the more data one collects, the less one is capable of understanding how radical a change language brought about. In the days when religion was taken seriously, this difference was felt by many as too vast to be explicable by science. Today, this problem has been eliminated simply by considering the difference not vast at all: to quote Daniel Everett’s How Language Began, “Language is not that difficult” (see Chronicle 567).

    What indeed explains why the phenomenologists’ notion of intention, which can be traced back to Kant, is never explained in terms of language? Intentionality is recognized as a trait of specifically human self-consciousness, and if there is one obvious difference between our consciousness and all others, it is that it is full of language. But just as astronomers are obsessed (on zero evidence) with finding life on other planets, philosophers and psychologists want to find language everywhere. Human language is no more than a fancy variant of what began with DNA, or with crystals, or atoms—the propagation of patterns.

    Is it not obvious that, when Sartre speaks of the néant that separates the pour-soi from the object of its thought or perception, it is our possession of language that permits us to “insert” the sign between our perceptual apparatus and the object, putting it on scene as an object of thought, reflection, and potential communication? Even for Robinson Crusoe on his island, it is only through conversion into signs that his perceptions and feelings are potentially connected to the entire human community.

    At the very least, one might expect that this simple idea might have been at some point entertained, if only to be rejected; but it is not. For the distinguished philosopher of whom I spoke above, who has spent his entire career reflecting on the nuances of human self-consciousness, the idea that this consciousness is inseparable from language, by which it is potentially connected to the consciousnesses of other humans, is certainly not denied. But it is taken for granted, bracketed, as though the real secrets of human self-consciousness lay deeper than the words in which we express them. The pot of gold at the end of the rainbow is a formulation of self-consciousness independent of any reference to human interaction. What is more intimate, more secret, than the pour-soi?


    GA is an unquestionably “Western” operation; a product of the Hebrew-Greek culture of the declarative sentence—and on the sociological side, of alphabetic writing. It is no coincidence that these two peoples, although they didn’t invent the alphabet, were the first to take advantage of its “digital” portability and communicability for cultural and not merely commercial and ritual purposes. This is in contrast with the incredibly complex aristocratic Chinese writing system, or even with the Babylonic cuneiform in which the Pirates of Penzance’s Major General could write a washing bill. Not coincidentally, Western culture, the high point of which is the Crucifixion (please forgive the double entendre), is indelibly focused on the scenic center in its tension with the periphery, with the importance that gives to sacrificial resentment, including the race-gender resentments of today’s victimary Left—not to speak of the righteous resentment that burns in the heart of Islam, in this sense the most “Western” of religions.

    But the reflections begun with the 2016 Nagoya GASC concerning a Buddhist or “Eastern” understanding of the scene were not a throwaway compliment to our Japanese hosts. The West created modernity, no doubt, but that does not prevent this modernity from interacting with approaches to the scene by cultures that, despite their extraordinary creativity and refinement, could never have created it. Indeed, in comparison with the West, one could say that Asiatic culture has reflected more deeply on the scene of human interaction (whence our desire to acquire its wisdom through “mindfulness” classes and the like), while the most powerful thinkers of the West have fled its dangers by converting it into a laboratory for exploring the natural world.

    To envision the potentially empty scene of representation itself as the ultimate focus of human endeavors is neither more nor less faithful to the originary hypothesis than the exaltation of the sacred central figure as the bringer of peace. Nor does this dichotomy imply—on the contrary—that no fruitful synthesis is possible. I am sure that historians on both sides of the Urals can find plenty of incipient examples of such syntheses, even among individuals and movements that evolved in complete ignorance of the existence of the contrasting culture.

    But even a model of the scene in which the essential role of language, once it has served its originary purpose of bringing the community together in peace, is to negate itself in the contemplation of the empty scene itself, can yet be understood only on the basis of an originary hypothesis of the origin of language.

    My hope is to live long enough to witness the day when our “intellectual world” finally musters the grace to admit this self-evidence.

  • Liberal Democracy Today

    Politics, in its most basic sense, is the art of doing what Rodney King deserves immortality for insisting on in a particularly difficult moment: that we all just get along. The bottom line in all human activities is maintaining the human community, which unlike other ecological groupings, is only possible if we defer our “instincts” and think about it. The deferred linkings can be subsequently reconnected by propositional thought to improve their operations; whence religion, philosophy, science.

    According to the originary hypothesis, subsequent to the reciprocal exchange of signs embodying the unanimous accord as to the significance/sacrality of the central figure, the latter’s division in the sparagmos furnishes the alimentary guarantee of the viability of the new human community. Although the reality of any such event is beyond verification by empirical means, it provides a model for future human events that allows us to think the empirical, in what would seem to be the most minimal way possible, in the scenic imagination.

    There is no simple connection between the originary hypothesis and the classical categories of Aristotle’s Politics. Aristotle’s models were based on a logic of experience that can be improved on only by examination of the premodern structures of power, not by a priori theorization of their possible derivation from the originary event. But I would claim that this is no longer true in the modern world, precisely because, in using their scenic imagination to construct models of the formation of the social order, Hobbes and his successors reflect the fact that the model of the human community implicit in modern politics returns, beyond the metaphysical world, to its originary source. The liberation of human energies that we call modernity enabled Hobbes and his successors to rethink the bases of society: how did humans come to get along when living in communities of individuals not yet bound, as they are becoming no longer, by ties of custom that diffuse fear of the originary conflict?

    Hobbes’ Leviathan scenario provides a more minimal origin of human self-consciousness than Descartes’ cogito, with its dependence on propositional logic. Objections to GA as a “social contract” theory presupposing an already-existing human community wholly miss the point that Hobbes’ model, as he presents it, requires as its sole motivation the experience of intolerable violence. No “contract” need be signed with Leviathan for him to be able to acquire sovereignty over those fed up with their “solitary, poor…” life in the “state of nature”—which needs only a small stretch of the imagination to be seen as a picture of the failing prehuman Alpha-Beta hierarchy. Leviathan is the prototypical big-man, the supplier of peace (hence implicitly of nourishment), not the transcendent force of the community embodied in a divinity, but a human who has taken this embodiment upon himself.


    The end of every history justifies its beginning. The point of departure for this essay was my desire to make clear what I continue to find attractive in Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 thesis that liberal democracy as practiced in today’s Western democracies is the realization of Hegel’s “end of history.” Although FF’s thesis as stated is embarrassingly naïve, it is not to be dismissed. No, this is not the “end of history,” nor would it have been even if everything had gone as we hoped in 1989-91. But FF saw something real; it was indeed the end of a certain epoch of history, and the post-modern world cannot put its genie back in the bottle—nor can the recent calls for “democratic socialism” by people half of whom cannot tell you who won World War II.

    The principle of democratic governance is that the citizenry or, in a larger society, their representatives, must possess a mechanism for arriving at decisions which the group as a whole must support. The legislative assembly that establishes laws and, with the help of the judiciary, oversees their execution, can function only if, following all debates and discussions among individuals and factions, the group’s adherence to the final decision, which manifests its loyalty to the institutions of the community as a whole, stands on a higher level than its members’ loyalty to individual or factional interests. The losers of a given debate must remain a “loyal opposition.”

    But the division between Left and Right characteristic of liberal democracy destabilizes from the outset this hierarchy of loyalties and, if functioning correctly, provides it with a self-correcting mechanism—a paradoxical result more serendipitous than intentional. There is nothing inherently paradoxical in the idea of a parliament designed to negotiate compromises between different interests and resentments. This was the view of the Founding Fathers, and of those such as Locke who had theorized the institutions of liberal democracy. And in times of political calm, left-right disputes typically present themselves as symmetrical: the Left requests a raise for workers of w% and a tax increase for the rich to t%; the Right suggests w-x% and t-y%, and they come to an agreement on figures somewhere in between.

    Yet this symmetry can only continue to function within institutional limits by “bracketing” the Left’s implicit assertion of a transcendental volonté générale in opposition to any institutional restriction. The left-right division, which can trace its ancestry to the Whigs and Tories of the British 17th century, and which acquired its directional symbolism in the French Revolution, reminds us that the existence of democracy in the modern era is the product of the delegitimation of the previously existing system. The Left’s loyalty is to the “people” rather than to the institutions by which a given polity is governed, and it retains in principle the right to put these institutions into question by violent means. (We may recall Jefferson’s remark that “The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.”) On various occasions since the Roundhead/Whig vs Cavalier/Tory battles of the 17th century, the Left has espoused, and on occasion, successfully, the radical modification of the institutions of government.

    As the high point of the Left’s conception of political community, Bolshevik “democratic centralism” espoused a model of political deliberation very different from liberal democracy. Rather than allowing debate and compromise to come up with solutions not previously anticipated, the Bolsheviks, putting into practice their faith in the volonté générale, conceived political deliberation as if it followed our model of the originary event. That is, the group was expected to arrive at a “correct” position implicit from the beginning, as in retrospect the sign was the “correct” solution to the Alpha-Beta crisis. In practice, this meant relying on the party leader’s firstness, or rather, his “proletarian genius,” to grasp and enunciate this solution.


    In liberal-democratic society, left-right symmetry functions adequately in most circumstances, even if the true leftist would ideally prefer to replace the democratic system with a socialist one. The US and even the nations of Western Europe have never possessed a sufficient number of socialist true believers to pose a real danger to the liberal-democratic system, nor do they do so today, however much the term “socialist” is thrown around—more now in the US than in the EU. Yet the fact that this long-lasting dichotomy has been problematized in recent years by the emergence of what for lack of a better name we may call neo-populism suggests that the liberal-democratic model has entered a “time of troubles” from which we can only hope will emerge a modification suitable to our postmodern era.

    Today’s victimocratic identity politics rejects in principle all the traditional norms of liberal-democratic society that take for granted communal unity. Defenders of these norms are considered forces of “hate,” to be condemned and silenced wherever possible. Yet the Obama administration’s opening to victimocracy was not fundamentally hostile to the liberal-democratic system. As I tried to show in the UFT Chronicles (598, 600-05), its politics could be understood as a means to adapt the liberal economy to the digital age, given its premium on symbol-manipulation and the decline of “labor-power,” with a minimum of social disturbance.

    But victimocracy pursued as a model rather than a strategy is ultimately corrosive of any stable political form. The replacement of the familiar term “liberal” by “progressive” already suggested this. And because even that word retains historical connotations that recall “working within the system,” it is being replaced by socialist, a term which, lacking a real history in the US, has retained its shock value among the young, who were spared the era of the Cold War and the “socialist bloc.”


    Although it relies on the central government to enforce its proposals, the Left’s social vision of “intersectionality” is at the antipodes of “Solidarity Forever” or the Internationale (“… shall be the human race”). The one element of the victimary program that views the human community as a whole is environmentalism. Formerly the province of NIMBY Sierra Club conservationists, the advent of “climate change” has made greenness into an instrument for uniting the entire society against fossil fuels and flatulent cows.

    Perhaps it is wishful thinking, but one might find a glimmer of hope in The Green New Deal being urged by the victimary millennials, which takes the environment as our unique victim across all human differences. Reading the GND “FAQ”, with its goal of eliminating all net emissions by 2030, etc., etc., I was struck more favorably by what it leaves out. The words “race,” “gender,” and “minority” are absent from the document, whose only concession to identity politics is a single mention of “indigenous people.”

    I’m not quite ready to team up with Geraldo Rivera, who calls himself “the only joint Trump/AOC fan,” but however absurd it may be in the current state of world affairs to treat climate change as the moral equivalent of World War III, it’s certainly an improvement on “Impeach the m..!” and “It’s all about the Benjamins, baby!” There is an upbeat aspect to the incredibly ubiquitous AOC that suggests at the very least that the millennial contingent, however questionable its aims, prefers a goal that involves attacking things rather than other people.

    Although, on the surface, attacking things in this manner would seem a quintessentially “Western” mode of behavior, the emphasis is not on the conquest of nature via the creation of new technology, but on treating nature as a victim of human perturbation that it is our task to minimize. At the limit, all our activities should be “organic” and “renewable.” Yet, other things aside, the GND is primarily a job program that emphasizes productive work toward a shared goal. The insistent emphasis on union labor speaks not to the pajama-boy-“Julia” couple of the Obama era, but to a long-term Democratic constituency from the days of Roosevelt and Truman, one that has not habitually indulged in “intersectionality.”


    What all humans have in common, even before acquiring the propositional thinking that the Hebrews and Greeks placed at the foundation of Western Civilization, is the scene of representation. Whence the ostensive exercises typical of Buddhism—fixing one’s gaze on an arbitrary object, repeating a mantra until the sound becomes void of meaning—that are meant to produce in us the experience of the bare scene of human intentionality, void of any specific object, hence implicitly shared by all.

    I would be reluctant to ask the proponents of The Green New Deal if this is ultimately what they have in mind, but their vision of activity for the purpose of reducing its own impact is in its way a synthesis of Western activism with the “Salvation from the East” I wrote about a couple of Chronicles ago—a synthesis which the Asian economic powerhouses have shown to be perfectly viable from their end of the spectrum. As the now-forgotten object of environmentalist worship, Gaia was too much like Jesus; defining our task as limiting ourselves to renewable energy seeks only to leave the scene of nature as it was before we arrived.

    Who knows if this may not be the best way out of the rapidly progressing mechanical-digital transition: ensuring the eventual dissolution of “racial” and “gender” identities in a culture of minimized presence, increasingly leaving propositional logic to machines programmed to minimize it ever further, while prolonging our lives in real and virtual pleasures. Old Westerners such as I can never partake fully of this social vision, but we are destined to perish. Young people today—I have heard them say this!—have begun to assume that by the time they reach my age, they will already have been assured of earthly immortality. Good luck with that!

  • How to Talk to Girls at Parties: The Cinema of John Cameron Mitchell

    I have always had a certain sympathy for films about the drag world (I’ll just mention Priscilla, Queen of the Desert and The Crying Game; if the IMDb had a better search engine, I would name a few more). Proust realized that “gay love” cannot be appreciated on its own terms by the heterosexual public, but there is an authentic passion in the drag scene that one must respect; its very theatricality is the deepest sign of its authenticity. These are not boys who call themselves “she” to get in the girls’ showers and/or on their soccer team.

    Hedwig and the Angry Inch (2001)

    John Cameron Mitchell, who had acted in a number of TV series before turning to directing, made a splash with Hedwig and the Angry Inch, which he had originally composed in 1998 as an off-Broadway rock musical, playing the title role in both versions. This composition, with its punk-rock score, is the grand opera of drag-queen passion; Hedwig’s theatrical rage provides an unforgettable esthetic archetype.

    The “angry inch” that supplied the name of Hedwig’s band, in case you haven’t heard, is the remainder of a penis that Hedwig, originally Hansel, a boy from East Germany, tried to have removed to convert him into a woman in order to marry his GI lover. The operation failed, as did the marriage. The symbolism, daring in its crudity, is rightfully in the title and at the center of the story; a drag queen is not a man-turned-into-a-woman but a man-wanting-to-and-knowing-he-can’t-be-a-woman, and without the “angry inch” as the failed residue of this desire, the paradoxical passion would be aufgehoben, and the story without a point.

    Nonetheless, simply as a narrative, Hedwig is not altogether successful. The overcharged plot-line has Hedwig following, across various American venues, his younger ex-lover Tommy, who has become a major rock star by stealing Hedwig’s songs. The story ends in a complex epiphany in which Hedwig and Tommy reunite, then separate reconciled. In the final sequence, Hedwig hands his wig and female accoutrements to his long-suffering European “husband” and sings a song of universal reconciliation; then Tommy appears in a fantasy-animation sequence as an Androgyne-“other half” created from himself. Finally, all passion spent, Hedwig exits the theater into the street, stark naked.

    It is the musical-operatic context that allows us to accept this transcendental ending, which shows Hedwig to be something other than a self-contained cinematic narration. Given the paradoxically infinite nature of the hero/heroine’s desire, neither a comic nor a tragic ending would have been possible.

    Shortbus (2006)

    Cameron’s second directing effort demonstrates his admirable willingness to follow his intuition wherever it leads. This is a trait that one must respect in modern artists; it at times leads them astray, but it is the sine qua non of their ability to produce true masterpieces. I would mention in this regard the writers Marguerite Duras and Alain Robbe-Grillet, whose works I described some time ago as “The Last French Novels” (Romanic Review 83, 4; Nov. 1992: 501-16)—a judgment that the intervening years have given me little cause to modify—and film-makers like Quentin Tarantino (Pulp Fiction), David Lynch (Mulholland Drive), Lars van Trier (Dogsville, Melancholia) and Claire Denis (Chocolat, Beau Travail).

    Shortbus is the one film I know of that displays repeated and prolonged graphic images of acts hetero-, homo-, and auto-sexual, while being utterly without pornographic effect. It is also, unfortunately, both a bit dull and, although endearing, ultimately rather silly. I include it here as part of what I see as a genuine dialectic. If Hedwig was so to speak too much for a worldly plot, attempting to find an impossible synthesis between desire and fulfillment in a domain where no real mediation is possible—the frequent references to the Platonic myth of the Androgyne indicate its mythic transhumanity—in Shortbus, Cameron appears to avenge himself on the transcendental element of sexuality by treating “recreational” sex with deadpan irony as an everyday entertainment. Indeed, if he had deliberately accentuated the banality instead of simply letting it emerge as a natural effect, the film could be taken as a satire on self-help therapy groups.

    The Shortbus itself, a cabaret in which the various sexual activities take place to a musical accompaniment far less absorbing than that of either Hedwig or the final film of this series, is explicitly named in contrast to the “long” school bus, but one imagines there may be some other connotation hidden from the non-initiated. Sofia, the chief heroine, is a Chinese-American woman who is shown at the beginning of the film having passionate sex with her husband, but who (as we learn shortly after) has never reached orgasm. The irony is that in her professional life, she is a marriage/partnership counselor. The case of hers that we follow in the film presents the main male protagonists, a homosexual couple, both with the same name (James and “Jamie”); their love for each other is not in question, but one of them feels the need to break the symmetry by adding a third member to their couple. His partner only mildly objects, and so a third is found, and the tripling demonstrated for us in expectedly explicit fashion.

    As for our heroine, after engaging in psychological but unphysical intimacy with a depressive dominatrix—the most authentic human relationship in the film—she finally experiences orgasm. But this takes place not with her husband or any other person, but solo on a surrealistically illuminated park bench. Its diegetic and stylistic removal from the banal sexual realism of the Shortbus, in contrast with the straightforward resolution of the problem of the gay duo-threesome, would seem to demonstrate that, as in Hedwig, the emotional crux of Shortbus cannot be resolved within the film’s established esthetic framework. But here it all takes place, as they say, as farce rather than as tragedy. Whereas the passionate energy of Hedwig made its very non-resolution all but appear to provide the criterion for a new esthetic form of its own, here the resolution, like the problem itself, is more or less of a joke.

    Rabbit Hole (2010)

    I will not comment in detail on Mitchell’s third film. It is separate from what I see as a three-film series; judged by this film alone, Mitchell would come off as a sensitive but not particularly original director.

    This story of a couple who loses their four-year-old son in an accident and spends years trying and never quite succeeding to get over it is more a case study of contemporary narcissism than a genuine tragedy—although it is unclear whether this perspective is at all implicit in the film itself. Losing a child is terrible; but they are still young, why not try to have another one? (I wouldn’t dare to ask why they couldn’t have more than one.) One wants to tell the couple to get out of the movie and get a life. Cameron clearly identified with this loss and dealt with it sensitively, but I don’t consider Rabbit Hole a significant element of his oeuvre.

    How to Talk to Girls at Parties (2017)

    What inspired this Chronicle in the first place is this most recent of Cameron’s films; it was the first that I watched, although I had certainly heard about Hedwig.

    The title makes little sense; it makes more if you read the 2007 sci-fi story by Neil Gaiman on which it is based. A mere 5000 words long, this minimalist tale contains the skeletal premise, but not the body, of Mitchell’s film. The alien nature of the girls at the party attended by the two rockers Enn (Henry), the shy first-person protagonist, and Vic, the ladies’ man, is not known in advance, but emerges subtly through the dialog. Above all, the romance that makes Mitchell’s film so endearing is barely implicit in the story, where Enn talks to several alien girls and never gets beyond a kiss and a recital of poetry in an unknown language before he is dragged off by Vic, panicked by an unsettling, inarticulable revelation experienced on attempting to make love to the beautiful alien Stella.

    As we learn, the ironic point of the title is that Vic is effective at seduction precisely because he talks and pretends to listen to girls without hearing them; whence his utter unpreparedness for his final discovery. It is rather through the introverted Enn, who listens to what the girls have to say, that the reader comes to discover their alien, poetic nature.

    This little story is a masterpiece of concision and what rhetoricians call litotes, but not the obvious basis for a movie, not to speak of a quasi-musical. Yet one can understand its attraction for Mitchell, given the desire he reveals in Hedwig for a sex-transcending representation of love.


    Gaiman’s story ends when the terrified Vic drags Enn out of the party. But in the film, when Enn stands in the street, not following behind Vic as in the story, Zan comes out after him, a rebel from the conformity of her Colony, and Mitchell’s film, now released from its textual bondage, follows its own course.

    The aliens touring the Earth have a fatalistic culture, not at all described by Gaiman, in which adult “Parent-Teachers” eat their children to reduce the population. Near the end of the film, the sexually ambivalent leader/founder of the six alien Colonies—each dressed in its own bright color and distinctive “futuristic” costume—announces that he/she awaits the final round of the parents’ eating the children to then eat the parents, and, in fine, end it all by eating himself. (Cf the cover of The Origin of Language.) Whether this is meant to satirize either the ecological passion for a human-free Gaia or its opposite is unimportant. On the other hand, the fact that, as we discover, Zan has through her “incomplete sexual activity” with Enn become pregnant (with five children, as we learn in the epilogue) is all-important. Her pregnancy gives her a tie-breaking, presumably positive vote on the decisive question of whether to accept Zan’s Parent-Teacher Waldo’s proposal to abolish the race’s child-devouring policy, hence to bring fecundity and life back to their otherwise dying planet. But to vote and bear her children, she must return forever to her home planet.

    Skillfully avoiding sentimentality a la Avatar, the film is nonetheless at the other end of the spectrum from the narcissistic sexuality of Hedwig or Shortbus, where neither the drag-queen passion of the former nor the “sexual problems” of the later have anything to do with procreation. Indeed, in this context, Rabbit Hole, which takes place between middle-class adults in a non-controversial sexual framework, is closer than we might have expected to the Hedwig end of the spectrum. The couple mourn their Trophy Child not as a lost hope of perpetuating their family and species, but as the crowning achievement of their marriage. He cannot be replaced, because to reveal his biological replicability would devalue the uniqueness of their creation.

    Whereas what matters in How to Talk‘s incomplete sexual relations—where in a whimsical love-scene Zan talks calmly about Enn’s penis changing shape, as though she could see it through his trousers, while their interaction remains as chaste as in a fairy tale—is not sex but love. Zan’s “I love you” to Enn before leaving him forever is as touching a declaration as you will find in any film. And unlike the narcissistic love of Mitchell’s other films, this one is fecund. The fact that it produces five children and turns around the whole ecology of their planet is less the point than that their love is of the kind that can do this; it is the perfect synthesis of a private idyll and a manifestation of communal solidarity—humans and aliens showing themselves to be part of the same community.


    The film’s (unexpected) epilogue takes place 16 years later, when Enn has achieved success as a graphic artist, his original ambition. It is difficult not to share the tears that we see in his eyes when his children—two girls and three boys—show up at his book signing to tell him they want to form a band. They each give their name, with no overt sign of recognition—but then Enn notices that they are all wearing the unmistakable insignia that adorned Zan’s ring.

    What more beautiful resolution could be found for Hedwig’s sexual agony? No doubt a film cannot solve the world’s, or even a drag queen’s problems, any more than any other work of art, but one could not imagine a more tender transcendence. Seeing these films as a sequence, one can truly say that the agony of Hedwig is justified by this cosmic redemption of sexuality that comes across as neither Pollyannaish nor ironic.

    No couple in cinema is more right than the lovely alien and the punk rocker, brought together by a gay film-maker. And I must congratulate the actors: Elle Fanning, totally convincing in all the aspects of her role, from innocence to rebellion to a minimal sensuality that remains more émerveillement than lust, and Alex Sharp, who, unlike the pauvre type in Gaiman’s story, is a tender but virile young man in love, in touch with his sexuality and yet able to fulfill it in every sense in this fairy-tale relationship. And we mustn’t forget Nicole Kidman’s spot-on performance as Boadicea, aging queen of the punk scene, who hosts the shy Zan’s blowout performance in an unforgettable blending of Hedwig-style hysterical musical liberation with an opening to the renewal of love and life itself.


    Despite many tries, I have yet to meet a person willing to share my view that Charlotte Lennox’s 1752 Arabella: The Female Quixote is the most delightful novel ever written. In consequence of this, I won’t advise you to watch How to Talk to Girls at Parties, let alone expect you to cry at the end. I’ll just say that I’m very glad to have seen it, and to have had the opportunity to appreciate the cinematic art of John Cameron Mitchell.

  • Salvation from the East?

    “The Pharmakos” of Plato

    Suppose Plato tried to set up a dialogue with a partisan of Victimary Thinking (VT), so that Socrates could set him straight about the dangers of using “never blame the victim” as a personal and public ethic.

    He would discover that philosophy/metaphysics, with its de-ostensivation of language, is no longer welcome in the agora. Although Socrates could expound the (non-indexical) meaning of The Good to refute Callicles and Thrasymachus, he couldn’t handle the Victim. Only Jesus, à la rigueur, could do it, and then only because he didn’t accept that the ostensive had been eliminated by the declarative.

    The mark of the Victim is not a concrete wrong that has been done him, for this could in principle be redressed. If he can prove that he has suffered a specific wrong, he can invoke the law. Societies in which groups of people are victimized de jure, as blacks were in the Jim Crow era or Jews in the Nazi era, have victims but not Victims. The latter is a Victim not de jure but de facto; his victimage is demonstrated not by violations of the law but by disparate impact. That is, not the disparate impact of what he does, but the impact on him and his fellows of norms, such as selection examinations, imposed by the law, or simply of the micro-aggressions of everyday life. Measures of “affirmative action” counteract in part the disparate impact of the law, while demonstrating the permanence of the Victim’s victimary status.

    Callicles and Thrasymachus are free agents uttering their personal convictions. Although it would be inappropriate to call Plato’s dialogues conversion narratives, Socrates engages with his opponents on a strictly conceptual plane, choosing his examples from experiences that all can be expected to share. Whether or not the interlocutors are persuaded, the reader is certainly expected to be. He is expected to follow Socrates’ reasoning as he might Euclid’s, and similarly accept its conclusions as deduced from the original premises. The modern reader may be wont to accuse the old man of some sophistical turns, but the dialogues pursue in principle the Way of Truth.

    The category of Victim, in contrast, is not defined by freely chosen convictions. Although not apparently an ascriptive category like race or sex, it is not chosen by the Victim himself, nor imposed on him by acts of discrimination, but inherent in his ascriptive identity as a member of a victimary group.

    Philosophical discourse in the traditional sense with the Victim is consequently impossible. Unlike the slave boy in the Meno, who is shown to “remember” geometry, which is really only to say that he is able to reason about geometry in the same way as a geometer, once given the appropriate premises, the Victim could not engage in philosophical dialogue without setting aside his victimary status. There is no way of reasoning “like a victim.”

    Plato would find this unnerving. But it can be interpreted as demonstrating, not the spuriousness of Victim status, but on the contrary, the fatal flaw of philosophical argumentation, which only becomes possible upon dismissing or “bracketing” the reality of victimhood. If the Victim wants to take part in the dialogue, he must, as the French would say, “leave his victimhood in the cloakroom.”

    Being a victim was not a prestigious role in the ancient world. When Christianity revealed the essential holiness of the victim, Nietzsche saw this as the triumph of “Jewish resentment,” which is certainly one way of putting it—and Max Scheler’s rebuttal (in The Man of Ressentiment, [Vom Umsturz der Werte, 1919]) claiming that Christian chivalry gives the lie to this abasement, is rather beside the point. The real point is that, from an originary standpoint, the Victim is the central figure in the scene of representation.

    Deconstruction of the Laboratory

    The laboratory permits the development of modern science by isolating systems so that correlations among their fundamental parameters can be determined. Even in its most primitive state, its existence depends on that of a supportive society that supplies it with peace, personnel, and equipment.

    The philosophical dialogue is also a laboratory, one that can isolate itself from the rest of human existence only because its freedom is guaranteed by a sufficiently peaceful community. And in order to create that community in the first place, an Ur-laboratory must have become available, which we have called the originary scene of representation.

    What makes the scene of representation a laboratory? All desires, all worldly considerations of any kind, are put aside to focus on one single significant/sacred object. This idea is the kernel of the originary hypothesis: like the hedgehog, the originary human knows One Big Thing.

    The failure of our discovery of this idea to strike a spark of revelation in more than a handful of souls is simply an effect of the incongruity between our intellectual universe and that of the “first men.” I have often heard admiration expressed for Stanley Kubrick’s “originary scene” in 2001, where the bone thrown up in the air becomes a spaceship. But whatever the differences between this scene and that of the originary hypothesis, the fact remains that not even the cinema can create appropriate conditions for us to effectively put ourselves in the place of these proto-humans. We are always-already human, carrying around the portable representation laboratory that Sartre called the pour-soi. To appreciate the originary hypothesis, we need to recognize the radicality of the transition, yet without being able to fully imagine it taking place. The only point of comparison would be with religious experience, which is precisely what social scientists are obliged to put entirely out of their minds, if any was ever in them, when they enter their laboratories.

    The point of these observations is to stress that the power of VT, however dubious its concrete manifestations, comes from harnessing that of originary religion, the power that Jesus realized when he appeared to Paul on the road to Damascus and asked why he was persecuting him.

    How then has it come about precisely in our postwar era that members of victimary groups can tap into this power? I have been exploring this question for several years, less in order to denounce VT than to explain its extraordinary strength, political and simply social.

    Philosophy/metaphysics cannot deal with this issue, and the political world that derives from it, that of the “Enlightenment,” has thus far shown its incapacity to resolve it without reverting to the cruder forms of the “Way of Opinion.” I have some sympathy with those respectable folks who, not wanting to choose between the crudity of “populism” and the nastiness of VT, wind up as never-Trumpers, sympathizing with the president’s aims, but anxious to disassociate themselves from the man himself and his personal flaws, as though once one makes it absolutely clear that one enthusiastically shares the victimary execration of racism, sexism, and the rest, one can then engage in a productive philosophical dialogue with the Victim.

    The manifest bankruptcy of this strategy shows that it is fighting the wrong war. The Victim can never accept the role of the Socratic interlocutor; to do so would be to endorse the metaphysical system of hidden oppression that he denies in his flesh.

    If asked why such arguments were not heard in the past, the Victim might reply that society has been from the beginning permeated by a hidden asymmetry, which the trauma of WWII finally revealed. He might, if sufficiently erudite, cite Derrida’s critique of the falsely neutral binary distinctions between black and white, male and female… Whence VT’s rejection of “free speech,” to which it responds with an intellectual variant of Anatole France’s boutade that both rich and poor are free to sleep under bridges. Propositional language, in its view, is not an instrument of communal cooperation, but of false symmetry and exploitation.

    How was this fraud imposed in the first place? If asked to come up with a VT equivalent of GA’s originary hypothesis, the Victim might counter with a scenario where the Alpha, realizing that he could no longer dominate the group via a queue structure, would assure perpetuation of his leadership by designating a “scapegoat” group for the persecution of the majority, using falsely symmetrical binary oppositions to make it impossible for its members to complain of their fate.

    But now, at last, the cat is out of the bag; the false symmetries that produce disparate impact have been exposed. Affirmative action is but a partial, overdue remedy for the hypocritical de facto oppression that has become all the more insidious now that the frank de jure form has been abolished.

    It might be said that what we call the Left has always held this position, and also that it has always used language not as a means of rational persuasion, but as a weapon; the name of Saul Alinsky (Rules for Radicals) is often cited in this context. But this was not always the case. Certainly it would be unfair to Marx, if not to Lenin and Stalin, to claim that his arguments are mere propaganda destined to hasten the fall of “exploitative” society. Marxism proposes an optimistic self-transcendence of metaphysics, implying that no intellectual tool other than metaphysics itself is required to transcend it, once its originary material basis has been reestablished—as he put it, by setting Hegel back on his feet. Dialectical materialism is a term you are unlikely to see in the tweets of our woke Democratic Socialists.

    Neither Hegel nor Marx nor their revolutionary successors attempted to trace metaphysics and its limitations to its root in the origin of language, and of the human itself. I would nonetheless say that today’s left, having discovered VT, has a clearer intuition of this origin than its traditional opponents. Which is why it is so ready to denounce “hate speech,” its term for discourse that fails to respect the victimary sacred, and is for all intents and purposes blasphemous (whence its fraternal connection with Islam)—or in our terms, falsely declarative but really ostensive. Such speech presents itself as “free” on the false premise that the scene of linguistic representation is a neutral zone of debate, rather than the locus of hidden asymmetries that it is our duty to “deconstruct.”

    The Victim is a martyr-witness to his victimhood, an experience he embodies in marks of color or gender like the stigmata that Jesus is said to transmit to his holiest saints. The unmarked, “white” person confronted by a Victim is thus faced with a pragmatic paradox. He can neither ignore these stigmata nor is allowed to react to them, but must demonstrate as implicit in any unfavorable judgment he may make of their bearer his non-consideration of them as a ground of his judgment.

    Fortunately, most members of victim classes do not flaunt their victimhood in everyday circumstances. It takes a special kind of self-regard to do so, and to be rewarded for one’s victimary exemplarity. But one never knows when such outbursts may occur, as for example when my old UCLA colleague Val Rust provoked a sit-in for correcting the grammar of some black students.

    When Rochelle Gutierrez claimed that “math is white” (see Chronicle 563), her real point was to denounce the fallacy, from the victimary perspective, that in grammar or math or any other system of cultural signs, the objective-unmarked is “fair” and neutral. In so doing, she was defending the Victim more honestly than those who demeaningly add a few hundred points to his SAT scores. Whether or not he has to learn math, the Victim should not let his moral equality be eroded by such so-called “objective” domains of knowledge. Gutierrez was not suggesting that math should be done away with, even in minority schools, simply that, understood as an instrument of the victimizers’ world, it should not be used as a measure of personal worth—thereby insuring low math scores in perpetuity.


    I have not yet lost my Fukuyaman faith in the liberal-democratic system, which if valid would put an end to a phase of history, though not of history itself. Is this system compatible with VT? So far, it has been. “Compatible” doesn’t mean without conflict, but VT has been proliferating within our democracy since WWII without as yet truly menacing the system. And although as an anthropological doctrine it is “incompatible” with it, so are communism, neo-Nazism, and Islamism, which are nevertheless openly espoused by citizens of democracies. In this regard, I was pleased to find in Victor Hanson’s column the other day (https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/progressive-politics-abolish-ice-tax-increases-free-college/) a reflection on the symbiosis of global wealth with VT-“progressivism” that makes some of the same points as the “United Field Theory” expounded in recent Chronicles.

    But history does not stand still, and a philosophy harmless among resentful children becomes deadly when the children grow into the empowered students of the Cultural Revolution.

    Salvation from the East?

    The West is the land of tragic firstness, where one accepts the cruelest sacrifice to claim one’s place at the center of the scene. Our principal religion celebrates God’s agony.

    Buddhism offers a release from this painful personification. Its utterly un-Western revelation is that what really matters is the scene of representation, which we all share in its emptiness, and that it is foolish to fight over, or try to agree on, what is on the scene. The propositions of metaphysics help us to understand the world, but they cannot avoid paradox and illusion; the empty scene alone does so.

    Is it then a coincidence that if we are ever to be liberated from “affirmative action” and its ambition to perpetuate forever the victimary status of its putative beneficiaries—why should they learn to score as high as the unmarked if their scores will be raised in any case?—it will be as a result of actions like the lawsuit against Harvard by Asian students, who have the embarrassing quality of doing very well in “white” subjects?

    As Yuri Slezkine pointed out in The Jewish Century, (Princeton, 2004) overseas Chinese have played throughout much of East Asia the “Mercurian” role of the Jews in Europe, provoking in some cases the equivalent of pogroms, as in Indonesia where the Chinese were slaughtered in 1965-66, and on a smaller scale, in 1998. But in case you hadn’t noticed, there is a small difference between the overall Jewish and Chinese populations.

    There used to be a numerus clausus to permit Harvard and Co. from being overrun by Jews; today, it’s Asians. When I attended the Bronx High School of Science, it was over 80% Jewish; today, I’m sure it’s at least 50% Asian. UCLA, during my tenure there, has become more and more the University of Caucasians Lost among Asians.

    The Chinese, like the Jews, are a “chosen people,” inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom that was the unquestioned center of civilization in the East Asian landmass for thousands of years. With all their ingenuity, inventing printing and gunpowder and the like, they would never have achieved a Scientific/Industrial Revolution, being, unlike the crude polyglots of the Middle East, too proud to invent an alphabet that would allow ordinary people to communicate with each other. Reading The Dream of the Red Chamber, the Chinese “novel” written not long before the French Revolution, you are transported into a universe of self-satisfied feudal refinement unlike anything we have ever known in the West.

    The Jews didn’t create the Industrial Revolution, far from it; but as I pointed out in the previous Chronicle, the Judeo-Christian idea of the Nation, pluralized in what was until the first half of the twentieth century mostly peaceful competition, was a stimulus to invention and discovery—firstness—that did not exist in China.

    But now that this Revolution has occurred, the Chinese and other Asians have been able to learn its techniques. At first, this was done by imitation and plagiarism, but lately, as “Spengler” (David P. Goldman) has been pointing out, they have been advancing on their own, and may well be ahead of us in 5G technology and even in space exploration (take a look on the dark side of the moon).

    I don’t want to sound fatalistic, but if Hegel were working on the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Postgeschichte, I’m sure he’d agree with me that the idea of the West with its singular, tragic Jews giving way to the East’s multiple, tranquil Chinese as the model of future “capitalist” development is the nec plus ultra of dialectic. If this is so, we should not be overly concerned at Mr. Xi’s belligerent tendencies, including his nascent partnership with Putin’s Russia. The dialectic still has a way to go, if we let it.

    But whether or not Asia becomes the creative center of future world civilization, generative anthropology will have marked in its own way “the end of pre-history”: the end of the era that preceded the first serious attempt to provide a minimal hypothesis of the origin of the human and its language.

  • Sovereignty and Firstness

    Words are only words, and their etymology is no guarantee that they bear an “essence” beyond what is traceable to their historical origin and its originary roots. But given its history, sovereignty is worthy of our interest for its reflection of a Christian world view that gradually takes on a national form, recalling that the Hebrew idea of nationhood, which would reemerge explicitly with the Reformation, had always been a corollary of the Judeo-Christian conception of God.

    The term sovereignty, as Bernard de Jouvenel makes clear in De la souveraineté  (Génin, 1955; translations mine), is associated with medieval kingship. Jouvenel emphasizes the difference between the way the word is used before the Renaissance and its usage in the “early modern” era beginning in the 17th century. His concern is to understand how a term that had originally emphasized one’s place in a hierarchy (“when one said [in the middle ages] sovereign, one simply meant superior“; “everyone had a superior” [217-18], the king’s presumably being God), came to designate absolute power, la volonté souveraine, which modern, that is, post-Revolutionary, writers attribute to “the people.” Thus Jouvenel traces a history from medieval, relative sovereignty, to the absolute sovereignty of the 17th century monarch, and from there to l’idée despotique of popular sovereignty that is in principle without “limit or regulation” (216-17).

    The two phases of sovereignty that Jouvenel describes, with absolute monarchy serving as an intermediate stage—still submissive in principle to religious admonitions, still using the medieval phrase heureuse impuissance [fortunate incapacity] to justify the king’s refusal to grant certain requests—reflect two very different attitudes toward firstness. The earlier notion limits the sovereign’s initiative to the implementation of the traditional obligations of his office, enforcing rules established in custom and guaranteed ultimately by God, whereas the modern notion is one where the authority of the sovereign is limited only by his own judgment as the embodiment of the “people.”

    I have in previous Chronicles touched on the subject of nationhood, focusing on the Judeo-Christian tradition in which the Hebrews, a particular community “chosen” by the universal God, can be called the first nation. But as writers from Ernest Renan to Benedict Anderson have noted, every nation is “chosen” in its particular way of receiving and passing on the original light unto the nations. Nor does this process exclude the possibility that something like the European Union could evolve into a new form of state that would combine different nationalities more organically, and at the same time less dictatorially, than what Yoram Hazony calls an empire (see Chronicle 597). But the means by which this might come about have not yet been successfully thought through, as witness the EU’s failure to guarantee its critical demographic/cultural mass before admitting millions of migrants from alien cultures, and the political turmoil that has resulted from it.


    Firstness is less an objective state than a state of mind, one that may be supported by facts, but never objectively enough to convince the skeptics. The case of the Jews is all too obvious: how dare they claim to be “chosen”? If GA can claim a moral lesson on the side of firstness to counterbalance its affirmation of the originary moral model of universal reciprocity, it is indeed the principle of “a light unto the nations”—accepting the temporal priority of firstness with a minimum of resentment, recognizing with a minimum of envy the advantages it may have accorded its initiators, and seeing it as in essence the production of a benefit to be ultimately shared by all.

    It is in this sense that we may say that the Hebrews shared with the world the concept of nationhood and with it, sovereignty as authority guaranteed by the One God rooted in the originary sacred center. Although national originarity is not that of the originary event, myths of national foundation are not simply fairy tales; they are ways of relating a given historical community to our common human ancestry.

    If we take the concept of sovereignty as specifically national in the Judeo-Christian sense, then we must understand it as both deriving its authority from the One God and at the same time affirming, and helping the community as a whole to affirm, its national “firstness.” Having a legend of national origin is not the same as claiming to be first among nations. But the Hebrews did not claim to be first, only chosen. The Hebrews were chosen by God who speaks of them as “my people” in contrast to all others. But Isaiah’s metaphor can be taken to imply that other nations too should aspire to be chosen as God’s people, “in their light,” on their example. If the human race is to pursue its course peacefully, each nation must accept for itself the gift of nationhood under the One God that affords entry into the marketplace of world history.

    The sovereign of a nation and that of an empire or tribe is concerned in the first place with maintaining order under never fully predictable historical circumstances. Whether he is a despot or a democrat, he is in the first place an executive whose tasks are never fully predictable in advance. That is, his role is prima facie antithetical to that of the inventor in the controlled environment of the laboratory. Yet firstness is implicit in sovereignty, seen in the light of its relationship to national exemplarity. Visionary totalitarian leaders have been able to insulate entire states from external conditions long enough to subject them to political experiments, with generally appalling results. But it is of more value to consider the sovereignty-firstness relationship in less extreme cases, notably in liberal-democratic societies like our own.


    The USA has realized in its national self-consciousness the clearest illustration to date of the nation-as-first-in-the-light-of-the-Hebrews. It is no accident that David P. Goldman (“Spengler”) likes to quote Lincoln’s quasi-prophetic appellation of the US as “that almost-chosen nation.” But if this bittersweet appellation can be taken as a special quality of the United States, it can equally well be understood as the status of the (non-Hebraic) nation in general.

    The tension between God’s uniqueness and the nation’s particularity can never be resolved: it is permanently productive. In that respect, all nations are equal, even if the Hebrews may appear “more equal than others.” If God is One, then his laws are universal, which means that the laws imposed upon the Hebrews are in principle imposed on everyone else. But there are laws and “laws.” Morality, the law of originary reciprocity, is unique, whereas ethics are adapted to the specific culture of each nationality. This was as true for primitive tribes and archaic empires as it was for the Hebrews. In contrast to the 613 “laws” of the Torah, the Decalogue corresponds more or less to the moral core that applies to all, and provides an implicit basis for the extension of the national concept to other peoples.

    The explicit liberation of the Christian from the Law that is at the center of Paul’s theology permits a clean separation between the moral core and the Hebrew tribal ethic, thereby making possible a generalizable concept of nationhood. There is no specific set of Christian ethical laws; just as he renders to Caesar what is Caesar’s, the Christian follows the customs of each individual society. Yet these societies become nations through their common acceptance of the Trinitarian God, accepting the One God/Father through the mediation of the Son in whom chosenness becomes a transcendental model accessible to all.

    Hillel had already affirmed that the “Golden Rule” “contains all the law and the prophets.” Imitatio Christi offers this same individual moral sense as a model for human interaction independently of local custom. The genius of this revelation is that once this model is accepted, the ethical specificity of the nation is not denied (as it will be in Islam) but declared culturally independent. What was implicit in the Hebrew distinction between the “law” and the moral law of reciprocity that informs the Decalogue and is concisely formulated by Hillel, is now unambiguously affirmed.


    The ancient civilizations, who did not share the Hebrew revelation of the One God, never felt a contradiction between the universality of ideas and the singularity of deities. Xenophanes recognized the distinction between the unique idea of God and the black gods of the Africans or the equine gods of horses, but he could not conceive of a One God who stood behind all these notions and yet was not an idea but a transcendental self, an embodiment of the unity of the human race—and as history would show, open to the revelation of the Incarnation. If we are to give sovereignty a sense beyond the nominal reality of central authority, it is that of recognizing in this authority the universal, humanity-wide nature of its sacredness.

    With the Christian idea of sovereignty, the abstract notion of the unity of the species receives a worldly embodiment in the nation. The members of any community recognize in principle that their mere belonging to the human race does not suffice to define them as human; each human being is and has always been part of a specific community. But a nation is a specific community that owes allegiance to the One God. It follows from this that the nations are more “internally mimetic” of each other, more in competition “ontologically,” as models of universal exemplarity, and not merely as rivals in military conquest. And it is not too far-fetched to correlate the development of patriotism, defined as loyalty to one’s nation as a unique exemplar of humanity-in-community rather than as the home of the most powerful god with the most powerful army, with the fact that, beginning with the total wars of the Revolutionary era, war’s increasing destructiveness in contrast with the productivity of peacetime industry obliges humankind to envision its abandonment as a means of national competition.

    In light of this new emphasis on peaceful competition, the “double marketplace” of liberal democracy, where the economic market is managed by a political marketplace of ideas, cannot be separated from the global market that assesses the value of each nation statistically through measurements like longevity, crime and poverty rates, and levels of education, a value summed up in their relative attractiveness as places to live.


    The question that inescapably arises today is whether the “Westphalian” model of nationhood, as consecrated after WWII by the United Nations and various treaties emphasizing respect for national borders, can maintain itself, let alone evolve more integrated forms such as the EU has striven to embody. We are living in an era where the entire inhabited world is divided into nations, but where the national concept has been meeting with growing resistance from “global” political actors who have no alternative model to propose. The world always needs new degrees of freedom, but the current disproportional preoccupation with such things as transgenderism strikes me, with all due respect to the few for whom it is indeed an issue, as a symptom that our demand for cultural “diversity” has outstripped the supply. In such situations, wisdom resides in resisting the siren call of the victimary critique that would undermine the national concept and its call to firstness.

    In this regard, we should note the difference between the Judeo-Christian nation-concept and the Islamic conception of the Umma. The “third-world” nature of most Muslim societies should not obscure the position of Islam in the historical dialectic after Judeo-Christian nationhood. Whatever the value of Hazony’s use of the term within his system of reference, the Umma is not a return to the archaic notion of empire. It must be understood as a far more ambitious project of universal unification—as a super-nation. A system of nations can share the One God and even the Christian religion, without however forming a single community. In contrast, the Umma tolerates national differences only as temporary obstacles to the universal caliphate that is Islam’s ultimate goal. Yet whatever the enthusiasm of its adherents, it is difficult to conceive this as a possible solution for the modern world.

    Finally, there is a unique Asian model of sovereignty, not that of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, which are recognizably Western in inspiration, but that of mainland China. China is not a “nation” but an empire, one whose history is very different from that of empires in the West, none of which has survived into the present century. Unrivaled in its cultural hegemony for millennia, China shares the Hebrews’ sense of chosenness without the need for One God to guarantee it against ostensibly more powerful rivals.

    China’s imperial tradition has paradoxically found itself more compatible with the unapologetically hegemonic Western philosophy of Marxism than the Western nations that, having promoted it, have now with trivial exceptions abandoned it. I am not certain that even the most accomplished Sinologists yet possess enough information to begin to explore this crucial question; certain that I do not, I will leave it as a subject for future reflection.

  • UFT 7: Coda — The Two Phases of the Victimocracy

    The felix culpa of humanistic anthropologies, whether theology or philosophy or generative anthropology, is that they explain things that work only because they have not been explained, and thereby contribute to disabling them. Theology does the least mischief because it exists within a preestablished religious framework, which it elucidates without seeking to reduce it to more primitive terms; when it does, we get Spinoza and Descartes, and soon after, the Enlightenment.

    Which is as much as to say that I understand why GA isn’t taken seriously in academic circles, where in South Campus you follow rigorously objective procedures and, in the North, apply in quasi-rigorous fashion the politically correct absurdities acceptable to the consensus. That these two criteria bear superficially equal weight might be shocking, but society still has enough sanity to distribute the bulk of its funding to serious scientific research and a relative pittance to victimary studies.

    GA fits into neither category, of course. We must accept that a humanistic anthropology must remain speculative and cannot expect or even desire to design algorithmic procedures for the study of culture. I flatter myself that over the years I have come up with a number of insights, some of which might be called “breakthroughs,” but it would be a category error to measure the originary hypothesis against Newton’s laws of motion, let alone Einstein’s Theory of Relativity.

    Nor am I tempted by the role that Foucault designated, in a backhanded compliment to Marx and Freud, as fondateur de discours. The fondateur remains ever the master of “his” discourse, and disciples even in future generations must refer to his insights as “foundational.” What that really means is that he is a cult figure, the founder of a belief system—and in a couple of generations, as we have seen in both these cases, he is largely repudiated, and even his genuine insights deprecated.

    My teacher René Girard was himself not without this tendency. I would not hold him personally to blame, but the dynamics of his thinking and its reception led to a personal focus that I hope to avoid, given that my personality is not such as to attract adulation, nor my books popularity. Fortunately, those interested in GA don’t call themselves “Gansians” on the model of Freudians and Marxists… or Girardians.

    But in order to take GA beyond the fondateur stage in a substantive sense, we need to develop a clearer path from its speculative basis in the originary hypothesis to the analysis of historical phenomena.


    I use the word “paradox” a great deal, and some thinkers who pride themselves on employing only les buzzwords du jour have pointed this out to me as a sign of philosophical unwokeness. Whether or not quantum mechanics is “paradoxical” is not for me to decide, although there is clearly something unsatisfactory about a theory that uses the category of “measurement” as a parameter, independently of any specific perturbation that an act of measurement has introduced. But the humanist is on more solid ground in claiming that the introduction of a system of signs to “measure” or simply to describe the human world must perturb this world in undecidable ways. Thus “supernatural” entities such as gods are introduced into the system from the outset, not, as the positivists liked to claim, as naively prescientific ways to remedy this undecidability, but in order to acknowledge that it cannot be remedied in any straightforward manner.

    GA’s theory of language origin reveals in minimalistic terms the genuine anthropological content of the speculations of Vico, Comte, et al., about the early “theological” forms of thought, stripping them of their anecdotal empiricism. We call the first word the name of God, and even this is misleading in that it suggests that this “equation” has different elements on both sides, when its point is that the first word is the originary mark of the sacred, the notions of significance and sacrality being at this point indistinguishable.


    Well, yes, this schema is very elegant and “minimal,” and although a distinguished professor of philosophy recently assured me that it is not at all original—itself something of a compliment as an alternative to telling me that it is either absurd or tautological—I am satisfied to stand on my record. Yet the degree to which what I call originary analysis allows us insight into the relationship in our society, seemingly less lucid than in the past, between the “personal” and the “political,” remains frustratingly opaque.

    Politics is perhaps the best example of a paradoxical because necessarily self-negating or at least self-disclaiming activity. Carl Schmitt, the great “realist,” said that politics was a relation among enemies, by which he simply meant that when you have to count votes, you are no longer in the realm of reason, and can only “stand up and be counted,” the battle of the ballot box being, like chess, a peaceful version of war.

    This is tantamount to saying that political arguments remain in the domain of opinion and never accede to that of truth, where there are right and wrong answers. Yet these arguments make use of reason; to seek to persuade is different from seeking to demonstrate only in its effects. When I make such an argument, I present it as though it were a mathematical proof; I don’t just say, “in my opinion…” The point is that the exact place where political debate lies between mere contestation and reasoning can itself be determined only by political rules, as in an election.

    These ideas were new in ancient Athens, and societies based on debates and elections, as opposed to autocracies, have done generally quite well since the Renaissance—which term itself evokes the return of politics as much as the revival of “classical learning.” But there are moments when democratic-republican systems break down in revolution—such as Hitler’s, which began (like so many) with a perfectly legal parliamentary election. At such times, one wonders what factors have changed to perturb the functioning of the system beyond the degree at which the “passions” it arouses can be sufficiently damped to be contained within it.


    The victimary phenomenon as we know it today appears to be having a deleterious effect on all democratic political systems, few if any of which seem capable any longer of functioning in the reasonably efficient manner to which the postwar era had habituated us.

    It is often deplored that so much of our political rhetoric consists in outrage, real or feigned, targeted at outrages whose outrageousness the media flaunt before the eye of the beholder. And it is anything but an accident that President Trump himself deliberately makes outrageous statements, as they say, trolling his opponents to goad them into excessive reactions. This has led certain pundits of the never-Trump variety, standing above the fray like Molière’s maître de philosophie, to deplore the “personalization” of politics “on both sides.”

    I disagree with this pseudo-Girardian symmetry—which in the case of Molière’s philosopher, Girard debunks, not without giving the reader some reason to accuse him of the same thing. As I too might be accused, but against which accusation I believe I could defend myself. To the composers of op-ed pieces in the plague-on-both-your-houses mode, I ask why disputes in the Way of Opinion should be necessary at all when some of us are gifted with the ability to enunciate the dicta of the Way of Truth.

    What is new in contemporary victimary politics is its “symbolic” and apparently unselfish nature. As opposed to traditional log-rolling, when interest groups were fairly well defined and smoke-filled rooms functioned to minimize the energy wasted in conflict among them, the virtue-signaling politics of the victimocracy, while benefiting the bureaucracy by inserting Diversity Officers at every point to insure against the further oppression of “victims,” provides no obvious advantages to most of its supporters, including the large majority of the victimary groups themselves. The symbiosis between victimocracy and the “global” economy cannot be explained on a straightforward cui bono basis, any more than can its support for causes of “justice” such as the Palestinian death-wish for Israel.


    In Chronicle 598, I suggested a model for what I would now call first-phase global victimary politics in the film The Big Short, where the Ponzi scheme that led to the 2008 crash (and Obama’s election) was rooted in the heightened enforcement by Clinton and G. W. Bush of the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act, an affirmative action scheme for mortgage lending in minority neighborhoods. This exercise in compensatory White Guilt, more benign than most, nonetheless started a chain of events that led to a major recession.

    It bears remarking that although bear-marketers today warn us of an impending repetition of this threat, the signature operation of victimocracy, which only came into its own under the Obama administration, has radically changed its form. It is no doubt characteristic of victimocracy that it is based so much on image rather than substance that it can operate such a change without anyone becoming clearly aware of it, not even its implementers.

    Thus we may compare the CRA’s obliging banks to lend “fairly” in minority neighborhoods to a typical example of full-fledged victimocracy, Arne Duncan’s 2014 directive, recently recommended for rescission by the Federal School Safety Commission appointed by Trump after February’s Parkland school shootings, that schools not suspend a “disproportionate” number of minority students, effectively establishing a quota system for school discipline. A more blatant example of “anti-racist” racism would be harder to find.

    We observe that this quota system, as opposed to that imposed on banks, involved no financial risks nor any inconvenience to anyone but the students and teachers of disproportionately minority schools, where the policy was implemented by effectively letting minority delinquents disrupt classes with impunity. (“In Oklahoma City, principals told teachers not to request a suspension ‘unless there was blood.’” Jason L. Riley, “Obama’s Racial Preferences Made Schools Dangerous,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 25, 2018.) And whereas the bank program could be understood as genuinely well-intentioned, this one would appear utterly cynical, since the education that was being disrupted was precisely that of the minorities one was supposed to be helping.

    And yet, to call it cynical probably misstates the case. Undoubtedly counter-productive in its results, it too was no doubt well-intentioned; but it can only be interpreted as such if we assume that officials like Mr. Duncan were so imbued with victimary ideology that they actually believed that the greater disciplinary problems of minority students were due to racial prejudice a la Bull Connor, even when carried out by largely minority personnel.

    But peu importe. What matters here is the contrast, which I imagine an empirical analysis (were such a thing possible in today’s social science environment) would substantiate, between a “real” pre-2008 program that actually invested money, and a “symbolic” post-2008 program whose only effect was to make the school system still less efficient, helping to perpetuate the minorities’ underclass status that provides the victimocracy with its ideological basis. Minority children may need incentives to improve themselves by education, but minority politics maintains itself by providing their parents with incentives for resentment.

    The beauty of this updated system is that not only does it cost little or nothing to implement while creating no risks to the financial system, it “progressively” does the job that Bull Connor would have done through racial coercion. That is, with no damage whatever to the “global” economy, it functions to maintain minority children in their lack of opportunity, while encouraging their worst elements.

    If most Americans can still afford to remain largely indifferent to this, we might examine the growing lawlessness in countries like Brazil or in Central America, or in the Philippines before Duterte, a situation that is repeating itself in European no-go zones. The control of such areas by criminal gangs is not directly contributory to the global economy, but the rise of a complementary sub-economy, independently of possible areas of overlap (e.g., drug dealing), allows the technosphere to maintain its domination by helping to marginalize the power and influence of the middle class, whose “bourgeois” values are by nature, to the extent that this “nature” still survives, resistant to the victimocracy.

    I can put myself in the shoes of a minority mother who complains that her child is bullied or simply distracted by unruly classmates whom the teacher is reluctant to discipline for fear of being accused of “discrimination.” The principal will no doubt tell her that his hands are tied because of this policy, which is after all designed to “protect” minority children. The parent may see through this, but she certainly won’t be able to provoke a headline on the front pages that cited Michael Brown’s fictive “Hands up, don’t shoot!” And I cannot imagine that a movement like Black Lives Matter would support a policy revision that would lead to increasing the number of black students suspended.


    There are few paradoxes in politics more intriguing than the one I have outlined here. For those interested by Adam Katz’s proposal to find applications for GA ideas in the “disciplines,” one could hardly find a better one than developing an empirical methodology for investigating the details of how a political movement can prosper among minorities and “woke” professionals and technocrats, not forgetting suburban professional no-longer-soccer-mom #MeToo enthusiasts, by denouncing the white-privileged pathology of color-blind melting-pot society in favor of a hyper-racialized one that, while producing no material advantages for the minority underclass, gives full rein to its resentments.

    Although I have not reached the point of despair, I am beginning to fear that Trump may turn out to be not even the beginning of the solution to the problem of affirming firstness in the digital era. If the Democrats return to power in 2020, I can see myself, like the Aesopian fox who told the hedgehog not to chase away the flies sucking his blood because they’d only be replaced with more bloodthirsty ones, regretting our not having elected Hillary in 2016.

    Certainly what looked like a reasonable assumption of the stability of liberal democracy in Francis Fukuyama’s 1989-91 heyday (“end of history” or not) no longer appears so today. We are discovering that the old-fashioned “content of their character” values that were at the heart of the civil rights movement in the days of MLK, that had earlier presided over the foundation of the modern political world, and that had provoked the West’s abolition of slavery, can be stigmatized as “racist” by a coalition of White Guilt and victimary resentment that would impose racial quotas everywhere.


    Among the few pundits I always read with respect, “Spengler” (David P. Goldman) is not only a clear thinker but remarkably well informed about the economic as well as the political world. His recent columns (e.g., “China Leapfrogs the U.S. in 5G Internet,” PJ Media, December 20, 2018) warn us that China’s challenge to the Pax Americana has gone beyond the theft of our technological and military secrets to taking its own high-tech initiatives, notably in the domain of micro-electronics and its military and economic applications. Goldman has been calling on the US to emulate the 1957 mobilization in reaction to Sputnik that led to our putting a man on the moon a dozen years later.

    But those were still the days of the “great generation,” the engineers and Rosie Riveters who churned out warships and tanks and airplanes, the GIs who landed on the beaches of Normandy—and the scientists who solved the Enigma machine and beat the Nazis to the atom bomb.

    An emergency program for the development of new American technology? For the benefit of the white-privileged country that massacred the Native Americans and killed off the passenger pigeon? A nation run by billionaires whose motto is “don’t be evil”? I’ll believe it when I see it.

  • UFT VI — Concluding Unscientific Postscript (with apologies to SK)

    No discussion of firstness can be complete without a mention of the Jews. The uniqueness, for better or worse, of the “first nation” needs no demonstration. Nowadays it is infelicitous to say anything positive about any group that cannot identify as a victim. But the Jews have been victims aplenty, yet saying good things about them is rarely well received, certainly not by those who pride themselves in their White Guilt toward “real” victims.

    The very existence of the term antisemitism, which has no equivalent for other nationalities, allows us to predict that the Jews would not be included in today’s “intersectional” coalition of victimary identities. As for those who thought that the crimes of the Nazis were so terrible that antisemitism would never raise its head… well, we still hate the Nazis, and therefore, we hate the Israelis as the new Nazis, remorselessly committing genocide against innocent Palestinians.

    Clearly the unique envy directed against the Jews, the mention of whose uniqueness merely reinforces it, is a sign that they have committed a crime unique and irreproducible, a felix culpa from which the whole world profits and that can be expiated only by following in their footsteps while condemning those who did it first—the crime of having their God declare himself the One God. Today it is considered bad form to credit the Jews with the invention of monotheism; most secular Jews will do anything to avoid taking responsibility for this innovation. But if indeed Akhenaton, or the Zoroastrians, or whoever, “really” inaugurated monotheism, why then is the entire West dominated by the Hebraic/Abrahamic family of religions?

    A couple of years ago, Adam Katz and I put together a book of essays entitled The First Shall Be the Last: Rethinking Antisemitism (Brill, 2015) that for a change proposed an explanation of antisemitism rather than merely detailing its horrors. For the many books on antisemitism, seemingly without exception, describe it in the same metaphoric register that the Nazis used for the Jews: antisemitism is a “virus,” a “disease,” an “infection” such as might have been spread by the “vermin” of our “mixed race” among pure-blooded Aryans.

    Yet although our book was published under the sponsorship of an organization dedicated to studying and fighting antisemitism, it was virtually ignored by that organization itself, as well as by all the others. Experts on antisemitism want to know everything about it, except what causes it, and the reason is that the “mark” that distinguishes the Jews, unlike the victimary minorities that the intersectionalists diligently ferret out, is not a simple sign of “discrimination.” The Jews are considered to be more skillful than others, more able to learn and excel in the various professions. As writers from Edouard Drumont to Louis Farrakhan are eager to inform us, it is precisely their sinister “cleverness” that makes antisemitic vigilance necessary. But the further one develops this theme, the more antisemitism is made plausible.


    Could things have happened differently? The Romans found the Jews repellent in their intolerant refusal to fit into the polytheistic ecumene, but one could hardly say they envied them. And yet the Romans’ sophisticated polytheism, so civilized in comparison with the intolerant religions of today’s Western and middle-Eastern world, has not survived into the modern age.

    The history of East Asian religion is very different. Buddhism is happy to include previously existing gods within the scene of consciousness whose empty existence in itself is the real locus of the sacred. Nor did a One God appear to reveal this to the Buddha. His revelation is of a Oneness without subjectivity, into which individual human consciousness and its illusory objects dissolve. No doubt the societies generated by the “axial” religions of Buddhism and Judeo-Christianity had different dynamisms, and modernity could hardly have been the product of the Buddhist world-view. Yet Asian societies have adapted quite well to modernity, and bid fair to surpass the West in this respect, demonstrating thereby the advantages of secondarity, for which neither a sacrificial figure nor a hubristic assertion of firstness is necessary.


    It seems strange that 200-odd years after the Enlightenment, one is obliged to point out that the central problems of the human have no “rational” solution but remain in a state of permanent instability, for that is the human condition, and that is why we postulate paradoxical entities like gods, whom we now realize can best be understood as partial visions of the One God that the Jews gave to the world.

    This is not mysticism but common sense. It is the attempts to deny it that have led to the current state in which the most absurd nonsense has become in many domains of knowledge a criterion of academic respectability. I need not burden this Chronicle with examples of the “math is white” variety; they are today the rule rather than the exception.

    If the Jews serve one purpose on whose utility all can agree, it is that they embody the paradoxical status of humanity better than any other human example. God is the most powerful paradoxical concept, but God is smart enough not to “exist” as a worldly being, whereas the Jews, not having acquired this talent, despite many inducements over the centuries to disappear, are often hated and occasionally admired, but never leave the world at rest. The late Jewish thinker Jacques Derrida expressed this paradox by the term différance or “deferral,” an insight that lets us excuse his perverse deformation of Sartre’s pour-soi freed by the néant from its worldly objects into what he describes as language’s failure to be “present” to its worldly referents.

    Différance, deferral is what makes possible the linguistic function that pour-soi and freedom attempt to characterize. What is deferred is what René Girard called violence, which is nothing but a synonym for nature at the moment in which it threatens our existence. Nature, whether or not red in tooth and claw, is violent in that it allows for no deferral of instinct, but at best, the conditioned arousal of an inhibitory counter-instinct. Whereas humans defer nature/violence through culture, of which language and its related representational activities are the instruments.


    The difficulty with GA’s reception as a “new way of thinking,” although it has not yet led to pogroms, is that it has much the same effect as the Jews. Just as antisemitism with all its horrors is easier to bear than even the most preliminary explanation of what antisemitism is really about, it is much less stressful to trade insults about the existence/non-existence of God than to seek to resolve the dispute through the acceptance of our paradoxical nature by both sides.

    As in all other species, some humans are healthier, smarter, stronger, etc., than others. But in the human world, as much as these differences are appreciated on the one hand, they are accursed on the other, since they generate resentment, which uniquely human emotion provides the reason why the human exists in the first place. For to defer the resentment of such differences within the human community on whose maintenance its members depend for survival, we have developed representation, and this invention has kept us going, however precariously, for a pretty long time.

    The Declarative Sentence

    Once you start looking for truth in the outside world, truth in the correspondence between both sides of an equation, it is the world, not ourselves, that offers the response. Whence at the origin of the modern era, in the so-called “axial” moment that coincides with the last centuries before Christ, the two innovations of Hebrew religion and Greek philosophy that led to the creation of Western culture and its subsequent discovery of the scientific method and the market system both involved the foregrounding of the declarative sentence or proposition.

    One of the key tenets of GA is the non-originarity of the declarative sentence, which is for philosophers not just originary with humanity, but so to speak prior to the universe itself. Just as Platonic thinkers believe that mathematics exists independently of the humans who “discover” it, so they unconsciously assume the virtual existence of propositional language, independently of the intelligent creatures capable of making use of it. But although philosophers are not shy of making this claim about mathematics, they never speak of the virtual reality of language. For to bring it up at all would raise the question of its non-existence, whereas the very existence of philosophy depends on never putting that of language into question.

    What about the Jews? In Exodus 3, God gives his “name” as a declarative sentence: ehyeh asher ehyeh, “I am that I am.” You don’t have to believe that God himself spoke these words to Moses to understand the significance of this revelation, or why the people who received it would come to be called the “chosen.”

    In comparison to the founding of philosophy by Parmenides and Plato, what is striking about the Hebrew revelation is its paradoxical nature. If God is simply Being itself, why does he use (human) language at all? Spinoza’s deus sive natura doesn’t speak to anyone. Why does Moses have to ask his name before God reveals it? And how can this self-identical God nevertheless promise to stand by “his people”? There are no independent criteria that would permit us to answer these questions. God’s definition of his own being must take precedence over any rules of logic or usage.

    The discovery that objective knowledge can be built on verifiable predications about the real world and their logical/mathematical consequences is the foundation of modern civilization, even if it took a couple of millennia to radically change people’s lives. There is nothing paradoxical about predication and logic, so long as we take its possibility for granted, which is what philosophy has done since Parmenides conceived the idea of the Way of Truth, in contrast to that of the doxa whose signs are ungrounded in Being.

    Whereas the Hebrews understood that the declarative sentence is not a tool of knowledge available from all eternity that men had simply to download from on high, that it was in the first place a gift of the sacred, and that the sacred was in the first place accessible only through our not-yet-declarative signs, which in its sacrality it allowed us to discover as means of addressing it—and through which it would at a moment in historical time inform us that its reality was not that of nameable things, but of self-identity itself.

    And most crucial of all, unlike Parmenides and his followers, the Mosaic “us” that was so informed was an interlocutor to the revelation, so that for the rest of human history, the people so addressed would be singled out for envy above all others, and despised as unworthy of the envy they inspire.

    As a shortcut to all this, we can say that the Hebrews were the first nation under God, to whom the God whose name is a declarative sentence revealed his un-ostensive being and promised its freedom and assigned the role of “light unto the nations”—the sole nation of world-historical importance to survive without a territory of its own for two millennia.


    To be a Jew obliges one to face this historical role, and hopefully to face up to it. Sadly, many if not most American Jews have reconceived their role in the framework of “repairing the world” by joining the victimocracy of the Democratic Party, often to the point of supporting BDS and deploring Trump’s move of the US embassy to Jerusalem. I think that the Jews, as the one group that has the most suffered for firstness, are the group that has the clearest duty to defend it against the victimocracy. We have paid our dues.

    White Guilt is a lie, and we if anyone should be smart enough to see this. Our role in the world is not to be the new Nazis, as the Jew-haters assure us we have become, but rather to demonstrate by thought and act that firstness is not equivalent to Nazism. It was not firstness but victimary thinking, antisemitism’s fellow remedy for resentment’s excesses, that produced “national socialism,” and socialism as well. Whatever we think of Jesus’ offering of himself as a sacrifice to human fraternity, the Jews cannot but affirm the necessity that humanity continue to live with the paradox that gave it birth.

  • Toward a Globalist-Victimary Unified Field Theory: Part V — A Morality of Firstness

    The originary hypothesis, the core of generative anthropology, is so simple that many mistake it for a return to the pre-evolutionary speculations on language origin of Condillac or Herder, whose scenarios I discussed in The Scenic Imagination. Ironically, this minimalism, with its appeal to Ockham’s razor, disqualifies the hypothesis a priori in the eyes of social scientists as based on an speculative scenario that is empirically unfalsifiable. As a result, the clearly unsatisfactory nature of social science’s own explanations of the origin of language, and of the human culture that depends on it, is taken simply as an encouragement to continue in the hopes of coming closer to the goal, even if the objective results, by any measure of their intellectual content, suggest rather that the very nature of the problem they are attempting to solve increasingly escapes them.

    If human language and its related representations indeed constitute as Karl Popper claimed a World 2 separate from that of reality, or in Sartre’s Hegelian terms, the world of the pour-soi in opposition to the en-soi, then the conception of language as an “emergence” of the protohuman brain’s increased cognitive capacity is simply a category error. The creation/discovery of a new world cannot be reduced to an improvement in preexisting technology. In our Enlightenment passion to reject the myths of our religious heritage, we have forgotten that the mysteries of the “supernatural” are of secondary importance to the unprecedented creation of a communication system by which we can share ideas which, as opposed to mental images and sensations, exist in a meaningful sense only as part of this system. The idea that individuals had “thoughts” that they invented language in order to communicate to each other is as absurd as claiming that genes were invented because creatures wanted to transmit their traits to their offspring. A thought is a representation; there is no such thing as a “thought” not already represented by signs.

    Our increasing suspicion of the intellectual content of (Western) culture leads us to deprecate its conceptualizations of human consciousness in favor of studying the neural complexity that alone is considered relevant for the emergence of human language. It goes without saying that religious thinking is ignored; but characteristic of recent times is the neglect, by students of the “cognitive revolution,” of the Western philosophical tradition as well, despite its focus since Descartes on the nature of individual consciousness. In our victimary era, “speciesism” is akin to racism, and it is thought shameful to suggest that we possess not merely a quantitative but qualitative superiority to other creatures; human language and culture are merely the “natural” products of our more complex brains.

    We inhabit an intellectual world where on one part of campus, philosophers continue in the Platonic tradition to study the “ideas” we find in our consciousness, as though the language we use to describe them were an instrument external to the ideas themselves, while on another part of campus, psychologists and linguists study the operations of language without any consideration for the reflections of the philosophers, discussing the cognitive functions of the brain as though digital computers alone provided scientifically useful models of our nervous system. Yet, whatever the specialists tell us, natural-scientific knowledge is insufficient to model the origin of language and culture. This can only be done from a humanist perspective.

    Becoming human was not an effect of genetic mutations, which enabled it but did not accomplish it. It was brought about by a discovery/invention that can only retrospectively be spoken of as the result of attaining a certain level of neuronal complexity. Before humanity could be born in the symmetrical exchange of language, humans had not only to have the individual mental capacity but the collective occasion to grasp the possibility that a nonproductive action could be used as a voluntary sign, in contrast to the indexical signs produced as byproducts of practical or involuntary actions and reactions. The protohuman community becomes human only when its survival depends on its renouncement of the (sacred) central object and on its collective sharing of this knowledge via the exchange of the sign.

    What I have called the “moral model” of the reciprocal exchange of signs around a sacred center provides the anthropological foundation for our universal sense of moral equality. It is this sense that explains the “categorical imperative” and the religious and political assertions of this equality rather than the reverse.


    It bears remarking that GA’s use of the term “firstness” is less a borrowing than a neologism. The introduction of firstness into the originary hypothesis is due to Adam Katz’ seminal article “Remembering Amalek: 9/11 and Generative Thinking” (Anthropoetics 10, 2). I have taken the liberty of simplifying C. S. Peirce’s original use of this term, as followed in Adam’s article, redefining it as the status of the one who goes first.

    For Adam’s main point in this article is to redescribe the originary event, the symmetrical exchange of the aborted gesture of appropriation converted into a sign, as a necessarily conscious innovation by one or several individuals, not an action spontaneously performed, as the abortion itself of the gesture may well have been, by the entire group. Such an act could not be an unthinking effect of mimesis, since it involves the emergence of a new consciousness. Given that, as I had stated, the origin of the first self-conscious act could not take place unconsciously, it follows that it could not spontaneously have occurred to all the members of the group. Were it a mere instinctive withdrawal, as suggested by the image of the hands hesitating to take the last piece of cake, it would not inaugurate a new form of comunicative behavior, let alone an entirely new dimension of consciousness. Once the members of the group come to defer their act of appropriation, they have liberated themselves from the automatism of “instinct,” and at that point it is as “free” individuals that they are at liberty to reflect on the potential new status of the “aborted gesture” as the shared designation of a sacred/significant central object.

    It is to the freedom that made the sign possible in the first place, and that permits its use to transcend the symmetry of the communal sharing of meaning that makes human existence possible, that I have given the name of firstness, in order to emphasize the impossibility of avoiding priority even in the most utopian vision of the human community. It is essential to point out that the exchange of signs, and similar cultural acts, are the only ones that permit the seamless adoption of an individual’s innovation by the entire community, and that it is precisely this possibility of firstness that makes it the foundation of the human community.

    The sign as the originary instrument of human firstness provides the ideal example of an original creation that can be indefinitely transmitted to others to everyone’s gain. That is, signs are the only things that can be freely exchanged without limit, and their creation is precisely what maintains the possibility of peace. In any instance of firstness that breaks this symmetry, the community, whose very humanity is constituted by the symmetrical exchange of signs, cannot but be disturbed, and forced to readjust.


    To be complete, this theorizing on firstness must be completed by what in The End of Culture (UC 1985) I called the “secondary revelation,” which took place at the beginning of the Neolithic or agricultural age: the usurpation of the sacred center by a human—at first the “big man” who deprives himself of food to be able to nourish the other members of the tribe, then chiefs, kings, emperors, and elected presidents.

    But what is curious in the victimary age is how insistently oppression is related solely to ascriptive categories; inequalities of wealth and power, including the traditional rich-poor dichotomy, are largely ignored except insofar as they can be conceived within those categories. “Poor whites” are not only not considered “oppressed,” they are seen as “deplorables” full of “oppressive” Nazi-like ideas, in contrast with the woke billionaires that it is very uncool to resent.

    The notion of “intersectionality,” which seeks to link the various ascriptive oppressions in a common opposition to the “privileged,” is generally understood as a political slogan allowing for the cooperation of various activist groups. Yet its ideological consequence is to locate the principal division in the society between this collection of groups and the nebulously and negatively defined “unmarked” possessors of “white privilege.” Which is to say that “privilege,” which since the French Revolution had been associated primarily with wealth and secondarily with political power, is now defined primarily by race and gender.

    This tactic could not work were it not grounded in the implicit caste structure of contemporary American society. The creation of a “lower class” of recent immigrants, many illegal, who work as gardeners, domestics, handymen, or in low-level service jobs in exchange for eventual citizenship (if not for them, then for their children) benefits the wealthy and upper middle-class, while their uncertain status reduces the pressure on the labor market. This class, like their “progressive” employers, share a political interest in supporting the Democratic Party. At least so far, this party’s globalist politics has not had to face, as it would in Europe, the problem of the mass immigration of Muslims increasingly alienated from Western values. Nor can one compare the “revolt” that led to Trump’s election in 2016 with the increasing chaos of European politics, faced with demographic decline and increasingly open conflict between national and global values.

    Beginning with claiming the always-already discriminatory/oppressive nature of language (white over black, male over female), victimary ideology redefines moral equality as the goal of an “intersectional” struggle against ascriptive discrimination. But what deconstruction found in texts, intersectional activists find embodied in all traditional human behaviors.

    The beauty of this system is that, like a moral neutron bomb, it attacks only human attitudes while leaving the economic infrastructure intact. This benefits not just the woke billionaires; it permits the economic system to operate at near-maximal efficiency at the relatively manageable cost of maintaining a welfare economy cum affirmative action for victimary minorities. Lip service is paid to criticizing “inequality,” but there is little or no pressure to check the growth of the winner-take-all aspect of the global economy, as illustrated most clearly by the dominance of Silicon Valley firms (“GAFA”) and the extraordinary wealth of their leading investors. Instead, we are asked to “check our privilege,” the “whiteness” we have possessed from time immemorial.

    If we bracket the absurd side effects (“math is white”) of this process, it reflects the intuition that the current problems of hierarchy, in short, of the liberal-democratic meritocracy, cannot be solved in the absence of a level playing field. In today’s newsworld, one has the impression that if we could eliminate all ascriptive claims of victimage, there would be nothing outrageous left to report.

    For example, one cannot avoid noticing that in the woke community, Islamic terrorism inspires less hostility to Muslims than a backlash of sympathy and warning against “Islamophobia,” often accompanied by anger at those accused of “blaming Islam” for these actions. Such is never the case for someone who can be accused, on whatever evidence, of ascriptive discrimination.

    My point here is less to deplore this than to point out its implications. If one sought an explanation of why an involuntary racial slur is more outrageous than a terrorist act, the answer would be simply this: if we could do away with racism, we would have no problems with terrorism. The murderous activities of Palestinians are described as the acts of freedom fighters seeking to reclaim the land stolen from them by the European Jews, and all terrorism can be understood in the same manner. If only we could eliminate racism (and sexism, ableism, cisgenderism…), we could deal with our differences in a civilized manner. Once more, I would cite in support of this contention John Rawls’ model of the “just” society as one in which all ascriptive characteristics such as race and gender are hidden behind the “veil of ignorance.”

    If this sounds fantastic, one should consider that the invention of CRISPR-Cas9 and similar tools for gene modification justify, or at least enable, futurist speculation anticipating wholesale ameliorations of our genome—to the point where, for example, Yuval Harari’s best-selling Sapiens (Harper 2014 [2011]) does not hesitate to predict the rise of a new bionic-cyborgian species to replace ours in the next century or so. Whatever the plausibility of such predictions, while the economy continues to function, the least hope of eliminating the material basis of ascriptive discrimination offers a useful pretext for kicking the can of “the good society” down the road, while fighting micro-aggressions en attendant.

    To be continued…