Author: staceymeeker

  • Originary Ethics

    [Those not familiar with the originary hypothesis are referred to the description on pp. 12-18, and in particular pp. 14-15, of my on-line monograph, The Girardian Origins of GA (available for $0.99 at Amazon.com).


    In all the years in which I have attempted to explain GA in writing and in speech, I have tended to place the major emphasis on representation, and in particular on “formal representation” or language. One of the points I have insisted on is that human language is qualitatively different from animal “languages”; the researches and insights of such as Terrence Deacon have essentially ended the debate on this point. But it follows from my very “definition” of the human as the species that poses a greater problem to its own survival than the totality of forces outside the human community that the primary transformation of the proto-human into the human was ethical. Language and more broadly, representation emerged, per the originary hypothesis, to defer conflict, not to provide a cognitive or ratiocinative tool. But in the configuration of the originary event, the moral model of the reciprocal exchange of the sign is just as indubitably unique a human creation as language, and indeed more essential to the success of the event—and to the consequent emergence of our species. The urgent need that the event fulfills is to find a model of behavior that can defer violence within a community for which one-on-one animal hierarchy no longer provides an adequate solution.

    If as it seems clear the original function of language was not cognitive but collaborative, the common designation of the central object through the sign is “arbitrary” in the Saussurean sense, not (yet) because the designative gesture is as divorced from its designatum as “cow” is from a cow, but more fundamentally, because the very practice of designating something, of pointing, is new, and its object, however appetitively attractive, cannot a priori be said to “justify” such an unprecedented act. But conversely, the sign is “infinitely” motivated since the community that makes use of it as the first sign of its language would not exist without it. Language is ethical in the most fundamental sense of being indispensable to the establishment of the originary human ethnos or communal (“ethnic”) group. The reciprocal emission and reception of a sign representing a common sacred object provides a model of equal status with respect to a “transcendent” object that can be intended but not (immediately) possessed. This model establishes the scene, with a human periphery and a sacred center, as the model of all human interactions. (It also anticipates the problem posed by hierarchy in human institutions, as will be discussed in the next Chronicle.)

    This originary emphasis on the ethical allows us to explain the apparent anomalies of language, viewed as an instrument of logical reasoning or the communication of information. It clarifies Frankfurt’s category of BS, which I have found helpful in describing the language of such things as antisemitic accusations (see Chronicle 429). More profoundly, this emphasis allows us to better understand the anomalies of religious thought and the inextricable quandaries that face those who inquire into the “existence of God.” Perhaps, in a perverse sense, it can also be said to explain the near-phobic reaction this mode of thought provokes in most of those who hear of it. The assertion that language is primarily ethical is paradoxical on its face, since to be understood, it must take language as first cognitive, making “statements of fact.” But the “statement of fact” asserts that, in fact, what is really important about language is its ability to unite (and subsequently, to divide); the first use of language is to agree on a common object we can call sacred, to “worship” it if one likes, as in another world outside the “metonymic” world of appetite.

    How then apply the criteria of reasoning, of the “excluded middle,” to such statements? These paradoxes too are best understood as ethical. If language was “invented” in the service of humankind, then our difficulties with language are in the first place contradictions in ethics. For as I have pointed out in Chronicle 390 (“The Fundamental Paradox of Signification”), the communal function of language is paradoxical in an originary sense that cannot be encompassed by a simple logical sequence. That is, if indeed language is as I have described it, the idea that the meaning of the word both precedes and is generated by the word itself—and that the originary “meaning” is simply being-designated, that is, being intended in the sense that this paradoxical expression refers to “intending” an object absent the intention to appropriate it—can only be expressed in a language that has already been founded on this paradox. Logic is the technique of manipulating the invariants in the language situation, provided that we accept its rules. But before we can say A=A, we must assume that the originary difficulty of choosing something to name A has been abolished, as though it had already been established that “somethings” existed before being named, and this can only have occurred as a result of the common agreement on the originary sacred central object of desire. Because we all desire this thing, we can consider it a thing, that is, something “in itself” beyond desire, something we can gesture at without our gesture either terminating in the object or being failed and forgotten, and consequently, without the continued existence of the object being affected by our gesture. It is this creation of the intentional object itself that is the core of human ethics, ethics based not simply on “consciousness” but on conscience, on shared knowledge of a moral model that, precisely, includes the sacred central object in relation to which we define our equality, not in abstract terms but in those of the reciprocal exchange of the sign of designation/renunciation/intentionality.

    This intuition is indeed the core of generative anthropology: it is the core of what it means to be human. That we can use language to describe reality and that we can establish rules of logic by which the relationships between (certain) signs and (certain) objects may be controlled is both the consequence and the cause of this moral relationship. We call this a “paradox” because logic derives statements from other statements, whereas at the origin such derivation is obviously impossible, since we cannot simply “translate” an originary act into a “proposition.” We may say in descriptive terms that the human is scenic in its mode of communicative existence, but our intuition of a scene is obviously not realizable or graspable in a context where scenes do not yet exist. Not that the all-too-familiar “always already” is more than a verbal finesse. The newness of language cannot fully be understood in the terms of the old, including whatever degree of proto-scenicity may be said to obtain among higher apes.

    One feature of the human with which we must come to terms—and it is our recalcitrance in accepting it that has made GA so apparently unacceptable—is that we cannot grasp the nature of the human in some “axiomatic” sense more clearly than in the scenario, the hypothetically reconstructed scene, described in the originary hypothesis. This does not mean that this scene is a privileged revelation that I am doing the world the favor of transmitting to it, but that with all its necessary inadequacy it is roughly as good as we can do. As soon as we go beyond the boundaries of a single scene of origin, we make it impossible to model the scenic coming-to-consciousness of the sign.

    Religious believers know this in their fashion and claim consequently that in order to fix our human nature in our minds, which for them is emphatically not a merely heuristic process, but one without which we have no real claim at a “complete” humanity conscious of its own essence, we must understand the scene as the revelation of an already-existing sacred. (The inconsistencies that this reveals in Girard’s religious anthropology deserve our attention, and will be dealt with in a later Chronicle.) For indeed, what is sacred is only in a secondary sense made sacred, as the function of “making-sacred” or sacrifice makes clear. Sacrifice always presupposes a preexisting divinity; one does not make something sacred in the strong, substantial sense of the term, but one assimilates it to an already-existing sacred being.Transubstantiation is so to speak the quintessential version of this process, whereby a humble piece of breadstuff becomes (but cannot be said to create, at least not in any originary sense) the body of Christ. The “man creates God” side of the originary event is not acceptable to the mind that focuses on the logic of the sacred— although we might say that its very paradoxicality furnishes the revelatory energy of the sacrificial event: we know we are not creating Christ’s body, but if God did not (yet) exist and we had to invent him for ourselves…

    The religious mind respects the logic of the sacred as, so to speak, part of a pre-human, divine thought process, whereas for the “enlightened” atheist, the sacred is a purely human phenomenon, an “arbitrary” designation. For the latter, the logic of the sacred is not that of an (empirically verifiable) attribute, but that of a name, a label that alone confers the “quality” we pretend inherent in its bearer. The “enlightened” mind is not concerned with what I call the fundamental paradox of signification. If on the one hand I call something a cat, that doesn’t make it a cat, since if it is indeed a cat, it was already a cat. If on the other hand I call something sacred, that doesn’t refer to a preexisting quality like cat-ness, it is merely a name we give to objects intended for use in certain “sacralizing” practices. But this presupposes a world of signs and things and a consciousness that can tell them apart; it helps us not at all to understand how a first sign could emerge whose primary function could only be to establish sign-ness, signification, by separating out its object from the appetitive world, hence making it transcendent, and forcing the sign-users to signify it.

    I have gone through this demonstration hundreds of times, and I fail to see how it can be refuted; but it can simply be turned away from. For even if one admit that this is arguably the most parsimonious scenario for the communal origin of language, given its presumed impossibility of verification, I cannot “refute” the assertion à la Durkheim that we should not speak of that of which we have no empirical evidence. My point is that this skepticism is naive; if one has no theory of language origin, one in effect assumes with no justification other than its empirical existence the possibility of creating a universe of signs that obeys the rules of Russell’s “theory of types” in not interfering essentially or “ontologically” with the object-world to which its signs refer. Once this truly extraordinary metaphysical leap has been made, one can reason about naming and reference as though the logic of consistent designation, deduction, etc., were somehow inherent in the universe itself.

    This Platonic idea, which is often expressed with respect to mathematics, conflates two things that can be distinguished only on the basis of… the originary hypothesis or its equivalent. The logic of numbers, etc., as we define them is inherent in the objects we have defined. If we define 2 as 1+1, etc., then 1+3=2+2 is inherent in the system we have created, not in “the universe.” When we apply this system to measuring aspects of the universe, it should not surprise us that the same rules apply: one planet plus three planets equals two planets plus two planets. But it is the height of naiveté to deduce from this that the universe “itself” embodies the logic of our system. The universe doesn’t count or measure; we do. It may be an objective fact that there are (now) eight planets in the solar system, but that is not a “mathematical” truth. The Platonists are right in claiming that the logic of mathematics is invulnerable to arbitrary postulations a la Dostoevsky’s 2+2=5, but that logic is independent of its “application” to the universe, which really means its application to the mathematical data we collect from applying our model to the universe. The planets are just there, they don’t themselves participate in equations.

    But mathematics is the least of our concerns. In retrospect, I find it well-nigh amazing that philosophers have been so little concerned with the origin of the instrument that they use with such certain intuition to construct and elucidate their theories. Is it ordained from on high that a species of mammal will have a system of signs that permits it to do… philosophy? How can one “love wisdom” and yet pay no attention to the origin of the instrument that permits one to acquire, or indeed to conceive of “wisdom”? “Anthropology” is supposedly a lower form of thought than philosophy because it is limited to empirically existing creatures, whereas philosophy applies to “mind” in general. This is, not to put too fine a point on it, arrogant nonsense. We may never be able to fully understand what it means to have language, or to put it more rigorously, to understand the workings of the universe independently of the system in which we encode it, but this by no means absolves us of the obligation to hypothesize how language might have come into being. For in the absence of such a hypothesis, we do not thereby become innocent of any presuppositions concerning language, as though it were a neutral tool whose origin is irrelevant to the presumably benign use we make of it, along the lines of “guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” For dealing with “nature,” this attitude may be more or less sufficient, but as someone like Bruno Latour will be glad to tell you, we only intermittently deal with “nature” without also dealing with “the human.”

    The only real refutation of these principles of GA is, so to speak, “empirical”: GA has been around for thirty years and has had no impact whatever on what may be called “mainstream thought.” Does that mean that GA represents an “end of philosophy” that philosophy cannot assimilate? or worse, is GA nothing but a useless set of speculations about a mystery that is “by definition” insoluble? Needless to say, none of these possibilities can be claimed to be deducible from the terms themselves. GA is both and neither anthropology and philosophy; it is an anthropology that has no pretension of empirical verification beyond a vague sense of plausibility; yet, like, but in contrast to philosophy, instead of deducing all from “first principles,” GA claims to set, pace Kant, the essence of human rationality in a worldly model rather than a “pure” construct of Reason.

    This contrast is not to my mind to the credit of philosophy, whose failure to take seriously the origin of the human along with representation seems so strange to me today. Nor has philosophy truly been transformed by the “linguistic turn” that leads our Anglo-Saxon philosophers and their disciples to split hairs over the definitions of words. Even Austin’s model of “performance,” which is about as close to anthropology as philosophy has ever come, is never understood in terms of the minimal conditions of human institutions and their operation, but taken in the usual Oxford sitting-room style as a curious “fact”: “Doing things with words.” How delightfully odd! If I say, “I now pronounce you man and wife,” nothing happens, but if a minister says it in the right circumstance… But the idea that somehow this relates or rather should be related to something called the originary function of language would be terribly out of place in such a conversation. As such statements have been “out of place” in every “serious” conversation about humanity or language, even religion.

    I have no illusions that after 430 Chronicles this one will prove a revelation. Nevertheless, I think it my duty to insist on the ethical core of the hypothesis, because it brings the “categorical imperative” and the Girardian souci des victimes back to the originary moment of language, the Word that was in the beginning, whether or not one need identify it with Jesus. Let it not be said that the main point of GA or of my “emendation” of Girard’s “emissary mechanism” is the “addition” of language/representation to the mix. That “addition” was necessary because the point of the human from the beginning, and not merely since the introduction of the extra layer of self-consciousness supplied by the Judeo-Christian, is the deferral of violence—through representation.


    In the follow-up to this essay I will attempt to deal with complicating problem of ethics that I still feel I have not explored with sufficient assiduity, that of hierarchy—the subject, in preliminary terms, of my talk at the Ottawa GASC in 2009.


  • The End of Antisemitism?

    In her 1973 The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt explains the virulence of modern antisemitism by the fact that the Jews, who had played an important role as international intermediaries in medieval Europe, were no longer needed in this role in the increasingly global political and economic marketplace of the early modern and bourgeois eras. The Jews were resented now that their access to monarchs and historically tolerated international connections were perceived as undeserved privileges. The classic expression of such sentiments was the sad 18th-century tale of Joseph “Süss” Oppenheimer, the basis of the novel and play Jew Süss, best known in its 1940 Nazi film version by Veit Harlan.

    The degree to which these privileges motivated general hostility to Jews is a question for historians, but we can certainly connect the resentment of the court Jew to the more systematic reflections of Karl Marx, whose work on the Judenfrage I discussed in Chronicle 406. We have here an example of the contrast between a historical approach to human motivation and an understanding founded on originary anthropology. Resentment of the Jews’ “tribal” facility with money, both as local moneylenders and as international bankers—still detectable in the “antisemitism lite” of Mearsheimer and Walt or Thomas Friedman—is not simply the product of a chain of contingent circumstances (Christians can’t practice usury, European Jews have no fixed national home…) but reflects much more directly the Hebrews’ originary role as the discoverers/inventors of monotheism.

    For the ethical insight of monotheism is that the originary sacred scene is defined by its model of moral reciprocity, and hence that the core of the ethics of the “tribe,” as expressed notably in the Ten Commandments, should be considered “categorical imperatives” generalizable to humanity as a whole. This emphasis on universal laws not bound by place reflects the exodic and exilic nature of Judaism from its beginnings, and provides an opening to the market’s generalization of exchange, and hence to the use of money, that was not available to “rooted” cultures. Jewish firstness has been transmuted into a greater facility and comfort with abstraction, a translation of the exodic relationship between a people and its communal god that is understood to be the One God and consequently encountered in a place but in essence detached from place. One can see perverse traces of an awareness of this in Palestinian claims that the Jews have no historical attachment to Jerusalem or to Israel generally. In factual terms absurd, these claims nevertheless reflect and indeed confirm the placeless or “exodic” essence of Judaism, in contrast with the Islamic goal of the conquest of territory for the Umma.

    Marx’s reflections are the great crux of our understanding of modern antisemitism. No doubt, to affirm that the Jews worship not God but money is a calumny. But if we recall Marx’s punch line that in the modern world, all Christians have become Jews, the relation of the Jews to modernity is revealed to be exactly the same as their relationship to monotheistic religion: that of firstness. Just as in the Western world all Christians first “became Jews” in worshiping the One God, so they have now followed the Jews in “worshiping” money, which in less polemical terms simply means in conceiving the free market as the basic source of economic value. In no way does this imply a rejection of reciprocal morality, although it modifies the terms of this reciprocity, which comes to be embodied typically in the transaction rather than in the gift-exchanges of traditional society.

    Except of course that, in contrast with monotheism, money, however much the Jews have been associated with it, is not a Jewish invention. And just as the Jews did not invent money, neither are they the masters of the market that its generalized use brings into being. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the height of antisemitic BS, describes a conspiracy that by definition can never be proven, its secret nature insuring that we can only “know” it through uncertain, unverifiable means, since its subjects will always deny its existence. We believe it exists because we find it useful to believe it exists, and believe it all the more because the accused deny it exists.

    Thus the Jews become the “scapegoats” for the unpredictability of the market, or more specifically, its decentralized generation of information. Just as the sacred can be conceived in Durkheimian terms as the expression of the values of the society as a whole as against those of its individual members, so the market generates information about values that no individual can create on his own. But if the One God can be understood as a the guardian of humanity’s universal set of sacred values, the market has no center. The Jew who is the presumed “chosen” of the One God, that is, a human being inexplicably singled out as the first recipient of God’s revelation, comes in the context of the market system to be seen as himself the “god” of the system, the master of information that no one in fact possesses. This is one way of understanding the surprisingly greater virulence of antisemitism in the bourgeois era. What is new in the market system is that the unpredictable resultant of indefinitely many transactions is now systematically recycled as information into the economy. Where the product of unforeseeable operations could in the past be assimilated to the inscrutable will of a divinity, it can now be understood as created by a conspiratorial human will, and although no one can control a free market, conversely, no one can demonstrate that its workings are indeed independent of clandestine influences. Hence the figure of the Jew as the beneficiary of unjustly imposed firstness can be adapted directly to that of secret master of the market. This is not quite Marx’s idea, but by emphasizing Jewish primacy with respect to money, antisemitic ideology naturally extends itself in this direction.

    Whence the series of book-length diatribes on the “Jewish question” that precede the Protocols, notably Toussenel’s Les juifs rois de l’époque (1847) and Edouard Drumont’s best-selling 1886 La France juive, whose very title asserts that France is essentially if not entirely in the hands of its Jewish minority. Such works are not, even mutatis mutandis, “texts of persecution,” although they certainly exemplify BS on a very large scale. Rather than reflecting the style of briefs to be used in a court case, they are works of “persuasion” designed to arouse “public opinion” to take unspecified measures to resist what is presented as near-complete Jewish domination. Their purpose was not to promote any specific program but to “raise consciousness”; as Drumont puts it, Aryan France is a sleeping giant that once roused will presumably make an end to Jewish domination. But it is striking that here and throughout the Dreyfus era, French antisemitism never had a concrete political program beyond supporting Dreyfus’ conviction and shouting “Mort aux Juifs!”

    Even in the German-speaking countries, the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy were never really able to deal with the “Jewish question,” beyond tolerating garden-variety prejudice and petty discrimination, and permitting such restrictions as the numerus clausus. Hitler alone in his murderous obsession formulated a full-fledged antisemitic program to defend “Aryan” society against the Jews. The classic quotation from the end of Vol. 1, Chapter 2 of Mein Kampf is, “Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord.” More than a simple demonstration of man’s inhumanity to man, the peculiar horror of the Holocaust reflected what appeared at least after the fact as a fully coherent anti-Jewish policy that took with full seriousness the ideological principle of bourgeois antisemitism. (As Timothy Snyder points out in Bloodlands [Basic Books, 2010], had the German conquest of the Soviet Union accomplished its goals, it is likely that the Jews who perished in the extermination camps would have been deported to the East and worked rather than gassed to death.) Of course even were the Protocols a true reflection of reality, the Holocaust would have been a moral horror, but if the Jews truly conspired to dominate the world one could nevertheless defend, if not the gas chambers, then Hitler’s basic position on “the Jewish question.”

    To make this point with respect to the Holocaust is in no way to minimize it; on the contrary. The coherence of Nazi ideology did not merely lead to horrible deeds, it reflected a pernicious view of the human world: the denial of Jewish firstness in the discovery of monotheism, which is the denial of the Jewish and subsequently Christian basis of Western civilization and of modernity as we know it. And this in the name of the fantastic idea that the free market, as the translation into economic terms of the Christian and ultimately Jewish intuition of the originary scene and its moral universality, is in fact a wholly immoral instrument of Jewish domination.


    The postwar situation, despite the great ethical advance constituted by eliminating virtually all de jure group-based distinctions between humans, reflects the incapacity of the victimary consciousness stimulated by the Holocaust to grasp the ideological basis of Nazism. One might say that the horrors of the camps did Hitler a perverse service by masking the specifically antisemitic rationale of his ideology. But in any case, antisemitism itself would surely have survived the Holocaust. The new source of its energy if not of its ideological content would be found in the Muslim world. The state of Israel, the embodiment of the Jews’ return to their Middle-Eastern homeland after their millennial experience of what had evolved into the modern Judeo-Christian civilization of Europe, became the focus of Muslim hostility as an alien product of the Jewish Diaspora. But where Hitler’s antisemitism corresponded to the affirmation as serious truth of the BS of the Protocols, Muslim hostility to Israel is ideologically grounded in the universal destiny of Islam, the corollary of which is that no previously Islamic territory can fall into non-Muslim, and surely not Jewish hands. Muslim antisemitism explains the obvious backwardness of the Muslim world with respect to the modern marketplace and its technology by identifying modernity with the Jews. The dominant position of the US in the world economy is easily enough associated with the same Jewish dominance. Sayyid Qutb’s exhortations to postwar Islamism, catalyzed by his horror at the licentiousness of 1940s Denver, Colorado, combine with horror at the dominance of Israel in the Middle East—and such as Mearsheimer and Walt are happy to solidify the link.

    Whereas we can observe how modern antisemitism evolved in the light of the completed history of Nazism, we lack this advantage for the antisemitism of the postwar era. The Holocaust allows us to understand the horror of taking seriously the extrapolation from Jewish “exilic” abstraction to conspiratorial power over money and the market. Muslim hostility to Israel, in contrast, has not finished working itself out, and there is at least a sliver of hope that it can ultimately be resolved through cooperation between Israel and the liberal elements of Palestinian society. No doubt this hope has continually diminished in the years since the Camp David agreements, Oslo, and the growth of antisemitism in Europe and Asia (and on the American left) as if in resonance with Middle-Eastern hostility to Israel (see Chronicle 302 for a discussion of Mohammed Mahathir’s 2003 speech to the Islamic Summit Conference), increasingly gives the impression that the old paradigm has been revived in a modified form.

    Today’s Jews are seen less as the masters of the capitalist market than as using their wealth to control the political process directly. The existence of Israel allows the Elders of Zion to come out of the shadows as agents of the Jewish State—a state, alone of the nations of the world, considered openly by many as intrinsically illegitimate. From the Muslim standpoint, “Palestine” is a land of the Umma to which the Jews have neither legal nor historical rights. The oft-repeated claims that Jews never inhabited Palestine, that the Palestinian Arabs are descendants of the original “Canaanites,” that Jerusalem was never a Jewish city… mirror the Muslim claim that the Uncreated Koran is older than the Torah, from which, as the most superficial reading makes clear, it derives most of its religious history. For the Muslim world, Israel is the demonstration of the spuriousness of Jewish firstness; the Jews who claim to be returning to the land of their ancestors are European colonialists occupying a territory with no ancient connection to Jews at all. The insistence on such claims is significantly exacerbated by the objective reality of “post-socialist” Israel’s increasingly striking economic success, which contrasts all too evidently with the “third world” status of Muslim countries, dependent on oil wealth originally discovered and processed by Western interests.

    What is new is that, in contrast with the era of bourgeois antisemitism, the Jews no longer inhabit the same countries as their “victims.” Following the creation of Israel and such events as the Iranian revolution, almost all Jews have been forced out of the countries of the Muslim Middle East, in most cases leaving their property behind. This objectively scandalous turn of events (cf. the “Palestinian refugee crisis”) has never aroused the least indignation anywhere outside of Jewish circles; expelling Jews is understood as a legitimate act for Muslim countries in the face of the existence of a Jewish state that will presumably command Jewish loyalties. So there is no Egypte juive or Irak juif for a latter-day Drumont to chronicle. In consequence, today’s Jewish achievements are seen less as the sort of local crimes chronicled by the latter than vaguer and vaster criminal enterprises on a world scale, illegitimate a priori because they take place on “occupied” territory. The Jews insure their continued world domination by, for example, promoting drug addiction among Gentiles (dixit Iran VP Mohammad Reza Rahimi this August 7) and even, in the writings of “serious” Muslim scholars at major Middle-Eastern universities, by means of the familiar pre-Passover blood-letting.

    This is not “scapegoating” on a level with blaming the Jews for poisoning wells during a plague. It is a cosmic denial of Jewish solidarity with the human race. The point is no longer to catch and execute some poor Jew (if one could be found) on blood libel charges, but to condemn the Jews en bloc in what are essentially Satanic terms. In this manner, today’s Muslim antisemitism offers an even more global explanation of the way of the modern world than that of the Nazis, who were after all participants in modern industrial society. Indeed, contemporary Muslim antisemitism synthesizes medieval, modern, and postmodern BS into what would appear to be antisemitism’s maximal form, as the explanation for all evil in the world. Unsurprisingly, we await in vain any outcry of indignation at this from the Western political world, the academy, or the media—which prefers to give a pass to any Palestinian action however heinous against Israel and its population.


    Yet, believe it or not, it takes only a small shift in perspective to envisage the Middle Eastern conflict as putting an end to antisemitism as a distinct phenomenon. For today the Muslim world sees “the Jews” as a single coherent interest group functionally identical to Israel. To the extent that there are Jews in other countries, notably the United States, the Jews manipulate these countries through money and guile (AIPAC!) to defend the interests of Israel. Whatever difficulties this new antisemitic ideology may create for Jews in the West, it does in effect, as Toynbee predicted long ago, assimilate the Jewish people in a way never possible in the past to a nation-state in the Western sense. This is “progress” to the extent that antisemitism comes to resemble other national hatreds—even such things as the blood libel are not foreign to national hatreds in Europe and elsewhere—and no longer singles out the Jew as an insidious presence within Christian or Muslim society itself. Thus the advantage conferred by the firstness of the “chosen people” that so enrages the Muslim world and its sympathizers becomes no more than that of a modern liberal democracy (run, it must be said, by a people known for its intellectual ability) in a world of pre-industrial despotisms.

    Although a few Muslim countries have indeed recognized Israel, the Palestinian refusal of recognition remains the key to Arab and Muslim public opinion. By maintaining the Jews in an imaginary diasporic status, this refusal remains the great obstacle to the “withering away” of antisemitism, a fact of which its defenders are very much aware. Given the importance of overcoming the refusal and the seeming triviality of the obstacles involved, I have a modicum of sympathy for, although by no means agree with, the many liberal Jews in the West and in Israel itself who blame Israel for not pulling out all the stops to help put in place the “two-state solution.” Even the disappointment of Gaza as an example of a future Palestinian state cannot be allowed to constitute a definitive counter-argument. Yet the idea of the equivalent of the Sderot rocket barrage raining down daily on Tel Aviv should suffice to purge all but the most optimistic of Shimon Peres’ Polyanna vision of a cooperative sister Palestinian state in the near future.

    My impression is that, barring some unforeseen catastrophe such as a nuclear war with Iran or a general middle-eastern conflagration, another generation at least will be required before any real progress can be made. Meanwhile, we will presumably have to put up with acts of Muslim antisemitism in Europe and their stimulant effect on the remnants of bourgeois antisemitism, typified today less by the sorry group of Neo-Nazis than by the victimary Left. “Post-Zionism” will continue to flourish among the “progressive” Jewish intelligentsia in Israel and elsewhere. Yet I continue to believe that the real solution must, and hopefully can, be found in the Middle East. No doubt it will have to await the definitive defeat of contemporary jihadism, the latest embodiment of the ancient dream of Muslim world conquest. But when the suicide bombers stop, assuming they will have failed to destroy the West, it will be time for the Israelis and the Arab world, and for the Jews and the West as a whole, to truly make peace.

    When the world does away with antisemitism, then the Messiah will truly have come—bringing with him a new set of problems for the next phase of human history.


  • Antisemitism: From Paradox to BS

    1. Antiquity: the ungraspable paradox

    It is problematic to speak of antisemitism in antiquity. The Jews’ adoption of monotheism does not appear to have impinged upon the discourse of the philosophers, who never remarked on the common reliance of both metaphysics and Judaism on the declarative sentence as a model for an objective, non-ostensive relationship to (sacred) reality. In antiquity, the idea that the sacred was a universal human phenomenon that linked each specific community to a common origin was not so much denied as granted only secondary importance in comparison with the “ecumenical” necessity of accepting the sacred of other communities. That is, “polytheism” is less a matter of insisting on the essential plurality of gods than of showing deference to other communities and “their” gods. We may allege in its defense that it exemplifies a tolerance that modern ecumenism cannot equal; the polytheist does not claim that “his” god is superior, nor even that the gods themselves are fundamentally different, but rather that we all deal with the sacred in our own way and that no one need assert the superiority of his own, rooted, as each set of rituals and customs is, in a particular history. In this context, the Jews’ One God seems merely to be their god whom they churlishly claim to be superior to everyone else’s, not the embodiment of a superior insight into the nature of divinity/humanity itself.

    Judaism’s offense in antiquity was to “diplomacy.” The truth of the One God undiplomatically asserts Jewish firstness, we might say, in two ways: (1) we realize that there is only One God; you don’t; (2) we worship the One God, who has chosen us, not you, as his focus of revelation among the communities of the world. The One God is not a particular God, but he can only be experienced in the particularity of being. Whence the sacrificial setting of the “burning bush,” where God does not appear but where his human interlocutor must be present. To be present to God is an act of particularity whose exclusivity the Hebrews cannot but attribute to themselves as “God’s own people.” The Greeks could not proclaim Zeus the One God, not merely because worshipers of Poseidon and the others would protest, but because they could not conceive themselves as limited to the community in which Zeus was worshiped, as he presumably had been in the past at Dodona and elsewhere, if not as the One God, then as the Only God.

    This hostility to the Hebrews is not quite “antisemitism,” since it cannot clearly see the Hebrew violation of protocol as a historical claim of firstness. The Jews were seen simply as intolerant, placing their tribal god over all others. A philosopher such as Xenophanes, author of the famous lines about horses and lions—as well as Scythians and Ethiopians—creating gods in their image, could conclude that there was one (greatest?) god inconceivable in anthropomorphic terms. For philosophers even today, such a god is more sophisticated than the One God of the Jews, whom they often call “Yahweh” (as Jews in principle never do) to suggest that he is “really” just the god of a local community. But the “unique god” of Xenophanes is a mere abstraction, cut off from ritual worship, a concept of god rather than the One God himself. Or to put it a bit differently, this god’s historical link to the origin has been severed because it does not reach back to the originary moment where there was indeed only “one god” at the center of the originary scene. What the Jews affirm on faith is that their God is the One God, not because they can trace his history to the moment of human origin, but because his and their very existence implies the existence of such a filiation. This is inconceivable for the Greeks, who could only “deduce” the Unique God from the generality of gods. To decide whether Xenophanes’ god was really unique or just greater than the other gods is unimportant, since in any case he would be an abstraction standing over the “real” gods worshiped by specific communities. In an ecumenical world, the only “supreme god” is one who usurps the role of the pantheon and takes all the godly roles for himself. He cannot be, like the God of the Jews, the unique god of a community discovered/revealed to be the One God, not because he is “superior” to others but because the specific community realizes that it is a model of the entire human community and that the scene of worship is ontologically unique since it derives in each case from the unique originary scene.

    Hence it is not accurate to oppose the Jews’ One God to the anthropomorphic gods mocked by Xenophanes. The One God’s “invisibility” is not necessitated by the need to avoid offering a particular image. Christianity could never have emerged within the Jewish orbit had anthropomorphism been a key issue. The point is not that God cannot look like any given human being, but that he is both too great to look upon, to conceive of in material form, and yet only imaginable in human terms. And thus we imagine him with a name, yet we discover that his “name” is a declarative sentence. Whereas for Xenophanes, either we have specific, historically attested, named Gods such as Zeus, or we have an abstract entity who never bore a name, but which we can call “(the) God.” This “classical” notion of the divinity is quite close to the Enlightenment theology of Deism. What makes the “Jewish God” a subject of resentment is precisely what makes him an “authentic” divinity; his connection with a real community. The paradox is the undefinable relationship between the originary community, which is both “all of humanity” and a specific group of (first) humans, and the “human community” as a whole, that of the subjects of the One God. The Greeks, and we may assume, polytheists in general, cannot fully experience this paradox, let alone explain it, since their way of transcending the particular gods of separate communities that were subsequently merged into “pantheons” is by abstraction, resulting in a God-in-General, but not in a One God.

    2. Christian antisemitism: a case of BS

    The history of early Christianity’s rivalry with Judaism is not coextensive with that of antisemitism. But this obliges us to sharpen our definition of precisely what “antisemitism” is, and in the first place, to help explain why such a term exists at all, why “hatred of Jews” or “rivalry with Jews” is somehow not good enough, why there is a phenomenon of antisemitism that has something of the status of an anti-religion. To speak of antisemitic resentment and hatred is at best to refer to Jewish firstness as an object of envy; it says nothing about how the antisemite evolves an antisemitic ideology, or in other words, about how he engages in a project of antisemitism.

    Both Christianity and Islam deny the reality of Jewish firstness, although Christianity is willing to credit the historical (if not the theological) anteriority of the Hebrews in making known the revelation of the One God. But the overall theology of Christianity or even Islam is not what we mean by antisemitism, whatever the motivations of its creators. The point of Christianity is not to disparage Jews, but to gain adherents, even if it be at the expense of the Jews; to the extent that it is indeed an authentic religion, it is oriented more toward love than resentment, and its resentful details are not its primary focus. Whence the interest of examining doctrines that can be detached from Christian theology to become specific foci of resentment and motivations for anti-Jewish behavior.

    The Gospels’ distortion of historical fact to make the Jews responsible for Jesus’ crucifixion is already “anti-Jewish”; it could only become antisemitic in the light of the established categories of Christian society. Since the branding of the Jews as “Christ-killers” is the archetype of all antisemitic accusations, we would do well to examine the phenomenon more closely. “Christ-killer” is not just a scapegoating accusation. No doubt the Romans, not the Jews, were responsible for the Crucifixion, and Pilate’s washing his hands is hardly a plausible historical event. But the point of the accusation is to transform Jewish monotheistic firstness, the object of the antisemite’s resentment, into itself a form of resentment. “The Jew” must be all the more resentful, second, the more his firstness is envied. Attributing to the Jews the responsibility for the Crucifixion is in effect accusing them of envy of Jesus’ ontological, and eventually chronological (“before Abraham was, I am”) firstness. The essential anthropological point that all humans are responsible for the Crucifixion, that all humanity is founded on the deferral of violence that is always at least minimally an act of violence, and consequently a mode of what Christians would later call “original sin,” does not of course single out the Jews. But the New Testament does lend itself to this reading, and the Jews even in the most generous reading of these texts are the exemplary representatives of universal humanity, a point René Girard has emphasized. Calling Jews “Christ-killers” is thus the archetypal antisemitic move of making this exemplarity into a stigma, a mark of human inferiority. The contrast between the firstness of the Jews and the backwardness of the “pagans” is translated into the enviousness of the former at their supersession by the latter. The Crucifixion becomes a means of annulling and thus denying the original firstness that the continued existence of Judaism preserves.

    In extrapolations of the Christ-killer accusation, the Jews have typically been accused of acts of spiteful envy that express resentful fantasies projected onto them, fantasies that not only have no historical basis but are wholly contrary to the spirit of Judaism. The idea that the Jews desecrate (“bleed”) communion wafers is one obvious example. The most extreme accusation commonly reported is the “blood libel”: the absurd idea, repeated since the Middle Ages, and never more frequently than in the Islamic world today, that the Jews kill non-Jewish children and collect their blood for use in preparing Passover matzoth. Despite its utter lack of foundation, this accusation has remained popular ever since it was “discovered” in twelfth-century Britain. In the antisemitic fantasy-world, the matzoth becomes a Jewish communion wafer in which the Jews, having failed to recognize Christ’s divinity, nevertheless require a substitute for Jesus’ blood. The child must give his blood because the Jews have refused to be washed in the blood of the Lamb. The Zionist theorist Ahad Ha-Am, as quoted in Prager and Telushkin’s Why the Jews? (Simon & Schuster, 2003, p. 84; the Ha-Am quote is from his Selected Essays, Meridian Books, 1962, p. 203-04), cites the blood libel as a source of Jewish self-confidence, since the inconceivability that it was a reaction to real Jewish behavior shows antisemitism to be motivated by resentment pure and simple.


    In Des choses cachées…, Girard classifies the medieval texts that indict Jews for such things as bleeding Christian children as “texts of persecution.” The one example Girard provides of such a text (in Le bouc émissaire, 1982) in fact accuses the Jews of poisoning wells during the Black Plague. His point is that these narratives are no longer myths, yet are not simple evidentiary documents. The victim is not transfigured into a supernatural being; he is simply accused of a crime within the framework of the legal system. Yet the accusation is so fantastic that it is easy for “us,” as heirs of the Enlightenment, to see that it is baseless and that the accused is a victim of “scapegoating.” This paradigm can be extended to all antisemitic accusations in the Christian era. The Jews are the scapegoats par excellence in Girard’s scheme. They are marked as factors of instability by their insistence not merely on rejecting Christianity (although they were the only inhabitants of medieval society that did so) but on maintaining their historical firstness as the true Israel, rejecting by their very existence as a people their “supersession” by Christendom. The scapegoat is always accused of refusing to adhere to the fundamental values of the society. But only the Jews could be accused not of naïve attachment to “uncivilized nature,” as in the case, for example, of the black lynching victim, but of adherence to a prior religious order, the object of an arrogant affirmation that could be punished only by profound humiliation.

    Alas, the idea that these “texts of persecution” are transparent to us and therefore no longer effective is a postmodern effect of Auschwitz that appears sadly naive today, when antisemitic literature has never been either more plentiful or more fantastic. This literature’s flagrant irrationality only makes it the more obvious that “rationality” is not as objective a criterion as we might think. “Texts of persecution” vary according to the standards of their respective societies. In today’s Middle East, professors at major universities offer “scholarly demonstrations” of the Blood Libel. The West does not endorse such discourses, although the Western intelligentsia displays no particular hostility toward those who produce them, in contrast to its antipathy for Israeli and Zionist academics. But more sophisticated indictments can be drawn up that are at bottom no less irrational. For example, many Western intellectuals seem convinced that Israel is the only country in the world that does not deserve to exist, or whose products should be boycotted. Is this a “rational” idea independent of the old antisemitism? The fact that we can see through medieval “texts of persecution” but hesitate before modern ones implies that not so much Girard’s category itself as its intentional structure needs further exploration. For we can assume that there was no more “proof” in the Middle Ages that the Jews poisoned wells and desecrated communion wafers than that Israel is committing “genocide” in the Palestinian territories today.


    Harry Frankfurt’s quasi-humorous philosophical category of “bulls***” (henceforth BS), whose most visible version is a little book published by Princeton in 2005 (the text is available at various places on the Internet, e.g., https://athens.indymedia.org/local/webcast/uploads/frankfurt__harry_- _on_bullshit.pdf) strikes me as a useful category for understanding antisemitic accusations. In the terms of HF’s analysis, such accusations are not lies. One asserts them because one finds it advantageous to do so, in anticipation of the effect they will have on others and on the society at large, unconcerned with whether they are true or false. But whereas HF’s etiology of BS is essentially narcissistic frivolity and the individual’s desire for prestige, antisemitic accusations have an important public function. Resentment against Jewish firstness is an undecidable combination of preexisting resentment of Jews and an independently provoked supplement of “scapegoating” or originary resentment that finds its pretext in the Jews, whose monotheistic firstness unites the two causes in a way impossible for another stigmatized group. Be that as it may, the category of BS is clearly applicable. Did the medieval Christians “really” believe that the Jews bled Christian boys? or did they just want to believe it, to enforce this belief? Qui veut noyer son chien l’accuse de la rage [He who wants to drown his dog accuses it of having rabies], to quote good old La Fontaine.

    Girard’s “text of persecution” may then be seen as a way of historicizing Frankfurt’s abstract conception of BS. The myths to which in antiquity we adhered “esthetically,” in the context of participation in a culturally prescribed ritual sacrifice performed without overt resentment, are replaced in the Christian era by BS in the form of antisemitic accusations. In this post-sacrificial world, where only individual resentment remains for “sacrifice” to efface, only the BS accusation provides satisfaction.

    It is in this sense of making resentment manifest, not in that of its mere presence, that Nietzsche and his Nazi followers were justified in associating resentment specifically with the Judeo-Christian world. Resentment is in effect a more evolved sentiment than the mindless “rage” of the participant in ritual sacrifice. In keeping with its common translation, the base meaning of menis, the first word of the Iliad, is indeed rage. But it is only because what the word refers to in Achilles is specifically motivated as resentment that there is a story, an epic rather than a liturgical myth, for Homer to tell.


    Frankfurt’s analysis of BS is that of an analytic philosopher and bears the marks of the genre, in particular in its indifference to the historical stages of culture. His prime example of BS is a platitudinous Independence Day speech, where a politician spews patriotic clichés without concern for truth or precise meaning. Although this speech uses such phrases as “divine guidance” and “our blessed country,” HF fails to make what seems to me the obvious and fundamental connection between BS and religious discourse. Such discourse is not itself BS. But if myth is the original form of which “texts of persecution” are the modern (that is, Christian-era) prolongation, then it is likewise at the origin of Frankfurt’s category (which, as I am suggesting, Girard’s texts of persecution exemplify). BS shares with myth the quality of affirming as true what cannot be verified as such—and of which the speaker knows, or at least surmises, that it cannot be verified as such. Such beliefs as virgin birth or transubstantiation can never leave the realm of faith to be verified, and consequently possess a different kind of truth from empirical statements. But in contradistinction to religious discourse, BS is produced in a world where verification is in principle possible. We are not in illo tempore but in the here-and-now, where wells can be poisoned and little boys bled to death. BS assertions are “acts of faith” that nevertheless pretend to be verifiably true.

    The Jew’s presumed evil intent fantastically reflects his insistence on the chronological and therefore anthropological priority of his religious project, transforming his people’s historical firstness in revealing the moral law into the arrogant denial of this law—and thereby depriving it, and him, of priority in its revelation. But this transformation can be carried out only in the mode of BS, through the assertion of unverifiable “facts” by which alone human ontology can be redefined. Thus the antisemitic “text of persecution” that accuses a Jew of murdering Christian children for Passover is affirmed in public without any genuine expectation of confirmation, save through some kind of coerced confession. Such a confession, we should note, is itself a painful form of BS, indeed, its purest form, since it is made neither to tell the truth nor to lie, but simply to make the pain cease independently of empirical truth or falsity. Like all BS, it can be summed up as “telling people what they want to hear.”

    ***

    The next installment in this series on antisemitism will pursue the “Jewish question” in the post-Enlightenment era of Jewish emancipation and “racial” antisemitism, leading to the Holocaust. As in the present Chronicle, I intend to focus on antisemitic practices and accusations. Jewish “election,” in which the Enlightenment saw an outdated prejudice whose abandonment was expected to put an end to anti-Jewish hostility, has never seemed more pertinent than today as an explanation of world history. This is true both for the antisemites, who are happy to attribute all the world’s ills to the Jews, and for the friends of the Jews, who cannot find it a simple coincidence that the world’s one universally stigmatized people has created the world’s one nation whose very existence is considered illegitimate by an important fraction of the world’s population.


  • Aurora and “Radical Evil”

    Some people have attributed the recent murders in Aurora to “radical evil.” I think there is indeed a sense in which this category applies, but a concept with so many connotations must be defined rigorously lest it become no more than a pretentious way of distancing oneself from something ugly. For if we seek a specific mark of Cain that makes one person in many millions capable of committing such horrible acts, we are forced to realize that, whatever proximate cause may push a given individual over the edge—and whether, as I rather doubt, those particularly vulnerable to such pushes can be identified in advance in any useful way—the force that pushes is a universal one. Its name, as my reader may already have surmised, is simply resentment. GA is a minimization of common sense, which explains why after 30 years of research and speculation its fundamental principles have never been disconfirmed—and perhaps also why knowledge of it remains limited to the happy few readers of these Chronicles and Anthropoetics. GA’s very anonymity, my complaints about which in a recent Chronicle drew some admonitions from our gentle critic Matthew Taylor, whom I had the pleasure of seeing recently in Japan, may just as well be made part of the explanation. Incidentally, the Davies Group, which has published a number of GA books, beginning in 2007 with Adam Katz’s collective The Originary Hypothesis and including last year’s A New Way of Thinking, is located in Aurora, Colorado.

    A couple thousand years ago, one Herostratus is said to have burnt down the temple of Artemis at Ephesus so that people would remember him. And, despite the efforts of the Ephesian authorities, so we do. And so we continue to do on a lesser scale for Herostratus’ copycats through the ages, including the Aurora killer, whose name I will not do him the favor of repeating. These may be called the antiheroes of resentment, willing to accept opprobrium as the price of significance. I don’t have to tell you how many times you’ve seen my picture on the front page of your local newspaper. But if I donned a suit of body armor and shot up a movie theater… No doubt the Aurora murderer, like the would-be killer of Gabrielle Giffords, is “insane” and cannot be judged by criteria I would apply to myself. I can talk about emulating him, but you know very well this isn’t going to happen. But just because I have a moral sense that prevents me from going out and randomly killing people (the “simplest” act of Surrealism, as you may recall—descendre dans la rue et tirer au hasard dans la foule [to go down in the street and shoot at random into the crowd]—Surrealism being a movement of self-conscious publicity seekers, as are most artists, especially in Paris) doesn’t mean that Mr. X and I don’t share the same desires and motivations. Nor, I would insist, does it mean that we don’t share the same moral sense. It is only that he was able to overcome his for the purposes of his act.

    Laure Murat, my colleague at UCLA, has won acclaim for her meticulous and insightful study of the archives of French mental hospitals, L’homme qui se prenait pour Napoléon [The Man who Took Himself for Napoleon] (Gallimard, 2011). Laure’s analysis of the hallucinations of insane individuals who see themselves as Napoleon or Louis XVI leads her to the conclusion that these fevered imaginations follow political trends, that is, that they tend to see themselves in roles that the general public perceives as charismatic. Or in other words, the insane, just like everyone else, identify with celebrities, only more so. An important consequence of which is that, like everyone else, the insane experience the resentful frustration of not being celebrities, only more so.

    In the Aurora case, the “celebrity” identified with by the killer was a fictional character (Bain… er, Bane) who in this latest Batman version, so they tell me, is the perpetrator of horribly sadistic crimes. Since history is ongoing, the question as to whether the sadism of popular culture tends to provoke imitation or better defer it is the very model of undecidability, but so far, deferral may be said to be winning. Steven Pinker optimistically points out that historically, violence has declined over the long term; modern society is orders of magnitude less violent than tribal society. One could even make the case that the excessive spectacularization of mass crimes such as Aurora reduces the number of future crimes by exhausting the publicitary energy available for such horrors, paradoxically raising the bar for future copycats. But to ask such questions is both to display and to compound their undecidability. Let us recall our recent discussion of the deferring effect of The Bomb, which “perpetuates” peace, until the moment when…

    To explain what happened in Aurora, we need make one further point. Herostratus’ destructive action was not concerned with people but with sacred space. He didn’t shoot up the agora (and no doubt mass killing is a much more difficult proposition in the absence of modern explosives); he destroyed the city’s most celebrated temple. No doubt we have experienced acts that similarly destroy a sacred space, and where people are killed as well; we need only recall 9/11. But these attacks on monumental edifices (World Trade Center, Pentagon, White House) are generally politically motivated; they attack an order (call it “Western capitalism”) for the benefit of another order (call it “Islam”). Similarly, T. McVeigh was making a political statement by blowing up the Murrah building in Oklahoma City. In contrast, Herostratus’ was not a political act; we assume that in Ephesus, whether one worshiped or not at the temple, as a citizen one was presumed to identify with it; there was no “anti-Artemis” faction, or at any rate supporting such a faction was not H’s point. Today’s apolitical publicity seekers in the mold of Herostratus eschew monuments and simply kill people. For one thing, “human life” in modern societies is felt as more precious than in the past. But above all, assaulting other humans gives what I fear to call an “esthetic” unity to the murderer’s act. On the one hand, it brings him instant fame. (It always is him, isn’t it? Must I still do penance for not “including” women in the originary event’s deferral of violence?) But on the other hand, it punishes a representative sample of the general population for having ignored the killer. In more familiar circumstances, such as the Columbine massacre, where the killers lived in proximity to their victims, the connection between murder and resentment is more obvious, but this connection transcends personal acquaintanceship. Anonymous victims are a mirror image of one’s own anonymity.

    Solutions? Whether more or less gun control would or would not help prevent shoot-ups of this sort, the most obvious preventive measure would be what was tried unsuccessfully in Ephesus: not to print the killer’s photo on the front page, not to use his name, not to publish reams of analyses that make an otherwise anonymous loser a privileged object of public attention simply because he has committed mass murder. But since, by the Bronx Romantic’s own definition, humanity is the species whose greatest danger comes from itself, human beings are supremely concerned with maintaining the deferral of violence. Violating this taboo is consequently the most attention-getting thing one can do. (And, conversely and perversely, understanding this in an originary sense is precisely the least attention-getting thing one can do.)

    The “insane” person knows better than anyone else the infallible source of fame, not “undying,” perhaps, but for a poor slob with no achievements to speak of, a few years on Lexis-Nexis is pretty good. And with the death penalty fast becoming extinct—I understand that for killing over 70 people our Norwegian friend faces a maximum sentence of 21 years in an extremely user-friendly prison—something to be enjoyed for many years, unless one’s fellow inmates decide to “take the law into their own hands,” as someone did a few years ago for the anthropophagic Mr. Dahmer. The glory of appearing on the front page might lose some of its value if one faced swift execution. But even in the most obvious cases, this is something we can no longer ask of our “advanced” societies, any more than we can demand a news blackout. On the contrary, we are treated to the televised spectacle of the Aurora suspect’s hearing.


    Epilogue: Satan and radical evil

    The other day Trevor Merrill was reflecting on how to understand Satan in a GA context. Girard wrote a book in 1999 entitled Je vois Satan tomber comme un éclair [I see Satan fall like a lightning flash]; here and elsewhere in his later work, he often refers to Satan as a personification of mimetic desire. But Girard doesn’t deal specifically with Satan’s use of language, nor with his familiar embodiment as a literary character.

    It seems to me that the notion of the Satanic allows us to clarify what we mean intuitively by the “radical evil” of the Aurora incident. In literary works such as Faust, Satan-Mephistopheles tempts the hero with riches, beautiful women, and other rewards for “selling his soul.” No doubt in a literary work, the author himself is “Satanically” tempted to heap rewards on his characters. There is a kind of film comedy I always find irritating that attributes creative talent, fame, and fortune to characters by all appearances totally mediocre, sometimes as architects (George Costanza favored this profession), more rarely as artists/musicians, and by far most frequently as writers. How many movies have you seen where the heroine/hero, getting over a divorce or some other trauma, decides on a whim to “tell her/his story” and becomes an instant celebrity? (Cut to high-powered book-signing ceremony attended by the ex…)

    But if we take fame as the fundamental human value, the greatest gift that Satan can offer, a gift that is indeed a kind of immortality, then we need not create a fictional universe for him in which to offer it. The Satan who is always with us, the embodiment of our resentment, has on permanent offer to any and all of us the kind of fame earned by Herostratus and by his emulator in Aurora. Kill a bunch of people and you’ll get your picture in the paper. Violate the sacred law that binds society together, the law of moral reciprocity that is as central a product of the originary event as language itself, and the world will be perturbed enough to endow you with significance. An ugly significance, no doubt, that in our increasingly rare moralistic moments we call infamy rather than fame, yet the only one that requires no productive talent to procure, but is at the disposal of pretty much anyone with a little bit of force and ingenuity.

    We may then define with some degree of rigor as radical evil the evil that is committed for no end other, not than “itself,” but than immortalizing its otherwise anonymous perpetrator. (The Holocaust and other genocides would not qualify by this definition, but the question of evil social orders is a more complex one than that of the evil that lurks in each one of our souls. The horrors of the Holocaust or of Pol Pot’s Cambodia are only compounded by the utopian nature of these massacres, eggs broken in the service of monstrous eschatological omelets.)

    And here, I dare say, is the “upside” of the horror of such deeds. Virtually all of us are anonymous, even those on the lower rungs of the Wikipedia. You and I will almost certainly never see our photograph on the front page of a newspaper, unless… But although the fame of Herostratus is available with a little effort to most of us, a given individual can be relied on with near total certainly not to succumb to Satan’s temptation. We accept the moral law, even when there is no death penalty to dissuade us. We cannot think of killing our fellow humans unless they are trying to kill us.

    And thus do we reaffirm our common humanity, which brings us together in the wake of massacres in a way just slightly different from our solidarity in the face of natural disasters. It is not a “visceral” but a moral solidarity, the solidarity of those whose love is greater than their resentment. Satan has his occasional victories, but those who remain come together afterward to celebrate his defeat. Je vois Satan tomber comme un éclair.


  • WWII and the Victimary Era: II

    This is the second part of the talk delivered at the joint COV&R-GASC meeting held in Tokyo July 5-9. The first part is found in the previous Chronicle.

    ***

    Girard’s remarks on the Holocaust situate it in the context of his vision of Western society as increasingly reflecting the Judeo-Christian concern for victims (le souci des victimes). Thus he understands the Nazis as in essence disciples of Nietzsche, reflecting the latter’s original and perverse insight into the victimary vocation of the West. For Girard, Nazi antisemitism is a reaction to Nietzsche’s revelatory understanding that post-Enlightenment Western society, “secular” in appearance, remains dominated by the Christian, victimary values whose “decadence” he denounces. This revelation of the victimary, whatever we think of it, is the source of a new “degree of freedom”: once we become aware that the victimary is indeed the direction the world is taking, and if this world, as Germans after WWI were likely to find, is going badly, then a political doctrine designed explicitly for combating the concern for victims—which was to adopt over time Mussolini’s term of fascism, sticking together without concern for outsiders—became a political possibility.

    Girard’s analysis strikes me as an excellent starting point for the explanation of the Holocaust, provided we integrate into it the notion of Jewish firstness. Nietzsche saw clearly enough that it was Jewish monotheism, with its insistence on universal moral equality among human beings under One God, that was at the origin of the Christian care for victims. (Girard too has always insisted on this. In a moving passage in Des choses cachées, he insists that Judaism is the ultimate worldly religion, of which Christianity is more the deconstruction than the successor—that there can be no such religion superior to that of the Pharisees, which is indeed the basis of modern, “Talmudic” Judaism.) By morally equating the Jews with “vermin,” Hitler could claim to be purging the human race of egalitarian-victimary sensibilities that were in effect extraneous to the human essence, so to speak rewriting the originary event. Nietzsche’s analysis was of particular value for Hitler, because in describing Christian “slave morality” as of Jewish origin, Nietzsche, despite his repudiation of antisemitism, performs the classic antisemitic gesture of eliminating through denial the Jewish claim to firstness. Unconcerned with chronology, Nietzsche presents the Jews and their Christian heirs as usurpers of what should have remained a heroic mode of centrality; for Nietzsche, Achilles’ noble “rage” has nothing in common with le ressentiment. Hence the myth that presents the “Aryan race” as the truly “first” authors of Western civilization, corrupted by Jewish-Christian slave morality, and whose values the Nazis will restore. Ominously, the Nazi denial of the historical firstness of the Jews eliminates the witnessing role they had played within Christian society and that protected them at least in principle from genocide.


    Here are the chief points about the Holocaust in Je vois Satan tomber comme un éclair:

    Le but spirituel de l’hitlérisme, à mon avis, était d’arracher l’Allemagne d’abord, l’Europe ensuite à la vocation que lui assigne sa tradition religieuse, le souci des victimes. (264)

    [The spiritual aim of Hitlerism, in my opinion, was to free first Germany and then all of Europe from the vocation assigned to it by its religious tradition, the concern for victims.]

    [Les Nazis] s’appuyaient dans ce domaine sur le penseur qui a découvert la vocation victimaire du christianisme, sur le plan anthropologique, Frédéric Nietzsche. (264-5)

    [[The Nazis] relied in this domain on the thinker who discovered the victimary vocation of Christianity as an anthropological phenomenon, Friedrich Nietzsche.]

    Dans certains inédits de la dernière période, Nietzsche évite la double erreur positiviste et post-moderne et découvre la vérité que je ne fais que répéter après lui . . . dans la passion dionysiaque et dans la passion de Jésus c’est la même violence collective mais l’interprétation est différente . . . (265)

    [In certain unpublished writings of his last period, Nietzsche avoids the double error, positivist and postmodern [of seeing either facts without interpretation or interpretation without facts], and discovers the truth that I am only repeating after him: . . . in the Dionysian passion and the passion of Jesus, the same collective violence is at work but the interpretation is different.]

    Pour discréditer le judéo-chrétien, Nietzsche s’efforce de montrer que sa prise de position en faveur des victimes s’enracine dans un ressentiment mesquin. . . . C’est la fameuse « morale des esclaves ». (267)

    [To discredit the Judeo-Christian, Nietzsche attempts to show that its stand on behalf of victims has its roots in petty resentment. . . . This is the famous “slave morality.”]

    And following the defeat and revelation of the horrors of Nazism, we have the victimary postmodern world of today, obsessed with victims to the point of suspecting even the most potentially creative modes of firstness:

    Loin d’étouffer le souci des victimes, [l’entreprise hitlérienne] a accéléré ses progrès mais l’a complètement démoralisé. L’hitlérisme se venge de son échec en désespérant le souci des victimes, en le rendant caricatural. (271)

    [Far from snuffing out concern for victims, [the Hitlerian enterprise] only accelerated its progress, but has left it completely demoralized. Hitlerism has avenged its failure by making the concern for victims despairing and caricatural.]


    The Judeo-Christian West, although it continues to play the predominant role, no longer simply dominates our “global” planet; its fundamental anthropology, which Girard has done so much to elucidate, is no longer without significant challenge. In particular, in addition to Ahmadinejad’s threats to ignore no first use = don’t cast the first stone and use the Bomb, militant Islam has taken advantage of the victimary climate of the West both to terrorize it with the accusation of Islamophobia and to take an unapologetic stance in asserting its claim of unique religious validity. Aside from the most backward Communist tyrannies, no non-Muslim country would dream of excluding churches of other religions, forbidding the possession of their religious materials, let alone executing converts to them. The contrast is quite obvious with the “oikophobic” West, which scarcely protests, let alone attempts to prevent such practices, which include the persecution of Christians in many countries (such as recently in Egypt). Part of the difficulty of the current Syrian civil war is that religious minorities like Christians prefer the protection of the Alawite dictatorship with all its brutality to the (Sunni) Islamic forces that are likely to prevail if the former is overthrown.

    What in this is of anthropological interest, both theoretical and practical, is that a world that has learned the lessons of WWII, that has become “Judeo-Christian” to an often caricatural extent, treating every Other as a potential victim and every act of the Other’s violence as an occasion for forbearance—such a world is vulnerable to a strategy that rejects forbearance (since God is great and man exists only to serve him, man can, indeed, must exercise total violence on his behalf) and rejects concern for victims (since the “victims” of God’s true religion are apostates who deserve their fate), except insofar as its users can manipulate their enemies into feeling that they have made them into victims.

    The reason this logic is not more salient is simply that the West remains confident in its technological and military superiority. We have seen that this superiority is anything but an external contingency. It is the worldly confirmation of faith in the Judeo-Christian anthropology whose liberating force on the human front has permitted a qualitatively more massive transfer of initiative / firstness to the natural world of things, and ultimately to the constructed cultural subset of this world, the laboratory, from which have emerged the theoretical discoveries of natural science that in their turn have made possible our technological progress.

    Were it not for this superiority in dealing with the natural world, which even after the end of “total war” continues to be tested on the field of battle, what we think of as the West’s superior insight into the origin of humanity would not only lose influence through military defeat, its very value as anthropology would be called into question. In the long term, the capacity of an “anthropology” to serve as the foundation for the most successful society is the highest proof that it grasps the fundamental truth behind human social organization. Or to put it a bit differently, the anthropology, religious or other, that liberates humans to operate on natural reality with the most degrees of freedom is prima facie the most effective theorizer of the human itself.

    No one can deny the West’s historical status of firstness with respect to natural science and the weaponry that derives from it. Yet firstness is a mode of deferral, not of ontological differentiation; it cannot confer permanent superiority. And now that the techniques of war are approaching their “ultimate” limit, by dint of the anthropological superiority of its Judeo-Christian heritage, the West may be said to have prepared the ultimate test of the eternal struggle between the irrational and the rational, connaissance and méconnaissance, or to put it in still more characteristically Girardian terms, the logos of violence and the logos of peace.

    Iran’s quest for atomic weapons may then be seen as a test of the relative anthropological truth of the Judeo-Christian and the Islamic traditions. What has empowered the Islamism of recent years is quite simply moral outrage at the kind of modernity that Christianity has made possible. Sayyid Qutb’s focal position in this movement reflects his reaction to the “decadence” of American life in Colorado in the late 1940s; we need not imagine how he would have reacted today, because we have plenty of evidence. Well, these traditional societies, brutally confining to women, whom they oblige to maintain high birth rates, limiting “knowledge” to the Koran, hostile to any form of self-expression, do have a point, even from the perspective of containing violence. For one thing, they don’t defer enough violence to evolve the ideas of nuclear physics and generate atomic bombs. But now the paradox has come home to roost in the confrontation between the traditional and the modern made possible by penetration of the scientific, technological, and above all, military revelations of the West into an increasingly global marketplace. The originary paradox with which the human began cannot be “transcended,” not even by the Prince of Peace himself. If our fate is now “in our hands,” we have only gone in a vast circle back to our beginnings.


    I have had more than one occasion to write about the 1959 Resnais-Duras film Hiroshima mon amour that opened the postmodern era. In this film, as you probably recall, the Japanese and even the Germans are characterized not by massacres and militarism, but by vulnerability. The war is no longer seen as it was by those who fought in it, as a struggle between good and evil, but as an unfortunate eruption of violence among brothers. It matters not who began the fight, nor who had “justice” on their side; the important thing is that it is over, and it is for the winners to offer sympathy and protection to the losers. Hiroshima is the symbol of Japan’s loss of the war, and the heroine’s dead German soldier-lover is likewise a representative not of the Nazi occupation of France but of Germany’s defeat. Love is accepting to see the losers in this light, as victims. This film sheds a positive light on the hypervictimary attitudes of the postmodern era.

    But Resnais’ film was made over fifty years ago, at a time when the winners could afford to be generous and the losers to be grateful for their generosity. Things are different today. Perhaps we may find a cautionary pendant to Hiroshima mon amour in Lars von Trier’s remarkable recent film, Melancholia. In striking contrast to Resnais’ picture of love and rebirth, von Trier’s film ends with the total destruction of the Earth. This destruction is presented as an astronomical event, and when I first heard of this, I imagined that Melancholia was just one more silly sci-fi disaster film. Not at all. A planet bearing the eponymous name Melancholia invades our solar system and destroys the earth. It is a fantastic and daring objective correlative of the depression of the main character, played by Kirsten Dunst, who expresses in extreme terms the oikophobia that has infected the West. To quote her climactic lines from the film: “the Earth is evil, life on Earth is evil, nobody will miss it.”

    An apocalyptic fantasy. But René Girard has taught us to respect Apocalypse. And I fear there may be more realistic, more human objective correlatives to this sentiment than rogue planets afoot in the world today.


  • WWII and the Victimary Era: I

    The following is the first half of my talk at this year’s joint annual meeting of the Generative Anthropology and Conference (GASC–our sixth) and the Colloquium on Violence and Religion (COV&R) at the International Christian University in Tokyo, July 5-8.


    Speaking as an American in Japan I am very much aware of the opening and closing moments of the great conflict between our two countries, the first of which took place in 1941, the year of my birth. It is not mere nostalgia that makes me recall WWII; nearly 70 years after its conclusion, we still live in its shadow. Or to put it another way, human life on Earth, until its hopefully indefinitely postponed extinction, will henceforth be defined by the deferral of WWIII.

    Our postmodern predicament is bound up with the obsession with victims and victimage that has characterized the postwar era. The era’s accomplishments include the end of colonialism, apartheid, and segregation, the many triumphs of feminism and more recently of the non-heterosexual community. They also include the anthropological reflections of deconstruction and especially Girard’s “mimetic theory,” which Generative Anthropology attempts to bring together in a minimalist synthesis.

    The historical explanation of this extraordinary phenomenon has always seemed to me to begin with the Holocaust. The Nazi race policies were so contrary to the most fundamental principles of human solidarity, as embodied in what I call the originary moral model of the reciprocal exchange of signs, that they provoked the reaction that in the future all policies that affirm, even tacitly, ontological difference among groups of human beings would be unacceptable. Michael Rothberg’s recent Multidirectional Memory (Stanford 2009), which insistently connects, in a French cultural context, the Holocaust to the “rival” victimizations of colonialism and slavery, only proves my point. For when Rothberg remarks on Aimé Césaire’s use of the term choc en retour to explain the Holocaust as the “boomerang effect” of applying dehumanizing colonial practices within Europe itself, the crucial point is that Césaire is speaking after the war and that his energetic condemnation of racial-colonial policies, which he affirms to be as worthy of condemnation as the Holocaust, is in fact dependent on the prior reality of the Holocaust. Even if we stipulate (as was of course far from the case) that the Holocaust was “no more than” the translation to the internal relations of the “white race” of attitudes that had previously been all but taken for granted between the races, the fact remains that it was only after the Holocaust that garden-variety racism came to be considered as not simply slightly disreputable but wholly unacceptable, to the extent that today no accusation is more stigmatizing than that of racism.

    But one cannot come to Japan without recalling the other apocalyptic manifestation of human violence that made WWII the last real war that humanity will be able to fight and survive with a functioning level of culture intact, or perhaps even survive at all. The Holocaust was arguably the most extreme example in history of man’s inhumanity to man. But what is yet more undeniable is that Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided examples of a technology that poses a far more direct threat to humanity’s survival. The gas chambers and killing fields of what Timothy Snyder calls the “Bloodlands” in Eastern Europe over a period of 12 years (1933-45) destroyed some 14 million civilians, Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and of course, Jewish. But these deaths are scarcely a blip on the chart of world population, which today exceeds 7 billion. No doubt this is even more true of the few hundred thousand deaths from the two atomic bombs. But within a few years of the war, the technology was already producing far more powerful weapons—H Bombs—and this progression can easily be extrapolated to the point where our entire species is in danger. In their current state, nuclear bombs and their fallout pose an undoubted threat to humanity as a whole. And their potential danger is increased by the fact that their use on the example of WWII would not require a monstrous ideologically based technology on the model of the Nazi death camps, merely the “normal” strategizing of war such as that which led the Allies to bomb German and Japanese cities with the aim of forcing surrender. Today as the West weighs the possibility that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons, such questions obtrude on our consciousness.


    These preliminary points having been made, in the context of this joint meeting it seemed to me appropriate to take René Girard’s reflections on the historical meaning of these phenomena as my points of departure. Girard discusses the Bomb in Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde, which appeared in 1978. For a discussion of the Holocaust, we must wait until 1999, when in Je vois Satan tomber comme un éclair, Girard explains the Holocaust as Hitler’s implementation of Nietzsche’s deadly combination of insight that our Judeo-Christian civilization is dominated by the concern for victims (le souci des victimes) with his aberrant judgment that this care exemplifies a decadent slave morality that must be eradicated at all cost.

    The Bomb

    The following citations are from Des choses cachées:

    Quand les hommes parlent des moyens nouveaux de destruction, ils disent « la bombe » comme s’il n’y en avait qu’une et qu’elle appartenait à tout le monde et à personne, ou plutôt comme si le monde entier lui appartenait. Et elle apparaît en effet comme la Reine de ce monde. Elle trône au-dessus d’une foule immense de prêtres et de fidèles… (278)

    [When men speak of the new means of destruction, they say “the Bomb” as if there were only one and that it belonged to everyone and to no one, or rather as if the whole world belonged to it. And it seems indeed to be the Queen of the World, reigning over an immense number of priests and believers…]

    Ce qui rend nos conduites actuelles analogues aux conduites religieuses, ce n’est pas une terreur vraiment sacrée, c’est une crainte parfaitement lucide des périls qu’un duel nucléaire ferait courir à l’humanité. (280)

    [What makes our present conduct analogous to religious practice is not really a sacred terror, it is a perfectly lucid fear of the dangers that a nuclear duel would pose to humanity.]

    Dire que nous sommes en situation d’apocalypse objective, ce n’est nullement « prêcher la fin du monde », c’est dire que les hommes, pour la première fois, sont vraiment les maîtres de leur destin. La planète entière se retrouve, face à la violence, dans une situation comparable à celle des groupes humains les plus primitifs, à ceci près, cette fois, que c’est en connaissance de cause; nous n’avons plus de ressources sacrificielles et de malentendus sacrés pour détourner de nous cette violence. Nous accédons à un degré de conscience et de responsabilité jamais encore atteint par les hommes qui nous ont précédés. (283-4)

    [To say that we are in an objectively apocalyptic situation is not at all to “preach the end of the world,” it is to claim that human beings, for the first time, are really masters of their own destiny. The whole planet finds itself, in the face of violence, in a comparable situation to that of the most primitive human groupings, with this difference, that this time, it is knowingly; we no longer have at our disposition sacrificial resources and sacred misunderstandings to turn this violence away from us. We have reached a degree of conscience and responsibility never before attained by our predecessors.]

    Ce n’est pas la faute du texte évangélique, assurément, si la bonne nouvelle dont nous nous croyions à jamais débarrassés revient vers nous dans un contexte aussi redoutable. C’est nous qui l’avons voulu ; ce contexte, c’est nous qui l’avons élaboré. Nous voulions que notre demeure nous soit laissée, eh bien, elle nous est laissée (Lc 13, 35). (285)

    [It is not the fault of the Gospel text, certainly, if the good news that we thought we had rid ourselves of forever returns upon us in such a formidable context. It is we who wanted it; this context, it is we who created it. We wanted our house to be left unto us, well then, it is left unto us. (Luke 13:35).]

    Thus the violence of the Bomb confronts us with the drastic choice either to learn to love each other or die. Girard’s notion of modernity is that Jesus’ revelation works through history by exposing the inefficacity of sacrificial scapegoating, which for him yet remains, in the absence of any consideration of other modes of human exchange, earthbound humanity’s sole means for deferring violence. The revelation of the Bomb is that we can no longer “make peace” by expelling violence from our community. Our former sacrificial means for removing violence from our midst can no longer be used because our “midst” is no longer protected from them, and the destruction of our enemies will also be our own. Henceforth we can only perform humanity’s most fundamental operation and defer violence. At least until some glitch occurs, the existence of these “ultimate weapons” guarantees the absence of war. But as Jean-Pierre Dupuy has been demonstrating, the hairtrigger logic of MAD is fraught with paradox; the most rigorous guarantee of deterrence, and therefore of non-violence, is the most inexorable threat of retaliatory violence.

    This is a revelation not unique to Girard, and whose paradoxical nature has been expressed in various forms: in Dr Strangelove, to give an early example. As an application of what we might call “Christian anthropology” to the modern world, it is in effect a reductio ad absurdum. By demonstrating that the existence of the Bomb imposes the same decision between peace and violence as Jesus’ revelation, it can be said to “fulfill” that revelation, but also to render it null and void. Jesus’ revelation of the violent arbitrariness of the old sacred on which the world depended is no longer necessary, since the Bomb is the Aufhebung of this arbitrariness: one “arbitrary” use of it, rather than killing one to save the others, or at least, killing the enemy to save “ourselves,” would lead to the universal annihilation of our species.

    Thus the Bomb returns us to our originary state, in which we choose between mutual annihilation and the deferral of violence. But the option of sacrificial religion is no longer operative, for the relation between the members of the human community is the inverse of that which prevailed at the birth of humanity. According to the originary hypothesis, the human, that is, language, religion, and representation generally, emerged because no “Alpha” individual could dominate the entire group once mimetic desire had reached the level where the entire group felt “equally” entitled to the central object. That is, the most powerful is brought to the level of equality by the community as a whole, who all become his peers, since the Alpha’s assertion of superiority cannot be sustained against all the others. But if each member of the group possesses a weapon powerful enough to destroy the entire group, the cohesion of the others against each no longer conduces to the unity of the group as a whole. Each is in principle as powerful as all the others together, equally capable of bringing about “the end of the world”; each must consequently exercise restraint on his own.

    To act in Girard’s universe is to cast the first stone, a phrase that, as Girard rightly points out, has become a universally accepted formula for deferring violence by focusing on its component of firstness. Jesus’ insight is to prevent this from happening, as Girard demonstrates in his very fine analysis of the “woman taken in adultery” passage in John. The Bomb pushes this reasoning to its limit by making the first act of violence not merely the beginning of a sacrificial expulsion, but potentially of mutual destruction. Thus the world of the Bomb leads to wars less and less “total” like WWII, in which survival depends on maintaining as a conscious choice not to use the ultimate weapons, not to act by “instinct,” not to engage in the violence-discharging firstness of the one who casts the first stone. No first use is not accidentally a variant of this turn of phrase.

    The originary dynamic was biased toward a diminution of violence, in that the community as a whole could enforce its will on any violent individual and channel the mimetic violence of all toward a common goal, whether it be scapegoating or what seems to me more realistic, the equal sharing of meat. The Bomb scenario, in contrast, gives an advantage to whichever member of the group can intimidate the others most credibly with a threat of using the ultimate weapon, that is, the group that best appears able to accept suicide. In the current world, I think we all know for which societies this is true. This suggests that allowing Iran and its rhetorically—at least—apocalyptic leadership to obtain nuclear arms may be a “tipping point.” Let us hope that this does not occur.

    ***

    Next week’s Chronicle will include the material on the Holocaust and the conclusion of the talk.


  • Antisemitism: The Fatal Paradox

    There are two basic approaches to the question of antisemitism. This duality reflects, as might be expected, the paradoxical nature of the phenomenon; why is there a single word in our vocabulary for a specific hostility against a specific ethnic-religious group? And can it be a coincidence that the word fails to designate the real object of this hostility, but describes the Jews in “racial” terms, so that, at least until the present-day proliferation of virulent antisemitism in the Muslim world, Arabs would claim that as “Semites” they could not be accused of antisemitism? Does not the simple existence of this anomalous term connect the specificity of hatred’s target with the necessary denial of its universal necessity? Jewish firstness must be reduced to a biological quality precisely because it is just the opposite, the “discovery” of the unique centrality of the cultural world of religion and language.

    Since antisemitism requires at the minimum an antisemite, the first approach is to concentrate on him. The classic statement of this emphasis is Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1946 Réflexions sur la question juive. Appearing right after WWII, the book makes no effort to examine Jewish reality. Its thesis is that the antisemite is the responsible subject not merely for antisemitism but even for Judaism; the Jew is whomever the antisemite designates as such. Absurd as a general rule, this formulation was less so in the era of Nazi persecution, which defined as “racial” Jews many persons who had never thought of themselves as Jewish. And that the Sartrean attitude is not confined to non-Jews nor to the immediate postwar period is demonstrated by “The Suicidal Passion” (Weekly Standard, November 21, 2011) by Ruth Wisse, professor of Yiddish and Comp. Lit. at Harvard, who insists that antisemitism is not a Jewish problem but a sentiment that invents its own “Jew” to hate, and that ends up damaging the antisemite more than the Jew. Wisse, unlike Sartre, is very much aware of Jewish reality; she merely thinks that this reality has rather little to do with antisemitism. Or at least, it should, for the more we “understand” antisemitism as a reaction to Jews, the more we seem to be blaming the Jews for it.

    Most works on antisemitism try to avoid arousing this fear, not so much by insisting on the total independence of the antisemite’s beliefs from Jewish reality as on the irrational nature of his hatred. Robert Wistrich’s books, Antisemitism, the Longest Hatred (1992) and A Lethal Obsession (2010), probably the most thorough recent documentations of antisemitism, list in what rapidly becomes a highly repetitive fashion the various manifestations of anti-Jewish ideology in different times and places. Each of the 25 chapters of the latter book contain much the same material, as Wistrich compiles with great conscientiousness such things as accusations of the “blood libel” from dozens of countries throughout the centuries. Wistrich is writing about antisemitism, not about Jews, and he is concerned with showing the virulence and generality of the “obsession” rather than explaining why specifically it is Jews who are its objects.

    Given all this, I find it reassuring that what appears to be the most widely read and assigned book on antisemitism takes a strong, explicit stand on the “Jewish question” diametrically opposed to Sartre’s. Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin (PT), authors of Why the Jews? (1983, 2003), entertain no doubt that antisemitism is a reaction to specific, fundamental Jewish traits. However fantastic some of its accusations, the basis of antisemitism is the specific role of the Jews in history. Readers of these Chronicles know that I am in full agreement with this position. (The obvious source of the book’s title, although it is not mentioned in the text, is an old joke whose original form probably goes back well before Hitler: At a Nazi rally Hitler is screaming, “Who causes all of Germany’s problems?” A man in the crowd shouts back, “The bicycle riders.” Hitler’s taken by surprise and asks, “Why the bicycle riders?” To which the man replies, “Why the Jews?”)


    The four elements of Judaism cited by PT as provoking antisemitism are: (1) the unique God introduced by the Jews, (2) the Torah or Jewish law, (3) Jewish peoplehood (the Jewish “nation”) and (4) the belief in chosenness. The authors present this list on pp 8-9 in a somewhat confusing way as combining to provide a different set of four answers to the question of what has provoked anti-Jewish hostility: (a) worship of a unique God and obedience to his revealed laws (i.e., 1 and 2); (b) belief in their chosen status (i.e., 4); (c) the moral imperative to “repair the world”; (d) the achievement of higher-quality lives than their neighbors as a result of Judaism, the latter two being loosely connected to (3), Jewish national unity.

    As I have discussed in previous Chronicles, I find the key to Jewish difference (and firstness) in the paradox that the Jews proclaim One God for the universe but who has “chosen” the Jews to reveal himself. PT’s third point about “repairing the world” (tikkun olam) is a reflection of the moral nature of the One God, on which the authors insist: this is not a God who can be influenced to neglect justice for the sake of his people’s material interests. The One God is a “Jewish god” to the extent that he has revealed himself to the Jews and has made a covenant with them as “his” people, but his universality guarantees his embodiment of the originary moral model of human reciprocity. The coup of declaring “their” God universal permitted the Jews to consider their defeats as divine chastisements directed at them rather than demonstrations of the superior power of “other gods.” But this is just another way of saying that the Jews understood themselves as subject not to divine whim but to a universal moral law. Finally, category (d), however subjective, reflects the added responsibility that comes from the “tribal” sense of chosenness. After all, the idea of the One God did eventually catch on, because it corresponded to a greater anthropological insight than that which led to “pantheons” of local gods. The human is made up of many separate communities, but all human beings share a common historical origin. The different gods all derive from the originary god and Judaism thus allows us to return from the many to the One. It should not surprise us that this procured the Jews an advantage with respect to most other social groups, although we should not neglect the constant testing of Jews through persecutions that would presumably impose greater selection pressures than on other groups.


    What is the “truth” of monotheism? “Believing in God” is certainly not the proof of anything but its own possibility, no small thing but hardly a proof of existence, although the “ontological proof” is not (pace Kant) refutable either: how can we claim to know that the capacity to formulate ideas in language is within the purview of “natural,” uncreated creatures? In the matter of the One God, when we speak of Jewish “firstness” we draw a parallel between the discovery/invention of monotheism and an objective discovery such as the laws of gravitation or the Pythagorean Theorem. For an atheist, One God is just as absurd as many gods, yet even the atheist is obliged to note that the history of the West, at least, has “selected for” One God quite radically over polytheism. I’ll let the philosophers argue over whether it is illogical to have many omnipotent beings, or whether God can be both omnipotent and omniscient at the same time.

    The crucial question, which cannot be resolved a priori, but which nevertheless invites intelligent speculation, is why the devolution from Judaism to other religions was necessary to spread the Jewish message. One could say that the fact that it happened not once but twice, and that two thousand years later, the two resulting religions are the world’s largest, while the Jews remain scarcely more numerous than in antiquity, is certainly the sign of a (pragmatic) paradox inherent in proclaiming the universal God in a “tribal” covenant.

    When the only rivals of the Jews were polytheists, monotheism could be singled out for its “intolerance” and the Jews, as a scandalous exception to the entire mutually tolerant system. Knowing that history has shown the “superiority” of monotheism, one might imagine that this opposition would endure for many centuries and eventually result in a universal conversion to Judaism. But as we know, things didn’t work out that way; or rather, they did, except that the universal conversion involved new variants of Judaism that, as it would in retrospect be difficult to imagine otherwise, came into conflict with Judaism in its original form. And Judaism itself, needless to say, no longer remained the same in opposition to what had not previously existed, a universalizing version of its own belief in One God. Each of the subsequent monotheistic offshoots, from (Catholic) Christianity to Islam to Protestantism, not to speak of Mormonism, saw itself as the natural successor to Jewish monotheism to which Jews could be expected to convert. As did many, but never all. The problem of Jewish firstness proper begins only with the “successor religions,” whose beliefs have Jewish monotheism at their core and which are all obliged in different ways to present themselves as “new” versions of Judaism, if only through denial. This is itself an homage to Jewish firstness, since even the Muslim claim of atemporal (“uncreated”) superiority is all the more a demonstration of historical dependency, as even the most superficial reading of the Koran makes clear.

    To say the Jews discover that there is only one God involves in fact two discoveries: (1) they discover that their previous, tribal God alone is God, or rather, their belief in their “tribal” God leads them to the understanding that the very idea of God implies uniqueness and consequently (2) they discover the universal truth that “God is One,” which makes no reference to any tribal connection. No doubt there is no logical requirement that 2 depend on 1, but there is certainly a historical requirement with a clear basis in the originary hypothesis, where the “universal” god is born in a specific, “first” community, but with no conception of “extension to other communities” that would permit some kind of ecumenism, let alone monotheism. It has been the purview of the successor religions to resolve the paradoxical tension between the two discoveries, by either with Christianity historicizing the evolution of God’s relation with humanity from the Jews to the rest of us, or with Islam de-historicizing the election of the Jews as a failed attempt at divine revelation that the Koran rectified.

    This suggests that the “legitimate” historical claim of antisemitism is that the Jews, although first in their discovery, fail to recognize the necessity of the successor religions to spread the monotheistic truth—without which, they would add, “monotheism” is an incomplete project, since if God revealed himself to the Jews, it is their responsibility to reveal him to the rest of humanity. But if other religions were necessary to spread this truth about God, to persuade not just a handful of Jews but an entire civilization of its validity, then how deny the “truth” of these religions themselves?


    Needless to say, blaming the Jews for this situation is inappropriate. Even blaming the antisemites isn’t very helpful. But antisemitism reveals something essential about the very question of firstness and the impossibility of ever getting it “right.” The communal nature of Judaism, which makes it difficult to spread to others, or at the very least, leaves an opening “on the left” for a religion like Christianity, which can arguably claim that its greater persuasiveness reflects a more advanced anthropology (and Islam, in its own way, can make a similar claim), is not something the Jews could have thought to “transcend.” Even today’s secular Jews depend if anything even more than observant ones on the abstract sense of belonging to a community to establish their “Jewish identity,” which is endangered by their loss of attachment to the solidarity-producing Law and its related individual and collective ceremonial activities.

    The people who had the intuition that God is One could only have had it in the context of belief in “their” God. Now we recall that the essential statement of this intuition is the revelation to Moses on Mount Horeb in Exodus 3 of God’s name as a declarative sentence, Ehyeh asher ehyeh. This corresponds to the de-tribalization of God, who no longer exists in the context of (imperative) prayer/invocation but in a self-contained objectivity. Yet this very declaration is contained, certainly not coincidentally, in the discourse most crucial to the establishment of the Hebrews as an independent nation through the Exodus. The universality of God functions within the national framework of the Hebrews as a new source of religious strength, and as a guarantee that God can be understood as concerned with their welfare whether or not they are victorious over their enemies: the One God need not prove his strength in relation to other gods. Perhaps the simplest way to understand this connection is as a guarantee of firstness; the Jews are not “better” than the Egyptians but their nation, however long-suffering, must be preserved as witnesses to the grandeur and stigma of being the first to grasp the universal truth about humanity.

    The association of this universalization with the declarative sentence is clearly linked to the existence, or at least the awareness of the possibility, of writing. Of course we speak in declarative sentences, but the written word is in essence propositional, since it must subsist in the absence of its “speaker” and his real or implicit ostensions. The Torah, or written law, is a set of “tribal” imperatives that might seem inconsistent with a God whose “name” is to be what he is, but it is a universalizing set of laws by the very fact of being written down and consequently made available to anyone who would read them. This universalization was available to all, and indeed there was a good deal of Jewish proselytization in the centuries preceding the triumph of Christianity, whose preservation of the Hebrew scripture shows that it shares the connection between writing and universality—as does the Koran.

    Christianity was successful, no doubt, but necessarily second, derivative of the originary moment where the One God was revealed to “his own” community. For the Christian, this second, universal moment is the key one, and Judaism is only a preliminary stage, the product of an “old testament” waiting to be superseded. Although the Jews are expected to remain as “witnesses” to the originary historical revelation, from a Christian perspective, this witnessing is fundamentally sinful, since Christ’s revelation of universality is not a supplement but a new revelation embodied in the Cross, which takes the place of the ritual center of communal sacrifice. In the latter, the (Jewish) community finds its shared nourishment. The Cross, in contrast, is a place of suffering where the Christian is invited to imagine himself. That is, instead of being a member of the peripheral community partaking of God’s central bounty, the Christian sees himself as aspiring to become a double of its unique, divine victim, of whom he is at the same time the sinful sacrificer, non-nutritively eating Christ’s flesh in communion, which involves a deliberate inversion of the nourishing role of sacrifice in a community.

    Because it begins from this “transcendence” of the community, Girard’s anthropology cannot understand the communal meal as the essence of religious ritual. The Jew reproaches the Christian with pretending not to eat, to nourish himself on spirituality alone. If we identify, as at the Last Supper, with the source of food rather than its consumer, then our worldly lives are without substance; to pretend to live thus is either folly or hypocrisy. But precisely this is the cost of a “universal” religion: it eats despite itself. Christians do eat, of course, and say grace similarly to the Jews, but these communal activities are not modeled on the exemplary ceremony of communion; on the contrary. It is no accident that Christendom’s best loved ceremonial feast is the Mardi Gras, a “pagan” preliminary to the fasting of Lent. Similarly, its other communal feasts, such as the traditional Christmas dinner, are, unlike the Jewish Seder, devoid of any exemplary link to the Christian model of the sacred.


    The One God is universal but has a special relationship to “his” people. This relationship, as PT among others have noted, is not an exaltation; the Jews are not “better” than others. The inclusion of the prophetic texts in the Bible, and even the overall tone of the historical books, puts on the contrary particular emphasis on the Hebrews’ negative, unworthy qualities. The special attention of God to his people nevertheless corresponds to a specific communal value. The “suffering servant” in deutero-Isaiah who is the principal Old-Testament model for the Christ role is not so much an individual as a personification of the Jewish people as a whole.

    I think the Christian notion of the “afterlife,” a conception with no original roots in Judaism, can be understood as what replaces the historical existence of the Jewish community when Judaism is transformed into a “universal” religion. The claim that the One God is concerned for “his” people is tantamount to the intuition that the contributions of individual members to the welfare of this people are sacred, and as such preserved from oblivion. In effect, if my life is focused on a community rather than my individual destiny, my quest for “immortality”—a desire implicit in our possession of the “immortal” signs of language—is not particularly concerned with the preservation of the contents of my individual “soul”; I am satisfied to leave my achievements and my DNA to my community. It is only with the creation of a “universal” religion that the individual becomes detached from the “tribal” community of those who follow the same customs and speak the same language. The Christian “afterlife” and the ultimate hope of “resurrection in the flesh” are supplements in the Derridean sense, unnecessary in pre-Christian Judaism, that reflect this emphasis on the individual’s relationship to God independently of his community.


    Antisemitism is such a troubling phenomenon because it is both condemnable and “natural.” Our condemnation of antisemitism, like the atheists’ condemnation of belief in God, just raises the question of why it exists in the first place. Presumably, as opposed to belief in God, antisemitism has no legitimate defenders. Yet the current anti-Israel near-unanimity among the intelligentsia, including many “post-Zionists” in Israel itself, shows that it suffices to change its name. The “evils” of Israel are what they are, but boycotting Israel and not the 100 countries that commit crimes far worse is antisemitism pure and simple. What is shocking, and perhaps even for Judeophiles, is that the Jews have their own state. How can such a state be legitimate, when Jews are a “community” whose very continued existence is a reproach to the (Christian) world of nation-states, made up of the subordinate groupings within the “universal” Christian domain of Christendom. Thus the most objectively absurd assertions of the “original ownership” of Jerusalem by Palestinians or of Israeli “Nazism” never fall on deaf ears. Nor does the constant barrage of stupidly vicious lies about Jews, notably including the “blood libel,” produced by Middle-Eastern Islamic institutions, and which is virtually never alluded to in the West as evidence of the bad faith of its producers.

    The difference with previous antisemitisms is that now there is a privileged (Palestinian) victim class, the true heirs of the Holocaust, who permit the Nazi-Jew paradigm to be maintained. Is this progress? We would do best to hope that in some as yet unclear way it is, that the focus on the Palestinians and their “peace process” with Israel, with all its false starts, truly promises to end not merely the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Middle East but the “Jewish question” and with it, the threat of antisemitism itself.


    The follow-up to these preliminary remarks will follow PT’s brief history of antisemitism from Antiquity through Christianity and the bourgeois/Marxist/”racist” era to the present-day “Palestinian” version. I hope that these speculations may serve to raise a few questions, perhaps a few hackles, and demonstrate the need for non-specialized speculative anthropological—neither metaphysical/philosophical nor “social-science”—thinking about these questions of the sort that only GA provides.


  • A GA Criterion of Social Health

    The relevance of GA to the human predicament is demonstrated by the fact that we ever return to the struggle between love and resentment. Abstractly it is easy enough to take the side of love, but in a society that contains inequality of any kind, resentment can always find justification as opposition to injustice. “Love,” under such circumstances, can be stigmatized as complacency. Should we love the Nazis? Pol Pot? In the wake of WWII, any difference of status can be suspected of leading to Auschwitz, and some have come pretty close.

    Whatever its justification, we resent inequality, our own and that which we can identify. The Peircean term of firstness introduced into GA by Adam Katz seems to me the most appropriate term for indicating how inequality may (but certainly not will) be reconciled in dynamic equilibrium with the originary moral principle of reciprocal exchange. Someone must go first, but his firstness remains communicable to others, and must be justified by his contribution to the collectivity. The analogy of a patent makes this plain. Just as a patent lets the inventor profit exclusively from his invention, but only for a time (and the current baroque legal maneuvers over technology patents say much about the malaise that has settled over the market system), so the benefits of firstness are not to be maintained indefinitely.

    Firstness as deferred reciprocity differs by its originary starting point from the “justice” model of John Rawls. Rawls’s “original position” is constructed a posteriori via distribution, whereas the real human problem is our potential for mimetic violence that the reciprocal exchange of representations must solve at the outset. For Rawls, the better-off individual must justify his advantage as having brought a higher level of prosperity to the least fortunate, so that they would choose a society in which his wealth existed over one where it did not. But in fact we “choose” societies where such possibilities exist because they work better than the alternatives to defer violence (locally) and channel it (externally). Until WWII, and to a considerable extent yet today, the benefits of firstness have been revealed above all in war, where victory generally rewards the highest and freest degree of social organization. We tend to forget that this, beyond Auschwitz and Hiroshima, was the primary lesson of WWII: the triumph of free societies (with a little help from Stalin) over tyrannies.

    The lesson that we tend to remember better from WWII is the converse: that the kind of inequality that creates victims is not, can never be, a legitimate form of firstness. The postwar victimary obsession that derives from the horror of the Holocaust could not have existed without the guarantee provided by the Allied victory, experienced quite reasonably as that of good over evil. But the evil itself was of Western origin, and this addition to the burden of Western firstness has led to what is often called the West’s oikophobia, or hatred of its own social order, as characterized by unjustified internal and above all external inequality. Merely as a result of the Western market system’s clear superiority to less free systems, it is blamed for its greater prosperity; this is the burden of “post-colonial” thinking. The zero-sum vision of those who chastise the West for its disproportionate use of resources is nothing but the application of the moral model to the world scene, naive but inevitable. It is as though we lived in a Rawlsian world where distribution were indeed the central human problem rather than the need for firstness to discover and exploit the world’s resources in the first place. Yet however justified we may be in claiming that our prosperity is the product of our own ingenuity and effort, firstness is still deferred equality; our economic superiority over, say, Africa, justified or not, is a promissory note on the future.

    The question of firstness intrudes as well on human exploitation of nature. It is common to extend the notion of legitimate inequality to non-human reality by means of the concept of sustainability. To maintain human civilization on our planet, we must not irreversibly modify our environment. To modify or “damage” the environment is permissible only if it is able, on its own or with our help, to restore itself. This provides an ecological equivalent of firstness. The harvesting of food plants and trees creates an “advantage” that will disappear over time as the cropped area is reseeded. Ecological equilibrium is the equivalent of equality between humanity and nature. But the principle of sustainability is conducive to the utopian dream of maintaining the natural world intact, a vision that presents the extractive industries, which by definition cannot put back what they remove, as evil a priori. The same kind of thinking that sees victims in all inequalities sees Gaia as the victim of all mining or drilling, regardless of the continuing discovery of vast new deposits of fossil fuels that has given the lie to the Club of Rome’s 1972 “Limits of Growth” analysis.


    Left and Right, Democrat and Republican, are defined pretty much uniquely by their attitudes toward firstness. The Left is suspicious of it, seeks to minimize it, regulate it, tax it, redistribute its benefits. The Right encourages it, tries to maximize its rewards and minimize its impediments. This was not always the case. The European sense of the term “liberal,” which means “pro-market” and corresponds pretty much to the domestic side of our term “(neo)-conservative,” is a relic of an era where being in favor of the market system, as opposed to the “old-right” agricultural aristocracy, was felt as a liberalizing, progressive stance.

    I have no compunctions about taking sides in this controversy, yet the logic of the situation is that even if I am right that our society would work more efficiently in a less anti-market atmosphere, just as I always tell atheists that they have to explain why all those other people believe in God, so I must explain why all those other people are on the Left. Perhaps they are indeed irrationally resentful, but if that’s the way humans are, then something has to be done about it. The way liberal democracy has always dealt with it is through elections; if you don’t like Obama, vote for Romney and you’ll get less regulation, etc. Is it a problem for democracy itself that the electorate seems more polarized than in recent memory? Is it a problem that people are increasingly differentiated not merely by wealth but by consumption and even moral values in ways unknown the day before Kennedy’s assassination (November 22, 1963), to take Charles Murray’s terminus a quo for describing the (post)modern world he sees as Coming Apart?

    There having been no reasonable alternatives proposed to liberal democracy, unless pre-modern Islam deserves this status (the Chinese model is hardly stable at this point, and I see nothing that should lead us to think of it as other than a temporary hybrid of market-society and “socialism,” currently carrying out a highly advanced version of “primitive accumulation”), the only real alternative to the current system is chaos and war, destruction and catastrophe. In that case, there’s not much point in theorizing. But to the extent that GA can reconcile us just a bit more than mainstream thinking to the necessity of firstness and its compatibility with our legitimate desire for equality, we might hope that it may shed just a bit of light on the dilemmas of contemporary politics, and thereby help bring our political adversaries just a bit closer together.


    If indeed my continued Fukuyama-like assertion of the superiority of liberal democracy is correct, then there is no “higher” argument for one side or the other; the very existence of two matched parties suggests that they have equal legitimacy and that that legitimacy is itself the highest political value. The seemingly hypocritical condition of political debate in which the sides contest each other’s legitimacy on an intellectual level while accepting it on a procedural level is the paradoxical foundation of liberal democracy. The paradox is that extreme suspicion of the other is on the one hand always necessary, since there is no a priori guarantee that one of the parties is not unconsciously or even consciously (e.g., a communist party) bent on destroying liberal democracy itself, whose existence is by our presupposition the highest political value. But on the other hand, such suspicion, and the hostility that goes with it, is in fully modern societies really nugatory, since the system protects both parties and the idea of a more than temporary one-party monopoly is inconceivable. To the extent that the system functions within its normal parameters, we need only glance occasionally at the boundaries while devoting most of our efforts to the debate that takes place within their limits. No doubt systems that had appeared to be stabilizing as liberal democracies can indeed reverse course, as we have seen in Russia and some other former republics of the USSR (Ukraine? Armenia?), and perhaps in Turkey, but the more established democracies in fully industrialized countries show (as yet?) no signs of regressing in this manner. Comes a great catastrophe, of course, and all bets are off.

    The paradox of democracy is just one more to add to the other paradoxes that derive from the originary paradox of signification. Skeptical readers might then ask what GA can contribute to the debate. If GA had specific answers for the political questions of the day, it would be a paradoxical theory indeed. In a democratic society, a “theory” that can deduce political conclusions a priori from objective conditions is a contradiction in terms. On this score, all GA can do is to reassure us in Hayekian terms that the liberal-democratic-market polity has been shown to have of all systems the greatest likelihood of being “more intelligent” than its individual members, and consequently of remaining a viable political system.

    But the other side of the coin is that a system that relies for its auto-regulation on what is nowadays called “crowdsourcing,” undisciplined collective decision-making of the sort our presidential race is currently revving up for, is constantly in danger of failing to adapt to some new development that requires “thinking outside the box.” Many recent developments suggest that the American system, along with the European and Japanese, is showing its age and is losing its ability to respond to the world’s challenges.

    Let me then make a tentative GA-based argument for the continued exemplarity of the United States on the world stage that I think goes about as far as any such argument can. Of all the nations of the world, I think there is little doubt that the US is the one where the dichotomy between believers and unbelievers, God-creates-man and man-creates-God, is closest to the point of equilibrium. If GA has anything to say about the health of societies, it is that the highest degree of human self-awareness is located at this point: neither at the pole of fideism nor, as too many intellectuals would have it, at that of atheism. I find great reassurance in the fact that our two political parties are more or less balanced on this point, one on each side, and despite what they often say about each other, neither at either extreme.

    It might be said that for an anthropologic thinker, showing favor to belief in God is a sign of abdication. I am not personally a “believer,” but I understand belief in our createdness as a gesture of proper humility toward the mystery of the human and its language. No individual mind can fully establish a causal chain between the human collectivity/community and the individual that language mediates, and “faith in God” is as good an expression as any to convey both that we acknowledge this incapacity and that we do not consider it an obstacle to the inherent goodness of our social order or to the overall success of the human enterprise. In terms of the political dichotomy discussed above, we may say very roughly that belief in God correlates with faith in the providential nature of a certain degree of firstness.

    In answer to the potential objection of those who see the US as an outlier in comparison to Europe, with its diminished church attendance (and birth rate), I would remind them that if Europe (with the exception of its growing Muslim population) has drifted toward the atheist pole, there are lots of places, starting with Iran and Saudi Arabia, where the drift is in the opposite direction. The interest of my classification is that it doesn’t affirm the superior “enlightenment” of one pole over the other.

    I hope these remarks are not taken as an expression of American chauvinism. It seems obvious that the United States, in all its imperfection, has for the past century or so played for the most part a globally benign, and in the two world wars, a saving role in human affairs. If it is to be superseded in this role, well and good. Only let its successor, be it a state (China?? India??) or some international body (????), maintain this same equilibrium between pride and humility, while reproducing its population, and there is hope that all may be well.


  • Generative Anthropology and Triangulation Theory

    The aim of this article is to take Eric Gans’ theory of Generative Anthropology, especially as regards its proposal about the origin and nature of language (Gans, 1985, 1993, 2007, et al.), together with my own explorations, called Triangulation Theory (Wright, 2005, 2008, 2011), and to suggest what overlaps, intersections and divergences might be discerned between the two.

    I begin with a quotation from Samuel Beckett’s novel Watt:

    Looking at a pot, for example, or thinking of a pot, at one of Mr. Knott’s pots, it was in vain that Watt said, Pot, Pot. Well, perhaps not quite in vain, but very nearly. For it was not a pot, the more he looked, the more he reflected, the more he felt sure of that, that it was not a pot at all. It resembled a pot, but it was not a pot of which one could say, Pot, Pot, and be comforted. It was in vain that it answered, with unexceptionable adequacy, all the purposes, and performed all the offices, of a pot, it was not a pot. And it was thus this hairsbreadth departure from the nature of a true pot that so excruciated Watt. For if the approximation had been less close, then Watt would have been less anguished. For then he would not have said, This is a pot, and yet not a pot, no, but then he would have said, This is something of which I do not know the name. And Watt preferred on the whole having to do with things of which he did not know the name, though this too was painful to Watt, to having to do with things of which the known name, the proven name, was not the name, any more, for him. For he could always hope, of a thing of which he had never known the name, that he would learn the name, some day, and so be tranquillized. But he could not look forward to this in the case of a thing of which the true name had ceased, suddenly, or gradually, to be the true name for Watt. For the pot remained a pot, Watt felt sure of that, for everyone but Watt. For Watt alone it was not a pot, any more.

    (Beckett, 1958, 88-89)

    Ontological anguish of so fastidious a quality, we seem sure, is certainly not ours. Such a passage would seen to belong more to a Lewis Carroll pedagogue than a modern philosopher—one thinks of the Turtle teacher in Alice in Wonderland with his “Will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you. . . ?” Yet, if we consider the actual implications of the situation in which a single person uses a word in the common language, which brings with it the obvious fact that he or she must have a way peculiar to them of understanding the common word, then the word ‘common’ itself becomes questionable.

    I Stereoscopy real and metaphorical

    In an earlier Anthropoetics article (2008) I drew from Gregory Bateson (Bateson, 1978: 79-81) the metaphor of Stereoscopy to make clear the structure of a dialogic interchange in language between two speakers. Each person has their own understanding of the common word at issue in some new would-be-informative utterance, but it is this very difference that lies behind the impulse to communicate it to the other, who is presumed to miss some key criterion.

    In the visual and acoustic stereoscopic sensations, it is the whole-field mismatch between the input from left and right sensory organs that enables the brain to create the sensory ‘space’ that gives such a spontaneous guide to a region of distribution in the real. We are hardly ever aware at the conscious level of the sensory differences: to take visual stereoscopy as an illustration, some philosophers of perception have claimed that, when by chance you see a finger as double, you are doing no more than ‘seeing one finger twice’ (Ryle, 1966, 107; Pitcher, 1971, 41), but, in fact the two images are not identical at the level of the actual sensations you are having. Not only are the degrees of focus and colour responses not purely identical, but the angle at which the finger is viewed is different.

    The metaphor is an appropriate one, the reason being that two persons’ perspectives cannot be the same since, firstly, the histories of their learning are peculiar to them, and secondly, their sensings equally so. It is precisely because the histories differ that one wishes to update the other, since it has apparently become plain to the speaker that some key criterion has not been perceived by the other, that it is not present in their memory. The criterial difference that one person makes plain to the other effects a change in their objectifying. This is the goad that Watt is feeling when alone, he does not see the pot as a pot ‘any more’; in the mundane public acceptance of the name he now finds something amiss.

    II The assumption of singularity as a method of obtaining convergence

    As I made plain in the earlier article, the number of entities presumed to be perceived is not necessarily preserved through the transformation of the utterance. The singularity of any entity is thus not guaranteed by our seeming agreement; the very singleness of a thing or any entity, even that of the self, is a needful illusion that is not ontologically secure. This mutual pretence of convergence is required by our having together to assume a single element in our sense fields in order to get a rough correlation of the selections we are making. When the match is close enough, which means when it answers, ‘with unexceptionable adequacy, all the purposes, and’ performs ‘all the offices’ of the thing we have ‘identified’, such as a pot, we deem that we have perceived ‘the same thing’ together.

    Note that purposes, that is, desires and fears, our motivations, have a part to play in the mutual validation of the word’s applicability—and, notoriously, those too are particular to the bodies involved. It is polite to neglect any lingering reservations we might have, as to point up the possibility of difference can look altogether too like distrust. However, once this provisional agreement, this mutual hypothesis of motivational harmony has been set up, the speaker at once alters it. He or she does this by providing a clue that transforms the hearer’s understanding of the word in that present circumstance. To quote a dictum of mine here: ‘It is by a PRETENCE of complete success that we partially capture the REAL’ (Wright, 1978, 538). A form of trust between speaker and hearer is thus indispensable in the interchange, even if it be two enemies talking.

    III Motivation as the sine qua non

    It perhaps is plain now what the relevance of Beckett’s fantasy is to our present concern. He has imagined Watt as hypersensitive to the differences that remain even when all seeming agreement about how a word ‘refers’, as we say, to some fuzzy region of the real has been mutually checked out. In view of the central place of motivation in this scenario, it is no surprise that Watt is ‘anguished’ by the minutiae of the disparity between his understanding of the word ‘pot’ and that of others in the language-game. Notice, too that he is ‘tranquillized’ when he is taught a new word, for then the agreement of him as student with whoever as teacher updates him appears to be a soothing one that has no obvious hint of conflict or consequent violence in it. No obvious hint, because the differences have not been banished, merely adjusted—’unexceptionable adequacy’, yes, may have been reached for the time being, but not logical identity. Indeed, the pretence of logical singularity must be repeated all over again with the next stage of adjustment of word to world. This is why Watt cannot shake his suspicion that ‘the pot’ as an element of the real fails to live up to the supposedly ideal agreement embodied in the word: he couldn’t say ‘Pot, pot, and be comforted’; and why it was painful to him to find that ‘the known name, the proven name’ no longer had the safe meaning he had so far assumed—which is as much to say he had discovered a unexpected discrepancy in his ‘approximation’ and that of others. Is Gans’s way of putting this ‘an aborted gesture of appropriation’? (Gans, gaintro.htm)

    Here is another similarity between the two analyses. The fact that even the most mundane statement involves a putative clash of motivations makes it plain that it is mistaken to think of language as basically a matter of moving from true to false, with declarative —or as J. L. Austin would have said ‘constative’—statements as the foundation of language. As Richard van Oort has persuasively argued (van Oort, 1997), it is better to regard language as fundamentally ‘performative’, to use another term from Austin, in that, in speaking, one performs a speech act similar to the ‘naming of a ship’ (an example of Austin’s). It can be seen that, since the utterance is a method of altering someone’s motivations, one is undoubtedly performing an act. One can thus say that every declarative statement (Austin’s ‘constative’) is a re-naming of some portion of the real, and is therefore covertly a performative. The relation between the real and the word has, hopefully for each person concerned, been moved on—for those persons are concerned, as Watt is.

    IV To each an idiolect

    But we can now, temporarily, stand at a safe philosophical distance and accept that every time we use the word ‘pot’, we cannot ignore the fact that criteria in our ‘identification’ of this mundane object cannot wholly match those of our fellow-speakers. If I may make again a reference I have made before:

    As George Steiner has cogently argued, we each speak an ‘idiolect’ of the ‘standard’ language; he adds, ‘[t]here are no facsimiles of sensibility, no twin psyches’ (Steiner, 1975: 170). It is not that we are speaking a ‘private language’ so berated by the Wittgensteinians of the last century: we are speaking a private version of the public language. Steiner likens it to a form of translation (ibid.: 47). (Wright, 2008)

    As is argued in my 2005 book on narrative, perception and language, the Joke makes capital out of this variance of understanding across persons, especially because we are reliant on context to help us disambiguate; witness the removal of ‘a’ and ‘the’ from in front of ‘pot’ in the Beckett passage would suggest at first glance that cannabis (a slang term from Spanish potaguaya, an infusion of cannabis buds) was the topic of the passage.

    Watt’s anguish reveals something else about the ‘teaching’ of a word, of the very nature of the Utterance. In such an act, to ask another to update his or her use of a word, is to alter their purposes, their pattern of motivation. You could say that it was, peformatively, a warning. The implication is clear, that to do so we must at the least trust each other in this particular move in the language-game—for it is usual to trust a person who warns us—and, on top of that, we ask the hearer to join with one in an initial mutual hypothesis that we both mean the same by a word (as mentioned above, to obtain the rough overlap of our selections from the real to allow the proposed adjustment of it to go through). This constitutes an overlap with Eric Gans’s analysis of the origin of language: a difference in motivation is a potential source of conflict, and the entrance into the mutual hypothesis is a deferral of possible violence (Gans, 2008,2).

    V The Joke as a familiar exemplar of the paradigm

    We need the Joke example to make plain the structure of the originary moment, for a joke is a performance in little of its essential character. Peter Gilgen (1993) opened a review of Eric Gans’s Originary Thinking with a pun:

    Eric Gans, whose recreational activities include distance running, has covered a lot of ground during the past decade.

    The analysis of any joke can reveal ultimately (for there is often a range of variations) a simple structure.

    (1) There will be an region of the real that is the focus of attention for the speaker. It will form the node about which interpretations will play. For the Hearer it may be either (a) a region he or she has paid no attention to at all, just a part of the unperceived chaos of sensing that the philosopher of perception calls the ‘non-epistemic’ (no-knowing), a sensing without perceiving. As a simple example, take your experience on waking in an unfamiliar room; you are looking at the room sideways, and for a moment you are quite unable to recognize anything you see (your field of vision may be doubled anyway, with one eye half-covered by the blanket). Or (b) it may be a feature in the sensory process that you have already fixed a percept upon, a memory-gestalt that has guided your actions up to now, and one you are now to have updated. In this case the ambiguous region (type b) is ‘Eric Gans . . . has covered a lot of ground’; this is the sound-sequence over which rival interpretations will play. I call this the Ambiguous Element.

    (2) There will be some apparently secure indication of the general context that is taken at first to be relevant in the interpretation of (1). In this case it is patently the context of the journal, in which academic activities are being carried on, in particular the work carried on by Eric Gans in the theory of the origin of language. I call this the First Clue (to a relevant context);

    (3) Then there is another clue which sets (1) in another context and thus, if the clue be of type (a), induces the Hearer or Reader to project a percept where there was none before (put another way, enables the Hearer to pick out from his or her visual field some portion that had been so far ignored), and, alternatively, if the clue be of type (b), induces the Hearer to change an existing percept into another or others (the latter must be included since there is no given preservation of singularity across the transformation, as in the example given in the earlier article where the apparent sight of what was seen as one bird is transformed into ‘two-and-a-bit leaves’). Here this clue is ‘whose recreational activities include distance running’. The metaphorical meaning of (1) ‘covered a lot of ground’, namely, has spent much time and effort over a wide range of research and made considerable progress is changed to its literal meaning, has run a considerable distance. I call this clue the Second Clue (one that reveals another possibly relevant context). Many jokes are of this form, taking advantage of the latent ambiguity of tropes.

    This triangular structure can be found in all jokes and stories (see Wright 2005, Chs 1 and 2, for a thorough investigation of the diverse forms it can present itself).

    VI The transformation of the Hearer’s understanding

    It is this that is found in the first utterance, at the origin of language. The joke works because it rouses a Watt-like ‘anguish’ which is dispelled (or not if the joke is black) by a return to a comforting, mundanely relevant context.

    Since there is no need to multiply examples, let us briefly quote that given in the earlier article (Wright 2008). A female and a male of some early hunting group are together in the forest: the female

    notices, as we would say, a stag hidden within a bush not far from them, the stag not yet having become aware of them (for her what we call the ‘stag’ may be non-linguistically, that is, wordlessly conceptualized only as prey or food, the ‘bush’ perhaps merely as non-rigid obstacle). Then she notices that her male companion does not realize that the animal is hidden there. She, having been as a child one who was fond of play of every kind (and we know well that animals have the capacity to play), now raises her hands to the sides of her head in the form of antlers. This is the necessary ‘transparency,’ the Second Clue, which is itself ambiguous, being at once merely open hands by her head and also a stag’s antlers. She foregrounds her mimetic performance as clearly as she can, perhaps sniffing like a deer, mock-nibbling with her mouth, and twitching her nose to improve the suggestion. This is the sort of thing perhaps she often did as a child in play. She then looks in the direction of the deer. She cannot point with her hands for that would be a symbol before symbols had come into existence. If now the male anthropoid tumbles to what is being said, and especially if now they make the attack together and the stag brought down, the first linguistic communication has gone through with great success. As Gans correctly insists, there is no necessity that the first statement be phonic in character (Gans 1999, 7). An updating of one agent’s mode of attention, and thus, his concept and percept, had been brought about by another agent employing a transparency in a situation where the ‘speaker’ was aware that the ‘hearer’ needed updating about a region of the real. We have to say that the female was certainly meaning that a familiar source of food was before them even before her male companion picked up the clue (even though she had no words for source of food, or even stag, only the concepts of them), so it is strictly possible to mean before a fully functioning language has come into existence.

    This triangle is at the core of the first utterance of language. It is, as Gans puts it, ‘a mimetic triangle’, because the first move is for Speaker and Hearer to enter into the (strictly false) hypothesis that their understandings of the word that refers to the putatively single referent are identical. It is as if Speaker and Hearer imitate each other in their singling out from the real of the ‘same’ element. This is where their mutual trust—or, ethically better—faith can be said to show itself, firstly for the Speaker, in his or her belief that the forthcoming transformation will be to the Hearer’s advantage, and secondly for the Hearer to accept the same outcome.

    VII Why faith and not blind trust is requisite

    It has to be an act of faith and not blind trust since even the most loving partner in dialogue cannot, as we say, ‘in all good faith’, know that the transformation that the utterance proposes will be to the Hearer’s benefit. Nothing can guard against Hearer’s and Speaker’s understandings being subtly at odds without either of them being aware of it. This is where Watt’s ‘anguish’ about the degree of ‘approximation’ can be shown to be well justified. One may feel that one has taken adequate account of the other’s perspective in this ‘joint attentional scene’ (Tomasello, 2003, 25-8), but there is no security in this. Many a comedy and tragedy makes plain the anguish that can result from an understanding presumed to be perfectly in common turning out as a result of time’s whirligigs to be unexpectedly irreconcilable. This is where it becomes only too plain that the shifts of words upon the world cannot be securely predicated, and that, for all those engaged in dialogue, not only is blind trust at its heart self-serving, but ontological surprises can enforce the choice of unpalatable sacrifice (see King Lear or Oedipus Rex). This can be said to be the ‘mimetic crisis’ that Gans speaks of (Gans 1995, 7).

    It is worth here quoting a closer analysis of his of this originary moment:

    Reduced to the mimetic triangle purged of all naturalistic elements, the originary hypothesis may be formulated as follows: the sign originates as the solution to the ‘paradoxical state’ or ‘pragmatic paradox’ engendered when the mimetic relation to the other mediator requires the impossible task of maintaining the latter as model while imitating his appropriative action toward a unique object. Put in geometric terms, the parallel lines of imitation must converge toward a single point. The mimetic model is both model and (potential) obstacle; it is the moment when this contradiction prevents action that the human linguistic sign appears. (Gans, 1997, 20)

    We have to see the uniqueness of the object, ‘the single point’, as a figment of human imagination, for, if the two agents were in perfect agreement about the focus of their interest (‘the impossible task’), no utterance would be required. It exists in their imaginations in its ‘sacred’ perfection as a timeless ‘referent’. Yet the mutual projection of that illusory uniqueness is paradoxically needed so that the Speaker can correct the Hearer’s take upon the region of the real from which each agent is making a different selection. What is further necessitated is that Speaker and Hearer share a measure of trust so that the correction (with its aura of rivalrous mismatch) can go through. But this trust is inadequate if it is a blind one, hiding the possible threat of subsequent disagreement over this ‘unique object’.

    Blind trust fakes certainty without realizing it. So determined not to face the fear, it regards any suggestion that ‘truth’, ‘the facts’, ‘sincerity’, ‘objectivity’ and the rest are not certain as a symptom of unethical betrayal, a ‘relativist’ hoax performed by a double-dealer, who cannot be trusted in turn. But that kind of trust is a Dickensian ‘great expectation’, always open to subversion, and, as for Pip in the novel, a subversion that can always ambiguously undermine one’s own interpretation. When cross purposes emerge unexpectedly, as they did for Pip, then the tragic confrontation may demand a sacrifice for which one is utterly unprepared. For Pip the tragic conflict reached inside his self as so far conceived, pitting love of Estella, the stellar symbol of his rise in social status, against his responsibility to the convict to whom he owes that rise.

    By now perhaps one can see that partners in dialogue do indeed ‘sacralize’ the putative referent at its corner of the triangle in that this focus of their attention is held to as an ideal never to be instantiated, and one that draws them into a commitment of faith that will not be ignored without ethical consequences. Their ‘rivalrous desires’ are to be laid aside in this dramatic performance of a unity of motivations converging on a ‘singular referent’, one that they should know full well is a mutual hypothesis and not an ontological given. This makes the ‘sacred centre’ as human as the ‘periphery’. After all it can be argued that the human came into existence with the first utterance, the first entrance into the fictive, the first projection of the impossible linguistic ideal. We play the imitation of the desire of the other, knowing all the time that it can never be achieved.

    No wonder that Gans should be tempted to attach ‘the name-of-God’ to the word in this dramatic performance (Gans, gaintro.htm) for in ‘singling’ out a logically perfect referent, it is as if they have attained to one of the eternal namings within God’s omniscience. ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God.’ This performance is what Alfred Schutz, in wishing to identify the strength of the social bond in language, has called ‘the Idealization of Reciprocity’ (Schutz, 1962, 3-47), the acting out of an ideal harmonization of intentions guaranteed by its promise, not of eternal agreement, for we have seen how that is unattainable, but of willing acceptance of the possibility of unknown future sacrifice, when till then unknown ‘rivalries’ come to the surface.

    To see this idealization as actually utopian, as pointing at a real heaven as the goal of all language, is to turn the performance into a real superstition. Sometimes it does look as if Gans, in a Hobbesian manner, privileges the sacralizing of the ‘vertical’ sign-centre over the ‘horizontal’, peripheral ‘rivalrous desires’, which are thought of as ‘animal’ (Gans, 2008, 3-4), but it must not be forgotten that the ideal goal of the dramatic performance of ‘a unique referent’ is to enable a transformation of it to satisfy those very desires in their transformation. It is easy to forget that it is the human body that is providing the dynamism of the whole process.

    This is where Thomas Bertonneau moves too far in his suspicion of ‘appetite’ (Bertonneau, 2009); it is a mistake to think that the social must always take precedence over the biological. In the theory of language there is no detaching the two. Poor old Watt was induced to opt out of the game by this oppression of the majority, when he had as much right as anyone else to adjust the definition of ‘pot’.

    IX ‘The deferral of violence’

    This is the nature of the ‘deferral of violence’ essential to generative anthropology. The ‘oscillation between object and word’ (Gans, op. cit.) arises precisely because of this underlying mismatch which the act of faith must embrace. To quote Beckett again, ‘But he could not look forward to this in the case of a thing of which the true name had ceased, suddenly, or gradually, to be the true name for Watt’—but the fact is that he does have to face up to this possibility when he speaks at all, both when he has either to accept another’s meaning, or when he has to challenge that new meaning. A ‘mimesis of the desire of the other’ can never be achieved. The responsibility for deciding between these two outcomes is an ethical matter, contingent on the circumstances, which may issue in a paradoxical conflict, as Gans insists. It is not always possible to purge resentment in a pure catharsis.

    X A dark conclusion

    This is a dark conclusion since it allows for tragic confrontations where to favour the goals of one side over another would amount to brain-washing. Is this the mise en abyme that Gans speaks of? (Gans, gaintro.htm). He says elsewhere that ‘violence is never eliminated’ (2008, 2), and this would explain why. It is no surprise that, rather than face up to what a genuine faith demands, some would rather call this argument ‘relativist’ or ‘solipsist’, yet it places the self and its identifications as inextricably involving the stance of the other.

    Neither does a sacrificial martyrdom have a divine reward. At the most it may offer the fragile hope that one’s example may work in the great social game after one’s death, which is the only form of ‘immortality’ that one may have (Wright, 2011, 39). Where the ‘departure’ of Watt’s understanding from that of the other is only ‘hairsbreadth’, a comic compromise can perhaps be effected. In the tragic case, we have to endure the stubbornness of the paradox, since there is no other way of playing the language-game.

    Works Cited

    Austin, J. L. (1975 [1962]) How to Do Things with Words. 1962. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

    Beckett, Samuel (1958) Watt. Paris: The Olympia Press.

    Bertonneau, Thomas F. (2009) ‘Eric L. Gans on Language, Culture God, and the Market’, The Brussels Journal, July 5th

    Gans, Eric ‘Introduction to Generative Anthropology’ Anthropoetics, https://anthropoetics.org/gaintro.htm

    Gans, Eric (1981) The Origin of Language: A Formal Theory of Representation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

    Gans, Eric (1985) The End of Culture: Toward a Generative Anthropology. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

    Gans, Eric (1993) Originary Thinking: Elements of Generative Anthropology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Gans, Eric (1997) Signs of Paradox: Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press

    Gans, Eric (2007) The Scenic Imagination: Originary Thinking from Hobbes to the Present Day. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Gilgen, Peter (1993) Review of Originary Thinking, Eric Gans, (Stanford University Press, 1993), Stanford Humanities Review, 4:2.

    Oort, Richard van (1997) “Performative-Constative Revisited: the Genetics of Austin’s Theory of Speech Acts.” Anthropoetics II/2, 1-14.

    Pitcher, George (1971) A Theory of Perception. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

    Ryle, Gilbert (1966) The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books

    Schutz, Alfred (1962) Collected Papers, Vol. I: The Problem of Social Reality. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff

    Wright, Edmond (1978) ‘Sociology and the irony model’, Sociology, 12 (1978), 523-43

    Wright, Edmond (2005) Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

    Wright, Edmond, ed. (2008) The Case for Qualia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

    Wright, Edmond (2011) Avatar-Philosophy (and -Religion) or FAITHEISM. Plymouth, UK: Imprint Academic.

  • The Sexual Market: Three Romantic Moments

    Freedom of response to the unfree imperatives of sexual desire, over against various sacral inhibitions thereof, was perhaps aspired to earlier and more persistently than other freedoms in the emergent human market place. Certainly stories of great and greatly transgressive lovers, of Tristan and Iseult or Abelard and Eloise, or of a multitude of more recent romantic strainers against social interest and religious control, including latterly loves daring to speak their own polymorphous (if thus no longer authentically perverse) names, have rather outpaced accounts of the transcendent energies of Captains of Industry, and at least kept up with myths of political and national liberation. And yet, in an endlessly bemusing paradox that has emerged less bluntly for the other categories, it is almost of necessity to the refuge or at least the metaphor of the sacred that the outcomes of such freedom must have recourse. Or so it would seem from the testimonies commonly available. (If Girard and others have dismissed this recourse as “deviated transcendency,”(1) there are many to retort that the deviation goes precisely in the other direction. “If this is a religious experience,” cry such skeptics before, say, Bernini’s Ecstasy of Saint Theresa, “We believe we have had it!”) At any rate, liberalization in this area of human experience, as it expanded in the forefront of the transformations of the European eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, increasingly represented itself as a resistance to the profanely mimetic forces now operative around the peripheries of an emptying ritual center. As they plunged below or soared above the horizontality of market exchange, however, the celebrants of unmediated love contributed immeasurably to the language with which that market created itself. It is not perhaps an exaggeration to say that proclamations of one’s right and power to follow the arbitrary dictates of romantic desire in the choice of a spouse or sexual partner, and by the same token to resist any and every form of external influence on or limitation of that choice, modeled a posture for the establishment of all subsequent constructions of individual identity and rights. This surely would help explain the early predominance and continuing prominence of the marriage plot in literature and other narrative art throughout the modern period. Given the stakes and intensity of interest involved, it is not surprising that the best artists would also gravitate to this theme and, from the beginning, help articulate the paradoxes and even potential tragedies inherent in this putative emancipation, even while they for the most part accepted its inevitability. This paper will attempt to sketch, from this perspective and in a necessarily preliminary manner, three such accounts, “moments,” little crises in the evolution of desire.

    Generative Anthropology has had some powerful and distinctive things to say about the fundamentals of the sexual love-relation, about the asymmetrical caring of heterosexual unions and the tenderness towards the beloved’s vulnerability.(2) It is in no way to diminish them to observe, though, that the resulting conceptualization of marriage or monogamous “relationship” as an at least quasi-sacral shelter from the competition and resentments of the modern world is widely shared, and probably even more widely and perennially sought for. (To those who resent by word or practice the apparently compulsory nature of such desires, and succeed in achieving similar goals in “friends with benefits” arrangements or other social forms we must, of course, offer our congratulations and good wishes, even while retaining a right to assess outcomes over the longue durée of modern lifetimes.) Nor would it be a stretch to identify this, as the soi-disant “Bronx Romantic” himself might concede, as a broadly Romantic position. If such physical and emotional unions offer to provide their participants with such protection, however, those still seeking or selecting a spouse or partner presumably have not the benefit. Because, now at least, even the most ideal tenderness must firstly have passed through the mimetic flux of attraction, or we should say, of attractions in the plural, of rivalrous claims on the potential lovers’ attention and desires—have passed, in short, through the market. One might therefore expect the tensions or contradictions of a project whose aim is, through the free exercise of market choice, to escape the market, to be particularly acute in these stages. Representations of the processes leading, or failing to lead, to the choice, to the establishment of the couple, to the falling into authentic love, even, might seem to promise direct access to certain core ethical issues. Besides, romantic narratives are notoriously silent on the condition of achieved and sustained love. If more recent narratives no longer so often cease at a wedding, they still have difficulty finding traction in ever-extending sessions of unmediated consummation. There are, there must be, problems, others. Mediation, or as Girard might say, triangularity, is the story, still.

    Moment One – “Corinne at the Capitol”

    This is firstly a shining moment, or a deeply silly one, in the history of the emergence of the second sex onto the public scene. Corinne is the heroine of Germaine de Staël’s celebrated 1807 novel of the same name. She arrives at the Capitol in Rome in a chariot drawn by four white horses and led by a crowd of noble male admirers. “Beautiful, striking music” sounds, girls in white run beside her, everyone “lavishly throws perfumes.” Breathless bystanders murmur:

    She receives homage from everyone, but she gives special preference to no one. She is rich and independent; they even think, and she certainly looks it, that she is a woman of noble birth who wants to remain incognito. Whatever the truth may be, . . . she is a goddess surrounded by clouds.(3)

    Mind you, Madame de Staël reminds us, these are Italians—one must make allowances. For her own part Corinne is no passive object of worship. She performs, is famous for it, plays a lyre, improvises poetically, sings, acts, even sometimes lectures. Today she celebrates Italian culture and artistic genius, and is given a crown, to immeasurable acclaim. The female laureate receives not just abstract admiration, nor even just the hotter, more intimate solicitations of what is clearly an early instance of modern popular celebrity, but is very clearly also the object of intense sexual desire, to which, in the safety of her artistic enthusiasm (or perhaps her aristocratic incognito), Corinne is either oblivious or indifferent—at least initially. This of course strengthens her desirability, her grip on centrality.

    If everyone in this scene concedes this, though, we are far from expecting that their modeling will successfully inculcate all those reading the book, especially in latter years. It is the modern feminist critic Ellen Moers who calls it silly, this “performing heroinism.”(4) Denouncing it as “raw fantasy” (183), Moers summons up the deleterious precedent of

    the admiration on which little girls are fed, in treacly spoonfuls, from their earliest years . . . praised, fondled and petted for giving pleasure with the amateur entertainment girls are required to provide in the domestic circle, just as Corinne provides it for all European civilization on the Capitoline Hill (197).

    There’s obviously justice in this. We may take “raw fantasy” as paradigmatic for the second phase of the originary aesthetic moment, and if subsequent fantasies are sometimes more thoroughly cooked than this one, they are still consumed in the sparagmos which predominates in this highly popular work. We may also observe that the half-life of fantasies is usually shorter than that of paradoxes, and that the category of silliness is largely a function of changing fashion. Fashion, a feature of market societies, is of course bound up with the fraught project of projecting private superiority into public spaces—and this is clearly what Corinne is doing. It’s fraught because the public has something to lose, as well as to gain—namely their own share of the center—and will eventually fight back. The centralization of Corinne’s inner beauty, her inner scene, is now too easily decoded for its appeal to our desires, producing critiques like that of Moers. But apparently not for most readers in 1807.

    Even so, hints of the paradoxes of desire are not entirely absent from Corinne’s triumph. She does experience a twinge of something that most little girls don’t, quite yet.

    In the hypnotized crowd is a chilly English lord, one Oswald Nelvil. Corinne from on high detects his chill, and improvises some verses on death, whose effect is to provoke in Oswald some entirely un-English raptures. Their eyes meet.

    Oswald, keenly touched, stepped out from the crowd . . . but an insurmountable embarrassment held him back. Corinne looked at him for a while, taking care, nevertheless, not to let him notice she was paying attention to him. But [as she is led absent-mindedly to her chariot], under various pretexts [she] looked back several times to see Oswald again.

    He followed her and, as she was descending the stairs escorted by her retinue, she looked back to catch one more sight of him; the movement made her crown fall off. Oswald hastened to pick it up and, as he handed it back to her, said in Italian a few words, whose meaning was that humble mortals laid at the feet of the gods the crowns they dared not place on their heads (II.IV.34).

    “Anyway,” as Randy Newman has it in one of his songs, “she dies.”(5) That descending, that crown falling off? Foreshadowing. It takes a while—it’s a long novel. Dies for love, and because Oswald can’t stop being English, is ultimately governed by the wishes of his dead father, that he marry a vacuous blonde Englishwoman. A thousand girl readers may fling aside the book at the latter’s literal appearance, as George Eliot’s Maggie Tulliver does. “Take back your Corinne,” she tells the friend who’d proffered it for modeling purposes,

    “you were wrong in thinking I should wish to be like her. . . . As soon as I came to the blond-haired lady reading in the park, I shut it up. . . . I am determined to read no more books where the blond-haired women carry away all the happiness. . . . Give me some story, now, where the dark woman triumphs. . . .”(6)

    But the rest persist because if you hang in, Corinne’s death is just as consumable a fantasy as her Capitoline apotheosis—or really, pre-apotheosis. Maggie is actually being a bit disingenuous, or obtuse, and indeed she herself dies a death very much as heroically romantic—or triumphant—as that of her equally dark-haired sister Corinne. How paltry, by comparison, those blonde “winners”!

    Still, one cannot quite ignore the sense that the perfection of Corinne’s public triumph, living or dead, the uncontested power of her identity, is genuinely menaced by a private desire which, despite her much insisted-upon self-origination, her purity, is clearly reflected back by her from its peripheral source in a male gaze. The public triumph was revolutionary, rebellious even, precisely because it transcended such desires—Corinne was not in this to get a husband! If one puts centrality to use, especially this use (if one is a woman), one of course risks losing it. (How disappointed the worshipers when, for example, the screen goddess marries, if she marries well and retires into obscurity and child-raising, a condition which they imagine, with horror, might even be satisfying to her. Without them.)

    In Corinne’s case, her Roman admirers are easily imagined tearing their hair, in particular, to think of Corinne choosing this one miserable Englishman from the plenitude of perfectly good, if largely interchangeable Italians. Does she not see he’s just playing hard to get? It is market behavior like this that makes psychologists mythologize about self-destructive tendencies and so forth. Choosing an anonymous Italian, she would not lose the center—or so it looks, from afar. Such a pairing would replicate the structure of her admirers’ own relationship with her, and thus be no threat to her dominion over them.

    But Corinne, and de Staël, apparently see wider fields of struggle, and thus potentially greater triumphs. From that first, half-volitional glancing back, Corinne chooses fatal desire. From the moment of its possibility, the choice is to follow, or wither. Which is to say, that de Staël can hardly be accused of achieving here the Girardian romanesque, of revealing the mensonge romantique. It is impossible to be more romantic than Corinne. Nor can she be advocating the death-wish of Denis de Rougemont’s Tristan, longing for obstacles in their own right.(7) Rather, the paradox apparently conceded here is pragmatic, and belongs firmly in the realm of anticipated market effects. Indeed, it might be more accurately identified as a (perhaps reckless) embracing of risk. The calculation is that the superiority of a woman’s inner scene is most persuasively witnessed by romantic sexual love—how else but in such passion can it be truly known?—but that this in its fulfilment is inauthentic unless it is seen to hazard the total destruction of the centrality that superiority has won her. This we may suspect to be operative whether there are crowds of lovers ranged on the steps below her monumentality, or only one, who, as in the case of Corinne’s Oswald, threatens to manifest what Eliot elsewhere memorably called “an equivalent center of self.”(8) In the market, all equivalences are at best only “rough”—even the most apparently satisfactory exchange may lead to uneven outcomes. To individual desire, there is no equivalence at all—only negotiations and oscillations, between model and subject positions, virtual and real appropriations. To engage sexually with an equivalent other, with his own equivalent self, as this narrative features it, is to enter upon the most contingent of all ventures, to risk everything.

    But retreat seems worse. Even at the Capitol, as the bystanders’ hushed speculations testify, the public Corinne would not be so compelling were she able or willing to rule out sexual love entirely: such a posture would surely be an even more serious liability than that of married and child-bearing domesticity (except perhaps to the little girls in her audience). Implicitly opposing any model of sexual love as an asymmetrical refuge from bourgeois competition, Corinne’s story figures submission to that asymmetry as a heroic gesture of victimary self-sacrifice, and thus also of rivalrous transcendence—a continuing of the competition by other means. Needless to say, Oswald comes to rue his choice, is first to bear witness to his own defeat. The novel is in the vanguard of modern accounts of the formation of marriages which narrate the process in this way, making the private political, not merely exalting resentment over love, but even resenting love for its curbs on resentment. No asymmetry on the other’s terms! No sacrifice of our truest self, or any of its claims! If modern marriage is indeed a refuge, competition is ever battering at its gates, exhorting women and men alike to ever more strenuous efforts, to defy the siren’s call, never to abandon the dream of total victory.

    In his account of the first “star couple,” Heloise and Abelard, Eric Gans suggestively situates the rise of what others call “companionate marriage” or, in his terms “the modern ideal of marriage” as simultaneous with and caused by the rise of bourgeois competition. The key element is even then a facilitating, rivalry-blocking embrace of asymmetry, that of male and female. The acceptance of this asymmetry, the awe-inspiring grace of this gesture “for love,” will defer the resentment generated by other kinds of asymmetry—for example, that between Abelard and Heloise’s respective levels of learning and fame. But it is surely to be noted that this “first modern love affair”(9) is between a man and a woman who, in unprecedented fashion, are able to compete in these terms, even if one is certainly stronger. If there was anything the pre-modern world had in abundance, it was gender asymmetry. What is new is Corinne’s possession of the Capitol, so to speak, to spend on what could be either a heroical-victimary gesture, or the deliberate sacrifice of centrality apparently essential to the establishment of a modern marriage. The latter would presumably have been operative had things “worked out” with the dismal Lord Nelvil—a consummation hardly to be wished for, at least in the terms established by de Staël’s overwrought bestseller. But then, there are other stories to be told, and other paths to felicity.

    Moment Two — Anne Elliot Pops the Question

    The heroine of Jane Austen’s Persuasion (1817) is no Corinne, to put it mildly. Anne Elliot largely avoids the public scene, even in the form it manifests itself in the English gentry life of Austen’s fiction: the balls, the brief duels of drawing-room conversation, the muted demonstrations of superior adherence to a conventional English class-morality or, call it, taste-as-morality, the avoidance of vulgarity as the summum bonum. These are not, despite the intense and surely diagnostic investment the many admirers of Austen’s novels have made in her heroines’ social prowess, the grounds upon which to establish a Corinne-like inner life—they are not Romantics, these women. Except perhaps Anne, who struggles interestingly, as many readers have agreed, at the border of two worlds, or even, two aesthetics.

    Anne’s dilemma is very much about the arrival of the market in the domain of romantic love, as against sacral, or quasi-sacral, inhibitions thereof, the usual allies or tools of an Austen heroine.(10) Quasi-sacral, more often, perhaps, as in the conservative social codes of the landed gentry— religiously motivated curbing of desire hardly features here. Readers respond still, at any rate, to the way Austen and her women defy that market: “We can only appreciate Jane Austen’s opposition to the values of her society,” claims critic Barbara Hardy, a fairly representative voice, “if we look hard at the apparent balance of cause and effect. The society that markets sexual feeling, markets other kinds of feeling too; the feeling for nature, for religion, for the poor, and for learning and art are all suspect.”(11) What Hardy does not acknowledge, however, is that those older, putatively pre-market codes might also be a central “value” of Austen’s society. Nor does she hint at any alternative to the marketing of feeling, although this is something her author is not nearly so shy about doing, as in her enthusiastic embrace of country-house mythology in Pride and Prejudice. So one-sided a reading, of course, is closely allied to the current Austen book-and-movie industry and its fairy-tale appeals to its audience’s own sense of an inner superiority needing no marketing whatsoever.

    But here too Persuasion is a bit different. In the previous novels it is generally not the marketing per se that is to be deplored, but the vulgarity of allowing one’s marketing to be seen as such. The serenity of the endowed class, of a Darcy or a Knightly, is to be sought because it occludes the action of desire. But these novels are about desire, above all about successful strategies of desire—it is the mainspring of their power and the source of their continued popularity. For Anne, though, the graceful models of inhibition are increasingly unreliable, indeed are sliding perceptibly into their own form of vulgarity, although neither she nor one feels Austen is entirely prepared to say this openly, even if it seems clear they see it. Yet the proofs are unpleasantly overt—in, for example, the person of Anne’s vain and irresponsible father, Sir Walter Elliot. Unlike the appallingly vulgar Lady Catherine de Bourgh of Pride and Prejudice, Sir Walter does not owe his title and position to the operations of the market, to trade. He is as blue-blooded as Darcy. Even in the absence of such authentic modeling, however, the prospect of independent response to the market world’s proffered desires, sexual desires at that, is still not easy to contemplate. Anne is smitten by Captain Frederick Wentworth, a handsome naval officer on shore leave from the long war against Napoleon. And he with her. But once young gentlewomen start falling in love with brave young sailors without a fortune, the maw of chaos yawns. There is something distressingly random about such transactions, and a discomfort with this seeps unmistakably into Austen’s language:

    He was . . . a remarkably fine young man, with a great deal of intelligence, spirit and brilliancy; and Anne an extremely pretty girl, with gentleness, modesty, taste, and feeling. —Half the sum of attraction, on either side, might have been enough, for he had nothing to do, and she had hardly any body to love; but the encounter of such lavish recommendations could not fail. They were gradually acquainted, and when acquainted, rapidly and deeply in love.(12)

    “He had nothing to do, and she had hardly anybody to love”—Austen’s famously ironic tone and unlocatable point-of-view may serve here, as so often, to defend English decencies against encroaching frivolity. But even to a true Romantic, the narrative implied by this paragraph is queasy-making. To a Romantic the random is actually the fated, an opportunity to demonstrate the inner scene’s independence from the calculations and influences of the outer scene. The random is freedom, even. Not this apparently automatic conversion of boredom and limited choice into rapid, deep “love.”

    More than Austen’s other novels, Persuasion engages directly with the specifics of history, and there is a hint here of the speeded-up, coarsened world of war. The market on octane, strange, shifting imbalances of supply and demand, shortages and surpluses, a sexual seller’s market, impulse buying, a flight from long-term thinking. Anne Eliot’s mother is dead and her father is too selfish to care, so parental control is exercised by a family friend, Lady Russell. This too is part of the moment, showing something amiss—this absence of effective fathering is a sign of the times. More to the point, perhaps, as ineffective fathers do occur elsewhere in Austen novels, is the absence of any effective replacement for such fathers. Lady Russell persuades Anne to reject Captain Wentworth, mainly for fiscal reasons. Wentworth goes off to sea again, offended. Anne sinks into loneliness, rejects other men Lady Russell champions, loses her bloom, suffers, is exploited by her family. Years pass. As Austen comments, she “learns romance” (IV.21).

    Romantics justly enough accuse arranged marriage of being a market transaction amongst parents, usually fathers trucking in daughters, for financial or social gain. But then the same critique is leveled at those who truck in themselves, arranging their own marriages for such reasons—the quote from Hardy above is an example. Romantics require, at least in principle, that the true souls, the Annes and Wentworths, immolate themselves in their contingencies. If Anne’s gentility, for example, with so impecunious a husband, would most certainly be destroyed in an onslaught of children and poverty, Romantics profess not to mind this, to the degree they admit it as a possibility. He never loved, who planned ahead.

    Austen’s earlier novels have made abundantly clear the folly of such principles—the misery of Fanny Price’s mother in Mansfield Park is an obvious result of them.(13) Sense trumps sensibility. Life is hard in any case, but stoical practicality is best—in the other novels there is no apparent prospect that the Romantics, en masse, might be able to change the whole equation, bend the market to their collective, spontaneous will. But Persuasion cannot quite bring itself to acknowledge the complete emptiness of the Romantic posture, or of its potential power.(14) Its terms must be restated, though. The choice, Austen’s last novel implies, is not so much between a brutalizing market and sacrally pure inner authenticity, as between a debased sacral authority and the first stirrings of meritocracy.

    Because Wentworth turns out rather an expert sailor, as various French (and perhaps American) captains discover to their rue. In the semi-privatized military of his day, he exploits the Napoleonic cataclysm to get rich quick. Military prowess, as Gans has noted, is the earliest field in which rival centers of value can emerge.(15) War ever after retains its potential to accelerate market development. And Romanticism depends, we must also surmise, on expanding economies, of every sort.

    If a Wentworth’s inner superiority can manifest itself in enemy captures, a fortune of twenty-five thousand pounds and upward mobility in the English class system, is there scope for an Anne too in this changing world? But for her, for a woman of her moment and situation, the dramatization of the inner scene’s place in public cannot be vocational. She has been proving her superior competence, as nurse and general organizer and sustainer of her crumbling family. This has been noticed, too, and credited. But it is not enough. Wentworth has returned, newly moneyed and eligible. It seems he may no longer be interested. Other choices beckon. In the climactic scene of the novel, Anne makes a public speech, within his hearing if not directly to him. “It would not be in the nature of any woman who truly loved,” she claims, given a conversational opening, to abandon her object of affection. “We certainly do not forget you, so soon as you forget us” (XXIII.155).

    She continues for the better part of three eloquent pages. For all its neo-classical balance and restraint, for all its being the least overtly victimary of plaints—Anne carefully gives men credit where due, hardly hints of injustice in the disposition of things, is to the end politely respectful of the mores of her society—still, this is unmistakably a paean to the authenticity conferred by inner suffering. She’s no Lord Byron, doubtless, but this is the speech of a Romantic.

    It is also a marriage proposal.(16) Wentworth feverishly scribbles his acceptance, furtively slips her the note. Hers is public, his private. Even if, to be fair, hers is not fully understood in its public assertion and his certainly will be, in the usual ceremonies and distribution of property. Nonetheless, the great field now for an Anne Eliot is this: making a love-choice for marriage. Claiming for her sexual desires—or perhaps more precisely, for their sphere of operation—a radical autonomy in the world.

    It remains fully to account, however, for the pervasive cast of melancholy much observed by readers of this beautiful novel. Anne’s sadness, her long loneliness are perhaps more memorable than her ultimate felicity, and this, finally, may be the most interesting thing about Persuasion.

    Rather than have recourse to standard-issue ideas of Romantic melancholy or agony, to Byronic posturing and so forth, we might want to continue to focus on the predicament of sexual desire in an emergent market situation. Again, this really is the novel’s issue. Let us freely grant Romanticism some of its premises by stressing the “emergent,” with all attendant inefficiencies, ambiguities, uncertainties and discomforts—they’re still with us, undoubtedly. (Perhaps indeed no market can ever be said to have fully emerged, even if some have emerged further than others.) Still, in an emergent market, emerging gradually from a system of ritually established values and curbs on the free operation of desire, and however the Romantic imagination itself may find it gratifying or useful to characterize such a market’s harshness, one is more likely, finally, to encounter persuasion than prohibition. Austen’s title presages a long litany of “social pressures” and “stigmas” and “guilt trips,” the lamentable warping of else-wise bilateral desires by the hellish gravitational influence of other people. But thus, at the same time, it hints at the weakening of ritual controls, and at a certain ominous passing of accountability to the desiring ones.

    Anne does feel guilty—not that this is the end of it. She feels guilty with regard to Lady Russell, and to Wentworth, and to herself. For much of the novel her own potential happiness sadly reproaches her—as it would of course not have done if her father had locked her in a room, or dragged her weeping to a sacrificial altar of some sort. Not that such fathers were ever more than a mixed blessing, but they did provide a certain kind of stability. The Romantic emancipation from the obligations of the public scene confers new obligations, or say, awakens new imperatives—then tends rather toabandon the poor, freed slave of self, to flux and ambiguity, to fending for itself in a daunting field of possibilities some indeterminate proportion of which are generated from within, by the self’s own behavior.

    Of course, there is more to it than this. It’s too familiar and simple, this crazy-from-too-much choice diagnosis. Anne and her creator are strong enough never to be caught singing along with Leonard Cohen’s Joan of Arc:

    I’m tired of the war
    I want the kind of work I had before:
    A wedding dress, or something white
    To wear upon my swollen appetite.(17)

    Nonetheless, to be subject to persuasion rather than control does make more difficult, more acute, the discomforts of the market participant who must weigh such rhetoric and those who utter it not so much against—as in the pure Romantic ideology—as amidst the intensifying and somewhat cacophonic representations importuning her even in the well-regulated fastness of English gentry-land. Anne finds she absolutely must make discriminations, must make her separate peace, even after the pragmatic issues have been resolved. “I have been thinking over the past,” she tells Wentworth, once their renewed engagement has been announced and approved by everyone, including Lady Russell, “and trying impartially to judge of the right and wrong, I mean with regard to myself; and I must believe I was right, much as I suffered from it”(XXIII.164).

    She must have been right to allow herself to be persuaded, she means, even if she now believes that Lady Russell was wrong. One might scoff at such views as incoherent, a self-contradicting conservative nostalgia, timidly unwilling to confront the implications of its own deepest desires. But this would be a bit hard—we’re all entangled in such contradictions. So is Romanticism itself. Anne believes she was right to listen to Lady Russell partly because of her sincerity—that is, the authenticity of her own inner scene—because of her ultimate disinterestedness, her desire for Anne’s well-being. If one loses one’s belief in the selfishness of the prohibitive Other, what grounds remain by which to discriminate one’s own inner scene from anyone else’s? I presume this is why so much Romantic art tends to slide into melodrama as the nineteenth century wears on—melodrama, with its stark oppositions between oppressive society and transcendent individual and other such comfortingly stable discriminations. The “victimize[d] superior individual,”(18) otherwise, starts to look neither superior, nor victimized, nor for that matter individual. Now, Anne Elliot unquestionably is all three of these things. But neither she nor Austen is entirely happy about it. Austen, for example, commented disparagingly on her heroine’s excessive goodness.(19) From the perspective being developed here, though, this is perhaps a pleasing feature of her last novel, as is the discomfort it illustrates and creates. Elizabeth Bennet, the brilliant and never truly nonplussed heroine of Pride and Prejudice, seems much more a fantasy. Persuasion is wrestling with issues more germane to the future, to us. Us the intuitively good, trying to decode the implications of that goodness for our own clashing desires.

    One other discomfort of the market world highlighted by the novel is the way time works in it. This can perhaps be put quite succinctly, although much more could be said. Desire, which in this world is instantaneous, encounters nothing but delay. In the pre-market world, to generalize the difference, desire itself is delayed, but fulfilment, once permitted, is closer to instantaneous. Hence earlier marriages in the latter, heavy use of veils, restriction of carnal knowledge until the wedding night and so forth. Anne’s sufferings, by contrast, belong with Petrarch’s. It is to say nothing new to note that the market world is a world of longings, of desires produced faster and more variously than they can ever be satisfied. In the sexual domain, serial monogamy only temporarily dams up the flood of market desire—although for such respites we remain grateful, one trusts. But if only Lady Russell had been able to persuade Anne not to want Wentworth!

    Moment Three – Wordsworth and Lucy

    William Wordsworth is a great Romantic who, rather unusually, says fairly little about romantic love. But if we visit him for our purposes, it’s not because we think he’s hiding something. Biographically, his secret came out a good while ago—a passionate liaison in Revolutionary France, an illegitimate daughter, a prospective marriage destroyed by war. We choose him because he helped develop one of the most persuasive and lasting strategies of defiance to the market, making him a considerable market success, of course, but also quite rightly attracting our attention to the details of that strategy. Anything he says, or doesn’t say, is of interest.

    And of course he does produce some quite significant poems about love: the “Lucy poems.”

    The Wordsworthian inner scene, the “egotistical sublime” as fellow-Romantic John Keats famously called it,(20) in potent alliance with a fundamentally benign natural world, has enriched and continues to enrich many lives. Mainly English-speaking lives, no doubt, and of course we may concede the primacy of Rousseau and the plurality of natural prophets. Granting these parameters, what the Wordsworthian scene or strategy provides is a path to respite from desire and resentment in a contemplation of nature clearly enough extended from earlier aesthetic models, in the calm of which may be fashioned an identity capable of returning to social interaction with a reduced measure of rivalry and an enhanced one of sympathy—the capacity to hear “the still, sad music of humanity.”(21) This is worked out with sufficient explicitness, especially in his masterpiece, The Prelude, as almost to render unnecessary the current author’s habitual reference to Gans’s diagnosis of the “constitutive hypocrisy of Romanticism.”(22)

    But can sexual desire be compatible with such sympathy? Wordsworth is too good a poet to suppress this question in the interests of his greater vision. He does not retreat, as others might have done, to pastoral pieties—he clearly acknowledges the creep of market choice even into the Lake Country or other such fortresses of authenticity.


    She dwelt among th’untrodden ways
    Beside the springs of Dove
    A Maid whom there were none to praise
    And very few to love.

    A Violet by a mossy stone
    Half-hidden from the Eye!
    —Fair, as a star when only one
    Is shining in the sky!

    She lived unknown, and few could know
    When Lucy ceased to be;
    But she is in her Grave, and Oh!
    The difference to me.

    Those who do not know or praise or love Lucy, who do not register her death, are everywhere in this exquisite poem. Silent rivals, vanquished rivals one might have thought, were it not for the association of Lucy’s isolation, the speaker’s solitary appreciation of her, and her “ceasing to be.” This is surely as beautiful an evocation of love’s desire to be free of the market as anyone has written: the beloved, “fair as a star when only one is shining in the sky!” But of course it betrays its own insecurity—fair because the only one visible. And even more, in the pregnant phrase, “the difference tome.” Has Lucy’s role in her lover’s struggle for identity in a plural world cost her life? Even or especially in sorrow, it apparently has delivered difference to him.(23)

    An early Gans Chronicle provides this statement of the fundamental paradox of love: “Were my love’s aim fulfilled and my beloved rendered invulnerable to death, the scene of my love would vanish.”(24)

    This may lead us on to another poem in the sequence:

    I traveled among unknown Men,
    In lands beyond the Sea;
    Nor England! did I know till then
    What love I bore to thee.

    ‘Tis past, that melancholy dream!
    Nor will I quit thy shore
    A second time; for still I seem
    To love thee more and more.

    Among thy mountains did I feel
    The joy of my desire;
    And She I cherished turned her wheel
    Beside an English fire.

    Thy mornings shewed—thy nights concealed
    The bowers where Lucy played;
    And thine is, too, the last green field
    Which Lucy’s eyes surveyed!

    Here, the scene of his love has not vanished—indeed its beauty, its meaning, like his Englishness itself, is guaranteed, against the myriad unknown men, by Lucy’s retrospective and permanent vulnerability. This is a profoundly tender poem, and profoundly asymmetrical—deeper than the male-female asymmetry, but significantly parallel to it here, is that between the living and the dead. But the tenderness and the meaning, again, are dependent on absence. Lucy’s absence, and the absence of others, of the whole “melancholy dream” of otherness, one might even say.

    Although the order of their composition is uncertain, any successive reading of these poems strengthens the connection between the poet’s social monopoly of Lucy, and her corollary association with, indeed, domination by his ultimate ally and rival, the truly heedless model, the coldly tender seducer, Nature.

    Three years she grew in sun and shower,
    Then Nature said, “A lovelier flower
    On earth was never sown;
    This child I to myself will take;
    She shall be mine, and I will make
    A Lady of my own.

    “Myself will to my darling be
    Both law and impulse: and with me
    The Girl, in rock and plain,
    In earth and heaven, in glade and bower,
    Shall feel an overseeing power

    Space lacks to quote the whole poem.(25) The final two stanzas:

    “And vital feelings of delight
    Shall rear her form to stately height,
    Her virgin bosom swell;
    Such thoughts to Lucy I will give
    While she and I together live
    Here in this happy dell.”

    Thus Nature spake—The work was done—
    How soon my Lucy’s race was run!
    She died, and left to me
    This heath, this calm and quiet scene;
    The memory of what has been,
    And never more will be.

    Ally against the social world, making Lucy what he could never hope to make her, a Nature Child immune from mediated desire. Rival, though, denying him anything but her memory, and the natural scene forever qualified by her loss.

    Clearly, Wordsworth understood he was wrestling with paradox. We need not quote all of “Strange Fits of Passion Have I Known”(26) either to appreciate the power of this poor, merely human lover’s sense of his own culpability in these effects. Because, without his own only too jealous desire, and the rivalries it thus contains within it, would she not have been safe? This, Wordsworth seems to say, is the dread truth all lovers know. The first and last stanzas:

    Strange fits of passion have I known:
    And I will dare to tell,
    But in the Lover’s ear alone,
    What once to me befel.

    . . .

    What fond and wayward thoughts will slide
    Into a Lover’s head—
    “Oh mercy!” to myself I cried
    “If Lucy should be dead!”

    This sense of implication—no longer wayward but inexorable—even more famously and beautifully informs the great quatrains:

    A slumber did my spirit seal;
    I had no human fears:
    She seemed a thing that could not feel
    The touch of earthly years.

    No motion has she now, no force;
    She neither hears nor sees,
    Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course
    With rocks and stones and trees.

    It is doubtless risky to go much further here, with such deep material, but perhaps we might venture the observation that in some manner or other Wordsworth is encountering, and with typical honesty exploring, the difficulties his larger modeled strategy of desire encounters in the specific instance of sexuality. In such an alliance with nature—senseless rocks and stones and trees after all—the protected self, the secured identity, seems to require a dangerous degree of isolation. Gans is among other critics of the Romantics to notice the penchant among male poets for tributary female figures, protected but at the same time diminished by the sublime poetic ego, unable to achieve an equivalent centrality of self, or even, in Wordsworth’s radically undisplaced version, to sustain life itself. It is all very well, one might say, to retreat into the protection of heterosexual romance, but if one brings another living human being with one, even an unsymmetrical woman, one brings the desires of others too, implicitly, their rivalries, the market. Even if one has retreated to the high country, one brings them in imagination. Wordsworth is both unveiling and reproaching this tendency here. To imagine such security, to imagine one’s love free of the touch of earthly years, is to slumber in spirit, to seal oneself off from that which gave vitality, motion, force, to such love in the first place.

    As an even more imperiously Romantic and solitary lover, Byron’s Manfred, has it:

    If I had never lived, that which I love
    Had still been living; had I never loved,
    That which I love would still be beautiful—
    Happy and giving happiness.(27)

    Other Moments, Unrepresented

    It seems rather a dilemma, although of course one may simply hold Romantics like Wordsworth and Byron incapable of the necessary humility or wisdom. Still, the embrace of the beloved’s asymmetry, of her vulnerability, seems almost a screen, with them at least, for an ultimately destructive unwillingness to let go of the desire to vanquish rivals, individual or collective as the case may be—the lover herself or those whose desires flow through her. The Romantic longing to fly free of the gravity of others’ desires thus rebounds upon itself, enslaves and destroys the very passion it seeks to protect. Is there no alternative, then? Perhaps, by a logic of inverse implication, one might arrive at one. A choice not to substitute vulnerability for desire, or to build in a stabilizing asymmetry, but rather to harness deliberately the equally mediated desires of both—a calculated exposure, one might call it, to the mediations of the world, of others, even other potential human lovers, and thus to the mimetic energy they might bestow upon the union. Might this be the half-hidden lesson of all three moments? Not celibacy or friends-with-benefits, but what we may perhaps call an alliance with the beloved.Alliance: an arrangement, merely, whereby internal competition is to some perceptible degree less intense than in the ambient market. A less-than-forceful, partial, tactical (not strategic) embrace, one might also construe it, of the sacral inhibition of resentment and desire. Oswald Nelvil under such a regime would need to accept his lover Corinne’s continued prominence upon the Capitol, fawning Italians constantly at his dinner table. Captain Wentworth, even as he sallied forth again to prey upon French shipping, would ruefully but manfully acknowledge his own wife’s having closed upon him and persuaded him to strike his colors. And Wordsworth be induced now and again to bring Lucy up to London . . . to be admired, or not.

    But of course, if arrangements of this ilk were to have been tried, even to have thrived, no true Romantic would ever admit to having been involved, and no Romantic art have recorded it.

    Notes

    1. Deceit, Desire and the Novel. 289. (back)

    2. See, to begin, “Chronicles of Love and Resentment,” numbers 6, 20, 31, 56, 94, 104, 109, 128, 156, and 220. https://anthropoetics.org/views/Chronicles_home.cfm. (back)

    3. Corinne, or Italy. Trans. Sylvia Raphael. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Book II, Chapter 1, page 22. Italics in original. (back)

    4. “9. Performing Heroinism: The Myth of Corinne.” Literary Women. New York: Doubleday, 1976. 173ff. (back)

    5. “They Just Got Married,” from Born Again. Warner Brothers, 1979. (back)

    6. The Mill on the Floss. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Book Fifth, Chapter IV, page 332. (back)

    7. Love in the Western World. Trans. Montgomery Belgion. New York: Pantheon, 1956. 45. The proto-Girardian analysis of the model-obstacle of desire is developed in the first Book, “The Myth of Tristan,” 15-55. (back)

    8. Middlemarch. New York: Norton, 1977. Book II, Chap. XXI, page 146. (back)

    9. All Gans quotations in this paragraph are from “Abelard and Heloise,” Chronicles of Love and Resentment no. 13, https://anthropoetics.org/views/view13.htm. (back)

    10. Mark Shorer long ago pointed out the pervasive language of “commerce and property” and called Persuasion “a novel about marriage as a market, and about the female as marketable.” Ian Littlewood, ed. Jane Austen: Critical Assessments. Vol. IV. Mountfield, East Sussex: Helm Information, 1998. 393, 395. (back)

    11. A Reading of Jane Austen. New York: New York University Press, 1976. 41. (back)

    12. Persuasion. Ed. Patricia Meyer Spacks. New York: Norton, 1995. Chap IV, page 18. (back)

    13. Fanny’s memorable visit to her Portsmouth home, “the abode of noise, disorder and impropriety” pointedly reminds her and the reader of the consequences of her mother’s “imprudent marriage” to her own, albeit lower-ranking sailor. Mansfield Park. New York: Bantam, 1983. Chapter 39, pages 316-17. (back)

    14. Laurence Lerner agrees with a number of others when he terms Persuasion Austen’s “one romantic novel: the one book in which love is not the product of gratitude and esteem. . . . [A novel] shot through not with the praise of prudence, but with that of impulse” Littlewood, ed. 438. (back)

    15. The End of Culture: Toward a Generative Anthropology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 240. (back)

    16. Some have disputed this—for example, again, Barbara Hardy: “Anne’s rhapsodic defense of woman’s constancy [is] overheard by Captain Wentworth but not designed for his ears.” Before Anne begins to speak, however, Austen notes her observe Wentworth pointedly listening to the conversation, and the two share “one, quick conscious look” (154). To claim that her subsequent speech is not for him is to claim for the heroine an implausible immunity to desire, a Corinne-like higher calling, and thus to give voice to the resentment of desire—and those who attract it— which has so often accompanied the rise of women to their current political and vocational freedoms. Anne, as the creation of the indisputably great Austen, must be defended against precisely the sort of aspersions made by the current paper. A Reading of Jane Austen: 55. (back)

    17.”Joan of Arc,” from Songs of Love and Hate. Columbia, 1971. (back)

    18. Eric Gans, Originary Thinking: Elements of Generative Anthropology. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. 167. (back)

    19. Anne Elliott, Austen writes in a letter to a confidant, “is almost too good for me.” Cited in Patricia Meyer Spacks’s “Preface” to Persuasion. x. (back)

    20. In a letter to Richard Woodhouse, October 27, 1818. Complete Poems and Selected Letters of John Keats. New York: Random House, 2001: 500. (back)

    21. “Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey,” line 91. (back)

    22. Originary Thinking. 166. (back)

    23. An earlier version of the poem begins, “My hope was one, from cities far / Nursed on a lonesome hearth.” (back)

    24. “Paradoxes of Love and Resentment,” September 9, 1995, https://anthropoetics.org/views/view9.htm. (back)

    25. But see: http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/174828 (back)

    26. But see: http://www.bartleby.com/145/ww146.html. (back)

    27. Manfred, Act 2, Scene 2, lines 193-96. (back)